




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Around the World

A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA • JOHN G. GEER



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PUBLIC OPINION AND
POLLING AROUND THE WORLD

A Historical Encyclopedia

Volume 1

John G. Geer, Editor

A B C  C L I O

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Oxford, England

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PREFACE

America has shown more boldness in trusting public opinion, in recognizing and giving effect to it, than has yet been shown elsewhere. Towering over Presidents, and State governors, over Congress and State legislature, over conventions and the vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the greatest source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it.

—James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (1891)

This passage underscores the importance of public opinion and why having an encyclopedia describing and outlining its key components is invaluable. Public opinion, obviously, matters, but in fact it matters a great deal more than we tend to assume, especially in a nation that claims to be democratic like the United States. The influence of public opinion on government is hardly new. Consider that James Bryce penned the above observation well over a century ago. Bryce was one of the great intellectuals of his time. He wrote numerous books on the American and British political systems. But he is best known for his insights into public opinion and its connection to the operation of democratic government.

If one reads the epigraph carefully, there is another subtle insight of a great mind. Bryce contends that America has “shown more boldness in trusting public opinion . . . than yet has been shown elsewhere.” The “yet” is telling. Bryce understood that although the United States gave more credence to the public opinion than other nations, this might not always be the case. He acknowledged that the spread of democratic government was possible and that other nations too would show such “boldness.” Over the last few decades, we have seen an explosion in the number of democracies around the globe. Nations everywhere are paying more and more attention to the thoughts and preferences of the citizenry—a natural by-product of democracy. It is this change, along with the importance of public opinion in the U.S. context, that makes the book very timely. The pages that follow not only provide a complete account of public opinion in the United States, it contains entries about how public opinion works in more than fifty other countries. This breadth provides readers a chance to forge a broader understanding of how public opinion works. No other volume takes such a comparative focus. The end result is a rich and interesting account of this topic.

This particular volume has several key components. First, some entries cover the

major theoretical underpinnings of public opinion. Readers learn, for example, how scholars in the fields of communication, psychology, and sociology envision public opinion. Second, many articles show how public opinion is measured, focusing close attention on polls and survey research. The advent of polling transformed how public opinion is conceived. A century ago, politicians and scholars thought of it as vague and difficult to define. With the scientific precision of well-done surveys, pollsters now know much more accurately what the public thinks. That transformation makes it possible for politicians to act on the views of the citizenry. However, polls must be done properly; a number of entries describe this process. A third group of entries provides a look at U.S. public opinion on key issues ranging from abortion to antiterrorism policy, including themes that arose from the September 11, 2001, attacks. Fourth, there are entries that examine the impact of public opinion on key institutions such as the presidency and the political parties. Fifth, readers can find entries about some of the key figures in the field; for example, Hadley Cantril and George Gallup, written by descendants who have themselves risen to prominence in the study of public opinion.

The particular strength of this volume is its comparative focus. The wonderful array of material from more than fifty countries will be useful to readers who want to learn about public opinion in nations such as Chile, China, and Russia. Some entries talk about the challenges of measuring public opinion in underdeveloped versus developed nations. These are

important differences that warrant attention. The comprehensive nature of this volume makes it of interest to a far larger group of people than would a U.S.-based study of public opinion.

It is also worth noting that the quality of the authors is outstanding. I have been able to recruit an extremely talented group of people, including highly visible scholars from the best universities in the world. Some individuals hold endowed professorships, and others are newly minted scholars who offer fresh perspectives on their topics. These entries are not only well written, but as up to date as possible.

Public opinion is a topic that is likely to grow in significance over the coming decades. Bryce spoke of its power in the late 1890s. That power grows greater today as more nations have joined the democratic fold and as surveyors have secured better ways of measuring and assessing public opinion. There is little reason to think these trends will not continue. With all the capabilities of the internet, scholars may well be able to gauge public opinion on a nearly constant basis. Such a development would force leaders to be even more responsive to public needs and desires. I therefore urge all readers to make use of these entries to advance their own understanding of this important topic, which will perhaps better prepare them for understanding the relationship between democratic government and public opinion in the twenty-first century.

John G. Geer
Nashville, Tennessee

Part 1

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC
OPINION IN DEMOCRACY

Section One:

Measuring Public Opinion

The Sociological Perspective

Beginning in the 1940s and continuing through the early 1960s, scholars from Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research undertook a new approach to study how citizens decide to vote. The Columbia school of research revolutionized public opinion research. Methodologically, the studies introduced the panel interview technique to the study of public opinion—collecting data from the same participants twice or more over some period. Panel studies have the important advantage of tracing how changes in opinion occur much more readily than cross-sectional research, in which information is gathered at a single point in time. Substantively, the sociological approach questioned then accepted notions regarding the careful considerations of voters and the powerful role of the mass media in developing opinions about public affairs. Instead, this perspective asserts the importance of one's social background and interpersonal contacts in determining vote choice. In this entry, the origin of the sociological perspective will be explored, drawing upon four of the more influential works: *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet [1968]), *Personal Influence* (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), *Voting* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), and *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Klapper 1960).

Although the sociological approach is often contrasted with the psychological approach (the so-called Michigan school), the most controversial aspect of the sociological perspective remains the role of the media. In addition to this body of research, the influence of the sociological perspective can be seen today, particularly in social network analysis and the study of "influentials."

The People's Choice

The origin of the sociological perspective is most closely associated with the work of Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, Joseph Klapper, Elihu Katz, and William McPhee. The majority of its key ideas are established theoretically, if not empirically, in the first and most important work, *The People's Choice*, in which citizens' opinions regarding the 1940 presidential election were examined. The researchers performed a panel study in Erie County, Ohio, in which almost 600 participants were interviewed monthly over the course of the campaign (May to November). Participants were asked extensive questions about their opinions regarding the presidential candidates and national political issues; their exposure to political media coverage (magazines, newspapers, and radio); and their personal communications with family and friends regarding the election. The researchers

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also created an index of interpersonal political predisposition (IPP) based upon a participant's class, religion, and urban/rural residence—ranging from strongly Republican (upper-class, Protestant, and rural) to strongly Democratic (lower-class, Catholic, and urban). People whose social characteristics pull them in different directions (e.g., rural Catholics) experience what Lazarsfeld and his colleagues dubbed “cross-pressures.”

Many of the researchers' findings were interesting. Surprisingly, about half of the sample—the “deciders”—were attached to their party, Republican or Democrat, even before the campaign began. The analysis mostly focused, however, on the remaining half of the sample—the “changers.” Even among changers, most never claimed to support more than one of the parties; they merely admitted to some indecision. Only 12 percent of the sample were “two-party changers”; 8 percent switched their support from one party to the other during the campaign; an additional 4 percent changed their minds about parties during the campaign but ended up voting for the candidate they had originally supported.

Contrary to expectation, changers for the most part did not seem to make up their minds by being persuaded by the mass media. Most voters were not particularly attentive, although those who were interested in the campaign did follow the media more closely. Interested voters, however, were likely to have already made up their mind. Also, most voters did not seem to use the media to learn the pros and cons of both parties—they tended to read more articles and listen to more programs that supported their party than the other, a phenomenon now known as “selective exposure.”

Yet voters did seem to be influenced by their social environment and interpersonal relationships. First, about 10 percent more of the sample discussed politics than read an article or heard a news story on any given day. And though it had been foreseen that demographic variables would be related to vote choice, the level of predictability of the IPP was unexpectedly high. About two-thirds of changers ended up voting for the party predicted by their IPP. Further, those experiencing cross-pressures seemed to have the hardest time deciding how to vote. They were likely to be among the few “two-party changers”; the least interested in the election and least attentive to the media; the last to decide how to vote; and the most likely to be persuaded by personal contact. Similarly, voters whose family members disagreed about vote choice were more likely to delay their decision or change their vote. Finally, most people actually attributed their changes in opinion to personal influence, not media exposure.

The Two-Step Flow of Communication
With these findings, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues developed the *two-step flow of communication model*. They determined that while the media can solidify a person's opinion by “activating” or “reinforcing” latent partisan predispositions, its impact on converting public opinion is weak and indirect. This has come to be known as the “minimal” or “limited effects” model of media influence. Instead, citizens decide how to vote from opinion leaders around them, those respondents who self-identified themselves as either trying to convince others of their political ideas or who had been asked recently their advice on a political

question—21 percent of the sample. Opinion leaders expressed more interest in the election and were more likely to follow politics in the media. The researchers presumed that opinion leaders gather information from the media and form opinions. Most citizens—less interested and politically aware—learn about the election from opinion leaders within their own social stratum and take their lead in forming opinions about public affairs. Personal relationships, the researchers surmised, are potentially more powerful in changing public opinion because political discussions reach more voters, especially among the undecided, and because personal discussions have psychological advantages over the media. For example, personal discussions can be tailor-made for a particular person, and citizens are less likely to “armor themselves against influence” with people as they may with media stories.

First-Generation Refinements

Later contributions in the first generation of research in the sociological perspective further developed the ideas presented in *The People's Choice*. In *Personal Influence*, Katz and Lazarsfeld interviewed almost 700 women opinion leaders in four substantive areas—public affairs, marketing, fashion, and movie-watching—in Decatur, Illinois. As in *The People's Choice*, the opinion leaders were initially identified by self-selection. However, the researchers attempted to improve the validity of the measurement by contacting advice-seekers and confirming influence, which they were able to do the majority of the time. Adding evidence to the two-step flow of communication, Katz and Lazarsfeld showed that opinion leaders are more exposed to the media

compared to nonleaders. However, in the area of public affairs, they noticed a more pronounced top-down flow of communication; influence seemed to be shaped mostly from opinion leaders in the top social classes, rather than the horizontal flow implied previously. And they noted that many opinion leaders appear to be influenced by other people at least as much as by the media.

In *Voting*, another key Columbia school study, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee performed a panel study in Elmira, New York, set around the 1948 presidential election. Importantly, their design added questions about the organizations to which participants belonged, their social “networks” (the friends, family members, and coworkers with whom they spoke politics), and the level of agreement with their (now-called) “discussants.” Their findings replicated results in *The People's Choice* and *Personal Influence* regarding the high stability of vote choice, the characteristics of changers (less interested, cross-pressured), the tendency of changers to choose finally as predicted by their IPP, and the tendency of opinion leaders to be influenced by other people. Their deeper analysis revealed as well that citizens' environments are both socially and politically homogenous. As with media exposure, citizens “selectively expose” themselves to points of view that they find agreeable. Moreover, voters tend to believe that the views of the party or candidate they supported, as well as the organizations to which they belong and their discussants, are the same as their own to a greater degree than is true in reality—“selective perception.”

Voting also added new information about when and how political views are

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changed. The authors noted that disagreement in political discussions, though it occurs rarely, converts rather than reinforces political opinion. The role of the media, in contrast, seems to be to increase knowledge, buttress support for one's chosen party, and increase interest—but rarely to change public opinion.

Finally, and by way of summary, *The Effects of Mass Communication* is not a research study itself; rather, it sought to integrate the findings of more than 270 empirical and theoretical studies, essays, and reports, drawing largely upon the research of Columbia University and its Bureau of Applied Social Research. Klapper reiterates that media exposure rarely changes voters' minds. More likely, media exposure reinforces public opinion due to mediating factors such as predispositions, selective exposure and perception, interpersonal communication, group norms, opinion leaders, and the customary role of the media in representing the status quo. Mass communications are also effective in communicating information and creating opinions for topics previously unconsidered by a citizen.

Psychological Perspective Critique

Often held up as a foil to the sociological perspective, the psychological perspective of the Michigan school was and continues to be a competing theory of vote choice. These scholars, such as V. O. Key, complained about the lack of politics and lack of predictability in the sociological perspective (Key and Munger 1959). The psychological perspective stresses the importance of such variables as political attitudes, knowledge, evaluations of candidates and parties, partisanship, and ideology (Campbell et al. 1960). Although the two perspectives emphasize different factors and utilize different methodolo-

gies, they are in agreement that voters are lacking in political sophistication (Mondak 1995) and the role of the media in influencing public opinion is small (Sheingold 1973).

Legacy of the Sociological Perspective

Through these and other critiques, many ideas emerging from the sociological perspective have continued to develop. Certain findings appear to be here to stay; the notions of cross-pressures and selectivity, as well as the influence of one's social background, are well accepted in public opinion literature. Opinion leadership research continues to grow, albeit under the new name of "influentials" (for a thorough review, see Weimann 1994). Most important, public opinion scholars continue to grapple with the two major ideas compared in the sociological perspective—the media and personal influence, although too often in isolation one from the other.

The Role of the Media

To date, the impact of the media on public opinion and public opinion change remains a large and controversial area of study. Importantly, the sociological perspective emerged prior to television pervasiveness, certainly the most powerful media influence (Glynn et al. 1999), and most scholars have searched for media effects here. Among the most significant challenges to the sociological perspective, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972) introduce the agenda-setting function of the media, suggesting the media play an important role in what people think *about*, if not what they think *normatively*. A few years later, Todd Gitlin (1978) asserted that the media's influence both in institutionalizing views and in creating opinions—which may be particu-

larly important in the area of public affairs—should have been emphasized, rather than merely acknowledged, in *The Effects of the Mass Communication* and other sociological perspective works. Larry Bartels (1993), similarly, argues that measurement error masks the strong long-term, indirect effects of the media. Finally, experimental work by Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder (1987) indicates the media increases the salience of concepts in the news (priming and agenda-setting effects). Yet as pointed out by Katz himself (1987), such findings do not actually directly challenge the sociological perspective.

Still, legitimate quarrels with the perspective certainly exist, and most scholars continue to question the validity of the minimal effects model. Gitlin (1978) convincingly shows that the minimal effects model rests on questionable assumptions. If citizens learn from opinion leaders who learn from the media, a strong media influence is implied. “It is as if one were studying the influence of streets on mortality rates—during an enormous flood. A street is a conduit, not a cause of drowning” (p. 218). He also points to an important discrepancy in *Personal Influence*—less than half of identified public affairs opinion leaders could be confirmed by advice-seekers, and most changes in public opinion were not attributed to personal influence. More recently, a creative quasi-experiment by Jeffrey Mondak (1995) shows that newspaper campaign coverage may indeed influence public opinion, even when political discussion is considered, and that the relationship between media exposure and personal influence may be more complex than the Columbia school researchers realized. He finds that media exposure *spurs* political discussion; moreover, its presence appears to limit

the impact of interpersonal discussion on vote choice.

Social Network Analysis

The two-step flow of communication is seen by most researchers, and even implied by the authors of *Voting*, as an overly simplistic model regarding the flow of information. John Robinson (1976) pointedly specifies research indicating a great number of relationships not predicted in the model—personal interaction among opinion leaders themselves, personal interaction among the less attentive themselves, and direct media influence upon the less attentive. Carl Sheingold (1973) calls for the “necessary” replacement of the two-step model with social network analysis.

With the technological advances of the 1970s, studies of the two-step flow of influence have indeed been replaced by social network analyses. This growing body of work appears to support many of the insights of the sociological perspective and promises to further enrich our knowledge of personal influence. Nearly all studies find networks influence political attitudes, and most citizens’ networks are homogenous, particularly among the politically inattentive (Marsden 1987; Beck 1991). As with the media, most people like to “selectively expose” themselves to people with whom they agree politically, most often family members (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Homogenous networks may also lead to more extreme views (Laumann 1973).

Some research suggests these close personal relationships are the most influential (Straits 1991; Kenny 1994). Yet other research suggests the homogeneity of networks implies a reinforcing role of personal interaction, rather than one of influencing change as suggested by the

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sociological perspective (Beck 1991). Current research has begun to focus on the interesting normative consequences of political discussion. For example, Mark Schneider et al. (1997) conclude that political discussion may exacerbate differences in political knowledge between class and racial stratifications, rather than alleviating them.

Conclusion

Appropriately, the sociological perspective does not exist today as an isolated approach to the study of public opinion. We now know that many other factors—such as political attitudes, partisanship, and rational behavior—play a role in determining public opinion and attitude change, particularly in a world more educated, mobile, and media-driven than in the 1940s. But there has been perhaps too strong a rejection of the sociological approach. Most current media research does not acknowledge any role for political discussion; therefore the probable interactions between media exposure and political discussion are understudied. The rejuvenation of political discussion in the form of social network analysis is welcome and promises to be an enriching body of research. The sociological perspective still offers part of the story on the flow of political information and influence, and social background and personal discussion ought to be included in any comprehensive model of public opinion.

Nancy Carrillo

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The Psychological Perspective

Political scientists have long borrowed from the disciplines of economics, sociology, and psychology in order to understand political phenomena. Perhaps nowhere is this cross-discipline borrowing of theory more prominent than in the impact of social-psychological theory on

the understanding of U.S. public opinion. Scholars have not only borrowed the theories of psychology, for example schemas, priming, and the like, but also the methodology increasingly as well, with both laboratory experiments and, more recently, computer-assisted telephone interviewing allowing for experiments to become part of the mainstream of public opinion research. In short, the application of social-psychological theory to the study of public opinion has proven to be an enormously fruitful union.

In this entry, I explore the contributions of the psychological approach in their historical context, as well as the current insights this approach provides. I focus on some of the key advances in our understanding of public opinion for which the psychological perspective is largely responsible. As this perspective has had an impact on almost every facet of the study of public opinion, it is not possible to be exhaustive here; I thus cover the fundamental areas of public opinion scholarship, as well as the research agendas where the psychological perspective has had the greatest impact. I discuss the essential issue of opinion formation, along with the fundamental topics in public opinion scholarship of ideology, political knowledge, and political socialization. In addition, I include the issues of media and race, where psychological theory has been especially important in driving major research findings. I conclude with an assessment of the contributions of this approach and what may be left to explore in the future.

Public opinion can be thought of in many ways, for example, the views of the majority, the clashing views of group interests, elite opinion, and even a complete fiction (Glynn et al. 1999). Yet the psychological perspective has been so

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strong as to essentially define the way scholars and laypersons alike conceive of public opinion, which most could agree consists of the aggregated attitudes of individuals toward political objects/events. For example, 65 percent of Americans approve of the job George W. Bush is doing as president, 15 percent believe abortion should never be legal, and so on. The modern public opinion survey methodology, in which 500–2,000 people are asked their opinions to form a statistical snapshot of the larger public, is ideally suited to interpretation via psychology. We are interested in the *attitudes* of these sampled individuals; using statistical theory, we can assume them to be representative of the broader public.

This focus on the attitudes of individuals helps to explain the dominance of the psychological perspective in contemporary public opinion research. Going back to the 1940s, the concept of attitudes, how they are formed, and how they change have been a primary focus of social psychology. The many definitions of “attitudes” share a central concept that we can focus on. An *attitude* is a person’s evaluative response toward an object in his/her environment—anywhere from strongly disliking the vice president to feeling moderately favorable toward bananas. From the original insights of the psychological perspective on public opinion in the 1950s to the insights of today, the concepts of the development and change of political attitudes remain at the forefront.

The genesis of the psychological approach to public opinion began with presidential election year surveys of the public by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. In two landmark works, *The Voter Decides* (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954) and *The*

American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), Michigan researchers laid out a new approach to studying the political opinions and actions of the U.S. electorate. This work marked a sharp break with the prevailing sociological model of the Columbia school, which focused on the relationships between social context and vote choice. The Michigan school instead focused on the *attitudes* of citizens. In fact, this focus on attitudes, more than anything else, has led to this being termed the “psychological approach”—these works are almost completely devoid of reference to the extant psychological research of the period.

The fields of voting behavior and public opinion were revolutionized during the 1980s as scholarship became not only nominally psychological through a focus on attitudes but also fully embraced the contemporary developments in psychological theory to apply them to questions of political behavior. This development is most prominent in the evolving social-cognitive approach to the study of public opinion and mass political behavior. Social cognition shares the primary concern of social psychology—how and why individuals interact as they do in the social world—with a cognitive-psychology focus on what transpires inside our heads as we engage the world around us. The social-cognitive approach is concerned with not only what our political attitudes are but also how they function and are represented in the brain.

Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the social-cognitive approach in public opinion is to build upon the concept of human beings as very limited information processors. The social world bombards us with myriad stimuli far beyond our brains’ ability to process everything from moment to moment. As a result, we

constantly engage in what is known as “top-down information processing,” for which cognitive schemas serve a basic role. A *schema* is a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept, including its attributes and the relations of those attributes (Fiske and Taylor 1991). For example, if we see a grown woman with something bundled in a stroller, we presume it to be a baby; only on a closer, more cognitively demanding inspection might we discover it actually to be a doll. In short, we have a schema that, when presented with basic perceptions of an adult female with a stroller, fills in the missing information with a baby.

Schemas represent a fundamental way in which our brains must simplify a vastly complex perceptual world. As described in Herb Simon’s (1985) landmark article, humans engage in “satisficing,” that is, finding the best possible solution to a problem while using limited cognitive resources. Public opinion scholars have taken this approach of humans as top-down processors with limited cognitive resources to create a dramatically more accurate understanding of an array of public opinion topics such as media impact, racial attitudes, ideology, political knowledge, candidate evaluations, and the theory of the survey response. In all these cases, the social-cognitive perspective has led to insights beyond those that existed before the psychological approach was embraced.

Opinion Formation

For most of the history of the scientific study of public opinion, models of opinion formation were dominated by the sociological and economic approaches. The sociological approach, characterized in the classic Columbia University voting

studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), essentially argued that you think and vote who you are. The social environment and the socialization process were seen as the key determinants of public opinion. For example, a person growing up in a blue-collar, white, union household would almost invariably adopt Democratic and liberal viewpoints.

The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) marked an important step beyond this in its focus on how certain political attitudes (e.g., presidential candidate preference) were based on antecedent attitudes (e.g., partisanship). This certainly moved into the psychological realm by focusing on individual attitudes and whence they came, but it was an incomplete break with sociology. The origin of almost all political attitudes was traced back to partisanship, which was still deemed to be largely a matter of socio-demographics and parental inheritance. This perspective on opinion formation, which used the attitude as the basic unit of analysis but did not pry too deeply into attitude formation, represented the psychological perspective for many years.

The economic perspective, like the psychological perspective, focuses on individual decisions and opinion formation as a unit of analysis. But rather than attempting to explain political attitudes through patterns of related antecedent attitudes, as the psychological approach, it focuses on the “rationality” of decisionmaking. Essentially, it argues that citizens approach political judgments as a cost-benefit analysis. In an exemplar of this tradition, Morris Fiorina (1981) creates a model of party choice where partisanship is not the static, sociologically determined root cause of all subsequent attitudes; rather partisanship is based upon a rational weighing of candidate

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and party performance. Fiorina and others who followed (e.g., Franklin and Jackson 1983) essentially turn the causal arrow of the American voter on its head, yet the question of exactly how the key causal attitudes, be they partisanship or political evaluations of candidates and voters, are explored only superficially. In short, up until the 1980s neither the sociological, psychological, nor economic perspectives could fully address how political opinions formed.

The more recent focus on psychological theory to explain public opinion has led to two well-grounded yet contrasting models of opinion formation. The “online model” of opinion formation evolved from explicitly psychological studies (Hastie and Park 1986; Hastie and Pennington 1989) and has been applied to the political realm in a consistent program by others (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). Milton Lodge and colleagues have developed this model exclusively in the context of political campaigns. Based on results using ingenious experimental designs, they argue that persons have a “running tally” or “online” evaluation of political figures. When new information about a political candidate is processed—for example, a candidate is found to have a favorable position on environmental issues—the individual updates the running tally to account for the positive information learned, but the specifics—for example, the environmental positions—are not fully encoded. Only the summary evaluation stays readily available and linked to the candidate in long-term memory. When this citizen is then queried about the candidate, he or she needs to simply access the latest count on the running tally to provide an instantaneous assessment of the candidate. This

model has been well supported in many experiments of candidate evaluation (e.g., Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; Rahn, Aldrich, and Borgida 1990).

In stark contrast to the online model stands the “memory model” advocated most boldly by John Zaller (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992). Zaller and Stanley Feldman return to the basic event of a public opinion survey—the response to an individual item—for the basis of their argument. In their theory of the survey response, when confronted with a survey question (e.g., “Are you for war in Iraq?”), the average citizen calls to mind a wide number of “considerations” (e.g., potential loss of U.S. lives, threat to national security, potential impact on the economy, etc.) and takes a sample of these considerations to essentially create an attitude on the spot. This sample of considerations is far from random, but in keeping with the availability heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), it depends upon those that are most available in memory. Rather than identifying and calling upon a preexisting “true” attitude, that is, a running tally, which already exists, persons think about a range of beliefs associated with the concept to create a survey response. In other words, under the memory model citizens do not have an attitude at the ready in long-term memory but instead sample the most available considerations from long-term memory to create an attitude on the spot. As to which considerations will be most available to be sampled, those that have more recently been in thought are more likely to be sampled. It is also important to note that on most issues citizens will have considerations that may lead them to decide in different ways; thus ambivalence is widespread and public opinion

will be inherently unstable and volatile due to the factors that may affect which considerations are recalled.

As the book's title implies, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Zaller 1992) is meant to provide a general and comprehensive model of public opinion. Understanding public attitudes as averages of the most easily recalled considerations helps to explain disparate phenomena such as question order effects, question wording effects, media influence, and elite influence. In fact, in most areas the model is applied, it seems, to successfully explain the dynamics of public opinion. Yet in the very consequential realm of candidate evaluations, Lodge and colleagues set up an explicit test between the memory and online models and find conclusively in support of the latter.

How to reconcile these findings? One possibility is that candidate evaluation is somehow unique and the dynamics and media coverage of a political campaign favor online processing in a way that does not occur for ordinary political attitudes. Additionally, it could very well be that, with further exploration, one might find more attitude domains where the online model is more applicable than the memory model. For our current purposes, it seems fair to state that both models play an important role in helping us understand public opinion formation.

Ideology: Innocents or Experts?

Following upon the work of *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), Philip Converse's landmark article ("The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 1964) delved deeper into the political attitudes of Americans and how, and to what degree, they were related. In other words, Converse was not interested in individual

beliefs but rather in *belief systems*, which he defined as configurations "of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (p. 207). In short, the fundamental concern motivating Converse was this: Are Americans' political views shaped by overarching, abstract ideological values that provide structure and coherence to political beliefs, or are these beliefs a miasmic hodgepodge, lacking any meaningful relationships between them? Using the Survey Research Center's 1956, 1958, and 1960 national election studies, Converse argued that the vast majority of Americans were largely innocent of ideology.

Converse found that a woefully small portion of the public (2.5 percent) could properly use ideological terms in discussing politics. Additionally, in attempting to find "constraint," a common foundation on underlying ideological principles, correlations across major contemporary issues found little, if any, consistency. Finally, Converse used the panel nature of the 1956–1958–1960 data set to examine the stability in attitudes over time. Obviously, stronger, more constrained political attitudes would exhibit greater stability over the time period. Alas, according to these standards, the general public again proved to be woefully nonideological in its thinking.

Overall, then, Converse (1964) painted a picture of the typical American voter who possessed inconsistent, weakly related attitudes divorced from overarching values and coherence. Given this rather substantial critique, of particular concern in a representative democracy, Converse's conclusions sparked myriad research over the subsequent decades. A debate has raged as to just how innocent of ideology average Americans are. This

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controversy, more than anything else, shaped the study of public opinion through the 1960s, 1970s, and much of the 1980s. Debates about methodology, survey questions, and how to define ideological thinking have led some scholars to take positions as critical of the public as Converse, whereas others see a much more enlightened, ideologically thinking American public.

Among the most notable challenges to Converse's position, researchers (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976) found similar results as Converse prior to 1964 but evidence for much greater ideological thinking afterward. These authors therefore take a much more optimistic view of citizens. They argue that in times of relatively stable, normal politics citizens may not be all that ideologically engaged. But when politics is a much more dynamic experience (e.g., the tumultuous 1960s), Americans respond by paying attention and thinking in a much more ideological manner. Alas, this was not to be. Coincidentally, 1964 was the year of the polarizing Lyndon Johnson versus Barry Goldwater election and marked the first usage of new and improved measures for public policy positions from the National Election Studies (NES) at the University of Michigan. Others (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979) convincingly demonstrated that it was this change in question format, rather than meaningful changes in public thinking, that led to an illusory increase in ideological thinking.

The study of ideology, as much as any topic within public opinion, has benefited from the social-cognitive approach. Public opinion scholars have aptly borrowed the psychological concept of the schema and applied it to understanding how citizens' political attitudes are interrelated. Politically, we might expect citizens to

have schemas for concepts such as liberal, conservative, Republican, Democrat, president, communism, and the like. For example, citizens might have a schema that liberal politicians favor increased environmental protection and infer this information, rightly or wrongly, upon learning that a particular politician is liberal. As schemas are essentially cognitive structures of attitudes and their relationships to others, there is a natural fit with the study of ideological thinking.

It has been argued that schemas provide the key concept for understanding political belief systems (Conover and Feldman 1984). Citizens who display constraint are distinguished by their cognitive political schemas. In other words, the hallmark of the politically aware, ideologically constrained citizens is extensive political schemas in which new political information is readily incorporated into existing cognitive categories and patterns of belief (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985). Ideology thus provides a set of categories—liberal and conservative—by which to process and integrate new political information (Jacoby 1991). The concept of schemas and their demonstrated importance provide a much-needed framework to understand the role of ideology in Americans' political thinking.

Building upon the role of the schema and ideology, scholars have explored the factors that affect individual use of schemas and how closely they are related to ideological thinking. Some (Knight 1985; Luskin 1987) have shown that the levels of political sophistication—roughly a combination of political knowledge, awareness, and interest—are closely tied to what Converse termed "constraint." The more sophisticated the citizen, the more their political attitudes seemed to present a coherent framework. Kathleen

Knight (1985) demonstrates that as sophistication rises, the levels of constraint between issue attitudes increase, as does the role of ideology in voting decisions. Categorizing persons along their ability to think in ideological terms, William Jacoby (1991) shows a differentially important impact of ideology on political thinking that cannot be explained by differences in education. Lodge and colleagues (Hamill and Lodge 1986; Norporth and Lodge 1985) demonstrate that those with more developed political schemas are substantially more able to recognize political figures and understand political concepts. In short, the psychological concept of the schema has allowed for robust new understandings and explorations of the central concept of ideology.

Zaller's memory model (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992) also sheds light on the controversy over ideology. As many factors—for example, question wording, question order, and changing political context—will have an effect on the unique mix of considerations that the average citizen can readily call to mind, it is no wonder that attitudes appear to be weak and unstable. When citizens have a very large number of considerations about an issue, as more politically sophisticated citizens surely will, any of these above factors will have a much smaller impact; thus these persons should demonstrate more stable and more constrained ideological thinking.

Political Knowledge

Closely related to the lack of political sophistication and ideological thinking is a simple lack of knowledge about politics and the political system. As long as scholars have been studying U.S. public opinion, they have been decrying the sorry state of our knowledge about politics (e.g.,

Converse 1964; Lane 1962; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). In recent surveys, for example, consistently less than one in 10 Americans can name the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Amazingly, upward of 20 percent of Americans consistently fail to name the vice president of the United States. Perhaps of greatest concern, despite ever-increasing levels of education, Americans appear to be no more politically knowledgeable now than they were decades ago (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).

To a considerable degree, this ignorance can be defended as reasonable. In truth, politics is central to very few of our lives. In 1962, Americans were “much more concerned with the business of buying and selling, earning and disposing of things, than they are with the ‘idle’ talk of politics” (Lane 1962, p. 25). This is a sound argument, but only recently has the psychological approach suggested how Americans deal with this problem. Much as we use schemas to help efficiently organize our attitudes, we use a variety of heuristics, or shortcuts, to make sense of the political world without engaging in exhaustive attention to and processing of political information. In *The Reasoning Voter*, Samuel Popkin (1993) presents a model in which citizens rely on everyday events and circumstances to come to reasonable and appropriate political decisions. Eloquently put: “one need not be an economist to see which way the economy is going” (Popkin 1993, p. 17). Simply following the stock market, the job fortunes of acquaintances, and trips to the grocery store can be quite revealing. Likewise, one might infer that George W. Bush's basic grasp of Spanish shows he cares about and understands the needs of the Hispanic community. In short, Popkin's

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“reasoning voter” is a citizen who may not necessarily know a great deal about politics but who is able to abstract political information from daily life and limited political exposure to form reasoned and rational political attitudes.

In addition to taking superficially non-political information to inform our political attitudes, we also use heuristics directly on political information. Most prominently, citizens take cues about politics from those who are better informed. For example, if you know that you generally agree with Rush Limbaugh, when he pronounces the latest budget proposal of the Democrats to be wasteful and pure folly, there is little reason to do your own research and seek out information on this issue. In a sense, by recognizing their own ignorance and basing their opinions on those of sympathetic elites, the views of relatively uninformed citizens can come to mirror those of their better-informed counterparts (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991).

The use of elite cues in opinion formation is demonstrated in the case of presidential approval. When presidents are first elected (the honeymoon period) and when they face an international crisis, opposition to the president is considerably muted. Lacking cues from opposition elites, those who would otherwise be predisposed to disapproving of the president give their approval. As has been demonstrated (Brody 1991), this honeymoon period and times of international crisis (“rally ‘round the flag”) consistently demonstrate periods of widespread support for the president.

As with most shortcuts, mental or otherwise, there is a downside. Although at times the opinions of the less informed may mirror those of the more sophisticated, this is not always the case (Bartels

1996). Relying on elites for cues also assumes that the less informed will be able to find and properly interpret these elite cues, not always a simple proposition. Additionally, Americans may think they know things that are actually incorrect (e.g., solving budget problems is simply a matter of streamlining government and eliminating waste, most welfare recipients are lazy minorities, etc.). To a substantial degree, genuine democratic citizenship demands more of its citizens than just seeing what some other person thinks. Modern social-cognitive theories of heuristics may have resuscitated to some degree the picture of blissful ignorance of the ordinary citizen, but the fundamental problem of absolute low levels of knowledge about government and politics remains.

Political Socialization

Though concerns over ideological thinking and attitudes versus nonattitudes dominated psychological approaches to public opinion for many years, the question of how political attitudes develop is at least as important. The study of political socialization, and the development and change of political attitudes, have led to a number of interesting insights, but nowhere near the controversy or debate surrounding the subject of ideology. What this reveals, as much as anything, is that political scientists go where the data are (Arnold 1982). Although those studying ideology had a series of large, national samples in NES data, questions concerning political socialization face inherent difficulty in data collection, in that we are primarily interested in the political views of children. Nonetheless, based on smaller-scale, less representative surveys of minors as well as in-depth interviews, scholars have come to some

interesting conclusions about the political development of Americans.

Given the major role of partisanship in understanding electoral behavior since *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), it represents the most thoroughly studied and best understood aspect of political socialization. Early studies of political socialization in children found that by fifth grade most children, about 55 percent, had a party preference (Greenstein 1965). Subsequent studies found that after this point, the proportion of children with a party identification increases much more gradually. One study (Jennings and Niemi 1968) of high school seniors in 1965 found that 64 percent of the students had a party preference. Cognitively, even among adolescents partisan attitudes are quite limited. Children are much less likely to associate major political figures with a party, much less clear on what the parties stand for, and much less clear on the differences between the parties.

The study of high school seniors (Jennings and Niemi 1968) is extraordinarily valuable in that it interviewed parents in addition to adolescents. Furthermore, this innovative study reinterviewed students in 1973 and again in 1982 for a more complete picture of socialization into adulthood. One of the central findings is that this now-developed partisanship of 17 to 18-year-olds is largely heritable. Although not all children shared the partisanship of their parents, in very few cases did a child have a partisanship in opposition to both parents. Continued analysis after panel waves indicated that partisanship continues to crystallize through the early adult years and does not reach adult levels of stability until persons are in their middle to late twenties (Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings and Niemi 1981). More-

over, this preadult socialization process is not entirely gradual but rather appears to be strongly shaped by exogenous political events such as presidential campaigns (Beck 1974; Sears and Valentino 1997).

More recent efforts to understand the development of partisan attitudes have explored the emotional and cognitive roots of these attitudes. The early development and transmission of political attitudes are primarily emotional. Children develop an affective attachment to parties long before they have the corresponding understanding of issues and policy to support this attachment (Beck 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1981). The issue-based, cognitive component of partisanship develops later in life and is crucial for determining whether an individual will remain attached to that same party (Beck 1974; Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989; Mattei and Niemi 1991). Later on, the adherence to issue positions different from those of one's parents moves individuals toward independence or the party more congruent with their ideology (Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989).

Perhaps due to the difficulty in obtaining good data, most discussion of socialization in recent years has focused on the stability of partisanship once adulthood is reached, rather than the more difficult exploration of initial partisan development. Although scholars of the Michigan school have argued that partisanship remains quite stable during adulthood (Miller 1991; Miller and Shanks 1996), a number of revisionist critiques have suggested that the socialization process is far from over and that adult partisanship is responsive to government performance (Fiorina 1981), emerging issues (Jennings and Niemi 1981), and political campaigns (Allsop and Weisberg 1988). Like the con-

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troversty over ideology, however, the measurement of partisanship, and therefore subsequent estimates of its stability, are not without question. Some (Green and Palmquist 1990; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) argue that problems of measurement in partisanship are to blame and that once these are corrected, the role of adult socialization in this regard is not substantial. Those scholars arguing for limited partisan change in adulthood make a persuasive case and have the latest word, but just how much adults' partisan attitudes continue to evolve will likely remain one of the substantial debates within the study of public opinion.

The Media

For as long as scholars have been studying public opinion, they have dealt with the question of how much the media influence what people think about politics. Before any systematic study, many feared that the rise of radio and television presented a distressingly persuasive vehicle for propaganda. In *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), the first in-depth studies of media impact on politics and public opinion, political communication via mass media served to strengthen the political predispositions voters already had. Though *The People's Choice* is most closely associated with the sociological approach to public opinion and an almost sociodemographic determinism, the authors' insights into the lack of media effects were psychological in nature. They argued that citizens were predominantly exposed to media communication that supported their predispositions and that citizens selectively interpreted communication on both sides of issues as supporting their preexisting political views.

The research of Paul Lazarsfeld's group was followed up by experimental psychologists who likewise were surprised at the apparently minimal persuasive impact of exposure to television (Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield 1949). Consequently, the predominant model of media impact came to be called "minimal effects," as that characterized the seemingly marginal impact of mass media on citizens' political views. Through subsequent decades, there was considerable focus on what ways and to what degree the media presented a biased portrayal of political reality, but there was little examination of the central contention of minimal effects. With little evidence that the media was influencing the content of mass political attitudes, attention shifted to the idea of *agenda-setting*—in other words, the degree to which the media determines the public agenda—what political issues people think about. Out of confused and somewhat contradictory earlier results, a longitudinal analysis of media coverage and public opinion provided persuasive, though not definitive, evidence that the public indeed follows the media in the attention they pay to and importance they attach to political issues (MacKuen 1981).

The study of media effects was revolutionized in the 1980s when two researchers (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) borrowed that most trusted tool of psychologists: the controlled experiment. In order to demonstrate without a doubt the causal connection between viewing the news and changes in subsequent political attitudes, Iyengar and Kinder had ordinary adult subjects watch carefully and subtly modified news broadcasts under controlled laboratory conditions. They went to considerable lengths to

make the process as realistic as possible. For example, subjects came in five consecutive days to view a single newscast per day and were presented with common distractions such as other viewers and magazines. The results in regard to agenda-setting were robust. In some cases the insertion of a single news story (e.g., on unemployment, national defense, etc.) in a 23-minute broadcast was enough to make subjects consider this a more politically important issue. Not on every issue, but on an array of issues under a series of different experimental conditions, viewers believed those issues that they had seen covered on the news to be more important than did those persons who had not seen these same stories.

In a closely related effect, termed "priming," Iyengar and Kinder showed the power of agenda-setting to determine the issues upon which citizens judge the U.S. president's job performance. Using social psychology's *accessibility heuristic*, they argued that information that more readily comes to mind (i.e., it is accessible rather than an exhaustive search of long-term memory) will be used for complex political judgments. For example, viewing news stories about national defense makes such issues more mentally readily available when citizens are queried about the president's performance and therefore more likely to impact the subsequent evaluation. In their experiments, Iyengar and Kinder find exactly this: exposure to particular news stories made subjects considerably more likely to evaluate the president based on these dimensions. Of course, given the differences between real-world citizen-media interactions and even the best laboratory setting, it is desirable to have real-world survey evidence as well. In the case of priming, the fortunate tim-

ing of several national surveys has enabled scholars to test the priming hypothesis under real-world conditions. Two such clear examples are changing evaluations of President Ronald Reagan in response to the Iran-Contra scandal (Krosnick and Kinder 1990) and changes in evaluations of President George H. W. Bush on the basis of the 1991 Gulf War (Krosnick and Brannon 1993).

With few challenges to the findings on agenda-setting and priming, current controversy within the study of media and public opinion has turned to the effects of negative advertising. In recent years, negative campaigning has received extensive attention for its presumed corrosive effects on the nature of political discourse and citizen efficacy (Lau et al. 1999). Though numerous historical studies demonstrate that the practice of negative campaigning is nothing new, the phenomenon does seem to have increased in frequency and intensity of late (Lau et al. 1999). The recent debate prominently got under way by virtue of a bold series of political experiments (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). As with the Iyengar and Kinder experiments, the authors went to great lengths to ensure experimental realism for the subjects. The experiments took place during a real campaign, and featured real candidates, real voters, and professionally produced political advertisements inconspicuously placed in the middle of a 15-minute news broadcast. The positive and negative ads were virtually identical in visuals and text, except for using opposite versions of key phrases, for example, "supported" legislation versus "opposed" legislation, "rejected" campaign contributions versus "accepted," and so on.

The key finding of Ansolabehere and Iyengar's experiments, bolstered by

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analysis of survey data, was that viewing negative advertising made subjects statistically less likely to go out and vote. They also found that negative ads led to genuine learning on the part of voters, in large part due to their reliance on commonly held symbols and schemas. They found that partisan agreement enhanced learning from a negative ad. It seems that preexisting political schemas tend to make political advertisements much more effective than product advertisements.

In seeking the psychological underpinnings of this demobilizing effect, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) conclude that negative ads decrease the inclination to turn out by raising cynicism and declining confidence in the effective of government institutions. These conclusions obviously do not bode well for our democracy and were quickly challenged on a number of fronts. Using NES survey data from a 30-year period, others (Finkel and Geer 1998) found no evidence that attack advertising made persons less likely to vote at either the aggregate or individual level. Another study (Kahn and Kenney 1999) likewise failed to find a demobilizing effect for negative advertisements in a broad analysis of Senate elections. One study (Wattenberg and Briens 1999) most directly challenges the claims of Ansolabehere and Iyengar. They analyze the same aggregate data and come to opposite conclusions, which, naturally, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon (1999) argue are likewise false. Perhaps the most definitive statement on the matter is the meta-analysis of studies that examine the effects of negative political advertising (Lau et al. 1999). Drawing upon 117 findings from 52 different studies of the topic, they conclude that negative ads are no more effective than posi-

tive ads and lack any genuine deleterious effects on the body politic.

Though the bulk of evidence seems to support the contention that negative advertisements *do not* demobilize the electorate, the question is still very much open to debate. Despite all the evidence from aggregate data, the basic negative advertising experiments remain compelling evidence until someone can better explain why these experiments should not translate into the real world of politics. Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar (1995) also make plausible claims that the aggregate data support their contentions. Given the continued concern about the effects of negative ads among the media and the general public, whether justified or not, and the lack of a truly definitive answer from within political science, we can expect this to continue to be an area of important debate.

Public Opinion and Race

Although the topic of race may seem a somewhat unlikely theme in a general discussion like this, it can be argued that public opinion on race, more so than any issue, is intimately linked with the psychological perspective in public opinion. Although classic studies dating back to the 1940s and 1950s (Myrdal 1944; Allport 1955) have addressed the issue of racism in the public, the systematic study of race and public opinion became prominent only in the latter part of the twentieth century. Prior to an in-depth study of the issue, most scholars adopted the economic perspective of rational self-interest and assumed that citizen attitudes on most policy issues, including race, were determined by the citizen's own self-interest. One set of researchers (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979) became the first to rebut this based on a psycho-

logical model of "symbolic politics." This perspective argues that persons have a limited number of *affective* political predispositions (e.g., party identification, ideology, racial prejudice, etc.) that are acquired in childhood and maintained thereafter, and also that adult response to new policy issues is shaped by the similarity of policy symbols to these long-standing predispositions (Sniderman 1993).

The "symbolic racism" perspective essentially argues that old-fashioned, overt, crude racism has disappeared but that racism itself remains a prominent determinant of racial policy attitudes. This "modern," or "symbolic," racism, however, is much more subtle and essentially hides racial resentment in the guise of support for classic American values of individualism. A number of studies (Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Kinder and Sears 1981; Kinder and Sanders 1996) have demonstrated that antiblack affect (or racial resentment) confounded with individualist attitudes (e.g., "most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get along without it if they tried") predicts white attitudes toward busing, affirmative action, and similar racial policies much better than any apparent self-interest.

Although the symbolic politics perspective marshals compelling evidence in a number of studies across a variety of racial policy domains, it has come under considerable attack from the "issue pluralism" perspective championed by Paul Sniderman and colleagues (e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). These studies take advantage of the latest advance in survey technology, computer-assisted telephone interviewing, which marries the large, generalizable surveys of political scien-

tists with the well-controlled experiments of psychologists. For example, in a nationwide survey question, one randomly chosen call recipient may be asked, "Would you deny unemployment benefits to a *white* man who had been unemployed for six months?" whereas another person might receive an identical question about a "*black* man." By controlling all aspects of the survey and varying only the race of hypothetical policy beneficiaries, Sniderman and colleagues are well positioned to draw causal conclusions about the factors affecting racial attitudes. The issue pluralism perspective argues that rather than a blanket set of "racial policies," social welfare, equal treatment, and race consciousness are all distinct policy domains that draw upon different antecedent attitudes. Most important, they argue that racism, in any form, is decidedly not a major explanatory factor in whites' attitudes toward any of these policy domains.

Much like negative advertising, race and public opinion is an issue that remains decidedly unsettled. Essentially, two groups of scholars taking different theoretical perspectives and using different methods have reached opposite and incompatible conclusions about the role of racism in U.S. public opinion. Nonetheless, the politics of race today remain as vital and controversial as ever, and public opinion scholars will undoubtedly keep working on these important issues in an effort to better understand the role of racial attitudes in U.S. political life.

Conclusion

After covering such an expansive amount of scholarship, as assessment is in order. What have been the primary accomplish-

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ments of the psychological perspective? The weaknesses? What does the future hold for psychological approaches to public opinion research? What are the unique insights of the psychological approach beyond, and in combination with, contributions from sociology and economics?

The psychological perspective has been valuable in helping us to understand the microlevel foundations of public opinion. In other words, we seem to have a solid understanding of how exactly a person forms an opinion on a political issue, be it affirmative action, a political candidate, or a potential war. Furthermore, the psychological approach has rehabilitated the early 1960s view of voters as hopelessly ignorant and politically naïve. We now understand that although citizens may not seem to be exhaustively knowledgeable on political issues, they use a variety of psychological shortcuts to navigate the political world in a reasonable manner. By investigating not just *what* people think about politics, but *how* people think about politics, the psychological perspective has created compelling answers for old questions and raised important new questions for the scientific study of politics. In short, we now have a much greater understanding of how fundamental aspects of our democracy (e.g., ideology, knowledge, media influence, etc.) evolve from the complex interplay between citizens and the political and social world in which they are immersed.

Despite its unquestioned success in revolutionizing the study of public opinion, the psychological perspective is not without its shortcomings. Not surprisingly, these failings come in an area where social psychology has little to say: socialization. Given social psychology's

near-complete emphasis on experiments, which are invariably short-term events, the long-term development and change of attitudes are largely ignored. Long-term patterns of attitude development are explored in the related discipline of developmental psychology, an intellectual area from which political science has rarely borrowed. In fact, the rise in the social-cognitive approach, and its dominance of public opinion research, largely coincide with the decline of political scientists' attention to issues of socialization. Whereas our understanding of adult political attitudes has developed dramatically in recent decades, our knowledge of how political attitudes grow and evolve through childhood to adulthood has stagnated. It is not that worthy efforts have come up short, but rather there has been a shortage of worthy efforts to address these questions. As public opinion scholars embraced the social-cognitive perspective, they unfortunately left behind consequential questions about the nature of public opinion. Whether driven by social psychology or not, the evolution of adult political attitudes is an important political question that warrants consideration in future research.

What, then, might we expect in the future from the application of social psychology to public opinion? We should probably expect incremental developments and refinements rather than any bold new theoretical developments and/or empirical findings. For many years, the psychological perspective borrowed little from social psychology except for the central concept of the attitude. Once political scientists looked more specifically to contemporary social-cognitive developments (schema theory, heuristics, models of memory, etc.), the application of these rich theories led to dramatic improve-

ments in political understanding. Now, however, political psychologists simply keep abreast of the gradual improvements in social psychology and social cognition and apply them to public opinion. Because social psychology is already a mature social science compared to political science (e.g., psychologists were conducting groundbreaking experiments on human behavior in the 1940s and 1950s, at a time when political science was still largely a descriptive and normative discipline), we should not expect any great leaps forward in social psychology at this point, and hence no consequent leaps in public opinion research, insofar as it is based on social psychology.

In short, what we can likely expect from psychological public opinion research is a continued refinement of theories and findings—a better understanding of why and under precisely what circumstances various political judgments are made. Perhaps most prominently, we might expect some reconciliation of the online and memory models. Both clearly have their place, but exactly when and under what circumstances are persons more likely to rely on one than the other? Likewise, what are the implications for various issue domains, for example, race, media effects, etc., as to whether they are more prominently shaped by one of these models? The review here has shown that the psychological perspective has been invaluable to the understanding of public opinion in recent decades, and although there may not be any great breakthroughs in the near future, we can certainly expect a continued evolution of significant findings that should help us to understand important questions of how citizens and their government interact.

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A Mass Media Perspective

As the fourth estate, the news media serve a number of functions in modern democracies, including helping citizens to learn and to become involved in the political and social worlds around them. For decades, communication scholars have been interested in the effects of the news media, particularly its influences on public opinion. This contribution examines the role of mass media in the formation of public opinion, focusing on key theories and perspectives that link the two.

Agenda-Setting: Media Effects on Perceived Salience of an Issue

At the most basic level, the media serve an agenda-setting function in that they bring events from the unseen environment into citizen consciousness. As political scientist Bernard Cohen put it, "The press may not be successful all the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its

readers what to think *about*" (1963, p. 13, emphasis added). Thus the emergence of agenda-setting as a domain of research reflects a shift away from the persuasive, or attitudinal, effects of the media to cognitive effects of the media. Specifically, agenda-setting research examines the extent to which media coverage of an issue influences audience members' perceived importance of that issue. In other words, does increased media coverage of an issue lead to increased salience of that issue? Does the media's agenda influence the public agenda?

The seminal work on agenda-setting, conducted by communication researchers Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw (1972), compared what voters reported as key issues during the 1968 presidential campaign with the actual content of the mass media these voters had used during the campaign. They found strong correlations between voters' perceptions of key issues and campaign media coverage found in local and national daily newspapers and network television news. The correspondence between voters' perceptions of key campaign issues and news magazine coverage was lower.

Since the early 1980s, agenda-setting research has focused on a variety of topics, including civil rights (Winter and Eyal 1981), crime (Brosius and Kepplinger 1995; Pritchard and Berkowitz 1993), the Gulf War (Haney 1993; Iyengar and Simon 1993), the environment (Ader 1995; Atwater, Salwen, and Anderson 1985), and the drug problem (Gonzenbach 1996). This perspective has generated scholarship grounded in a number of countries (e.g., Ghanem and Wanta 2001; Soroka 2002; Wilke 1995) and has explored the effects of various media and outlets, including newspapers (Sohn 1984), television (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Watt, Mazza, and

Snyder 1993), online news (Althaus and Tewksbury 2002), photographs (Wanta 1988), and advertising (Ghorpade 1986).

Agenda-setting effects differ in magnitude depending on a number of factors. First, the obtrusiveness of the issue under study can have an influence on how much of a problem audience members perceive the issue to be. Media coverage of unobtrusiveness issues, or issues with which individuals have little direct experience, tends to lead to greater agenda-setting effects (Zucker 1978). Second, media coverage of issues that are more concrete leads to greater agenda-setting effects (Yagade and Dozier 1990). Third, characteristics associated with the individual audience member usually make a difference. For instance, individuals with a high need for orientation—defined as interest in or relevance of the message content and the level of uncertainty about the issue—will tend to be more susceptible to agenda-setting influence (McCombs and Weaver 1973). The correspondence between media and public agendas also may be stronger among more politically disengaged citizens (Iyengar and Kinder 1987).

Agenda-setting researchers assume a cumulative effect of media messages and recognize that media coverage of issues falls into four phases. At the outset, before issues are targeted as problems and thus worthy of news coverage, media coverage is in the *preproblem stage*. Media coverage in the *discovery stage* begins to draw linkages among relatively disparate incidents. Coverage of the issue then peaks and is sustained for some time during the *plateau stage*. Finally, coverage heads into the *decline stage* as other issues vie for attention (Gonzenbach 1996). Because there are cycles of coverage, agenda-setting effects typically

cannot be pinpointed to a specific message. Similarly, the time between when an issue appears on the media agenda and when it emerges on the public agenda is not fixed. Time lags range from a few days to months to years (Jeffres 1997).

Although the term *agenda-setting* reflects the influence of the media agenda on the public agenda, the reverse cannot be ruled out. A body of research on agenda-building concerns the extent to which media content is influenced by sources such as policymakers and interest groups representing the public (Berkowitz 1992). Sometimes content in one medium or one outlet can affect what other media present, a process known as *intermedia agenda-setting*.

Although agenda-setting research is concerned with the effects of one aggregate-level phenomenon (media agenda) on another aggregate-level phenomenon (public agenda), it has been linked to other bodies of research that help us better understand the significance of issue salience. Specifically, research in priming indicates that audience members use what is salient, or top-of-mind, to evaluate issues or individuals (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Miller and Krosnick 1997). Thus mass media coverage can influence what citizens perceive to be important, and citizens in turn use what is important as standards by which to make political judgments.

Framing: The Effects of Media Presentations

Beyond their direct influences on public opinion, such as making issues more salient in people's minds, the mass media can shape public opinion in more subtle ways through the way they cover events or policies. In other words, audience members' interpretations of issues differ,

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depending on *how* these issues are described in mass media rather than *if* these issues are covered (Iyengar 1991; Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Scheufele 2000). This process is known as *framing*.

Public opinion research commonly distinguishes between a macroscopic and a microscopic approach to framing (Scheufele 1999). A *macroscopic perspective* focuses on media frames as outcomes of journalistic norms or organizational constraints and is based on what communication scholars Zhongdang Pan and Gerald Kosicki (1993) call the “sociological approach” to framing research. This approach is commonly linked to sociologist Erving Goffman’s (1974) work on frame analysis and assumes that the news media’s depiction of events depends on the framework employed by the journalists. Or, as Goffman (1974) puts it, “The type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event to which it is applied” (p. 24). Within this macroscopic perspective, media frames have been defined as a “central organizing idea” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987) of a news story that gives it meaning by providing a context to the reader and putting the story into a larger context. Media or news frames serve as working routines for journalists, allowing them to quickly identify and classify information and to package it for efficient use by audience members (Gitlin 1980).

Public opinion researchers focusing on a *microscopic (or psychological) approach* (Fischer and Johnson 1986) examine frames as individual means of processing and structuring incoming information. This psychological approach is grounded in social psychologist Muzaffer Sherif’s (1967) work on “frames of reference.” Sherif assumes that individual judgments and perceptions are not only influenced

by cognitive or psychological factors but also occur within an appropriate frame of reference. Therefore, it is possible “to set up situations in which appraisal or evaluation of a social situation will be reflected in the perceptions and judgments of the individual” (Sherif 1967, p. 382). Although this work does not suggest how mass media can influence individual judgments and perceptions, research on prospect theory (e.g., Quattrone and Tversky 1988) points to a possible link between mass media coverage and the framework individuals employ to interpret events. Specifically, how a decision-making situation is framed can affect what people believe will be the outcome of selecting one option over the other (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). In the context of this microscopic approach, audience frames are defined as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information” (Entman 1993, p. 53). They are the interpretive schema that audiences use to interpret and make sense of news and other media content.

The ability of the mass media to influence public opinion, then, lies in the media’s ability to shape the predominant frames used in public discourse of an issue or event, thereby influencing the way audience members interpret these issues. In examining media impact on public opinion, studies on framing tend to differentiate media frames in a number of ways.

One common distinction of media frames situates the frame as either *episodic* or *thematic* (Iyengar 1991). Episodic news stories, typically found in TV news, depict public issues as concrete instances or specific events, whereas thematic news stories, often found in newspaper stories, report more background

information and discuss trends and themes. Individuals exposed to issues framed episodically tend to perceive the problem as a “mere idiosyncratic outcome” (Iyengar 1991, p. 137). By contrast, those who are exposed to stories framed thematically are more likely to believe that responsibility for the problem rests with the government.

A second common pair of media frames concerns what communication scholars Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1997) call *strategy* and *issue frames*. They argue that broadcast news tends to avoid the substantive, in-depth discussion of politics that people need in order to make informed decisions. Rather than reporting on candidates’ issue stances or analyzing the relative merits of various issue positions (issue frame), TV news tends to frame campaign coverage as a game—covering who is ahead and who is behind and what strategies the candidates are using in order to win (strategy frame). Strategy-oriented coverage increases cynicism among the electorate and increasingly disengages citizens from the political process.

The Spiral of Silence: The Effects of Media Portrayals of Public Opinion

As noted above, the mass media can influence public opinion on an issue by merely covering that issue (agenda-setting) or covering that issue in a particular manner (framing). Mass media also can shape public opinion by virtue of their coverage of public opinion—in other words, coverage of what everyone else thinks provides important cues for the expression of public opinion. This notion is embodied in the *spiral of silence theory* formulated by German communication researcher Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) and tested in numerous countries,

including the United States (Glynn and McLeod 1985), Hong Kong (Willnat 1996), Israel (Shamir 1995), Japan (Ikeda 1989), and Mexico (Neuwirth 2000).

The basic premise of the spiral of silence theory is that one’s willingness to publicly express one’s opinion on controversial topics (e.g., politics, race, affirmative action) is a function of how one perceives public opinion. In any type of community or social setting, Noelle-Neumann argues, individuals constantly scan their social environment to find out what most people think about important issues. Mass media, of course, are the most easily accessible source for such information. If people perceive a majority of the population to hold a view inconsistent with their own, or if they see a trend in that direction, they will be less likely to publicly express their individual opinion. This individual reluctance to speak in public translates into a one-sided perception of public opinion that will increasingly silence people with minority opinions.

The spiral of silence theory is based on a number of assumptions rooted in research from various disciplines, including psychology, sociology, and political science. First is the assumption that most societies are characterized by some level of social control, or what Noelle-Neumann calls *threat of isolation*. “In the social collective cohesion must be constantly ensured by a sufficient level of agreement on values and goals” (Noelle-Neumann 1991, p. 258); to guarantee this agreement, society threatens individuals who violate the consensus with social isolation and ostracism. Second, and somewhat related, human beings are fearful of that threat of isolation. Any formation of individual opinions and attitudes is therefore characterized by the

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fear of individuals to isolate themselves within their social environment. Third, as a result of fear of isolation, individuals, with their quasi-statistical sense, constantly monitor the distribution of opinions in their environment as well as the future trend of opinion. Such monitoring can involve attending to media coverage of an issue, direct observation of one's environment, or interpersonal discussion of issues. Finally, individuals tend to publicly express their opinions and attitudes when they perceive their view to be dominant or on the rise. When people sense their view is in the minority or on the decline, they become cautious and silent.

The interaction of these four factors leads to a process of formation, change, and reinforcement of public opinion. Over time, changing perceptions of the opinion climate influence people's willingness to express minority opinions and thereby further diminish the perceived public support for that minority view until the majority stance emerges as the consensus opinion. The critical factor is the dynamic character of the theory, that is, the interaction between perceived aggregate climate of opinion and individual willingness to speak out (Scheufele and Moy 2000). Perceptions of aggregate opinion, biased or not, influence individuals' willingness to speak out, which in turn influences their perception of the climate of opinion. The result is a spiral process that establishes one opinion over time as predominant public opinion.

The spiral of silence theory places great importance on the linkage between media coverage and perceptions of public opinion, suggesting that mass media have a strong influence on which opinions are perceived to be in the majority and therefore influence individual-level willingness to express these views. The

spiral of silence theory also is a macrolevel theory of public opinion, explaining social-level change with individual-level and group dynamics, therefore providing links to the meso- and microtheoretical levels.

Conclusion

The three major theories outlined above reflect very different perspectives on the process by which mass communication bears on public opinion. Each theory represents a slightly different view of the power of the media, as well as the extent to which the public is regarded as expressing opinions based on full information or making political judgments based on bits of information. More important, these theories linking mass media to public opinion integrate strands of research from different areas into a consistent theoretical model, bridging gaps between disciplines such as psychology, sociology, communication, and political science.

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Section Two: Shaping Public Opinion

Interest Groups

“Interest groups (also known as factions, organized interests, pressure groups, and special interests) are natural phenomena in a democratic regime—that is, individuals will band together to protect their interests” (Cigler and Loomis 1998, p. 2). Interest groups emerged and flourished because of a continuing interest in national policy and legislation. Focused on a single issue or a range of issues, interest groups represent subsets of the public at large. Interest groups are both *of* the public and *apart* from it. Consequently, the mass public’s opinion (represented by demonstrations, letters, or surveys) can be both a tool and a challenge to an organization’s goals.

The Interest Group and Its Goals

Interest groups are collections of like-minded individuals banded together to influence government on a single issue or group of issues. Individuals join interest groups for three reasons: material benefits (e.g., prescription drug discounts, tote bags, bumper stickers), solidarity benefits (intangible feelings derived from the act of association), and expressive benefits (intangible feelings generated by advancing a cause) (Olson 1971). Although Alexis de Tocqueville (1984) has long argued that the United States is a nation of joiners, the choice to join a group is per-

sonal and distinguishes individuals from the mass public. After all, affiliation with an interest group requires more than self-identification; it requires membership dues. Members of an interest group generally have strong feelings about the issue position for which the group fights. Attitudes among the public at large across the same set of issues are likely to be different. Thus, an interest group is an entity existing within the mass public but apart from it.

Individually, interest groups seek to influence government for their own benefit (although some benefits can be shared). Writing in the *Federalist Papers*, James Madison famously articulated the evils of the faction and helped defend a system of government that, via checks and balances, reduced the likelihood that a single individual or faction would win on every decision. Madison equated factions with narrow interests arrayed against the “aggregate interests of the community” (Madison 1987, p. 123). By the twenty-first century, however, interest groups exist at the heart of U.S. “politics and policy making in a complex, large and increasingly specialized governmental system” (Cigler and Loomis 1998, p. 3). Views of interest groups range from an “element of continuity” in a complex world to a source of “evil . . . greed, trickery, deception and fraud” (Hugo Black,

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cited in Cigler and Loomis 1998, p. 3). In either case, interest groups seek to influence government outcomes, by influencing policy or by influencing the policy-makers.

On any given issue, there exists an array of interests and interest groups all seeking to lobby for their preferred outcome. As a result, interest groups must employ a range of activities (with varying degrees of success) to set their views apart from the multiple voices all are seeking to influence. A long-standing option for influencing those in power has been to solicit a stamp of approval and support from the public at large. Trumpeting the support of the public allows an interest group to move beyond charges of selfish support of parochial goals to a communitarian approach that benefits all.

Recruiting with Public Opinion

According to political scientist Mancur Olson, interest groups suffer from a fundamental dilemma, which he termed a *collective action problem*. An interest group is a group of like-minded individuals united around achieving a common goal via political action, for example, environmental protection legislation. However, if the interest group is successful, then members of the interest group benefit, *as do nonmembers*, creating the collective action problem of the “free rider.” Individuals can benefit from the law without contributing to the group via membership dues (Olson 1971). The free-rider problem can potentially devastate an interest group if individuals choose not to contribute, preferring to enjoy the free benefits. Thus, interest groups are forever searching for individuals who support the goals of the organization and are willing to participate

financially. Successful recruitment of these individuals is critical to sustaining the group and ultimately any attempt to achieve its goals.

Public opinion is generically helpful for organization recruitment and interest group goals. “The ups and downs of organizational membership reflect . . . changes in public opinion” regarding group issues (Johnson 1998, p. 38). Some interest group leaders believe that “a spontaneous bubbling up of public sentiment” leads to increased group membership (Johnson 1998, p. 45). These changes in public opinion often stem from reactions to crises or frustration regarding government response to issues. However, the attitudinal response must also spur action, ranging from the easy (donating) to the difficult (volunteering), for interest groups to benefit.

Additionally, via organizational polling, groups can determine specific aspects of public support for group goals. Polls also help interest groups determine what selective benefits might motivate individuals to join groups. But “it is frequently impractical for lobbies to try to influence mass opinion” (Berry 1984, p. 136). Thus, public opinion has greater influence and import as a mechanism for signaling other elites in the political process.

Using the Public in the Presurvey Era

Public opinion polling was not a key component of any political strategy until after the 1960s. Yet interest groups did employ strategies that depended on public attitudes. In 1958, V. O. Key noted that there were essentially two types of public strategies for an interest group: short-term and long-term. A short-term campaign “may be designed to whip up public opposition to or support of a particular legislative measure” (Key 1958, p.

145). A long-term campaign involved the management of public attitudes creating favorable sentiment toward an industry or corporation (Key 1958).

Interest groups demonstrated public attitudes to the U.S. Congress via protests, campaign contributions, letter-writing campaigns, and telegrams. For example, between 1930 and 1950 the American Medical Association (AMA) effectively opposed efforts to create national health insurance (Starr 1982). In that twenty-year period, the AMA ran massive campaigns and successfully changed congressional mail from 2.5:1 in favor of health insurance to 4:1 against it (Key 1958, p. 146). Although more difficult to organize, mass demonstrations and protests were also effective mechanisms for demonstrating voluminous support from the public for a group's ideas (Ginsberg 1986). Another mechanism with which to demonstrate support or opposition was the creation of the umbrella organization. Numerous interest groups representing different segments of the population would band together in order to demonstrate strength. These options were all designed to signal to government that a narrow group represented an idea or position supported by the larger population. The development of the public opinion poll made gauging popular support easier.

Using the Mass Public in a Polling Era

In the 1960s and 1970s, public opinion polls became the dominant source of information on public attitudes for political elites—including interest groups. Interest groups jockey for position with each other while employing an array of tools with which to attempt to influence Congress, the president, the media, and the public. Public opinion poll data rep-

resent a mechanism for evaluating pitches to the public. However, public opinion poll data are also offered as the voice of the people. In contrast to a mass mailing campaign or a march on Washington, displaying poll data is an extremely cost-effective means for articulating the public will.

Educating the Public

During and between election cycles, interest groups want to persuade individuals and other groups to adopt their thinking. Thus "at one time or another, almost all interest groups find themselves trying to educate the public about an issue" (Berry 1984, p. 143). Leaders of interest groups often contend that the public does not support their position because the public does not understand the issues (Berry 1984). Public opinion surveys routinely report low political knowledge for Americans about most political issues (Erikson and Tedin 2001). Moreover, the more complex an issue is, the more likely for misunderstanding or lack of knowledge to stand between the citizens' and interest groups' positions. Both free and paid media are vital components to public education. The free sources (newspapers, television, and the Internet) represent the most cost-effective means for groups to influence the public via the dissemination of research or supportive facts. Moreover, information presented via the free media lends credibility to an interest group's position.

Additionally, interest groups use public opinion poll data to educate the public via free media. Traditionally, the public opinion reported in the news arises from surveys generated by media organizations. However, Michael Traugott finds that groups sell their position and persuade

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journalists to run the interest group's position in a story based upon support from poll data (Traugott 2002). The reference to public opinion makes the group position newsworthy (Traugott 2002). Interestingly, the savvy interest group strategist can move the journalist with only "alleged or implied but not revealed polling data" (Traugott 2002, p. 21).

Interest group purchases of institutional and ideological advertising on television and in newspapers and magazines are recent innovations in the running battle to influence public opinion. The legislative fights for health care and the North American Free Trade Agreement were peppered by sophisticated political advertising. It is estimated that groups spent \$60 million on advertising, half of all interest group spending resisting President Bill Clinton's health care program during 1993 and 1994 (West, Heith, and Goodwin 1996). Focus groups and public opinion surveys helped identify the key issues for Americans displayed in the infamous "Harry and Louise" ads, developed by the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) (West, Heith, and Goodwin 1996). The advertising effectively educated the public about Clinton's health care plan but did not produce the intended public opposition to the program (West, Heith, and Goodwin 1996). Interestingly, without actually moving public opinion, the TV ad campaign convinced elites in Congress that opinion had shifted. The belief in the potential for opinion shift due to the ads was so strong that the House Ways and Means Committee chair, Dan Rostenkowski, made a deal with the HIAA. Rostenkowski accepted "changes in health care legislation in exchange for HIAA's promise not to run ads in partic-

ular states" (West, Heith, and Goodwin 1996, p. 62).

Dealing with Congress

Although Congress deliberates and votes on the floor of the House of Representatives and the Senate, most of the legislative work occurs in committees. Not surprisingly, interest groups try to influence the work of the committees by influencing members, "assisting" in the markup of a bill, and participating in the hearing and information-gathering process. In this process, interest groups consistently invoke public opinion as a support for their position. In congressional hearings, "representatives of interest groups reflected only about one-seventh of the witnesses who appeared before committees to testify, but they made half of all the references to 'public opinion'" (Traugott 2002). Interest groups calculate that the invocation of "public opinion" will remove the perceived taint of representing "special interests." Interestingly, however, national public opinion data do not influence individual members of Congress. Researchers note that past congresses and past congressional leaders did not identify opinion leadership and polling as significant (Jacobs and Shapiro 1998). Congress members and their staffs found polls to be easily manipulated; "they distrusted public opinion surveys and overvalued focus groups" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Not until the revolutionary Republican movement under Newt Gingrich did the leadership make a concerted effort to utilize public opinion poll data in strategizing (Jacobs et al. 1998). Even under the changing attitudes toward polling by the leadership, individual legislators were highly suspicious

and even dismissive of public opinion polling data (Jacobs et al. 1998).

Dealing with the President

Traditionally, the umbrella of the political party ideologies sheltered interest groups and provided mediation between groups and government. However, since the 1960s, presidents and interest groups have bypassed the parties and relate to each other directly. Since the White House of Richard Nixon, presidents have created staff positions and institutionalized the opportunities for access for interest groups. These White House liaison officers were part of the White House polling apparatus and were regular poll users. Moreover, interest groups frequently employed public opinion poll information as part of their effort to influence the president and his staff. The interest groups used poll data to bypass the parties and link their wants and needs directly to presidential programs, policies, and politics by sending poll information to the White House.

Initially, the White House was leery of interest group-generated data. But as groups began utilizing "mainstream" polling organizations, and even the firms of presidential pollsters, the White House began accepting, trusting, and utilizing interest group poll data. An example from Donald Rumsfeld, deputy chief of staff during the Gerald Ford administration, reveals White House thinking: "I pass along some polls and figures received recently from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC]. AIPAC is a domestic lobbying organization, but the sources of the figures are reputable polling organizations: Harris, Gallup, and Yankelovich" (Memo to Rumsfeld from Goldwin 5/1/75 in Robert

Goldwin box 7 Jewish Issues [2] Gerald Ford Library). Robert Goldwin continues, informing Rumsfeld that "the significant facts are that Nixon got 17 percent of the Jewish vote in 1968 and 40 percent in 1972. AIPAC contends that this shift was based mainly on gratitude for the delivery to Israel of Phantom jets early in 1972" (Memo to Rumsfeld from Goldwin 5/1/75). Simply by forwarding the results of a poll, AIPAC's interpretation of the poll numbers penetrated the Ford White House. AIPAC clearly linked approval ratings to their issue: aid to Israel. Interest groups widely adopted this tactic of sending poll data and their spin on the poll data to the White House.

The gathering of poll data by the White House and from interest groups represents an interesting battle between the outside lobbying (known as signaling) and the inside tactic used by politicians (called reverse lobbying). By forwarding poll data and analysis, an interest group can move beyond traditional lobbying by offering not only its own membership's attitudes but also, via the poll, mass support for the group's goals and ideals. Sending poll data to the White House enables an interest group to expand who it purports to represent without expanding its membership, which would trigger inevitable collective action problems. Moreover, the interest group can achieve representation without dealing with the muddled connection between the parties and monetary contributions.

Conclusion

Interest groups are narrowly focused on a single issue or subset of issues. As a result, interest groups cannot claim to represent mass public opinion, nor do they wish to represent the public as a

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whole. However, groups often seek to connect their goals to preferences that the mass public shares. Tapping into mass attitudes epitomizes good political strategy, as it enables groups to expand the scope of their claimed representation. Public opinion poll data provide interest groups with the ability to demonstrate public support to political elites, to the media, and to the public. Interest groups do not always seek to demonstrate public support. Sometimes groups strive to educate the public, and sometimes they are content to buck the tide of public sentiment. Public opinion is but one tool among many for influencing the powerful to support a cause.

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News Media

The mass media provide the public with information. This content and its presentation shape public attitudes. Inversely, the media also provide the public with data resulting from opinion polls. But public opinion data are not news in the strictest sense. Thus messages from the media both report the news and report the ensuing effect of the news. The public's opinion has a long history within the U.S. press. As a result, Americans are accus-

tomed to public opinion data appearing in newspapers and on television. The presence of public opinion information on television, on radio, and in the newspaper not only provides factual information but also influences the political process.

History of Polls and the Media

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, newspapers (the primary form of mass communication) were arms of the political parties. Newspapers began collecting and reporting public attitudes because politicians needed this information. In the early 1800s the preferred means for accumulating public opinion was the straw poll. Straw polls were a crude version of the modern public opinion survey. Instead of interviewing over the phone, straw polls counted a show of hands or collected paper responses. The *Harrisburg Pennsylvanian* performed the first straw poll in 1824 (Erikson and Tedin 2001). It correctly showed Andrew Jackson as the popular winner over John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay. (In actuality, John Quincy Adams became president. Although Jackson won the popular vote, he did not have a majority of electoral votes so the House of Representatives decided the election. Adams won as Clay threw his support behind Adams in exchange for the position as Secretary of State.) Straw polls remained popular because they were relatively easy to produce. "One popular journalistic tactic was to poll people on steamers and passenger trains" (Herbst 1993, p. 76). Straw polls first appeared in the press coverage of early-nineteenth-century elections and became a significant component of election and political coverage.

Straw polling came to an abrupt end, and scientific, randomly sampled polling became the preferred option for journal-

ists after 1936. In the 1920s and 1930s, *Literary Digest*, a popular magazine, used straw polling to predict election outcomes. *Literary Digest* mailed and counted millions of ballots, and the results appeared in cartoons and other newspapers and magazines all over the country. Politicians watched the predictions with great interest because for years they were fairly accurate, correctly predicting both the winners and vote differentials from 1920 to 1932 (Herbst 1993).

In 1936, Democrat Franklin Roosevelt defeated Republican Alf Landon for the presidency in a spectacular popular vote (60.8 percent to 36.5 percent) and Electoral College landslide (523–8). *Literary Digest* predicted that Landon would win—and big. *Literary Digest* was dramatically incorrect because the magazine mailed ballots to and received responses from households based on telephone directories and automobile registrations, which placed these respondents primarily in the upper income brackets. In addition, in the same election George Gallup used random sampling, based on mathematics, and came within 7 percentage points of accurately predicting the Roosevelt victory (Glynn et al. 1999). Straw polling disappeared as the media completely adopted random-sampled, statistically based poll data.

However, the early years of "scientific" polling were not without problems and embarrassment for the media. In 1948, randomly sampled polling inaccurately predicted Republican Thomas Dewey would beat the incumbent president, Democrat Harry Truman. The 1948 error was not due to a focus on one income bracket but rather polling too early in the race (Asher 2001). Many Democrats who defected early came back to Truman in the end. Polling closer to election day

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might have prevented the famous newspaper headlines declaring Dewey victorious. However, these early setbacks did not prevent the print and electronic news outlets from increasing their reliance on polls for issue and election coverage.

Modern Media Use of Polls

In a major change from the 1800s, print and electronic media not only report polling information but also produce it regularly. Moreover, TV networks and newspaper outlets have combined to produce and disseminate public opinion. For example, the results of a CBS News/*New York Times* poll may appear in a story in the *Times*, a report on *CBS Nightly News*, and in news releases by both organizations (Asher 2001) (NBC News works with the *Wall Street Journal* and ABC News works with the *Washington Post*). These polling conglomerates provide a constant source of public opinion for the news organizations while spreading the costs. Media outlets initially sought constant sources of opinion to bolster their campaign and election coverage.

During campaigns, electronic and print media use poll data primarily to keep track of the “horserace”—who is ahead, who is behind, and whose fortunes have changed most dramatically. The media do track responses to the issues and candidate issue positions, but the horserace poll data dominate most media coverage of most campaigns.

In the 2000 presidential race, the media polls increasingly frustrated journalists covering the campaign. From September through November, all media polls (as well as Gallup and Harris) revealed an exceptionally close race. Republican candidate Governor George W. Bush and Democratic candidate Vice President Al Gore fluctuated back and

forth, running neck and neck in the polls. Nightly newscasts regularly cited 40–45 percent of Americans supporting each candidate, with 10–20 percent claiming to be undecided. With a margin of error of plus or minus 5 percent, the presidential race could not be called for either candidate. Thus, anchors and columnists were forced to inform their audience night after night that they could not predict the outcome: the race was too close to call. Of course, the polls turned out to be correct: the national race was too close to call, as the presidential race in individual states, like Florida, revealed.

Between campaigns, media outlets continue to track and use public opinion data, although with less frequency than the barrage during election cycles. The most prevalent use of public opinion polling by the media is in presenting presidential approval ratings: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president?” Because media outlets have the capability to conduct their own polls, surveys can be conducted across a range of issues with very little notice. Thus, on virtually any issue, electronic and print media outlets can relate public opinion to any news story whenever they choose. When newspapers use public opinion for issue articles, approximately 30 percent of the poll data concern economic issues, 40 percent concern domestic issues, and 30 percent concern foreign policy issues. On television, 70 percent of the poll data concern domestic issues, with 15 percent concerning economic and foreign policy issues.

During a crisis, the media traditionally rely on public opinion to evaluate the government’s responses. In an armed conflict, the media employ the president’s job approval rating as a signal for citizen support for the effort. Thus, as a president’s

ratings typically increase in what is known as the rally-'round-the-flag effect, the media provide a conduit for displays of patriotism. However, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, media outlets did not display a significant amount of polling. In 2001, polling on terrorism represented only 15 percent of all issue polling on television. In contrast, 45 percent of all polls on television concerned the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal in 1998.

Influencing the Public

For Americans, the news is a picture of reality, by day or by week, depending on the news source. However, very little news is actually event-driven. An analysis of two major newspapers discovered that only 1 percent of political news stories were reports of events. Instead, the newspapers reported "political talk": the information from interviews, press conferences, and news releases (Kernell and Jacobson 2000, p. 467). Political talk benefits both the news organizations and the politicians. Media outlets receive a regular source of information (events are obviously not as predictable). The politicians receive a mechanism with which to reach the public and other politicians.

The media are not simply a conduit for political talk. The information that the media provide the public influences the public in a multitude of ways. The media, in particular television, have the powerful ability to influence attitudes and beliefs by virtue of their delivery system. Media reports influence what people think and believe, not only by providing information but also by the way in which they provide information. The media both prime the audience and frame information. When priming, the press signals to the public that one issue is more important than another by plac-

ing it above the fold on the front page or first on the nightly TV newscast. In addition, the media influence public opinion as well as the political process by virtue of the agenda-setting role. The press sets the agenda by selecting certain stories to discuss rather than others.

The media profoundly influences public opinion because it represents the primary source of information for the public. How the media tell a story also influences beliefs and attitudes by framing the information. "There are compelling reasons to believe that the media's focus on [the frames of] political conflict and the strategies of politicians and political activities affect[s] public opinion" (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000, p. 231). By emphasizing one view or downplaying one fact, the media will not necessarily change latent opinion, but they can prompt different expressed responses. Moreover, the current journalistic norm, which demands storytelling with the opposing sides clearly articulated, signals to the public those voices that are valuable. Even the choice by the reporter of whom to quote and when to narrate influences the information the public digests (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).

The confluence of reporting style, placement of information, and coverage of individuals moves public opinion—and the changes are measurable. Short-term opinion change is dramatically influenced by the news media (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). In particular, messages from reporters (and anchors), experts, and popular presidents have the greatest impact on opinion (Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987).

Influence on the Process

In the twenty-first century, the media are presenting public opinion information to

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a greater degree than ever before. In fact, public opinion is presented to the public almost solely by the news media. Individuals rarely learn of aggregate data collection from any of the other organizations that poll (e.g., academics, consultants, and polling organizations). Moreover, the media, through their polling conglomerates, are producing the public opinion they employ. The increased media polling influences the political process—for the media, elites, and the public.

The combination of increased interest in and increased access to public opinion information prompts concern over the methods of conducting polls, as well as the mechanisms for reporting poll findings. Journalists are now trained to employ public opinion poll data, although that training produces a “preoccupation” with the “objective” poll results. The reporting of poll results suffers from traditional critiques of reporters—superficiality and lack of analysis (Asher 2001).

However, the most critical questions connecting public opinion coverage to the political system occur in the campaign arena. News coverage of the horserace eerily parallels poll results of the standing of candidates. Therefore, the better a candidate does in surveys, the more coverage the candidate receives. This “indexing” of the amount of coverage also affects the tone of coverage (Jamieson 2000). Candidates who lead in the polls are described as the ones to beat, whereas those candidates who trail are considered “on the ropes” (Jamieson 2000). The influence of the polls on the reporter subsequently influences the citizen and the poll respondent. Political scientist Larry Bartels (1988) finds that the “horserace” reporting of standings influences outcomes during the primary season. In what appears

to be a vicious cycle, reporters highlight changes in poll numbers and, in particular, who is trailing. The mere mention of such information can alter subsequent poll responses, as poll respondents may not want to indicate support for someone whose star is falling. More significant, reporting changing poll fortunes can influence voting and ultimately primary race outcomes, as voters are reluctant to support a loser.

Poll reporting by the news media can have various effects. The in-house creation of survey data contributes to the overuse of such data. Media use of poll data also encourages horserace reporting by eliminating candidates early, thereby altering campaign outcomes. The repeated use of the in-house poll also legitimizes and gives preferential treatment to in-house poll data. Thus, the media tend to ignore other (perhaps contradictory) poll results.

The presence of a consistent and constant source of information also leads to the highlighting of interesting poll findings (Bartels 1988; Asher 2001; Herbst 1993). If a media conglomerate performs a survey and produces unexpected results, then those results become news. Thus the very presence of the ability to collect information highlights issues that are not currently political issues. Therefore the media reporting of poll information can potentially create public debates that may not have existed prior to the poll.

Information reported by the news media receives a measure of validation via priming, framing, and agenda-setting. The presentation of survey information goes a step farther, validating or socializing individuals toward the attitudes espoused. Poll data lend an air of authority to discussions of any news story. A 1985 Roper poll on the state of public

opinion polls revealed that most Americans believe polls are accurate, are honest, and that respondents tell the truth when answering. However, respondents did question the validity of random sampling when pressed by follow-up questions on the subject (Herbst 1993). Thus, the media, by virtue of their use of public opinion, further influence public opinion by using poll data as "proof" of a position.

The influence of the media on public opinion, and thus the political process, looms large. The role of polling in media stories is just as significant. Traditionally the press relies on authoritative government officials as its primary sources. The presentation of public opinion within this news genre is usually as evaluator of government performance. However, public opinion can also become another voice within the story.

By and large, public opinion is not presented in the same manner that the media present information from sources like government officials and/or government spokespersons. Rather than provide a forum for the masses during issue debates or critical events, the media tend to report only campaign horserace information and presidential approval ratings (Bennett 1989). Thus, as a "gatekeeper" for filtering public voices, the media marginalize public opinion by presenting the "wrong" type of polling data. "Only on amorphous concerns such as presidential approval and candidate popularity do people hear their opinion voices forcefully and regularly in the context of a general public opinion (usually expressed in poll data) that can be heard as a loud, persistent and legitimate voice" (Bennett 1989, p. 325). Media application of public opinion dooms the information to become an afterthought or spectator within any issue debate. The news media marginalize pub-

lic opinion as a legitimate source of authority during policy debates.

However, whereas press reporting on campaigns may in fact trivialize the public's voice, political issue debates produce different media behavior. Examining the issue of health care, political scientists Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro find that "political strategy and conflict may not be chasing out news coverage of substantive policy issues. . . . health care issues were portrayed more in positive and constructive terms than negative ones" (2000, p. 217). Further, they contend that reducing the public to a jury who evaluates after both sides state their case misses the dynamic interaction of public opinion with the media and other actors in the political process.

Conclusion

The media want to report the public's attitudes. The public's opinion represents a useful evaluation of campaigns, issues, and events. However, by virtue of providing information to the public, the media also influence the public and thus the political process. Thus, for the media, public opinion is both a measurement of the audience and a tool to be used. Via priming, framing, and agenda-setting, news and political information not only informs but also sways. Similarly, the presentation of public opinion poll data by the media provides the public with an opportunity to voice its opinion between elections but also to be influenced by its own mass voice.

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Political Parties

Parties and Polling

Onetime Republican Party pollster Richard Morris, who would work closely with Democratic president Bill Clinton, writes that his job was "figuring out how politicians can advance issues that move voters and win elections" (1999, p. 7). This also is the primary goal of political parties, and opinion polling is one of the more important tools of achieving that goal. Mr. Morris's successful strategy

involved using opinion polls to tell Mr. Clinton "which of the positions he had already taken were the most popular. I would always draw the distinction between deciding on policy and identifying certain issues for emphasis" (1999, p. 9) in campaign material.

This contribution will address two broad topics. The first is the ways in which parties use polls as tools to advance election campaigns and public policy. The second is the ways in which the public perceives parties and their particular strengths and weaknesses. It's not always clear who is leading and who is following. In some cases parties and officials introduce issues, and party loyalists respond; it is also true that politicians respond to what they find is popular through opinion research.

Parties, Politicians, and Polling

Parties use polls to identify their strengths and weaknesses. They use polls to figure out issues that are important to core constituents and to the larger public. They use polls to uncover strengths and weaknesses in the opposing party both to win elections and to win legislative debates. These polls are raw materials used to make weapons used against opponents, and survey research is used to help advocate the issues needed to build a party's base of support in a policy debate or a campaign. In terms of dealing with public opinion, political leaders fill several important roles: they *set agendas*, they raise the *salience* of issues, and they *offer choices*.

Salience and Agenda-Setting

The salience of a problem refers to its importance in relation to other problems. Having enough money for Social Security recipients today may be impor-

tant, but it is in competition with fighting global terrorism for the “most important” problem.

Both are on the policy agenda, and the one that is most salient usually gets the most attention. To uncover the salience of issues and to help set agendas, party leaders will hire pollsters to ask people questions like “What is the most important problem facing the country?” At the same time, politicians can raise the salience of certain issues by persistently discussing them.

President Clinton and his Republican opposition, for example, used poll numbers to help them choose persuasive language for advancing competing ideas about modernizing Social Security, Medicare, welfare programs, and improving the economy. President Clinton did this first by regularly raising the issues most beneficial to him in public addresses. Clinton was advised to highlight “optimistic” language about it during his State of the Union address and in the 1996 election season (Morris 1999). Later, polls told him to contrast with Republican alternatives described as “too conservative.”

Clinton also would emphasize that he was aware of public concerns about the financial well-being of the Social Security program. His polls guided him to refer to “the public” and its support for his proposals for “saving” Social Security. Many of his Republican opponents, meanwhile, used polls that showed support for “privatizing” parts of Social Security (see Cook, Barabas, and Page 2002). Polls are thus used to guide party leaders in their word choices and the themes they advocate.

Because the public and policy-setting institutions have limited time and resources to deal with issues, candidates

need to make choices about whether they should emphasize platforms concerned with, for example, the environment, tax cuts, foreign affairs, education, or law enforcement. This is what Morris advised his political clients to do—use polls to identify topics of discussion and then emphasize high-priority issues where the party’s positions were most pleasing to voters.

Republicans and Democrats offered competing ideas for dealing with Social Security. They used polling numbers to support their claims. This might seem like someone, then, isn’t telling the truth. But researchers seem to think that outright lies by party elites are rare; however, they also caution that it’s just as hard to find clear-cut support for many of their assertions (Cook, Barabas, and Page 2002).

Local political organizations, like national parties, use polling devices for election strategy and policy advocacy. In Chicago, for example, aldermen are elected without party labels attached to their names. However, most are Democratic activists, and this is widely reported in local newspapers. One Chicago alderman who presides over the Democratic ward organization recently used surveys to decide how closely he should align himself with the administration of Mayor Richard M. Daley, local members of the state assembly, and other local interests like labor unions or influential clergy. The poll served to identify portions of the ward where individuals felt underrepresented. The poll gauged name recognition of the incumbent alderman, assessed policy areas where he was considered weak or strong, identified salient policy issues, and measured attitudes about an individual rumored to be interested in challenging the organization’s

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candidate in the upcoming city council elections.

These types of surveys, often called *benchmark polls*, cover a lot of ground. Local party organizations and candidates want an early indication of their strengths and weaknesses prior to the beginning of an active campaign. They usually sample voters who are expected to vote in party primary elections and in the general election. Because many states record who votes in the party primaries, these records are public information and can become the basis of drawing a sample for a political party.

These polls ask about a variety of topics and then ask if this changes people's minds about the candidate. They ask likely voters about their views of candidates when he is described by "positive" traits: Does the alderman "get things done"? Does he care about people like me? Is he fiscally responsible? These polls try to find out how well he is described by words like "political machine," "self-serving," or "arrogant." They test campaign themes to see which are most persuasive, the issues that will raise doubts about the party's candidate, and the way the candidate's position meets voter demands. Similar questions were asked about potential opposition to the ward organization's candidate.

Answers to these questions would be used to develop a campaign strategy and to anticipate attacks that he might come up against. This type of information will let the party organization develop an attack campaign against a formidable opponent or respond to an opponent's political attacks. The party organization can compare his "positives" and "negatives" among whites and African Americans, business owners and union members, or men and women. This knowledge

gives the party organization a chance to develop targeted campaign materials and will allow the incumbent alderman a chance to initiate pleasing policy programs in the city council even before formal campaigning begins.

Partisanship and Political Preferences in the Public

"Partisanship is the single most important influence on political opinions and voting behavior," write social scientists William H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale (1998, p. 53). *Partisanship* is the attachment a person feels toward a political party. People feel drawn to political parties for a variety of reasons, and this attachment is an important indication of how people will look at candidates and policy issues. Party attachment is often acquired in childhood, much like religion. For a lot of people, this loyalty deepens during adulthood and becomes part of a person's self-image.

Political analysts tend to agree that party attachments are important indicators of how people will respond to survey questions about political topics. The Pew Charitable Trusts funded a study that reported during the 2002 congressional election campaign that "Democrats are favored (51 percent–40 percent) among those who point to general economic concerns or jobs, while Republicans hold a comparable edge among voters who cite taxes as the top issue." This survey also found that affiliation corresponds with how they look at a serving president, which relates to voting intent:

Republican voters continue to say their congressional vote is a vote in support of the president. Nearly six-in-ten (54 percent) say this is the case. In 1998, just a third (35 percent)

of Democratic voters considered their midterm vote to be a vote for President Clinton. Most Democratic voters (56 percent) say Bush is not a factor in their vote, while three-in-ten consider their vote to be a vote against the president. This is consistent with the 1998 midterms, when 36 percent of Republican voters said their vote was in opposition to Bill Clinton.

Other surveys bear this out. The National Election Studies (NES) at the University of Michigan reports how Democrats and Republicans think the government should deal with certain issues. Table 1 summarizes the ideas expressed in the 2000 NES survey.

The Pew analysis indicates that people who favor lower taxes liked Republicans, whereas people who are worried about the economy preferred Democrats. Some analysts, however, think that it is partisanship that determines policy prefer-

ences, rather than the policy preferences that cause people to side with either the Democrats or Republicans.

“The alternative positions championed by party elites structure the political choices offered to the mass public and thus play an important role in the development and expression of citizens’ views,” according to recent findings reported by political scientists Geoffrey C. Layman and Thomas M. Carsey (2002, p. 788). Layman and Carsey find that people with a strong sense of party loyalty pay close attention to what their party leaders say about current political issues. When Democratic and Republican leaders speak on an issue, loyalists tune in and get an indication of how people like them should think.

In other words, loyal Republicans and Democrats adjust their policy views, rather than their party affiliation, to keep their stands on issues and party attachment from coming into conflict. This is true not only on a single issue but also on

Table 1 Democratic and Republican Solutions to National Problems

<i>Issue</i>	<i>% of Democrats</i>	<i>% of Republicans</i>	<i>% of Independents</i>
To balance budget, respondent favors cuts in government services & spending.	8	37	15
Individuals should be on their own to guarantee job or standard of living.	40	66	46
Government should provide more services.	51	21	41
Favor government health insurance plan.	48	27	43
Blacks & minorities should help themselves.	38	67	49
Abortion should always be a personal choice.	46	30	39
Favored increased military spending.	37	60	40

For tables of full results see the NES website, <http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide>.

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a range of domestic concerns. The view of Layman and Carsey contrasts with Morris's. To Morris, party leaders, and President Clinton in particular, would "use polls to adjust not just his thinking on one issue, but his frame of reference so that it was always as close to congruent with that of the country as possible" (Morris 1999, p. 11). Similarly, the Pew analysis suggests that people with particular policy concerns align themselves with parties most sympathetic to those concerns.

Many analysts also disagree about what happens with old political issues as party leaders raise new concerns. Some think that issues are "displaced." That is, as new issues emerge as important, they replace older issues, which lose their importance (see, e.g., Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983). Others, like Layman and Carsey, say that there is a "conflict extension," where people who identify with political parties move with their party leaders farther to the extremes. In either event, party leadership has an important role in replacing issues on the

public agenda or sharpening the controversy around political topics.

Although party leaders can influence party loyalists, it is true that voters evaluate parties on an issue-by-issue basis. This means that voters look at parties and think one is better able to fix a problem than the other. For example, Republicans are often given more favorable ratings with respect to military and foreign policy. Meanwhile, Democrats benefit from domestic policy, or group benefit policies. In a recent Pew Center survey, participants were asked which party was better able to deal with several important problems. Table 2 shows where each party seems to have strengths and weaknesses on some of those issues.

Because parties appeal to different groups for support, they will identify different "issues" as "problems," they will weight their importance differently, and they will offer different solutions. Public opinion polls are useful tools for parties to use in addressing these issues and supportive groups. Polls are also useful in defining issues and candidates. Polls sug-

Table 2 Perceptions of Political Parties' Strengths and Weaknesses

<i>Issue</i>	<i>% Say Republicans Have Best Ideas</i>	<i>% Say Democrats Have Best Ideas</i>	<i>% Say Neither Party Has Best Ideas</i>	<i>% Don't Know or Refused</i>
Keeping Social Security financially sound	32	38	9	21
Providing prescription benefits to seniors on Medicare	21	39	9	31
Dealing with the Middle East	44	24	10	22
Dealing with military effort to destroy terrorist groups	56	19	5	20

Available on the Internet at <http://people-press.org/dataarchive>.

gest to candidates where they are vulnerable to attack and where their opponents are weak or strong.

This discussion has introduced readers to political parties and their relationships with survey research. Opinion polls and political parties have an interesting relationship. Parties rely on polls to tell them which ideas and leaders have the best chances of success. They have strategic value, such as indicating which issues and descriptions of candidates should be used. They can also help us evaluate parties and measure popular support for their platforms. They indicate which party as a group has the greatest support for its plans for dealing with important social issues, like keeping Social Security solvent or fighting terrorism. Polls also tell us that over time, party leaders and loyalists respond to issues or identify new issues, often in tandem.

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Presidents

Leading the public is the primary governing strategy of modern presidents. As part of the permanent campaign, presidents cultivate public support for their policy initiatives, reelections, and prestige in dealing with legislators, bureaucrats, media, and foreign diplomats. Public support increases the likelihood that presidents will achieve their policy and political goals; public support is a potential source of power for modern presidents (Neustadt 1990). The public has also become somewhat of a liability to presidents. Public expectations of presidential performance are often unrealistically high given the president's lack of unitary control over government and international events. The public typically punishes presidents for poor economic performance even though the chief executive cannot direct the economy. Despite the importance of public approval to the president's power and authority, having it does not guarantee the president success.

To cultivate public support and to temper high public expectations, modern presidents must know where they stand vis-à-vis public opinion. The most direct method of determining public support for the president involves measuring presidential approval. As a result, political scientists have dedicated much effort to learning about and explaining presidential approval and its impact on politics.

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Indeed, we know a great deal about presidential approval ratings. We know who approves of the president, what affects approval ratings, and how approval ratings trend within and across presidential administrations. We know that rally events and national addresses can increase, and a souring economy can decrease, approval ratings. I detail these next, beginning with a definition of presidential approval.

What Is Presidential Approval?

Since the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Gallup polling organization has assessed public support for the president. The typical question asked by Gallup, and since adopted by most other polling organizations, is "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [president's name] is handling his job as president?" Some polling organizations have extended this basic approval question to assess the president's handling of specific policy areas, such as foreign affairs, the economy, and health care.

Essentially, the president's approval ratings represent a continuous referendum on the president's performance in office. When presidents are able to fulfill their campaign promises, the economy happens to be growing, and the presidency is not mired in scandal, the public typically rewards the president with high approval ratings. As the economy sours, presidents reach stalemate with Congress, and foreign conflicts persist, the public punishes the president. Salient issues have the greatest impact on the public's evaluation of the president's job performance (Krosnick and Kinder 1990). Because the economy is often salient, especially when it is in recession, the state of the economy often determines a president's popularity.

Some may infer that presidential approval ratings represent the public's support of the president's personality, not the president's performance. Because the president's personality is stable over the course of his tenure (Barber 1972), yet presidential approval ratings fluctuate (see Figure 1), it follows that a president's job approval rating represents the public's support for the president's performance in office, not his personality. Besides, Gallup and other organizations also assess the president's favorability, which may be based more on personality than on performance (Cohen 1999).

Who Approves of the President

Two factors explain who approves of the president. First, party identification has a clear and unequivocal influence on the public's perception of the president's job performance. The party in the electorate shares beliefs with the party in government, which translates into party-based support for the president. Typically, Republicans approve of Republican presidents and Democrats approve of Democratic presidents. Second, the public has a deep psychological bond to the president, the central leader of the nation. As a result, the public is predisposed to respect, to trust, and to support the president. Lacking detailed information about the president's achievements and failures, the public will rely on a "positivity bias" and support the president (Edwards 1990).

The Rise and Decline of Presidential Approval

Presidents typically begin their tenure with high approval ratings. During the honeymoon, presidents act on campaign promises by proposing legislative initiatives. Presidents often receive high




Figure 1 Percent of the Public Who Approves of the President’s Job Performance, 1953–2002

approval ratings due to the public’s positivity bias (Edwards 1990, p. 123), euphoria over a new presidential administration, or because presidents have not yet had time to make inevitable mistakes that will hurt their public standing. Honeymoons vary in duration, but typically presidents have about 100 days during which they maintain the public’s favor.

Presidential approval ratings usually decline after the honeymoon. During this “disillusionment phase” (Ragsdale 1994) or “decay curve” (Brace and Hinckley 1992), presidents are held accountable to high public expectations. Some presidents may even experience an economic downturn (as with Ronald Reagan), lose support due to scandal (Bill Clinton), or pay the price for politically unpopular decisions (George H. W. Bush). Although most presidents regain public support toward the end of their first terms (Lyn-

don Johnson and George H. W. Bush both left the White House with approval ratings near or above 50 percent), two-term presidents are best able to weather this phase of public discontent as they experience an increase in public support throughout their reelection campaigns.

Presidents also begin their second terms with high approval ratings, usually as a result of a landslide reelection victory. Aside from President Clinton, who experienced an increase in job support in spite of impeachment proceedings, the other two-term presidents since 1950 all endured a decline in public support during their second terms. Dwight Eisenhower experienced his lowest public support during 1958 and an economic recession. Watergate led to the lowest approval ratings of any modern president, culminating in Richard Nixon’s resignation from office. Although Reagan finished strong

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with approval ratings above 60 percent, his public support also plummeted when the public learned of Iran-Contra.

Since Watergate, a long-term trend of lower average approval ratings through the Reagan administration seems to have reversed itself. Whereas Presidents Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson enjoyed average approval ratings much higher than Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Reagan, the Clinton and both Bush presidencies rival the former presidents' mean approval ratings. Even though approval ratings vary over time, and recent presidents are less likely to receive the benefit of the doubt from the public, post-Watergate presidents still achieve relatively high approval ratings, with the two highest approval ratings occurring after 1990 (see Table 1).

Events and Approval

Of course, presidential approval ratings are not strictly a function of broad trends. Events particular to each administration are also influential. One of the clearest and most consistent predictors of presidential approval is the state of the economy. Since John Mueller (1970) found a

link between the economy and approval ratings, scholars have discovered a link between approval ratings and inflation (MacKuen 1983) or unemployment (Monroe 1984, chap. 4). When the economy improves, presidents tend to reap higher job approval ratings. When the economy sours, the public holds presidents accountable, resulting in lower levels of approval. This pattern is consistent with retrospective public evaluation of its politicians (Fiorina 1981). That is, the public rewards or punishes the president based on how well he—and the economy—are doing. Moreover, the public's evaluation of the president is often not the pocketbook but rather sociotropic in nature (Kinder 1981). An individual does not evaluate the president according to whether he is personally doing well economically, but whether the president can alleviate economic strife for the entire nation. Public expectations about the future state of the economy also fuel presidential approval ratings (MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992).

Even though the state of the economy is crucial to the president's public support, presidents cannot typically improve

Table 1 Presidential Approval Ratings by Presidential Administration

<i>President</i>	<i>Average Approval</i>	<i>Maximum</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
Eisenhower	65	79	48	6.88
Kennedy	71	83	56	7.14
Johnson	56	79	35	13.20
Nixon	48	67	24	13.68
Ford	47	71	37	7.14
Carter	47	75	28	12.17
Reagan	52	68	35	7.71
Bush	62	89	29	14.11
Clinton	55	73	39	7.57
G. W. Bush	71	90	51	12.03

Note: G. W. Bush is through September 8, 2002.

the economy to increase approval ratings (see, *inter alia*, Golden and Poterba 1980). Even if presidents could improve the economy, it is not clear that the public would realize this. Public approval is often the product of public perceptions, not fact (Edwards 1990, p. 141). Fueled by media attention to the 1991 recession, for example, the public perceived that the economy was still in decline well after it had recovered, leading to low approval ratings and an electoral defeat for George H. W. Bush (Hetherington 1996).

Presidents also benefit from rally 'round the flag-type events, typically international in nature. Diplomatic successes as well as international crises can increase the president's approval ratings. After he helped broker the Camp David Accords, Jimmy Carter received a burst of goodwill from the public, and his approval ratings increased. Ronald Reagan received a similar bump after U.S. troops rescued medical students from Grenada. Rally events lead to only a small increase in the president's approval ratings, as long as the president has not already reached a high level of approval. As a result, some presidents do not experience a bump in support even when they act on what may be considered a rally event. When Clinton launched air strikes against Afghan and Sudanese targets in 1998, he received no noticeable increase in public support, having already reached a relative high point. Moreover, rally events are strictly short-term bumps. Any prolonged international conflict generally hurts the president's public support.

Although more speeches do not necessarily correlate with higher or lower approval ratings (Powell 1999), national addresses tend to increase the president's job approval ratings (Brace and Hinckley 1992). On average, presidents who make

national addresses improve their approval ratings by about 4 percentage points. For example, in May 2002, George W. Bush's approval ratings slipped to its lowest level before September 11, 2001 (about 70 percent), yet a national address in June 2002 increased his approval by about 4 percentage points. National addresses allow presidents to speak directly to the public and appear presidential and in charge.

Does Approval Matter?

Knowing what affects approval ratings and how they vary over time is important. But knowing whether or not approval ratings affect the president's success in dealing with Congress or the public is crucial to how government works. As a general rule, high approval ratings increase the likelihood of presidential success in Congress, whereas an unpopular president tends to invigorate the opposition (Neustadt 1990). In other words, popular presidents increase the chances that they will be successful in Congress, whereas unpopular presidents have little chance to secure even minor policy initiatives. Even though party makeup in Congress is the best predictor of success, popular presidents governing under conditions of unified government still have greater success rates than unpopular presidents governing under similar conditions (Bond and Fleisher 1990, p. 193).

Approval also matters when presidents attempt to influence the public's support of policies. Generally, presidents have great difficulty influencing the public, whether by increasing an issue's salience (Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2002) or by changing the public's perception of an issue (Edwards and Eshbaugh-Soha 2000). Presidents who can affect public opinion are usually popular (Page and Shapiro 1985).

Polling in the White House

As public expectations have risen, presidents have become more concerned with cultivating public approval as a source of power. Concomitant with this rise in public expectations has been an institutional structure to deal with them. Instead of relying on external polling organizations to conduct surveys, every administration since Nixon has had a polling organization as part of the White House office. Polling within the White House has followed a predictable trend: all presidents use polls, and they tend to use them more than their predecessors. Presidents also use polls to determine the public's positions on the president's policy initiatives or what types of people watch the president's speeches. Bill Clinton even commissioned a poll to see where the public thought he should vacation.

Lacking any definitive study on the question, we cannot say under what conditions presidents are more likely to follow polls or whether attention to polling is an individual preference. We can say, nevertheless, that presidents pay attention to polls and use them—maybe not to determine their specific positions on every issue but to tailor their strategies to cultivate public support. After all, even though approval does not *determine* presidential success in Congress or the ability to lead the public, it matters, and presidents know this (Edwards 1997).

Presidential Approval and Democracy

Presidential approval ratings matter to individual administrations. But do they matter to democracy in general, and if so, how do they matter? One of the major benefits of public opinion polling is that it gives elected officials an insight into the minds of those whom they represent. Polling lets politicians know what the

public is thinking and how it wishes to be governed. Although polling data do not guarantee that representatives will interpret public opinion accurately and use it wisely, public opinion polls—and presidential approval ratings—may increase responsiveness and improve democracy.

Approval ratings, in particular, provide a reliable barometer of presidential performance without suggesting a specific course of action. A president experiences low approval ratings for one clear reason: the public does not approve of his job performance. Because presidents cannot unilaterally improve approval ratings (as evidenced by the limited impact on popularity of rally events and speeches), approval ratings are unlikely to encourage demagoguery and whimsical responsiveness. In turn, they encourage presidents to pursue broad support, possibly doing what is right for the entire nation, yet limit responsiveness to capricious public concerns. Contrary to the fears of the Founders, therefore, appealing to public opinion does not necessarily mean responding to the whims of public concern, as long as a president understands his limitations in improving his own approval ratings in a democracy.

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Presidents and Foreign Policy

According to a civics textbook view of U.S. democracy, presidents gain a sense of the minimally acceptable and maximally tolerable in foreign policy through polling and campaigning, and thus a close connection between what presidents propose in foreign policy and public opinion is maintained. Reality, as defined by the state of the art in political science, suggests a more complicated relationship between presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy, however. In this entry I review political science scholarship on the subject and provide an overview of the role public opinion has played in the presidencies of the last half of the twentieth century.

Presidents historically have been loathe to admit considering polls in making foreign policy. Indeed, attention to public opinion polls and effective stewardship of U.S. foreign policy have not been closely associated in either theory or practice throughout the history of scientific polling. In their reluctance to declare that public opinion matters in foreign policy,

presidents reflect a strong theoretical tradition holding that issues involving foreign relations ought to be insulated from the unstable and uninformed character of public opinion. For much of the Cold War, empirical examination of poll data offered support for the proposition that public opinion provides an unreliable basis for the pursuit of an effective foreign policy. Thus, presidents have been expected to act in foreign affairs on the basis of their assessment of the national interest, not in response to opinion polls.

Since the Vietnam War, the links among presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy have been reexamined and reconceptualized. Political elites held public opinion responsible for interfering with the defense of U.S. national interest prior to World War II; the failure of intervention in Vietnam led to the opposite conclusion: that decisionmakers isolated from public opinion could commit the United States to dangerous and imprudent interventions. The Vietnam experience unleashed renewed academic interest in public opinion and a growing sense that popular opposition to policy can act as a prudential constraint on military intervention. A revised understanding of the relationship between foreign policy makers and the public emerged after Vietnam, holding that the public and policymakers are linked in a reciprocal relationship (see Holsti 1992, 1996; Powlick and Katz 1998).

I first trace three main theoretical traditions used to interpret the relationship among public opinion, the president, and foreign policy: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. I then turn to an overview of the historical relationship between the foreign policies of presidents and public opinion. I begin with Franklin D. Roosevelt and place the public opin-

ion/foreign policy relationship of successive presidents into three categories. Finally, I consider future directions of research into the relationship among presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy.

Realist Theory of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Following World War II, political elites in the United States embraced the so-called realist theory of foreign policy leadership (Jacobs and Shapiro 1999). Historical experience, reinforced by empirical evidence, made uncontroversial the idea that elected officials should make foreign policy insulated from the vox populi. Prominent commentators argued that the dangers of the emerging Cold War required that the United States maintain an active role in international affairs. Moreover, these analysts considered public opinion either unsupportive of U.S. international engagement or too mercurial to provide a consistent guide for policymakers. At the same time, early poll data showed how utterly uninformed average Americans were about the most basic features of the international scene; therefore public opinion did not seem a reliable basis to undergird an activist foreign policy (see Mueller 1973; Holsti 1992, 1996).

Commentator Walter Lippmann gave voice to the normative injunction against consideration of public opinion in foreign policy, warning that it "has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures" (Lippmann 1955, p. 20, quoted in Holsti 1992, p. 442). For Lippmann and others, policymakers had been too solicitous of a public opinion that opposed U.S. international engagement during the interwar period, when events proved it would have been prudent to do so. To ensure

U.S. security at the close of World War II, Lippmann, along with Hans Morgenthau and George Kennan, advocated an activist foreign policy to contain communism. Their low regard for the ability or willingness of public opinion to contribute positively to this endeavor, combined with the paucity of evidence that the public had knowledge of foreign policy issues, led to the so-called Almond-Lippmann consensus: public opinion was too volatile, emotional, and unstructured to be a meaningful factor in foreign policy formulation (Holsti 1992, 1996). Instead, elected officials were expected to generate public support behind policies they identified as meeting the national interest and not be perceived as responding to popular pressures.

Whether or not presidents and their aides have actually considered polls during private deliberations on foreign policy, they and their advisers are reluctant to acknowledge the influence of public opinion on their decisions. For example, while interviewing State Department officials for his influential 1973 release *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, one of Bernard Cohen's high-level respondents famously quipped: "To hell with public opinion. . . . We should lead, and not follow" (p. 62). Similarly, when Lyndon Johnson sought advice in November 1967 as the Vietnam War grew unpopular and his resolve became unsteady, Abe Fortas counseled that the president ignore those advising retreat in the face of popular pressure. Instead, Fortas proposed that the administration "do what we consider right. . . not what we consider (on a highly dubious basis with which I do not agree) the 'American people' want" (Abe Fortas letter to Lyndon Johnson, November 9, 1967, quoted in Berman 1989, p. 106). In the most recent presidential cam-

paign, George W. Bush echoed this realist view of foreign policy leadership, offering implicit criticism of the incumbent administration in his final campaign debate with Vice President Al Gore by asserting that "we have to be steady, we can't worry about polls or focus groups. You've got to have a clear vision. That's what a leader does" (*New York Times*, October 18, 2000, p. A26).

Liberal Theory and Public Opinion

With its focus on the individual, liberal theory offers three avenues through which citizens influence their government's foreign policy. First, a liberal economic system generates incentives for wealth creation, encouraging commerce and trade and thereby discouraging war, which is disruptive of the economic interests of individuals. Second, a liberal political system gives voice to ordinary citizens through elections, and thus democracies would be more inclined than authoritarian systems toward pacifism, as those who fight would be hesitant to authorize war. Last, a form of sociological liberalism advocates transnational ties and institutions that familiarize individuals across boundaries and build bonds, making the outbreak of war less likely (see Nye 1988). All these liberal variants emphasize the relationship between citizen interest and the national interest and consider the participation of public opinion in formulating foreign policy beneficial (Kahler 1997).

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was dedicated to the establishment of a global liberal economic system and the development of governmental and nongovernmental international organizations. The Almond-Lippmann consensus, however, discredited the notion of liberal peace, as the volatile, emotional public

was considered just as likely to pressure a reluctant government toward war as a bellicose government toward peace. At the same time, the promotion of democracy abroad took a backseat in U.S. foreign policy to anticommunist containment, with successive presidents placing a higher value on keeping pro-Western elites in power in foreign capitals than in allowing the popular will in those countries to be expressed (Mastanduno 2002). Coincidentally, just as public opinion analysts began to revise their understanding of the role of public opinion on foreign policy, international relations theorists uncovered empirical support for the liberal peace, and the approach of U.S. presidents began to shift on both scores.

The reluctance of democracies to fight other democracies has been championed by several international relations theorists and trumpeted by U.S. leaders. Even a realist such as former president Richard Nixon (1994) embraced the idea of promoting democracy in Russia to benefit U.S. national security. Democratic peace theorists identify two possible sources of the phenomenon: liberal norms and institutional structures (Russett 1993). Regardless of whether the norm of peaceful conflict resolution or the separation of powers serves as the primary causal factor in democratic peace, the free expression of democratic publics in competitive elections is a crucial ingredient in limiting the war option between democracies (Ray 1995).

Of course, it was precisely this fear of public intrusion into the determination of state interest that led realist theorists to encourage policy elites to ignore public opinion. The reluctance of elites in a democracy to trust public opinion on foreign policy made sense when the public was thought to be easily manipulable or

irrational, but after the Vietnam War, polling evidence confirmed that public opinion was coherent, structured, and affected policy (see, e.g., Holsti 1992, 1996; Jentleson 1992, 1998; Wittkopf 1990; Aldrich et al. 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992). It remains to be seen whether greater empirical and normative support for liberal theory translated into a changed relationship among presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy.

Constructivism, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy

Public opinion may have a more subtle relationship with presidents and vice versa than survey or archival research can detect. Perhaps broad societal forces influence what is acceptable for a leader to undertake in the name of the state. Constructivism provides a third avenue to help us understand the relationship between presidents, public opinion, and foreign policy by highlighting the significance of nonmaterial factors such as identity in the definition of a state's national interests (see Katzenstein 1996). To constructivists, interests are "socially constructed," meaning that an interactive process among members of societies produces international policies (see, e.g., Finnemore 1996; Hopf 1998). Whether U.S. identity is that of a self-interested great power, a benevolent force in world affairs protecting the vulnerable, or something in between is a question suitable for constructivist inquiry. In contrast to realists and liberals who concentrate on the "logic of consequences," constructivists focus on how the "logic of appropriateness" conditions state behavior (Finnemore 1996). Perhaps the broad outlines of what a president can do in foreign policy is drawn not by responses to polls but by an interactive process of defining

state interest and identity, or what is appropriate for U.S. foreign policy. To date, constructivists have not linked public opinion to national identity, but this is an untapped avenue for building theory about the connection between public opinion and foreign policy.

Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: The Initial Stage

Politicians have always been sensitive to public opinion; it is only during the era of scientific polling that the linkage between the views of citizens and foreign policy may be readily investigated (cf. Eisinger 2000). Though public opinion can be represented by various measures, including elections, letters to the editor, and organized protest, scientific opinion surveys provide us with the best approximation of "public opinion" (Geer 1996; cf. Powlick 1995). Susan Herbst (1993) suggests two ways in which presidents use public opinion information contained in polls. First, opinion polls may provide presidents with a gauge of how they and their policies are faring with the public, or the receptivity of the public to prospective policies. When utilized in this fashion, polls are *instrumental*. Second, polls may be used to influence public opinion and politics. Used in this way, polls are *symbolic*, meaning that the data gleaned from surveys are packaged as part of a public relations campaign to persuade citizens, members of Congress, allies, and others that the public is behind the president's policy. For the purposes of this overview, we divide presidents and foreign policy polling into three descriptive and chronological stages: (1) an initial stage when presidential polling was embryonic and primarily instrumental (Franklin D. Roosevelt–Eisenhower); (2) a transitional phase when polling became

more sophisticated and institutionalized (Kennedy–Johnson); and (3) the modern period, when the interpretation and symbolic dissemination of poll data became an essential White House function (Nixon–present).

The era of scientific polling began during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, so our survey of the relationship between public opinion and the chief executive begins with him. Roosevelt was the first president to have a relationship with a pollster, Hadley Cantril, who provided polls on issues such as the president's assistance to Britain in 1941 (Ruggie 1997) and even bombing strategy during the war (Geer 1996). Not surprisingly, President Harry Truman was blunt about his distrust of public opinion surveys given the failure of polls to predict his 1948 election victory. Truman believed that someone "who is influenced by the polls or is afraid to make decisions which may make him unpopular is not a man to represent the welfare of the country" (quoted in Foyle 1999, p. 180). Eisenhower had a greater interest in polls than his immediate predecessor but shared the view articulated by the Almond-Lippmann consensus that foreign policy should reflect the leadership's assessment of the national security interest and that, if necessary, public opinion could be educated to provide support (Foyle 1999). For the most part, this group of presidents had limited access to public opinion data and analysis. Pollsters may have provided readings of public opinion, but during this period the White House was not organized to initiate, process, or propagate polls.

Transitional Phase

The next era of presidential polling on foreign policy began when John F. Kennedy

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institutionalized the collection and interpretation of public opinion data in the White House (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995). Kennedy built a relationship with the pollster Louis Harris during his campaign for the presidency and commissioned sixteen polls from the Harris firm while in the White House (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995, p. 167). Lyndon Johnson installed a more refined apparatus for gauging public opinion. The White House endeavored to use the polls of Oliver Quayle and others to lead opinion in realist fashion and build public support for the president's Vietnam policy. Johnson's aides also engaged in symbolic polling, placing favorable opinion polls in selected media outlets to counteract the impression from other polls that the people were against the president on Vietnam (Jacobs and Shapiro 1999). Yet the Johnson White House did not use these data to uncover public beliefs informing popular opinion on the president's policies (Altschuler 1990). At this stage, presidents were becoming more sophisticated and systematic in their use of public opinion, but this phase was a transition to the ultimate masters of symbolic polling: the Nixon administration.

The Modern Period

With a wealth of experience in public relations and marketing, the Nixon White House took public opinion and polling to a new level. The president and senior officials took a keen interest in public opinion, survey research, as well as the impact of news coverage. Nixon's team employed an outside polling firm, Opinion Research Corporation (ORC), to conduct its private surveys but kept its links to ORC hidden. The Nixon White House also made efforts to influence public pollsters, both in terms of poll ques-

tions asked and in how results were reported. In addition, White House polls were sometimes used as a corrective to unfavorable published polls (Jacobs and Shapiro 1995/1996). Nixon's team also timed private polls to coincide with major presidential speeches on Vietnam, so that the White House could use the public's positive responses to affect the political debate, all the while keeping their sponsorship of the poll concealed (Katz 1997).

Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency as the antidote to the secret, heavy-handed Nixon administration. The Carter team had a capable pollster in Pat Caddell, but the White House did not position itself to make maximum benefit of its polling operation as did the Nixon administration. There was little effort to probe Caddell's surveys for an underlying structure to the foreign policy beliefs of the public (Katz 2000). Moreover, there was no one in the Carter administration who had the expertise to question Caddell's interpretation of the polls (Heith 1998). So, unlike in the Nixon administration, polling did not contribute to Carter's policy salesmanship. Instead, Carter's political opponents were able to use their own polling data in an effort to persuade public opinion that the president's policies on the Panama Canal, arms control, and the like were not worthy of support (Katz 2000).

The Ronald Reagan administration brought a command of polling back to the White House. Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin provided regular opinion data to administration officials. In an interview with Kathleen Shoon Murray, Reagan aide David Gergen confessed that Wirthlin's data were "enormously valuable in knowing how to frame issues . . . and even more valuable in knowing how to

word arguments" (quoted in Murray 1999, p. 22). When the administration perceived an impending public relations disaster following the 1986 Reykjavik summit, officials quickly commissioned a poll, with Wirthlin's findings providing the necessary ingredients for a campaign to counteract negative impressions of the summit (Murray 1999). In contrast, in the face of public opposition, Reagan remained dedicated to the cause of the Nicaraguan contras. The administration devoted resources to realist opinion leadership, but in the end the sensitivity of members of Congress to what public opinion might become resulted in a level of support for the contras below what presidential rhetoric indicated would be necessary (Sobel 1993).

In contrast to his two immediate predecessors, George H. W. Bush brought a wealth of foreign policy experience to the White House. Given this background, coupled with his normative predisposition toward realist leadership, we would expect public opinion polling on foreign policy to recede in importance during his term. Indeed, on issues such as the reunification of Germany, Bush proceeded based on his assessment of the national interest, regardless of domestic criticism (Foyle 1999). During the 1991 Gulf War, however, polling led the White House to doubt public patience for sanctions and its tolerance for a costly war, and to appreciate the public's receptivity to justifications for war based on Iraq's nuclear program (Mueller 1994). Former executive branch official Ronald Hinckley concluded that public opinion was as significant to Bush's conduct of the war as technology (1992, p. 120). Interestingly, as poll data indicated displeasure with the administration's emphasis on foreign policy following Bush's triumph in the

Gulf War, the White House shifted focus to domestic issues (Geer 1996).

In a 1997 interview, President Bill Clinton forcefully denied using polls to determine his policies, but he admitted using them instrumentally, as well as to decide "what arguments might best support a position that I believe is the right position for the country" (quoted in Foyle 1999, p. 195). Lack of public support appeared to constrain Clinton's policies on Somalia and, initially, in Bosnia. However, in 1995 Clinton asserted public support and took action against Serbia, insisting he was morally required to do so regardless of public opinion (Sobel 2001). Does this comment signal the continuing applicability of the realist approach to opinion leadership, or do post-Vietnam presidents have a more nuanced relationship with the public?

Conclusion

At a September 1994 press conference, Clinton observed that the public is always skeptical of military action at first "unless our people have been directly attacked" (quoted in Foyle 1999, p. 195). This was probably as true for FDR as events seem to demonstrate in the wake of September 11. The nation does rally to the commander in chief's side when U.S. prestige is on the line (Mueller 1973), but it is a mistake to think that presidents can reliably manipulate foreign engagements to boost their popularity (for a review of the literature on diversionary war, see Meernik 2001). Instead, as this entry demonstrates, presidents use polls to gauge what is possible in foreign policy and to help lead or manipulate public opinion (Shapiro and Jacobs 2001). Officials act according to a "public support norm" (Powlick and Katz 1998) that restrains presidents from

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pursuing foreign policies that lie outside the range of what the public considers appropriate. This range is defined neither by polls nor presidents alone but by society's conception of its identity—a pending subject of inquiry for students of public opinion and foreign policy.

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Part 2

PUBLIC OPINION IN
THE UNITED STATES

Section One: History

Founding-Era Elections: 1787–1824

Following the end of the Revolutionary War, the Founders of America, in a meeting in Philadelphia on May 25, 1787, that lasted nearly a year, attempted to diagram the best conceivable structure for a new government that would unite and guide the colonial states at the national level. The governmental system that was established and put into action less than two years later was the basis for what would become the modern system of parties, federalism, separation of powers, and national rule that we know today. However, in its early forms the federal system of government neither looked like a bastion of democracy nor contained many elements that could warrant a justified comparison to the party systems, electoral structure, or political operations of modern-day government. Instead, the period 1787–1824 suggests a tedious time in which glimpses of the foundations for modern governmental development could be occasionally seen but were frequently absent in the stead of fluid parties, sectional and regional political loyalties, issue-driven elections, and trial-and-error processes of national governance.

Partisanship and Politicians

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, political aspirants for federal office resembled little of today's

career politicians. Becoming a U.S. representative or U.S. senator meant travel through treacherous country by horse or carriage to a distant destination (New York, then Philadelphia, and finally Washington), housing in less-than-hospitable quarters, governance in which stability and surety were hoped for but never assured, and a return trip after several months with many questions about what had been done as well as its propriety. The men who did accept the challenge to become members of Congress often did so only as a stepping-stone to more preferable political office in their home state. Candidates of the time were single-mindedly ambitious about their political careers. The turnover rate was exceedingly high for the federal positions, and 83 percent came into their national positions with prior experience and 57 percent went on after holding congressional positions to assume other political duties and appointments at the state level.

The draw of congressional service came from significant benefits offered to those who wished to be known better at local levels as well as those who wished to be considered for state offices. Congressional publications as well as personal letters and pamphlets were frequently used to reach constituents (these were forerunners of political newspapers) and contained news on national policy, speeches

that the representative or senator had given, as well as reminders of voting dates and constituent meetings. Elections were also usually held on a district (versus an at-large) basis, thus establishing a more personal connection between elected officials and constituents.

Parties were weak at the national level and weak or nonexistent at the local level; coupled with regional acceptance of open and direct electioneering, this rendered the letters and other entrepreneurial electoral activities politically valuable to the candidate or incumbent. Therefore, Congress members would use the resources available at the national level to maximize their current base of support in order to pursue future prospects. Lax party control at the national level also made individual activity possible and placed local considerations at the forefront of a representative's decisionmaking processes. The chances and opportunities for further office would be much higher if an individual retired as a popular incumbent who could have won reelection in his district. The chief characteristic of their regions—weak political parties—was also characteristic of the country as a whole.

National Parties and Issues

At the national level, parties during this time were informal gatherings of "interests" instead of nationally organized and cohesive machines for policy proposal. In the South as well as around the country, nominees for federal office would nominate themselves or else attend an ad hoc meeting of friends, family, and other elites and be "nominated" by those individuals. Campaigns were limited to simple personal correspondence and limited pamphleteering. In addition, few campaigns or elections fell into the tradition-

ally understood two-party system of competition and organization. Even at the national level, congressional party leaders were not strong and advanced the chief executive's goals. Even when Henry Clay, a strong and popular Speaker, held the reins of the House, in five of the seven major policy controversies in which he became involved he failed to secure a majority of House members who would oppose the executive proposal.

When parties were involved in congressional, presidential, or state-level elections, they followed the political lines of opposition and support that arose from the consideration and debate of the Constitution and the major issues of the day. The three major questions/issues of the period were how much government was necessary, who should govern, and what positions the country should take in relation to England, France, and their conflicts across the ocean. The Federalists represented a party supportive of the Constitution, friendly to Britain, believing in central government and a ruling elite, and supportive of industry as well as urban development and financial structures with executive leadership. The strongholds for the Federalists at the beginning of the period were the New England states. The Jeffersonian Republicans, who would later become the Republicans, were associated with the belief in decentralized government, agrarian interest, confidence in a self-governing people, and favorable relations with France. The base of power for the Jeffersonian Republicans was the South. The border states between the two areas were often competitive.

These two parties did not resemble anything like the party systems of today. They did not operate with the mechanisms assumed to be integral to party operations today (organization at state

and local levels, nominating conventions, campaign organizations, party cohesion in the legislature). Nor did they bond citizens holding the same beliefs across the country. Instead, they arose at different points during this period, often adopted aspects of each other's platforms, were associated with different beliefs in different parts of the country, and accordingly were simply heuristics that citizens could use to identify issue stances that they supported in their region or state. Therefore, voters often could identify with different parties on different issues. Voters who elected a Republican congressman in one district were frequently not the same ones who voted for a Republican governor or who cast votes for Republican electors.

Organizational competition of parties rose and fell in response to issues, most of which arose in foreign policy and affected most states; but some were individual to states, and positions taken were strongly influenced by geography, cultural heritage, state pride, occupation, economic relations, religion, and other social attributes. Indeed, the competitive pressure for office often didn't come from the opposing party but instead from prior precedent or competition within the same party in power. The party organization's major reason for being was the winning of spoils and the opportunity for state politicians to use federal positions to rise to greater prominence in their own state. Committees provided valuable resources, and congressmen even at this time were claiming credit, advertising, and taking positions in order to exhibit busyness and a working ethic for their district. Therefore, although parties may have existed, they were political parties in name only and lacked the organization, cohesion, and durability associated with a developed party system.

Elections: 1789–1792

In late 1788, after the Philadelphia convention had concluded its debate and the Constitution had been ratified by eleven out of thirteen states (North Carolina and Rhode Island would wait a while longer), it was generally assumed by citizens and delegates to the convention alike that one man would be the country's first president: George Washington. However, Washington had hesitations about taking the office, such as his age (56), the power of his enemies in government, and the fact that he would be the first president of a new nation. However, chief among his concerns was that there would be competition for the office and that he would be forced to degrade himself through campaigns or defend himself on his previous actions and positions. This hesitancy set precedent for the future, as other candidates down the road would likewise express reluctance.

Washington's worries of competition were unfounded, although a partisan battle was pitched for vice president. The Federalists needed a candidate who could garner support in New England, and Alexander Hamilton and other Federalist leaders decided on John Adams as the nominee. However, as a failsafe against Adams receiving more votes than Washington and thereby becoming president (the constitutional system lacked the specification of the Twelfth Amendment that separates the two tickets: the winner of the most electoral votes was the president, and second place became vice president), Hamilton persuaded Pennsylvania and Connecticut to throw away some of their votes for vice president. The anti-Federalists nominated Governor George Clinton of New York as their candidate. The problem faced by the anti-Federalists,

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however, was that they were unable to criticize a government that had not been commenced. How would one protest something that might or might not occur?

Except for a snag in New York, the election went smoothly and as Hamilton had planned. In New York, the electors were chosen by the legislature (two states had popular election of electors) and the lower house had selected Clinton as vice president while the Senate had selected Adams. The result was that New York forfeited its electoral votes for the election and Washington won the presidency by 69 out of 69 electoral votes. Adams, however, received only 34 out of 69 votes but was still elected vice president.

In all respects, Washington's first term was a success, he had added a Bill of Rights to the Constitution to please anti-Federalists, he had seen new states enter the Union, and he had surrounded himself with brilliant men as his advisers and Cabinet. However, Washington witnessed infighting between Hamilton and Jefferson over the financial matters of the nation, as well as the Whiskey Rebellion, in which the militia was needed to quell a citizen uprising. In 1792 he was tired of the quibbling, was sixty years old, had suffered serious illness in 1790 and 1791, was going deaf and losing his eyesight, and was worried about his reputation being assailed in the political realm. He would be convinced, however, by sentiments presented through united pleadings by Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton that conflicts across the ocean necessitated a stability and continuity within the nation and that he was the only man for the job and must continue as president.

The 1792 election would bring the same result: Washington would be re-

elected unanimously, and Adams would be reelected after competition. Adams was again the Federalist vice presidential candidate and was again opposed by Governor George Clinton of New York. Washington received all 132 electoral votes to continue his tenure as president. Adams received 77 electoral votes to Clinton's 50 to win the vice presidency for another four years. During Washington's presidency, the nation did not witness the polarization of opposing parties or divisive issues that would threaten to unhinge the union. Instead, Washington delayed the rise of political parties by his tentative nature and unwillingness to begin or enter a political fray. Washington's landmark farewell address, containing strong opinions about faction, signified his presidency as a whole: he had worked for unity, and general unity had prevailed at the cost of strong or divisive faction or party. This era of political non-activity would not last, however, and political parties arose soon after Washington began his second term.

Elections: 1796–1816

By 1796 two parties had developed within the political structure of the nation. The primary concerns at the time were U.S. relations with France and Great Britain, and the propriety and levels of tariffs on U.S. trade. The Jeffersonian Republicans were bolstered by many people in the South who decried high tariffs and supported free trade and the French Revolution. In addition, Washington's neutrality during the conflict between Britain and France had angered those who assumed loyalty to France would arise from its loyalty to the states during the Revolutionary War. As an ill-fitting bandage, the Jay Treaty attempted to prevent European conflict within and

against the states. However, the British were not forced to pay indemnity for the slaves and ships they had carried off during the Revolutionary War, which further angered southern farmers. In addition, the treaty failed to relax British shipping restraints against the United States, which angered northern businesses. The debate and opposition to the treaty paved the way for the nation's first test of political fortitude.

In 1796, succession to the presidency became the largest issue facing the government. Would Jefferson and the Jeffersonians rise to power, or would Adams follow Washington in Federalist command? The campaign strategies were different for the parties: the Federalists courted the state electors, whereas the Jeffersonians attempted what could be known as the first grassroots movements in American politics. The Federalists proposed Adams for president and the Republicans submitted Jefferson. In December, Adams was announced as the winner, gaining 71 electoral votes to Jefferson's 68. The power of the presidency had successfully been passed from one member of the Federalist Party to another, marking the first transition of power in the country. In addition, the country now saw Federalists in control of the presidency and the Senate, and the Republicans in control of the House of Representatives. The election of 1796 is significant for the succession of power it peacefully witnessed as well as the ordering of presidential terms and elections that demarcate political time to the present day.

In 1800, all of the tranquillity and peaceful operation of government that the fledgling government had enjoyed would be put to the test. It was entirely a party contest, as there was little effort to

establish more than a rudimentary ideology as a platform. In addition, for the first time in U.S. history, there was no hero to head the government and the president, Adams, was forced to stand on the positions and operations of his tenure. As a result of the Jay Treaty, France had halted trade with the United States. In addition, Congress released dispatches from France (the so-called XYZ crisis) that expressed anti-U.S. sentiment. In the midterm election of 1798–1799, the Federalists, gaining from the anti-France groundswell, built their congressional lead, created the Department of the Navy, and passed the Alien and Sedition Laws and the Naturalization Act of 1798.

Federalist and Republican states attempted to change their form of appointing presidential electors to either popular vote or legislative appointment as best would suit the party in power and secure votes for the presidency. Raising democratic questions, only five out of 16 states chose their electors by popular vote. In addition, a Republican congressional caucus held in 1800 selected Jefferson as presidential nominee and Aaron Burr as his vice president (this was the origin of the caucus nominating system, which would continue until 1824). The tight competition that was expected led to the adoption of such party machinery as the creation of statewide election laws, party caucuses within states, and committees of correspondence, though party membership was still limited to elites and activists.

The primary threat to Adams came not from Jefferson but from within his own party. Hamilton so disliked Adams that he worked to take the election from Adams by attempting to influence votes in South Carolina, as well as by releasing scathing letters to the public that

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attacked Adams more devastatingly than Republicans had ever attempted. Adams forced the Hamiltonians in his Cabinet to resign in response. Neither party protested just on policy. Both appealed to regional prejudices, fears, and emotions concerning trade, European affiliation, and monetary debt to motivate and frighten voters to the polls.

After all the electoral votes were counted, Jefferson and Aaron Burr had tied with 73 electoral votes apiece. Adams ran a distant third with 65. The tie in the Electoral College forced the vote to the House of Representatives, where each state would receive one vote for their choice of president. On February 17, 1801, on the thirty-sixth ballot, Jefferson received the votes of 10 states, making him the victor. This election was significant because it represented the peaceful change of power from one party to another, the first real party-based election, as well as the inefficiencies of the Constitution. As a result of the tie for the presidency, the Twelfth Amendment was passed in 1804 and separated the balloting for presidential and vice presidential elections.

In 1804, Jefferson faced no opposition in his attempt to win reelection. His record, consisting of the Louisiana Purchase, new agrarian measures, encouragement of canals and other land improvements, lessened opposition to industry and labor, lack of opposition to the Bank of the United States, cutting of the levels of the Army and Navy, lowered debt, and good policy with Britain and France, created a seemingly undefeatable persona. The Republicans did hold the congressional caucus, renominated Jefferson unanimously, and decided to switch vice presidential nominees from Aaron Burr to George Clinton of New York. In a pri-

vate gathering unrepresentative of the nation as a whole, the Federalists proposed General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney as president and Rufus King of New York as vice president.

The election was dominated by the Republicans. They chose campaign committees for each state, set up local committees in closely contested states, utilized strong Republican daily presses, and directed news to the average person. The Federalists had no campaign at all in some states, and in New York, where Federalists were considering support of Aaron Burr, vicious attacks on his character by Hamilton ended the consideration and led to a duel between Burr and Hamilton in which the latter was killed. In total, Federalists received only 14 electoral votes while Jefferson won handily with 162 votes. The credit of the sweeping victory can be laid with the ability of the Republican Party to mobilize when necessary, the incapacity and decline of the Federalist power, and the administration record that pleased both Republicans and Federalists alike.

The election of 1808 is significant because the entire campaign was fought by and through the press and partisan newspapers and was a battle of personal attack and media speculation. James Madison was the heir apparent and had been mentioned by Jefferson as being a man better than Jefferson ever could have been. Because of the conflict between France and Britain, Jefferson had been forced to call for a trade embargo on a departure of all U.S. ships from U.S. harbors. France prohibited trade with Britain and would seize any Britain-bound cargo, and Britain had declared that it would seize any freight it saw as bound for France. The Federalists, having no organization of their own, attacked Madison

for being a supporter of France, another presidential nominee in the “Virginia Dynasty,” and breaking the proper succession of the vice president (Clinton) to the presidency. Because of his dealings in foreign policy, James Monroe was mentioned as a possible rival for Madison, someone who would be better equipped to handle conflict with Europe.

This factionalism broke the parties into Republicans, Monroeites, Clintonites, and Federalists. Feeling the possibility for victory or a swing in power, the Federalists were roused and began serious consideration of the election. However, this rallied the Republicans to Madison, who was elected in their congressional caucus with 83 votes to Monroe’s three and Clinton’s three. Clinton was nominated by the caucus for vice president. Now without a candidate, the Federalists again nominated Pinckney and King as their ticket. However, on November 7, Jefferson released correspondence that showed Madison as a defender of U.S. trade against Britain and France even to the point of war with them; the chances of presidential success for Monroe, Clinton, and Pinckney were over. Madison won the election with 122 electoral votes to Pinckney’s 47 and Clinton’s six; Clinton won the vice presidency with 113 electoral votes.

The election of 1812 came just five months after the war on Great Britain had been declared. The election centered on the issues about the justice of the war with Britain as well as the president’s methods of warfare. Party labels meant nothing in this election, as Republicans ran against Federalists, who were also called Federal-Republicans, and sometimes simply Republicans. On May 18, the congressional caucus nominated Madison by a vote of 81–1, but 51 delegates were absent. In New

York, the legislature voted to nominate De Witt Clinton as the Republican nominee, which left the Republican Party in that state in shambles. However, by appealing to Federalists and to Republicans in his campaign, he earned the distrust of contemporaries. The Federalists met on September 15, 1812, and in lieu of nominations simply agreed not to put forth a Federalist candidate.

For most Americans, Clinton was the Federalist candidate. The Clintonite platform denounced the Republican congressional caucus, accused Madison of ill preparation, and criticized the methods by which Madison was conducting the war (namely, attacking the surrender of General William Hull to British forces at the battle of Detroit). Madison’s campaign was better organized, and the Republicans carried out defenses of the war and of Madison in districts and states across the country. However, the final electoral vote (Madison 128, Clinton 89) signified the sectional differences and attitudes toward the war. Madison had received only 6 votes in the North and Clinton only 9 in the South. The impending end of the War of 1812, however, marked the end of the Federalist Party. The Republicans had simply absorbed the important issues of the day as well as established national campaign support when necessary. The Federalists had neither issues nor support and faded from the political scene.

Elections: 1816–1824

With the withering of the Federalist Party following the War of 1812, a new period of Republican rule came to dominate the political landscape. Members of Congress were free to act according to their constituency, and votes were determined on a sectional and issue basis. The

campaign of 1816 began with two candidates—James Monroe and William Harris Crawford. They were the secretary of state and secretary of war, respectively, in Madison's Cabinet. Having the paramount position, Madison was considered the next logical choice for president. When Crawford withdrew his candidacy, Monroe was the single nominee under consideration for the presidency. However, Rufus King arose yet again from the ashes of Federalism to claim 34 of the electoral votes.

The election was a virtual sweep for Monroe, who attempted to join all feuding factions of the political sphere by representing all regions and affiliations in his cabinet. This "era of good feelings" was a reality throughout the country as crowds in Federalist locales greeted him with hospitality, and the men he surrounded himself with (John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, William Harris Crawford) were arguably better men for the position of president than he himself was. The election of 1820, as a result, was virtually uncontested. The people of the country were enjoying greater suffrage in elections, as 235 of the electors were chosen by direct vote of the people, and only 72 were still chosen by the legislatures. A sense of general indifference pervaded, although there were issues such as slavery, arising from the issue of slavery in new states, and rising business power, backed by the Supreme Court case of *McCulloch v. Maryland*, which protected the branches of the Bank of the United States from taxation, and the *Dartmouth College* case, which put monopolies beyond the reach of federal legislation. In all, less than 1 percent of the eligible male population went to the polls in 1820, and Monroe won reelection by an electoral vote of 231 to 1.

Following the era of good feelings was the election of 1824, in which many contenders came forward to succeed Monroe. They were, however, all members of the Republican Party and ran on personality as well as sectional questions like slavery, tariffs, internal improvements, banking, and public land policy. The candidates also represented a new generation of leaders. They were men who were not part of the generation of elder spokesmen; in addition, there were no candidates from Virginia. In the beginning there were seven prominent nominees. Three of those, De Witt Clinton, William Lowndes, and John C. Calhoun, either withdrew or died before the end of the campaign. The remaining four, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, William Harris Crawford, and Andrew Jackson, were all qualified nominees in a race that would be determined by the House of Representatives.

Elimination of the Republican congressional caucus was perhaps one of the biggest changes seen during this election. Due to the decline and disappearance of the Federalist Party, it no longer provided the unity necessary to beat an opponent. In addition, every candidate but Crawford looked elsewhere for the party nomination in 1824. And Crawford, nominated by only 66 Republican congressmen who showed up (out of 261), signified that the caucus had lost its power and its prominence among the Republican Party members and leaders. Party conventions, legislative state caucuses, straw votes, and mass meetings were all used for candidates to officially become candidates in the race for president. As an example, Calhoun was endorsed by the South Carolina legislature in December of 1821. Without the presence of party as an identifier in the elections, personal attacks

frequented pamphlets and newspaper publications. Adams was criticized for his dress, Calhoun as a young man consumed with ambition, Clay as a drunkard and a gambler, Crawford for his honesty in light of the last election, and Jackson as a simplistic military man.

As state after state held its nominating convention it became clear that the contest was between Adams and Jackson. The South was solidly for Jackson and the North for Adams; as the electoral votes returned, no one candidate had the majority (Jackson 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, and Clay 37). As a result, the election was thrown to the House of Representatives once again. Clay, after long thought, threw his support behind Adams. Even though there were allegations that Adams had agreed to make Clay secretary of state for his support, Adams went on to win with the necessary 13 states. His first appointment immediately thereafter, for better or worse, was Clay to secretary of state. The contest had been closely decided by the House of Representatives with charges of impropriety and patronage. This would begin competition for the next election before the dust from this one had begun to settle.

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Jacksonian-Era Elections: 1828–1848

The elections of the Jacksonian era mark the genesis of those modern techniques now associated with presidential electoral campaigning. Although two newspapers conducted polls for the presidential election of 1824, polling as a science remained in its infancy during this period. Similarly, while Adolphe Quetelet asserted that mathematical principles could apply to the social sciences with his discussion of the "common man" in 1848, there was no general awareness of public opinion during this period. Instead, campaigning involved an engagement with the public to prompt and sustain interest in presidential candidates. During these two decades, the numbers of eligible voters participating in the process of selecting a president rose dramatically. This rise is partially due to the continuing expansion of the franchise, but a concerted effort to infuse personality into campaigning contributed as well. Prior to this era, decorous politicians refused to acknowledge their desire for the presidency; nor would they actively campaign for the most prestigious political post in the country. Andrew Jackson not only changed this mind-set; the era that takes his name also witnessed the increasing professionalism of politics. In addition, the elections from 1824 to 1828 were often marked by "dirty" tactics discrediting presidential candidates. During the

rise of the Jacksonian democracy, greater attention was paid to a candidate's character; often, it took precedence over their political views. As a result, this era witnessed a growing pandering to and manipulation of public perceptions in order to achieve party goals rather than a genuine canvassing of public opinion.

Election of 1828

As contested by Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, the hero of the Battle of New Orleans, the election of 1828 served as a referendum on the previous presidential election. Although that election had appropriately gone to the House of Representatives when none of the five candidates received sufficient electoral votes, Jackson, who had led both the popular vote and Electoral College in 1824, was embittered when the House elected John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts as president rather than recognize what Jackson termed the "will of the people." When Adams promptly selected another presidential contestant, Henry Clay of Kentucky, for the prestigious post of secretary of state, Jackson charged both with having struck a corrupt bargain to intentionally deprive him of the presidency. The 1828 campaign began almost immediately (the Tennessee legislature put forward Jackson's name in October 1825), driven by the notion that the people could right the wrongs committed four years earlier.

To contest the election, the Democratic-Republicans cohered quickly around Jackson and benefited from the organizational talents of New York's Martin Van Buren. The National Republicans, organized by Clay and Adams, defined themselves somewhat vaguely around support for tariffs and internal improvements but were more tenuously organized. Despite

policy differences, this election was more about personalities than ideas, especially as the candidates were a study in contrasts. Continuing attention to the "corrupt bargain" of 1824 hurt Adams, but he was also decried as an aristocrat of loose morals whose corrupting influence included introducing gambling (popular games) into the White House, whereas Jackson was depicted as a violent bigamist and adulterer (due to questions about the validity and timing of his wife Rachel's divorce from her first husband) whose ruffian tendencies would reflect poorly on the White House. However, the more savvy Jackson was well-served by the number of newspaper editors arrayed behind his campaign, and they, along with a "central committee of correspondence" managing the national message, were instrumental in shaping public opinion in his favor. In 1824, Jackson had expressed doubts about the viability of his candidacy but had been embraced by the larger citizenry. It was Jackson's ability to galvanize that same citizenry in 1828 that led to his landslide victory. Jackson was elected president with a record 642,553 votes (56 percent), and the incumbent John Quincy Adams received 500,897 votes (43.6 percent), almost 400,000 more votes than when he won in 1824. Although Adams remained strong in the Northeast, Jackson dominated in the South and in the newer regions of the West, a fitting outcome for the first president elected from west of the Appalachian Mountains. The continuing expansion of the franchise and a greater democratization of the process contributed to a dramatic increase in voter participation: almost 57.6 percent of those eligible voted, more than doubling the participation of 1824 (26.9 percent). A significant segment of the electorate was thus moti-

vated to participate due to the personalities involved; although these efforts were coordinated and the criticisms of both men resonated in all regions, public opinion remained organized on a local rather than national level.

Election of 1832

The election of 1832 continued the trend of increased participation; more than half of those eligible (55.4 percent) cast votes. Running for reelection, Jackson was vulnerable to charges that he had become the tyrant opponents had warned against in the election of 1828. Given his view that he was the sole representative of the people in the national government and thus had a unique mandate to shape legislation, Jackson was an unusually assertive and active president; over his two terms, Jackson would veto twelve bills, three more than all his predecessors combined. Under his direction, the Democratic Party continued to strengthen as an organization, a national result as well because many of Jackson's policies, such as rotation in office, affirmed the necessity of party loyalty. Nonetheless, organized largely around personality, such organizations might more appropriately be considered factions.

In addition to concerns over Jackson's patronage policies, the tariff, and internal improvements, the central issue of the campaign was the fate of the Bank of the United States. Although the bank's charter would not expire until 1836, the National Republicans in Congress, led by Daniel Webster, had urged Nicholas Biddle, the bank's president, to prematurely force the issue, believing Jackson lacked the courage to veto the bill. However, convinced that the bank represented the worst of special privilege, Jackson pledged to kill the "monster" institution. When

the National Republicans selected Henry Clay of Kentucky, who headed the opposition against Jackson in Congress and was financially backed by Biddle, as their candidate, the election was cast as a referendum on Jackson himself. Nonetheless, the National Republicans campaigned on specific policies, although the anti-Jackson issues (decrying the spoils system that Jackson had introduced to government and affirming the primacy of the Supreme Court in constitutional questions, an implicit criticism of Jackson's Native American policy) reinforced the impression that the election was fundamentally about the president. When he won 54.2 percent of the vote (701,780) to Henry Clay's 37.4 percent of the vote (484,205), Jackson was vindicated.

In addition to the two major parties, the election of 1832 involved a third party. The Anti-Masons had formed around distrust of the influential and secretive Masonic societies whose members included both Jackson and Clay. Their candidate, William Wirt, the former U.S. attorney general under both Presidents James Monroe and Adams, polled 7.8 percent of the vote, winning slightly more than 100,715 votes and receiving seven electoral votes from Vermont. Despite this weak showing, however, the Anti-Masons had convened the first national presidential nominating convention in Baltimore on September 26, 1831, a move soon followed by the two major parties. Although conventions had existed on the local and state levels, this election saw their extension to the national level. Replacing the traditional congressional caucus with conventions to select nominees demonstrates the greater democratization of politics during this period. By 1832, only South Carolina retained the use of the state legislature

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(rather than a popular vote) to select presidential electors.

Election of 1836

The election of 1836 was a pivotal election because it tested the ability of the Democratic Party to move beyond Andrew Jackson's personality. Nonetheless, the Democratic Party ran a campaign largely tied to Jackson; in fact, an 1835 convention had selected Vice President Martin Van Buren early in order to forestall any dissension against Jackson's selection of his successor. Long a proponent of the importance of party organization, Van Buren was an appropriate candidate to usher in an era that helped shape the second party system. Although Van Buren was considerably less popular than Jackson, under him the party mustered sufficient discipline for victory.

The National Republicans had given way to the Whig Party, which embraced Henry Clay's American System advocating national rather than local development. Unlike the Democratic Party, the emerging Whig Party remained stratified and ran three regional candidates for the presidency. Each candidate supported basic Whig policies, and each was backed by state legislatures in their region: Senator Hugh White of Tennessee received 73 electoral votes, Senator Daniel Webster of Massachusetts won 14, and General William Henry Harrison of Indiana received 26. The Whigs had hoped to throw the election to the House of Representatives with this sectional strategy, but they miscalculated when Van Buren, with 50.8 percent of the vote, received 170 electoral votes, 22 more than he needed, and won the election outright. However, Congress did have a role when the Senate selected the vice president for the first time after Democrat Richard

Johnson of Kentucky fell one vote short of victory in the Electoral College.

Election of 1840

The election of 1840 is particularly relevant to public opinion. It is the first election in which we see an emphasis on shaping public opinion by manufacturing personas for the candidates through the use of slogans and other techniques to stir the public imagination. Setting aside their failed regional strategy of 1836, the Whigs nominated William Henry Harrison; as the hero of the Battle of Tippecanoe during the War of 1812, he had military credentials to match those of Jackson, who continued to dominate his party. As his running mate, the Whigs chose former Democrat John Tyler, who had broken with Jackson over the Bank of the United States. When a Democratic paper questioned Harrison's ambition by stating that he would happily pass his days drinking cider by a log cabin, the Whigs embraced this image and successfully portrayed Harrison as a frontiersman and turning the log cabin into a badge of honor. Furthermore, the Whigs embraced traditionally Democratic techniques and got out the vote with slogans such as "Tippecanoe and Tyler too!"

Despite concern that economic conditions would hurt his candidacy, the Democrats retained the incumbent, Martin Van Buren, as their candidate. However, whereas there was no significant rival to Van Buren, there was dissension over the vice president (largely southern concerns over Johnson's open family life with an African American woman). Interestingly, this election echoed many of the elements of 1828, only reversed. Whereas then the Democratic nominee was heralded as the common man, now Van Buren was depicted as an unwelcome

holdover of the past (“Van, Van, Van / Van is a used-up man”), an aristocrat, or perhaps a secret monarchist out of touch with the common man who was now represented by Harrison, the Whig candidate. With this election, the Whigs successfully took the election to the people—they bought newspapers to circulate their message, they sent party speakers on tour, they employed mass rallies to stir up emotion. All these techniques were done to reach voters, and the Whigs succeeded far more ably than the Democrats, who had pioneered these techniques. Although the popular vote was close, 1,275,390 (52.9 percent) to 1,128,854 (46.8 percent), a difference of 146,536 votes, the Whigs won decisively in the Electoral College, 234 to 60. However, a month into his administration, Harrison succumbed to pneumonia and as president, Tyler proved to be a Whig in name only.

Election of 1844

In the election of 1844, both major parties confronted slavery as a political issue. Although Van Buren was considered the likely Democratic nominee, his opposition to the annexation of Texas, in a party dependent on southern support, damaged his chances. Instead, in a first for the parties, a compromise candidate, former Tennessee governor James Polk, came through on the ninth ballot, with George M. Dallas as his running mate. This decision reflects how thoroughly the Democratic Party had organized—they recognized that a deadlocked convention would damage the party and opted for another course. By 1844, under the leadership of Van Buren, the Democratic Party had transformed itself into a disciplined organization, recognizing that the good of the party superseded the fate of its standard-bearer.

After the disappointment of the Tyler administration, the Whigs returned to Henry Clay, the most prominent Whig of his time, with Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey as his running mate. The Whigs were as united as the Democrats but faltered somewhat when Clay uncharacteristically supported the annexation of Texas and alienated the anti-slavery northern Whigs, an important segment of the party. The ramifications of this decision were most clearly seen in New York, where the race between the Democrats and the Whigs was extremely close. There the Liberty Party, a third party founded on an abolitionist platform headed by James G. Birney of Michigan, siphoned off sufficient votes to throw the state’s 36 electoral votes to the Democrats. The two parties were separated by only 5,106 votes, and the 15,812 votes of the Liberty Party were decisive.

In an election where the two parties’ platforms differed mostly on how to handle proceeds from the sale of public lands (Democrats favored retention by the federal government, whereas Whigs advocated disbursement to the states), the popular vote was extremely close. Polk won 1,339,494 (49.5 percent) to Clay’s 1,300,004 (48.1 percent), with 170 electoral votes to Clay’s 105. Although the Liberty Party did not win any electoral votes, its 62,103 votes (2.3 percent) were larger than the margin of victory between the two leading candidates.

Election of 1848

Whereas it could be glided over in 1844, given the lands from the Mexican Cession needing organization, the issue of slavery was paramount. The Whigs selected General Zachary Taylor, a military hero from the Mexican War, as their candidate. However, having learned from

Clay's misstep, Taylor refrained from airing his views on public policy. Nonetheless, as Taylor was a slaveholder, many antislavery Whigs abandoned the party. The Democrats were similarly wracked by dissension over slavery (New York sent two delegations to the national convention; one delegation walked out and formed the nucleus of a third party) and returned to Lewis Cass, a senator from Michigan who advocated allowing territorial residents to choose their own institutions, to head the ticket. The third party contesting the election was made up of the remnants of the Liberty Party as well as northern Whigs and Democrats who were disaffected by their parties' proslavery stances. Although the Free Soil Party was a new entity, it was led by the experienced Martin Van Buren. The Whigs won the election with 1,361,393 (47.3 percent) and 163 electoral votes over the Democrats, who received 1,223,460 (42.5 percent) and 127 electoral votes. Although the Free Soil Party did not receive any electoral votes, its 291,500 votes represented 10.1 percent of all votes cast, almost a five-fold improvement over the votes its precursor, the Liberty Party, had won four years earlier. This success represented a growing trend against the expansion of slavery, an issue of greater importance over the 1850s.

Conclusion

The elections of the Jacksonian period began with Andrew Jackson's triumph in the election of 1828. Carried to the White House on a wave of popular approbation, Jackson fundamentally changed the approach of politicians to electioneering. In 1828, two parties emerged to contest the election, bringing with them the first glimmers of the development of a party organization as well as a sophisticated

recognition that success required a party apparatus to organize "the people" in the service of ideology. The intense popular interest in the election itself was aptly illustrated when Jackson's inauguration was overrun by several thousand of his enthusiastic supporters.

Over time, this popular interest in elections grew. This period represents a sea change in the national concept of politics as the ideal of an independent politician using his own sober judgment and reason to make decisions for the nation eroded in favor of a politician elected precisely to carry out the "will of the people" expressed in specific policies. The greater importance placed upon public opinion is reflected in the growth of conventions, both nominating and platform-oriented, and the rise of voter turnout from 3.8 percent in 1824 to 16.7 percent in 1856 due to the gradual elimination of property or taxpaying qualifications that led to near-universal suffrage for white adult males. In addition, campaign literature and songs proliferated, and it became common for candidates to embark on national speaking tours and to release their views on salient issues of public policy. Nonetheless, despite these changes and advances, it remains a misnomer to discuss public opinion in its contemporary usage. When polling was done, it was still very small and largely local. Thus, despite the party understanding of a need to influence the public, when we discuss public opinion, it remains the opinion of an educated elite.

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Civil War–Era Elections: 1850–1866

Democracy and self-determination could solve pressing national problems. So concluded many U.S. politicians in the aftermath of Andrew Jackson's presidency. Indeed, policymakers confronting the growing sectional crisis over slavery often advocated local majoritarian rule, allowing the people of a given area to decide themselves issues such as the legality of bondage. *Popular sovereignty*, as this solution came to be known, remained mostly a Democratic Party nostrum. But the Jacksonian democratization of the preceding decades guaranteed it wide currency as an idea that embodied the egalitarian spirit of the age.

When antebellum politicians contemplated public opinion, popular sovereignty thus figured largely in their thought. Would the majority of Southerners acquiesce in secession? Might the northern public desire an end to sectional and partisan bickering? Ascertaining the public response to such questions through periodic elections, thus letting popular sovereignty run its course, came to represent a crucial fulfillment of the American republican experiment. If Americans could respect their countrymen's opinions as expressed through the democratic process, the North-South discord menacing the Union might subside. Key elections during the late antebellum and Civil War periods show how popular sovereignty was used and abused, prescribed and subverted, by both sides in struggles over the westward expansion of slavery and the meaning of the American Union.

The Early 1850s

By 1850, Congress had endured a four-year stalemate over the question of whether to allow slavery in its new, formerly Mexican territories. The introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, proposing to exclude racial bondage from these lands, ignited controversy in 1846. The dominant Whig and Democratic Parties suffered defections from antislavery leaders who endorsed the proviso, and the Free Soil Party emerged after 1848 in order to represent these new interests. Affairs seemed desperate by early 1850, when the "great compromiser," Senator Henry Clay, stepped forward to craft a rapprochement. Architect of previous sectional adjustments, including the Missouri Compromise and the Nullification-ending Compromise of 1833, an aging Clay for the last time tried to preserve his cherished

Union. As finally passed that autumn, the compromise admitted California directly into statehood without bondage, ended slave trading in the federal capital, allowed Utah and New Mexico settlers to decide the local status of slavery for themselves, and mandated a rigorous Fugitive Slave Act obliging Northerners to assist in capturing runaways. The nation as a whole rallied to this hope of warfare averted.

But not all parties were mollified by this resolution. Free Soilers denounced Whigs and Democrats for passing allegedly proslavery legislation, and dissident members of the two major parties opposed what they saw as piecemeal capitulations to either North or South. The revised Fugitive Slave bill, making slave catchers out of northern civilians, seemed particularly galling. Elections in fall 1850 allowed voters to express their opinions and select local and congressional candidates who pledged either to support or repudiate the recent measures. In Massachusetts, for example, a group of Free Soilers decided to join with Bay State Democrats in order to topple procompromise Whigs. Local Free Soil–Democratic coalitions elected twenty-two state senators compared with the Whigs' eight. Free Soilers and Democrats jointly won a majority of the state senate seats and 222 of the 438 spots in the statehouse—a rebuke to the Whigs who had helped in passing the compromise. Overall, however, elections across the nation demonstrated support for the legislation.

Down south the elections of 1850 turned not only on the compromise, but on recent plans for disunion. Since 1849, Dixie politicians had raised the specter of secession by calling for a convention to meet at Nashville, Tennessee, and consider the region's plight. Deliberations on

the compromise, however, took wind out of the sails of the Nashville movement. A New Orleans paper reported that, out of the 8 million–strong southern voting population, “not ten thousand” now took interest in electing delegates to the meeting. The convention adjourned for five months while watching the compromise proceedings, and after a second weak gathering, the 1850 secession movement fizzled. In various fall elections southern Unionists gained the upper hand and averted bloodshed. A joint Whig–Democratic “Constitutional Union” movement defeated Georgia secessionists by a margin of 22,000 votes, for instance. One by one, defensive southern states such as South Carolina and Mississippi saw Unionist electoral victories as signs that the South was not ready for concerted action. As these results indicate, sufficient acceptance of the compromise as the ultimate settlement of sectional tensions headed off disunion. Both Whigs and Democrats, North and South, thereafter wrote this “finality” into their party platforms and insisted that the crisis of the Union was over.

Bipartisan consensus over “finality” in fact obscured long-standing party differences as Whigs and Democrats prepared to elect a new president in 1852. In place of sharp, economically focused partisan competition, intraparty sectional fissures over the compromise became salient. The Baltimore Whig convention of 1852, for example, was dominated by Southerners' determination to write “finality” into the platform, with Northerners opposing the plan. Northern anticompromise Whigs gravitated toward General Winfield Scott, Mexican War hero, while their colleagues considered both Secretary of State Daniel Webster and President Millard Fillmore. “Old fuss and

feathers," as Scott was known in the military, held a reputation for being stiff and uncongenial as well as lacking any political acumen. Observers saw him as an "available" rather than a "regular" candidate. Scott's nomination represented party leaders' desire to avoid running an issue-based campaign and instead shepherd a closed-mouthed military candidate, à la William Henry Harrison and Zachary Taylor, into office. Although the Whig convention selected the northern-backed Scott, it also endorsed the finality of the compromise. This ensured that the party could not focus on sectional issues during the campaign itself, since it was now officially committed to settlement of all North-South questions.

In the Democratic camp a vibrant nationalistic movement calling itself "Young America" presented Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois as its candidate. Embracing a return to the heyday of Manifest Destiny expansionism, a quest for European intervention in support of republican revolutions, and a restive desire to unseat party elders, Young America appealed to the rancorous "spirit of the age." But the bitter Democratic convention saw major party candidates like Douglas defeat each other through forty-nine ballots. Only then did it settle on Franklin Pierce, a dark-horse New Hampshire doughface (the derogatory term for a southern-appeaser) who overwhelmed Scott. The Whigs seemed moribund as their candidate captured only four states (254 versus 42 electoral votes), although he garnered 44 percent of the popular vote as opposed to Pierce's 51 percent. Rounding out the canvass was Free Soil candidate John P. Hale with 5 percent of the popular vote. Whig inability to attract Free Soilers to Scott, coupled with southern anxiety about

Scott's possibly pro-North policies, cost them the election. Conversely, the return to the party of Barnburner Democrats, who in 1848 had bolted for Free Soil, sealed Pierce's victory.

Twitchy expansionists expected the new administration to reenact policies of territorial growth, while most voters also anticipated that the bipartisan commitment to "finality" would prevent future sectional agitation. Yet the blustery Stephen Douglas, having lost a presidential bid in 1852, hardly intended to leave the national stage. For years he considered it his mission to return control of government to local settlers. He envisioned a developed West united by a transcontinental railroad, needed to placate the South in preparation for future political candidacies, and wished to spread republican government throughout North America and the world. These priorities emerged in his Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, which organized those two areas as territories and allowed local settlers to decide the issue of slavery for themselves through the mechanism of popular sovereignty. In stipulating this, Douglas's bill overturned the Missouri Compromise's prohibition of slavery above 36 degrees, 30 minutes latitude, allowing black bondage into areas permanently reserved for free soil. Although he well anticipated the "hell of a storm" his scheme would generate in the North, Douglas's principled devotion to local democracy led him to push for passage of the act regardless.

Reactions came in midterm elections that fall, when northern Democrats held responsible for Kansas-Nebraska suffered staggering reverses. In Ohio, which had been a competitive Whig-Democratic state, anti-Nebraska forces scored resounding congressional victories. President Pierce's endorsement of the bill as a

Democratic litmus test deepened his party's losses. Eventually the furor unleashed by Kansas-Nebraska led to the formation of the northern Republican Party, an organization committed to free soil. But for the moment, Whigs hoped to capitalize on Democratic liabilities and did not yet join with other parties to create a sectional antislavery majority. An immediate beneficiary of the anti-Nebraska furor, however, was the nativist Know-Nothing Party, which grew in strength until the Republicans displaced it as the dominant anti-Democratic contender after 1856. Promising to counter the tide of papists and foreigners, Know-Nothings tapped the escalating anti-immigrant, protemperance persuasions of voters North and South. Protests against Pierce and Douglas offered them an opportunity to gain adherents.

The Republican Party, 1856–1860

As Know-Nothings took advantage of instability created by Kansas-Nebraska, the new Free Soil Republican Party reaped benefits from the Kansas civil war beginning in 1855. Here, according to Douglas's legislation, popular sovereignty would resolve the status of slavery. Hopes for local democracy turned into a sham, however, as free-state and slave-state forces from outside Kansas flooded the territory and battled for the outcome. The sack of Lawrence (free-staters' newly established capital), along with a massacre by the abolitionist John Brown and other acts of reciprocal violence, made "Bleeding Kansas" a sore test of popular sovereignty and a valuable instrument for Republican Party agitation. Together with the southern assault on Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the Kansas wars bolstered Republicans' prospects during their first presidential election.

Indeed, the platform crafted at the party's 1856 Philadelphia convention explicitly called for the admission of Kansas as a free state, as well as for enjoining the federal government to uproot slavery wherever constitutionally feasible (i.e., western territories). Republicans also echoed the old activist Whig economic program, mentioning in particular a transcontinental railroad, and chided Know-Nothings by decrying attempts to hinder any social group. The convention considered U.S. Supreme Court Justice John McLean for president before settling on John C. Frémont, California settler and western explorer. Straw balloting revealed 359 votes for Frémont and 190 for McLean. Republicans hoped to capitalize on residual northern anti-Democratic feeling due to Kansas-Nebraska, but there they had also to contend with the Know-Nothing movement. Nativist bickering over slavery caused a sectional split in Know-Nothing ranks, with "north Americans" eventually seceding over the party's endorsement of the Nebraska bill and flocking to support Frémont. Those remaining nominated the former president, Millard Fillmore, hardly a biting nativist but a palatable New York Unionist. In terms of nominations this was a season of safe choices, and Democrats followed suit by picking James Buchanan, a well-worn Pennsylvania officeholder whose main credential was being out of the country during recent animosities. The Democratic platform sustained popular sovereignty as the preferred way of settling slavery-related questions.

On the stump that autumn, Republicans played up the Kansas and Sumner affairs to give credence to their charge that a southern "slave power" was compromising white as well as black liber-

ties. In return, followers of Fillmore and Buchanan painted Republicans as the ushers of disunion and Frémont as a closet Catholic. Democrats polled solidly throughout the cotton belt, while Frémont and the Republicans captured New England and parts of the mid-Atlantic and Midwest. Buchanan won Pennsylvania and California (receiving a nationwide total of 174 electoral votes and 45.3 percent of the popular vote), and Frémont captured 11 free states and did not even appear on the ballot in 10 southern states. He ultimately received 114 electoral votes and 33.1 percent of the popular vote. Overall the results displayed a disturbing North-South divide. They also confirmed the death of the fractured Know-Nothing coalition and demonstrated impressive strength within the new Republican Party. Routed but emboldened by what one historian has called their “victorious defeat,” Republicans hoped to mount a successful challenge in 1860. Meanwhile they continued to harp on sectional issues and utilized their amalgamation with former northern Know-Nothings in order to make a strong showing in local and congressional races during 1858. That year, Democrats lost 18 congressional seats in the North, and Republicans did unexpectedly well in states like Pennsylvania and Illinois.

They did better still within two years, as the party turned down front-runner William H. Seward in support of Abraham Lincoln. Once again running on a platform that combined economic development with free soil, Republicans hoped to capture northern states that had gone out of reach in 1856. In Democratic circles only turmoil reigned, as southern delegates walked out of the party’s Charleston convention in April 1860.

Failing to realize their demand for a federal slave code to “protect” the western territories, southern Democrats reassembled and selected as their candidate Vice President John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Their northern colleagues chose Douglas and ran for popular sovereignty once again, despite its being effectively struck down in the U.S. Supreme Court’s *Dred Scott* decision of 1857. America’s last real bisectional coalition had fractured. In the South, Democrats also faced John Bell and the Constitutional Union Party, a conservative group vaguely dedicated to preventing secession.

The presidential election of 1860 is best understood as two contests: Breckinridge versus Bell in the South, and Douglas versus Lincoln in the North. It was widely rumored that the election of an antislavery president would result in southern secession, an event that seemed more likely after Lincoln swept almost every free state. Douglas came in second in the popular vote and won only Missouri; his southern counterpart, Breckinridge, carried 11 slave states. Bell gained Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, homes to many conservative Unionists with comparatively little investment in slavery. One must appreciate the momentousness of this outcome to account for the coming secession: a northern, sectional organization that had within the past decade begun as a marginal third party had now, with a minority of the popular vote (40 percent), captured the executive branch and elected a president committed to the ultimate destruction of slavery. To be sure, Republicans did not capture either house of Congress. Yet southern “fire-eaters” feared that the executive’s control of federal patronage would provide enough rewards to mildly antislavery southerners to threaten slavery and justify

secession. South Carolina withdrew from the Union in December 1860, followed by other states from the Deep South and by the Upper South in spring 1861, following Lincoln's call for troops.

Civil War and Reconstruction

Lincoln's election and the various state-level contests between southern Unionists and secessionists posed the problem of public opinion acutely for U.S. politicians. What did the popular will really mean if a minority-backed president from the North now governed the entire country? How much did rank-and-file Southerners desire secession? Policy-makers could answer these questions in the abstract because direct voting rarely complicated their calculations: presidential elections were handled through the Electoral College, slavery-related elections under popular sovereignty were held by territorial legislatures, and decisions for secession were usually not submitted to Southerners for a popular referendum. As both sides mobilized for war in spring 1861, no one could easily say whether public opinion in either section had led to bloodshed, only that powerful minorities in each region gained control of national affairs. In other words, the nagging question of public opinion could be swept aside because there were few direct measures of it during this era.

Nevertheless, regular elections reminded leaders that a constituency, however abstractly conceived, held them accountable. The midterm elections of 1862 gave Lincoln just such a reminder. Public discussion focused on the emancipation policy Lincoln was then considering, on his controversial handling of wartime civil liberties, and on his overall management of the conflict. Given the low morale of 1862, Democrats made a

resurgence, capturing legislatures in Indiana and Illinois and gaining 32 seats in the next federal House of Representatives. Still, Republicans polled well in New England and in the West and kept control of Congress, so the meaning of the results was not completely clear. A more menacing challenge to Lincoln's conduct of the war came in the presidential election of 1864, when he ran against Democrat George McClellan, the general whom he had earlier removed from command. McClellan favored a "soft" prosecution of the war without emancipation, although the Democratic platform actually called for a negotiated peace. Lincoln realized the outcome would turn on Union military fortunes, and he received a needed boost from General William T. Sherman's capture of Atlanta that fall. As Union troops continued to conquer Confederate territory, Republicans got 212 electoral votes, compared with 21 for McClellan. Lincoln received 55 percent of the popular vote, and the 1864 election ensured that emancipation would remain a Union war policy.

When the fighting ended in April 1865, plans for reconstructing the Union took center stage. President Lincoln's assassination left Tennessee Unionist Andrew Johnson in charge, and Johnson wasted little time in making enemies among the Radical, congressional wing of his party. Whereas Johnson adopted a lenient southern policy, granting pardons to former Rebels and vetoing bills that would aid black freedmen, many Radical Republicans wished to treat the South as conquered territory and place it under strict military oversight. In campaigns during 1866, Radicals described Johnson as a traitor serving northern dissidents and former Confederates. Discussion especially focused on Johnson's opposition to

the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, a federal guarantee of equal rights and due process aimed at black freedmen. Most voters agreed with the Radicals, because Republicans won more than a two-thirds congressional majority, every contested northern governorship, and all northern legislatures. Radicals succeeded in rebuking Johnson as they prepared to take control over the next phase of Reconstruction. If in 1850 the Democratic cry of popular sovereignty had focused attention on the masses, by 1866 it was clear that Republican Party politicians were in charge. The transition from Jacksonian democracy to the era of party and machine politics was complete.

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Reconstruction-Era Elections: 1868–1892

The end of the Civil War ushered in a time of previously unrealized growth as well as seemingly impossibly high electoral activity by the masses. It was a time of industrial expansion and backlash. It was also a period when the United States searched for its identity in the ashes of

the Civil War. The electorate attempted to make sense of the moral issues that lay behind the Civil War, and the politicians were forced to determine whom and what they and their parties stood for or against. In this tedious attempt to redefine politics in the country, issues, stances, and moralities were often blurred and difficult to develop for the major political parties. Indeed, many of the strongest threats to their success, as well as their mere existence, came from divisions within the party.

Post-Civil War Growth of the Nation

The end of the Civil War was not just a new beginning in U.S. electoral history, with enfranchisement of former slaves and the influx of black voters into the possible electorate; it was a new beginning for industrial America as well. The United States transformed from a nation that used primitive tools and relied heavily on importation of manufactured goods to a country in the midst of booming industrial development that produced farm goods and manufactured items that were exported throughout the world. The period 1870–1880 witnessed the most rapid introduction of modern agricultural tools to farming the nation had ever seen. And by 1880 the United States had become the greatest exporter of wheat in the world. The introduction of territorial governments between 1861 and 1890 of Nevada, Colorado, North and South Dakota, Arizona, Indiana, Montana, Wyoming, Nebraska, Washington, and Idaho effectively ended the days of the undeveloped frontier in the West. Farming and industry within cities were new big business all around the country. Accordingly, newly developed urban areas saw previously unparalleled growth of population and development in manu-

facture. By 1890, one-third of the U.S. population lived in cities. From 1860 to 1900, more than 640,000 new patents were issued. And from 1860 to 1890, the output of U.S. factories quintupled.

There were other forces that contributed to this revolution in U.S. industry. The Homestead Act of 1862, granting every adult citizen 160 acres, had transferred close to 56 million acres to private ownership by 1880. In 1866, the Texas cattle industry began the annual "Long Drive" of longhorn cattle from Texas across the plains to the railways in Kansas. This brought beef to sources of transportation and produced a higher quality of cattle, as they were able to feed all along the drive route. Although natural barriers (in large part due to the Homestead Act) began to make the drive difficult around 1880, the cattle industry had witnessed huge gains from its newly found trade and transportation routes. The congressional charter of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1862 had led to a meeting of the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific railroads at Promontory Point, Utah, in a 1,775-mile endeavor that connected the East and West Coasts of the nation. Mining and precious metal production boomed along with other industry as well. For example, silver output rose from \$150,000 in 1860 to more than \$36 million in 1873. The United States, it seems, was making unparalleled inroads in industry and commerce. It was, however, this rise in materialism and production that led to continually contested issues throughout the period. In effect, the period can be characterized by battles and conflicts that occurred over tariffs, coinage of money, alcohol temperance, civil reform, and civil rights and reconstruction.

Electorate and Party

The electorate was no better off than its representatives in determining political values and positions. The Civil War resulted in an unstable period that often left the electorate trying to discern exactly what each party stood for and what policies would be adopted if one party or another took over the Congress or the presidency. That did not, however, prevent voters from turning out at the polls to make their voices heard. Electoral participation rates for this period were the highest of the nineteenth century. In addition, although Democrats may have feared a Republican dynasty following the war, and the Republicans may have forecasted their continuing control of government, neither became reality. Instead, elections at the federal level were close, and Democrats and Republicans played a game of power alternation that, in retrospect, would have warranted little fear of a single dominant party. The period was characterized by tight partisan balance with little fluctuation in power. Indeed, during the period 1854–1892, Democrats enjoyed only a 1.2 percentage point lead over Republicans nationally. This narrow lead was not indicative of close competition of Republicans and Democrats in every state, although many states did witness close competition and frequent change of partisan powers during this period. Instead it reflected the solid partisan blocs that had developed regionally after the Civil War. The South and the border states became solidly Democrat, whereas New England and more mid-western states became the bastions of Republicanism. It was this regional partisan attachment, more than candidate appeal or nationally debated issues, that tended to drive voting behavior and elec-

tion outcomes. Because of the “Solid South” and the “Republican North,” Republicans in the South as well as Democrats in the North often were forced to fuse with third parties to better their chances for success.

The Nation and Elections, 1868–1876

From 1868 to 1876, elections were close partisan battles that addressed and centered on the issues mentioned above. Indeed, these issues were divisive even among party members in the establishment of platforms and the adoption of a unified political front. However, regardless of how the parties at convention time had framed their platforms or their approaches to campaigns, elections during this period can be classified as determined by the prevalent North-versus-South or Union-versus-Rebel mind-set. The parties had become associated with former enemies, with Democrats in the South assuming the role of the “white man’s party” and successfully painting the Republicans as representative of “black rule.” In northern states, the expansion of production and industrialization had created political machines that seemed to give power to those who were able to influence and corrupt the majority. However, despite the differences, the nation hoped that a national election could bring stability and harmony.

Truly, the issues of the day, driven by Civil War animosities, played a large role in determining each party’s position. Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the new governments instituted in the South were all points of contention between Republicans and Democrats. The Republicans felt that they would have an easy victory, as they had the psychological edge over the

defeated South and controlled patronage in many sections of the federal government stemming from the Lincoln administration. However, divisions within the party arose over the imposition of black equality on the rest of the nation. The Republicans met and nominated Ulysses Grant for president, claiming that the country needed the former war hero to lead them. The Republican platform praised the efforts of Reconstruction, suffrage, and the Fourteenth Amendment and called for reform of Johnson’s staff and lower taxes.

The Democrats nominated Horatio Seymore as their candidate on a platform that illuminated and exploited the differences between North and South. It called for immediate restoration of the southern states to full Union rights, amnesty for offenses committed during the Civil War, a tariff for revenue purposes, an end to corruption in government, and indictment of the Republican Party for the mismanagement of Reconstruction.

The campaign became one of the dirtiest in presidential history, with both sides attacking the character of the opponent and both parties rallying around the issue of black suffrage. As state elections began in September through October, eight of nine states went Republican. Feeling this to be a bad omen for the upcoming presidential election, Democrats mobilized in the South to intimidate black voters with harassment and violence. There were killings of black voters in Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. However, Republicans successfully convinced the public that Democrat power in the White House would mean a return of Confederate power, and Grant won the election with 214 electoral votes and 52 percent of the popular vote. And

although both parties charged the other with corruption, transition to Grant came without violence by the opposing party.

Grant's first term, however, was less than smooth. He began appointing individuals viewed as incompetent, setting the stage for battles over patronage. He also signed a tariff into law in 1870 that alienated reform-minded members of his party. Under pressure from newly powerful industrial groups, he became indifferent to civil service reform and disappointed many voters by failing to alter the former harsh policies of Reconstruction. All this caused dissidents in the Republican Party to split in 1872 into the Liberal-Republican faction in hope to oust Grant from power. The Liberal Republicans believed that Grant's shenanigans had become the curse of the country, which could be put on the right path only through his defeat. Their platform called for Confederate amnesty as well as civil service reform, and the reformers and free-traders could find no common ground on the tariff issue, so they left it to the voters to decide in the fall. The nomination fell to Horace Greeley, media kingpin, largely due to journalistic engineering at the conference. The Democratic convention later that summer took only six hours and simply ratified the Liberal Republican platform and its ticket.

Grant, glad to be rid of the heckling Liberal-Republicans, was nominated unanimously on the first ballot of his party's convention. With a platform of vigorous enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, equal political and civil rights for all, fair wages, lower postal rates, pensions to veterans, and amnesty to Confederate leaders, the Republicans attempted to take the wind

out of the sails of the Liberal-Republican/Democrat movement. To further the cause, the session of Congress prior to the election stole the liberal reform platform and reduced the tariff by 10 percent, ended duties, and declared amnesty for most Confederates.

Although Grant's first term was problematic, his policy during the campaign was to keep quiet and stand by the Republican Party. Although Liberal Republicans had seemed to command their own destiny by joining with Democrats, two elements of the campaign led to their defeat in 1872. First, the Liberal-Republicans' organizations within states were a disaster, with inability, incompetence, lack of funding, inept coordination, and internal feuding crippling any national movement. In addition, Greeley felt that the best possibility for winning the election was through speechmaking. From September 19 to 29, Greeley delivered more than 200 speeches. In addition, at speeches in Pittsburgh and Louisville just before the election, Greeley insulted Union soldiers, suggested that he would abide by a peaceful separation of the Union if that was the predilection of southerners, and called blacks ignorant, deceived, and misguided. The result of the election was a landslide for Grant, who carried all but six states. He won with 55.63 percent of the popular vote to Greeley's 43.82 percent. It seemed in the end that dissatisfied Republicans did not defect and disgruntled Democrats did not vote.

Although Grant won decisive reelection in 1872 due to the organizational incapacity of the Liberal Republicans and speechmaking blunders by Greeley, his second administration corrected none of the corruption or party division of the

previous term. The administration was rocked by discoveries of corruption, which led to the dismissal of Grant's private secretary, secretary of war, commissioner of internal revenue, vice president, secretary of the interior, attorney general, and secretary of treasury. Worsening the situation, millions who had invested heavily for large profit after the Civil War were thrown on unpredictable times in 1873. In September the failure of one of the largest brokerages in New York, as well as a panic overseas earlier that year, caused more than 5,000 banks and businesses to fail. More than 3 million people were laid off. This produced the first great farmers' movement in America, known as the Granger Movement; more significant, there was a refocus on coinage of paper versus metal-backed currency and tariff reform. Further, the people saw government and big business corruption as a leading reason for the financial downturn; they also saw Grant as representing those elements. As a result, 1884 witnessed a change in power in the House of Representatives to the Democrats and the loss of seven Republican states to the Democratic Party.

In 1876, the North-versus-South election pitted the protectionist tariff supported by Republicans in the North against the "revenue-only" tariff believers in the South. Civil rights for the black population also was a dividing issue, along with the continuing specter of Reconstruction. Republicans frightened the public with visions of an unrepentant South coming to power, and Democrats frightened the public with images of federal and corporate corruption that led to uncaring, greedy government. The Republican convention nominated the governor of Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes, on a reform

platform. The Democrats responded by nominating the governor of New York, Samuel Tilden. On the morning after the election, Tilden had 184 (out of the 185 necessary) electoral votes to Hayes's 165, with Oregon, South Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana still undecided. In January, Congress created an electoral commission of senators, representatives, and justices to oversee the final decisionmaking for the election. On all crucial votes determining the debated states' results, Hayes won by an 8–7 margin (along partisan lines) and ended up winning the election with 185 electoral votes to Tilden's 184. This election (referred to by some as "the crime of 1876") was the impetus for the reevaluation of politics, party, and national issues. In fact, this would be the last election in which Reconstruction, the South's return to power, or Confederate fears would be mentioned.

The Nation and Elections, 1880–1892

Following the disputed election of 1876, the United States would witness a change in electoral behavior as well as party structure. Hayes entered office and broke previous Republican tradition by gathering able men around him, as well as instituting civil service reform in the form of standards for patronage in the federal government. Hayes proved to be a compromising president who healed the wounds of war and conceded when necessary to build national unity. These concessions, however, split the Republican Party into "Stalwarts," who believed Hayes was pandering to the South, and "Half Breeds," who supported Hayes's refusal to lend further military support to the interim governments in the South and passed a bill prohibiting troops' presence at the polls.

Hayes had promised to serve only one term, and because of the threat of Democratic unity, Republicans pulled together to nominate Senator James Garfield on the thirty-sixth ballot of their convention over Grant, who had been seen as a favorite to return to the White House. The Democrats nominated General Winfield Hancock at their convention. The platforms of each party advocated separation of church and state as well as civil service reform, and the campaign was unspectacular. Garfield won the election with 214 electoral votes to Hancock's 155, but he won only 48.3 percent of the popular vote against the 48.23 percent attained by Hancock. The difference was 10,000 votes.

Upon Garfield's assassination in 1881, Chester A. Arthur assumed the role of commander in chief. He reconstituted the Cabinet and promised to continue with the civil service reforms desired by the masses. Yet his inaction on the subject led to Democratic victory in the House of Representatives in the midterm elections of 1882. This also led to a split in the Republican Party in the 1884 election in which the Stalwarts, aggravated by Arthur's civil service reforms and attacks on patronage, nominated James Blaine, former presidential nominee, Cabinet member, and senator. Independent-Republicans and Democrats joined forces to nominate the reform-minded Grover Cleveland in hopes of defeating the Republican regime in power. The platforms of both parties were similar, and it seemed that personality would carry the day. Blaine lost the campaign for himself, becoming embroiled in a railroad scandal in which he had instructed a colleague in one letter to "burn this letter," as well as attending an opulent dinner in which the Democratic Party had

been referred to as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," which alienated the Catholic electorate in America. The result was a victory by Cleveland with 183 electoral votes to Blaine's 182, and a popular vote for Cleveland of 4,875,971 to Blaine's 4,852,234. Cleveland had, in effect, won thanks to 1,149 votes in New York that had given him that state's 36 electoral votes.

In 1888, the main issue for both parties became the tariff. A revenue surplus that began in 1881 had forced the government to determine whether the tariff was still necessary, as revenues had already seen surpluses. The Democrats nominated Cleveland on the platform of tariff reduction in June 1888. The Republicans, seeking to continue a long tradition of protecting industry and trade, nominated a former senator, Benjamin Harrison, for president. Republicans proposed reducing the revenue not through tariff elimination but by cutting any internal taxes. Harrison won the uneventful election with 233 electoral votes to Cleveland's 168, although Cleveland had won the popular vote with 48.7 percent to Harrison's 47.8 percent.

Upon entering office, Harrison did as promised and refunded taxes to the states directly and raised the pensions of veterans from \$81 million to \$135 million. In addition, the McKinley Tariff of 1890 raised general duties from 38 percent to 49.5 percent while also eliminating other contested duties and cutting internal taxes. As a result, however, some goods were taxed almost to the point of halting importation. Further, the high rates of the tariff were quickly reflected in retail sales, leading to consumer protests and Republican defeat in the House in 1890. Democrats were eager to keep the attention focused on the tariff question and

used their new power in the House to continually do so as the presidential election approached.

In 1892, a central issue was again the tariff. Harrison was nominated unanimously by the Republicans, who again espoused the “American doctrine of protection.” The Democrats nominated Grover Cleveland on the simple platform of tariff reduction. Cleveland won the election 277 electoral votes to Harrison’s 145, as well as 46 percent of the popular vote compared with Harrison’s 43 percent.

However, the election of 1892 also heralded the rise of a third party, the People’s Party, or Populists, which received 22 electoral votes on a platform of coinage of silver, government regulation of transportation and railroads, and an enhanced banking system. This, as well as the increased third-party participation in 1876 (American National Party, National Prohibition Reform Party, National Greenback Party), 1880 (Prohibition Party, Labor-Greenback Party), 1884 (Prohibition Party, Greenback Party, Anti-Monopoly Party, American Party, Equal Women’s Rights Party, American Prohibition Party), 1888 (Prohibitionist Party, Union-Labor Party, American Party), was an indication that the two major parties had failed to incorporate the beliefs and feelings of the population into their simplistic platforms and policy proposals. This reassessment would lead to the realignment of the parties and the electorate during the 1890s.

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Progressive-Era Elections: 1894–1928

By 1892, the Civil War–era party alignment had run its course outside the South. In 1877 the Republican Party ended Reconstruction as well as their commitment to civil rights; by the early 1890s the Democratic Party had abandoned its agrarian rural base, with Grover Cleveland siding with eastern money interests on critical issues, including currency reform.

Silver and Gold

Under the gold standard, the money supply was directly linked to federal gold reserves. The last major gold expansion occurred during the 1850s after the California Gold Rush. But the population doubled between 1860 and 1890 (from 31 million to 62 million), and the economy shifted from agrarian/rural to industrial/urban.

With the money supply stagnant and new industries gaining dominance, agricultural prices plummeted. An 1893 Senate committee report showed a decline to around 30 percent of post-Civil War levels; cotton and wheat prices, the staples of the South and West, respectively, were hit even harder as gold prices rose steadily. The greater availability of silver due to strikes in the West in the 1860s and 1870s made it attractive to those who wanted to expand the money supply.

The two sides on this issue simply acted on their regional economic interests. A shift toward silver and the inflation it would have engendered *would have* harmed northeastern industrial and financial interests; the gold standard *did* squeeze southern and western agrarian interests. As always, lenders feared inflation, whereas debtors craved it. In between was the large industrial labor force whose loyalties and votes were up for grabs.

Cleveland's antisilver stance in 1892 helped the Populist Party in the South and West. After his reelection, Democrats split into feuding silver and gold wings as Cleveland firmly supported the gold standard and refused to budge.

The Realignment of 1896

The worst depression in U.S. history to date began with the "Panic of '93" and continued until 1897, bringing unemployment, business failures, and large Republican congressional majorities. Populist House candidates received roughly 1.5 million votes in 1894 (not including fusion candidates from major parties). Democrats faced a dilemma: stay Cleveland's course and risk losing their agrarian base to the Populists or co-opt the Populist agenda and risk losing support in the Northeast.

In other issues, northeastern industrial concerns favored high protective tariffs, and southern and western agrarians wanted lower tariffs supplemented by income tax (which the U.S. Supreme Court repealed in 1895). Antitrust legislation was also important, and again the Supreme Court handed the Populists an issue by dismissing a major suit. Organized labor had the potential to cut across regional lines, and here the Court consistently upheld the rights of capital against those of labor.

The Great Commoner

William Jennings Bryan, a young Nebraska senator, electrified the Democratic convention, orating: "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold!" The convention nominated Bryan on the fifth ballot, with a free-silver platform; "Gold Democrats" walked out and opposed his candidacy. The Republican convention adopted a strong progold platform and nominated Ohio's William McKinley.

Populists split into two camps—one insisting on nominating their own candidate, the other favoring fusion with the Democrats. The fusionists won, and the Populists endorsed Bryan.

Bryan was both idolized and vilified during the campaign. He was the "Silver Knight of the West," the "Great Commoner," or the "Peerless One." But he was also a "socialist, anarchist, communist, revolutionary, lunatic, madman, rabble-rouser, thief, traitor, murderer." Traveling 18,000 miles while giving speeches to 5 million people, Bryan ensured that the election revolved around him and silver. McKinley's low-key "front porch" campaign suited the Republican Party's desire to appear "civi-

lized.” After three years of depression under Cleveland, McKinley stressed prosperity and the “Full Dinner Pail.”

The battle was now engaged, with divisions along economic and regional lines. This was a critical election, but it was no landslide: McKinley won with 51 percent, followed by 46.7 percent for Bryan and 1 percent each for Gold Democrats and the Prohibition Party (see Table 1). In the Electoral College McKinley bested Bryan 271 to 176 (see Table 2). McKinley swept the Northeast and the industrial Midwest, adding Kentucky, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, Oregon, and California. Bryan swept the old Confederacy, as well as every state west of the Mississippi except those just mentioned.

The population was so centered in the Northeast and Midwest that McKinley could have won without carrying any state outside those regions. Bryan’s only hope to make necessary inroads in the Northeast rested with industrial workers, who went heavily for McKinley for two reasons. First, Bryan occasionally insulted cities with comments that Republicans were quick to exploit. Second, many employers bluntly warned their workers that if Bryan were elected,

they would be fired. Thus, most states in the Northeast and Midwest went decisively for McKinley.

Although the election of 1896 was unremarkable in terms of the electoral or popular vote margins, or the ultimate Republican victory, it represented a remarkable shift in many ways from the period that preceded it. As one historian put it:

For twenty years, the contests between Democrats and Republicans had been little more than sham battles that decided no consequential issues (except the tariff) but ordained mainly who would gain and allocate the spoils of office. . . . On the fundamental question of the time—the role of government in a modern industrial society—the two national parties had no quarrel. (Sundquist 1983, p. 154)

1898: Solidifying the Realignment?

Electoral realignments are rarely clear as they occur. Although the 1896 election returned Republicans to the White House, they actually lost 40 seats in the House to a combination of Democrats

Table 1 Popular Vote for President, 1896–1928

<i>Year</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Prohibition</i>	<i>Socialist</i>	<i>Progressive</i>	<i>Other</i>
1896	51.01	46.73	0.90			1.37
1900	51.67	45.51	1.50	0.62		0.70
1904	56.41	37.60	1.91	2.98		1.10
1908	51.58	43.05	1.70	2.82		0.85
1912	23.18	41.84	1.38	5.99	27.39	0.23
1916	46.11	49.24	1.19	3.18	0.19	0.09
1920	60.30	34.17	0.70	3.42		1.42
1924	54.06	28.84	0.19		16.56	0.36
1928	58.20	40.77	0.09	0.72		0.21

Source: Presidential Elections since 1789, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983.

Table 2 Electoral Vote for President, 1896–1928

<i>Year</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Progressive</i>
1896	271	176	
1900	292	155	
1904	336	140	
1908	321	162	
1912	8	435	88
1916	254	277	
1920	404	127	
1924	382	136	13
1928	444	87	

Source: Presidential Elections since 1789, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983.

and Populists while retaining their majority. In the Senate, Gold Republicans held steady at 44 seats, with a combination of Democrats, Silver Republicans, Populists, and Silver Party senators holding 46.

Ironically, by the time of McKinley's inauguration, gold from Alaska and South Africa was already creating just the currency inflation that the Populists and Democrats demanded. That, plus elation at McKinley's victory among eastern financial and industrial interests, spurred economic growth. In 1898, with the economy growing and the nation at war with Spain over Cuba, Republicans won a clear majority of the Senate while losing 21 seats in the House. Whether this would be a short-term Republican tide or a realignment remained unclear.

Comparison: 1850s and 1890s

The 1890s makes a fascinating comparison with the 1850s. In each case the major parties took similar positions on critical issues, which third parties brought to the electoral debate. In the 1850s, Whigs and Democrats equivocated on slavery's extension, whereas Republicans firmly opposed it. The

Whigs lost the 1852 presidential election by a perfectly normal margin yet ceased to exist by 1854, with northern Whigs largely joining the Republicans and southern Whigs the Democrats.

In the 1890s, Republicans were solidly progold, and Democrats were divided regionally. Thus the silver issue represented both a threat and an opportunity for Democrats. Although the Democrats' choice of Bryan and silver set them up as the minority party for a generation, that was better than one possible alternative, in which they could have gone the way of the Whigs.

The Issue That Didn't Materialize: Race

The realignment of 1896 is also interesting for issues that did not arise, particularly race. After Reconstruction ended in 1877, the rights of blacks were systematically undermined nationwide, using largely extralegal means. This was cemented by the Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), which held that state segregation laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The major parties and the Populists were silent. *Plessy* was perceived rightly as an invitation to write

the de facto discrimination into law; from grandfather clauses to poll taxes, segregation, wrongful conviction, and educational and workplace barriers, blacks had virtually no rights anywhere in the country heading into the twentieth century, and no party raised a voice against it. The only public opinion that mattered was white public opinion.

Only among the nation's blacks were racial matters debated, with one side favoring progress under segregation and the other full integration. Booker T. Washington argued in 1895: "In all things that are purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress." On the other side, W. E. B. DuBois would write that "Mr. Washington represents in Negro thought the old attitude of adjustment and submission. . . . Mr. Washington's programme practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races." There was a bitter generational rivalry that DuBois was bound to win. After Washington died in 1915—six years after DuBois founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)—DuBois's model reigned supreme for decades. In the meantime the rights of African Americans remained off the table of partisan and electoral politics between 1877 and the 1940s.

Rematch: The Election of 1900

When both parties easily renominated their 1896 standard-bearers, a rematch was set in place. But unlike the previous rematches, in which Jefferson and Jackson defeated their respective John Adamses the second time around, the tide was not in Bryan's favor.

Given prosperity, silver was a non-starter. Bryan attempted to make an issue out of trusts but had no luck there,

either. As for empire, the Spanish-American War of 1898 had impacts far beyond Cuba, with the nation flaunting new possessions in Puerto Rico and the West Indies, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii. Although public response to the war and colonial expansion was largely positive, the American Anti-Imperialist League was formed, boasting Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain, Samuel Gompers, and other prominent Americans among its members. Bryan intoned: "I would not exchange the glory of the Republic for the glory of all the empires that have risen since time began." When the Republicans selected war hero Teddy Roosevelt as their vice presidential nominee, the battle lines were clearly drawn and the public chose McKinley, Roosevelt, prosperity, and empire.

McKinley defeated Bryan more convincingly than before, winning 51.7 percent to Bryan's 45.5 percent, with 1.5 percent for the Prohibition Party and 0.6 percent for Eugene V. Debs and his Socialist Party. McKinley bested Bryan in the Electoral College 292 to 155. McKinley's gains were marginal and his victory, though convincing, was again no landslide. The electoral map was also similar, with Bryan adding only Kentucky and McKinley adding South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming, Utah, and Washington. Meanwhile, Republicans padded their majorities in both the House and Senate.

Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement: 1901–1912

McKinley's assassination in 1901 and the accession to office of the popular vice president, Teddy Roosevelt, sealed the doom of the Democrats for the foreseeable future. With great appeal in the West, Roosevelt built an independent

power base and a personal agenda while not straying too far from the Republican Party line during his first “accidental” term.

Roosevelt’s agenda of natural conservation and regulation of trusts proved immensely popular; the only doubt in early 1904 was whether he would win the party’s nomination (he did). Meanwhile, Democratic “safe-and-saners,” thinking they had learned from previous defeats, nominated conservative progold New Yorker Alton Parker.

With little campaigning and no important issues separating the parties, the uneventful 1904 campaign ended with a landslide of historical proportions. Without a Populist Party to turn to and with a conservative easterner as the Democratic nominee, Roosevelt swept the West. Parker carried only the old Confederacy plus Kentucky, Tennessee, and Maryland, winning 140 electoral votes to Roosevelt’s 336. Roosevelt won 56.4 percent of the popular vote, followed by Parker’s 37.6 percent, 3 percent for the Socialists, and 1.9 percent for the Prohibitionists. Roosevelt’s percentage of the popular vote and his margin of victory were the largest in history. Republicans won decisively in Congress, with Republicans now leading Democrats 250–136 in the House and 58–32 in the Senate.

During his elected term, Roosevelt came to the forefront of the growing Progressive movement sweeping the nation. Unlike most political movements, the Progressives were a wing of the Republican Party and remained loyal with the notable exceptions of 1912 and 1924. Progressives viewed the party leadership as corrupt and beholden to wealthy interests. They sought to reform the party using a variety of means, including the direct primary, direct democracy (includ-

ing the initiative, the referendum, and the recall), direct election of senators, and nonpartisan elections in localities dominated by a single party.

Although Roosevelt disparaged Muckrakers—journalists who exposed the unpleasant underbelly of government and industry—he co-opted their agenda, sponsoring the Meat Inspection Act, Pure Food and Drug Act, stricter regulation for railroads and other big business, as well as stronger conservation measures.

1908–1912: Roosevelt and Taft

Although Roosevelt decided not to run in 1908, he controlled the party machinery and easily engineered the nomination of his protégé, William Howard Taft, along with a Progressive platform. The Democrats, having seen the result of nominating a conservative easterner, went back to Bryan for the third and final time, arguing that he, not Taft, was the better standard-bearer for Progressive principles. Although Bryan would soon be proved right, Taft won easily, handing Bryan his worst defeat, adding only Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada to the states Parker had won four years earlier.

Seen as a Roosevelt protégé—one joke held that “Taft” stood for “takes advice from Theodore”—Taft moved quickly to claim the presidency for himself. He was well positioned to do so, with a convincing victory and solid majorities in Congress. But his desire to be his own man led to disaster. Unwilling to maintain Roosevelt’s coalition of Progressives and conservative party regulars, he shifted toward the regulars and by 1912 had abandoned the Progressives altogether.

Meanwhile, Progressive Republicans had toppled legendary leaders in the House (Joe Cannon) and Senate (Nelson Aldrich), a harbinger of coming intra-

party conflicts. A movement arose to draft Roosevelt, who grew openly critical of Taft, then attempted to use the new party primaries to wrest the nomination from him. From March to June 1912, Roosevelt won nine primaries, Robert La Follette two, and Taft only one. But Taft controlled the party machinery and the delegates. By the convention, the rivalry was deeply personal; neither candidate would back down or allow a compromise candidate. Taft won, and Roosevelt and the Progressives bolted the convention and the party.

Although not a candidate, Bryan still led his party's Populist wing, and he was determined that they would not nominate another Parker. The Democrats nominated Bryan's choice, Woodrow Wilson, on the forty-sixth ballot and passed a platform stressing tariff reduction and trust-busting. Taft largely stayed out of the campaign, ensuring Roosevelt's centrality. Wilson merely had to appear as a safe and reasonable choice.

With the Republican vote divided among two candidates and two parties, Wilson won an Electoral College landslide, with 40 states, 435 electoral votes, and 41.8 percent of the popular vote, along with comfortable majorities in the Senate and House. Roosevelt followed with 27.4 percent, six states, and 88 electoral votes. Taft won only 23.2 percent and carried only Vermont and Utah. Eugene V. Debs received 6 percent, the most a Socialist ticket would ever receive in the United States.

Wilson's Interregnum: War, Peace, and Internationalism

After Europe exploded into war in July 1914, the issues that had divided the country seemed unimportant. The "Great War" and international affairs would

define Wilson's presidency and public opinion during it. In the 1914 midterm elections, Democrats padded their lead in the Senate while giving up ground in the House.

For 1916 the Democrats renominated Wilson, adopting the slogan "He kept us out of war," while Republicans chided Wilson for choosing neutrality over national honor. Roosevelt had angered too many Republican regulars to win their nomination, but neither would he accept the Progressive nomination. The Republicans nominated a moderate progressive, Charles Evans Hughes, of New York.

Despite the Democrats' advantage in international affairs, the Electoral College still favored Republicans. Thus, while Wilson led Hughes 49.2 percent to 46.1 percent and carried 30 states, he was only one state away from losing the electoral vote. Most Americans went to bed on election night believing Hughes had won, but Wilson's 187-vote plurality in California earned him a second term. Interestingly, Wilson's winning electoral map was very similar to Bryan's losing map of 1896. Wilson was able to bring back together the Democratic/Populist base and cherry-pick just enough Republican states to eke out a victory. Meanwhile, Democrats held on to their leads in the Senate and the House (the latter just barely).

1920–1928: The Republican Restoration

The Democratic interregnum would not extend beyond Wilson's second term, however. Wilson hoped the 1920 election would be a referendum on his vision of humane internationalism embodied in the League of Nations. With Teddy Roosevelt's death in 1919, conservative

Republicans led by Henry Cabot Lodge controlled the Republican convention. The leader of Senate opposition to the League, Lodge knew he was too controversial, so he engineered the nomination of conservative Warren Harding of Ohio, along with the Massachusetts governor, Calvin Coolidge, for vice president.

The Republican slogan "Return to Normalcy" perfectly matched the public mood; after years of attention to foreign policy, most Americans wanted a focus closer to home. The Democratic ticket of James Cox and Franklin Roosevelt never had a chance. Harding won 60 percent to 34 percent, a percentage margin of victory that remains the greatest landslide in history. As for the Electoral College, if 1916 resembled 1896, then 1920 resembled 1904—Cox won no state outside the South. As an interesting aside, 1920 was the first election that the *Literary Digest* tried to predict through its straw poll (it predicted Harding's victory and continued to predict the winners, if not their margins, correctly through 1932).

Rewriting the Constitution

The election of 1920 was notable for more than just the return to Republican dominance. The Nineteenth Amendment was ratified in 1920 after decades-long efforts of the suffragist movement, making this the first national election in which women could vote. Not since the Bill of Rights have so many amendments been ratified in such a short period, with eleven new amendments from 1913 to 1971. The Sixteenth Amendment (1913) allowed a federal income tax; the Seventeenth Amendment (1913) established direct election of senators—both Progressive victories. The Eighteenth Amendment (1919) on prohibition resulted from decades of activity by the temperance

movement—one of the major sociopolitical forces of the period.

The New Ku Klux Klan and the Progressive Backlash

Republican dominance prevailed through the 1920s. When Harding died of a heart attack in August 1923, Coolidge quickly became a popular president. Surviving the Teapot Dome Scandal without taint, Coolidge's nomination in 1924 was never in question.

The Democratic nomination was more contentious, due largely to the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. Benefiting from positive attention in the 1915 film *Birth of a Nation*, and critical stories in the *New York World* and congressional investigations in 1921, Klan membership soared. Focusing on small-town Protestant values, along with large doses of racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, and nativism, the new Klan by the mid-1920s was a major social and political force nationwide, boasting several governors and senators among their members.

The Klan movement straddled the parties, with Klansmen siding with Republicans in the North and West and with Democrats in the South. But it was the Democrats who would be torn apart in 1924, divided between their Protestant rural base and their increasingly Catholic and Jewish urban base. When delegates backing New York's Catholic governor, Al Smith, proposed a resolution condemning the Klan, the Klan had enough support to block it by a single vote. They were also able to delay the nomination until an alternative to Smith—Wall Street lawyer John Davis—could be selected on the 103rd ballot on the ninth day of balloting. (A longer-term success of the Klan was the passage in 1924 of the National Origins Act, the most restric-

tive immigration law in the country's history, which remained in effect until 1965.)

Disillusioned by a choice between two eastern conservatives, the Progressive Party reformulated itself, nominating La Follette, with hopes of winning enough states to throw the election into the House of Representatives. But Coolidge still got 54 percent of the popular vote; "Fighting Bob" won only his home state of Wisconsin while coming in second in 11 other states. Like Parker and Cox, Davis won no state outside the South.

*1928: The Great Engineer
and the Happy Warrior*

By the time of its infamous 1925 parade down Pennsylvania Avenue, the Klan was already in decline; by 1928 it had disintegrated due to revelations of corruption and its volatile mix of moralism and violence. Even the nomination of "Happy Warrior" Al Smith as Democratic standard-bearer could not remobilize them.

Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover was the consensus Republican nominee. Republicans already had an edge because of eight years of prosperity and Hoover's reputation as the "Great Engineer" and as a humanitarian. Smith's nomination split the Democratic Party in a number of ways. Smith's urban, "wet," Catholic background offended much of the Democrats' rural following, especially in comparison with Hoover's Iowa Quaker roots. Smith's Catholicism hurt him more: with detractors warning of "Rum, Romanism, and Ruin," Hoover carried six states in the South, the first time a Republican nominee had done so since Reconstruction. The Republican potential in the South would take another generation to bear fruit, but the Democratic Party was beginning to

establish a new base among urban immigrant and "ethnic" voters, which would prove important much sooner.

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**Depression-Era
Elections: 1930–1940**

Public opinion and elections during the 1930s focused overwhelmingly on three issues: the Great Depression; Franklin Delano Roosevelt, his policies, and his personality; and the political upheavals, followed by war, in Europe. This period also witnessed the development of scientific polling, enabling government officials and the public to obtain, to an

extent previously unimaginable, reliable estimates on the views of the public at large on a variety of issues. I include examples of early Gallup polls throughout this entry, where applicable.

The Collapse of the System of 1896

Like the post-Civil War party system that preceded it, the "system of 1896" was brought down by a major economic depression. No one could have predicted in 1928 or early 1929 that the end of Republican political dominance was imminent. Herbert Hoover beat Democrat Al Smith by a landslide in both the popular vote and the Electoral College. But when the stock market crashed on Black Tuesday—October 29, 1929—and the economy went into depression shortly thereafter, everything changed.

Neither before nor since has an electoral realignment replaced one dominant party with another so quickly and decisively. Most previous critical elections were close races (e.g., 1800, 1860, and 1896) and all (adding in 1828) followed periods of close electoral competition, not dominance by another party.

The realignment of 1932 was different. In 1928, Hoover had defeated Democrat Al Smith 58 percent to 41 percent; four years later he received less than 40 percent of the vote; Smith's former protégé, now nemesis, Franklin Roosevelt, re-

ceived 57 percent (see Table 1). This 35 percent net shift from a 17 percent margin of victory to an 18 percent margin of defeat remains the biggest single-election shift in U.S. history. The Electoral College vote shift was even more striking: Hoover beat Smith 444 to 87, then lost to Roosevelt 472 to 59.

A similar shift occurred in Congress, but over two elections during the same period. After the elections of 1928, Republicans controlled both houses of Congress convincingly—267–168 in the House and 56–40 in the Senate (see Table 2). The midterm election of 1930 resulted in a razor-thin Democratic edge in the House—221–214; meanwhile, the Senate was in a virtual tie, with 48 seats each (counting Minnesota Farmer-Laborites with the Democrats).

In 1932, the Democrats sealed the deal. The same election that provided Roosevelt with his landslide victory increased his party's margin in the House to nearly 3:1 (318–117) and swept them into control over the Senate (56–40). By 1936, the collapse of the Republican Party was so complete that some wondered whether it would go the way of the Whigs in the 1850s. Roosevelt bested Alf Landon by 24 percent, with the latter claiming only Maine's and Vermont's eight electoral votes. At the congressional level, Republicans were down to

Table 1 Popular Vote for President, 1928–1940

<i>Year</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Socialist</i>	<i>Communist</i>	<i>Union</i>	<i>Other</i>
1928	58.20	40.77	0.72	0.13	NA	0.17
1932	39.64	57.42	2.22	0.26	NA	0.45
1936	36.54	60.79	0.41	0.17	1.96	0.13
1940	44.82	54.70	0.23	0.01	NA	0.24

Source: Presidential Elections since 1789, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983.

Table 2 Electoral Vote for President, 1928–1940

<i>Year</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>
1928	444	87
1932	59	472
1936	8	523
1940	82	449

Source: Presidential Elections since 1789, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983.

89 seats (20 percent) in the House and 16 seats in the 96-member Senate. One humorist wrote, “If the outcome of this election hasn’t taught you Republicans not to meddle in politics, I don’t know what will” (Boller 1996, p. 249).

Rumblings of Realignment:

The 1920s as Prologue

The realignment did not occur in a vacuum—events during the previous decade served as important prologues. The Republican Party’s abandonment of its progressive wing during the 1920s was centrally important. During the 1920s, progressive and reformist activists and voters aligned themselves with either Democrats or Republicans, depending on the state. But nationally the Republican Party was controlled by the same conservative, eastern probusiness elements that had run the party since the 1890s, with the notable exception of the Teddy Roosevelt years.

Democrats at the national level alternated between progressives and conservatives, nominating a moderate progressive in 1920, then the legal counsel to J. P. Morgan four years later. The fact that both major parties nominated conservatives in 1924 opened the door for the Progressive Party to reconstitute itself around Wisconsin’s Robert La Follette and run its own ticket for the White House.

Although La Follette carried only his home state, he ran second in a solid swath of 11 states, including Minnesota and Iowa all the way to the Pacific, plus California and Nevada, frequently beating Davis and the Democrats by large margins. But La Follette’s death in 1925 took the steam out of the movement and saved the Democrats from the prospect of having to compete for major party status in large parts of the country (a status it would indeed lose in Minnesota to the Farmer-Labor Party in the 1930s).

La Follette’s death, combined with Republican refusal through three administrations to address an economic depression in the farming sector that had started in the early 1920s, provided Democrats with an opportunity to regain the allegiance of farmers that they had held briefly under Bryan. This might well have happened in 1928, but Al Smith, a “wet” Catholic New Yorker, was the wrong person to lure farmers back into the fold. Although he was progressive, fear of his Catholicism and distaste for his Tammany Hall roots forced him to send enough messages of moderation that voters from farm states saw him as little different from Hoover on farm issues.

Even so, while Hoover soundly defeated Smith outside the South and New England, the Democratic ticket

made significant gains in farm states. Smith also helped the Democratic Party make important gains in urban areas of the Northeast, especially among blacks, Jews, Catholics, and other “white ethnic” populations that would become core components of the New Deal coalition in the 1930s.

The Landslide of 1932

Hoover was a moderate conservative who believed that the Great Depression, like previous depressions, was a temporary problem, likely to last a few years and then turn around. Like presidents during previous economic panics (most recently Grover Cleveland), he was unwilling to compromise his basic political philosophy to solve a problem that he had every reason to believe would soon correct itself.

Hoover’s most visible response to the Depression was to create the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) to lend money to “established industries, railways, and financial institutions . . . [to] protect the credit structure and stimulate employment . . . [and to] strengthen confidence”; as for direct relief, however, Hoover was “opposed to any direct or indirect Government dole” (Sundquist 1983, pp. 202–203).

So ingrained was Hoover’s opposition to direct assistance that, when 20,000 World War I veterans marched on Washington as the Bonus Expeditionary Force demanding the early payment of their veterans’ bonuses (due in 1945), Hoover called in the Army. Led by General Douglas MacArthur, soldiers in tanks used tear gas to disperse the bonus marchers and drive them out of town, an event that took on great symbolic force as an indication of Hoover’s apparent indifference to the nation’s economic plight. (In con-

trast, when the marchers returned the next year, they were met by Eleanor Roosevelt and plentiful coffee.)

Although many Democrats supported this stance, an interventionist opposition was beginning to find a voice in that party. Speaking against the RFC, George Huddleston (D–AL) lamented the injustice of loaning money to industries while avoiding direct aid: “To these interests he would open the Treasury, but to starving men, women and children he would not give a red cent” (Sundquist 1983, pp. 202–203). Prior to the 1932 election, however, opposition to Hoover’s policies was based on a coalition of congressional progressives in both parties.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was well positioned to run as a moderate progressive. In his taboo-breaking acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention, he orated: “I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a new deal for the American people” (Boller 1996, p. 233) and the term stuck. Although he spoke broadly about the “forgotten man” and the need to attack the crisis “from the bottom up and not from the top down,” his views were similar to Hoover’s on many issues. He viewed public relief as a state and local issue and ran on a platform of balanced budgets. But his willingness to experiment was an important difference with the reluctant Hoover: “Take a method and try it; if it fails, admit it frankly, and try another. But above all, try something” (Sundquist 1983, p. 209). Roosevelt did not present specific proposals during the campaign, but his victory was assured by a 24 percent unemployment rate and the lack of a serious third-party effort that might have split opposition votes.

Roosevelt’s victory over Hoover was monumental. Hoover carried only six states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic

and was swamped in both the popular and the Electoral College vote.

The Rise of the New Deal Coalition

The Great Depression presented Democrats with the opportunity to win an election or two. But it was up to Roosevelt and his party to ensure that 1932 was not just another deviating election, like Wilson’s victories in 1912 and 1916. The events of the 1920s had laid the groundwork for a long-term coalition of farmers, eastern immigrants, and laborers, with the party’s stalwart core of southern whites. The genteel, Protestant Roosevelt was far better positioned to carry this off than Smith had been.

And carry it off he did. During the 1930s the Democratic Party increased its support dramatically in northern urban areas in general, and even more strongly in urban areas with large Catholic and immigrant populations. The shift in voter loyalties also had a class basis, with Democratic strength skyrocketing among unskilled and semiskilled workers, lower- and working-class voters, and union

members. Taken together, these groups came to be known as the New Deal coalition. Overall Democratic support grew in all areas and among all groups during the early 1930s, although not nearly as strongly as in the above areas. A certain level of offsetting defections among conservative Democrats to the Republican Party also occurred, especially in rural white Protestant areas.

1934–1938: Consolidating the Realignment

Despite continued economic stagnation, Roosevelt’s commitment to innovation was clear and his positive outlook was infectious. Voters responded to Roosevelt’s leadership and personality, as well as to the activist approach of congressional Democrats to Roosevelt’s left. As a result, Democratic strength continued to grow through the election of 1936, reaching 337 seats in the House and 78 in the Senate—the highest numbers ever in absolute terms, and the highest percentage figures since the James Monroe administration in the

Table 3 House and Senate Partisan Alignments, 1929–1941

Year	House			Senate		
	Republican	Democrat	Other	Republican	Democrat	Other
1929–30	267	168	0	56	40	0
1931–32	214	221	0	48	48	0
1933–34	117	318	0	36	60	0
1935–36	103	324	8	25	70	1
1937–38	89	337	9	16	78	2
1939–40	169	263	3	23	71	2
1941–42	162	268	5	28	66	2

Source, House: “Political Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present),” (http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional_History/partyDiv.php); Senate: “Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present,” (http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm); Minnesota Farmer-Labor members counted as Democrats: “United States Representatives,” (<http://www.minnesotapolitics.net/USCongress/MNUSReps.htm>).

1820s. Roosevelt's own reelection was also of historic proportions.

Discussing the 1936 campaign, Roosevelt stated, "There's one issue in this campaign. It's myself, and people must be either for me or against me" (Boller 1996, p. 240). With the nation's industrial and financial classes and newspaper editors lined up in scathing opposition, this was assured. Roosevelt's opponent, progressive Kansas governor Alf Landon, actually backed much of the New Deal program, making it difficult for him to make a strong case for a switch. The 1936 campaign was probably most notable for the *Literary Digest* poll that predicted a Landon victory by a landslide, while George Gallup, Elmo Roper, and a few other pioneers of scientific polling correctly predicted a Roosevelt victory.

Democratic representation in Congress fell substantially after the 1938 midterm elections—no party could remain long at the giddy heights of 1936 in the absence of the complete collapse of the opposition party, but their strength still remained at very solid levels.

Fascism Abroad, Demagogues at Home
As the Great Depression wore on through the early and mid-1930s with little improvement, some Americans began to look at other governing models with admiration. Starting with Benito Mussolini in Italy (1922), Adolf Hitler in Germany (1933), then Francisco Franco in Spain (1936–1937), fascist dictatorships seemed to restore national pride, optimism, and even economic growth. Although these gains came at great cost to life and liberty, some Americans found fascism's efficiency and structure attractive during these dark times.

Although admirers of Hitler and other European dictators were always a small

minority, prominent Americans like Charles Lindbergh and Henry Ford admired Hitler and extolled his virtues throughout the 1930s. (Ford's anti-Semitic newspaper columns, published as *The International Jew* in 1922, both influenced Nazi philosophy and helped convince Hitler that Americans would tolerate his Final Solution.)

Many demoralized Americans were drawn by the populist messages of demagogues such as Louisiana governor Huey Long, California physician Francis Townsend, and Michigan radio priest Father Charles Coughlin, among others. Initially an ardent supporter, Coughlin turned on "Franklin Double-Crossing Roosevelt" in 1936, joining the Union Party effort to unseat him. At the height of his popularity Coughlin's increasingly paranoid, strident, and bigoted weekly radio "sermons" drew audiences estimated at 45 million. By 1939 he had alienated many of his listeners (now estimated at "only" 15 million), and by 1940 the Catholic Church reassigned Coughlin to congregational duties.

Roosevelt's Court-Packing Scheme and the Switch in Time
During Roosevelt's first term, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down major New Deal programs like the minimum wage and the National Industrial Recovery Act. Emboldened by the landslide victories of 1936, Roosevelt proposed in February 1937 what came to be derided as his court-packing scheme, allowing the president to appoint an additional justice to the Supreme Court for each sitting justice who had not retired within six months of his seventieth birthday. This would have resulted in six new appointments, providing a comfortable margin for New Deal legislation. Critics saw

through Roosevelt’s justification that the Court was overworked and attacked it as an assault on judicial independence and supremacy.

In March 1937 the Court upheld a minimum wage for women in *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*; in April it upheld the National Labor Relations Act, completing a broad retreat from stringent judicial scrutiny of labor regulations. This apparent reversal came to be known as the switch in time that saved nine—that is, nine justices. With the retreat and the resignation of stalwart anti-New Deal justice Willis Van Devanter, the plan lost steam rapidly: a May 12 Gallup poll showed only 31 percent support (down from 47 percent in February), and the Senate Judiciary Committee killed it.

Although the timing of the reversal was suspicious, and conventional wisdom attributes it to Roosevelt’s plan, current scholarship suggests two alternative explanations. Some see a more gradual process of doctrinal change based on shifting understandings of work and workers. Others point to Congress’s more careful drafting of legislation along lines suggested by the Court. In any case, the justices were aware of the public hostility toward their rulings and likely had concerns about the continuing legitimacy and authority of their institution.

1940: A Third Term and a War

The 1940 presidential race was dominated by the war in Europe, which began

in 1939, and by Roosevelt’s decision to run for a third term, breaking a tradition that had stood since Washington. But when Hitler’s blitzkrieg overran the Low Countries in May 1940, Roosevelt’s mind was set, and a well-engineered “draft” was arranged for the Democratic convention. Although Roosevelt’s popularity was still considerable, and most voters understood his belief that the country should not “change horses in mid-stream” during times of crisis, he was not immune to the shock that the third term itself engendered.

Gallup polls demonstrated public ambivalence on the matter. Asked whether they “favor a third term for Roosevelt,” between 63 percent and 77 percent replied that they did not in several polls between December 1936 and May 1939 (see Table 4). Yet through 1938, substantial majorities expressed an intention of voting for Roosevelt despite misgivings. When Roosevelt’s support really did drop in 1939, it was due to a variety of issues, including the continuing Depression and his heavy-handed approach to political opponents related to the court-packing scheme.

Extensive polling by George Gallup’s American Institute of Public Opinion for the first time showed the dynamics of shifts in levels of Roosevelt’s support and the issue bases of that support. Wendell Willkie, the Republican businessman who had beaten out Robert Taft and Thomas Dewey for the Republican nom-

Table 4 Percent Opposing a Third Term for Roosevelt, 1936–1939

<i>Date</i>	<i>12/36</i>	<i>7/37</i>	<i>6/38</i>	<i>8/38</i>	<i>2/39</i>	<i>5/39</i>
Oppose 3rd Term	70%	63%	70%	69%	69%	77%

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), *Public Opinion Quarterly* (various).

Table 5 Percent Who Would Vote for Roosevelt, 1937–1940

	1937		1938		1939			1940					
	Jun.	Nov.	Mar.	May	May	Aug.	Oct.	Jan.	May	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.
Vote for FDR	60%	63%	58%	55%	33%	40%	43%	46%	57%	51%	51%	55%	52%

Source: American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), *Public Opinion Quarterly* (various).

ination, did his best to make an issue of the third term but got little traction. He did a bit better with the war. Roosevelt had signed the Lend-Lease deal with Britain in September 1940; along with Roosevelt's preparedness agenda, Willkie claimed this showed an intent to take the United States into war. Roosevelt denied this allegation, but the issue hurt him with some voters.

However, the war helped Roosevelt, too. An August 1940 Gallup poll showed 62 percent support for selling destroyers to England, and surveys leading up to the election consistently showed support for additional assistance. In addition, in the middle of 1940, when the war began going poorly for the Allies, Roosevelt's support began to increase. As Americans woke up to the possibility of German victory, Gallup respondents consistently expressed the importance of a steady hand at the helm, presenting a huge challenge for the novice Willkie. Willkie was not even helped by widespread opposition to entering the war, as Gallup respondents consistently felt that the likelihood of entering the war was the same regardless of who won the election.

By a large number of measures, Americans' acceptance of the necessity of involvement in the war was becoming clear. The once-unpopular draft suddenly became an obvious necessity, with sup-

port increasing from 37 percent in 1938 to 67 percent in July 1940. Nonetheless, hostility toward the third term, the continuing Depression, fear of war, and Willkie's fresh face and ebullient personality kept it close—Gallup polls showed the race at 51 percent–49 percent as late as August, and Roosevelt's victory was by no means a foregone conclusion.

In the end, Roosevelt still won convincingly—while his 10-point margin of victory in the popular vote and 442–89 edge in the Electoral College were substantial reductions from his previous victories, they were huge comebacks from his unpopularity in 1939. Meanwhile, Democrats held on to roughly two-thirds majorities in both houses of Congress. The decade ended with the U.S. public appreciative of Roosevelt's largely unsuccessful economic efforts, looking to him for leadership at a time of war and uncertainty. By this point there was little doubt that a true sea change, or party realignment, had occurred in U.S. politics. By 1940 Roosevelt had re-created the federal government in an activist and nationalist image that would endure for decades.

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World War II–Era Elections: 1942–1958

The U.S. elections from 1942 to 1958 helped set the electoral contexts for the second half of the twentieth century. As the Soviet Union forced most of Eastern Europe into its empire, it shifted from wartime ally to postwar antagonist. The fall of China to communist control in 1949 only increased the specter that revolutionary communism posed a grave threat to Western democracies. This entry concentrates on the foreign policies that shaped these elections.

The 1942 Congressional Election

The party winning the presidency usually gains seats in the House and Senate in the presidential election and then loses seats in the following midterm congressional elections. This surge–decline pattern held true in the 1940 and 1942 elections to the House of Representatives. In President Franklin D. Roosevelt's reelection in 1940, the Democrats gained five seats in the House, giving them a 105-seat edge over the Republicans. In 1942, the Democrats lost 45 seats in the House, although they retained a comfortable majority. Following

their overwhelming 75–17 edge over the Republicans established in the 1936 elections, the Senate Democrats lost six, three, and nine seats in the 1938, 1940, and 1942 elections, respectively, while still retaining a 57 to 38-seat lead over the Republicans after 1942.

The 1944 Presidential Election

President Roosevelt's average approval rating in the polls had grown steadily from 59 percent in 1939 to 76 percent in 1942 as Americans accepted his leadership of the war effort after Pearl Harbor. (This and subsequent approval ratings exclude those with no opinion.) The Democratic strategy in 1944 was to make the reelection of Roosevelt appear indispensable to winning the war and preparing for the peace. The end of the war in Europe was in sight by 1944. Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower led the Allied landing at Normandy in June. Italy had formally surrendered in September 1943, and U.S. and British forces succeeded in retaking Rome in June 1944 and Paris in August. However, the final victory over Germany did not come until May 1945. In November 1944, Roosevelt was still seen as critical to the U.S. war effort.

Although Roosevelt's health was failing rapidly, he was able to present himself to the public as a forceful and capable leader. The war strategy was working, and plans for a postwar international organization that would become the United Nations (UN) were taking shape. Representatives of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States met in August at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., to discuss the initial proposals. Thomas Dewey, who won the Republican nomination for president, did not want to revive memories of Republi-

can opposition to the League of Nations after World War I, and he promised that his campaign would not make U.S. participation in an international organization a partisan issue in the campaign.

The war in Europe did create political problems within the Democrat's ethnic coalition. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the Soviet army had occupied a large section of eastern Poland, which the Soviet Union had lost after World War I. Polish American organizations voiced support of the pre-war boundary. Roosevelt gave vague assurances that the United States would give "moral support" to the Polish government in negotiations with the Soviet Union, which was sufficient to neutralize the boundary issue among Polish American leaders, despite the fact that the Poles were losing 300,000 soldiers in a futile uprising in Warsaw against the German army in August 1944.

Roosevelt also managed to avoid a potential schism among Jewish Democrats over Jewish immigration to Palestine. Britain set an annual limit on Jewish immigration for five years, with no more immigration after April 1944. A proposed congressional resolution in 1944 calling for free immigration into Palestine pressured Roosevelt to provide whatever assurances he could to Jewish leaders, short of violating a pledge that the status of Palestine would not be altered without consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Roosevelt said that he had not approved the British policy and authorized Jewish leaders to say, "When future decisions are reached full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home." Roosevelt thus defused this issue for the duration of the campaign.

Roosevelt defeated Dewey 53 percent to 45 percent, the narrowest of the presi-

dent's four victories. With many soldiers overseas, turnout, at 56 percent, was 6 percentage points lower than 1940. The Democrats regained 21 seats in the House of Representatives and maintained their Senate majority at 58 seats. Roosevelt would die in April, just four months into his fourth term. Vice President Harry S. Truman would become president.

The 1946 Congressional Election

With the demobilization of U.S. troops following Japan's surrender on August 10, 1945, the 1946 election would be fought primarily on domestic issues. The Republican Party gained 56 House seats and 13 Senate seats, winning control of both chambers. An assertive Republican congressional leadership tried to dominate the national policy agenda, and Truman adopted an oppositional veto strategy. Truman would campaign against the Republican Congress in the 1948 election, labeling it the "Do Nothing" Congress.

The 1948 Election

The 1948 election turned on domestic issues. Samuel Lubell contended that economic and farm issues led German American isolationists to return to the Democratic camp, which they had abandoned in 1940. Domestically, the Republican Congress's passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 over President Truman's veto authorized presidents to intervene in collective bargaining disputes by imposing back-to-work orders and mandatory cooling-off periods. Labor unions called Taft-Hartley the "slave labor act." Its passage gave unions a powerful incentive to get out the vote for Truman's reelection. Truman's whistle-stop railroad campaign helped bring Democrats back to their partisan moorings, and Tru-

man support gained rapidly at the end of the campaign, after pollsters had ceased surveying the public.

Bipartisan Foreign Policy and the "Water's Edge"

Once the national party conventions nominated President Truman and New York governor Thomas E. Dewey as the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates, Truman and Dewey both pledged to continue the bipartisan foreign policy that marked the 1944 election. In accepting the Democratic nomination, President Truman stated, "Partisanship should stop at the water's edge; and I shall continue to preach that through this whole campaign."

Dewey's commitment to bipartisanship in the 1948 campaign strategy was based on early polls that showed him with a seemingly insurmountable lead over Truman. Anticipating victory, Dewey wished to campaign as president-elect and enjoy full latitude in policy options in his coming administration.

Although Dewey's bipartisan foreign policy strategy accounts for the minor role that foreign issues played in the 1948 election, no previous U.S. election was preceded by as many important international crises and longer-term international developments. As the Iron Curtain closed around the states of Eastern Europe, officials in the U.S. government worked toward a bipartisan plan to combat the expansion of communism. In March 1947, Truman proposed the Truman Doctrine, which called for \$400 million in economic and military assistance to Turkey and Greece. Arrangements for the Marshall Plan were initiated in June 1947 to support the economic recovery of Western Europe. Public attitudes toward the Soviet Union hardened rapidly. Large

majorities supported the anti-Soviet containment policy exemplified by the Truman Doctrine.

Other foreign crises threatened to influence the 1948 election. When Czechoslovakia came under Communist Party control in spring 1948, former secretary of state James Byrnes warned that hostilities might break out in Eastern Europe within four weeks. The fear of war increased when, on June 23, the Soviet Union cut all transportation links to Berlin in response to the plans of the United States, Britain, and France to unify their occupation zones and to permit the formation of an independent West German government. President Truman implemented a full-scale airlift of supplies into Berlin to counter the Soviet blockade, something that Dewey supported.

The Truman administration was itself divided on the recognition of Israel as a state. Many in the Departments of State and Defense challenged Truman's preference for a policy endorsing the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state. Eleven minutes after Israel proclaimed its existence at midnight, May 15, 1948, Truman announced U.S. recognition of Israel as "the de facto authority of the new State of Israel." Both the Democratic and the Republican Party platforms endorsed the administration's policy.

The possible infiltration of the U.S. government by domestic Communists became a potentially important campaign issue in the summer. Whittaker Chambers, a self-confessed former Communist, testified at congressional hearings that he had been connected to a ring that sought to infiltrate government agencies and that Alger Hiss, a former high-level official in the State Department, had passed government secrets to the Soviets in the

1930s. President Truman avoided vulnerability on this issue by attacking the Progressive Party candidate, Henry Wallace, for that party's alleged ties to the Communist Party. Dewey chose not to exploit the charges of communist influence in the government.

Because Dewey did not criticize Truman on foreign policy, domestic issues divided Truman and Dewey voters more than did foreign policy. Truman voters were more likely than Dewey voters to oppose the Taft-Hartley Act and to support rent and price controls. Truman's victory, then, is attributable to the fact that he successfully linked his party and his policies to the continuing popularity of the New Deal.

Strom Thurmond's anti-civil rights campaign did win four southern states and 39 electoral votes. However, with Truman's unexpectedly large margin over Dewey outside the South, Truman overcame the defection of Thurmond's states rights wing of the Democratic Party.

The Truman sweep carried over to Congress. As the surge-decline hypothesis predicts, the Democrats also gained 75 House seats and 9 Senate seats. The Democrats thus comfortably regained control of both chambers, which they had lost in the 1946 Republican tide.

The Congressional Elections of 1950

In the midterm congressional elections of 1950, the Democrats lost 29 seats in the House of Representatives but retained control. In the Senate, the Democrats lost six seats, emerging with a narrow margin of 48–47, with one independent. The fall of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) regime in China, the outbreak of the Korean War, and the Senate hearings conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy together formed much of the

foreign policy context for the 1950 and 1952 elections. The military collapse of Nationalist China began in Manchuria in September 1948. The Nationalists abandoned the mainland to Mao Tse-tung's communist insurgency and established a temporary capital on Formosa (Taiwan) on December 8, 1949, precipitating a subsequent partisan controversy over "who lost China."

In June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, prompting the United States to mount a defense of South Korea under the terms of a United Nations mandate. U.S. general Douglas MacArthur led a landing force at Inchon on September 15, 1950. MacArthur subsequently ordered his troops to cross the 38th Parallel dividing North and South Korea. On October 4, the Chinese communist regime entered the war in defense of North Korea. The conflict soon developed into a military stalemate. Charging that General MacArthur had publicly questioned administration policies in the Far East, President Truman relieved him of command on April 11, 1951.

In February 1950, Senator McCarthy began quoting figures on the number of Communists and "communist sympathizers" in the State Department, charges that seemed to take on more credibility with the conviction of Alger Hiss on charges of perjury. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee convened an investigation of McCarthy's charges in March 1950, giving McCarthy a platform for his allegations. In both 1950 and 1952, Republicans attacked Democrats with the slogan "Korea, Communism, and Corruption."

The 1952 Presidential Election

The public's impatience over the military stalemate in Korea contributed to a sharp

decline in Truman's approval rating from 80 percent in January 1949 to a low of 28 percent in November 1951. Truman resolved early in 1951 not to run for reelection, though he allowed his name to be entered in the New Hampshire primary to help derail the candidacy of Senator Estes Kefauver. Dwight Eisenhower subsequently declared himself a Republican and successfully gained the nomination for president, defeating Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. The Democrats nominated Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois.

Stevenson depicted the Korean conflict as a just fight against tyranny. Eisenhower, however, contended that the war could have been avoided by ordinary foresight and prudence. Republicans also charged that Truman's determination not to force North Korean prisoners of war (POWs) to return home unwillingly delayed an armistice agreement and prolonged the unpopular conflict. Stevenson vowed never to force POWs to return to their communist homelands. Eisenhower concurred that no prisoners would be repatriated by force, but he pledged a fair and humane settlement of the POW issue. Eisenhower also said that the South Korean army should be trained and equipped to take the place of U.S. soldiers, a view the public came increasingly to favor during the campaign.

Policy and Performance

Issues in 1952

Political scientists distinguish between "policy" and "performance" issues in elections. On policy issues, voters take opposing positions, pro and con, and support the candidate who is closest to their own policy views. On performance issues, most voters share a desired goal and vote for the candidate whom they view as more likely to achieve it.

By November 1952, a narrow majority of voters believed that the United States had made a mistake in going to war in Korea. Most voters wanted an honorable peace, but neither an escalation of the war nor its indefinite continuation. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander who had brought victory in World War II, made his famous declaration on October 24, 1952, "This administration cannot be expected to repair what it failed to prevent," pledging, "I will go to Korea." Eisenhower did not have to tell voters how he might achieve an honorable peace. The public's confidence that Eisenhower would conclude this unpopular war was central to his comfortable victory.

The debate over "who lost China" constituted a second performance judgment aiding Eisenhower. Seventy-five percent of those who blamed the U.S. government for the communist takeover of China voted for Eisenhower, compared with 46 percent of those who did not view U.S. actions as responsible.

Longer-term domestic position issues continued to divide voters along partisan lines. Those who approved of a strong federal role in unemployment, education, and housing supported Stevenson. Those who opposed a strong federal role voted for Eisenhower. Similarly, a strong majority who advocated either the repeal or revision of Taft-Hartley voted for Stevenson, whereas an equally large majority of those who supported Taft-Hartley voted for Eisenhower.

The attractiveness of the two major party candidates, Eisenhower in particular, drew almost 64 percent of the voting-age population to the polls. Voting turnout in 1952 was the highest since the advent of women's suffrage in the 1920

election and 10 percentage points higher than in 1948. Eisenhower handily defeated Stevenson by a margin of 55 percent to 44 percent.

The 1952 and 1954

Congressional Elections

With the surge both in turnout and in support for Eisenhower in 1952, the Republicans gained 22 seats in the House of Representatives, sufficient to wrest control from the Democrats. The Republicans gained only one seat in the Senate, but this was enough to seize control of the Senate as well. Eisenhower's election was more a personal than a party victory, but his coattails proved just long enough to ensure a Republican House and Senate.

In the 1954 midterm elections, Republicans continued to allege that Democrats were indifferent to domestic subversion. Nonetheless, the Democrats gained 19 House seats and one Senate seat. The Republicans would not again control the House of Representatives until the 1994 election.

The Presidential Election of 1956

Omitting those with no opinion, Eisenhower's presidential approval rating began at 91 percent in January 1953 and never fell below 70 percent during his first term. His popularity and his leadership in the foreign crises that would arise during the heat of the 1956 campaign ensured that the election would be fought to his strengths. All of his major campaign speeches concentrated on foreign affairs.

Adlai Stevenson, whom the Democrats again nominated to run against Eisenhower, knew that any effort to appeal to voters on foreign policy would pit his ideas against Eisenhower's greater credi-

bility. Even so, in nearly every speech he spoke of foreign affairs, usually suggesting that the Republicans were losing the Cold War through a policy of drift.

The 1956 campaign debate over the future of Europe and East-West relations was framed by the events leading up to the Geneva Conference in July 1955. Great Britain developed a formula for the Western recognition of West Germany and for the rearming of its military forces, which were incorporated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviets responded with the creation of the Warsaw Pact in early 1955.

Large majorities of Americans favored NATO and its principle of collective security. The percentage stating that the number of U.S. troops stationed in Europe was either “about right” or that “more should be sent” did not fall below 80 percent in any of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys from November 1953 to December 1956.

In Europe, however, the division of Europe into the two political and military alliances stimulated public support for a summit to reduce East-West tensions. In May 1956, the Soviet delegate to a UN disarmament subcommittee in London presented a comprehensive arms control proposal, which was compatible with Western insistence on large reductions in conventional forces in Europe. In response, the Eisenhower administration developed the idea of *mutual aerial inspection*, known as Open Skies.

The American people approved of the prospect of better relations with the Soviet Union. The public consistently supported summit meetings between Soviet and U.S. leaders, as well as cultural and other exchanges between the two superpowers, even while continuing

to favor a strong military presence abroad to assist other countries in limiting Soviet expansion.

Nuclear fallout from atmospheric testing increased as a public concern throughout the mid-1950s. A majority of the public opposed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s doctrine of *massive retaliation*, the deterrence policy that the United States would respond to a Soviet invasion in Europe with a U.S. nuclear assault on Soviet cities.

Stevenson responded to this concern about nuclear weapons and fallout by proposing a ban on nuclear testing. After conducting three tests in August 1956, Soviet premier Nikolay Bulganin also proposed a test ban. Bulganin then clumsily undercut Stevenson by appearing to endorse a Stevenson victory in the election. In the Gallup October pre-election poll, 70 percent of those who opposed a test ban said they would vote for Eisenhower, whereas 73 percent who supported the suspension of tests supported Stevenson. A clear majority disapproved of a test ban, indicating that Stevenson’s proposal cost him votes on this issue.

As one element in a proposal to modernize U.S. armed forces and to create a more professional military, Stevenson also proposed an early end to the military draft. The Republican campaign elevated it into a major campaign issue. In the October Gallup pre-election survey, 63 percent of those who supported the draft said they would vote for Eisenhower, whereas 71 percent who opposed the draft said they would vote for Stevenson. Supporters of the draft outnumbered opponents by more than 4:1.

Two international crises erupted during the 1956 campaign. In December 1955, Secretary Dulles had extended an offer to

Egypt to help finance the Aswan High Dam. President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt concluded substantial arms deals with the Soviet Union and with China, and the United States encouraged Great Britain and France to sell Israel tanks and fighters. Rising tensions between Israel and Egypt led to heavy fighting in the Gaza Strip in April 1956. On July 19, 1956, Dulles abruptly cancelled the U.S. offer to help build the dam. Nasser responded by seizing the Suez Canal and declaring that he would build the dam with canal revenues.

Eisenhower believed that the U.S. public would not support intervention to stop the canal's seizure as long as the Egyptians operated it effectively. The crisis flared out of control on October 29 when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, followed by British and French landings at Port Said on November 5, the day before the election. Identifying the United States with anticolonialism, Eisenhower organized international opposition to the British and French invasion. On November 2, an emergency session of the General Assembly adopted a U.S. cease-fire resolution.

Most observers conclude that Stevenson made a difficult political situation worse by criticizing Eisenhower during the crisis. Majorities of voters in the post-election surveys of Gallup and the NORC disapproved of the invasion by Israel, England, and France, and those who disapproved of the invasion voted disproportionately for Eisenhower over Stevenson.

As the Middle East situation deteriorated, rebellion erupted in Eastern Europe as Poles and Hungarians began protests against Soviet domination. The Republicans had stressed their support for liberation of the "captive nations"

since 1952, and they included a plank reaffirming Republican support for the "oppressed peoples and nations" of Eastern Europe in the party's 1956 platform.

The unrest in Poland quickly spread to Hungary, where protesters also called for the removal of Soviet troops. Soviet tanks repelled freedom fighters in Budapest armed with rocks and Molotov cocktails, and the last resistance collapsed only two days before the U.S. election. Eisenhower opposed any intervention that would appear to the Soviets to be threatening the Warsaw Pact.

Fortuitously for the administration, the Soviets agreed on October 30 to withdraw troops from Hungary. When the Hungarian government agreed to an armistice for the freedom fighters, the political dangers that the events in Poland and Hungary posed for Eisenhower's reelection largely evaporated. Voters continued to judge the Republicans better able to keep the country out of war by a ratio of more than 5:1.

When a president runs for reelection, people tend to decide their votes by evaluating the president's performance in office, not by comparing the campaign policy promises of the president and his challenger. Though the public preferred the domestic policy positions of the Democratic Party in 1956, they believed that foreign affairs were paramount in importance, and they were confident in Eisenhower's conduct of foreign affairs. President Eisenhower easily won reelection over Stevenson by a margin of 57 percent to 42 percent.

Although Adlai Stevenson shared Eisenhower's commitments in East-West relations, he did propose curtailing H-bomb tests and suspending compulsory military service, both of which Eisenhower and the larger public opposed.

Table 1 Popular and Electoral Votes for President, 1940–1956

<i>Year</i>	<i>Major Party Candidates</i>		<i>Electoral Vote (number and percent)</i>		<i>Popular Vote (number and percent)</i>		
	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Other</i>
1940	Franklin D. Roosevelt Henry A. Wallace	Wendell Willkie Charles McNary	449 85%	82 15%	27,263,448 54.7%	22,336,260 44.8%	238,991 0.5%
1944	Franklin D. Roosevelt Harry S. Truman	Thomas E. Dewey John W. Bricker	432 81%	99 19%	25,611,936 53.4%	22,013,372 45.9%	349,879 0.7%
1948	Harry S. Truman Alben W. Barkley	Thomas E. Dewey Earl Warren	303 57%	189 36%	24,105,587 49.5%	21,970,017 45.1%	2,615,620 5.4%
1952	Adlai E. Stevenson John Sparkman	Dwight D. Eisenhower Richard M. Nixon	89 17%	442 83%	27,314,649 44.4%	33,936,137 55.1%	457,981 0.7%
1956	Adlai E. Stevenson Estes Kefauver	Dwight D. Eisenhower Richard M. Nixon	73 14%	457 86%	26,030,172 42.0%	35,585,245 57.4%	413,684 0.7%

Source: Vital Statistics on American Politics, Tables 1–7, and Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections.

Table 2 House and Senate Election Results, by Congress, 1942–1958

Year	Congress	House					Senate					President
		Dem.	Rep.	Other	Gains/losses		Dem.	Rep.	Other	Gains/losses		
					Dem.	Rep.				Dem.	Rep.	
1942	78th	222	209	4	-45	47	57	38	1	-9	10	
1944	79th	243	190	2	21	-19	57	38	1	0	0	Roosevelt (D)
1946	80th	188	246	1	-55	56	45	51		-12	13	Truman (D)
1948	81st	263	171	1	75	-75	54	42		9	-9	Truman (D)
1950	82nd	234	199	2	-29	28	48	47	1	-6	5	
1952	83rd	213	221	1	-21	22	47	48	1	-1	1	Eisenhower (R)
1954	84th	232	203		19	-18	48	47	1	1	-1	
1956	85th	234	201		2	-2	49	47		1	0	Eisenhower (R)
1958	86th	283	154		49	-47	64	34		17	-13	

Note: Because of changes in the overall number of seats in the Senate and House, in the number of seats won by third parties, and in the number of vacancies, a Republican loss is not always matched precisely by a Democratic gain, or vice versa. Gains/losses reflect pre-election/post-election changes. Deaths, resignations, and special elections can cause further changes in party makeup.

Source: *Vital Statistics on American Politics*, Tables 1–18.

Table 3 Voter Turnout Rates: Overall, South, and Non-South, 1940-1958 (percent)

<i>Presidential Election Years</i>				<i>Nonpresidential Election Years</i>			
<i>Year</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Non-South</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Overall</i>	<i>Non-South</i>	<i>South</i>
1940	62.4	72.9	26.1	1942	33.9	42.0	6.9
1944	55.9	65.1	24.5	1946	38.8	47.2	10.4
1948	53.3	61.8	24.5	1950	42.6	51.6	12.4
1952	63.8	71.4	38.4	1954	43.1	51.3	16.1
1956	61.6	69.2	36.6	1958	44.5	53.5	15.2

Note: These turnout figures represent the percentage of the electorate of voting age casting valid (officially tabulated) votes in presidential elections and, in nonpresidential election years, elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. The base is the citizen voting-age population. The number of people actually going to the polls is slightly higher than these percentages indicate; some voters do not vote for a given office such as president or U.S. House, and a small number of ballots are spoiled. Also, some persons of voting age were not legally eligible to vote in their states. This number was particularly high in many southern states in this period because these states actively discouraged or prevented African Americans from registering to vote.

Source: *Vital Statistics on American Politics*, Table 1-1.

These two policy issues, in conjunction with the crises in Suez and Hungary in the last two weeks of the campaign, added to Eisenhower's landslide reelection.

Eisenhower's victory was more personal than partisan, and his coattails were nonexistent. The Republicans lost two seats to the Democrats in the House and one seat in the Senate. Turnout continued to be high by U.S. standards, as 62 percent of the voting-age population went to the polls.

The Congressional Elections of 1958

Americans made a second kind of performance judgment in 1958, this time on the performance of the economy. In fall 1957, the United States entered the second recession of Eisenhower's two administrations. Since the Depression of the 1930s, voters had judged the Democratic Party to be the better guardian of prosperity. The Democrats gained 49 House seats and 13 Senate seats, leaving the Democrats with large majorities in

both chambers. More than any other during the 1950s, the election of 1958 turned on the performance of the economy.

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Cold War Elections: 1960–1976

1960 Election

President Dwight D. Eisenhower was prohibited from running for a third term in 1960 because of the recently adopted Twenty-Second Amendment. The Republicans easily nominated Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Milhous Nixon, with running mate Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., a U.S. senator from Massachusetts, to run in what proved to be one of the closest elections in history. The Democrats' nomination was more hotly contested, and a forty-three-year-old senator from Massachusetts, John Fitzgerald Kennedy,

received the nomination. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Baines Johnson of Texas agreed to be Kennedy's running mate after having lost the presidential nomination to him.

Kennedy and Nixon each received 49 percent of the popular vote. However, Kennedy won with 303 Electoral College votes to Nixon's 219. The election also saw 62.8 percent voter participation, and the Democrats kept control over both the House and Senate. This was the first election that reflected the newly admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii, and thus there were additional congressional seats. The Democrats held 64 Senate seats to the Republicans' 36, and 262 House seats to the Republicans' 175.

Kennedy was the first president born during the twentieth century and the first Catholic elected as president. He was the son of the wealthy Joseph Kennedy, onetime ambassador to Great Britain. Bred to be a politician, John Kennedy graduated from Harvard, was decorated for bravery during World War II, and ran for the House of Representatives in 1946 and Senate in 1952. Although he was more known for his social life than for his legislative abilities, Kennedy after the 1956 election began his campaign for the presidency, barnstorming across the country. Richard Nixon, by contrast, had made a name for himself as a junior representative in the late 1940s, chairing the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAAC) hearings against Alger Hiss. As vice president under Eisenhower, Nixon was able to run a campaign based on "experience counts," something he felt Kennedy lacked.

Even if Kennedy was less experienced than Nixon, he did represent to many a new generation, and his youthful

charisma appealed to Americans. Style ended up playing a vital role in this election. Theodore White's *The Making of a President, 1960* (1961) explains in great detail how Kennedy was marketed to the public, especially via the relatively new medium of television. In presidential debates that were televised, the cool, tanned Kennedy convinced Americans that he was experienced and composed in contrast to the pale and nervous Nixon. Polls showed Nixon winning the debate if only heard on radio, but losing to Kennedy on television based on style and appearance.

Despite style issues, the election focused on foreign policy issues and what Kennedy dubbed a missile gap between the Soviet Union and the United States. After the Soviet Union successfully launched the first man-made earth satellite, *Sputnik*, on October 4, 1957, and the press leaked a presidential ad hoc committee report, chaired by Rowan Gaither, that stated that the United States was in its "gravest danger in history," Democrats hollered that the Eisenhower administration was placing the United States in danger with low defense budgets and made claims that there was a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union. The charge was false, but Eisenhower kept the top-secret U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union (which would prove the claim false) a secret until Gary Powers was shot down in May 1960. By that time, Eisenhower's campaign efforts for Nixon were too little, too late, and Nixon remained on the defensive for most of the campaign.

In addition to the missile gap, Kennedy focused his campaign on what he called the New Frontier proposals. These included stimulating greater economic growth, supporting antidiscrimination

efforts, conducting a more aggressive Cold War foreign policy, and increasing federal spending on social programs. Although Kennedy was careful to avoid the religious issue, his being Catholic hurt his candidacy in the traditionally Democratic South. In this respect, Lyndon Johnson helped the ticket by carrying his home state of Texas.

1962 Midterm Elections

The Democrats gained three seats in the Senate, giving them a 67–33 majority. The Republicans gained one seat in the House, but the Democrats lost three due in part to redistricting that reduced the number of House representatives to 435, from the 437 two years earlier. The Democrats retained control of the House 258–176.

In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren ruled in *Baker v. Carr* that state legislatures had to apportion electoral districts so that equal weight was given to rural and urban votes. Many states were divided in such a way that rural area votes weighed more than urban votes, hurting the political voice of minorities who traditionally lived in the cities. *Baker v. Carr* gave more voting power to blacks and Hispanics and other minority groups.

1964 Election

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, and Lyndon Johnson was sworn in as president. The Democratic nomination went handily to Johnson and his running mate, Senator Hubert Humphrey, a liberal from Minnesota. The Republicans nominated Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and his running mate, Representative William E. Miller of New York.

Receiving 61.1 percent of the popular vote and 486 electoral votes, Johnson won with a larger plurality than any candidate before or since. However, Goldwater's 52 electoral votes and 38.5 percent of the popular vote were not insignificant; Goldwater did carry five Deep South states, something the GOP had not done since Reconstruction. The election also saw 61.7 percent voter participation, and the Democrats kept control of both the House and the Senate. In fact, the Democrats won record majorities in both chambers. The Democrats held 68 Senate seats to the Republicans' 32, and 295 House seats to the Republicans' 140.

Johnson was a career politician from the hill country of West Texas and first went to the nation's capital as an aide to a Texas congressman in the 1930s. In 1937 he ran for Congress himself and in 1948 he went to the Senate. A New Dealer and admirer of Franklin Roosevelt, Johnson wished to go down in history as a greater reformer than his mentor. As such, he campaigned in 1964 for what he called a Great Society. After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson was able to get Congress to pass the first meaningful civil rights legislation since Reconstruction, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus setting the stage for more reform measures. The Great Society program was intended to continue to help those on the fringes of society and to increase standards in education, health, welfare, culture, and the arts. As Johnson explained during the commencement address at Howard University in 1965, it was "not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates" (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library website).

Challenging Johnson was Goldwater, the conservative Republican who won the nomination through a grassroots organization effort. Goldwater believed that many voters were disillusioned with the Democratic liberalism of Kennedy and Johnson, so he campaigned on conservative issues, attacking civil rights legislation in particular. In fact, Goldwater was one of only eight senators who had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, that was not because Goldwater was against civil rights; rather he believed such legislation gave too much power to the federal government. He also alluded to dismantling Social Security. In addition, he was critical of Johnson's policies in Vietnam and the Cold War in general, calling his foreign policy too timid. Although Johnson was campaigning on peace (and promising the American people that he would not send American boys to do what Asian boys should be doing in Vietnam), Goldwater was campaigning to bomb North Vietnam. Goldwater was perceived by many to be too hawkish and dangerous when it came to controlling nuclear forces. Goldwater himself said that people who feared nuclear war were "silly and sissified." Given such extreme attitudes, liberal Republicans abandoned Goldwater and openly supported Johnson in the campaign. Despite Johnson's landslide victory, Goldwater marked not the end but the beginning of the GOP's move to the right.

1966 Midterm Elections

Building on Goldwater's conservative message, the 1966 midterm elections witnessed a white backlash from those who feared urban unrest and open housing measures; for this many blamed John-

son and the Democratic Party. Midterm elections sent 47 more Republicans to the House of Representatives, destroying Johnson's liberal majority. The Democrats held on to 64 Senate seats to the Republicans' 36, but the Republicans jumped from 140 to 187 House seats while the Democrats fell from 295 to 248. This election foreshadowed the political voting attitudes of the 1968 presidential election.

1968 Election

The Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and the antiwar protests colored the 1968 election. Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the public outcry against the war, influenced his decision not to seek reelection. In a complicated race for the nomination, Johnson's vice president, Hubert Humphrey, finally won the nomination, along with running mate Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine. The Republicans had an easier nomination with the comeback of the former vice president and 1960 presidential candidate, Richard Nixon, and his running mate, Governor Spiro Agnew of Maryland. A third party, the conservative American Independent Party, nominated Governor George Wallace of Alabama.

Nixon and Humphrey each received about the same percentage in the popular vote, 43.4 percent and 42.7 percent, respectively. Wallace received 13.5 percent of the popular vote. Nixon won the election with 301 electoral votes to Humphrey's 191 and Wallace's 46. There was a 60.9 percent voter turnout for the election. Although the Republican victory and good showing for the conservative Wallace gave Republicans gains in both houses, the Democrats kept control, with 58 Senate seats and 243 House

seats, compared to the Republicans' 42 and 192.

President Johnson faced growing opposition to the war, even from within his own party. Senators Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, both Democrats, threw their hats into the ring. McCarthy, a dove, nearly beat Johnson in the New Hampshire primary, a traditionally hawkish state. That, and the political pressure Johnson faced in the wake of the Tet Offensive, convinced him not to seek reelection. The race for the Democratic nomination was tight. Kennedy, a favorite as the brother of the former president, won the California primary. Tragically, Sirhan Sirhan assassinated him in June, just after the primary. The assassination of Robert Kennedy, just two months after civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. had been slain, added to the growing frustration among youths and urban minorities. Urban riots lit up the summer nights of 1968, and unrest spilled over into the August Democratic Party convention held in Chicago. Plagued by dissent inside and violence in the streets, Humphrey won the nomination, but the events aired on television left a lasting negative impression on voters.

Humphrey ran on Johnson's current policies, which also hurt him politically. Late in the campaign he changed tactics and announced he would seek an end to the Vietnam War, but it was too little, too late to secure a victory for the Democrats.

Richard Nixon, after losing the 1960 presidential election and 1962 California gubernatorial election, got back into politics after Goldwater's 1964 defeat. He began to court Republicans in the South like Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, promising to de-emphasize

civil rights if elected, building on Goldwater's break into the South. Although Nixon himself was a moderate Republican, his tactic worked in that he won the southern rim states.

Nixon's biggest appeal was to what he called the Silent Majority. He saw himself as the spokesman for middle America and offered promises of law and order, stability, government retrenchment, and "peace with honor" in Vietnam. Claiming he had a "secret plan" to end the war, Nixon was able to avoid tough questions about that topic and focused on curbing urban unrest and liberal welfare spending. Nixon, as well as Wallace, appealed to a growing number of white working-class voters who felt frustrated that the Great Society programs used their tax money to help minorities while they themselves received few benefits.

George Wallace made a name for himself as governor of Alabama when he tried to block the admission of black students to the University of Alabama in 1963. He took pride in being a defender of segregation and is famous for his pledge of "Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! Segregation forever!" He attacked student radicals, militant blacks, and the eastern establishment. He ran in the 1964 and 1968 Democratic primaries and had done reasonably well. In 1968 he decided to run as a third-party candidate. His running mate, a former commander of the Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay, gave the campaign a hawkish tone (LeMay advocated using nuclear force in Vietnam, claiming that too many Americans had a "phobia" against nuclear weapons).

Wallace took the Deep South, states vital to Humphrey if he was to be victorious. But Humphrey won only Texas in

the South, thereby loosening the Democrats' grip in the South that they had held since Reconstruction.

1970 Midterm Elections

The 1970 midterm election saw a loss for Democrats in the Senate, but also a rise for that party in the House after losing seats in two consecutive elections. Democrats continued to hold the majority in both houses, with 54 Senate seats, compared to 44 seats for Republicans and two for independents. Democrats held 255 House seats to 180 for the Republicans.

1972 Election

President Richard Nixon had little trouble winning the Republican nomination in 1972, keeping Vice President Spiro Agnew on the ticket. The Democrats were still split over Vietnam, a war that continued to be waged despite Nixon's de-escalation efforts. The Democrats chose a candidate from the most liberal wing of the party, Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. McGovern's choice for running mate, Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, left the ticket after the press leaked that he had undergone treatment for emotional problems. Sargent Shriver, director of the Peace Corps, replaced him.

In one of the largest winning margins in history, Nixon won a second term. Nixon took 60.7 percent of the popular vote to McGovern's 37.5 percent and swept 520 Electoral College votes to McGovern's 17. McGovern carried only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia. Voter participation continued to decline, with only 55.2 percent turnout. Republicans continued to gain seats in the House, as they had since 1966. With twelve new seats, the Republicans held 192, but Democrats

kept control with 242 seats. Republicans lost two seats in the Senate, dropping to 42 seats to the Democrats' 56.

After George Wallace split the conservative vote with Nixon in the 1968 election, Nixon was determined to consolidate his voter base by building a coalition that included Wallace supporters. This was particularly difficult given that Wallace planned to run again in 1972. But Wallace, having won the Michigan and Maryland primaries, was shot in May in an assassination attempt. Paralyzed, he dropped out of the presidential race, and his supporters moved to Nixon's camp.

McGovern was the antiwar candidate and continued to support big government to help marginalized groups. Specifically he campaigned for higher taxes on the wealthy, guaranteed income for all Americans, amnesty for Vietnam War draft resisters, decriminalization of marijuana, and deep cuts in defense spending. These stances alienated the traditional backbone of the Democratic Party: white, blue-collar, working-class men who felt like the party had been taken over by the white-collar, educated, middle-class elites concerned more with social reform than with the economic needs of the working class. These voters epitomized Nixon's Silent Majority, and many more Democrats voted for the GOP in the 1972 election.

Nixon was helped as well by his foreign policy. Since 1969 he had fostered détente with the communist countries, visiting Beijing and Moscow in 1972. Nixon was now seen as a master of foreign policy, and so many people believed Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when they promised during the campaign that the war in Vietnam would soon be over.

Despite good odds that he would win a second term, Nixon had created a separate campaign organization, the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP). This organization solicited mostly illegal contributions. The activities of CREEP and the break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex before the election had no effect on the 1972 election, but it would force Nixon to resign in August 1974.

1974 Midterm Elections

One result of the Watergate scandal was a public backlash against the Republican Party. The GOP continued to lose Senate seats, losing five more to drop to 37 to the Democrats' 60. The biggest loss for the Republicans was in the House, where they lost 48 seats from their 1972 high. The Democrats held a strong majority in the House, with 291 seats to the Republicans' 144.

1976 Election

Richard Nixon had resigned as president in the wake of the Watergate scandal in August 1974. Vice President Spiro Agnew had resigned earlier after charges of corruption as governor; Representative Gerald Ford of Michigan was appointed to that office. Upon Nixon's resignation, Ford would become president. Governor Ronald Reagan of California launched a credible challenge to Ford for the Republican nomination in 1976, but Ford squeaked out a victory. Senator Robert Dole of Kansas ran as the vice presidential nominee on the GOP ticket. The Democrats turned to an outsider, someone not connected to Beltway politics. James "Jimmy" Earl Carter was a former governor of Georgia. He chose Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota as his run-

ning mate to balance the ticket and give the campaign an air of experience.

In a close election, Carter and Mondale won with 50 percent of the popular vote and 297 electoral votes. Ford received 47.9 percent of the popular vote and 241 electoral votes. Reagan, who ran as an independent, took one electoral vote from a Ford delegate in Washington State. Voter turnout was poor, at 53.5 percent participation, reflecting the apathetic attitude many had toward politics since Vietnam and Watergate. A popular bumper sticker of the time read "Don't Vote. It Only Encourages Them." The election saw little change in the makeup of Congress. Democrats held 61 Senate seats and 292 House seats; the Republicans held 38 Senate seats and 143 House seats.

Gerald Ford had to overcome a failing economy and general public disenchantment with his service. One of the first things Ford did as president in 1974 was to grant Nixon a full pardon for any crimes he may have committed relating to Watergate. Although Ford saw it as an essential decision in order for the country to heal and to move forward, many Americans were angry and felt that the Republican Party had disgraced the White House.

Carter was a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and trained as a nuclear engineer. He returned to Georgia to become a millionaire agricultural businessman and, eventually, the reform governor of the state. He was also a devout Baptist and proclaimed born-again Christian. However, he attempted to win everyone's vote and agreed to an interview with *Playboy* magazine in which he admitted that he had "lusted" in his heart. Although his honesty and piety appealed

to many voters who were frustrated with the corruption of Washington politics, the same characteristics also made many feel Carter lacked what was needed to be a strong leader, making it a very close election.

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Post-Cold War Elections: 1978–1990

Although conflicts abroad and the climactic ending of the Cold War could well define politics in the United States during the 1980s, trends in public opinion tended to move in directions that could not always be explained by international developments. In addition to reflecting the conservative tendencies of the electorate, public opinion during the 1980s proved to be an enigma as political scien-

tists labored to fully understand the gender gap, race (an issue brought to the fore by Jesse Jackson's 1984 candidacy), the declining significance of parties (resulting in split-ticket voting and divided government), and the impact of personality traits and the prominence of candidate-centered elections. In the end, the 1980s provided strong evidence for those who argue that Americans engage in retrospective voting, whereby economic considerations, more than anything else, condition the vote.

The Early 1980s: The Beginning of the Reagan Era

In 1980, actor-turned-politician Ronald Reagan, the Republican candidate, was elected president in a convincing victory over incumbent Jimmy Carter. Though Carter's administration had proven capable—its most significant achievement being the Camp David Accords—the administration was hurt by an oil boycott in 1979 and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Iran, which resulted in a hostage crisis. As a result, Americans tended to disapprove of Carter's job performance and personality for most of 1980. Ultimately, it was not so much disapproval of Carter's foreign affairs as his management of the struggling economy that led to Carter's undoing (see Table 1). These shortcomings opened the door for conservative tendencies in the electorate that lay dormant in the 1978 congressional elections and were skillfully articulated by Reagan, whose ability to communicate such messages was second to none.

For the Democratic Party, the 1980 presidential election represented its worst performance in a quarter-century. In some respects this may have been the

Table 1 Carter Approval Ratings on Three Issues

	<i>Jan. 1980</i>	<i>Feb. 1980</i>	<i>Mar. 1980</i>	<i>April 1980</i>	<i>June 1980</i>	<i>Aug. 1980</i>
Foreign policy	45	48	34	31	20	18
Economy	27	26	23	21	18	19
Iran	55	63	49	39	29	31

Note: Questions: (1) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling foreign policy? (2) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling the economy? (3) Do you approve or disapprove of the way Jimmy Carter is handling the crisis in Iran? Each percentage is the proportion approving Carter's actions on the stated issue.

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* polls.

result of a president, Carter, who had distanced himself from the party in Congress during nonelection years; the party in Congress itself lacked discipline. The strong showing of Independent John Anderson in 1980 suggested that voters were rejecting Democrats in Washington rather than demonstrating a vote of confidence in Reagan or the Republican Party. On Election Day, nearly 40 percent of those who voted for Reagan suggested that their motivation was simply that "it was time for a change." As well, in 1980 it appeared that the New Deal coalition had finally been stretched beyond its breaking point. Although Carter was able to garner the support of black voters—Senator Edward Kennedy's strong showing in the Democratic primaries that year was a clear indication of the importance that new demographics would have within the party—his inability to maintain support from traditional white, working-class Democrats ultimately paved the way for the Reagan victory.

Reagan, like Carter in 1976, ran as a political outsider and as the antiestablishment candidate. Reagan also made it clear that in domestic and foreign affairs he would not rely on indirect measures to solve the nation's ills, as Carter had.

Though his campaign promised more action than inaction, during his inaugural address Reagan restated what was a common theme in his campaign: "In the present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem." Accordingly, the challenge for the Reagan campaign was to prove to the U.S. public that the aging former governor of California was competent enough to handle the agenda of an active and aggressive president. To this end Reagan's performance in his first presidential debate, with Anderson, went a long way in helping him counter the perception that he was a man who did not fully understand the trappings and demands of the modern presidency. Reagan's third debate, with Carter, tempered concerns about his aggressive nature. In the end, it was Reagan's ability to convey a message of optimism and hope to the country—evidenced by a surge in the stock market the day following his election—that led to his election in 1980.

Although the Democrats' power of incumbency in Congress, which had allowed them to maintain control in both the House and the Senate in 1978, did not abate, the 1980 election did see Republican gains. The Ninety-Seventh

Congress consisted of a Republican-controlled Senate for the first time in twenty-eight years; only a slim Democratic majority held on to the House of Representatives. The 53 Republicans in the Senate were the most since the Herbert Hoover administration. However, one should be cautious about making claims about a conservative mood sweeping the country or about a referendum on the Democratic Party. The GOP's success can largely be attributed to its ability to mount a unified campaign that stood in contrast to the relative lack of coordination in the Democratic Party.

Despite successes in passing key elements of his economic program through Congress during his first few months in office, Reagan's job performance rating of 42 percent in October 1982 was the lowest it has been for any president since Harry Truman in 1946. Reagan's low rating was largely due to an economy still in recession; unemployment rates had reached a postwar high of 10.1 percent. Despite the recession and growing unemployment, the 1982 midterm elections saw only modest Democratic gains. This seemed to suggest that campaigns somehow mattered beyond political circumstance. Once again a disorganized Democratic Party, unable to take advantage of a political opportunity, fell victim to a prudent Republican Party that strategically channeled efforts and monies to specific candidates and districts. As well, Republicans were able to maintain their slim majority in the Senate. But the poor economic situation led to the loss of 26 Republican seats in the House. And as the economy continued to struggle after the election, the president's approval rating dipped as low as 35 percent in January 1981.

The Mid-1980s: The Successes of "Reaganomics"

The 1984 presidential election was interesting on a number of levels. The 1984 Democratic primary season featured the first black candidate to have a noteworthy impact on the process itself, Jesse Jackson. Jackson's candidacy brought to the surface tensions within the Democratic Party. And though Jackson had limited success within the party, he was able to stimulate black voter registration efforts and bring issues to the national spotlight. Another interesting element was the Democratic Party's attempt to take advantage of the so-called gender gap that had been observed in the electorate in 1980, when women appeared much more likely than men to support Democrats in the presidential and congressional elections. Attempting to capitalize on this, the Democratic presidential ticket of 1984 featured the first female vice presidential candidate, Geraldine Ferraro. In the end, however, gender seemingly had little effect on the outcome. Reagan won in an unprecedented landslide over Democrat Walter Mondale, carrying 49 states, 525 electoral votes, and 59 percent of the popular vote.

The resurgent economy and an improved public mood perpetuated Reagan's tenure in the White House. Although only 10 percent of Americans were satisfied with the way things were going in the country in 1979, more people were satisfied than dissatisfied in 1984. And though people had always liked Reagan as an individual, Americans were now approving of Reagan as the president as well. No longer able to attack Reagan for being too conservative, Mondale attacked Reagan's faculties but had little effect on the electorate; Reagan conveyed

to the public the image of a capable leader. Furthermore, Mondale admitted that he would *raise taxes* in order to reduce the growing national deficit. This struck Americans as odd given the improvement in the economy, which was being attributed to Reagan's tax cuts and spending reductions.

In 1984, Reagan, now the "Roosevelt of the Right," was able to run as a moderate candidate. In so doing he gained the support of one-fourth of registered Democrats on Election Day. This was problematic for the Republican Party, however, because Reagan's move toward the ideological center was a move away from more conservative elements. In actuality, part of the Reagan campaign's strategy was to suggest to voters that they could vote for a Democrat for Congress yet still vote for Reagan. Eager for a change in leadership four years earlier, the public in 1984 appeared to be expressing a preference to stay the course.

Once again, some of Reagan's extraordinary success can be attributed to the failures of the Democratic Party. The strain on the New Deal coalition was even more pronounced in 1984 as white southerners, who had been voting Democratic since Reconstruction, voted for the incumbent president. In the South Reagan garnered his most solid support (72 percent). One reason for the defection was the decline in party loyalties, which became less significant to a new generation of voters. Another reason was that the Democratic Party, pressed by the candidacy of Jackson in the primaries, now had to turn its back on southern whites and their leaders.

Democrats lost little ground in the House and gained a seat in the Senate, and so the 1984 election can be characterized as a landslide without coattails.

Part of the problem for Republicans was that, by not fielding enough quality candidates, they were not ready to take advantage of Reagan's success the way they had four years earlier. Many would-be candidates were skeptical about the possibilities for the economy through November. Their decisions to run, then, were made before it was entirely certain that Reagan would easily win reelection. Another problem was the defensive nature of the Reagan campaign, which allowed voters to justify their preference for no change and so maintain the condition of divided government that had been established in 1980 and had characterized most of the postwar period.

Despite the fact that the Democrats regained control of the Senate for the first time during the Reagan administration, the 1986 midterm elections proved uninteresting, as Democrats only made modest gains in the House. Democrats took control of the Senate by picking up eight seats, as they were able to gain narrow victories in key states. Indeed, these victories could have gone the other way (only 55,000 votes determined the outcomes). To some extent these results suggested that the electorate's movement away from the New Deal coalition was somehow more settled. The Democratic Party would have to come to grips with political realities. Not only could the South not be taken for granted; in all likelihood the region had been lost altogether.

The End of the 1980s: The Succession of George H. W. Bush

Although events like Iran-Contra, the October 1987 stock market crash, failure to pass key elements of a national defense plan, and continued unemployment would tarnish Reagan's legacy, the Democrats failed to take back the White

House in 1988. It was not for lack of trying, however, as the Democrats made a valiant effort to piece together what little remained of the New Deal coalition, running Michael Dukakis (a liberal governor from Massachusetts) for president along with Lloyd Bentsen (a more moderate senator from Texas). In the end, though, Vice President George H. W. Bush was able to keep the presidency for the Republican Party for four more years. Utilizing campaign strategies that were becoming increasingly negative on both sides, he also capitalized on the positives attributed to the prior administration. Bush became the first sitting vice president to win a presidential election since Martin Van Buren in 1836.

In part, Dukakis's vulnerability in the general election was predetermined by his move away from the national center toward a more liberal position during the primary season. Whereas Bush's nomination was won with relative ease, a hard-fought Democratic primary required that Dukakis move away from the political center in order to present himself as a candidate who was liberal enough to earn the support of those Democrats who were being courted by Jackson, who once again was making his presence felt in the primaries. As a result, Bush, calling for a "kinder, gentler nation," was able to seize the political center vacated by Reagan and, in so doing, paint Dukakis as too liberal to warrant consideration by moderates and independents. To that end, Republican advertisements capitalized on Dukakis's record in Massachusetts, where he could be faulted on his environmental record—portraying the Boston harbor as a dump site—and for being soft on crime—showing images of furloughed convicts (the infamous Willie Horton spot). This strategy was successful, and

Bush was able to secure the support of some registered Democrats and most political independents on Election Day.

Bush benefited from his position on political, social, and moral issues such as national security, drugs, school prayer, and the Pledge of Allegiance, as well as his ability to put them on the agenda. Dukakis reminded voters of Iran-Contra, Bush's role in it, and the huge deficits and the possibility that they would continue to grow if Republicans maintained control. The problem for Dukakis was that the economy was actually improving, and so there was no reason to vote for any real change. In the end, the Dukakis campaign achieved little on Election Day; Bush carried 40 states and nearly 54 percent of the popular vote.

Federal elections in 1988 can also be described as a study in the power of incumbency. Not only did the Republicans continue their stay in the White House; with next to no turnover in the House and the Senate, the Democrats maintained control of both. Dukakis's efforts to warn the nation fell on deaf ears. The Bush campaign was in no way pushing for real change, either, making explicit appeals to "stay the course." Accordingly, it was difficult to persuade voters to oust the incumbents of either party. The result was divided government that bore a striking resemblance to preceding ones.

Throughout the 1980s, economic considerations seemed to dictate turnover in federal elections. The 1990 election was no different, as Republicans in Congress would have to bear the brunt when President Bush reneged on his "no new taxes" pledge from the 1988 campaign. Despite his noteworthy capabilities in foreign affairs—especially in Eastern Europe, where the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and

also in Nicaragua and Panama—and success in Congress, Bush saw his approval ratings steadily decline over the course of the election year. Even though the outcome was only a moderate increase in Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate, the 1990 elections appeared to represent the end of the antitax fervor that came to the political fore in 1978. Indeed, the issue had peaked during the mid-1980s as the economy began to surge, then slowly lost momentum as deficits continued to increase throughout the decade.

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Contemporary Elections: 1990–Present

As the United States emerged from the Cold War and then the Gulf War during the early 1990s, it was not immediately obvious that the focus was shifting back to domestic issues. But Bill Clinton's astute handling of the presidential campaign garnered him 43 percent of the popular vote in the 1992 election, something that signaled a narrow mandate for Democrats, who then controlled both the Congress and the presidency. But the

elections that followed did not see a major shift toward the Democratic Party or liberal politics in general. Within two years Clinton was the first elected Democratic president since Franklin Pierce (in 1854) to lose both congressional chambers in the midterm elections (unelected Truman also did it in 1946). Republicans seized control of both chambers for the first time in 40 years. Despite this enormous setback for Democrats, the country did not move in a decisively conservative direction. Rather, a series of elections resulting in divided government ensued until the historic 2000 contest, in which George W. Bush won a narrow, disputed victory in the Electoral College (while losing the popular vote).

The two major features of the Clinton-era elections are indecision and surprise. The public steadfastly refused to deliver a mandate to either political party. This led to startling outcomes, where pillars of conventional wisdom fell to a temperamental electorate. Presidential candidates lost when they should have won and won when they should have lost. Congressional elections violated long-standing historical patterns such as the Democratic dominance of the House and the pattern of midterm losses for the president’s party. These twin elements—

indecision and surprise—reveal the danger in election interpretation: public attitudes can change quickly and often produce contradictory political outcomes.

Economy, Issues, and Approval Ratings

When asked in 1992 how the country’s economy had done in the last year, almost three out of four Americans said it got worse (see Table 1)—the worst evaluation since 1980, when Reagan was swept to power and 83 percent of the public felt that way. In the early 1990s the public was interested mostly in pocketbook issues: when asked in 1992 about the “most important problem” facing the country, 33 percent named economic issues, with other concerns lagging far behind. But by the late 1990s the economy had dramatically improved, and social policy issues like Medicare, Social Security, education, and welfare drew attention: only 9 percent indicated economic issues as the most important problem in 1996, whereas 17 percent named social issues and 13 percent named crime (ANES 1992 and 1996).

A crucial indicator of public sentiment is the job approval number for presidents. Most observers believe them to be a strong predictor of both the president’s own chances for reelection and the coun-

Table 1 Perceived State of the Nation’s Economy in the Last Year (1992–2000)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Gotten Better</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>Gotten Worse</i>
1992	5	23	72
1994	35	38	28
1996	38	45	17
1998	47	38	15
2000	39	44	17

Source: National Election Studies.

try's mood. When George H. W. Bush won the 1991 Gulf War, his popularity stood at unprecedented levels: 89 percent. (All public opinion approval numbers on presidential and congressional approval are taken from the Gallup Organization. Data were generously provided by Karlyn Bowman of the American Enterprise Institute.) Eighteen months later, a Gallup poll pegged his job approval number at 29 percent. Bush's rating remained below 50 percent for all of the 1992 campaign. Bill Clinton's approval started off relatively high—in the mid-50 percent range for the first few months of his presidency—but scandals quickly induced a dip into the 40 percent range. And though his approval numbers bounced around, they hovered just above 40 percent during the 1994 midterm elections. Several Democratic congressional candidates refused to campaign with him (Stephanopolous 2000), and the landslide congressional elections went to the Republicans. Clinton's approval stayed below 50 percent until the budget showdown with the Republicans in late 1995, when it began to climb and then shot up before his victory in the 1996 elections (see Table 2). Despite personal scandal,

Clinton's job approval rating would remain stratospheric through the rest of his presidency. He averaged above 58 percent in 1997, and an even higher 63.6 during the scandal year of 1998. Though his numbers fell slightly from the 1998 high, Clinton left office with one of the best job approval records in history—success that did not help vault Vice President Al Gore into the White House.

Although pundits tend to pay less attention to congressional approval numbers, the measure exhibits a somewhat puzzling trend for the 1990s. From a low point of 18 percent in March 1992, congressional approval improved on average throughout the rest of the decade (see Table 3). It is puzzling because the 1990s figures are historically high. For example, between 1974 and 1983 the percentage approving topped 40 percent only once, in 1977. It is doubly puzzling because Congress in 1998 was trying to impeach Bill Clinton, an act the public emphatically did not approve. Although approval for Congress slipped a bit in the fall (during the impeachment hearings), the measure remained above 40 percent. This translated into electoral dividends. After the 1994 debacle (which almost

Table 2 Average Approval for Bill Clinton by Year

<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent Approving</i>
1993	48.6
1994	46.3
1995	47.2
1996	54.5
1997	58.2
1998	63.6
1999	60.0
2000	59.9

Note: Numbers are average across all polls taken during the year.

Source: The Gallup Organization.

Table 3 Average Congressional Approval (1992–2000)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Percent Approving</i>
1992	18.0
1993	24.5
1994	25.2
1995	33.5
1996	35.8
1997	35.6
1998	47.4
1999	42.2
2000	40.5

Note: Numbers are average across all polls taken during the year.
Source: The Gallup Organization.

exclusively impacted Democrats, anyway), the percentage of incumbents seeking reelection who won their seat was 94, 98.3, and 97.8 percent for 1996, 1998, and 2000, respectively. On balance, the late 1990s was a reasonably good period for incumbents (on average between 1946 and 2000 the percentage was 92.1 percent) (Ornstein et al. 2002).

One final trend of interest is the decrease in split-ticket voting. From 1960 to 1988 an average of almost 35 percent of congressional districts split their tickets (voted one way for president and another way for the local House member). The numbers for 1992, 1996, and 2000 were 23, 25.3, and 19.8, respectively. The three numbers are the lowest percentages for any election since 1952, implying far greater congruence between a district's local and national preferences. No longer did large numbers of Democratic House members hang onto their seats while their constituents voted Republican at the presidential level (Ornstein et al. 2002).

These trends tell the basic story of the 1990s: the country's attention turned from international to domestic economic

issues, inducing the removal of a formerly popular president who had not focused on the economy; his successor's popularity increased as the economy improved; increasing levels of congressional approval led to safety for incumbents; and congressional and presidential voting appeared to come into greater alignment. This broad picture is true as far as it goes, but each election upset long-held notions about U.S. politics and illustrated the temperamental character of the U.S. public.

As has been noted elsewhere (Fiorina et al. 2003), the 1990s saw five successive elections that overturned conventional wisdom about U.S. politics. Each of these "surprises" can be traced in some measure to shifts or uncertainty in public attitudes.

1992

The unified government of 1992 was a surprise. George H. W. Bush was supposed to win the election, based on his extraordinary popularity following the Gulf War and the fact that the real economic numbers portended a victory. But 1992 turned out to be the most surpris-

ing, or unpredictable, election since 1916 (Fair 1992). Few of the electoral models applied to the 1992 race predicted Clinton's victory.

Early in the race several of the most prominent Democrats declined to challenge the popular Bush. When Al Gore dropped out of the race, one journalist described the Democrats as "having little success in mounting a respectable field of challengers to [President Bush]" (Pianin 1992). At the time that story was written, in August 1991, President Bush's job approval rating stood above 70 percent.

But when voters actually went to the polls in 1992, only 20.8 percent of voters approved of the job Bush had been doing relative to the economy (80 percent of those approving were Republicans; among true independents fewer than 10 percent approved) (ANES 1992). The average respondent's assessment of his financial state over the previous year stood at its worst point since 1972: more than two-thirds believed themselves to be in the same place or worse off. Thus, Clinton's campaign mantra—"It's the economy, stupid!"—was prescient.

Perception is not reality, though this perception was not very accurate, which largely explains why electoral models based on real economic data went wrong. Marc Hetherington (1996) finds that the key factor is the media's role in shaping public opinion. He describes an election when the recession was effectively over (GNP growth above 2 percent) but the media continued to beat the drum of recession, negatively impacting voters' evaluations and subsequently their vote choice. Despite the fact that real economic numbers were better than in 1984, when President Ronald Reagan won every state but Minnesota, Bush lost (see Hetherington 1996, p. 372).

The narrow mandate (if it can be called that) went to Clinton and the Democrats, but one odd outcome of the 1992 election should have warned observers that the Democratic Party had electoral challenges to come: despite the fact that Clinton won, Democrats lost a net 10 seats in the House of Representatives (the Senate remained stable). This was only a taste of the changes to come two years later.

1994

Nothing rocked Washington like the demise of the semipermanent Democratic majority in 1994. The earthquake was tough to predict: 11 of the 14 pundits tapped by the *Washington Post* (1994) predicted that the House would remain in Democratic control; only pundits believed it would fall. Professional reluctance to predict a Republican tide is understandable. For 40 years Democrats had controlled the House. It was not so much a political outcome as a fact of life.

Although the South had been trending Republican for decades, the party had never achieved critical mass there. And whereas the 1992 elections had awarded 62 percent of the southern seats to Democrats, the 1994 elections saw Republicans win a majority of southern seats for the first time ever. Additionally, the economic good times were not being felt as strongly as Democrats might have hoped. Although Election Day exit polls found less economic discontent than in 1992 or 1990, the numbers were still relatively high (see Table 1). A *Los Angeles Times* poll two weeks before the election found that 53 percent of the country still felt that the nation was in a recession (see Jacobson 2001, p. 179, esp. n. 66).

Lagging economic indicators do not fully explain the outcome. The public

was unhappy with Democratic policies and took out its frustration on the party's congressional candidates. Scholars have noted the importance of a few specific issues that galvanized a section of the electorate that came to be called the "angry white male." Gary Jacobson (1996) showed that votes with President Clinton on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) significantly hurt Democratic incumbents. And John Ferejohn found that a number of congressional votes on social issues such as gun control strongly contributed to 1994 Democratic losses (Ferejohn 1998).

1996

After the brawls in 1992 and 1994, the 1996 elections were pedestrian by comparison. But Clinton did manage to become the first Democrat elected with concurrent Republican majorities in both congressional chambers. A more typical pattern (particularly in the nineteenth century) would have been to see the public remove a president whose party had done so poorly in the midterm elections, but Clinton beat that model.

The key factor in the elections was certainly economic improvement, leading to higher approval ratings for both Clinton and the Congress (see Tables 2 and 3). Incumbents benefited generally. But this election particularly illustrated the level of aggregate indecision in the U.S. public. Although it is true that most partisans voted their ticket for both president and Congress, more than one-quarter of congressional districts still saw a split result. A *New York Times*/CBS News poll, taken two weeks before the election, illustrates the dynamic. Despite the fact that the poll showed generic Democrats with a 47–39 percent advantage when respondents declared which party they

would support, Republicans held a 48–41 percent advantage when voters were asked if it would be "better to elect a Democratic Congress to increase the power of President Clinton" or elect a Republican Congress to "limit the power of President Clinton" (Clymer 1996).

It is unclear whether or not voters consciously split their tickets to achieve policy balance (see Fiorina 1996), but no other election so clearly illustrated the possibility that the public gets nervous about unchecked partisan power. Republicans were clearly cognizant: they ran ads urging voters not to write Clinton a blank check by returning Democrats to congressional power—a virtual abandonment of their party leader, Dole. Their efforts earned a split decision in 1996: Clinton won, but the Republicans retained control of Congress, losing only three seats.

1998

Since the Civil War, only the FDR-led party of 1934 had managed to gain seats in a midterm House election. Despite the fact that he was embroiled in scandal and facing impeachment charges in the Congress, Clinton duplicated that feat when the Democrats gained five House seats in 1998. In the postwar era the average loss for a midterm election is 25.5 seats. Later years in that period saw relatively fewer average losses for the party in power, and the 1994 earthquake meant Republicans had captured most of the seats they were likely to gain in 1998 anyway. But Republicans were still expected to gain at least a few seats with history on their side.

Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, playing off of the unfolding Monica Lewinsky scandals, authorized a series of ads designed to tie Democratic House

members to the president's fate. The results appeared to backfire, and Gingrich resigned as speaker shortly after the election. Despite the fact that Congress enjoyed historically large popularity in 1998 (see Table 3), 69 percent of those surveyed disapproved of the way that Congress was handling the scandal. Two-thirds felt Clinton should not resign, and more than 70 percent of respondents felt he should not be impeached (ANES 1998). Most Americans felt it was a private matter. There is no conclusive evidence tying the Republican defeats to the scandal or the way Gingrich handled it—indeed it seemed to be a largely incumbent-driven election. But Republican strategists felt that the late series of ads emphasizing impeachment and Lewinsky did not help the party: those who made up their minds late chose Democrats by a wide margin—perhaps influenced by the ads that were Gingrich's ultimate downfall.

2000

With Clinton's popularity remaining extraordinarily high, congressional approval slipping, and the economy growing at better than 2 percent per year, most analysts expected Al Gore to win the 2000 election and perhaps sweep in a group of new Democrats to control the House. The election models all predicted that Gore would win 53 percent to 60 percent of the two-party vote for president. He actually won 50.2 percent of that vote, and lost in the Electoral College. What went wrong? With Clinton's approval high and the economy going well, how could Gore lose?

It is difficult to say without a bit more historical perspective on the election. But clearly, Gore's campaign mistakes hurt his chances for election. For in-

stance, Gore was perceived as too liberal. He was perceived as the most extreme Democratic presidential candidate between 1972 and 2000 (ANES data, as presented in Fiorina et al. 2003), a distinction that did not help his candidacy.

Perceived liberalism alone would not have sunk Gore, but it was not the only factor. Clinton fatigue or a kind of moral retrospective voting had a significant impact on Gore's chances. More than 54 percent of the American National Election Studies (ANES) respondents felt that the country's moral state had gotten worse between 1992 and 2000. Controlling for a host of factors such as partisanship, ideology, and perceived economic conditions, among others, the effect of perceived moral decline in the country had at least as strong if not a stronger effect than perceived economic decline (Fiorina et al. 2003).

These factors, combined with the normal election forces such as a strong economy and approval of the outgoing president's job and policies, did not appear to have the same effect as they usually do. Gore simply did not get the credit normally accorded the party in power. Whether or not 2000 is an anomaly or part of a larger trend remains to be seen.

Conclusion

The key policy element throughout this period is aggregate indecision. Michael Barone describes this country at the beginning of a new millennium as the 49 percent nation (Barone et al. 2001). Neither party can cobble together a lasting majority: Democrats capitalized on Republican inattention to domestic affairs, while Republicans seized opportunities when Democrats supported aggressively liberal policies. Incumbents

use the prevailing mistrust of both parties to persuade the public that only through divided government can policy be safe.

Perhaps because of the closely divided electorate, every election from 1992 to 2000 presents political observers with surprising results. The lesson is that public attitudes about elected institutions are not easy to predict. The public can punish officeholders for a poor economy, then turn right around and vote on morals or other surprising factors rather than bread-and-butter issues. Long-standing patterns such as midterm losses and Democratic control are not safe. The only constant is the consistently responsive nature of representative government.

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Section Two: Issues

Abortion

In 1973, in the landmark case *Roe v. Wade*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, by a 7–2 majority, that the state of Texas could not restrict a woman’s ability to have an abortion (O’Connor 1996). The majority based its ruling on the 1965 case *Griswold v. Connecticut*, in which the Court determined that the state of Connecticut could not outlaw birth control because such a law violated an individual’s right to privacy. Similarly, a state, such as Texas, could not infringe upon a woman’s right to privacy to end her pregnancy (O’Connor 1996). At the time of the ruling, about one-quarter of Americans vigorously celebrated, another one-quarter were morally outraged, and the rest fell in between these two extremes. Similar to 1973, although there remain strong proponents of—as well as opponents to—abortion, public opinion rests firmly in the “mushy middle.” Indeed, although most Americans today favor the pro-choice position, they also strongly support modest to major restrictions on when one may have access to the procedure.

The Mushy Middle

Although abortion has been one of the most controversial issues debated since the early 1970s, most have remained in the middle of the debate, refusing to com-

pletely favor one side over the other. Indeed, since the mid-1970s, a majority—or at least a strong plurality—of Americans have consistently believed that although abortion should be legal, some restrictions should be placed on the procedure. Today, 51 percent support this view, whereas only one-quarter believe it always should be legal and only 22 percent argue it always should be illegal (Saad July 2002). Although there has been some variation in these percentages over the years, they have remained relatively consistent. For instance, according to a recent study, the strongest support received by the “legal under any circumstances” position was in June 1992, when 34 percent chose that option (its lowest score was in January 1985, when only 21 percent agreed). The highest score that the middle view garnered was in August 1997, when 61 percent of respondents believed that abortion should be legal only under certain circumstances (the lowest score came in June 1992, when a 48 percent plurality agreed). The strongest support for the always-illegal side occurred in May 2002, when 22 percent agreed (the lowest support for this view occurred in June 1992, when only 13 percent agreed). According to this study, then, it appears that the pro-choice side gets the consistent support of between one-quarter and one-third of the popula-

tion, the pro-life side receives the support of between 15 and 25 percent, and the vast majority (50–60 percent) remains in the middle of the debate (Saad July 2002). The latter segment is comfortable with neither the abortion-on-demand view nor the outright outlawing of the procedure.

When more categories are offered to respondents, however, a slightly pro-restriction undercurrent among the public is revealed. For instance, only 37 percent of Americans argue that abortion should be legal under any or most circumstances. Conversely, 61 percent believe it should be illegal or legal in only a few cases. Nonetheless, these data demonstrate that most Americans support some form of legal abortion, as only 22 percent favor outlawing it in all situations (Saad July 2002).

Moreover, there are several situations in which the public takes an overwhelmingly pro-choice view. For instance, when pregnancy is a threat to the woman's life (84 percent support) or health (83 percent), or the result of rape or incest (79 percent), Americans strongly support the pro-choice position (Saad January 2002). Indeed, public support for these positions is so strong that very few pro-life candidates favor outlawing abortion when these circumstances are present. These issues tend to be "off of the table" as candidates for public office debate whether abortions should be allowed under other circumstances. Although majorities of the public also support abortions when a woman's emotional health is threatened (54 percent approve) or there is a strong chance that the fetus will be born with a defect or abnormality (66 percent), these majorities are much smaller than those found with the aforementioned situations (Robinson 2002).

Public Favors Some Restrictions

In other circumstances, however, the public is very supportive of placing restrictions on access to abortion. Indeed, majorities support parental notification laws, which require minors to get the approval of at least one of their parents before an abortion can be performed. When asked in a recent survey if girls under the age of 18 should be required to "obtain the consent of at least one of their parents before having an abortion," 82 percent of Americans answered affirmatively (Saad July 2002). Similarly, 70 percent support laws that require informing husbands prior to the procedure (Saad January 2002). Additionally, 86 percent favor laws that require doctors to inform patients about possible alternatives before agreeing to perform an abortion. Americans also favor limiting both second- and third-trimester abortions, when fetal viability outside of the womb often is at issue. According to a recent poll, 69 percent of the public oppose those performed in the second trimester of pregnancy, whereas only 24 percent approve. Even more dramatically, 86 percent believe that third-trimester abortions should be illegal, whereas fewer than one in 10 (8 percent) support them (Saad July 2002).

The public also is not generally sympathetic to lifestyle abortions. For instance, 62 percent believe it should be illegal for a woman to abort her pregnancy solely because she cannot afford the child. Similarly, by a margin of 51–39 percent, most favor outlawing abortions performed because tests show the baby will be mentally impaired (Saad July 2002). A recent study also reveals that only about one-quarter support abortions that are performed to ensure motherhood does not interfere with the woman's career. The

poll also found that very few Americans support abortions performed because the couple does not want to marry (35 percent), the woman and her family do not want more children (39 percent), or a teenager would need to drop out of school (42 percent) (Saad January 2002).

The Importance of Question Wording

Public opinion polls about abortion provide excellent examples of the importance of question wording when attempting to gauge public attitudes. Indeed, a lot of the variation observed in polls can be attributed to how questions are worded and which factors are stressed. For instance, a recent study found that although the public generally views abortion as murder, how the question is phrased affects the margin. When asked if they agree or disagree that "abortion is murder," a majority of the public, by a 57–36 percent margin, says that it is. The percentages move slightly, however, when respondents are asked if they consider it to be "the same thing as murdering a child" or not the same "because the fetus really isn't a child." With this wording, 50 percent take the former view, and 38 percent choose the latter option. When the question is presented as an oblique choice of thinking of abortion as "an act of murder, or don't you feel this way," a 48 percent plurality argue it is murder, but a strong 45 percent disagree (Saad January 2002).

The differences produced by question wording also can be seen when observing the partial-birth abortion debate (discussed below). The data indicate that when the lateness of late-term abortions is emphasized, and especially when the exception for saving the life of the mother is included, Americans (in a recent poll, 77 percent) oppose the procedure.

However, when these two factors are not mentioned and the involvement of a doctor is stressed, Americans narrowly (51–43 percent) support keeping the procedure legal (Saad July 2002).

Pro-Life versus Pro-Choice

Further evidence of the divided nature of public opinion regarding abortion is seen when the public is asked if they are pro-choice or pro-life. According to a recent poll, Americans are evenly divided, as 47 percent describe their views as pro-choice and 46 percent as pro-life (Saad July 2002). Among those who identify as pro-life, 31 percent believe abortion should always be illegal, and 59 percent argue it should be legal in only a few circumstances. Only 9 percent of this group believe it should be legal in most (5 percent) or all cases (4 percent). Among pro-choice Americans, half (50 percent) argue that it should be legal in all circumstances, whereas 19 percent believe it should be legal in most, and a little more than one-quarter (27 percent) think it should be legal in only a few instances. Only 3 percent of those who identify as pro-choice believe abortion should always be illegal (Saad January 2002).

These data show that even though the pro-choice and pro-life movements are relatively evenly split in their support among the public, the pro-choice side may have weaker commitment from its adherents than its counterpart. Indeed, whereas only 5 percent of those who identify as pro-life believe abortion should be legal in most cases, 27 percent of pro-choice Americans believe it should be illegal in most situations (Saad January 2002). This seeming inconsistency among a significant portion of pro-choice Americans may be the result of competing values within that segment of the

population. Although they may be generally opposed to abortion, their steadfast commitment to the few instances in which they believe it should be legal may help override their personal opposition to the procedure generally, thereby pushing them to identify with the pro-choice side of the debate.

Pro-Choice Movement on the Defensive: Additionally, the pro-choice movement seems to have lost some steam. For instance, in 1995, 56 percent of the public called themselves pro-choice, whereas only 33 percent self-identified as pro-life. Since that time, the number of Americans identifying as pro-choice has dropped steadily while the number of pro-life adherents has concurrently increased (Saad July 2002). This shift in public opinion may be the direct result of a relatively recent change in the focus of the abortion debate. Since 1995, pro-life organizations have successfully set the abortion agenda, focusing the public's attention on the procedure labeled as partial-birth abortion by opponents. Polls show—the most recent by a margin of 63 to 35 percent—that most Americans would vote for a law that made it illegal to perform partial-birth abortions except to save the life of the mother (Saad July 2002). This generally late-term procedure involves the partial, feet-first delivery of the fetus/child. While the head is still in the birth canal, a catheter perforates the soft tissue at the back of the head, collapsing the skull, so it can be removed from its mother. Over the past several years, the extensive discussion of this gruesome procedure probably has caused many Americans to reason that there are, indeed, circumstances in which they would limit access to abortion. The result, evidenced by the data presented above, has been a decrease in

the percentage of the public self-identifying as pro-choice.

The number of Americans who view abortion as morally wrong (53 percent) also has increased. Today, only 38 percent claim it is morally acceptable, and only 8 percent believe it is acceptable in certain situations (Franz 2002; Saad July 2002). Moreover, among those who believe it is morally acceptable, more than one in four (26 percent) believe it generally should be illegal. Conversely, only 11 percent who find it morally wrong nonetheless believe it should be generally legal (Saad January 2002). Additionally, when asked if abortion would be an option for them or their partner, by a strong margin (66–23 percent), most say it would not (Franz 2002). It seems, then, that although Americans do not favor outlawing abortion, they also are very reluctant to personally embrace the procedure.

Religion: The Root of Abortion Beliefs? Although gender does not seem to strongly influence views about abortion (Saad January 2002), religious commitment and religious tradition appear to shape one's beliefs. For example, by a margin of 71–26 percent, those who identify as “not very religious” favor keeping abortion legal in all or most situations. The middle category on the religious scale, those who identify as “fairly religious,” is evenly divided on the issue; by a 51–48 percent margin, they favor allowing abortions in most or all circumstances. Nonetheless, among this group a 41 percent plurality believe abortion only should be allowed in limited cases. Among those who identify as very religious, 68 percent believe it should be illegal or available only in limited circumstances, whereas 27 percent argue it

should be allowed in most or all situations (Saad January 2002). Further evidence of religious beliefs shaping abortion attitudes is found when those who oppose the procedure are asked to explain their opposition. Half (50 percent) cite their religious beliefs as the main reason for opposing the procedure (Robinson 2002).

Religious tradition also appears to shape attitudes toward abortion. According to one survey, 52 percent of all Americans support the procedure in all or most circumstances, and 43 percent believe it should be mostly or always illegal. Among white evangelical Protestants, however, 63 percent favor the latter position, and only 34 percent believe abortions should be mostly or always legal. Conversely, Catholics, by a margin of 55–43 percent, and white Protestants, by a 2:1 margin (66–33 percent), are more likely than the general public to support the procedure (Robinson 2002).

The Influence of Abortion Attitudes on Politics

Although religious beliefs appear to shape how Americans view abortion, their beliefs about the procedure have helped to shape the coalitions that constitute the nation's political parties (Layman 2001; O'Connor 1996, p. 157). Indeed, there is strong evidence that those who support access to abortions and those who do not fall into separate political camps. Among Democrats, for instance, 59 percent argue that abortion should always or mostly be legal, whereas 37 percent disagree. Conversely, among Republicans, 58 percent believe that abortions should always or mostly be illegal, whereas 40 percent have the opposite view (Robinson 2002).

When one examines how citizens vote, there is even stronger evidence that abor-

tion attitudes shape the parties' electoral coalitions. For instance, 2000 exit polls revealed that Americans who believe it should be illegal in all cases (according to the exit poll, 13 percent of the electorate) voted, by a margin of 74–22 percent, for George W. Bush over Al Gore for president. Additionally, among those who think abortion should be illegal in most cases (27 percent), Bush received 69 percent of the vote (to Gore's 29 percent). Conversely, among those who believe it should be legal in all cases (23 percent), 70 percent backed Gore, whereas only 25 percent supported Bush. Similarly, among those who posit that abortion should be legal in most cases (33 percent), Gore outpolled Bush 58 to 38 percent (ABC News 2000).

Conclusion

America's elites remain strongly divided over the issue of abortion as Democratic politicians generally favor allowing abortions in most circumstances and Republican officials generally support restricting it to a limited number of cases. Similarly, among the general public, those who oppose restrictions are less religious and tend to identify as and vote for Democrats, while those who favor them are more religious and identify as and vote for Republicans. Nonetheless, although the public remains divided, it appears that a general consensus has emerged, as most Americans believe abortions should be allowed, but that they should not be available on demand. Indeed, a strong plurality fall neither in the pro-choice nor pro-life camps, favoring either few or many restrictions on when, and under what circumstances, an abortion can be performed.

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Affirmative Action

The term *affirmative action* was first used by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, as he revised Executive Order No. 10925 to state: "The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin" (Kull 1992, p. 200). From this wording it would appear that the term referenced a proactive attempt to eliminate discrimination as a part of the work environment. However, government agencies soon began redefining the term to require that goals and timetables

be established for the hiring of racial minorities. Through the actions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, by the early 1970s preferential hiring and racial quotas represented affirmative action in the eyes of the federal government (Sniderman and Carmines 1997).

It is this later definition that has dominated political debate, media coverage, and research ever since. Much of the research on attitudes toward affirmative action has relied on survey data from the National Election Studies (NES) and the General Social Survey (GSS). Most of this research has focused on special preferences for targeted groups, primarily African Americans. On occasion, surveys will include questions in relation to improving opportunities or targeted recruitment of minority populations, but such questions are rarely asked on a consistent basis over a number of years.

Attitudes over Time

When we look at the early years of affirmative action in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, there is little indication of where public opinion stood on the issue. It wasn't until *University of California Regents v. Bakke* was working its way through the courts that surveys began to include questions related to affirmative action. In the *Bakke* case a white student sued the medical school on the grounds that lesser qualified black students had been admitted while he had been denied admission twice. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually ruled in *Bakke* that state universities could not set aside a fixed quota of seats for minority students. Considering race as one of many factors when selecting students, however, did not violate the Constitution's equal

protection guarantee according to the court.

Due to the publicity surrounding the *Bakke* case, the Gallup Organization began polling citizens' attitudes on affirmative action. In 1977, Gallup included the following question: "Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women and members of minority groups should be given preferential treatment in getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which point comes closest to how you feel on this matter?"

In this first survey 10 percent of respondents thought minority groups should get preferential treatment in getting jobs. The large majority, 83 percent, thought ability should be the main consideration. Support for preferential treatment was lowest among white respondents, with only 8 percent supporting such policies. Though black respondents were the most supportive of preferential treatment, at 27 percent, in the 1977 survey a large majority of black Americans opposed such policies.

The Gallup Organization continued to use this question for 14 years with little fluctuation in support for preferential treatment. In fact, in 1991 support among all respondents remained exactly the same. Support among white respondents increased by 1 percentage point, and support among black respondents had decreased 6 percentage points. Though other polling organizations find a little more or less support for preferential treatment of minorities in employment and education, throughout the 1980s and 1990s a large majority of Americans did not support such policies (for a more extensive review of polling trends and

affirmative action, see Steeh and Krysan 1996).

Public Opinion on Affirmative Action at the Turn of the Century

Today race remains one of the most debated subjects in the political arena. Americans are often divided in their opinions about the best way to handle the racial inequalities evident in today's society. The National Election Studies is a biennial national public opinion survey conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan (NES surveys are available at www.umich.edu/~nes/index.htm). One of the most widely used surveys in political science, the NES tracks opinions in a number of different policy areas. In 2000 the NES included the following question about affirmative action: "Some people say that because of past discrimination blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion?"

Like the Gallup question on affirmative action, the 2000 NES question defines affirmative action policy as preferences.

In Table 1, the results of the 2000 NES question are presented. Looking at this table, we see that only 16 percent of all respondents approve of preferences in hiring or promotion. Like the earlier surveys, more than 80 percent of Americans are against such policies. When we look at respondents broken down by race, we see that whites are least supportive, with 91 percent stating they disapprove of preferences. Unlike the earlier Gallup

Table 1 Approval of Affirmative Action for Blacks

	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>
All Respondents	16%	84%
<i>By Race</i>		
White	9%	91%
Black	63%	37%
Asian	21%	79%
Native American	10%	90%
Hispanic	18%	82%
<i>By Gender</i>		
Male	14%	86%
Female	18%	82%
<i>By Party</i>		
Democrats	24%	76%
Republicans	6%	94%
Independents	15%	85%
<i>By Ideology</i>		
Liberal	26%	74%
Moderate	11%	89%
Conservative	7%	93%

N = 1628.

Source: National Elections Studies 2000.

surveys, a majority of black respondents, 63 percent, now supports preferences in hiring and promotion. Asians and Hispanics also show slightly greater support for affirmative action than whites, at 21 and 18 percent, respectively.

Affirmative Action and Partisan Identification

In *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*, Edward Carmines and James Stimson (1989) show that since the early 1960s, there has been an evolution in public perception of where the parties stand on racial issues. The Democratic Party is viewed as the party supporting programs intended to improve the lives of racial minorities, including affirmative action. Republicans, by contrast, have been

viewed as opponents of such programs, arguing that affirmative action is reverse discrimination and unconstitutional.

Looking again at Table 1, we see respondents' answers to the 2000 NES question grouped by partisan identification. In it we see that differences on the issue of affirmative action evident among party elites are not as apparent in the U.S. public. Respondents who identify with the Democratic Party are the most supportive of preferences in hiring or promotion for blacks. However, 76 percent do not support such policies. As we would expect, respondents who identify with the Republican Party are least supportive, with only 6 percent approving preferences. Though slightly more supportive of affirmative action than Republicans, only 15 percent of independent

identifiers approve of preferences in hiring or promotion for blacks.

Affirmative Action and Political Ideology

A second common division among the public is that of political ideology. A *political ideology* is a set of beliefs or principles about the role of government. In the United States, political ideology is most often discussed in terms of *liberal* and *conservative*. Individuals who identify themselves as liberals tend to support a more active role for government. They believe that government can improve the lives of its citizens through programs targeting such areas as poverty, education, health care, and the environment. Conservative identifiers tend to think that government should have a less active role in citizens' lives. They believe that the problems facing citizens can best be solved in the private sector or at the local level.

When it comes to racial issues, liberals have often been very supportive of policies intended to improve the lives of minorities and protect against discrimination. Conservatives, in contrast, have not supported such policies. They argue that government should enforce laws prohibiting discrimination but refrain from implementing policies intended to make up for past discrimination.

We find in Table 1 that, as expected, respondents who identify themselves as conservative are least supportive of preferences in hiring or promotion for blacks. Only 7 percent of conservatives approve of affirmative action policies. Respondents who self-identify as moderates show only slightly more support than conservatives, at 11 percent. Most surprising is the small amount of support for preferences among respondents who self-identify as liberals.

Though they do show the most support, 26 percent, a large majority of liberals does not approve of preferences in hiring or promotion for blacks.

Affirmative Action for Women

Why do so few Americans support affirmative action for blacks? One reason may be that the policies are intended to help blacks, and though most Americans won't publicly condone racism, racial resentment is still very prevalent in today's society (Sidanius et al. 2000). Another reason may be that Americans see preferences in hiring and promotion as counter to egalitarian values (Sniderman et al. 1996). (For a more comprehensive coverage of this debate, see Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo [2000]).

One way to investigate this question is to compare support for affirmative action when the policy targets women with support when it targets blacks. In 1996 the General Social Survey included separate questions about affirmative action for women and blacks (GSS surveys can be found at www.icpsr.umich.edu:81/GSS/). The questions read as follows: "Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it discriminates against whites. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?" and "Some people say that because of past discrimination, women should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of women is wrong because it discriminates against men. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of women?"

If support for affirmative action was race-neutral, we would expect to find the same percentage of respondents not approving of preferential hiring and promotion for women as we do for blacks. In Table 2, we see that, at least for some respondents in the 1996 GSS survey, that is not the case. Overall, 10 percent more respondents support affirmative action programs when they are targeted at women. When we look at the results broken down by race, we see that blacks are as supportive of affirmative action for women as they are when such programs are intended for other blacks. The same cannot be said for whites and other minorities. Almost 10 percent more whites and 16 percent more nonblack minorities approve of preferences in hiring and promotions for women.

The same pattern appears when respondents are broken down by gender,

partisan identification, and political ideology. Women and men show 10 percent greater support for preferences in hiring and promotion for women than for blacks. Of respondents who identify with the Democratic Party, 36 percent approve of affirmative action programs for women, and only 25 percent support the same programs when they are targeted at blacks. Among Republicans, 5 percent more respondents support preferences in hiring and promotion for women than for blacks. The largest difference is among independents, where 31 percent support affirmative action for women and only 16 percent support affirmative action programs for blacks.

The results in Table 2 suggest that, at least for some Americans, the intended beneficiary of affirmative action programs influences their support. Regardless of gender, party identification, or political

Table 2 Approval of Affirmative Action for Women and Blacks

	<i>Approve Women</i>	<i>Disapprove Women</i>	<i>Approve Blacks</i>	<i>Disapprove Blacks</i>
All Respondents	27%	74%	17%	83%
<i>By Race</i>				
White	20%	80%	11%	89%
Black	51%	49%	50%	50%
Other	38%	62%	22%	78%
<i>By Gender</i>				
Male	24%	76%	14%	86%
Female	28%	72%	19%	81%
<i>By Party</i>				
Democrats	36%	64%	25%	75%
Independents	31%	69%	16%	84%
Republicans	13%	87%	8%	92%
<i>By Ideology</i>				
Liberal	34%	67%	26%	74%
Moderate	26%	74%	14%	86%
Conservative	20%	80%	12%	88%

N = 1821.

Source: 1996 General Social Survey.

ideology, respondents in the 1996 GSS survey were more supportive of affirmative action for women than of the same programs for blacks. Only black respondents appear consistent in their support. One should note that even with these differences a large majority of Americans does not support preferences in hiring and promotion, despite the group intended to benefit from the program.

Question Wording

The primary focus of this chapter has been on public opinion for affirmative action programs that promote preferences in hiring and promotion for women and blacks. This is due to the prominence of such questions in surveys and the attention such questions have been given by politicians, the media, and political scientists. This does not mean that all Americans think of affirmative action in the manner asked in most surveys. How a question is asked in a survey can influence greatly the answer given by the respondent (Asher 1995).

Question wording has been found to have a large amount of influence in the answers given by Americans when they are polled on issues of race (Sigelman and Welch 1991). Support for affirmative action is often greater when the survey question includes a statement suggesting that quotas are not part of the definition. Americans have also shown greater support for affirmative action programs that stress job training and educational assistance for blacks (Bobo and Kluegel 1993). Such variation in respondent answers has caused some scholars to suggest dropping the term *affirmative action* altogether from questions and focusing instead on the content of the specific policy (Steeh and Krysan 1996). In any case, a reader should always take into consideration

the wording of questions being asked when interpreting poll results.

Conclusion

I have looked at public opinion as it relates to affirmative action programs that call for preferences in hiring and promotion for blacks. Most public support for such programs has been very low from the late 1970s to the present. Only African Americans have become more supportive over the years. Regardless of gender, partisan identification, or political ideology, large majorities do not approve of affirmative action programs that stress preferences in hiring or promotion for blacks.

Further, the amount of support for affirmative action is influenced by the population the program is intended to benefit. Support for preferences is greater when affirmative action programs are targeted at women. Again, this pattern remains when we take into account a respondent's gender, partisan identification, or political ideology. African Americans were the only group that approved of affirmative action at the same levels despite the program's intended beneficiaries. This finding suggests that racial attitudes may play a part in the support that Americans are willing to give preference programs.

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Alienation

Political alienation is a set of attitudes or opinions that reflect a negative view of the political system. This characteristic distinguishes it from cultural, social, or psychological alienation. The root of this concept, "alien," underscores the perception of distance or feeling of separation behind these attitudes. Just as a newcomer or immigrant is initially struck by the strangeness of a new setting, the politically alienated individual finds the political world to be uncomfortable. Voting is seen as an infrequent act that bears little

meaning to daily life, and politics and government often appear remote and irrelevant to one's immediate concerns.

Political alienation represents a less-than-positive view of the political world; it indicates a displeasure with political leaders and institutions. Robert Lane defined the concept of alienation as "an individual's disapproval of the way political decisions are made" (1962, p. 162). In a similar vein, Franz Neuman describes alienation as a "conscious rejection of the whole political system which expresses itself in apathy" (1957, p. 290).

Political alienation, as Neuman suggests, can include a sense that one is powerless to influence the political system. Such individuals often feel incapable of having any meaningful impact on political events or developments. However, there are also alienated individuals who have this same negative view of politics. But instead of withdrawing from politics or becoming apathetic, they choose instead to direct their energies to nontraditional ways of expressing political opinions, such as protest or civil disobedience.

As such, political alienation represents a general disillusionment and disenchantment with the political system, but the concept includes different dimensions, some of which may be present, in different degrees, in an alienated individual. Furthermore, the dimensions of alienation can arise from different factors and can have a variety of behavioral consequences.

The Measurement of Alienation

A major advance in approaching the definitional problems of alienation was the research on the dimensionality of this concept (see Finifter 1970; Clarke and Acock 1989; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991; Weatherford 1991, 1992). This type

of inquiry breaks down the larger concept of alienation in order to specify the “dimensions” of alienation by identifying the different ways in which political alienation may be expressed: powerlessness or inefficacy, a perceived lack of government responsiveness, and cynicism.

Powerlessness reflects the individual’s belief that he or she is unable to affect the course of political events and outcomes. Survey questions from the University of Michigan’s American National Election Survey, which are used to measure the dimension of powerlessness, include: (1) “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does” (agree/disagree) and (2) “I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think” (agree/disagree).

Government responsiveness represents a more general evaluation of how receptive political institutions are to input from *all* individuals in society, not simply the individual per se. This dimension refers to beliefs about whether political parties offer meaningful choices among candidates, whether elections provide an effective way for citizens to influence the political system, and whether elected bodies are representative of the general public (Gilmour and Lamb 1975). Survey questions tapping this dimension include: (1) “How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think—a good deal, some or not much?” and (2) “Over the years, how much attention do you feel the government pays to what people think when it decides what to do—a good deal, some or not much?”

Political cynicism, also known as distrust, refers to the belief that the government is not producing policies according to expectations; the noncynical are generally satisfied with the procedures and

products of government (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1980). The following survey questions are used to measure this dimension of alienation: (1) “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”; (2) “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” (yes/no); (3) “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?”; and (4) “Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it?”

Trends in Political Alienation

Since the 1960s, Americans have become less attached to the two major political parties, less trusting of elected officials and political institutions, and less confident in their own abilities to influence the political system. Nearly every public opinion poll taken since 1964 has shown a dramatic decline in the public confidence in political leaders and institutions. Surveys conducted by the University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies confirm this trend, as presented in Figure 1 below. Other surveys have also confirmed this trend (see, e.g., Council for Excellence in Government 1997; Pew Research Center 1998).

The Effect of Political Developments and Events

This increase in political alienation has been influenced and shaped by the direction of governmental policies or specific actions taken by political leaders during




Figure 1 Trends in Political Alienation, 1964–2000

Source: Indices of “External Efficacy,” “Government Responsiveness,” “Trust in Government,” *National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1948–2000.*

this period. The growing disillusionment with the conduct of the Vietnam War under the administrations of Democrat Lyndon Johnson and Republican Richard Nixon, coupled with the urban unrest that erupted in the late 1960s, certainly affected the general public’s assessment of the capabilities and competence of public and party officials (Tolchin 1998). The slowly evolving revelations of Watergate, with widespread implications for other political figures outside the Nixon White House, led many Americans to question the impact of the electoral process, and large campaign contributors were shown to have influenced major decisions, ranging from government contracts to ambassador appointments. As additional political scandals, from Abscam to Iran-Contra

to Bill Clinton’s impeachment trial, unfolded in subsequent decades, feelings of alienation continued to grow among the American public.

A related development is the heightened media coverage of crises and scandals in government, leading some to blame the overzealousness of the post-Watergate media for this growing alienation (Garment 1991; Sabato 1991). Others have described this trend as a result of years of “bad news” rather than a reflection of the manner in which this news was communicated (Craig 1993).

The Consequences of Political Alienation

The three different dimensions of alienation may combine in different ways and

result in a variety of behaviors. A cynical individual, who nonetheless feels that voting is an important way to influence the political system, is likely to want to "throw the rascals out" (Citrin 1974) and will continue to vote. In contrast, a cynical individual who feels powerless as well is likely to stay home on Election Day. Much of the research in the field of social science has underscored the variety of ways in which alienated Americans have reacted to growing feelings of disenchantment and disillusionment over politics.

Increased Support for Third-Party Candidates

In certain electoral contexts, many alienated individuals are provided with an outlet for their frustrations. Specifically, such individuals can and do protest the current state of political affairs by voting for a third-party candidate for president (Hetherington 1999; Southwell and Everest 1998). This type of protest voting represents an extension of the rejection voting model (Fiorina 1981; Kernell 1977; Key 1966), whereby voters displeased with a certain policy or personality within their party defect to another party.

As is well established in rational choice literature, a strategic individual will usually vote for his second preference in a situation in which his first preference is unlikely to win, therefore avoiding a "wasted" vote (Black 1978; Cain 1978; Downs 1957). In contrast, the alienated voter often behaves in an opposite manner to the strategic voter. She may gravitate toward a third-party candidate *because* that candidate has less chance of victory. The protest voter has been described as one "who may vote for a third party not so much to unseat the incumbent as to reduce the majority sta-

tus of that incumbent and so send a message of dissatisfaction" (Bowler and Lanoue 1992, p. 489). This research found that protest voting was more likely to occur in those districts in which third-party strength was weakest. Alienated individuals per se may not regard a vote for an unlikely winner as "wasted" but rather as a statement of dissatisfaction.

Decreased Voter Turnout

Without a third-party candidate to provide an outlet for voter dissatisfaction, alienation can and often does lead to abstention. Many nonvoters are those who have become dissatisfied with the available options in U.S. electoral politics, and the pool of nonvoters now includes many "dropout" voters who may have actively supported a particular candidate or party in the past (Cavanagh 1981). To many of these individuals, voting is no longer a creative political act but has become a mere reaction and a simple endorsement of the status quo (Schuman 2002). As is well documented in the literature, alienated individuals are less likely to vote, even after controlling for all of the other demographic factors that affect voter turnout (Nownes 1992; Reiter 1979; Southwell 1985, 1986; Teixeira 1987, 1992.)

Increased Support for Political Reform

There is also considerable evidence that alienated Americans are more likely to rally behind certain electoral reforms or "elite-challenging" behaviors (Craig 1993; Tolchin 1998). Alienated individuals are more likely to favor term limits for elected officials (Southwell 1995), and the politically alienated are more likely to vote against ballot measures (Magleby 1984). Other researchers conclude that such individuals are more likely to sup-

port tax-limiting ballot measures (Lipset and Schneider 1983; Sears and Citrin 1983).

Increased Levels of Protest Activity and Civil Disobedience

The aforementioned consequences of political alienation are conventional in comparison to the responses of alienated Americans who actively engage in public protests or acts of civil disobedience. Following the antiwar protests and urban uprisings during the 1960s and 1970s, researchers began to examine possible links between alienation and unconventional behaviors. In general, feelings of powerlessness and a perceived lack of government responsiveness lead to increased disruptive behavior, more so than does cynicism or a negative attitude toward current governmental leaders and institutions (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Craig 1993). Cynicism appears to be somewhat related to protest behavior, but this response is confined to liberals (Citrin 1977; Useem and Useem 1979).

Conclusion

Political alienation in the United States has increased dramatically since the 1960s, as the events of Vietnam, Watergate, and other scandals unfolded. Social scientists investigating alienated attitudes have broken them down into three dimensions: powerlessness, government responsiveness, and cynicism. Research suggests that these dimensions combine in various ways to affect the subsequent behavior of individuals, leading to non-voting, support for third-party candidates, support for political reforms, and sometimes unconventional forms of behavior such as protest activity.

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The Campaign

Political campaigns attempt to influence public opinion, and volumes of research have documented successes and failures. Surprisingly little research, however, has explained how campaign organizations decide upon effective messages or has investigated the reasons for their effectiveness. This entry examines the science that consultants use to devise, perfect, and execute campaign messages—particularly of the attack or negative variety—and argues that this scientific approach succeeds because it supplies voters with precisely the education they need to make informed choices about competing candidates.

The substance of this entry is drawn from my own professional experience and observations of how campaign organizations utilize strategic information research. I have worked closely, for many years, with Fred Steeper, a widely respected Republican pollster and consultant. In that capacity, I have managed and analyzed comprehensive research programs for dozens of candidates for federal, state, and local offices.

Many of the specific research applications described here have been developed by Steeper, who was also responsible for each campaign's overall research design and ultimate strategic recommendations. Other consultants use similar techniques, or variations on the techniques described here, and some may have developed techniques even more sophis-

ticated than these. (Many campaigns, however, do not use the full range of techniques described here. There are many reasons a given technique may not be used. A given campaign's consultant may not be aware of a given technique, may not have the capacity to execute it, may not be able to afford it, or may not believe it would be appropriate for the campaign in question.)

The Benchmark Poll

An extensive benchmark poll, conducted soon after the identities of both candidates are firmly established, is critical for determining a plan of attack. The substantive material tested in the poll is typically compiled by professional background researchers (sometimes referred to as opposition researchers). Opposition researchers examine in great detail the voting records, newspaper stories, and old campaign materials of both candidates. The object is to cull from this material a complete picture of each candidate's history of issue positions, legislative votes, and public statements.

If the candidate has held any kind of legislative office, for example, a background researcher will compile, examine, and summarize every vote that the candidate cast. Special attention is given to patterns of ideologically extreme votes, votes against politically popular legislation, and those where the legislator was the only person to vote in a particular manner.

A typical organization for the poll questionnaire itself is to begin with a warm-up question about the general direction of the state or country, then ask about awareness and favorability of political figures and other people in the news, followed by trial-heat matchups for various offices that will be on the ballot that

November. After the trial heats, it is common to measure job performance for candidates currently holding some elective office. Voters would also be asked what issue or issues they believe to be most important.

The remainder of the questionnaire would test opinions of policy proposals that both sides have made and reactions to attack themes that could be used against each candidate. These are drawn from the opposition research report and are typically presented as batteries of questions. For example: "Here are some things you might learn about [candidate's name] voting record in Congress. For each one, please tell me if it makes you much more likely, somewhat more likely, somewhat less likely, or much less likely to vote for her for Governor, or if it makes no difference to your vote." Another series of questions might simply state each candidate's position on various controversial issues and ask with which side the voter agrees. The objective of all these question batteries is to test each side's potentially strongest positives and most troublesome vulnerabilities, as well as to simulate the range of messages voters might hear over the ensuing months.

The main part of the survey typically finishes with a second reading of the trial heat, prefaced with a statement such as "Now that we have discussed the race for [office/position] in more detail, I am going to ask again a question I asked earlier." Those giving a different answer at the end than at the beginning might be asked, open-ended, the reasons why they changed sides or are no longer undecided.

Analyzing the Benchmark Poll

There are a number of ways to assess the power of the various pieces of potential attack information being tested. The

most obvious is to rank-order the items about the opponent from largest to smallest percent responding "much less likely" to each one. This gives a general sense of the relative revulsion with which voters react to each piece of information. Many campaigns are inclined to rely on little more than this rank-order (and crosstabs of certain attack items with certain strategic subgroups) to determine the best communication strategy.

Many campaigns ask a larger question, which cannot be answered by the crosstabs or marginal rank-ordering of attack items alone: Will raising a given issue *really change people's votes?* The simple rank-order does not show any prima facie relationship with actual switching of votes, and an attentive consultant will therefore make a more thorough analysis of the data. There are often pieces of information toward which a great many voters will react negatively, but that do not move many votes. It could be that the information is already widely known (and therefore already included in the vote calculus). In other instances, the information may be negative, and therefore earn a negative reaction, but simply not be salient enough to change a vote. Simply rank-ordering the items, therefore, is not sufficient for determining what moves voters to switch.

The open-ended question "What are some of the reasons why you changed your vote?" is valuable because the voters themselves say, in their own words, what was most important in moving them from one candidate to the other. However, voters may not be able to remember all the reasons they changed allegiances or the relative importance of each reason.

To offer even more systematic understandings of opinion, Market Strategies

has found one effective use of applied multiple regression analysis as an unobtrusive means of measuring attitude change. When used in conjunction with other techniques, such as the open-ended "Why did you change?" question, it can provide important confirmation of suspected reasons for trial-heat movement. The information items about the candidates are coded as continuous scales, ranging from "best for opponent" to "best for our candidate," with neutral responses in the middle. These are treated as independent variables predicting the late trial heat, which is also coded as a continuous scale (opponent-undecided-our candidate).

However, each voter's *initial* inclination in the trial heat is likely to exert some influence over how he reacts to the information items themselves. Negative information about his preferred candidate, and positive information about the candidate not supported, may be discounted. Furthermore, voters may have already been aware of some of the attack information and factored it into their initial vote choice.

It is important, therefore, to control for voters' initial leanings in the trial heat. This is accomplished by building a two-step multiple regression model predicting the late vote, entering the early vote on the first step, and then using a step-wise method to select which of the information items should be entered on the second step. The relative size of the standardized regression coefficients of the selected information items can then be compared to determine the relative strength of each item in driving early-to-late vote change.

Presumably, the way in which voters respond to the information items will be conditioned in part by their existing can-

didate preference. Computing a *partial* correlation between each item and the late vote, controlling for the early vote, determines the portion of the relationship that is independent of existing candidate preference. Because the early vote is taken into account, this essentially yields a relationship between each information item and *change* in vote preference.

The analyst would prepare a simple table to streamline the presentation. Each row of the table would represent a single information item. Columns would be included for the overall net percent more likely (i.e., to vote for the candidate based on that information minus percent less likely), the zero-order (Pearson's r), and partial (controlling for early vote) correlations between each item and the late vote, as well as the size of each item's standardized regression coefficient (beta) in the final regression model.

The information items are then sorted by size of the standardized regression (beta) coefficients and/or partial correlations with the late vote. This gives the analyst a concise picture of which information items have the *strongest relationship with vote change*. Such an analysis provides an important blueprint for a successful campaign.

Qualitative Research

Once the most fruitful *areas* of attack are determined, small focus groups of swing voters are typically convened to test the most effective *means of executing* those attacks. The moderator's goal is to introduce the candidate information to respondents, lead a discussion about it, and explore respondents' thoughts and reactions. Often, the language and tone voters use, and the way they suggest things to each other, will provide critical insights into how issues and information

can be most effectively framed. The responses participants give contain a richness and texture that are impossible to capture in a telephone survey. Focus-group participants notice things, consider things, and turn over things in their heads much like real voters do over the course of a political campaign. Participants can therefore give insights that cannot be captured in a survey; those insights can be incorporated into the texture and tone of the ensuing campaign advertising. Framing and presenting information using language and images that voters understand are critical for maximizing the impact of that information.

The moderator may also show mock television spots and have participants react using electronic instant-response dials. Aggregate participant reactions would be represented as a moving line, superimposed over the spot; the moderator would later probe these reactions during a discussion period. A thorough ad-test analysis will break out separate reaction lines for those initially voting Republican, Democrat, and undecided. A *successful* attack spot moves the lines for all three groups (Republican, Democrat, undecided) significantly into negative territory. An *adequate* attack spot moves undecided voters and those initially supporting the ad's sponsor (the attacker) into negative territory but leaves the target's supporters around the neutral point. A *poorly executed* attack spot moves only the attacker's partisans into negative territory but drives undecided voters and the target's supporters into positive territory (indicating the spot generated sympathy for the target or even a backlash against the attacker).

In this manner, the polling and qualitative research work together to first identify attack information that is relevant

for voters, then present that information in a manner that they understand and can act upon.

A Textbook Illustration

The 1994 Illinois gubernatorial campaign provides an excellent example of how such strategic research can both educate an electorate and establish a candidate advantage. Incumbent Jim Edgar was a moderate Republican first elected by a narrow margin in 1990. His first term had been marked by neither spectacular achievements nor ignominious scandals; it might best be characterized as quiet but solid management of state government.

Edgar was challenged by Chicago Democrat Dawn Clark Netsch, the incumbent state comptroller and a former state senator (1973–1991). She won a bruising three-way primary in March by a 45 percent to 36 percent to 15 percent margin, after placing third in public opinion polls as recently as January (Hardy 1994). Netsch was widely credited as having won the primary on the strength of three television spots, which showed her (a slightly built, gray-haired, older woman) sinking trick pool shots. The tag line was "Dawn Clark Netsch: A Straight Shooter for Illinois," and she blanketed the airwaves with these spots in January and February (Kirby 1994). A poll conducted in the wake of the primary showed voters knew little about the substance of Netsch's issue positions or proposals—but Edgar enjoyed only a 6-point lead (49 percent to 43 percent).

Opposition research revealed some potentially fruitful avenues of attack. Netsch was the only state legislator to vote against several bills increasing or imposing mandatory minimum sentences for particularly horrific-sounding crimes; she also voted against the death

penalty at nearly every opportunity. As she explained, these votes were the product of deep convictions and firm principles: she opposed the death penalty, and she thought judges should be granted the maximum discretion in imposing sentences. Such positions were not unpopular with the urban, upscale, lakefront liberals who comprised a large portion of her senatorial district and had reelected her by comfortable margins. It seemed unlikely that such positions would resonate favorably with the rest of the state's voters, however.

In addition to Netsch's crime votes, the benchmark poll tested her proposal for education reform. Because Netsch's education proposals included a tax component, the natural impulse in Republican circles was to attack her for supporting a tax increase. (The proposal involved increasing some income taxes and decreasing property taxes by less, yielding more money for education and spreading those dollars around to various districts more equitably.) Others argued, however, that Netsch's voting record on crime should be attacked instead. The benchmark poll was designed to provide some guidance in choosing the most effective use of limited campaign dollars.

The poll included a battery of information items about Netsch's education and tax proposal, asking voters the extent to which each aspect made them more likely or less likely to support her proposal. As Table 1 shows, reactions to the proposal were mixed; voters liked the additional education funding, as well as the property tax reduction, but balked at the additional income taxes. Although these items do not measure a direct impact on the gubernatorial vote per se, Netsch had invested so much of her campaign in the education and tax proposal,

and tried to identify herself so closely with this proposal, that support for that critical proposal could be thought of as support for her candidacy.

Reactions to her crime votes, by contrast, were anything but mixed: the survey closed by asking the trial heat a second time. Edgar's margin jumped from 49–43 percent to 55–35 percent. When asked, open-ended, why they changed sides, a large majority of voters cited Netsch's record on crime issues. Given these results, the crime issue seemed the most logical area of emphasis: Netsch appeared to be far from the mainstream of state opinion on the issue, it was likely that few voters were aware of her outlying views, and once voters were informed of her views they tended to side with Edgar. (In a regression model predicting the early vote, tax plan items dominated the crime items. This indicates that Netsch's current trial-heat standing was much more a product of public information about her tax plan than her voting record on crime. Indeed, there had been very little mention of her crime votes during the primary campaign, but much had been made recently of her education and tax plan.)

The correlation analysis and regression model served to reinforce this finding. Table 3 shows, for each item, the overall "net more likely," the zero-order (Pearson's r) and partial (controlling for the early trial heat) correlations with the late trial heat, and the beta coefficient in the regression model. Netsch's opposition to the death penalty looked like an exceptionally fruitful line of attack: it had one of the strongest beta coefficients in the model, and one of the largest overall "net less likely" percents. Although some aspects of Netsch's tax proposal might make her vulnerable, all of the crime

Table 1 Reactions to Netsch’s Education and Tax Proposal

Here are some other things about Netsch’s tax proposal. For each one please tell me if it makes you more likely or less likely to support her proposal. (If More/Less) Would that be much (more/less) likely or just somewhat (more/less) likely? (Rank-ordered by percent much less likely.)

	<i>Much More</i>	<i>Smwt More</i>	<i>Smwt Less</i>	<i>Much Less</i>	<i>Not Imp</i>	<i>DK Ref</i>	<i>Collapsed</i>	
							<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>
QB55. She proposes to increase the state income tax by 42 percent.	7%	15	25	47	2	3	23%	72
QA55. She proposes to increase the state income tax from 3 percent—to 4.25 percent.	8%	19	30	38	4	1	27%	68
Q58. Her tax proposal raises income taxes by 2.5 billion dollars.	13%	23	24	31	5	4	36%	55
QA59. Her tax proposal would provide an additional 280 million dollars to Chicago city schools.	27%	22	17	27	4	3	49%	44
QB59. Her tax proposal would provide an additional 280 million dollars to Chicago city schools, 270 million dollars to suburban Chicago schools, and 450 million dollars to downstate schools.	29%	28	16	19	4	5	57%	35
Q56. Her proposed income tax increase would allow a 9 percent reduction in property taxes.	25%	32	18	16	5	4	57%	34
Q57. Her proposed income tax increase would provide <i>an additional</i> one billion dollars to Illinois public schools.	39%	23	16	15	4	3	62%	31

items had a strongly negative impact on her vote.

I have deliberately excluded the more detailed regression coefficients and statistics that it would be customary to report in a scholarly paper or journal article. The purpose of Table 3 is to re-create the kind of presentation that a political researcher would use in analyzing a pre-

election benchmark poll. The analysis aims at quickly and concisely presenting the nature of relationships between “learning exercise” information and the impact of that information on voting.

The qualitative research confirmed the poll findings and gave some guidance for executing the message. Focus-group participants had a mixed reaction to Netsch’s

Table 2 Reactions to Netsch’s Crime Votes

Here are some things you might learn about the way Dawn Clark Netsch voted on the crime issue when she was a state senator from 1973 to 1990. For each one please tell me if it makes you more likely or less likely to vote for her for governor. (Rank-ordered by percent much less likely.)

	<i>Much More</i>	<i>Smwt More</i>	<i>Smwt Less</i>	<i>Much Less</i>	<i>Not Imp</i>	<i>DK Ref</i>	<i>Collapsed</i>	
							<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>
Q65. She voted against the death penalty in nearly all murder cases including murder of police officers, paramedics, and minors; and voted against the death penalty in cases of murder by drug dealers or for those convicted of a second murder.	7%	6	22	58	5	2	13%	79
Q66. She voted against most proposals for longer jail sentences, including voting against life sentences for third-time convicted felons.	6%	6	27	54	5	2	12%	81
Q68. She voted against stricter laws on the use of firearms in a crime, including voting against a 10-year minimum sentence for an armed felony, and against a 20-year minimum sentence for a second armed felony.	9%	7	29	47	5	3	16%	77
Q69. She voted against stricter penalties for juvenile offenders, including voting against making it a crime to join a street gang and against trying minors convicted of an armed felony as adults.	9%	12	27	46	4	2	21%	73
Q67. She voted <i>against</i> proposals to restrict parole, bail, and good time credit, including voting <i>against</i> a proposal to deny parole for the most serious convicted felons.	17%	17	23	35	4	4	33%	59

education and tax plans, but few expressed much passion one way or the other. When discussion turned to her votes on crime and the death penalty, however, there was a marked change in the room. Many participants grew quite animated. Some expressed shock and dis-

belief that any elected official could have *really* cast the votes that Netsch did. The groups concluded that if the votes could be documented appropriately, then Netsch was simply not a credible candidate for statewide office. The campaign concluded from this exercise that

Table 3 Impact of Netsch Information on Late Trial Heat

	<i>Net More Likely</i>	<i>Zero- Order</i>	<i>Partial (Early Vote)</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Q69 Opposed stricter juvenile measures	-52	.31	.29	.10
Q65 Against death penalty in all cases	-66	.41	.28	.10
Q58 Raises taxes by \$2.5B	-19	.49	.28	.09
Q55 Increase the state income tax percent	-45	.45	.24	.07
Q67 Against parole restrictions	-26	.25	.21	.07
Q66 Opposed longer sentences	-69	.35	.28	n.s.
Q68 Against armed crime sentences	-61	.30	.23	n.s.
Q59 Additional dollars to various schools	+13	.40	.22	n.s.
Q56 Allows 9% property tax reduction	+23	.42	.20	n.s.
Q57 Provides \$1B to schools	+31	.41	.13	n.s.

Netsch's voting record on crime, accompanied by thorough documentation, should be publicized as widely as possible and as quickly as possible. Furthermore, tests of ads detailing Netsch's crime votes confirmed the effectiveness of the execution: moment-to-moment reaction lines were sharply negative, even among those initially supporting Netsch.

Edgar's campaign mounted a major advertising offensive in mid-June, focusing on Netsch's crime votes and opposition to the death penalty. Over the course of two weeks, the Edgar campaign spent roughly \$750,000 saturating the electorate with these messages. At the end of June, Edgar's margin in the trial heat had climbed from 6 points to 29 points, and his net advantage on handling the crime issue jumped from 10 points to 37 points. When asked, open-ended, why they were supporting Edgar rather than Netsch, crime and the death penalty dominated the responses. Edgar went on to win in a landslide.

Conclusion

In the case of 1994 Illinois, it could be argued that the statistical tie in April was the product of an electorate casting its

vote based largely on partisan and idiosyncratic considerations (such as Dawn Clark Netsch's ability to sink trick pool shots), rather than a well-informed consideration of the issue positions and records of each candidate. The Edgar campaign's use of strategic research identified the information voters needed most and how to communicate that information best.

As much as some voters complain about the negative tone of attack advertising, candidates continue to use it because it is highly successful at shifting votes. This entry has examined the underlying science that makes such campaign communications so potent an influence on public opinion. Political campaigns seek to educate voters about the nature of the choice between the candidates and, in so doing, win the maximum number of voters for the minimum possible expenditure. The science of strategic information research enables candidates to determine exactly which information an electorate needs about the opponent—and how to supply that information most effectively.

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Campaign Finance Reform

Campaign finance reform captivates the mass media and Washington elites and is a cottage industry within the academic community. Some view money in politics as an evil that must be rooted out, whereas others are skeptical that money corrupts in the way that reformers describe. Advocates for change especially point to the importance of campaign finance reform to Americans as a major justification for altering the way in which campaigns are funded. As it turns out, however, public opinion data offer little evidence that the public cares about this issue or even knows much about it. These facts are based on an extensive review of questions asked by major polling organizations, and the findings are remarkably attuned to changing political conditions. Whether or not the issue is receiving significant attention in Washington, whether or not reformist Senator John McCain is running for president, the contours of public opinion on the issue of campaign finance follow consistent patterns. Three main areas will be addressed: (1) campaign finance reform is not a policy priority for most all Americans; (2) the public strongly supports the concept of reform and generally favors most reforms, though question wording can affect the levels of support; and (3) most Americans believe that reforms will not change politics significantly, which may be due to the lack of a

link between trust in government and campaign finance.

Reform as a Low Priority

Calls for reform usually include the battle cry that Americans are clamoring for change. In announcing new legislation, Republican John McCain of Arizona said, "I believe that the country wants this reform. There is no doubt about the explosion of soft money. There is no doubt that it has gridlocked us here in Washington and the message of the last election is that Americans do not want that." But the public opinion data suggest otherwise. There are three ways to assess whether campaign finance is a policy priority. An open-ended polling question asks, "What do you think are the two most important issues for the government to address?" Individuals voluntarily offer issues rather than choose from a preset list. When this question is asked, campaign finance falls at or near the bottom of the list, with 1–3 percent of the population volunteering reform as a priority. This result is germane to whether campaign finance is currently being debated, an issue entrepreneur is advocating for change, or a campaign finance scandal is captivating Washington, D.C. Results from one poll appear in Table 1.

The second type of question, forced response, places campaign finance in a list of issues and asks individuals to state which is the most important for the government to address. For example, a question taken from a Fox News poll reads, "Of the following issues, which do you think is the most important for Congress to be working on right now? . . . The economy, education, Social Security, homeland security, military defense, taxes, energy issues, campaign finance reform." Again, campaign finance typically falls

Table 1 Policy Priorities of the U.S. Public

<i>Issue Area</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Education	18
Health care (not Medicare)	14
Not sure/Refused	14
Social Security	13
Crime/Violence	11
Taxes	10
Drugs	7
The economy (nonspecific)	6
Other	6
Gun control	5
Medicare	5
Abortion	5
Federal deficit/Budget	4
Foreign policy (nonspecific)	3
Oil/Gas prices	3
Environment	3
Welfare	3
Employment/Jobs	3
(Programs for) the poor/Poverty	3
Programs for the elderly (not Medicare/Social Security)	3
Domestic/Social issues (nonspecific)	2
Defense	2
Homelessness	2
Issues involving children	2
AIDS	2
Campaign finance	2
Human/Civil/Women's rights	2
National security	2
Peace/World peace/Nuclear arms	1
Family values (decline of)	1
Immigration	1
Morality/Sex on TV (television)	1
Race relations	1
Reducing the size of federal government	1
Religion (decline of)	1
(Bill) Clinton sex scandal/(Monica) Lewinsky/Impeachment	1
General elections/Presidential primary issues	1
Teen pregnancy/sex	1
World hunger	1
Elian Gonzalez	*

Source: Harris Poll, July 24, 2000.

near or at the bottom of policy priorities. Education, taxation, and national defense far eclipse the funding of political campaigns as issues of import. See Figure 1 for a 1999 survey that reflects the results on this type of question.

The final and least reliable method is to simply ask directly whether campaign finance should be a priority for Washington. Here a larger proportion of Americans believe that the issue should be a high priority, but still many do not view




Figure 1 Policy Priorities of the U.S. Public

Source: American Viewpoint National Monitor Survey, April 19, 1999.

campaign finance reform as urgent. This query does not require individuals to face the reality that agenda space is scarce. At any point there are innumerable questions for policymakers to consider, but reality dictates that only a limited number can be considered. Failure to force individuals to choose violates the basic trade-offs in politics, a point that political scientist Robert Weissberg has made in the context of polling questions that ask people whether they would like to see additional funding for a given policy area.

Despite the revealed preferences evidenced in polling data, when asked directly why campaign finance reform might fail in an April 1997 NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll, only 22 percent responded that it was because reform was a low public priority, with an overwhelming 69 percent answering that

“special interests and politicians will oppose changes.” And those who feel that politicians will hold up the legislation tend to blame both parties equally. In a 2002 poll of individuals who did not believe action would occur on campaign finance, 72 percent ascribed blame to the Democrats *and* the Republicans.

Widespread Support for Reform

Although there is little evidence that campaign finance reform is a policy priority for most Americans, there is overwhelming evidence that Americans favor the concept of reform generally. A question such as “Based on what you have heard or read, do you favor or oppose Congress passing new campaign finance laws?” elicits large majorities in favor of new regulations. The campaign finance issue has been defined such that citizens

believe reform is a positive even if disagreement exists over specifics.

Favorability toward particular reforms often depends on the way in which a question is worded; question-wording effects are a common problem in public opinion. A question that defines soft money as “unlimited large contributions given by corporations and labor unions” elicits strong support for new regulations, whereas a question referring to contributions that promote “grassroots attempts to get out the vote and educate voters” has the opposite effect. For instance, a study commissioned by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate (1994) asked:

Some people have suggested changes in the way elections for Congress are conducted. I'd like your opinion about a few of these suggestions. . . . Another proposal would eliminate contributions of something called soft money/grass roots money. Soft money/grass roots money is a contribution given to a nonprofit group or political party, instead of to a candidate, for purposes of educating voters and increasing their participation in elections. Which of the following two statements comes closer to your view about eliminating soft money/grassroots money? It would be good because it gives people a way around campaign contribution limits, and the money is often spent in ways that indirectly help a particular candidate, or it would be bad since it is the only reliable source of money to support activities involving the average citizen.

A subset was polled using the term *soft money*, and others were asked the ques-

tion using the term *grassroots*. The overall results had 56 percent of the respondents in favor of making no changes, with 33 percent in favor of change. This alteration in question wording—even for just a portion of respondents—reversed the results.

A similar pattern is observed in questions that ask about government funding of campaigns. The following question was asked in a 2000 *New York Times*/CBS News poll: “Some people have proposed public financing of political campaigns—that is, using only tax money to pay for political campaigns. Would you favor or oppose public financing to pay for political campaigns?” When the question is asked like this, 75 percent oppose government funding of campaigns. In a different form, using the phrase *public financing* or *public funding*, opposition drops significantly.

If questions are worded in a particular way, the public will tend to prefer any reform. In a 1997 survey commissioned by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and administered by Princeton Survey Research Associates, a majority favored either somewhat or strongly all of the following reforms: mandatory public financing, further restrictions on political action committee (PAC) contributions, limiting TV advertising, and limiting contributions to political parties. Simultaneously, nearly a majority polled favored the elimination of all limits on contributions.

One reason for question-wording effects is the low knowledge levels with respect to campaign finance law. Such regulations are complex and require expert knowledge to understand, so it is not surprising that the American public is by and large ignorant of even the basics of the law. The CRP found that only 4

percent of those polled knew that laws forbid corporations from contributing directly to the campaigns of candidates for president and Congress, and only 12 percent answered three or more of five knowledge questions correctly.

The Effects of Reform

The public at the same time demonstrates that they do not believe that campaign finance reform will reduce the influence of special interests in Washington. Large majorities believe that reform will not fundamentally change Washington. In a February 2002 poll conducted during debates over new campaign finance legislation, CBS News asked: "The House of Representatives recently passed campaign finance reform legislation, which would prohibit or limit various types of campaign contributions. If this legislation passes the Senate, do you think as a result that big business will have less influence on government, or will things go on much as they did before?" Nearly two-thirds (61 percent) responded with the latter. A 1996 poll commissioned by the National Association of Business Political Action Committees (NABPAC) found that 62 percent of respondents believe that if reform were enacted, "campaigns would find a way around the new rules and things would basically stay the same." At the same time, as an NABPAC analysis suggests, Americans believe that *if done right*, reform could change Washington. When asked about laws in the abstract (i.e., whether laws could make a difference), Americans respond favorably. For instance, the 1996 NABPAC poll found that 77 percent of respondents believed that reform would result in the reduced influence of interest groups.

A 2001 Gallup poll asked: "In general, if new campaign finance reform legisla-

tion were passed, do you think it would make our democratic form of government work—much better than it does now, just a little better, about the same, just a little worse, or much worse than it does now?" Fifty-nine percent answered "much better" or a "little better," with 32 percent believing nothing would change and fewer than 10 percent arguing that things would get worse.

One reason for these seemingly conflicting figures may be that campaign finance is not strongly linked with respondents' perceptions of government. When asked if they were satisfied with the political process, 59 percent of respondents in the CRP poll said that they were not. Of those, only 14 percent said that the reason for their dissatisfaction was the perception that politicians are corrupt or that special interests "buy" outcomes. This suggests that of the polled population, less than 10 percent make a direct link between their overall view of the system and money in politics.

Additional research supports this claim. The National Election Studies at the University of Michigan asks the following question every two years: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?" "Trust" or "confidence" is usually defined as answering just about always or most of the time. Political scientists John Coleman and Paul Manna used individual-level data from the 1994 and 1996 U.S. House elections to demonstrate that Americans' confidence in the federal government and views about their ability to influence government are not linked to campaign spending. At a macro level, trust in government also is not closely linked to campaign spending, according




Figure 2 Trust in Government and Campaign Spending

Source: Trust Measure: National Election Studies at the University of Michigan; Congressional Campaign Spending: Federal Election Commission Press Releases. This chart also appeared in earlier research.

to research I have conducted on this topic (see references and Figure 2).

The news media's attention to campaign finance bears a stronger relationship to satisfaction with the political process. Reporters pay close attention to campaign finance and often link policy disputes with the amount of campaign contributions provided by interested groups or individuals. In the 1997 CRP survey cited above, 60 percent of Americans who heard at least some information about questionable fund-raising were dissatisfied with the political process, compared with only 45 percent of those who had heard little or nothing.

Conclusion

Public opinion is central to the issue of campaign finance because a main justification for reform is that the public

demands it or that it will restore faith in democracy. This entry has noted three key points about campaign finance and public opinion. First, the American public does not view the issue as a policy priority. With the exception of issues like education and national defense, it is difficult for any issue to consistently be ranked as a policy priority. But the extensive evidence that this issue is *never* a priority contrasts with the close link between justifications for reform and public sentiment. Second, there is widespread support for the concept of reform, but support for specific reforms can be altered by question wording. This is fueled in part by limited knowledge of existing campaign finance laws and the various ways in which campaigns are (and are not) funded. Third, at the same time that reform is supported, Americans

do not believe that reforms will change Washington in fundamental ways, which may be due to the weak link between confidence in government and the campaign finance system. Overall, then, the concept of campaign finance reform is a favored if not particularly important policy for the American public.

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Civil Liberties

Civil liberties means rights that protect citizens from capricious governmental imposition, as well as rights that give citizens the power to change their government. In the United States, rights commonly referred to as civil liberties are

proscribed by the Bill of Rights and, more generally, the Constitution. As such, civil liberties are a foundational feature of democracy in general and American culture in particular (Andsager 2002). Thus civil liberties speak to the core of American culture, yet they are not static; Americans have exchanged certain civil liberties for personal and national safety. Public opinion about civil liberties is therefore an important mechanism in the regulation of freedom and democratic government.

History is marked with recurring trends in the public's opinion of civil liberties (Erskine and Siegel 1975). In general, the otherwise affirmative public opinion is less concerned with preservation of civil liberties for deviants—or non-conformists—when faced by a perceived threat to personal or national safety. Although there are many approaches to interpreting the dynamic trends in U.S. public opinion about civil liberties, the most straightforward and powerful method is to examine changes in opinion throughout major periods in history. As the following overviews of historical periods show, the type and degree of threat that tends to elicit changes in public opinion of civil liberties have varied.

Revolution and the Birth of Civil Liberties

American public opinion about civil liberties originated at the beginning of the republic itself. The overthrow of oppressive British rule was fresh in the minds of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution when they scribed the first portion of this document, the Bill of Rights. These civil liberties, such as freedom of speech in the First Amendment, are symbolic of the imperative for civil liberties in U.S. society.

Although some accounts of colonial America suggest that it was a place where the public valued the full gamut of civil liberties, most evidence suggests that public opinion about civil liberties has generally increased over time (McClosky and Brill 1983). Although civil liberties were the dominant theme in the Bill of Rights, these liberties were granted only to formally recognized citizens and not all people residing in the nation.

Women and racial minorities were not considered to be U.S. citizens; as such, they were not privy to the civil liberties granted to white male property holders. Civil liberties were valued as a necessity for a free and democratic society yet were not applied to all people. Other than race and gender, the intolerance commonly found in colonial America was based on religious creed (Levy 1963). Historical records indicate that while citizen opinion valued personal freedoms afforded by civil liberties, such liberties were too rarely granted to citizens outside an individual's religion or community (Roche 1958).

Other evidence regarding public opinion about civil liberties during this time is found in the legislative record. The entire evolution of public opinion about civil liberties can, in fact, be traced through legislation. Key examples of such legislation include the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, which required the deportation of noncitizens who voiced "dangerous" remarks about the republic or who wrote against the government. After some time, the "sober second thought of the people" repealed the acts (Stouffer 1955, p. 13). An even more blatant sign was the legalization of slavery. Even after the Civil War, public opinion in favor of slavery lingered.

The apparent lack of public concern for civil liberties during early America does not indicate a widespread lack of com-

passion. Instead, it signifies a country in its infancy negotiating the coexistent ideals of freedom, national security, and personal gain. In fact, compared to most other nations at the time, the United States and its citizens had extremely high standards for the preservation of civil liberties (McClosky and Brill 1983).

Industrialization and the Adolescence of Freedom

If the time of colonial America represents the infancy of American civil liberties, the rapid expansion of industrialization near the turn of the twentieth century depicts its adolescence. Several notable shifts occurred during this time, for two likely reasons: first, the U.S. government was forced to mature as its population grew, and second, a strong industrial economy provided a platform for progressive collective action. Women's suffrage is just one clear indicator of the extreme shifts in public opinion that occurred during this time (Keyssar 2000).

This era brought an increase in organizational and political protest. These types of actions were a driving force in the evolution of public opinion of civil liberties. The advent of labor unions and the legitimating of labor union strikes demonstrate how quickly public opinion of civil liberties evolved during this time to a level that acknowledged the freedoms of nonconformists, or people whose interests are counter to those of the dominant group. The American Civil Liberties Union was founded in 1920 and still fights vigorously for the preservation of civil liberties for all U.S. residents. The trend of progressive strides made during the nation's adolescence is not, however, without exception.

World War I and World War II were some of the most threatening times to

U.S. society. Threats of this kind and magnitude tended to result for some in the willful exchange of civil liberties for a sense of safety. Japanese American internment camps powerfully illustrate how public opinion altered during this time because of the need for personal and national preservation. The policy of imprisoning Japanese American citizens, under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, shows how public opinion of civil liberties of outsiders, or nonconformists, can be retracted when it serves the interest of the dominant group (Robinson 2001). Once again, however, public opinion guided the better judgment of citizens and lawmakers to recognize the illegitimacy of such violations.

Tempering Liberties for the Communist Threat

Public opinion data on civil liberties became available around the 1950s as research into the relationship between communism and civil liberties was recognized. Legislative behavior, typified and often led by U.S. senator Joseph McCarthy, marked the fear experienced by some Communists in the years following World War II.

Seminal work attempting to explain the nature of variation in public opinion examined factors from individuals as well as the communist threat (Stouffer 1955). In this study it was found that characteristics such as age, sex, geographic location, and education all impacted individuals' opinions. The study also found that while most people were not concerned about the threat of communism to individual civil liberties per se, higher levels of perceived communist threat were associated with less tolerance for civil liberties of nonconformists (Stouffer 1955; Williams, Nunn, and Peter 1976). There-

fore, the more strongly a person believed communism posed a threat to the United States, the more strongly the person believed in abandoning certain civil liberties of admitted Communists.

This relationship between public threat and public opinion is consistent across time. Although preservation of fundamental civil liberties for dominant groups is persistent across time, the "gray" freedoms afforded by civil liberties—those protecting dissenting opinion and feared persons—tend to wax and wane as society changes (McClosky and Brill 1983; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; Erskine and Siegel 1975). Most important, the type of change in society that most frequently elicits change in public opinion about civil liberties is the threat to individual or national safety.

A Time of Polarity: Vietnam, Hippies, and the Civil Rights Movement

Even though polling to examine opinion about civil liberties was largely begun in the 1950s, it was not until the post-Vietnam era that this mode of research became common in scientific literature; thus data were collected more frequently and were more precise. The surge of interest in public opinion was not, however, so much directed toward understanding favorable opinion about civil liberties so much as intolerance of civil libertarian principles. As such, a host of information was collected during this time on intolerance of civil liberties, under the auspices that civil liberties were innately valued by U.S. citizens.

Contrary to this idea, many studies found that stronger opinions in favor of civil liberties were not inborn but were largely a product of education (Stouffer 1955; Erskine and Siegel 1975; Nunn 1973; Davis 1975; Montero 1975;

Lawrence 1976; Rich 1980; Seltzer and Smith 1985; Weil 1985). As access to education increased over time, general public opinion about civil liberties has evolved to be more tolerant of nonconformists.

Recognizing that protection of civil liberties is a by-product of education shows exactly how public opinion has matured (Erskine and Siegel 1975; McClosky and Brill 1983). Because public opinion had evolved to greater tolerance of nonconformists, political activism opposing the war in Vietnam was more prevalent than during previous wars (Gibson 1989). Although the majority of the public initially favored war, this stance was juxtaposed to the growing hippie movement, which opposed war and valued freedom and civil liberties at an unprecedented level. Simultaneously, the historically tolerant public was also composed of citizens opposed to the civil rights of African Americans.

This period was unique in the coexistent public opinions wildly supportive of unfettered civil liberties and those still reluctant to grant civil liberties to all citizens. Political intolerance egged on by anti-civil libertarian public opinion led to political repression during this period (Gibson 1989). The danger of this public opinion coalesced in the Watergate scandal and the surreptitious collection of confidential information to bolster Nixon's Enemies List (Erskine and Siegel 1975; Gibson 1989).

The Cold War and Valuing Civil Liberties

Public opinion about civil liberties has been influenced by perceived threats of varying magnitude. The relatively peaceful decades following Vietnam were marked by a dedication to civil liberties, although one exception was found in the

Cold War-induced heightened national alertness (Lieberman 1995). During these times, members of the public once again tended to sacrifice certain civil liberties of nonconformists in exchange for protection from a perceived threat. Constitutional amendments spurred by Cold War fears validated the decreased value in public opinion of civil liberties during this time (Belknap 1977).

Even though familiar trends occurred because of Cold War anxieties, the 1980s and 1990s were mostly peaceful. Research focused on the role of social institutions and personality characteristics, rather than major historical events, as determinants of public opinion regarding civil liberties. For example, it was found that conservative religion tended to inhibit dedication to civil liberties for nonconformists (Steiber 1980; Reimer and Park 2001). But facets of social organization such as civil society were found to promote opinions that were more tolerant of nonconformists (Hougland and Lacy 1981; Wilson 1985; Persell, Green, and Gurevich 2001; Hurwitz and Mondak 2002). A number of examinations showed that personality traits such as flexibility, self-reliance, and independence indicated greater tolerance of civil liberties for nonconformists (Zalkind, Gaugler, and Schwartz 1975; Gaugler and Zalkind 1975).

Civil Liberties versus National Safety: New Trends in Opinion?

The question inherent in any historical analysis is what can be expected. History suggests two patterns will hold: first, the public's opinion of civil liberties will gradually become increasingly tolerant of civil liberties for nonconformists as educational access and levels increase; and second, threats to personal and national

safety will have a measurable but not long-standing effect on reducing tolerance for civil liberties of nonconformists. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, provide fertile ground to evaluate the latter of these two expected trends.

Support for measures limiting civil liberties has declined in public opinion according to poll data collected after September 11 (Taylor 2002). Over time, the percentage of the public favoring expanded surveillance actions gradually decreased. Although public concern for civil liberties initially decreased following September 11, additional data show an eventual increase with time (Carlson 2002). Likewise, the proportion of the population believing that the government should take preventative steps to avoid terrorism without violating civil liberties has increased over time, whereas the proportion of the population believing that the government should take steps even if civil liberties are violated has decreased over time. Both of these sources of data yet again evidence the temporary negative effect of perceived threats on the public's willingness to extend civil liberties. It is reasonable to expect this trend to continue over time and that the dynamic exchange between security and civil liberties will be played out in public opinion time and again.

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Civil Rights: 1942–2000

One can argue that the most important event in U.S. domestic politics during the twentieth century was the struggle for equality waged by black Americans and their sympathizers. The civil rights movement, along with the nonviolent campaigns for civil rights undertaken by other disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups that it inspired, was largely responsible for placing civil rights issues on the agendas of the Congress, the presidency, and the federal judiciary. These movements were successful in changing the laws governing overt race relations in the public sphere within the United States. But how successful have the civil rights movements been in changing the way that Americans—particularly white Americans—*think* about blacks and other minorities? Have whites become more tolerant and accepting of blacks, or do they still harbor crude and inaccurate stereotypes? Do whites view blacks as

morally and biologically equal members of the body politic who are entitled to equal treatment? Are whites willing to interact with blacks in social and residential contexts? What policies are white Americans willing to support in order to help blacks and other disadvantaged groups lift themselves out of the poor conditions that disproportionately affect their members?

These are questions that modern polling data can help us answer. To this end, this entry presents the results of national surveys conducted between 1942 and 2000 in which representative samples of respondents were asked a variety of questions pertaining to the attributes, status, and rights of blacks and minorities within the United States.

As we will see, major changes have occurred in the way that white Americans think about blacks and other minority groups. This does not mean that there are no longer divisions among citizens over civil rights issues; but as some scholars note (e.g., Sniderman and Carmines 1997), the divisions today more frequently center on questions of ideology and the role of government in society than they do on perceptions of innate inequalities and principles of equal treatment. To be sure, white animus toward blacks still exists in the United States, but it has abated substantially.

Whites' Perceptions of Blacks

Historically, one pillar of racism was the notion that whites were morally, biologically, and intellectually superior to blacks (see Campbell and Schuman 1968; Kluegel and Smith 1986). The data in Figure 1 indicate that since the 1960s, there is mixed evidence to support the contention that a substantial number of

white Americans share these views. For example, when asked whether blacks have “worse jobs, income, and housing than white people” because they possess less ability, more than 70 percent of whites answered no. The trend since the mid-1970s indicates that today more than 80 percent of whites do not think blacks have less ability to succeed. Thus, an overwhelming majority of whites believe that blacks have the ability to secure a good job and acquire economic resources, a position inconsistent with notions that blacks are biologically inferior to whites. However, fewer whites are willing to say that blacks are hardworking (only about 18 percent during the 1980s and 1990s) or that they do not lack motivation—although the percentage agreeing with this has gone from a low of 32 percent in 1977 to about 45 percent in the late 1990s. Thus, a substantial number of whites believe that blacks lack the motivation to work hard and that this partially explains why they have not succeeded to the same extent as whites.

At the same time, though, roughly 35–40 percent of whites consider differences in economic success between whites and blacks to be the result of discrimination encountered by blacks—a ratio that has not changed appreciably since the mid-1970s (data not presented in Figure 1). Likewise, roughly 50 percent of white respondents consider black economic status to be hindered by the fact that blacks have not been given adequate education opportunities, a figure that has remained highly stable since the 1970s. Thus, a considerable number of white Americans recognize that blacks have been forced to overcome many hurdles that most whites have not faced, and that these constraints—rather than innate




Figure 1 Whites' Perceptions of Blacks

ability and moral deficiencies—help explain why blacks are disproportionately less well-off than whites.

Another method that can be used to estimate how whites think about blacks is to ask how they feel about blacks. When asked to place blacks on a feeling thermometer that ranges from 0 to 100, the average response since the 1960s has been around 60. This is about 10–20 points lower than the average rating whites gave to whites during that same period, so it seems fair to conclude that whites do not harbor intense hostilities toward blacks. Somewhat surprisingly, however, is that the average black feeling thermometer score among whites did not rise during the 1962–2000 time period. If race relations between whites and blacks genuinely improved over the last 40 years, we might have expected whites to have

increasingly viewed blacks more warmly. One problem, of course, is that we do not know how warmly whites felt toward blacks prior to the 1960s, a period when state-sponsored as well as private discrimination was much more entrenched in the United States.

White Commitment to Principles of Equality

Evidence indicating that a large number of whites view blacks as moral equals does not mean that they are willing to grant blacks equal opportunities. Blacks might still be viewed as an out-group that, although equal to whites in an abstract sense, should not be afforded the same rights and privileges as whites. The data presented in Figure 2 demonstrate that this is not the case: by the end of the twentieth century, whites overwhelm-

ingly thought that blacks should be given the same opportunities as other members of society. For instance, by the early 1970s, more than 90 percent of whites favored equal job opportunities for blacks, a stark difference from the 45–50 percent who thought this was a sound position in the mid-1940s. Similarly, the percentage of whites who thought blacks and whites should attend the same schools went from a low of 32 percent in 1942 to the 90-plus region in the 1990s. At least in principle, then, whites have been willing to state in surveys that they support the idea of providing blacks with the types of civil rights that are necessary to raise one’s standard of living. Indeed, according to whites, the situation for blacks was one of marked improvement for much of the 1960s and 1970s, although Figure 2 demonstrates that fewer whites are willing to say this in the post-1980 period.

One of the ultimate tests to assess whites’ commitment to the principle of equal treatment for blacks is whether they would vote for a qualified black presidential candidate. As the trend line in Figure 2 indicates, there has been a steep and steady increase in the percentage of whites willing to vote for a black candidate. Less than 35 percent claimed they were willing to do so in 1958, whereas more than 90 percent professed they would do so in 1996. Of course, as with many of the issues discussed here, one must remember that we are asking survey questions to whites while they are sitting in the comfort of their homes. Perhaps many are sincere when they answer that they would vote for a qualified black candidate, but how do we really know? When given an opportunity to do so in the real world, they might still vote for a white candidate who is less qualified. More cynically, whites might




Figure 2 White Support for Equal Treatment of Blacks

feel socially pressured in the presence of the interviewer (particularly black interviewers) to provide socially acceptable answers. For most that would mean answering affirmatively. Any response other than that one would vote for a qualified black candidate would demonstrate that one possesses some racist inclinations, and most—even most racists—would probably prefer to keep that kind of information private.

For many years blacks were legally prohibited from residing in certain communities in the United States, and in others they were deterred from residing in an area due to private discrimination (e.g., homeowners might refuse to sell to blacks). Eventually, however, laws were passed or courts issued orders prohibiting such conduct. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that white public opinion

has increasingly opposed racial discrimination in the residential context. Indeed, for each of the four questions presented in Figure 3, the trend in white opinion has been one of movement from intolerance and exclusionary attitudes toward tolerant and welcoming attitudes. Thus, the percentage of whites claiming that blacks cannot be excluded from a residential community and that the owner of a home cannot refuse to sell has doubled. Similarly, the percentage of whites who say that they would not move if a black family moved in next door increased from the mid-50 percent range in the 1950s to 95-plus in the late 1990s.

Less encouraging are the results for the question whether one would move if great numbers of blacks moved into one's neighborhood. In the 1950s only 20 percent of whites claimed that they would




Figure 3 White Support for Equal Housing Opportunity for Blacks

stay put. But there has been a steady increase in the number of whites who claim that they would not move if many blacks entered their neighborhood, so much so that by the late 1990s roughly 70 percent said that they would not move. To be sure, a greater percentage of whites are troubled by the prospect of seeing a large influx of blacks move into their neighborhood compared to the entry of a single family. But the vast majority of whites are not troubled under *either* scenario—most whites claim that they would not leave, period. Given the degree to which desirable housing and attractive neighborhoods promote one's overall quality of life, these trends in white opinions concerning equality in the housing context are very encouraging.

*Equality and Social Interactions
between Whites and Blacks*

It is one thing for whites to claim that they see blacks as equals and that blacks should be treated equally in the realm of politics, employment, education, and housing, but how do the attitudes of whites stack up when they are asked about interacting with blacks in a personal manner? The data presented in Figures 4 and 5 help answer this question. Figure 4 illustrates that whites rarely object to the idea of sending their children to a school in which a few members of the student body are black; indeed, in surveys conducted over the last 30 years more than 90 percent of whites assert that they would not object to this possibility. However, when told that half of the student body is black, the percentage of whites offering "no objection" responses falls off to 70–80 percent. The percentage plummets to less than 50 percent when respondents are informed that a majority of students are black.

Thus, for many whites it appears that it is acceptable if their children attend a school with a few blacks, but less so when the school is equally split between blacks and whites—and much less so when a majority of students are black. Does this mean that many whites still harbor deep-seated racist beliefs? Perhaps. After all, why should it matter whether one's children attend majority white schools or majority black schools if one considers whites and blacks to be equal? To be sure, there may be nonracist reasons for whites disliking the idea of sending their children to schools composed of a significant percentage of blacks (e.g., perhaps whites conjure up images of poorly funded, black-majority schools found in many blighted urban areas; or perhaps they think this will require some cumbersome busing program), but the data should give us some pause in our rush to conclude that racism in the United States has overwhelmingly dissipated.

Other measures of whites' willingness to interact with blacks are presented in Figure 5. Responses to these questions show a gradual increase in the willingness of whites to interact with blacks on a personal level. Thus, whites indicating that they would not object to a family member inviting a black person to the family's home for dinner increased from a low of 52 percent in 1963 to about 75 percent in the early 1980s. Of course, as the data indicate, the number of whites who have had a black dinner guest at their home has been modest—although there has been a slight increase in this activity during the 1990s. Figure 5 also reports the percentage of whites who *disagree* with the statement that blacks should not push themselves into areas where they are not wanted. Clearly, an




Figure 4 Percentage of Whites Who Would Not Object to Sending Their Children to Integrated Schools

increasing number of whites have concluded that it is okay if blacks push to break down barriers excluding them from certain neighborhoods, professions, community organizations, and educational institutions, thereby bringing them into more frequent contact with whites.

Arguably the most direct type of personal interaction between whites and blacks comes in the form of intermarriage. A dinner guest leaves at the end of the evening, but a spouse stays for a lifetime (or at least for the duration of the marriage). Consistent with the generally increasing levels of tolerance and commitment to equality displayed by whites, the trends regarding intermarriage are not surprising. In the 1960s less than half of whites supported the idea of marriage between whites and blacks. By the end of the 1990s more than 85 percent of whites

were not opposed to these unions. And although the support is less robust, less than 35 percent of whites were opposed to intermarriage even when it involved one of their family members. Again, these results bode well for optimists who believe that white-black relations in the United States have and will continue to improve.

Attitudes toward Government Programs Designed to Promote Civil Rights

Whites are increasingly willing to say that blacks should be granted equal opportunities and that they are not opposed to interacting with blacks on a personal level. But the data presented in Figure 6 move, for the most part, in the opposite direction. Thus, whites have been less willing to support an active role




Figure 5 Whites Having Personal Relationships with Blacks

for the federal government in promoting the integration of public schools, in providing equal treatment in jobs, and in allocating aid to blacks and other minorities. At first glance these findings seem to run counter to those presented earlier—particularly those indicating that whites were supportive of integrated schools and equal employment opportunities for blacks. Some scholars (see Sears 1988) argue that this is so because many whites still harbor significant racist beliefs and resentment toward blacks, and that the positive trends depicted above are nothing more than “slopes of hypocrisy” (Schuman et al. 1997, p. 304).

According to this line of reasoning, numerous whites provide socially acceptable, nonracist answers to survey questions concerning civil rights and equal treatment of blacks. After all, few respondents want to admit outright that

they are bigots. But because they are truly resentful toward blacks, these individuals are unwilling to support programs sponsored by the federal government that are designed to implement and protect the civil rights of blacks and other minorities. In contrast, bigoted white respondents can safely provide negative answers to questions regarding these types of programs because, taken alone, such answers do not confirm that one is a racist. After all, one might credibly argue that she opposes such programs because she is, in principle, opposed to expanding the role of the government—particularly the federal government—in the private lives of citizens. Needless to say, this view has been strongly challenged by other scholars who posit that many whites who oppose government programs designed to promote the civil rights of blacks are principled adherents




Figure 6 Percentage of Whites Favoring Government Actions to Promote Civil Rights

of the “less government” worldview (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Sniderman and Carmines 1997) or to individualistic values (Lipset and Schneider 1978) and are not racists using such positions for cover.

But not all of the findings in Figure 6 demonstrate that whites are opposed to government programs designed to promote civil rights and the interests of blacks. For instance, whites have continued to support (although it has declined a bit in recent years) a role for the federal government when it comes to promoting equal treatment of blacks in public accommodations (e.g., restaurants, hotels, transportation, etc.). And although the busing of white students to black schools, and vice versa, was a widely disliked policy among whites and sparked several violent confrontations during the 1970s and 1980s, there is evidence that whites have

increasingly found this type of program to be acceptable during the 1990s (although it is still supported by less than 30 percent of whites).

The evidence presented in Figure 7 demonstrates that there is a wide gulf between the opinions of whites and blacks on affirmative action policies. Only about 30 percent of whites support the practice of giving blacks preferences in college admissions, whereas the corresponding number for blacks is more than 70 percent. Granting preferences to blacks in hiring and promotion decisions also divides white and black respondents; during the 1990s a mere 10 percent of whites supported such policies, whereas 40–50 percent of blacks did so. Whites and blacks also disagree about whether whites are hurt by affirmative action policies. The data indicate that about 70




Figure 7 Attitudes toward Affirmative Action by Race

percent of whites agree with that contention. In contrast, only 30–50 percent of blacks believe that affirmative action policies adversely affect whites (although more blacks agreed with this position during the late 1990s).

Conclusion

In his dissenting opinion in *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote that “the destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.” Justice Harlan dissented from the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold a Louisiana law mandating that railroad companies provide “equal but separate” accommodations to black and white passengers. In doing so, he was one of the

earliest political elites in the post-Reconstruction era to recognize that the relationship between blacks and whites in the United States would ultimately determine how deep the nation’s commitments were to democracy’s core principle of equality. Fortunately, as the results presented above indicate, the commitment to equality held by whites has grown substantially since the end of World War II. Although there are complex questions regarding the sincerity and depth of this commitment, one cannot deny that public attitudes toward blacks and civil rights issues in general have become more positive. The trajectory that race relations will take in the next century is uncertain, but it seems that U.S. citizens increasingly share a set of values governing the types of civil rights to which individuals are entitled. And although the consensus is not unan-

imous, this should help ensure that race relations are better than during previous eras.

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Death Penalty

In 1936, a Gallup poll asked Americans for the first time their opinions about the death penalty, finding that almost two-thirds supported this ultimate judicial measure for convicted murderers. Ever since, with very few exceptions, a majority of the U.S. populace has favored capital punishment. This support fluctuated, dropping to an all-time low in the mid-1960s and peaking in the mid-1990s, but it is safe to say that Americans have been

approving of the death penalty overall, to the degree of being enthusiastic, according to some researchers. Even so, death penalty approval rates have seen a steady decline in recent years.

The public's backing for executions has never been universal and unconditional. It has varied according to gender, race, age, education, income, religion, and political views. Public opinion is shaped by the case specifics and by factors such as mental retardation or age of the offender, or if the alternative sentence of life without parole is available.

Support for the death penalty has subsided recently due to a number of factors, most likely falling crime rates and growing media criticism of the sentencing process, exemplified in the exculpation of 101 death-row inmates from 1973 to 2002, and the related moratoria on executions in Illinois and Maryland.

The Death Penalty in the United States
The death penalty was transplanted to North America along with the rest of the British codes, but colonies varied widely in the way they exercised capital punishment. After 1776, all the colonies retained the death penalty in statute, as did the federal government.

The abolition movement gained strength in the early to mid-nineteenth century, especially in the Northeast, gradually bringing about an end to public executions in the United States. Starting in 1846, 17 states and jurisdictions expunged the death penalty from their statutes, following waning public support for executions.

This reformist trend continued into the twentieth century, but fears of rising crime during the Prohibition era (1920–1933) and the Great Depression facilitated a shift in public attitudes and

policies. The use of capital punishment was at an all-time high (167 executions per year in the 1930s), as a number of previously abolitionist states rushed to reinstate the death penalty.

Arguably the strongest blow to the death penalty was dealt by a series of Supreme Court decisions during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Court started reviewing the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1967 out of concerns over its arbitrariness. This led to an unofficial moratorium on sentencing and executions in the 40 death-penalty states. Following several landmark decisions by the Supreme Court challenging the application of state laws, Florida, Georgia, and Texas were forced to rewrite their statutes to satisfy the justices' objections in 1976. With this development, capital punishment in the United States was made legal again, and executions resumed in 1977.

Most states have since reintroduced capital punishment by revising their laws, the latest being New York in 1995. As of December 2002, 38 states, the federal government, and the U.S. military had the death penalty. Most statutes provide for capital punishment only in cases of murder.

On January 31, 2000, Governor George Ryan of Illinois imposed a moratorium on executions after a series of high-profile media investigations of the deeply flawed death-penalty system in the state. Maryland declared a moratorium on executions in 2002, and several other states are considering such a step with the ostensible goal of improving sentencing procedures.

Public Opinion of the Death Penalty

Gallup polls provide the best tool for historically tracking public opinion on the issue, having asked about it since 1936

(see Table 1). In recent decades, other authoritative sources, such as the Harris poll (see Table 2) and the General Social Survey (GSS) by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, have routinely asked Americans about capital punishment. At present, a cornucopia of polls is tracking the nation's attitudes toward the death penalty. Researchers Samuel Gross and Phoebe Ellsworth at the University of Michigan counted at least 12 national surveys asking about the death penalty in the first nine months of 2000, and it is safe to assume that there is no lack of state or local polls as well.

The mid-1960s became the nadir of death-penalty support, which had been waning steadily for some time before. Only about 38 percent (Harris Poll 1965) to 42 percent (Gallup Poll 1966) of respondents favored capital punishment. During this period opponents of capital punishment outnumbered supporters for the first and only time in history. However, from the end of the 1960s through the mid-1990s the trend was reversed, and favorability toward the death penalty started to increase. Approval rates reached a maximum of 80 percent in 1994 according to the Gallup Poll and 75 percent in 1997 according to the Harris Poll.

This trend seems to hold across various surveys. For instance, the GSS provides similar results, with an increase from 66 percent support in 1974 to a peak of 80 percent in 1994, with some decline afterward (73 percent in 1998). Estimates for the drop in support since the mid-1990s range from 6 to 10 percentage points, which effectively brings current public opinion to where it was in the mid-1970s.

The increase of support in the 1990s coincided with decreasing crime rates,

Table 1 Support for the Death Penalty in the United States, 1936–2002

Question: "Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?"

	Favor, %	Oppose, %	No Opinion, %
Oct. 2002	70	25	5
May 2002	72	25	3
Oct. 2001	68	26	6
May 2001	65	27	8
Feb. 2001	67	25	8
Aug./Sept. 2000	67	28	5
June 2000	66	26	8
Feb. 2000	66	28	6
1999	71	22	7
1995	77	13	10
1994	80	16	4
1991	76	18	6
1988	79	16	5
1986	70	22	8
1985	72	20	8
Nov. 1972	57	32	11
Mar. 1972	50	41	9
1971	49	40	11
1969	51	40	9
1967	54	38	8
1966	42	47	11
1965	45	43	12
1960	53	36	11
1957	47	34	18
1956	53	34	13
1953	68	25	7
1937	60	33	7
1936	59	38	3

Source: Jeffrey M. Jones, *Plurality of Americans Believe Death Penalty Not Imposed Often Enough*. Princeton, NJ: Gallup News Service/The Gallup Organization (March 2003). Available online at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030312.asp> (accessed March 12, 2003).

exactly the opposite of the situation in the 1960s, when felony rates were on the rise. The current downward trend in approval has several explanations, one of which is that it is a delayed reaction to the improved crime situation. A very likely—but largely untested—reason may be that Americans have been bombarded with media accounts of miscarriages of justice in capital cases. As of

July 2002, 101 inmates have been released from death row after exculpatory evidence was found. The public seems to perceive advances in DNA testing as the most important method of proving innocence, although in reality only about one in 10 cases has been overturned by DNA evidence. Americans have been exposed to a growing number of stories about incompetent counsels who botched the

Table 2 Nationwide Attitudes toward the Death Penalty, 1965–2001

Question: “Do you believe in capital punishment, that is, the death penalty, or are you opposed to it?”

	<i>Believe in Capital Punishment, %</i>	<i>Opposed to Capital Punishment, %</i>	<i>Not Sure/ Refused</i>
2001	67	26	7
2000	64	25	11
1999	71	21	8
1997	75	22	3
1983	68	27	5
1976	67	25	8
1973	59	31	10
1970	47	42	11
1969	48	38	14
1965	38	47	15

Source: *The Harris Poll #41*. Rochester, NY: Harris Interactive (Aug. 17, 2001). Available online at www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=252 (accessed October 20, 2003).

defense, overzealous prosecutors who coerced confessions, and police officers who concocted evidence. Abundant proof of racial and class disparities in death-row sentencing has contributed to growing unease over fairness.

A Gallup poll question found a growing number of people believing that an innocent person has been executed in the past 20 years (82 percent in 1995, 91 percent in 2000). In a 2001 Harris poll, 94 percent believed that innocent people are sometimes convicted of murder. The average estimate of innocents on death row in that poll was 12 percent. African Americans gave an even higher estimate, 22 percent; Hispanics estimated 15 percent, whites 10 percent. These results are concurrent with similar polling data from 1999 and 2000.

The proportion supporting the death penalty if a “substantial” number of innocent people were put on death row has dropped from more than 50 percent in

1999 and 2000 to just 36 percent in 2001. Such findings may reflect the growing use of DNA testing and the belief that new technology leaves little excuse for the judicial system to make errors. Some wrongful convictions gained prominence, like that of Frank Lee Smith, who died of cancer on death row while being exonerated by DNA analysis.

Racial disparities in capital sentencing help explain why African Americans, who represent 43 percent of death-row inmates, are also least likely as a group to favor capital punishment (see Table 3). Only 46 percent of blacks support the death penalty, and 43 percent oppose it. This is far less than the proportions of white and Hispanic respondents who favor it (73 percent and 63 percent, respectively). Table 3 provides further breakdowns of support for the death penalty by demographic characteristics.

When respondents are presented with an alternative to the death penalty, such

Table 3 Attitudes toward the Death Penalty by Demographic Characteristics, 2000

Question: "Do you believe in capital punishment, that is, the death penalty, or are you opposed to it?"

	<i>Believe in It</i>	<i>Opposed to It</i>	<i>Not Sure/ Refused</i>
<i>National</i>	67	26	7
<i>Sex</i>			
Male	74	22	4
Female	62	30	8
<i>Race, ethnicity</i>			
White	73	22	6
Black	46	43	10
Hispanic	63	33	4
<i>Age</i>			
18 to 24 years	72	23	5
25 to 29 years	66	23	11
30 to 39 years	71	24	5
40 to 49 years	63	33	4
50 to 64 years	66	28	6
65 years and older	67	22	11
<i>Education</i>			
College postgraduate	53	40	7
College graduate	66	29	5
Some college	70	26	3
High school graduate or less	69	22	8
<i>Income</i>			
\$75,000 and over	61	34	5
\$50,000 to \$74,999	73	25	2
\$35,000 to \$49,999	73	19	8
\$25,000 to \$34,999	65	27	8
\$15,000 to \$24,999	66	21	13
Less than \$15,000	67	29	4
<i>Region</i>			
East	65	31	4
Midwest	74	20	6
South	63	28	9
West	70	23	8
<i>Political affiliation</i>			
Republican	85	12	2
Democrat	54	36	10
Independent	68	25	6

Source: Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds., "Table 2.60: Attitudes toward the Death Penalty." In *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000.

as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, support for capital punishment drops substantially. Although the May 2001 Gallup poll found that 65 percent of Americans would favor the death penalty in general (see Table 1), only 52 percent still continued to favor execution when presented with the option of life in prison. It seems that life imprisonment can become a viable alternative to capital punishment if enough Americans become convinced that murderers locked up for life will indeed stay behind bars.

*Contradictions and Motives
for Death Penalty Support*

The public tends to be sensitive to capital punishment on a case-by-case basis, and sometimes this leads to the expression of mixed opinions. For instance, a poll by the *Dallas Morning News* found that only 45 percent of Texans in 1998 favored the execution of Karla Faye Tucker, a female murderer who repented publicly and converted to Christianity in jail. Almost three-quarters of Texans at the time supported the death penalty in principle.

Americans don't seem eager to execute mentally retarded persons, either. In 2001, a Fox News poll found that only about one in five (19 percent) would support applying capital punishment if the offender was mentally retarded, and two-thirds (67 percent) would oppose such an action.

Since 1989, not less than 57 percent of Americans supported the possibility of death for 16- and 17-year-olds, with a post-Columbine peak of 75 percent reported by Opinion Dynamics. At the same time, according to a CNN/*Time* poll, if one of the so-called Beltway snipers of 2001, 17-year-old John Lee

Malvo, was found guilty, 51 percent of respondents would want him executed, and 43 percent would rather see him in prison for life. For the other suspect, 44-year-old John Allen Muhammad, 72 percent favored death, whereas only 23 percent favored life in prison.

Yet one in five of Americans who opposed capital punishment in principle supported the execution of Timothy McVeigh for the 168 deaths he caused in the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. High-profile crimes do not provide an automatic boost to public support for the death penalty. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did not lead to any noticeable increase in support for capital punishment (68 percent in October 2001, 72 percent in May 2002; see Table 1).

Gallup reports that a plurality of pro-death penalty respondents saw it as "eye-for-an-eye" punishment that fits the crime (48 percent in February 2001, 40 percent in February 2000 and June 1991). Saving taxpayers' money by cutting prison costs was the second most repeated explanation, with 20 percent in February 2001 and 12 percent in February 2000/June 1991. Similar percentages responded that only the death penalty will prevent convicted murderers from repeating their crimes. Setting an example or acting as a deterrent was named by only 10 percent as a reason to support the death penalty (8 percent in February 2000/June 1991). Overall, the number of those who believe that the death penalty can deter others from crime has dropped from 63 percent in 1981 to 42 percent in 2001, according to Harris.

At the same time, Gallup in recent years has found consistently that a majority of Americans (60 percent in 2000) think that the death penalty is not imposed often enough. Harris has been

reporting that fewer and fewer Americans favor an increase in executions—53 percent wanted an increase in 1997 versus only 35 percent in 2001. Such disparities most likely reflect the difference in question wording.

Public Opinion in the States

Researcher Barbara Norrander of the University of Arizona has compiled information (see Table 4) showing support for the death penalty in states at approximately the time when this support peaked nationwide. Table 4 also compares the opinions in the early 1990s to those in 1936. The degree of support for capital punishment has dropped on a state-by-state basis in the late 1990s and early 2000s, exactly as it did nationwide. Space limitations will not allow us to discuss this trend in detail, with the exception of two traditionally pro-death penalty states: Texas, the state with the most executions, and Illinois, where Governor Ryan imposed a moratorium.

The *Houston Chronicle* compiled a special report in December 2002 that included polling data from Harris County, where one-third of all Texas death-row sentences are handed down. The poll showed that a slim majority of Harris County residents (53 percent) and somewhat more among all Texans (59 percent) favored capital punishment. Moreover, a majority in Texas seems to believe that the state has executed an innocent person (55 percent in the same *Houston Chronicle* poll and 65 percent in a Scripps-Howard poll in early 2001).

There is no argument that public opinion influences sentencing rates, but other factors can be even more important, such as political culture, past policies, laws, and execution rates. This explains why some states (i.e., Texas) maintain a record

high rate of sentencing and executions even though the populace is not that much more, if at all, pro-death penalty.

A poll by Zogby International found that despite the time lag in August 2002, two-thirds of Illinois voters (68 percent) supported the moratorium, whereas only one in four (26 percent) opposed it. Various other polls, conducted by the *Chicago Tribune*, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, and Roper Starch Worldwide, in 2000–2002 yielded similar results favoring the halt to executions. However, a Copley News Service poll reported in March 2002 that support for the moratorium dropped to 46 percent from the initial 81 percent in February 2000. The overall support for the death penalty in Illinois decreased to 58 percent by 2000 from 76 percent in 1994, as the *Chicago Tribune* reported in March 2000.

Two separate nationwide polls in early 2000 found that slightly more than 50 percent of Americans believed a moratorium on executions should be imposed until a commission can establish the fairness of death penalty practices. Only about one in four in both polls opposed a moratorium.

Along with the virtual elimination of the death penalty as a meaningful item from the post-1992 electoral campaigns, support for suspending executions seems to be the most interesting recent development. A moratorium allows supporters and opponents to talk, while neither side has to abandon its positions completely. However, it remains to be seen whether the current trend in disapproval for capital punishment will be sustained or whether the public mood will swing again, perhaps spurred by some well-publicized crime or terrorist act. Even though Americans tend to favor capital punishment in principle, it is obvious

Table 4 Support for the Death Penalty by State, 1936–1990s

<i>State</i>	<i>Favor Death Penalty (%), 1990/1992</i>	<i>Favor Death Penalty (%), 1936</i>
Rhode Island♦♣	61	52
Kentucky	64	68
Vermont♦	68	70
Minnesota♦♣	69	55
Mississippi	69	79
North Dakota♦♣	69	58
New Hampshire	70	72
New York♦	70	67
Wisconsin♦	70	49
Massachusetts♦	70	67
New Mexico	70	62
Louisiana	70	68
Connecticut	70	67
Maine♦♣	71	56
Alabama	71	69
Tennessee	72	69
Michigan♦♣	73	53
California	74	64
North Carolina	74	67
Colorado	75	56
South Carolina	75	68
Arkansas	76	76
South Dakota♣	76	52
Indiana	76	54
West Virginia♦	76	71
Delaware	76	60
Maryland	76	62
Georgia	77	75
Kansas♦	77	63
Illinois	78	70
Arizona	78	73
Iowa♦	78	61
Oregon	78	59
Pennsylvania	79	67
Washington	81	68
Virginia	81	65
Texas	81	65
Nebraska	82	66
Nevada	82	84
New Jersey	82	69
Ohio	82	62
Montana	83	64
Missouri	84	69
Idaho	86	76
Wyoming	86	77
Utah	87	82
Oklahoma	88	59
Florida	91	75
Mean	76.0	65.8
Standard Deviation	6.4	8.0

Note: States without a death penalty statute in 1989 are marked with ♦, those without the death penalty or with a very limited statute in 1936 are noted with ♣.

Source: Barbara Norrander, "The Multi-Layered Impact of Public Opinion on Capital Punishment Implementation in the American States." *Political Research Quarterly* 53(4) (December 2000): 782.

that they don't want to be seen as blood-thirsty or taking pleasure in executions. The biggest concern for the public seems to be that serious crimes—particularly murder—should not go unpunished and that society should be rid of the perpetrators. The death penalty in the United States may become a thing of the past only when the nation becomes convinced that there is a better and cheaper way to accomplish the same goals.

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Domestic Politics

The idea that U.S. presidents employ military force or threats of force to distract the public from domestic troubles has now become commonplace in popular culture. The 1997 movie *Wag the Dog*, in which a president concocts a fictitious war against Albania to distract the public from a domestic sexual scandal two weeks before an election, gained an air of reality when juxtaposed against real-world events in the White House. When President Bill Clinton ordered the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan in August 1998 and Iraq in December 1998 concurrently with dramatic developments associated with the Monica Lewinsky scandal, the concept became seared, and widely accepted, within the popular consciousness. Although the concept's logic—often referred to as the *diversionary use of force*—that presi-

dents employ uses of force to boost their standing domestically might seem straightforward, an examination of the evidence suggests that there might be less support in reality than commonly realized.

Concept in Popular Culture

Diversions efforts have been described as coming in three distinct types. First, politicians in dire political straits might use force internationally to create a boost in support, called the *rally-round-the-flag effect*, to recover their drooping political fortunes. Second, the *October surprise* concept suggests leaders will use foreign policy to domestic advantage to achieve a dramatic foreign policy achievement shortly before an election. In combination with the rally-round-the-flag process, this view suggests that politicians will resort to force to create an upsurge in generalized public support in the face of a purported international threat to propel the leader to victory in the upcoming election. A third view suggests that leaders faced with domestic turmoil will use force internationally to divert the public's attention away from the domestic difficulties and focus more on dramatic events in the international scene (*wagging the dog*). In this case, politicians do not so much expect to create more public support from the use of force; rather they hope to avoid the negative consequences that would otherwise be associated with domestic turmoil. If for no other reason, this strategy would assist the leader by replacing the bad news with the dramatic, and presumably positive, news regarding the use of force.

U.S. politics is rife with examples that would presumably support these interpretations of the diversionary use of force.

One oft-cited instance of a president attempting to create a rally-round-the-flag effect occurred in 1983 during President Ronald Reagan's administration. In this instance, the bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks in Lebanon seemed to foretell another quagmire for U.S. foreign policy reminiscent of Vietnam. When, only days later, U.S. forces invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada, critics suggested that the administration undertook that action to cause a popularity boost to counteract any damage done by the Lebanon bombing.

Numerous examples of potential October surprises exist in recent memory. The 1968 announcement by President Lyndon Johnson of a full halt to the bombing in Vietnam a week before the election has been interpreted by some as a political effort to bolster the chances of Vice President Hubert Humphrey of defeating Republican challenger Richard Nixon. Similarly, many accused the Nixon administration of playing politics with the Vietnam War when National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger announced two weeks before the 1972 election that "peace was at hand." In 1980, some have suggested that President Jimmy Carter's ill-fated April rescue attempt of American hostages held by Iran was motivated by electoral considerations in the hopes of dramatically releasing the hostages and gaining their triumphant return. Additionally, talk in Washington late in the election year centered on potential deals that the Carter administration might pursue in releasing the hostages or even an invasion of Iran.

The most notable accusations of a president attempting to wag the dog to counter bad news occurred during the Clinton administration in 1998. In August, after providing legal testimony

of the details of his relationship with Lewinsky, Clinton authorized the bombing of Afghanistan and Sudan. Later in December, as the House moved to consider impeachment proceedings, Clinton launched military reprisals against Iraq. Both of these instances led critics to suggest that the uses of force were motivated more by domestic difficulties and the president's desire to change the news than by international imperatives. More recently, with the country in recession in 2002, critics of President George W. Bush's overt discussion of war against Iraq suggested that planning for the war was an attempt to move the negative economic news off the front page in the run-up to congressional elections.

Popularity Surges and Their Causes

A common thread is that presidents create and/or use what is called a rally event for political benefit. The most widely accepted view of this concept defines it as an international event that involves the United States and is attention-grabbing. Each of these conditions might provide the president with an opportunity to create united public support around the administration. International events create a potential "us-versus-them" dynamic compared to domestic crises that might enhance, rather than mitigate, internal divisions. International events unassociated with the United States will either not attract as much public attention or create divided, rather than united, loyalties. The direct involvement of the United States and president creates a dynamic more likely to enhance support for the president given his personal engagement. Finally, sharply focused issues grab the public's attention and enhance any potential national uniting effect. In the end, all these conditions suggest that rally events

might then create an upsurge in public support for the president. Several examples of rally events are: sudden U.S. military interventions (Korea, Grenada, the 1991 Gulf War), major actions during an ongoing war (the Tet Offensive), major diplomatic developments (the Cuban missile crisis), dramatic technological developments (*Sputnik*), and major international summits including U.S. presidents (Mueller 1970, pp. 21–22).

Although the rally-'round-the-flag boost to popularity seems to occur during rally events, the increased level of support, on average, that the president receives is relatively modest and short-lived. Although evaluations vary depending upon the nature of the research employed, the average boost as a percentage of the president's popularity ranges from close to zero to the low to mid-single digits (Brody and Shapiro 1989; Brace and Hinckley 1992; Meernik and Waterman 1994). In addition, any effect is likely to dissipate within a couple of months at the most. Although there certainly have been large and sustained upsurges in public support (e.g., the post-September 11 approval ratings of President George W. Bush), dramatic increases are the exception.

Although it appears that presidents do receive modest approval increases, the reasons are more open to question. The original explanation relied on arguments that rally events create an enhanced sense of patriotism among the public. With the threat to the nation, the public might experience an almost unthinking response to support the president in times of crisis (Mueller 1970).

Another explanation suggests that international crises create a broader sense of public support than that implied by patriotism. International crises might

spur symbolic allegiance to political institutions throughout society during times of stress. Rather than being focused on the presidency itself, this view suggests that an increase in support of governmental institutions occurs more generally, and applies to other organs of government such as Congress, as well as trust in government (Parker 1995).

A third perspective sees the positive effects as contingent upon potential critics. This view suggests that rallies emerge when critics of the administration, such as leaders from the other political party, withhold criticism during times of crisis. The silence of critics creates a situation where mostly positive statements appear in the media, which feeds an upswing in support for the president. Once things return to normal, criticism returns and support for the president reverts to the precrisis level. On the other hand, if the administration's political opponents continue to criticize the president, he might not receive any popularity increase at all (Brody and Shapiro 1989).

A final view suggests that the dynamics have more to do with how different individuals respond to potential rally events than with the behavior of politicians. Because members of the public who support the president cannot rally (since they already support the president), potential rallies must emerge from people who are either neutral or opposed to the president's policies under normal circumstances. When faced with foreign policy crises, mild opponents will likely support the president, leaving only ardent opponents expressing disapproval. In the end, a rally emerges. As the crisis recedes, the rally supporters return to their previous opposition and the rally deflates (Baum 2002).

Do Politicians Attempt to Create Popularity Upsurges?

Do politicians attempt to create bumps in political support? Although popular wisdom suggests otherwise, the evidence provides a mixed message as to how politicians behave. Several factors might influence a politician to try to create an artificial increase in public support, including a close campaign, a poor economy, and flagging popularity.

Given the presumed connection between popularity and elections, a common suspicion has been that politicians use force to enhance popularity at critical preelection times. However, the logic behind such a connection, as well as the evidence of how politicians actually behave, provides a contradictory picture.

First, largely counter to the diversionary use of force, some evidence points to the possibility that upcoming elections cause peace because of the high costs in terms of financial expenses and casualties. To avoid potential damage, politicians might choose to wait to respond to dangerous international issues until *after* the election. In fact, scholars have found that there are fewer uses of force during election years and more during the periods immediately following elections (Gaubatz 1999). For example, U.S. entry into the Vietnam War followed this pattern. Although internal documents reveal that President Lyndon B. Johnson knew he faced a decision on increasing the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, he decided during 1964 to push these decisions to 1965, that is, after the election. From this perspective, upcoming elections cause politicians to provide "peace and prosperity" rather than attempting to use force to enhance their political position.

But some have suggested that elections influence choices to use force; this

behavior is highly contingent upon the prevailing political and economic conditions. A president who is expected to win the election is unlikely to be tempted to use force for political reasons. But if the incumbent is unpopular and/or the economy is in poor shape, then a president might use force to raise his prospects in the upcoming election. Most notably, Carter's failed hostage rescue attempt in 1980 fits this pattern, as it occurred during a deepening economic recession and declining presidential popularity.

Finally, elections might have no discernible effect because politicians either almost always or only rarely respond cautiously. In the first sense, election years might be no different than nonelection years because politicians are *always* tempted to use force in a diversionary manner. Because of the connection of political power to the president's approval rating, a leader might be inclined to use foreign policy to increase flagging public support whether or not an election is approaching. In the second case, some have argued that politicians simply do not respond to political conditions in their foreign policy making; this view is supported by several statistical studies.

One of the most common assertions is that presidents choose to employ force when the economy is suffering as measured by recession, rising inflation, and/or growing unemployment. In this situation, foreign policy provides a useful tool to increase the administration's public standing, distract the public from domestic difficulties, and/or create an "us-versus-them" dynamic. By similar logic, good economic times are thought to have a suppressing effect on the use of force because leaders will have the economic resources available to assuage domestic discontent. Scholarly findings supporting this per-

spective are balanced by other analyses that find that uses of force are not responsive to economic factors.

Low popularity of the president overall and with critical constituencies provides an additional reason for politicians to use military force. Several notable examples are Reagan's 1983 Grenada invasion, Carter's 1980 hostage rescue attempt, and President Gerald Ford's 1975 response to Cambodia's seizure of the *Mayaguez*; statistical results from several studies support this. Yet these findings have been countered by research suggesting that approval ratings are not associated with increased uses of force.

Still others have pointed to key political constituencies as the relevant consideration. Politicians require the support of ardent partisans, and they might be tempted to employ the use of force when key partisan constituencies decline in their level of support. They might also be the individuals most likely to rally 'round the flag. Although several examinations have found that politicians appear to use force in this diversionary manner when political support of key partisans drops, such as Clinton's June 1993 missile attack on Iraq's intelligence headquarters, other studies dispute these findings.

Conclusion

Despite the common assumption that politicians use military force to divert public attention from domestic difficulties, evidence to support this contention provides a decidedly mixed picture. No doubt, part of this results from differences in the subject of analyses (e.g., war, uses of force, crisis initiation, crisis escalation), data sources, and analytical methods that scholars employ (see references). Although numerous examples in

the popular culture seem to confirm that diversionary behavior occurs, the lack of consistent evidence suggests that is misplaced. Compounding the difficulty is the likelihood that politicians will anticipate that their actions will be questioned if they occur during difficult political times. Under these conditions, politicians are likely to feel *less* inclined to use force. Alternatively, politicians might go to great lengths to ensure that their motivations and choices are not tainted by charges of political manipulation. For example, President Clinton seems to have gone to extreme measures to isolate the decision to use force in August 1998 from domestic politics and to ensure that Republican secretary of defense William Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported his choice (Hendrickson 2002).

In all, although the concept of the diversionary use of force appears firmly embedded in the American political culture, evidence to support the view remains anecdotal at best and far from definitive. Although "wagging the dog" provides an interesting perspective on politics, conclusions that politicians behave in this manner should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism given the contradictory nature of the evidence.

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The Economy

Public opinion about the economy is often of great importance in politics. As those who witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union can attest, persistent negative perceptions about the economy can help bring about the collapse of an entire political system. Although the relationship between the economy and political events has certainly been less dramatic in the United States, it has nevertheless provided an adequate research setting to study the link

between public opinion about the economy and political outcomes. A great deal of what political scientists know about this subject comes from the study of the United States because there exists a wealth of data on U.S. public opinion regarding the economy.

Because of the political importance of the economy, it has probably been one of the most studied topics in political science. Consequently, political scientists know about the structure of public opinion on economic matters and its impact on political behavior. Much of this entry will be devoted to summarizing key areas of knowledge generated by political scientists on this subject.

Before these issues are discussed, it is important to define key concepts that political scientists have constructed when studying public opinion and the economy. Although the economy is often spoken of as if it were an entity that we can reach out and touch, it is really an abstract concept. Politicians, journalists, and academics use the term *the economy* to refer to a multifaceted set of complex interactions among consumers, businesses, and the government. Consequently, the impact of the economy on public opinion can be studied in a number of ways by simply using different definitions of the economy.

Measuring Public Opinion about the Economy

Public opinion is generally measured with the help of scientific surveys in which a small number of individuals is *randomly selected* from a population (e.g., eligible voters in the United States) and asked questions. These questions are designed to elicit respondents' attitudes regarding topics of interest to researchers, such as the economy. An *attitude* is the

degree to which someone likes or dislikes an object in his or her environment. By aggregating (e.g., taking the average) the attitudes expressed in a survey, researchers are able to measure public opinion and quantify the degree to which the public likes or dislikes public officials, government policies, and economic performance (just to name a few).

Political scientists have conceptualized economic attitudes in a number of ways. In general, individuals think about the economy in two aspects: egocentrically or sociotropically. *Egocentric* economic attitudes are evaluations of individuals' personal economic well-being. An egocentric evaluation answers the question "How am *I* doing?" *Sociotropic* economic attitudes are evaluations of the overall national economy. A sociotropic evaluation answers the question "How are *we* doing?" Egocentric and sociotropic evaluations come in two forms: retrospective and prospective. *Retrospective* economic evaluations are assessments of how things have changed in the past, whereas *prospective* economic evaluations are beliefs about how things will be in the future. Table 1 depicts how these concepts overlap.

These different concepts imply four different measures of economic public opinion. The National Election Studies (NES), which has surveyed the United States in every election year since the 1950s, provides a reference point. The NES (and other survey organizations) have measured retrospective egocentric evaluations by asking respondents, "Would you say that you and your family are better off, worse off, or just about the same financially as you were a year ago?" Retrospective sociotropic evaluations have been measured by asking, "Would you say that over the past year the nation's econ-

Table 1 Defining Types of Economic Attitudes

	<i>Egocentric</i>	<i>Sociotropic</i>
<i>Retrospective</i>	Has my economic situation improved, worsened, or stayed the same?	Has the economic situation of the country improved, worsened, or stayed the same?
<i>Prospective</i>	Will my economic situation improve, worsen, or stay the same?	Will the economic situation of the country improve, worsen, or stay the same?

omy has gotten worse, stayed about the same, or gotten better?" Prospective egocentric evaluations are measured by asking respondents, "Now looking ahead, do you think that a year from now you and your family will be better off financially, worse off, or just about the same as now?" And finally, prospective sociotropic evaluations have been measured with the question "Do you expect the economy to get better, get worse, or stay about the same?"


Trends in Public Opinion about the Economy

Figure 1 compares trends in egocentric evaluations with sociotropic evaluations from 1980 to 2000 using NES survey data. The lines represent that change in the percentage of respondents who said that their personal financial situation improved (egocentric evaluation) and the percentage who said that the overall economy improved (sociotropic evaluation). These figures show that egocentric and sociotropic evaluations tend to trend together. This means that as the overall economy gets better, people's personal finances tend to improve as well; conversely, as the overall economy worsens, people's personal finances also worsen. Figure 1 also shows that across both ret-

rospective and prospective frames, the public tends to assess their personal finances more favorably than the economy as a whole.

In Figure 2, the trends in retrospective and prospective economic evaluations are compared. In terms of egocentric evaluations, the findings mirror Figure 1. Retrospective and prospective egocentric evaluations tend to move together. So as the personal finances of more people improve, more people express the belief that their personal finances will get even better in the near future. Moreover, prospective egocentric evaluations tend to be more positive, on average, than retrospective egocentric evaluations. In other words, people tend to be optimistic about their future finances. A different picture emerges when comparing retrospective and prospective sociotropic evaluations, though. When few people say that the economy has improved, a higher percentage of people say that the economy will get better. In contrast, when many people say that the economy has gotten better, a lower percentage of people say it will continue to get better. This suggests that when times are bad, people tend to be optimistic about the future, but when times are good, they tend to be more pessimistic about the future. In

1a) Retrospective Evaluations



1b) Prospective Evaluations





Figure 1 Comparing Trends in Egocentric and Sociotropic Economic Evaluations, National Election Study Data, 1980–2000

fact, as the data from 1994 to 2000 show, the longer the public’s retrospective evaluations of the overall economy remain positive, the less positive its sociotropic evaluations become.

Reality versus Perception

Public opinion is largely a function of perception. People form attitudes about the economy on the basis of how they think the economy is doing. This begs

2a) Egocentric Economic Evaluations



2b) Sociotropic Economic Evaluations




Figure 2 Comparing Trends in Retrospective and Prospective Economic Evaluations, National Election Study Data, 1962–2000*

*The NES asked questions about egocentric economic evaluations on the 1962 and 1964–2000 surveys, while it only asked questions about sociotropic economic evaluations on the 1980–2000 surveys.




Figure 3 The Match between the Inflation Rate and Public Opinion about Inflation, 1960–2000

the question as to whether actual changes in the economy are reflected in changes in the public’s perception about the economy. Economists use a number of indicators to assess the economy. Two widely used measures are the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. The *inflation rate* measures the percentage change in prices from year to year. As prices increase, inflation increases. *Unemployment* measures the percentage of the civilian labor force that is out of work. Higher levels of unemployment and inflation indicate that the economy is doing poorly, whereas lower levels indicate it is doing well.

Since 1960, the NES has asked respondents to say what they believe is the “most important problem facing the country.” Respondents are not given choices and are allowed to answer this question freely. The useful aspect of this question is that it permits researchers to measure specific elements of the economy—such as inflation and unemployment—that the public views as a problem. In Figure 3, the 1960–2000 trend in the percentage of respondents who said that inflation was the most important problem is overlaid on the actual inflation rate during that period. Figure 3 shows an overwhelming match between

changes in the public's perception of inflation and the real inflation rate. In general, the public is more likely to say that inflation is the most important problem when the inflation rate increases.

A similar analysis is done in Figure 4 with the percentage of respondents saying that unemployment is the most important problem and the actual unemployment rate. Again, public perception closely matches reality. As unemployment increases, more people view it as the most important problem.

Finally, the inflation rate and unemployment rate can be summed to measure the performance of the overall economy.

This *misery index* is so named because higher numbers indicate a poor overall economy. Figure 5, in the fashion of Figures 3 and 4, compares the misery index with the percentage of people saying that the economy in general is the most important problem. Again, there is a close match between perception and reality.

Differences in Economic Perceptions across Groups

The last section suggests that economic perceptions are heavily influenced by actual changes in economic performance. However, this does not mean that other factors do not influence these perceptions




Figure 4 The Match between the Unemployment Rate and Public Opinion about Unemployment, 1960–2000




Figure 5 The Match between the Performance of the Overall Economy and Public Opinion about the Economy, 1960–2000


as well. In fact, one would expect that because different groups of people in society do not all share the same economic experiences, there may be meaningful differences in the economic perceptions across those groups.

Figure 6 demonstrates that people who express an attachment to one of the two major parties perceive the economy differently depending upon which party controls the presidency. When there is a Democratic president, far more Democrats than Independents and Republicans say that the overall economy improved over the last year. Similarly, when there is a Republican president, far more Republi-

cans than Independents and Democrats say that the overall economy has improved (see details in the next section).

The economy may also affect groups differently. Some groups of people benefit from a good economy more than others, whereas some are harder hit by a bad economy than others. In particular, women, minorities, and poor people may consistently view their personal finances as fairing less well than men, whites, and the rich. Figure 7 suggests that while fewer women and minorities report that their personal finances have improved over the past year compared to men and whites, the difference is quite small. Fig-

6a) Democrats Control the Presidency



6b) Republicans Control the Presidency




Figure 6 Perceptions about the Overall Economy, Partisanship, and Political Control of the Presidency

ure 8 paints a different picture for income groups. Those who are on the low end of the income scale are far less likely than those on the upper end to say that their personal finances improved.

Economic Voting

Political scientists have focused most of their attention on studying the link between the economy and voting decisions. Descriptions of voters in the scholarly




Figure 7 Percentage of Women and Minorities Compared to Men and Nonwhites Saying Personal Finances Improved




Figure 8 Percentage of People in Certain Income Categories Saying Personal Finances Improved

literature and popular press tend to point out high levels of political ignorance. The average American voter is often derided for failing to know much about political issues and candidates, casting votes on the basis of inherited party attachments rather than thoughtful consideration (Campbell et al. 1960). In contrast, economic voting research suggests that the average voter might not be such a dolt after all.

It has long been conventional wisdom that elections are closely tied to the economy. This *reward-punishment thesis* predicts that when economic times are bad, citizens vote against the party in power, and when economic times are good, citizens vote for the party in power (Key 1966). However, scholars did not initially find strong evidence for such a link using survey data (see Fiorina 1978). These studies did not show that voters' economic attitudes played a role in voting decisions. Subsequent research has found that a link between economic attitudes and voting behavior does in fact exist but that the relationship is often indirect and nuanced.

First, it makes little sense for individuals to punish the party in power when the economy goes sour or to reward it when the economy is doing well if they do not believe that the party in power is responsible for economic outcomes. A number of political scientists have convincingly shown that a strong relationship exists between attitudes about the economy and voting behavior among individuals who attribute responsibility to the government for economic conditions (Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh 1988; Feldman 1982; Lau and Sears 1981; Peffley 1984). Moreover, it appears that voters who blame the government for a bad economy are far more likely to punish the incumbent

party than those who credit the government for a good economy are to reward the incumbent party (Bloom and Price 1975).

Second, recent work in political science demonstrates that the uninformed nature of the American public does not necessarily undermine citizens' ability to effectively monitor and sanction politicians. Individuals need not follow the news or understand the inner workings of the stock market to make economic and political assessments. They need only use information shortcuts that are readily available, such as the price of gas or groceries, to make a judgment about the economy (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin 1991).

Third, political scientists have also demonstrated that egocentric economic attitudes are not always good predictors of voting behavior. This is probably because many people do not see the source of their personal financial situation as political in nature and thus do not base voting behavior on egocentric evaluations (Brody and Sniderman 1977). In contrast, sociotropic evaluations have a powerful impact on voting behavior. Here it is much easier for citizens to see a connection between government actions (or inactions) and broad patterns in the overall economy (Kinder and Kiewiet 1979).

Sociotropic evaluations are so powerful that they allow political scientists to predict voting behavior in presidential elections with a high degree of accuracy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Economic attitudes seem to play less of a role in congressional elections, where incumbents have a major advantage over would-be challengers. The economy tends to matter only in those congressional races where well-financed and well-groomed challengers use economic downturns as a

weapon against incumbents (Jacobson and Kernell 1981).

Fourth, institutional features of the U.S. political system also have an impact on economic voting. One prominent feature is *federalism*, which is characterized by the national and state governments sharing powers. In a federal system different levels of government (e.g., national, state, and local) have responsibility for different sets of issues. As a result, voters may hold politicians at different levels of government accountable for only those policies that they believe are relevant to the office. Some scholars have found this to be the case when it comes to economic voting. Voters tend to punish governors rather than senators for negative evaluations of their state's economy; they punish senators rather than governors for negative evaluations of the national economy (Atkeson and Partin 1995).

Another institutional feature of our system is that separate *branches* of government share power. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government each have the ability to check the power of the other. Some researchers have found this relevant to economic voting because voters can place responsibility with different branches of government. When the same political party controls both the legislative and executive branches, voters are more likely to blame that party for poor economic performance. In contrast, when different political parties control the legislative and executive branches, voters have difficulty finding a clear target of blame and are less likely to blame either political party (Nicholson and Segura 1999).

Finally, political scientists have also studied the impact of economic attitudes on the decision to vote in the first place.

Initial studies found contradictory evidence. Some showed that a bad economy depresses voter turnout (Rosenstone 1982); another showed that it increases turnout (Schlozman and Verba 1979). Recent work suggests that responsibility attribution plays a role. Those who blame the government for a bad economy are more likely to vote, whereas those who do not blame the government are less likely to vote (Arceneaux 2003).

The Relevance of Economic Attitudes in the Formation of Political Attitudes
Economic attitudes affect more than just voting decisions. They appear to have a decided impact on the president's job approval rating as well. In short, presidents are less popular when the economy takes a downturn and are more popular when it takes an upswing (Brace and Hinckley 1992). Economic attitudes also impact how much individuals trust the government to do the right thing. Individuals who perceive that the economy is improving are more likely to say that they trust the government than those who perceive that it is worsening (Hetherington 1998). Perceptions of economic performance also cause some individuals to change political party allegiance (Fiorina 1981). Although partisan attachments are typically stable across the lifetime of individuals (Abramson 1983), some individuals switch parties, and economic attitudes may provide a partial explanation for such changes.

The Factors That Shape Economic Attitudes

Thus far the discussion has focused on the impact that economic attitudes have on political behavior and attitudes. But political scientists have also studied why individuals perceive the economy as they

do. Scholars have isolated a number of important factors. First, actual changes in the economy tend to be reflected in economic perceptions (Conover et al. 1986; see Figures 3, 4, and 5).

Second, the media shapes the public's views on the economy. When media news programs repeatedly and consistently report that the economy is in recession, for instance, public opinion about the economy is more negative among those who watch the news than it is among those who do not (Hetherington 1996).

Third, social context shapes the types of economic information that individuals receive. People form an opinion about the national economy based in part on the conversations they have with friends and coworkers, as well as the conditions of their local economy that they observe on a daily basis (Weatherford 1983).

Finally, individuals who have a stable attachment to one of the political parties tend to selectively perceive information in ways that conform to their existing beliefs (Zaller 1992). For this reason, individuals with strong partisan attachments tend to view the economy more positively when their party is in power than when their party is out of power (Campbell et al. 1960; see Figure 6).

Conclusion

Compared to other subject areas, political scientists know a great deal about the nature of public opinion on the economy. Economic attitudes are powerful determinants of both political attitudes and behavior. For instance, public opinion about the economy goes a long way toward explaining electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, our understanding of economic public opinion is far from complete. Hopefully, the next generation of scholars will contribute even more to our

knowledge about how economic attitudes are formed and what impact they have on the political world we see.

Kevin Arceneaux

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Education

Although polls on hot-button issues such as vouchers and high-stakes testing have received a lot of media coverage in recent years, the monitoring of public opinion on education issues is not a recent phenomenon. Gallup and the educational magazine *Phi Delta Kappa* (PDK) have been tracking the rise and fall in attitudes toward public schools since the early 1970s. Although public confidence in our nation's public school system has been declining since the early 1970s, about half of all adults would still grade their local public schools with an A or a B, and more than 8 out of 10 would give them a C or higher (PDK 2002). Polls taken by several groups have shown that this contradiction should not be interpreted as complacency. The American public strongly supports reforms aimed at increasing students' performance and school-level accountability and appears willing to pay more taxes if that would result in better schools. This entry examines some of these trends, focusing on the public's opinion on the quality of both our nation's schools as a whole and respondents' local schools in particular, attitudes toward recent reform efforts such as high-stakes testing for promotion and graduation, levels of support for spending public money in private schools through vouchers, and public support for increases in education expenditures.

*Trends in Public Attitudes
toward Education*

Americans have a lukewarm perception of our nation's schools, although they tend to have higher regard for the schools in their local community than for the schools in the "nation at large" (see Table 1 and Figure 1). From 1974 to 1983, the average grade that adult respondents gave the schools in their community in annual

Gallup/PDK surveys declined from 2.6 (almost a C-plus) to 2.1 (a C-minus). This decrease coincided with a drop in student test scores in reading, mathematics, and science taken as part of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NCES 2000). Since the early 1980s, test scores and the grades that the U.S. public has given local schools have risen, with the latter climbing to a solid C in 2001.

Table 1 Average Grade the Public Would Give the Schools in Their Community and in the Nation at Large: 1974–2001

Year	All Adults			No Children in School			Public School Parents			Private School Parents		
	Nation	Local Commu- nity	Local Neigh- borhood	Nation	Local Commu- nity	Local Neigh- borhood	Nation	Local Commu- nity	Local Neigh- borhood	Nation	Local Commu- nity	Local Neigh- borhood
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1974	—	2.63	—	—	2.57	—	—	2.80	—	—	2.15	—
1975	—	2.38	—	—	2.31	—	—	2.49	—	—	1.81	—
1976	—	2.38	—	—	2.34	—	—	2.48	—	—	2.22	—
1977	—	2.33	—	—	2.25	—	—	2.59	—	—	2.05	—
1978	—	2.21	—	—	2.11	—	—	2.47	—	—	1.69	—
1979	—	2.21	—	—	2.15	—	—	2.38	—	—	1.88	—
1980	—	2.26	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1981	1.94	2.20	—	—	2.12	—	—	2.36	—	—	1.88	—
1982	2.01	2.24	—	2.04	2.18	—	2.01	2.35	—	2.02	2.20	—
1983	1.91	2.12	—	1.92	2.10	—	1.92	2.31	—	1.82	1.89	—
1984	2.09	2.36	—	2.11	2.30	—	2.11	2.49	—	2.04	2.17	—
1985	2.14	2.39	—	2.16	2.36	—	2.20	2.44	—	1.93	2.00	—
1986	2.13	2.36	—	—	2.29	—	—	2.55	—	—	2.14	—
1987	2.18	2.44	—	2.20	2.38	—	2.22	2.61	—	2.03	2.01	—
1988	2.08	2.35	—	2.02	2.32	—	2.13	2.48	—	2.00	2.13	—
1989	2.01	2.35	—	1.99	2.27	—	2.06	2.56	—	1.93	2.12	—
1990	1.99	2.29	—	1.98	2.27	—	2.03	2.44	—	1.85	2.09	—
1991	2.00	2.36	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1992	1.93	2.30	—	1.92	—	—	1.94	2.73	—	1.85	—	—
1993	1.95	2.41	—	1.97	2.40	—	1.97	2.48	—	1.80	2.11	—
1994	1.95	2.26	2.43	1.95	2.16	2.34	1.90	2.55	2.64	1.86	1.90	2.23
1995	1.97	2.28	2.47	1.98	2.25	2.43	1.93	2.41	2.56	1.81	1.85	2.09
1996	1.93	2.30	—	1.91	2.22	—	2.00	2.56	—	1.80	1.86	—
1997	1.97	2.35	—	1.99	2.27	—	2.01	2.56	—	1.99	1.87	—
1998	1.93	2.41	—	1.92	2.36	—	1.96	2.51	—	1.81	2.20	—
1999	2.02	2.44	—	2.03	2.42	—	1.97	2.56	—	—	—	—
2000	1.98	2.47	—	1.94	2.44	—	2.05	2.59	—	—	—	—
2001	2.01	2.47	—	2.00	2.42	—	2.04	2.66	—	—	—	—

— Not available.

Note: Average based on a scale where A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, and F=0.

Source: Phi Delta Kappa, "The Annual Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes toward the Public Schools," various years. (This table was prepared January 2002.)




Figure 1 Average Grade the Public Would Give the Schools in Their Community and in the Nation at Large: 1974–2001

Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 2002: Table 22 (based on Gallup/PDK poll).

Grades given to schools in the nation as a whole have been both lower and more stable than those given to local schools since they were first measured in 1981—fluctuating around 2.0 (C-minus/D-plus range). About half of Americans think highly of their local schools, however. Although 47 percent of adults graded the public schools in their community with an A or a B, only 24 percent gave grades that high to public schools in the nation as a whole in 2002 (PDK 2002).

Adults with children in school tend to have more confidence in local schools compared to adults without children in school. Public school parents tend to give higher grades to local public schools compared to adults with no children in school (with 58 percent compared to 44 percent giving A's and B's in 2002; par-

ents with children in private schools tend to give lower grades to local public schools [with 39 percent giving A's or B's in 1998—the last time data were reported separately for this group] (PDK 1998). The gap is even more apparent when public school parents are asked about the school that their oldest child attends—7 out of 10 gave these schools A's or B's in 2002, whereas less than 1 out of 10 gave these schools a D or below (PDK 2002).

Although some may see a C or C-plus rating as an indictment of public schools, the percentage of adults responding in 1996 that they have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of “respect and confidence” in public elementary and secondary schools is only slightly lower than the percentage with a similar level of confidence in private elementary and secondary

schools (45 percent versus 50 percent) (NCES 2002). The level of confidence that the public has in public schools, compared to other public institutions, is comparatively high. For example, the percentage of adults responding in 1996 that they have “great deal” or “quite a lot” of “respect and confidence” in local government, state government, the federal government, or Congress was considerably lower (ranging from 31 percent to 16 percent).

Support for Educational Reform Efforts

Across numerous polls, the public has expressed strong interest in seeing higher standards for students and teachers—even if higher standards imply increased testing and local school districts giving up their traditionally strong decision-making roles. For example, in 1999 a survey by International Communications Research (ICR) for National Public Radio, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Kennedy School of Government showed that 94 percent of adults were in favor of “making students meet adequate academic standards to be promoted or graduated” and that 89 percent were in favor of “requiring teachers to pass a standardized competency test” (NPR 1999).

The public also appears to support testing as a means of accountability for schools, teachers, and students. A 2000 poll for the Business Roundtable (Belden, Russonello, and Stewart 2001) found that 85 percent of adults agree (strongly or somewhat) that “scores on statewide tests are very useful for schools to evaluate how their own students are performing”; 83 percent agree that “scores are very useful for parents and the community to evaluate how well their schools are performing”; and 74 percent agree that “scores on state tests are very useful for schools to evaluate how their teachers

are doing.” The public does not see testing as a cure-all for the nation’s education problems, however. This same poll revealed that the public also agrees that statewide testing should not be relied upon for a number of reasons, including “because some children perform poorly on tests even though they know the material” (81 percent); “state-wide tests cannot measure many important skills that children should learn” (71 percent); and “when states hold teachers accountable for test results, teachers begin to teach what is on the tests and drop other important ideas and curriculum.”

There even appears to be majority support for increasing the federal government’s role in education. For example, part of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), signed into law January 8, 2002, increased the federal government’s monitoring and, in the case of failing schools, decisionmaking role in public elementary and secondary education. This legislation requires that all 50 states test students annually in grades 3–8. Although conservatives and states’ rights advocates have traditionally opposed a greater federal role in education, the public appears to think that a stronger role is warranted. For example, in the 2002 Gallup/PDK poll, two-thirds of respondents favored the “tracking of student progress from grades 3 to 8 based on an annual test” (PDK 2002). Although the legislation allows states to select their own tests, a strong majority of the public endorses standardization. After being informed that NCLBA allows states to choose their own tests, respondents were asked, “Which would you prefer—letting your state use its own test, or requiring all 50 states to use a single standardized test?” Two-thirds of respondents were in favor of standardization (PDK 2002).

Furthermore, the same poll indicates that a similar proportion would favor a standardized national curriculum. Although the public may have opinions on testing and curriculum standardization, respondents admit not being very knowledgeable about the specifics of reforms in their state. For example, a 2000 poll sponsored by Public Agenda showed that among adults who are aware that their states have content standards, only 14 percent said that they are "very familiar" with the standards, and nearly half said that they were "not at all familiar" or "not very familiar" (Public Agenda Online 2002).

*Parent Support for
Standards and Testing*

Although some states have recently delayed the introduction of high-stakes tests (i.e., tests that students must pass to either graduate or advance a grade), parental support for the standards movement remains strong. In September 2000, Public Agenda conducted a national survey of parents to gauge whether there had been backlash against standards. The study contained a nationally representative sample of parents, as well as parents in districts actually implementing higher academic standards (Public Agenda Online 2000). This study found that only 2 percent of parents who know that their school district is implementing higher academic standards want to return to previous practice. Fifty-three percent want to continue with the effort as planned, and 1 in 3 (34 percent) want to continue with some adjustments. Additional interviews in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and New York (five cities with highly visible efforts to raise standards) returned similar results. More than 8 in 10 (82 percent) parents

who know their school district is implementing higher standards believe their schools have, in fact, been "careful and reasonable" in putting the new standards in place.

Relatively few parents in the study said that their child's school requires them to take too many standardized tests to the detriment of other important learning (11 percent), that teachers in their child's school "focus so much on preparing for standardized tests that real learning is neglected" (18 percent), or that their child receives too much homework (10 percent). Furthermore, 3 out of 4 parents agreed that "students pay more attention and study harder if they know they must pass a test to get promoted or to graduate," and a similar proportion agreed that "requiring schools to publicize their standardized test scores is a wake-up call and a good way to hold schools accountable." Parents did not feel, however, that promotion or graduation decisions should be based on a single test. Almost 8 in 10 (78 percent) agree "it's wrong to use the results of just one test to decide whether a student gets promoted or graduates."

*Employer and College Professor
Perceptions of How Well Young People
Are Prepared for Work and College*

Employers and professors are far more disapproving than parents or teachers of how well young people are prepared for college and work, and very large majorities continue to voice significant dissatisfaction about students' basic skills. This finding comes from a 2001 "Reality Check" Survey by Public Agenda (Public Agenda Online 2001b). This survey tracked whether efforts to set high education standards have made a difference by interviewing the students and teachers in public schools, the parents of those

students, and the college professors and employers who deal with recent graduates. Employers and college professors were asked how they would rate recent job applicants and freshmen and sophomores, respectively, across different topics, including clear writing, work habits, motivation and conscientiousness, and basic math skills. About two-thirds of professors found the basic math skills of recent freshmen and sophomores to be only "fair" or "poor." More than 80 percent stated that student ability to write clearly was only "fair" or "poor."

These results point to the continuing gap between student skill level and preparation for college and college professors' views of the adequacy of student preparation. Results were similar for employers regarding recent job applicants. Professors and employers support testing, with employers more likely to support testing of basic skills and professors more likely to support a test "showing that they (high school graduates) have learned at higher levels." Less than 10 percent of both groups reported thinking that "requiring kids to pass a test" before receiving a high school diploma is a "bad idea."

Attitudes toward Public Funds Being Spent on Private Schooling

Although Americans tend to think that private schools have higher academic standards than public schools (Public Agenda Online 1998) and are supportive of "vouchers" when told what they are, few see vouchers as a means to solve the nation's education problems (Public Agenda Online 1999). In 1999, Public Agenda (1999) asked a sample of adults how much they knew about school vouchers and how they work (see Figure 2). Nearly two-thirds of adults responded "very little" or "nothing," and 80 percent

said that they needed to learn more before they could have an opinion. An even larger percentage knew "very little" or "nothing" about charter schools. Respondents were then asked if they favored or opposed parents being given a "voucher or certificate by the government to pay for all or part of tuition if they decide to send their child to a private or parochial school." More than half (57 percent) favored or strongly favored this proposal as described, with African American and Hispanic adults more likely to favor vouchers (68 percent and 65 percent, respectively). In a more recent poll conducted for the Associated Press by International Communications Research (Lester 2002) in July 2002, respondents also favored (by a 51–40 percent margin) the idea of school vouchers to help send children to private or parochial schools. When asked if they still support the idea if it takes money from public schools, however, they opposed vouchers by a 2-to-1 margin. Furthermore, more than half of the respondents (56 percent) said private schools that accept taxpayer-funded vouchers should be required to accept all students who apply, and just over one-third (37 percent) said the schools should be allowed to choose whom they accept. Republicans were evenly split on that question, whereas almost two-thirds of Democrats said they should accept all, and about 6 in 10 independents responded similarly (Lester 2002).

Although most adults thought in 1999 that vouchers are a "good idea," few thought that they would solve the nation's educational problems. Furthermore, a 2001 poll by Gallup, CNN, and *USA Today* found that a greater percentage of adults thought that paying teachers more (84 percent), providing more federal money for local school districts to




Figure 2 Public Opinion on Vouchers in 1999

Source: Public Agenda Online, 1999. *On Thin Ice: How Advocates and Opponent Could Misread the Public's Views on Vouchers and Charter Schools.*

use as they see fit (80 percent), and using standardized tests to measure achievement (73 percent) would improve public schools a "great deal" or a "fair amount," compared to half of respondents who thought that providing vouchers would improve schools by that amount (Public Agenda Online 2001).

Would the Public Pay More to Get Better Schools?

Several polls indicate that Americans rank increases in spending on education as a priority, even if it means increasing taxes. Since 1973 the General Social Survey has tracked trends in national spending priorities. In 2000, health and education were the public's top two spending priorities, above other popular areas like Social Security, crime, the environment, dealing with drugs, and assistance to the poor (Smith 2001). From 1973 to 2000, the percentage of adults thinking that we spend too little on education rose from about 50 percent to more than 70 per-

cent, and the percentage thinking that we spend too much fell from around 10 percent to about 5 percent (see Figure 3). Support for education spending has been particularly strong since 1989.

Public support for education spending is positive even when the proposal cites specific tax increases. In a September 1999 National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government poll, there was strong public support for educational reforms, even if it meant paying higher taxes. Three out of four Americans said they would be willing to have their taxes raised by at least \$200 a year to pay for specific measures to improve community public schools; more than half (55 percent) say they would be willing to have their taxes raised by \$500. Only 16 percent say they would not pay even an additional \$100 for this purpose (NPR 1999). The public's support for education spending appears to carry over into tough economic times. The 2002 Gallup/PDK poll found that




Figure 3 Percentage of Adults Responding That We Spend Too Much, Too Little, or about the Right Amount of Money on Improving the Nation's Education System: 1973–2000

Source: T. W. Smith, 2001 (based on data from the General Social Survey).

only 26 percent of adults would reduce state spending for education. Seventy-eight percent would avoid such cuts by cutting in other areas, and 58 percent would do so by increasing state taxes (PDK 2002).

Conclusion

Ever since educational issues began to take center stage in national political debates in the late 1980s, the frequency of polling on education issues has risen. The sheer number of polls on similar topics over time allows us to track the public's views on education policy issues from multiple perspectives. Although the public's responses to poll questions tend to be sensitive to question wording, a few themes are apparent. Although many Americans rank their local public schools as good or excellent, most think that the nation's schools are pretty "average" and

strongly support many current educational reforms, including high-stakes testing for promotion and graduation, as well as standardization of the curriculum. The public also appears to support, more than it opposes, publicly funded "vouchers" that parents could spend on private education, although most adults admit that they know very little about the content of these "choice" programs, and support declines rapidly if it is suggested that the funding for these programs would be taken away from public schools. Finally, most Americans consider educational spending a high priority, and many would agree to pay more in taxes if it would improve the nation's schools.

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Elected Officials

"Suppose you were an idiot and suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself."—Mark Twain

"This country has come to feel the same when Congress is in session as we do when the baby gets hold of a hammer."—Will Rogers

The remarks of two of America's most famous spokesmen ring truer today more than ever. The American public generally holds elected officials in low regard. Federal government officials increasingly rate poorly on measures of trustworthiness, honesty, competency, and compassion. At the same time, the public views its individual representatives much more positively. Individual congressmembers consistently receive better marks than the Congress as a whole. Similarly, state and local government officials are seen as much more honest, competent, and compassionate than their national-level counterparts.

General Impressions of the National Government

Almost two-thirds of adults recently interviewed said that they would not want their child to grow up to be president (Langer 1999). The children them-

selves were even more adamant about not entering public service. A full 81 percent of teenagers interviewed responded negatively to the suggestion that they grow up to serve in the nation's highest elected office. Although disheartening, these results are not remarkable in light of growing negativism toward elected officials. In general, the public holds a rather negative image of public officials.

Since the 1960s those holding public office increasingly received poor marks for trustworthiness, honesty, competency, and compassion (National Election Studies 2000). Overall, trust in federal government has dropped precipitately since the late 1950s (see Figure 1). Although about three-quarters of those surveyed felt that the government in Washington could generally be trusted in 1958, less than half felt the same at the start of the twenty-first century. The consistent decline of trust traces a history of

unpopular policies, scandal, and partisan attacks. Trust steadily declined throughout the 1960s when the country's Vietnam War policies garnered loud protests. The Watergate scandal and President Richard Nixon's resignation marked a sharp drop in the early 1970s, and the strong partisan rhetoric of the 1994 midterm elections marked the low point of trust, with barely 20 percent of the public expressing trust in government.

The public is no more upbeat about the honesty, competency, and compassion of those elected to national office. Since the late 1950s, the public has increasingly seen elected officials as dishonest, incompetent, and uncaring. Although less than one-quarter of those surveyed in 1958 felt that government officials were crooked, more than half expressed that opinion in 1994 (see Figure 2). The Watergate period of the early 1970s marked a dramatic increase in dishonesty ratings, with a




Figure 1 Trust in the National Government, 1958–2000

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

nearly 20 percent jump between 1968 and 1974. Ratings of the dishonesty of federal elected officials peaked in 1994. This is not especially surprising given the strong partisan rhetoric and harsh campaign tactics of this midterm election. Perhaps the public responded to the negative images that congressional candidates painted of one another during that heated campaign season.

Ratings of official competency are even more pessimistic (see Figure 3). More than 60 percent of those surveyed in 1980 felt that quite a few of the people running government did not seem to know what they were doing. Although this represents a remarkably high level of pessimism, there appears never to have been a time when the public was very optimistic about the abilities of elected officials. Even in the 1960s, when dishonesty ratings were relatively low, about

one-third of the public believed that elected officials were incompetent.

Finally, the public increasingly views elected officials as unresponsive to the needs of voters. Since 1960, there has been a steady increase in the proportion of the public who feels that elected officials don't care much what the public thinks (see Figure 4).

Again, the 1970s showed a marked increase in negativism, with a steady rise in the proportion of those feeling public officials were out of touch with their constituents. In fact, for most of the years since 1974 more than half of those surveyed have expressed this opinion. The first administration of Ronald Reagan (1981–1985) represents the exception to this trend. Perhaps President Reagan's celebrated warmth helped to stem the rising tide of pessimism, if only temporarily.

“Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?”
(Percent Answering “Quite a few”)




Figure 2 Honesty of Government Officials, 1958–2000

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

“Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of them don’t seem to know what they are doing?”

(Percent Answering “Don’t know what they are doing”)




Figure 3 Competency of Elected Officials, 1958–1980

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Percent Agreeing with Statement: “I don t think public officials care much what people like me think.”




Figure 4 Compassion of Elected Officials, 1952–2000

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

Overall, then, the public seems highly disenchanted with national elected officials in general. Interestingly, the public is not nearly as pessimistic about individual congressmembers or about state and local government officials. Although the public clearly feels that the national government in general falls short on many levels, individual congressmembers and subnational governments garner much higher praise.

*We Love Our Representatives
but Hate Our Congress*

Despite the public's overwhelming negativity toward elected officials in general, individual congressmembers consistently receive high marks (Davidson and Oleszek 1985). More than half of those surveyed in each year from 1980 to 2000 approved of the job their incumbent congressmember was doing (see Figure 5). In

contrast, Congress as a whole rarely receives the approval of more than half of those interviewed. These survey results reflect one of the most persistent findings in political science—the paradox that the public hates the Congress but loves their congressmembers (Fenno 1975, 1978). In fact from 1980 to 2000, the gulf between Congress's job approval ratings and approval of the job incumbent congressmembers are doing is nearly 20 percentage points. At its highest, in 1992, the gap between congressional approval and incumbent approval was a full 34 percentage points.

What accounts for these divergent attitudes? Years of investigating have revealed two main explanations for this paradox. First, Congress and congressmembers are held to different standards. The public holds Congress to much tougher standards




Figure 5 Approval of Congress and Its Incumbent Members, 1980–2000

Source: National Election Studies Cumulative Data File.

than they do individual congressmembers. Second, congressmembers themselves perpetuate the differential ratings by disparaging the institution of Congress to boost their own electoral chances. Congress is viewed as an institution of petty bickering, compromise, and gridlock, whereas individual congressmembers are seen as fighting such inadequacies.

One of the earliest and most empirically supported reasons for this gulf is that the public measures individuals by a different yardstick than they do the institution (Born 1990; Jacobson 1987). Specifically, the standards applied to individual members are less demanding than those applied to Congress the institution (Fenno 1975; Parker and Davidson 1979). Congress as a whole is expected to solve national problems, work in harmony with the president, and produce a steady stream of quality legislation (Fenno 1975; Parker and Davidson 1979; Ripley et al. 1992). In contrast, congressmembers are expected to identify with and attend to the needs and desires of their constituents (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Cook 1979; Fenno 1975; Parker 1981; Parker and Davidson 1979; Parker and Parker 1993; Ripley et al. 1992). Thus, the public's image of the individual congressmembers is largely based on their service to the district and their personal attributes. Ultimately, the public evaluates individual congressmembers without citing policy actions as a criterion for judgment, whereas evaluations of Congress are based heavily on its actions with regard to policy. It is perhaps no wonder, then, that individual congressmembers receive such high ratings compared to Congress as a whole. It is much easier to live up to specific expectations about district service and communication with constituents than to vague policy demands.

However, congressmembers themselves must take responsibility for at least some of the gap in approval ratings. Individual campaigns often resort to denigrating Congress as an institution to boost the image of the individual congressmembers. Put succinctly, representatives "run *for* Congress by running *against* Congress" (Fenno 1975). Congressional haggling, bargaining, delay, and partisan argument leave a sour taste in the public's mouth (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 2001). Individual incumbents distinguish themselves from the institution by citing these institutional characteristics and then distancing themselves from them (Fenno 1978). The public is not deaf to these campaign appeals. Negative perceptions of the congressional environment appear to shape ratings of Congress, but not of individual congressmembers (Parker and Davidson 1979). In fact, the public increasingly disapproves of Congress as election time approaches, suggesting that the Congress-bashing of campaigns drives down congressional ratings (Brady and Theriault 2001). It appears, then, that at least part of the gulf derives from the actions of individual congressmembers.

Although the public remains disappointed in elected officials in general, people are much more optimistic about individual representatives. A similar contrast exists between perceptions of the national government and state and local governments. The public is much more optimistic about subnational governments than about federal government.

City and States versus the National Government

Although trust in the national government has taken on increasingly negative dimensions, the public seems to place

more and more trust and confidence in state and local governments (see Figure 6). More than two-thirds of those interviewed in each year from 1972 to 1998 expressed trust and confidence in their state and local governments (Polling Report 2002). In fact, by 1998 more than three-quarters held these subnational governments in high regard.

The public holds state legislatures in much higher esteem than the national Congress (Newkirk 1979). Although the public views congressmembers as dishonest, incompetent, and uncaring, they perceive state legislators as honest, hard-working people who study problems thoroughly. Additionally, representatives at the state level are reported to know their districts very well and take an interest in serving others (Jewell 1982; Patterson, Hedlund, and Boynton 1975).

The public's love of their state legislatures is not unconditional, however. The

more a state's legislature looks like Congress, the less it is liked. As state legislatures grow more professional—holding more frequent and longer-lasting sessions, paying legislators more, and providing more staff—the public comes to like them less (Squire 1993). It appears that as states increase the resources they provide to legislatures, they become more like Congress in other ways as well. More professional legislatures are likely to be more racially diverse (Squire 1992), and more diversity likely leads to more conflict over policies and procedures. Additionally, as a legislature stays in session longer, the public becomes more aware of conflicts and controversies, and the less respect they have for the institution (Jewell 1982; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). So while the public appears to hold state legislatures in higher regard than the Congress, this optimism is not boundless.

"How much trust and confidence do you have in the government in the state where you live [in the local governments in the area where you live] when it comes to handling state [local] problems?"




Figure 6 Percent Trusting in Local and State Governments, 1972–1998

Source: Polling Report, Inc., "Politics and Policy: Institutions."

State legislators are not the only elected officials viewed more positively than their federal counterparts. In contrast to the federal government, local governments are consistently viewed as giving citizens the most for their money (Cole and Kincaid 2000; Kincaid and Cole 2001), and city government officials are seen as much more honest, competent, and caring than those in the national government (Ulbig 2002). More than half of those interviewed in each of four different metropolitan areas felt that their city government officials were honest, with 62–79 percent of those interviewed reporting positive evaluations. Similarly, city officials garnered much more positive competency ratings than their national counterparts, with 65–77 percent of those interviewed rating their city officials as competent. Finally, respondents viewed city officials as much more caring than national politicians. Between 58 and 67 percent of those interviewed felt that the views of the average citizen had an influence on the city government's decisions.

Why does the public like its local officials more than its national ones? These disparate attitudes probably have to do with size and proximity. Smaller, more local units of government tend to be perceived more favorably than larger units (Rose and Pettersen 1999). Smaller units of government seem to be more transparent and permeable, so local residents are more likely to feel they have some control over the actions of elected officials at this level (see e.g., Dahl and Tufte 1973; Diamond 1999). Hence, city governments are generally seen as more personable and friendly than the more distant, impersonal, and bureaucratic federal government.

Conclusion

The American public views its elected officials with a discriminating eye. The common wisdom that the public hates politicians appears to be only partially true. Citizens may hold national elected officials in low regard, but they have much more positive views of their own congressmembers, as well as state and local government officials.

Although state and local officials have traditionally received positive marks, it will be interesting to see if evaluations remain positive. As states and localities take on primary responsibility for an increasing range of policies, the competency and honesty of officials at the subnational level are likely to be highlighted. Perhaps state and local officials can learn something from the experience of their national counterparts. As they handle new policy responsibilities, it is important to maintain a respectful relationship with constituents. State and local officials may need to make an effort to listen to and take into account the public's opinions. If not, they may find themselves in the unenviable position of being as disliked and unsupported as Congress.

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The Environment

Since its founding, and during the first century of exploration and colonization, the United States was perceived by the public to be a vast wilderness. Unlike in Europe, scarcity was not an established concept. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that environmental issues began to move onto the public opinion agenda, as environmental damage became a major issue to sectors of society, and as those sectors began to articulate and promulgate a proenvironmental platform. Industrialization, especially with regard to mining and logging (as coal began to replace dwindling wood supplies for heating), and rapid growth in the population (and resultant urbanization) were beginning to take a toll on the perception of a vast and endless wilderness. As the public began to frequent public lands, overuse became more and more apparent. Outdoorsmen became concerned with preserving the pristine wilderness for hunting, fishing, and other outdoor activities. Similarly, urban dwellers and workers began to see firsthand the impact of industrialization. Advocates of conserving America's natural beauty began to articulate this interest—hence the first environmental movement, conservationism, began.

Conservationism: Early Environmentalism and the Roosevelts

Conservationism reflected the fear of many that America was going to lose its

pristine character. Henry David Thoreau, an ardent conservationist, was one of the most effective promulgators of conservationism. In *Maine Woods*, Thoreau helped to put conservation on the public opinion agenda with his discussion of the beauties of the wilderness and his advocacy of the conservation movement as a way to preserve natural beauty in North America. In part due to his eloquent prose, and because Thoreau's work reflected the awareness of environmental degradation, the concept of state action to protect the environment became a national issue. But it was another spokesman and activist, John Muir, who was largely responsible for the impetus of the movement in the late 1800s. He moved to Yosemite Valley in 1869 and, concerned with preserving the beauty that he saw around him, began to persuade the rich and influential to support conservation of the environment. Muir started one of the first environmental interest groups, the Sierra Club (the Audubon Society had been created six years earlier).

As the public's awareness increased, the conservation movement found support in President Theodore Roosevelt, himself an ardent recreationalist. Roosevelt shared the views of other outdoorsmen and saw the need to preserve wilderness. Several conservation projects were started under his administration prior to World War I, though the public's attention was soon consumed with wartime issues. After the war, the United States began to turn to domestic issues again, and an unprecedented level of industrialization took place. Popular concern for the environment began to rise once again given strong growth and weak state protection.

Ironically, just as public concern for the environment was replaced by more

immediate economic concerns surrounding the Great Depression, conservationism gained its largest victory to date. President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced a nation in desperate need of jobs and thus created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The CCC worked on building roads to and within national parks. In addition to creating the CCC, President Roosevelt attempted to stimulate the economy through public works projects such as large dams and reservoirs. Not only were young men being given jobs that would benefit the environment; they were being exposed to pristine landscapes. Throughout Roosevelt's tenure, environmental conservation measures continued to gain popularity in Congress and with the people, particularly in regard to mining and fish and wildlife protection.

Environmentalism: Public Awareness Becomes More Sophisticated

The focus on conservation continued until the mid-1950s, with emphasis on reduction in soil erosion, conservation of water, forest management for the logging industry, and restoration of the fish and game populations—concerns apparent to the nature-loving public. But in the 1960s, the focus of the environmental movement changed from conservation to a more all-inclusive environmental plan. Again, public opinion was shaped by conditions as articulated by outspoken environmental advocates—this time concerning less visible environmental dangers. Rachel Carson was one of the most influential, speaking out and alerting people to the dangers of mistreating the environment in her 1962 book *Silent Spring*. Carson detailed how pesticides and other chemicals were ruining the air, land, plants, and animals that surround people.

She also showed how chemicals could injure humans. *Silent Spring* caused an outcry against usage of such chemicals—even so, it took nearly a decade to ban the use of DDT (banned in 1972).

During the 1960s, environmental groups such as the National Audubon Society and the Sierra Club noted rapid increases in membership numbers. As a result of the growing environmental awareness, Congress began to implement environmental policy. In 1964, Congress passed the Wilderness Act, preventing large amounts of land from ever facing development. By 1969, the desire for environmental protection had grown to such an extent that Congress thought it necessary to create a new governmental agency via the National Environmental Policy Act: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA became an independent executive agency on December 2, 1970.

Earth Day: The Start of Modern

Environmentalism in the United States
By 1970, awareness of environmental issues was at an all-time high. Shown in the creation of the EPA, public policy began to reflect this new awareness and call for action. The first annual Earth Day was April 22, 1970. Throughout this environmental decade, several pieces of legislation were passed, including the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, and the Endangered Species Act. The Endangered Species Act noted the renewed interest in conservation of the environment, but in a different sense from the old movement. It focused on preserving the environment for mostly aesthetic and nonrecreational reasons. Another important piece of legislation included the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, which established funds

(the Superfund) for cleaning up hazardous waste sites throughout the nation. The executive and legislative branches of government were supportive of policies aimed at protecting the environment throughout the 1970s.

Modern Environmentalism: The Environment Competes for Space on the Agenda

Due to a recession in the early 1980s, and a recognition of the far-reaching effects of the legislation enacted in the 1970s, environmentalism fell from the public opinion agenda for much of the 1980s. As the government became responsible for environmental protection, much of the sense of urgency was finally removed. The new emphasis was on economic efficiency, or balancing economic growth and protection of the environment. President Reagan spearheaded this effort, and Congress passed several new pieces of legislation aimed at preserving regulations established in the 1970s, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1984 and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1986, but with a more business-friendly mandate. By the end of the 1980s, environmentalists were intent upon returning the national focus to the environment, arguing that the Reagan administration had abandoned it. But environmentalists now had to compete with other interests and concerns for public attention.

The late 1980s and 1990s saw George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton serve in the White House. President Bush was more proactive than his predecessor, but he maintained efficiency as the primary requirement for governmental policy. By the end of his term, Bush was criticized by environmentalists for not being a staunch supporter of the environment—and their message resonated with the

public as concern for the environment began to rise (Gallup and Dunlap polls showed spikes in environmental concern in 1992 and 1993, and the environment once again made a strong showing [8 percent] as the American National Election Study's *most important problem*). In the election of 1992, Bill Clinton and running mate Al Gore came out in strong support of the environment. Gore, who wrote the book *Earth in the Balance*, was known to be a strong environmentalist. Many environmentalists had high hopes for the administration. These hopes were dashed, however, during the first Clinton administration. Policy gridlock was the result as the Congress and the presidency could not seem to find compromise. The situation worsened when an antibureaucratic Republican majority gained control of Congress in 1994. The Congress cut budgets for environmental programs and attempted to curtail EPA regulations. In response to this seemingly antienvironmentalist legislature, the president came out in adamant support of the environment; amid one of the highest levels of public concern for the environment, Clinton won a landslide election in 1996. This high level of concern can be attributed to the president's advocacy and to the state of the economy. Due to the high level of economic growth, concern over the economy fell to an all-time low. Although the American National Election Studies usually finds that the economy is the most important problem to more than one-third of all Americans (it has been in every election year since 1980), in 1996 it was the most important problem for only 10 percent. With limited room on the public opinion agenda, a healthy economy allowed the environment to surface again as an important election issue.

The 2000 election saw the defeat, barely, of the environmental presidential candidate—Al Gore. George W. Bush has already set his administration's tack by refusing to sign the Kyoto Treaty and for advocating drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Area and Refuge in Alaska. Once again, although environmentalists were quick to rally against the president, the public opinion agenda has been co-opted by security issues in the aftermath of September 11. That attack and the resultant war on terrorism captured public opinion like no other event in recent history. By effectively controlling the messages out of Washington and pursuing a war in Iraq, Bush continued to make security the primary public concern. It is likely, however, that as security concerns begin to fade, once again the environment will become a central issue on the public opinion agenda.

Conclusion

We have seen an increase in public awareness of the environment since the 1850s. It is clear that the U.S. population is very concerned with the environment and opts for protection when provided a choice. But there are three caveats. First, the urgency of environmental concern fluctuates with state action. As the state expanded in the 1970s to incorporate environmental protection, much of the public pressure on government abated—a trend clearly evident in significant drops in public concern over pollution during this period (Trendex Polling data, in Gilroy and Shapiro 1986). To a lesser degree, this process has been repeated with successive administrations. To the degree that a given administration shows concern and advocates for the environment, public concern is abated. In the face of apparent administrative abandonment, environ-

mental advocacy again crests. Under Republican administrations, environmental concern has risen, whereas under Democratic administrations, environmental concern has lessened.

The second caveat is that public awareness is influenced by specific incidents, such as the *Exxon-Valdez* oil spill and the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown. Immediately following such catastrophes, public concern peaks and public policy is expedited (often, legislation moves from a stagnant position on the congressional agenda to immediate debate and a vote). But much as these events lead to environmental concerns being placed high on the public opinion agenda, other events lead to their sidelining. Because there is limited room on the public opinion agenda, events like September 11, or high-profile crimes, co-opt public concern. Issues that receive the most press coverage are likely to figure high on that agenda and drive off others.

The third caveat is that the public often waits for elite direction. Often a spokesperson is necessary to galvanize public opinion and to use it to produce public policy. Key figures, such as John Muir, Rachel Carson, and Al Gore, have been influential in making sure that environmental concerns remain prominent. But more than just setting the agenda, these spokespersons often make the public aware of "unseen" environmental risks. Just as Carson began to make us aware of the dangers of chemical contamination, so scientists have begun to warn of global warming—with attribution to the burning of the Brazilian rain forests, automobile emissions, and the use of aerosols. Due to the complex nature of the environment, such reliance upon environmental personalities is likely to be a permanent condition in public opinion.

Timeline

1864—Henry David Thoreau's book, *Maine Woods*, is published posthumously.

1872—Yellowstone National Park is created; it is the first national park.

1886—The Audubon Society is established.

1891—Forest Reserve Act is passed by Congress, allowing presidents to establish forest reserves.

1892—Sierra Club is established with John Muir as president.

1916—National Park Service is established to administer the national parks.

1948—Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 is passed by Congress to help local governments build sewage treatment plants.

1955—Air Pollution Control Act is passed by Congress; this is the predecessor to the Clean Air Act of 1970.

mid-1960s—International population assistance programs are established to aid in world population sustainability.

1962—*Silent Spring*, by Rachel Carson, brings pesticides and other environmental issues into the mainstream public policy arena.

1964—Wilderness Act is passed by Congress, preventing some lands from ever being developed.

1970—Environmental Protection Agency is created through passage of the National Environmental Policy Act by Congress.

1970—Clean Air Act is passed.

1970s—Domestic family planning pro-

grams are established to aid in world population sustainability.

1970—President Richard Nixon signs into law the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

April 22, 1970—First Earth Day.

1972—DDT is banned in the United States.

1972—Water Pollution Control Act is passed by Congress.

1973—Endangered Species Act is passed by Congress.

1978—President Carter declares Love Canal an emergency.

1980—Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act declares 100 million acres of park and wildlife areas.

April 26, 1986—Chernobyl disaster.

March 24, 1989—*Exxon-Valdez* disaster.

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Foreign Policy

Given the remoteness of many foreign policy issues from our daily lives, a common concern is that a lack of public interest in foreign affairs will translate into a preference for isolation from the international system. However, a close analysis of public attitudes on foreign policy suggests that the public, though not always prioritizing foreign policy issues, has consistently held policy preferences for multilateral international engagement to engage the central problems confronting the United States. Although the September 11 attacks have affected American attitudes, they reinforced preexisting views and did not dramatically alter the public's foreign policy inclinations.

Engagement versus Isolation

The public's desire for engagement or isolation in international affairs has remained a focus of discussion from World War I to the present. During the period between World War I and World War II, the public largely opposed involvement in international politics and favored restrictions designed to keep the United States out of foreign entanglements (Holsti 1996). World War II changed this pattern. In February 1942, just two months after Japan's December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, 70 percent of the public endorsed the United States taking an "active part" in international affairs rather than an approach that would "stay out of world affairs as much as we can," which was only supported by 21 percent of the public (Roper Center; see references below).

Despite fears that the end of World War II would bring a return to isolationism, during the period from World War II through the end of the Cold War in 1989, large majorities favored taking an active

part in international affairs. Through the mid-1960s, high levels of support for international engagement continued, reaching 65–75 percent, with a high of 79 percent favoring internationalism immediately preceding the escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in June 1965. Despite the wrenching Vietnam experience, public support for international engagement continued, with 66 percent favoring an active role in foreign affairs in March 1973. Still, by 1973 the percentage endorsing "staying out" of world affairs nearly doubled, to 31 percent from 16 percent in 1965. Except for an October 1982 poll in which only 54 percent supported active involvement during the midst of a deep economic recession, the public continued to express support (around 60 percent) for engagement throughout the rest of the Cold War (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989, p. 53).

With the end of the international imperatives associated with the Cold War, some feared a return to isolationism, but the public continued to support international engagement. With the Coalition victory over Iraqi forces during the 1991 Gulf War, support for internationalism surged to around 70 percent in 1991 and returned around 60 percent for the rest of the 1990s (Roper Center). In the aftermath of September 11, public support for active involvement moved to 71 percent again in mid-2002 (CCFR 2002). In all, despite fears to the contrary, the public has rigorously supported internationalism since World War II, with internationalist sentiments peaking between World War II and Vietnam, around the Gulf War, and after September 11.

Unilateralism versus Multilateralism

Strong public support for international involvement masks important nuances

in public attitudes, especially regarding the level and form of involvement. In 2002, 26 percent favored taking a leading role in international affairs; 52 percent favored the public taking a “major role, but not the leading role” in international affairs; 16 percent suggested a minor role; and 4 percent indicated they supported no role for the United States whatsoever (Roper Center). A different question yielded even more support for working with other countries, with 17 percent supporting the view that the United States “should continue to be the preeminent world leader in solving international problems”; 71 percent of the public thought that “the U.S. should do its share in efforts to solve international problems together with other countries” (CCFR 2002). These findings suggest that while a significant percentage of the public favors a dominant U.S. position in the world, the majority prefers working with others in the international system.

The theme of multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy is not a recent phenomenon but rather a consistent historical trend. A series of surveys from 1964 through 1991 found that roughly two-thirds consistently favored multilateral U.S. action in international politics. When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Since the United States is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether other countries agree with us or not,” an average of 66.9 percent disagreed with going it alone (with a high of 72 percent in 1968 and 1972 and a low of 57 percent in 1974). A question asking if the United States “should take into account the views of its major allies” when formulating foreign policy elicited an even higher

level of approval for multilateralism, with an average of 78.5 percent agreeing with the statement (with a high of 86 percent in 1991 and a low of 69 percent in 1974) (Richman 1993, pp. 270–271).

During the post–Cold War era, the public has expressed a strong preference for multilateral action in dealing with specific foreign policy threats. For example, in 1998, 72 percent thought that the United States should not act alone when “responding to international crises,” and only 21 percent favored a unilateral response. After September 11, a greater percentage of the public (31 percent) favored unilateral action in international crises, although nearly two-thirds (61 percent) favored not acting alone (CCFR 2002). This overall preference for multilateralism reverberates in specific attitudes regarding use of force as well as attitudes toward international institutions.

Foreign Policy Priorities

The public has also been regularly surveyed about its priorities both within foreign policy issues and between foreign and domestic issues. These surveys (often asking about “the most important problem facing the country”) suggest that the public’s priorities vary over time depending upon the main issues in the news. For example, in the midst of the Great Depression in 1935, only 11 percent prioritized foreign policy while 61 percent indicated the economy held the most significance. As international circumstances changed by 1939, 47 percent made foreign policy a priority, and in November 1941, one month before Pearl Harbor, 81 percent identified foreign policy as the most important issue. With the end of World War II, the priority of foreign affairs again waned, with 12 percent indicating it was the top priority in October 1945. Through

the first half of the Cold War until the end of Vietnam, percentages for the most part in the 50 percent range indicated that foreign policy remained a top priority, with sharp upswings occurring during points of international crisis such as growing tensions in Europe in March 1948 (68 percent), the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 (66 percent), and U.S. entry into Vietnam in August 1965 (57 percent). With the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in 1973, attention turned inward, and interest in foreign affairs dropped to the single digits beginning in February 1973 (9 percent) and did not move out of the single digits for any two consecutive monthly periods until January 1980 (Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989).

The quadrennial surveys commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) between 1974 and 2002 (asking for the “two or three biggest problems facing the country today”) reveal that as a total of all problems indicated, the percentage of responses that identified foreign policy problems moved steadily up in the resurgence of the Cold War in 1978 (11.1 percent), 1982 (15.2 percent), 1986 (25.9 percent), but down in 1990 (16.8 percent). With the end of the Cold War, public priority on foreign affairs decreased with the 1994 (11.5 percent) and 1998 (7.3 percent) surveys (CCFR 2002).

However, with the 2001 terrorist attacks, foreign policy once again rose in priority. Foreign policy represented 41 percent of the total responses in the 2002 CCFR survey. Table 1 provides a summary of the issues that received the highest percentages, with comparisons to previous years back to the mid-1980s. The most striking change is the rise of terrorism as a national priority and the fact that the 2002 survey was the first time that a

foreign policy issue was the most cited problem facing the nation. Still, 64 percent did not see terrorism as one of the major problems facing the country. Competing for agenda priority with terrorism were traditional domestic concerns such as the economy and education; together (33 percent) they were listed by nearly as many people as terrorism. Table 1 also highlights variation over time in the issues that the public emphasized. Terrorism did not appear on the list in 1998; the top issues in that year were all domestic: crime (26 percent), drug abuse (21 percent), education (15 percent), poverty (11 percent), the economy (11 percent), and immorality (11 percent).

Among foreign policy issues (see Table 2), terrorism dominated the 2002 list, with 33 percent pointing to it as a core problem, a sharp rise from the previous survey in 1998. The Middle East, Israeli-Palestinian relations, and Iraq collectively were indicated by 24 percent of the survey’s respondents. As with the broader question (including both domestic and international issues in Table 1), responses to the question vary over time. Issues rising in priority in the 2002 survey reflect current events such as terrorism and concerns about the Middle East (largely because of the rise of the violence between Palestinians and Israelis). Issues that dropped dramatically in importance, such as foreign aid and concern with staying out of the affairs of other countries, were largely associated with views that would imply more isolationist tendencies and a desire to stay out of international politics. This pattern reflects the same shift in public attitudes after September 11 that caused the rise in public interest in foreign news and support for internationalism.

Table 1 Public Perception of Priority Issues, 1982–2002 (percentage of individuals)*What do you feel are the two or three biggest problems facing the country today?*

<i>Issue</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2002</i>
Terrorism	na	na	na	na	na	36
Economy	18	10	16	10	11	22
Education	2	5	8	12	15	11
Defense	3	2	1	*	1	10
Unemployment	64	26	10	20	9	9
Immorality	6	7	7	8	11	8
Foreign Relations/ Foreign Policy	6	6	4	4	3	8
Drug Abuse	3	27	30	18	21	7
Health Care/Insurance	1	2	5	19	8	7
War	na	na	6	2	1	7
Crime	16	10	15	42	26	6
Poverty	2	10	13	15	11	6

na = not available.

* = less than 0.5 percent.

Source: CCFR, 2002. Percentages do not add to 100 percent because of multiple responses.**Table 2 Public Perception of Foreign Policy Priorities, 1982–2002 (percentage of individuals)***What do you feel are the two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing the United States today?*

<i>Issue</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>2002</i>
Terrorism	na	20	2	1	12	33
Mideast Situation	19	7	21	3	8	12
Unrest in Israel and Arab/ Israel and Palestine	na	na	na	na	na	9
Foreign Aid	16	9	18	16	7	8
Stay out of affairs of other countries	8	5	6	19	7	7
Immigration	3	3	1	12	3	7
Arms Control	13	16	2	3	7	5
War	11	8	8	3	4	4
Oil Problems	6	2	14	1	*	4
Iraq	na	na	18	11	4	3
World Economy	2	1	3	2	11	3

na = not available.

* = less than 0.5 percent. Percentages do not add to 100 percent because of multiple responses.

Source: CCFR, 2002.

Foreign Policy Goals

U.S. attitudes toward foreign policy goals reflect the same response to international events and a concern with goals that are more closely associated with domestic issues and threats to the home-

land (see Table 3). The priority goals for U.S. foreign policy in 2002 are closely associated with a response to terrorism, threats from nuclear weapons, controlling illegal immigration (linked with concerns over terrorists entering the United

Table 3 Public Ratings of Foreign Policy Priorities, 1974–2002

For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. (percentage indicating “very important”)

<i>Goal</i>	1974	1978	1982	1986	1990	1994	1998	2002
Combating international terrorism	na	na	na	na	na	na	79	91
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons	na	na	na	na	84	82	82	90
Protecting the jobs of American workers	74	78	77	77	84	83	80	85
Stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States	na	na	na	na	na	85	81	81
Securing adequate supplies of energy	75	78	70	69	76	62	64	75
Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	na	na	na	na	na	72	55	70
Maintaining superior military power worldwide	na	na	na	na	na	50	59	68
Improving the global environment	na	na	na	na	73	58	53	66
Combating world hunger	61	59	58	63	na	56	62	61
Defending our allies' security	33	50	50	56	43	41	44	57
Strengthening the United Nations	46	47	48	46	52	51	45	57
Safeguarding against global financial instability	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	54
Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries	na	na	na	62	70	59	50	51
Protecting the interest of American business abroad	39	45	44	43	46	na	na	49
Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	na	39	43	42	40	34	39	47
Strengthening international law and institutions	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	43
Protecting weaker nations against aggression	28	34	34	32	32	24	32	41
Promoting market economies abroad	na	na	na	na	na	na	34	36
Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	28	26	29	30	28	25	29	34
Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations	39	35	35	37	33	22	29	30

na = not available.

Source: CCFR, 2002.

States), and maintaining U.S. superiority. Each of these items received significant increases in support when compared to previous years. Support for multilateral issues associated with the war on terrorism, such as defending allies and improving the United Nations (UN), also rose significantly in importance.

Support for most foreign policy goals rose across the board from the previous survey in 1998. Of the 17 questions on the 2002 survey repeated from 1998, 12 goals received at least 5 percent more support as a "very important" goal, and six goals experienced double-digit increases in support. Taking a broader time frame beyond 1998, public support for a range of goals has risen over time, including support for policies to protect jobs, maintain power, protect allies, assist the UN, and protect the environment. Although less than a majority of the public favored defending human rights, protecting weaker nations, and spreading democracy, Americans supported each of these goals at higher levels than in previous periods. This generalized increase in support reflects the public's increasing concern with foreign affairs, public officials' heightened attention to foreign affairs after September 11, as well as growing U.S. dominance in international politics in the post-Cold War era.

At the aggregate level, Americans gave the highest priority to goals most closely associated with U.S. self-interests, with more than two-thirds identifying terrorism, nuclear proliferation, jobs, illegal drugs, energy supplies, illegal immigration, and preserving power. Multilateral institutions and objectives received moderate support, including the global environment, world hunger, defending allies, the UN, and international financial stability. The expression of majority support

or higher for all these goals reflects the internationalist attitudes expressed by the public, especially as to goals associated with responding to September 11.

At the same time, the public remains mostly uninterested in attempting to achieve goals associated with helping others as an end in itself or in reforming other countries. The public gave low levels of support for improving international law and institutions, protecting weaker nations, and improving the standard of living in other countries. Supporting ideological goals associated with cultural liberalism, such as human rights, capitalism, promoting business interests abroad, and democracy, also received modest support.

In all, the public is supportive of a broad range of international goals. Although support for multilateral institutions exists, little support emerges for transformative actions in international policy. As such, these attitudes reflect broader themes in the public's attitudes that favor internationalism, multilateralism, and the support of U.S. interests at home and abroad through foreign policy.

The Use of Force

These broader attitudes reverberate in public attitudes on the use of force. In general, the public has expressed reluctance to support the use of U.S. troops in a range of hypothetical scenarios in 2002, such as a North Korean invasion of South Korea (36 percent), an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (48 percent), an Arab invasion of Israel (48 percent), and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (32 percent). Although the percentages supporting these actions represent small increases over 1998, public opinion is best described as divided and reflects attitudes over a number of years (Holsti 1996).

As the questions posed become more general and focus on the purpose of the use of force, dramatically higher percentages of support emerge. For example, majorities of the public favored the use of U.S. troops to “ensure the supply of oil” (65 percent), “destroy a terrorist camp” (92 percent), liberate hostages (77 percent), help “a population struck by famine” (81 percent), and “uphold international law” (76 percent). The only question that did not generate majority support was bringing “peace to a region where there is a civil war” (48 percent) (CCFR 2002).

What accounts for this variation in response between specific and more general questions? One factor might be that the specific scenarios create a stronger impression of the costs associated with a particular situation. One of the most important factors in determining public support for a particular action is the level of battlefield casualties. Unlike the common view that the public in most circumstances is unwilling to accept *any* casualties from the use of force, evidence from past wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf suggests that public support decreases as casualties mount. As casualties increase by a factor of 10 (i.e., from 1,000 to 10,000), public support for a conflict decreases by 15 percent; the cost of the conflict causes increasingly more Americans to turn from support to opposition (Mueller 1994). For example, only 24 percent of the public viewed U.S. involvement in Vietnam as a mistake in August 1965; that number rose to 50 percent after the Tet Offensive in January 1968 and to 60 percent in January 1973. By November 2000, 69 percent of the public viewed U.S. involvement as a mistake (Roper Center). This pattern suggests that initial support for a conflict

provides a baseline level of support that erodes over time as costs increase.

Echoing broader foreign policy inclinations, multilateralism appears to be an important factor that increases public support for the use of force. For example, one 2000 survey found that 49 percent of the public favored using force in conjunction with the UN, and 26 percent with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); only 17 percent favored acting alone as the “best” approach when “it becomes necessary to use military force.” The same appears to hold true for specific instances as well. A series of surveys in 1998 found that if a question posited that U.S. action was part of a UN operation, 76 percent of the public approved of a U.S. military response if Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia and 68 percent approved if North Korea invaded South Korea. On a similar question positing that other countries in the UN failed to participate, support dropped to 33 percent in the Saudi Arabia case and 21 percent in the South Korea case (Kull 2002, pp. 105–106).

The purported mission also seemed to influence the level of public support across a range of cases (such as Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq) in the 1990s. Based perhaps on the lessons of Vietnam, the public appears reluctant to support use of force to bring political change to other countries, with only 36 percent of the public approving of such actions across a range of cases. When the mission of the action is directed at repelling attacks across international borders, public support rises on average to 55 percent. Humanitarian interventions received the highest levels of support, with 64 percent approving actions designed primarily to help people in need in other countries (Jentleson and Britton 1998).

However, some evidence suggests that the post–September 11 context shifted the public’s stomach for involvement in other internal conflicts. A question on the 2002 CCFR survey posed a range of specific circumstances, all of which would involve the United States in internal conflicts; it found majority support for all instances and 3-to-1 support for several scenarios. The public favored helping the Philippines fight terrorism (78 percent/19 percent); preventing an unspecified government from committing genocide (77 percent/19 percent); participating in an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan (76 percent/21 percent); overthrowing Saddam Hussein of Iraq (75 percent/21 percent); combating drug lords in Columbia (66 percent/30 percent); participating in an international peacekeeping force between Israel and the Palestinians after a peace agreement (65 percent/30 percent); using U.S. troops to assist the Pakistani government against an Islamic revolution (61 percent/32 percent); and helping the Saudi Arabian government put down an overthrow attempt (54 percent/37 percent). Although it is too soon to tell, it is possible that public inclinations toward the employment of U.S. troops after September 11 have experienced the first important shift since the end of the Vietnam War. The public is now more willing to approve of involvement in conflicts that would have surely raised the specter of “another Vietnam” in previous times.

Defense Spending

Public assessments of defense spending have tended to move cyclically in relation to perceived international threats. A range of surveys, employing questions that often asked the public whether “too little, too much, or about the right

amount” was being spent on defense or whether the defense budget should be increased, decreased, or kept the same, found that the public believed that too much was being spent on defense in the late 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, as the international situation became more threatening (the Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), majorities favored increases in defense spending. After the defense budget increases under Ronald Reagan and the domestic economic problems of the early 1980s, public sentiments reflected roughly equal percentages favoring the view that too much or the right amount was being spent on defense, with significantly less (percentages in the teens) favoring an increase in defense spending. With small fluctuations and depending on question wording, the end of the Cold War found pluralities and even majorities of the public favoring level defense spending, somewhat less favoring a decrease of defense spending, and percentages in the teens endorsing an increase in defense spending. This trend shifted in late 2000, with some polls indicating pluralities favoring an increase in defense spending, and a sharp drop in the percentage favoring a decrease in defense spending (Torres-Reyna and Shapiro 2002). After September 11, a plurality (44 percent) favored an increase in defense spending, slightly less (38 percent) favored keeping it the same, and a smaller percentage (15 percent) supported cuts (CCFR 2002).

Economics

Because of its relation to domestic politics, economics has risen in importance, especially given increasing globalization. For the most part, the public has adopted sanguine attitudes regarding the effect of

globalization; a majority in 2002 (56 percent) saw globalization as “mostly good” for the United States, while a much smaller percentage (27 percent) saw it negatively. Although the public holds generally positive views of globalization and its effects on the domestic economy, American companies, consumers, and standards of living, the public expresses reservations about job security; 51 percent see jobs being damaged by globalization, while only 32 percent see it as helpful (CCFR 2002).

Ambivalence toward international economics extends to free trade and protectionism. When asked about free trade generally, 89 percent expressed support for the concept, with 16 percent doing so unconditionally. Still, when asked specifically about whether the public favors those who support tariffs as “necessary to protect certain manufacturing jobs in certain industries from the competition of less expensive imports” or those who oppose tariffs to create lower prices, 50 percent saw tariffs as necessary, while only 38 percent favored eliminating tariffs (CCFR 2002). This ambivalence extended to specific trade agreements as well, where mixed attitudes emerged regarding both the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement in the 1990s (Holsti 1996, p. 89).

International Organizations

Public assessments of the most visible international organizations with U.S. involvement, the UN and NATO, remain largely supportive. Of the organizations queried in the 2002 CCFR survey, the UN received the highest mean “thermometer” rating (64 on a scale of 1 [cold] to 100 [warm]); the public also expressed support for U.S. participation in specific UN actions, with 58 percent favoring (32 per-

cent opposed) the United States paying its dues in full, and 64 percent indicating that the United States should take part in UN peacekeeping forces around the world. Support for keeping the U.S. commitment to NATO rose in the most recent CCFR poll to the highest level since the survey began, to 65 percent (a 6 percent increase from the 1998 survey), with 11 percent supporting an increased commitment; only 11 percent favored decreasing the U.S. commitment, and 6 percent favored withdrawing entirely from the organization. U.S. attitudes toward major international economic organizations remain decidedly mixed, with the International Monetary Fund (48) and World Bank (51) receiving tepid mean thermometer ratings (CCFR 2002).

Sources of Public Attitudes

Ideology and partisanship, with ideology most important, appear to be the strongest determinants of foreign policy attitudes, with factors such as race, education, generation, region, and gender playing a decidedly lesser role (Holsti 1996). Members of the public maintain well-developed attitudes toward foreign policy that shape responses to issues (Wittkopf 1990). Consistently over time, research has demonstrated that the public’s orientations can be described with reference to two dimensions: support/oppose cooperative internationalism (which entails working with international institutions and other nations with a focus on economics and humanitarian issues), and support/oppose militant internationalism (primarily focused on the use of force, often unilateral in nature, to deal with international problems and the pursuit of U.S. national interests). Combining the two dimensions, the U.S. public roughly divides equally into four broad orienta-

tions toward foreign policy issues: *internationalists* (favor both cooperative and militant internationalism), *hard-liners* (oppose cooperative and favor internationalism), *accommodationists* (favor cooperative and oppose militant internationalism), and *isolationists* (oppose cooperative and militant internationalism).

These orientations appear to divide individuals ideologically and by political party. Liberals and Democrats tend to view the world from the accommodationist framework, whereas conservatives and Republicans tend toward the hard-liner perspective. Moderates of both parties were largely found in the internationalist category (Wittkopf 1990). At the extreme ideological ends, strong liberals and conservatives tend to adopt the isolationist perspective (Holsti 1996).

Although a broad consensus exists on international engagement and policy priorities, the potential for division remains over the means to address these problems. For example, accommodationists and internationalists will support (and hard-liners and isolationists will oppose) cooperative efforts such as arms control and international inspection regimes to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and multilateral efforts to stem the flow of drugs into the United States. Hard-liners and internationalists will likely support unilateral military efforts to attack proliferation and drug production at its source, whereas accommodationists and isolationists will likely oppose these efforts. In short, even though a consensus exists on the foreign policy priorities, significant divisions are possible over policies to address them.

Conclusion

In the 1990s, the common knowledge within U.S. political circles held that the

public viewed international institutions and multilateral foreign policy with a suspicious eye and instead favored unilateral responses or even a de-emphasis on foreign policy altogether in a manner suggestive of a return to isolationism (Kull and Destler 1999). After September 11, it has become common to assert that the shock reawakened the public to the dangers inherent in the international system. The extensive data presented in this entry suggest that these conclusions are incorrect on both counts. Both before and after September 11, the public favored international engagement and preferred that the United States do so in a multilateral context. Rather than seeing foreign policy as unimportant, the public prioritized a number of foreign policy goals even as it saw the main problems facing the nation largely in a domestic sphere. Although the September 11 attacks affected attitudes on foreign policy, most notably by increasing the prominence of terrorism and other national security-related issues in the ranking of important problems to be confronted, their main effect on attitudes has been to enhance the already majoritarian inclination for engagement, support for a range of foreign policy goals, and working multilaterally to achieve foreign policy goals. Overall, public attitudes toward foreign policy have been characterized more by consistency than by change.

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Gay and Lesbian Rights


Gays and lesbians are one of the most maligned groups in the United States. And public opinion on gay rights has undergone many changes since the beginnings of survey research on the subject. What Americans think about gay and lesbian rights in part depends on what the

issue is and who the respondents are. I illustrate these points using data from the 2000 National Election Study and the 2000 General Social Survey, two nationally representative surveys of public opinion. (The data from the General Social Surveys [GSS] and National Election Studies [NES] were accessed online using the Computer-assisted Survey Methods Program [CSM] at the University of California-Berkeley.) To assess changes in public opinion on gay and lesbian rights where it is possible, I use longitudinal data from the General Social Surveys.

Basic Public Opinion of Gays and Lesbians

A good place to start is to examine how much Americans approve or disapprove of homosexuality. Since 1973, the GSS has been asking respondents whether they think that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex are "always wrong," "almost always wrong," "wrong only sometimes," or "not wrong at all." In the 2000 survey, a majority of respondents expressed outright disapproval of homosexuality or more or less strong reservations about it (58.8 percent indicated that sexual relations between adults of the same sex are "always wrong," 4.5 percent "almost always wrong," 8 percent "sometimes wrong," and 28.8 percent "not wrong at all"). Although disapproval of homosexuality is the norm today, an over-time examination of attitudes toward homosexuality shows that they have become somewhat more favorable. This trend is shown in Figure 1 below.

The continuing low levels of approval of homosexuality are also reflected in responses to the feeling thermometer questions about gays and lesbians and other sociopolitical groups incorporated



Percentages of respondents indicating that it is “not wrong at all” when commenting on sexual relations between two adults of the same sex

Figure 1 Trends in Approval of Homosexuality (1973–2000 General Social Surveys)

into the 2000 NES. Respondents evaluate a particular group on a feeling thermometer between 0 (very cold) and 100 (very warm), 50 meaning neutral. On this measure of basic affect, gays and lesbians receive a mean score that falls below the scale midpoint (46.87). Compared to 19 other sociopolitical groups that respondents evaluate on the feeling thermometer measure (e.g., people on welfare, Christian fundamentalists, the women’s movement, big business), gays and lesbians receive the lowest mean evaluation and are the only group receiving a mean evaluation that falls below the midpoint. In short, basic evaluations of gays and lesbians, in spite of some over-time changes, continue to be generally unfavorable, regardless of whether

one examines approval of homosexuality or feeling thermometer evaluations of gays and lesbians.

The Specific Issue Matters


Although basic responses to homosexuality and gays and lesbians are generally negative, they do not automatically translate into negative reactions to gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties. The 2000 NES respondents were asked three questions concerning gay and lesbian civil rights: whether homosexuals should be allowed in the military, whether gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to adopt children, and whether there should be laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination. The 2000 GSS contains three questions bearing on gay and

lesbian civil liberties: whether homosexuals should be allowed to make a speech in a respondent's community, whether they should be allowed to teach in a college or university, and whether a book written by a homosexual in favor of homosexuality should not be removed from a respondent's public library. The latter three questions collectively measure the extent of political tolerance respondents are willing to award gays and lesbians. The levels of support for gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

Three points can be made. First, support for gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties is higher than basic evaluations of gays and lesbians and approval of homosexuality might lead one to expect. Second, support for issues raising gay and lesbian civil rights is generally lower than


the extent of political tolerance awarded gays and lesbians. Third, the extent to which civil rights are supported depends on the specific issue; this is also true, to a lesser extent, about opinions on issues involving gay and lesbian civil liberties.

In the category of civil rights, Figure 2 demonstrates that Americans are most accepting of allowing gays and lesbians in the military, less supportive of laws prohibiting employment discrimination gays and lesbians may face, and least enthusiastic about allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt children. In the category of civil liberties, Figure 3 shows that speech by a homosexual individual is tolerated most, closely followed by tolerance of a homosexual teaching in a college or university, and willingness to allow a homosexual to have a book in the library. Over-time data demonstrate, in



Percentages of respondents supporting gays' and lesbians' right to adopt children, laws protecting gays and lesbians from employment discrimination, and gays in the military

Figure 2 Support for Gays' and Lesbians' Civil Rights (2000 National Election Study)



Percentages of respondents agreeing that homosexuals should be allowed to make a speech, to teach in a college or university, and to have a book in favor of homosexuality in a public library

Figure 3 Support for Gays' and Lesbians' Civil Liberties—or Political Tolerance Awarded Gays and Lesbians (2000 General Social Survey)

addition, that tolerance of all three scenarios has increased at a higher rate than approval of homosexuality, from a low of 63.2 percent respondents prepared to tolerate homosexual speech in 1973, 49.4 percent willing to allow a homosexual college teacher, and 55 percent accepting a book in favor of homosexuality to remain in a public library.

In sum, support for gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties is relatively high, though by no means uniform. Substantial minorities are opposed to laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination, allowing gays and lesbians in the military, and extending civil liberties protections to gays and lesbians. A majority of respondents, in addition, are opposed to allowing gay and lesbian couples to adopt children.

The Respondents Matter

The favorability of public opinion on gay and lesbian rights depends, finally, on respondents' sociodemographic, political, and psychological characteristics. Fundamentalism of respondents' religious views, religiosity, education, age, and sex are the most important socio-demographic influences. Ideological self-identification is the most important political influence. Respondents' views of both moral traditionalism and traditional gender roles are the most important psychological attributes linked with public opinion on gay rights. Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate how approval of homosexuality and support for gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties vary with respondent characteristics. To simplify this presentation, I include only one

Table 1 Sociodemographic Characteristics, Approval of Homosexuality, and Support for Gay and Lesbian Rights and Liberties

	<i>Fundamentalism+</i>		<i>Religious Attendance++</i>		<i>Education++</i>		<i>Age</i>		<i>Sex</i>	
	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>18–30</i>	<i>46–89</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Men</i>
	Approval ++	59.3%	10.8%	24.5%	9.2%	21.4%	35.7%	49.8	29.4	29.7
Military	88.6	59.6	77.9	67.9	70.3	80.2	83.7	70.1	82.5	66.7
Employment	74.0	56.5	68.7	62.5	64.0	69.9	70.4	64.7	72.4	60.1
Adoption	68.5	26.4	48.7	29.1	37.0	51.0	55.0	36.0	49.4	37.5
Speech	94.1	64.6	78.4	66.2	74.9	90.1	87.1	79.2	82.7	83.5
Teach	89.1	65.0	69.9	55.1	70.6	86.9	87.0	72.9	80.4	78.0
Book	88.6	56.1	70.1	54.7	65.4	80.7	83.5	65.7	71.9	75.4

+ Variable coding:

low fundamentalism = believing the Bible was written by men

high fundamentalism = believing the Bible represents the true word of God

low religious attendance = attending church no more than once or twice a month (or never)

high religious attendance = attending church at least almost every week

low education = high school diploma or less

high education = some college or more

++ All numbers in the table correspond to a favorable evaluation (percentages saying there is nothing wrong with homosexuality, approving of gays in the military, adoption, nondiscrimination laws, homosexual speech, teaching, and book in the library).

measure of basic evaluation—approval of homosexuality.

Sociodemographic Characteristics

The fundamentalism of respondents' religious views, or the extent to which they believe the Bible represents the word of God, most dramatically differentiates opponents from supporters of gay and lesbian rights, particularly on the question measuring approval of homosexuality, with 10.8 percent of fundamentalists (those who believe the Bible represents the word of God) indicating there is nothing wrong with homosexuality and 59.3 percent of nonfundamentalists (those who believe the Bible has been written by men) subscribing to that sentiment. The division of opinion on the question of gay and lesbian adoption is similarly pro-

nounced, with 26.4 percent of fundamentalists supporting gay and lesbian adoption, in contrast to 68.5 percent of nonfundamentalists. Fundamentalists are also significantly less tolerant of gays' and lesbians' civil liberties and less supportive of allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the military. The effect of religious fundamentalism on attitudes toward laws prohibiting job discrimination against gays and lesbians is, in contrast, weaker, though still substantial.

A different dimension of religious views—the frequency of religious attendance—is also correlated with public opinion on gay and lesbian rights. Compared with individuals who attend church frequently, individuals who never go to church or attend it infrequently are significantly more approving of homosexual-

Table 2 Political and Psychological Characteristics, Approval of Homosexuality, and Support for Gay and Lesbian Rights and Liberties

	<i>Ideology</i>			<i>Moral Traditionalism+</i>		<i>Gender Roles+</i>	
	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Con</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Non-traditional</i>	<i>Traditional</i>
Approval ++	46.1%	27.8%	18.6%	38.5%	9.7%	32.8%	13.8%
Military	88.1	80.6	71.3	80.7	61.1	79.9	44.5
Employment	74.1	70.1	45.7	73.5	47.2	71.8	47.6
Adoption	65.0	52.6	24.1	51.8	24.8	50.6	17.8
Speech	90.0	82.4	79.7	87.8	67.1	85.4	66.8
College teacher	87.5	79.9	72.9	87.4	63.5	83.8	64.1
Book	82.1	73.0	69.0	81.0	57.5	76.7	60.3

+ Variable coding:

low moral traditionalism = for GSS items, approval of premarital sex; for NES items, tolerance of others' moral standards

high moral traditionalism = for GSS items, disapproval of premarital sex; for NES items, intolerance of others' moral standards

nontraditional gender roles = for GSS items, disagreement with a statement that women are not suited for politics; for NES items, belief that men and women should have equal roles

traditional gender roles = for GSS items, agreement with a statement that women are not suited for politics; for NES items, belief that women's place is in the home

++ All numbers in the table correspond to a favorable evaluation (percentages saying there is nothing wrong with homosexuality, approving of gays in the military, adoption, and nondiscrimination laws, homosexual speech, teaching, and book in the library).

ity; more supportive of antidiscrimination laws in the workplace, gays in the military, and gay adoption; and more tolerant of gays and lesbians speaking in their community, teaching in a college or university, or having a book in the public library.

Education and age influence public opinion on gay rights, with the well-educated and youngest respondents more accepting of homosexuality and gay rights and liberties than their poorly educated and older counterparts. The impact of education and age is smaller on the question about employment discrimination laws. The difference between younger and older respondents' views is also small on the question concerning homosexual speech.

The relationship between respondents' sex and opinions on questions concerning gay and lesbian rights and liberties, finally, depends on the issue area. Although women and men do not differ in their approval of homosexuality, women are considerably more approving of civil rights for gays and lesbians, particularly of allowing gays and lesbians in the military. There is no significant difference in women's and men's support for gays' and lesbians' civil liberties.

Political Characteristics

Ideological self-identification is an important correlate of attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. On every measure, self-identified liberals'

attitudes are more favorable than those of self-identified moderates'. Similarly, on every measure, self-identified moderates' attitudes are significantly more favorable than those of self-identified conservatives'. As a result, there is a sizable gap between liberals and conservatives on every issue. This gap is particularly wide in approval of homosexuality and on issues concerning gay and lesbian civil rights (turning into a gulf on the issue of gay and lesbian adoption, with 65 percent of liberals supporting the right of gays and lesbians to adopt kids and 76 percent of conservatives opposing it). Ideological differences are small in the area of political tolerance, with liberals, moderates, and conservatives exhibiting largely similar attitudes.

Psychological Characteristics

Respondents who subscribe to traditional notions of morality and gender roles significantly differ from respondents who reject similar traditional notions in their positions on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. Moral traditionalists, or those who frown upon premarital sex and individual moral standards, are significantly less approving of homosexuality and less tolerant of homosexual speech, gay and lesbian teachers, and a book written by a homosexual than respondents who reject traditional notions of morality. Compared with respondents rejecting traditional conceptions of morality, moral traditionalists are less approving of gays and lesbians in the military, gay and lesbian adoption, and laws protecting homosexuals against job discrimination.

Respondents espousing traditional gender roles, manifested in the belief that women's place is in the home rather than in politics and public life, are less approving of homosexuality when compared

with respondents who believe in gender equality. Gender-role traditionalists are significantly less supportive of gays and lesbians in the military, gay and lesbian adoption, and laws protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination when compared with individuals whose conceptions of gender roles are nontraditional. They are less tolerant of gay and lesbian civil liberties than are respondents who reject traditional gender roles.

Conclusion

Public opinions concerning gay and lesbian rights are multifaceted. Although large numbers of respondents disapprove of homosexuality and evaluate gays and lesbians lukewarmly at best, basic attitudes toward homosexuality have grown somewhat more favorable over time. Public opinion on issues concerning gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties, in addition, is generally more sympathetic, though substantial minorities (and a majority in the case of gay and lesbian adoption) oppose the extension of various rights and liberties to gays and lesbians. Support and opposition also vary with respondent characteristics, particularly the fundamentalism of their religious views, education, age, ideological self-identification, moral traditionalism, and conceptions of gender roles.

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Globalization

Globalization essentially describes the notion that people around the globe are more connected than ever before, from the flow of information to the exchange of goods and services. The term is often used to describe the political, cultural, and economic atmosphere of today's world—more and more people, governments, and nation-states are interacting—which calls for recognition of a global civic environment. Several issues are seen as related to the phenomenon of globalization, including but not limited to international trade and communication, global business and multinational corporations, national borders, international institutions, labor movements, environmental concerns, and human rights.

Proponents of globalization claim that the nations that have embraced globalization—by supporting free trade and open investment policies—have seen an increase in per capita income and a decrease in national poverty. Opponents claim that globalization leads to widespread poverty, greater economic inequality, and damage to the global environment (Hansen 2003, p. 143).

This entry is an overview of the most recent U.S. public opinion data on the issues surrounding globalization. All of the data come from the *Worldviews 2002 Report*, published by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Globalization in General

In 2002, when Americans were asked to say whether globalization was mostly

good or mostly bad for the United States, a majority—56 percent—of Americans answered that globalization is mostly good for the United States, up 2 percent from 1998. Twenty-seven percent of Americans said that they thought globalization was mostly bad for the United States, while 8 percent said it was neutral. Nine percent of Americans were not sure or declined to answer.

When Americans were asked to evaluate the effects of globalization on various subjects, public opinion varied. For example, as seen in Table 1, a majority of Americans think globalization is good for the U.S. economy and U.S. companies. In addition, 51 percent of Americans believe globalization is good for their own standard of living. Fifty-one percent of Americans believe globalization is bad for the job security of U.S. workers.

Overall, there is no strong consensus among Americans on the issue of globalization. In 2002, 49 percent of Americans said that the United States should actively promote, or continue to allow, globalization. Thirty-nine percent of Americans said that the United States should try to reverse or slow down globalization. Twelve percent of Americans were not sure or declined to answer.

International Trade

International trade, or the exchange of goods and services between countries, is seen as a major facet of globalization. In 2002, 73 percent of Americans favored free trade provided that the U.S. government helps workers who lose their jobs as a result of free trade practices. Only 16 percent of Americans supported free trade and did not believe that it was necessary for the U.S. government to help workers who lose their jobs. Nine percent of Americans did not favor free trade

Table 1 U.S. Public Opinion on Globalization: The Effects of Globalization

<i>Subject</i>	<i>% Good</i>	<i>% Bad</i>	<i>% Not Sure/ Decline/ Other</i>
The U.S. economy	52	30	18
American companies	55	30	15
Consumers like you	55	27	18
Creating jobs in the U.S.	43	41	16
The environment	42	37	21
Job security for American workers	32	51	17
Democracy and human rights	61	20	19
Your own standard of living	51	28	21

Note: Question wording was "Overall, do you think globalization is good or bad for. . . ?" Sample consists of U.S. adults. N= 700. Surveys conducted in June 2002.

Source: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *Worldviews 2002 Report*.

at all; 2 percent were not sure or declined to answer.

A critical tool in promoting free trade is the elimination of governmental tariffs and restrictions on imported goods. As Table 2 shows, since 1976 more and more Americans support the elimination of tariffs—from 23 percent in 1976 to 38 percent in 2002.

Although most Americans favor free trade, many support various stipulations for those countries that take part in international trade agreements. For example, 93 percent of Americans think that countries participating in international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum standards for working conditions. Ninety-four percent of Americans think that countries taking part in international trade agreements should be required to maintain minimum standards

for protection of the environment. Seventy percent of Americans support the United States' joining a treaty to reduce global warming, specifically requiring fewer emissions from U.S. power plants and cars.

International Institutions

In regard to globalization, proponents of international institutions view them as mechanisms for dealing with shared global problems. Opponents of international institutions claim that the organizations often do more harm than good, specifically to developing countries (Hansen 2003, p. 143). Examples of such institutions include but are not limited to: (1) the World Trade Organization (WTO), designed to promote free trade by encouraging countries to remove tariffs, subsidies, and import quotas; (2) the World

Table 2 U.S. Public Opinion on Globalization: Support for Tariffs and Restrictions on Imported Goods

<i>Year</i>	<i>% Eliminate Tariffs</i>	<i>% Tariffs Are Necessary</i>	<i>% Not Sure/Decline</i>
1976	23	55	22
1977	18	66	16
1978	22	57	21
1982	22	57	21
1986	28	53	19
1990	25	54	21
1994	32	48	20
1998	32	49	19
2002	38	50	12

Note: Question wording was “. . . Generally, would you sympathize more with those who want to eliminate tariffs or those who think such tariffs are necessary?” Sample consists of U.S. adults. N= 1105. Surveys conducted in June 2002.

Source: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *Worldviews 2002 Report*.

Bank, which finances development projects in third world countries; (3) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a security alliance designed to protect the United States and its allies; and (4) the United Nations (UN), an organization designed to maintain international peace and security while solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems.

As Table 3 shows, most Americans, to varying degrees, believe that these international institutions should be strengthened. Sixty-three percent of Americans think that the WTO should be strengthened. Forty-nine percent of Americans think that the World Bank should be strengthened. A much larger percentage—77 percent—of Americans believe that the UN should be strengthened. Sixty-one percent of Americans think that NATO should be strengthened. Fifty-six percent of Americans view NATO as essential to U.S. security, whereas 30 percent view it as no longer essential. Four-

teen percent of respondents were not sure or declined to answer.

Economic Aid to Other Countries

Economic aid to other countries also plays a role in globalization. As Table 4 shows, U.S. support for giving economic aid to other countries varies over time. In 2002, 54 percent of Americans favored giving economic aid to other countries while 38 percent opposed. Eight percent of respondents were not sure or declined to answer.

Support for U.S. economic aid to other countries varies when Americans are asked about specific types of aid. For example, 84 percent of Americans favor economic aid for food and medical assistance to people in needy countries. Seventy-nine percent of Americans support foreign aid for assistance with the prevention and treatment of AIDS in poor countries. Seventy-one percent of Americans support aid for birth control in poor countries to help reduce population growth,

Table 3 U.S. Public Opinion on Globalization: Support for Strengthening Various International Institutions

<i>Institution</i>	<i>% Yes, Strengthen</i>	<i>% No, Strengthen</i>	<i>% Not Sure/ Decline</i>
World Trade Organization (WTO)	63	30	7
NATO	61	29	10
The World Bank	49	39	12
The United Nations	77	21	2

Note: Question wording was "Some say that because of the increasing interaction between countries, we need to strengthen international institutions to deal with shared problems. Others say that this would only create bigger, unwieldy bureaucracies. Here are some international institutions. For each one, please tell me if it needs to be strengthened or not." Sample consists of U.S. adults. N= 752. Surveys conducted in June 2002.

Source: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *Worldviews 2002 Report*.

Table 4 U.S. Public Opinion on Globalization: Support for Giving Economic Aid to Other Nations

<i>Year</i>	<i>% Favor</i>	<i>% Oppose</i>	<i>% Not Sure/ Decline</i>
1974	52	38	10
1978	46	41	13
1982	50	39	11
1986	53	36	11
1990	45	45	10
1994	45	45	10
1998	47	45	8
2002	54	38	8

Note: Question wording was "On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations?" Sample consists of U.S. adults. N= 1083. Surveys conducted in June 2002.

Source: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, *Worldviews 2002 Report*.

and 64 percent of Americans support economic aid for promoting democracy abroad.

Conclusion

Americans today in general support globalization. When Americans are probed on specific issues related to globalization, however, public opinion varies greatly

based on the time period, the context, and the issue at hand.

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Government Spending

U.S. taxpayers can be vocal when it comes to government spending. Although many support spending to better schools and roadways, few support spending on both foreign and domestic programs that seemingly cannot be defined. With wage-earners paying the government a substantial portion of income, expectations run high, and when those expectations are not met, respondents tend to let opinion pollsters know about it. Data gathered by the National Election Studies (NES) from 1948 to the present provide an excellent portrait of what Americans have had to say about the allocation of tax dollars.

Democrat Harry Truman defeated Republican Thomas Dewey for president in 1948, and NES data from that election year reveal a strong labor vote for Truman, reflecting the U.S. working class and its collective interest in keeping government spending close to home in the years following World War II. At this time, 84 percent of NES respondents earned between \$500 and \$4,999 annually, with "\$5,000 and over" representing the highest income bracket. With 92 percent of respondents aged 25 or over, memories of the war and the Great Depression seemed very much apparent. In

terms of voting decisions, one in four voted based on the candidate's domestic platform; just 7 percent cast votes based on foreign policy, reflecting widespread interest in keeping natural and financial resources on American soil. This pattern would continue throughout the twentieth century, with domestic spending coming first in the voting booths as well as in public opinion polls.

Republican Dwight Eisenhower defeated Democrat Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election; based on NES data, Eisenhower appeared strongest when it came to maintaining, if not reducing, the role of government. As an example, more than half of respondents said that government involvement in social welfare issues was about right, with an additional 12.8 percent suggesting that the government should do less. It should be noted, however, that while a firm base espousing traditional Republican stances did exist, about one in four respondents also supported the national government passing laws to assist blacks in securing employment, with an additional 15 percent supporting laws at the state level. These numbers are important, for they represent opinion about the respective governments passing laws *only*, as opposed to *doing other things too* (i.e., spending tax dollars to improve the situation). Just 1 percent of respondents supported "doing other things" at the national and state levels, respectively, when it came to helping blacks better their employment situations. Thus, while offering help generated support in the abstract, implying the direct allocation of tax dollars seemed to introduce hesitation. As voting patterns across time demonstrate, voters often support aid in the abstract, but mentioning specific uses of tax dollars seems to bring

those altruistic sentiments back to a much more pragmatic, if not cynical, set of attitudes.

NES respondents in 1956, the year voters elected Eisenhower to a second term, also appeared conservative when it came to fiscal policy. As an example, while more than half of respondents disagreed with a tax cut even "if it meant putting off some important things that need to be done," nearly one in three agreed categorically with cutting taxes. In addition, when the NES asked respondents if they felt government was going too far with cutting taxes, three in five said it was about right, with 36 percent saying it was less than it should be. Although one in two expressed support for providing aid to underdeveloped countries, one in three did not. Again, the nature of survey questions must be considered, specifically, how respondents might agree with spending when broad items appear, but be much less supportive when they can see their own dollars spent on initiatives with which they may not agree. Overall, in 1956, respondents expressed greater support for domestic initiatives, such as the building of schools, than they did for foreign spending.

In 1960, Democrat John F. Kennedy defeated Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon, for the presidency. Kennedy brought to office a northeast liberalism, focusing on civil rights issues in particular. Yet he also had the Cold War and Soviet stockpiles of nuclear weapons with which to contend, which would become evident with the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Cuban missile crisis. NES data from the 1960 election year reveal that Americans continued to support the government allocating funds for domestic initiatives while also expressing support for assisting undeveloped

nations, although not as enthusiastically (i.e., fewer "strongly agrees" but an appreciable number of "agrees" for supportive measures). Although more than one in two strongly agreed with the government subsidizing medical care on the home front, less than one in four strongly agreed with aid to poor countries.

By 1964, with the United States deploying more troops to Southeast Asia in order to combat a perceived domino effect (i.e., the fear of countries tipping to communism), support for aid to foreign countries actually increased, with nearly three in five supporting it. That did not mean, however, that Americans had become apathetic about the use of their tax dollars on the home front. Less than one in 10 NES respondents said "not much" when asked about the amount of tax dollars wasted by the government, while nearly half said "some" and approximately 40 percent said "a lot." Data seem to reveal a skepticism that lingers today with how the government allocates monies it collects from citizens. In addition, televised images of wounded and dead American soldiers in Southeast Asia had not become as ubiquitous as they would by the end of the decade.

In 1968, one of the most volatile years in U.S. social and political history, Lyndon Johnson told the country that he would not accept the Democratic nomination to remain president of the United States. Nixon, who had lost his bid for the White House in 1960, and who had failed to win the California governorship thereafter, reemerged, winning the presidency in 1968 and putting a Republican in the White House for the first time since his old boss, Eisenhower, had occupied the office. With the war in Vietnam escalating, the country hit a deep divide over U.S. involvement. As an example,

nearly one in two NES respondents in 1968 favored aid to foreign countries, but more than 30 percent favored countries “making their own way.” In addition, nearly 60 percent of NES respondents said “not too well” when asked about U.S. diplomatic efforts, and approximately 60 percent also said that government wasted “a lot” of tax dollars—a substantial increase from just four years earlier. Clearly, many Americans questioned the efficacy of their government, and images of fatally wounded American soldiers did not help the cause. Veteran journalists such as Walter Cronkite began to cast doubt on the nation’s mission in Vietnam. In addition, members of the National Guard gunned down several students at a Kent State University demonstration, Robert F. Kennedy became the second Kennedy brother assassinated in the 1960s, and civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. died after being shot in Memphis, Tennessee.

Despite ongoing and seemingly endless domestic turmoil, Nixon won the presidency again in 1972, defeating George McGovern and his running mate, Sargent Shriver. Perhaps reflecting fading American spirit, 70 percent of NES respondents said “a lot” when asked about government waste of tax dollars, with about half of respondents stating that those in government “don’t know what they’re doing.” More than half of the 1972 respondents disagreed with statements suggesting that America should provide aid to countries with different social and political systems. Thus, the support Americans once expressed for furthering the cause of democracy around the world seems to have faded into widespread cynicism about the country’s capacity to effect international change. Vietnam had soured the American spirit, and not long

after Saigon fell and U.S. troops withdrew, several men associated with Nixon were caught breaking into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate complex in Washington, D.C. As history shows, Gerald Ford ultimately pardoned Nixon after Nixon had resigned the presidency, but Americans apparently were ready for an ideological change. In 1976, a little-known peanut farmer-turned-governor from Georgia defeated Ford, in part because of the pardon but largely because of a serious petroleum crisis in the United States.

Jimmy Carter became president with more than three of every four Americans (generalizing from the NES) suggesting that the government wasted “a lot” of tax dollars. As a consequence, one might expect to find minimal support for social programs at that time. With respect to government assistance with medical costs, one in four strongly favored government insurance, but the same number also had strong feelings about individuals getting their own medical insurance through private agencies. On the whole, people seemed to recognize the importance of some government spending practices, as three in four disagreed with a statement suggesting government should spend less even if cuts meant scaling back health and education spending. Consistent with spending attitudes throughout the second half of the twentieth century, many people looked to government to use their tax dollars wisely by maintaining programs with a direct impact on their lives. With respect to providing aid to countries with different ideals than the United States, about half said they did not favor such aid, reflecting continued cynicism in the wake of Vietnam, a war that led to 50,000 American deaths and 2–2.5 million Vietnamese deaths.

As Carter occupied the presidency, gasoline prices skyrocketed while millions saw TV images of blindfolded Americans being held hostage in Iran. Apparently, American voters saw Carter's failed attempt to rescue the hostages as indicative of the administration on the whole, and in 1980 former California governor Ronald Reagan, a staunch Republican, defeated Carter while vowing to make sure that the United States had the strongest military in the world. Public opinion clearly supported Reagan's defense initiatives, with the number of 1980 NES respondents increasing as a survey scale moved from support for greatly decreasing defense spending to greatly increasing it. Americans, it seems, had seen enough of perceived weaknesses in the military, and they made that clear in the polls. They also had seen enough of perceived wastes in tax spending, with 80 percent falling in the aforementioned "a lot" category. Carter, admired for his humanitarian ideals, did not inspire confidence among the people; Reagan, with the assistance of a veteran staff, seemed to build confidence as he came to symbolize U.S. strength abroad and effectiveness at home. Perhaps this is why, in 1984, he was reelected. Reagan defeated Walter Mondale in that election and continued to espouse the benefits of minimal government in the lives of citizens—and to try to improve public opinion on tax spending, as 1984 NES data reveal that more than six in 10 said the government wasted "a lot" of tax dollars. So while some appeared a bit more optimistic four years after Reagan first took office, more than half continued to have little faith in how the government spent tax dollars.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the NES asked respondents whether govern-

ment should provide fewer or more services for Americans, and in each study respondents expressed support for existing services but few more. This may have reflected the Republican hands-off leadership, or it may have been the product of a middle class generally satisfied with social and economic conditions. In examining 1984 respondent attitudes toward a series of spending issues—defense, the environment, crime, public schools, Social Security, food stamps, Medicare, unemployment, and science—one finds support for spending amounts already in place and, in some instances, increases in spending. One issue that did not reflect this pattern, however, was food stamps. Here, approximately one in three respondents called for decreases in food stamp spending, again reflecting widespread opinion that one could earn a living in the United States if he or she was willing to work for it. Spending numbers, in short, continued to reflect an expectation of return on tax dollars, with very little support for foreign spending.

In 1988, George H. W. Bush, Reagan's vice president, went to work as the nation's chief executive, defeating Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis. Not surprisingly, the Bush economic philosophy picked up where the Reagan philosophy left off, despite the fact that more than six in 10 NES respondents continued to say that government wastes "a lot" of tax dollars. The public expressed support for existing allocations, such as funding for the maintenance of highways and schools, and like respondents from 1984 they supported increases for initiatives with a direct impact on their lives. As an example, the NES asked about attitudes regarding the domestic issues mentioned above and also inquired about providing aid to the Contras in Nicaragua and to

college students in the states. One in two respondents called for decreases in funding Contras, with just one in 10 calling for increases. But when it came to domestic issues, three in four called for more spending on the fight against AIDS, and the same number supported increases in funding for elderly care. More than two in three supported increased funding for the homeless, and three in four supported funding increases for the war on drugs. Respondents appeared a bit less enthused about funding college students and assisting the unemployed—not to be confused with the homeless—but the numbers still revealed support. Again, working Americans tended to support programs with benefits having a direct impact, meaning that support for foreign spending initiatives largely paled in comparison with domestic proposals.

Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas defeated Bush in 1992; the economy had slumped, leaving Bush vulnerable on the domestic front. Additionally, Texas businessman Ross Perot entered the race and ultimately helped Clinton get elected with less than 50 percent of the vote. Still, Clinton brought to office plans to improve the economy, and his communication skills led people to listen. NES respondents expressed support for increased funding on many programs, such as those mentioned earlier, but just 4.1 percent favored increases in foreign aid; that compares to 64.5 percent calling for decreases in foreign spending. In addition, respondents offered little support for funding increases pertaining to food stamps and less still for space research. Finally, seven of 10 said government wasted “a lot” of tax dollars.

With Americans expressing little faith in government spending, Clinton faced many challenges during his first four

years in office, and he confronted enough of them successfully to win reelection in 1996, defeating Senator Robert Dole. Support for foreign aid again hit bottom relative to support for domestic spending, as just 5.2 percent of respondents in 1996 supported increases, while 57.6 percent called for decreases. Consistent with previous NES data, nearly one in two respondents called for decreases in food stamp spending, with more than one in two supporting decreases in welfare spending. In terms of spending increases, 65 percent expressed support for more immigration patrol, and more than one in two supported increases in college loans. One draws the impression from 1996 NES data that while Americans supported education and training for employment, they were quite protective of their jobs once they had secured them. Also, Americans clearly expected fellow citizens to put forth effort in securing and maintaining employment, as terms like “handouts” had become common in political debate.

Many termed the 2000 election year “Selection 2000,” as George W. Bush took office after losing the popular vote but apparently winning among members of the U.S. Supreme Court. Florida voting procedures proved disastrous in one of the closest presidential elections in history and, as an aside, failed again in the 2002 midterm elections. Consistent with earlier studies, about six in 10 NES respondents said that government wasted “a lot” of tax dollars. Again, respondents appeared to be the most cynical about foreign aid and immigration, as well as spending on food stamps and welfare. Respondents appeared most supportive when it came to funding for public schools, Social Security, dealing with crime, and child care, again reflecting the

aforementioned interest in seeing specific taxpayer benefits.

In considering public opinion and government spending, then, several conclusions can be drawn. First, Americans are suspicious about the spending of their tax dollars, and their suspicions lead them to support spending on programs that directly impact their lives and to question spending on programs that appear nebulous. Given the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, taxpayers almost certainly will continue to have suspicions about government spending on foreign initiatives. Understandably, many reacted emotionally to the terrorist acts by metaphorically, if not literally, throwing their hands in the air and saying, "That's it—no more!" September 11 brought many Americans closer together, and the collective attitude has been to allocate monies necessary to fight terrorism and preserve American ideals. In all likelihood, support for foreign spending independent of fighting terror will continue to drop and calls for domestic spending (e.g., homeland security) will increase.

Conclusion

As with all survey research, question wording affects the answers that respondents provide. Over the years, the National Election Studies have conducted many pilot analyses to study and improve the questions asked, such that reliability is as high as possible in this form of social research. When it comes to attitudes about government spending, NES investigations demonstrate that when issues are explained in the abstract, respondents tend to support allocations of funds, as doing so seems like the right thing to do. When issues are explained in greater detail, such that the pros and cons of spending plans emerge, support dwin-

dles as pragmatic concerns come to light. Thus, while respondents tend to favor spending that has a direct, observable impact on their daily lives, they tend to frown upon the allocation of resources toward programs that seemingly cannot be measured for effectiveness and relevance to the specific needs of most Americans. This means support for domestic spending remains consistently high, while the opposite tends to hold true for the spending of tax dollars on foreign interests.

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Health Care

According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Americans spent \$1.3 trillion, or 13.2 percent of the gross domestic product, on health care in 2000. Since the mid-1960s, health care costs have increased at double-digit levels, far exceeding the rate of inflation. In response to these cost increases and his desire to make medical coverage more widely available, President Bill Clinton tried to overhaul the nation's health care system in 1993 and 1994. Ultimately, he did not succeed. Over the next ten years, however, employers controlled health care costs by requiring their workers to join managed-care programs, such as health maintenance organizations. Today, more than 100 million Americans are covered by managed care.

It still is not clear whether managed-care procedures will contain costs over the long run. The underlying factors that drove up health care costs in the 1980s are still in place: increasing life ex-

pectancy for both men and women and the explosion of new (and expensive) medical treatments. Although some citizens are content with their coverage, millions of uninsured Americans desperately desire coverage, and millions more who have coverage are worried about the quality of their medical care in the future. This entry takes a broad look at public opinion on health care, with a special emphasis on spending preferences, satisfaction with the current system, levels of confidence, and views on potential reform options.

Health Care Spending

Since the mid-1980s, the General Social Survey (GSS) has asked respondents if “we are spending too much, too little or

about the right amount on improving and protecting the nation’s health.” As Figure 1 illustrates, a majority of the public consistently has said that we are spending “too little.”

One of the most striking patterns is the increasing gap between those saying we are spending “too little” and those saying “the right amount.” The difference between the two was 23 percent in 1983; by 2000, the gap had more than doubled, to 49 percent. The percentage saying that we are spending “too much,” by contrast, has remained below 10 percent since 1983 and has averaged around 5 percent over the entire series.

GSS data from the mid-1990s indicate that women are more likely to state that we are spending “too little” than men. In




Figure 1 Public Opinion on Health Care Spending

Note: The question was “In your opinion, are we spending too much, too little or about the right amount on improving and protecting the nation’s health?”

Source: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, General Social Survey.

addition, individuals in the highest income bracket (\$75,000 and over) are less likely than individuals in all other income categories to say we are spending too little. Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, people under the age of 50 are more likely to say we are spending too little than those over 50. In general, though, support for increased spending on health care transcends most individual-level differences.

Despite the almost universal preference for higher levels of spending, public opinion polls conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* and Gallup in 1990 and 1991 show that the public is unwilling to endure higher taxes to expand health insurance coverage for all Americans. The *Times* poll reports that 46 percent of the public are willing to pay an additional \$200 in taxes to expand coverage. Gallup puts that figure at 40 percent. One bright spot, according to political scientists Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, is that the percentage responding “don’t know” to these questions is unusually high (33–47 percent). They find that the public’s level of uncertainty drops when it is informed of the added benefits that a tax increase might bring. More important, Americans are more likely to accept small increases in their taxes to receive those benefits (Jacobs and Shapiro 1994).

Health Care Satisfaction

Americans are satisfied with the health care they personally receive. This view, along with a clear sense of public apprehension over health care coverage in the future, emerges in a series of surveys conducted from 1998 to 2002 called the Health Confidence Surveys (HCS). These surveys were sponsored by the Employee Benefit Research Institute, the Consumer Health Education Council, and Mathew Greenwald and Associates, Inc. Accord-

ing to the HCS data presented in Figure 2, more than half (53–57 percent) of the respondents who received medical care in the past two years were extremely or very satisfied with the quality of the medical care. Also in these surveys, a majority (53–57 percent) in each of the five years covered by the HCS is extremely or very satisfied with the ability to choose doctors. Satisfaction with health care tends to increase with age and household income (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2002).

Although most are satisfied personally, Americans are unhappy about the overall state of the health care system in the United States. Jacobs and Shapiro (1994) identified a tendency for Americans to be satisfied with the care they and their family receive but to be unhappy with the quality of care that others receive. These patterns are clearly seen in the HCS surveys. In a question that asks, “How would you rate the health care system in America today?” the proportion of Americans giving the health care system a poor rating increased from 15 percent in 1998 to 24 percent in 2002. Large percentages of the public rate the health care system as only “fair” (30–34 percent from 1998 to 2002), and a similar proportion thinks it is “good” (29–33 percent). From 1998 to 2002, the HCS surveys show that only 3–4 percent of Americans rated the overall health care system as “excellent” and only about one-tenth thought it was “very good” (10–13 percent).

About one-fifth of Americans identify health care as a critical issue for the nation to address. In 1998, 14 percent named it as the most critical issue in the HCS survey. By 2002, almost one in five (19 percent) identified it as the critical issue, ranking it below terrorism and national security (29 percent) and about

equal to education (18 percent). Health care ranks ahead of the economy (13 percent), Social Security (8 percent), taxes (7 percent), and the budget deficit (2 percent) as the most critical issue (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2002). The HCS surveys also show that more women and individuals over age 45 rank health care as a critical issue than do men and those under age 45. Salience of the health care issue differs according to income; HCS data show that those with household incomes of less than \$35,000 are more likely to identify health care as the most critical issue in America.

Dissatisfaction with health care overall is not confined to America. According to Humphrey Taylor (1999), the chairman of Louis Harris and Associates, a survey his firm conducted for the Harvard School of Public Health and the Commonwealth Fund found that large majorities of the

public in five English-speaking countries—Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States—are unhappy with their health care systems. In the spring of 1998, no more than one-quarter of those polled believed that their health care systems were working “pretty well and that only minor changes were necessary.” Most thought “fundamental changes” were needed or that policymakers should “completely rebuild the system” (Taylor 1999). According to Taylor, these trends have become worse since the early 1990s and are true of many countries in the non-English-speaking world as well.

Confidence in Health Care

Confidence in many aspects of health care diminishes as Americans look toward the future. Data from the 2002 Health Confidence Survey by the Employee Benefit




Figure 2 Satisfaction with Quality of Medical Care Received among Those Receiving Care in Past Two Years

Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute, Consumer Health Education Council, and Mathew Greenwald & Associates, Inc., 1998–2002 Health Confidence Surveys.

Research Institute and the Consumer Health Education Council in Figure 3 show this nervousness. Although more than half (55 percent) of Americans are “extremely” or “very confident” that they are able to get the treatments they need in 2002, only one-third (34 percent) express the same level of confidence about 10 years in the future (or until they are on Medicare). The extended outlook is even worse. Only one-fifth (21 percent) are “very confident” they will get the treatments they need while on Medicare. The same pattern of diminishing confidence appears in the rest of Figure 3. As Americans are asked to look into the future, they are not confident that they

will have enough choice in who provides their care, that they will be able to afford prescription drugs without financial hardship, and that they will be able to afford health care without financial hardship.

It is also the case that women and older respondents are more concerned about the future of the health care system than are men and younger respondents. According to the 2002 Health Confidence Survey, women are more likely than men to be “not too” or “not at all” confident that they will be able to afford prescription drugs without financial hardship (52 percent versus 37 percent), that they will be able to afford health care without hardship (51 percent versus




Figure 3 Respondents Who Are Extremely or Very Confident in Certain Aspects of Health Care

Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute, Consumer Health Education Council, and Mathew Greenwald & Associates, Inc., 2002 Health Confidence Survey.

Table 1 Confidence in Ability to Purchase Health Insurance with at Least Same Amount of Benefits as Currently, by Age

	<i>Age Group</i>			
	<i>Under 35</i>	<i>35 to 44</i>	<i>45 to 54</i>	<i>55 and Up</i>
Extremely Confident	11%	13%	13%	4%
Very Confident	22	12	17	18
Somewhat Confident	34	38	3130	
Not Too/Not at All Confident	30	35	37	45
Don't Know/Refused	2	1	2	2

Source: Employee Benefit Research Institute, Consumer Health Education Council, and Mathew Greenwald & Associates, Inc., 2002 Health Confidence Survey.

37 percent), and that they will be able to get the treatments they need (41 percent versus 26 percent). Women are more likely than men to say they are not confident in their ability to purchase insurance with at least the same level of benefits as they currently have. Table 1 shows that older respondents are more likely than younger respondents to report they are “not too” or “not at all confident” they will be able to purchase health insurance with at least the same level of benefits that they currently enjoy.

Confidence also tends to decrease as education or household income increases. For example, in the HCS surveys, 30 percent of those with a high school education or less are not confident they will be able to purchase an equal level of benefits, compared with 35 percent of those with some college and 44 percent of college graduates. As many might suspect, confidence in health care varies by health status. Those who describe their health as “fair” or “poor” are more likely than those who describe it as “excellent,” “very good,” or “good” to say they are “not too” or “not at all” confident in being able to afford future health care. For

example, a majority (55 percent) of those in “fair” or “poor” health are not confident of being able to afford health care once they are eligible for Medicare, compared with roughly 42 of those in “excellent” or “very good” health and 43 percent of those in “good” health. There are similar trends in the HCS surveys for fair or poor health status and diminished confidence in the choice of who provides medical care and the ability to get treatments during the next ten years. However, when it comes to rating their ability to purchase health care coverage with at least the same benefits as they currently have, those who are in fair or poor health are nearly equally likely as those in excellent or very good health to report they are extremely or very confident (32 percent versus 29 percent).

Health Care Reform

Public preferences will likely influence health care reforms in the United States. Overall, Americans support government intervention. Since 1975, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has asked a question about whether citizens think the federal

government should “help in paying for doctors and hospital bills . . .” or whether “people should take care of these things themselves.” Most favor government responsibility over individual responsibility. The stability of this trend can be seen in Figure 4. Across Democratic and Republican presidential administrations, shifting party control of Congress, and the mood of the nation in general, almost 50 percent of Americans think that the government should assume responsibility for health care.

When asked whether they would prefer to get their health insurance through an

employer, from the government, or directly from an insurance company, three-fourths of the respondents in the 2002 Health Confidence Survey indicate they are reluctant to deal directly with insurance companies. Almost half say they would prefer a system where they get insurance through an employer (48 percent), and one-quarter (25 percent) would prefer to get it from the government. Roughly one in five Americans would prefer to get care from an insurance company. Respondents aged 65 and older are more likely than younger respondents to prefer a government-based




Figure 4 Support for Government Intervention on Health Care

Note: The question wording was “In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you put yourself on this scale or haven’t you made up your mind about this?”

Source: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, General Social Survey.

system; younger respondents prefer an employment-based system. Government-based systems also are popular among those with a high school education or less and those with a household income of \$35,000 or less (Employee Benefit Research Institute 2002).

Americans have strong preferences about particular health care reforms. According to a survey conducted by National Public Radio (NPR), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government in the spring of 2002, two-thirds (67 percent) think the Medicare program should be expanded to pay for prescription drugs, while one-quarter (26 percent) think the government should help seniors buy private health insurance to cover drug costs. This same poll showed that large majorities favor options to guarantee health care for more Americans, including expanding state government programs for low-income people (84 percent), expanding neighborhood health clinics (80 percent), requiring businesses to offer insurance to employees (76 percent), and offering tax credits or other financial assistance to help the uninsured purchase insurance on their own (73 percent). The only option asked about in the NPR/Kaiser/Harvard survey that was not favored by a majority is a national, single-payer health plan (favored by 40 percent).

On nearly all publicly available polls in the 1990s and early 2000s, Democrats have a double-digit advantage over Republicans on the question of which party would do a better job of handling health care. Such disparities also are seen in candidate evaluations leading up to the last three presidential elections. In 1992, polls conducted by most major media

organizations reported that Democratic candidate Bill Clinton was seen as the person who would do the best job dealing with health care. According to an NBC News/*Wall Street Journal* poll of registered voters, 52 percent preferred Bill Clinton on health care over the incumbent, President George H. W. Bush (at 19 percent), and Independent Party candidate H. Ross Perot (at 10 percent). In 1996, a survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates of likely voters just before Bill Clinton was reelected found that 60 percent said Clinton would do a better job on health care if elected over his opponent, Robert Dole (35 percent). In late October 2000, before the presidential election, a survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates showed that 47 percent said the Democratic nominee, Vice President Al Gore, would "do the best job of improving the health care system," whereas 38 percent said the Republican, Governor George W. Bush of Texas, would do a better job.

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Ideology

Since the early twentieth century at least, students of public opinion and U.S. government have understood that how citizens think about politics and what citizens can understand about politics shape many of the possibilities with regard to democratic self-governance (Key 1961; Lippman 1997). This begs the question of the abstract structures, if any, that exist in the American mind with regard to politics, as well as the result, if any, of the ideological attitudes that exist in the minds of the American public.

Ideology as an Abstraction of Political Ideas

An *ideology* is an abstract, consistent system of opinions based on some set of core values. Many ideological systems of belief exist in the world, ranging from authoritarian and autocratic systems (communism, fascism) to the American system. Although there are some individuals in the United States who espouse extremist views that come from systems like communism and fascism, they are most definitely the exception and not the rule.

Malcolm Hamilton (1987), in an attempt to integrate the diverse understandings of the concept, defined ideology as "a system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realize, pursue, or maintain." Many others have attempted to summarize just what an ideology actually is, including one influential study of political and ideological thinking (Lane 1962), which pays careful attention to the disjunctions between the state and current society. Similarly, another study of political reasoning stated that ideology is a subjectively constructed "way of defining and making sense of specific people, issues, and events" (Rosenberg 1988, p. 59). Importantly, in each of these definitions, the ideological aspects of political thinking involve the comparison between the way things are and the way things ought to be, usually with regard to the role of the government in the lives of the governed (Gerring 1997). Also important, at least with regard to self-governance, is the question of how ideology is used as a means of organizing political attitudes (Jacoby 1986, 1989, 1991). In this line of thought, ideology is viewed as the source of the substantive content of the overarching "capping abstractions" that characterize an ideological belief system (Converse 1964). This is especially the case regarding ideas about how society should be organized that provide the core values that structure personal orientations about policy issues, political candidates, and general orientations toward government (Feldman 1988).

What Does the "Left" and the "Right" Stand for in the United States?

In discussing the ideological placement of most citizens, scholars often attempt to place individuals somewhere on an ideological scale, somewhere between the terms *conservative* and *liberal*. These terms have become so well established in the lexicon that even relatively unsophisticated voters can make use of such labels in forming partisan or candidate preferences, even if their conceptualizations of these terms are not characterized by consistent policy positions (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Conover and Feldman 1981; Jacoby 1986, 1995). "Virtually all political stimuli (candidates, parties, issue stands, etc.) can be described in ideological terms" (Jacoby 1991, p. 202). These terms, therefore, "have served for the last century as the fundamental yardsticks for measuring political life" and "political life is incomprehensible without some sense of its central continuum" (Neuman 1986, p. 18).

This single dimension of ideology is meant to reflect a summary measure that attempts to capture not just attitudes toward the fundamental role of government in society but also the dimensions of most political issues in political discourse. A *liberal*, who is said to be on the "left," favors activist government and has a progressive vision of the state's role with regard to economic redistribution of resources through necessarily higher taxes, especially for the wealthy, and believes in the importance of the rights of individuals and groups. Liberals generally believe in a large and free private sector that is generously defined, defended, and promoted by the public sector—in other words, a balance between the primacy of individual and group behavior.

The ideal or complete *conservative* is said to be on the "right," tends to oppose an activist government role on economic issues, usually favors marginally lower and even equal taxes, believes in the importance of individual responsibility and the family structure, and believes that it is the responsibility of individuals within each family to do as much as they can for themselves before asking for assistance. When assistance is needed, the progressive route is sometimes taken; however, conservatives would prefer that local or state governments provide that assistance, with the federal government perceived as the avenue of last resort. Simply put, a pure conservative believes in the least government possible at all levels.

Although these ideological terms describe ideals and are used in public opinion to describe political attitudes as well as popular and elite discourse, it could be argued that they do not capture all of the complexity in public opinion. The argument has been made that other dimensions exist inside this single ideological dimension where individuals can have varying and even conflicting opinions on the role of government in various parts of society (e.g., social, economic, even "moral"). For example, *populists* are defined as individuals who share with conservatives a concern for traditional values but, like liberals, they favor an active role for government in providing economic security. In contrast, *libertarians* are opposed to government intervention in both the economic and social spheres. That Americans can have conflicting views on the role of government in various aspects, or on the various issues, of a society is just another difficulty that citizens experience when attempting to use and understand terms

like *conservative* and *liberal* efficiently and accurately.

The Liberal-Conservative Dimension in the United States

When scholars of public opinion attempt to measure the ideological distribution of the United States, they usually consider the common liberal-conservative dimension as the best measure of ideological preference. To measure this concept, the National Election Studies (NES), known to public opinion scholars as the survey of record, simply asks individuals to place themselves on a 7-point scale, ranging from extremely liberal to moderate to extremely conservative (see Table 1).

Figure 1 presents the breakdown of ideological identification for the year 2000. From looking at the results, we can see that self-identified conservatives outnumber liberals by a sizeable margin, though most of that margin comes from individuals who do not express the most extreme of ideological viewpoints.

However, perhaps the most striking characteristics of the ideological distribution of the United States are the large number of individuals proclaiming themselves moderates (23 percent) and the even slightly larger contingent of individuals who claim not to have thought about or do not know about such things (27 percent). This might be interpreted to mean that half of the U.S. populace does not espouse a necessarily ideological

viewpoint. Conversely, around three-quarters of Americans can and do place themselves somewhere on the ideological scale. Even though nearly one-quarter of all Americans place themselves in the moderate category, another half of the population place themselves ideologically toward the extremes.

Has it always been this way in American politics? Table 2 and Figure 2 present ideological identifications over time for those who were able to place themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum. NES data from 1972–2000 place those respondents identifying at all with either ideological group together and separate them only from the moderates. A striking element is that the ideological distribution of the polity has remained consistent over time, with conservatives outnumbering liberals. Another visible trend is that conservatives gained ground off and on from 1980 to 1994. That trend has ameliorated somewhat from 1996 onward; however, the number of conservatives outnumbers liberals to this day by a sizeable margin.

Of the people who are able to place themselves on this dimension of ideology, what do we know about them demographically? Table 3 shows the breakdown of ideological identification for various subgroups for selected years in the period 1972–2000, which is illustrative of many of the demographic tendencies that exist with regard to ideological identification.

Table 1 Range of U.S. Political Ideologies

Left		Moderate			Right	
Extremely Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Extremely Conservative




Figure 1 Ideological Self-Identification in the U.S. Electorate, 2000

Although slight fluctuations exist over the period, the demographic patterns remain stable. Because of this, we can say with some certainty that those who are wealthier, male, older, live in rural areas, are of Caucasian decent, and are religiously fundamentalist tend to be more conservative than liberal. Those who are of lower socioeconomic status, female, younger, live in urban areas, are of minority descent, and religiously secular or not affiliated with a religion at all tend to be more liberal than conservative.

The most consistent differences across the various demographic groups include racial (blacks tend to be more liberal than whites) and age (older individuals tend to be more conservative). Differences also exist with regard to tendency toward an ideological identification: namely, the more educated an individual is, the more likely she is to be ideologically conservative or liberal. Political activists also tend to be more extreme and have become even more ideologically distinct over time (e.g., Saunders and Abramowitz 2001).

Table 2 Percentage Self-Identifying along Range of Political Ideologies, 1972–2000

	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Extremely Liberal	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	2
Liberal	7	11	7	8	6	6	7	6	6	7	8	6	7	7	9
Slightly Liberal	10	8	8	10	9	8	9	11	9	8	10	7	10	9	9
Moderate	27	26	25	27	20	22	23	28	22	24	23	26	24	28	23
Slightly Conservative	15	12	12	14	13	13	14	15	15	14	15	14	15	15	12
Conservative	10	12	11	11	13	12	13	13	14	10	13	19	15	13	15
Extremely Conservative	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	2	3
Do Not Know/ 28 Have Not Considered	27	33	27	36	36	30	25	30	33	27	24	25	23	27	
With Don't Knows excluded completely	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Liberal	25%	29%	24%	27%	27%	23%	26%	24%	24%	24%	27%	18%	24%	23%	27%
Moderate	38%	36%	37%	37%	31%	34%	33%	37%	31%	36%	32%	34%	32%	36%	32%
Conservative	36%	36%	37%	37%	44%	42%	41%	40%	46%	39%	42%	47%	44%	39%	41%
With Don't Knows in moderate	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Liberal	18	21	16	20	17	15	18	18	17	16	20	14	18	18	20
Moderate	55	53	58	54	56	58	53	53	52	57	50	50	49	51	50
Conservative	26	26	25	27	28	27	29	30	32	26	31	36	33	30	30
Democrats	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Liberals	71	72	75	74	77	80	73	74	73	75	76	83	84	80	79
Moderates	53	53	51	57	57	62	52	52	49	53	50	54	58	55	52
Conservatives	34	33	31	33	33	33	25	31	27	34	28	21	25	28	26
Republicans	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Liberals	20	13	16	13	15	12	20	18	19	20	14	12	11	14	14
Moderates	34	30	30	26	28	27	33	33	36	38	36	34	30	29	34
Conservatives	56	53	60	56	57	58	68	59	66	59	65	70	70	67	67
Independents	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Liberals	10	14	10	12	9	7	7	6	7	4	9	5	4	5	7
Moderates	12	15	19	15	13	9	13	13	13	9	15	12	12	14	14
Conservatives	10	14	9	10	9	9	7	10	6	7	7	8	5	5	8




Figure 2 Ideological Self-Identification in the U.S. Electorate, 1972–2000

Source: 1972–2000 National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

The Capacity for Ideological Abstraction

The definition of ideology includes a coherent worldview in the attitudes of an individual. The coherent viewpoint assumes that each issue in the political universe has an ideological (conservative or liberal) viewpoint or understanding of the political world. This means a person who thinks ideologically, or what public opinion scholars call an *ideologue*.

This person, if she is truly ideologically driven, should be consistent in her beliefs on many of the issues that come into play with whatever ideological identification she espouses. A true conserva-

tive ideology would amount to an amalgamation of every conservative issue stance that can be taken on the universe of issues. This individual’s ideologically driven attitude structure is then activated in the formation or use of other political attitudes as well as resulting behaviors, such as voting; this is *ideological constraint*.

Mass Belief Systems: Nonattitudes and Levels of Political Conceptualization

This evidence was derived from a renowned study of the “nature of mass belief systems” (Converse 1964), which found strong evidence to suggest that

Table 3 Ideological Identification by Demographic Characteristics, 1972–2000

% of Group:	1972			1980			1988			1994			2000		
	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Cons</i>	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Cons</i>	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Cons</i>	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Cons</i>	<i>Lib</i>	<i>Mod</i>	<i>Cons</i>
<i>Gender</i>															
Males	26	36	38	26	26	48	25	27	48	16	30	54	21	32	47
Females	25	39	36	25	35	40	22	35	43	22	38	40	32	32	36
<i>Race</i>															
Whites	23	38	39	24	30	45	20	31	49	19	31	50	26	31	43
Blacks	54	32	14	39	31	31	33	34	33	27	48	25	30	41	28
<i>Education</i>															
Grade Sch./Some High Sch.	22	46	32	22	36	42	28	35	37	6	38	55	**	**	**
High School Diploma	19	44	37	20	38	43	23	36	41	14	43	43	21	36	43
Some College, No Degree	33	32	35	30	25	44	21	30	49	21	33	46	31	31	39
College Degree/Postgrad	40	19	41	31	21	48	26	24	50	27	19	54	28	28	44
<i>Income</i>															
Income 0–16 Percentile	32	37	32	29	35	37	33	28	39	19	45	35	22	38	40
Income 17–33 Percentile	30	39	31	25	35	40	25	37	38	27	42	31	32	31	37
Income 34–67 Percentile	24	39	37	26	32	41	22	33	44	19	32	49	27	24	49
Income 68–95 Percentile	24	37	38	25	24	51	22	29	49	16	29	54	28	35	37
Income 96–100 Percentile	25	31	44	20	26	54	**	**	**	28	17	55	**	**	**
<i>Region</i>															
South	23	35	42	21	33	46	20	32	47	18	34	49	24	32	44
Nonsouth	27	38	35	28	29	43	24	31	45	20	35	46	28	31	41
<i>Age Cohort</i>															
Born 1975 or later	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	**	15	43	43	48	40	12
Born 1959–1974	**	**	**	31	28	40	31	31	38	24	32	44	24	31	45
Born 1943–1958	38	35	27	29	29	42	24	28	47	22	31	47	26	28	46
Born 1927–1942	22	38	39	25	25	49	19	34	47	11	35	53	21	30	49
Born 1911–1926	18	40	43	18	38	43	19	34	47	13	42	45	23	35	42
Born 1895–1910	19	38	44	18	35	47	17	33	49	**	**	**	**	**	**

** Indicates question not asked or too few cases (< 50) within group to generalize with certainty.

Source: National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

much of the population held “nonattitudes” on political issues, giving responses that have little or no relationship to other expressed issue opinions or to the answers to the same questions at a different time (see also Free and Cantril 1967). According to Philip Converse, the typical voter possessed low levels of information about public affairs, did not exhibit meaningful beliefs on policy issues, and voted more on the bases of social characteristics and party identification, both politically socialized attitudes (usually from parents or peers) that are not necessarily individually oriented or developed (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1968, 1974; Beck and Jennings 1975) than

because of any well-reasoned ideological consideration of parties and candidates.

Closely related is the presence of sophistication necessary to think in such an abstraction. In a pioneering study of political attitudes and electoral behavior (Campbell et al. 1960) researchers attempted to measure the ideological thinking at the individual level, or what they called an individual’s “level of conceptualization” about politics (see Figure 3). To do this, they analyzed how individuals thought about politics, identifying five levels of conceptualization that individuals could fit into: (1) ideologues, (2) near-ideologues, (3) group benefits, (4) “nature of the times,” and (5) no issue content.




Figure 3 Levels of Ideological Conceptualization in the United States, 1956–1988

Source: National Election Studies 1956–1988, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan.

These levels were constructed based upon the quality of the reasoning of individuals in response to discussions of the political discourse of the day. Ideologues and near-ideologues (usually grouped together as "ideologues" in the literature) were defined as individuals constrained by ideology in their thinking and understanding of politics.

The most important conclusion reached was that around 13 percent of the total respondents could be placed in the highest levels of ideological constraint (ideologue and near-ideologue). The judgment they made about the levels other than the "ideologues" was that more than 80 percent of the electorate lacked any reasoning on the part of an individual in ideological terms; therefore those individuals were considered to be of lower ideological sophistication and constraint. This, tied together with the later research of Converse and others that continued to demonstrate the consistently low levels of ideological usage and constraint in the U.S. public, painted a picture of an unsophisticated electorate lacking political understanding as well as the ability to understand and use ideology as an abstraction.

ANES stopped collecting data on the political conceptualization variable in 1988 for many reasons. However, one of the strongest reasons was that the belief-systems literature could not refute alternative explanations or structures of political attitudes (Just, Crigler, and Neuman 1998; Lane 1962; Neuman 1986; Rosenberg 1988) or the existence of other political schemas that individuals use to organize their political cognition (Kuklinski, Luskin, and Bolland 1991). Others (Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) went on to argue that political

sophistication does not necessarily take place in the abstract world; instead, it occurs because certain individuals pay more attention or have better knowledge of and better understand the political world than others. Individuals often learn this knowledge at the single-issue level, where information is more understandable and available, not necessarily at an abstract or programmatic level. Political sophistication based on political knowledge of officeholders or about politics in general has gone a long way in replacing the level of political conceptualization as the area of interest and exploration in attitudinal research.

Does Ideology Matter?

Even though much evidence exists regarding a negative case for the use of ideology as an abstract belief system, some evidence exists that contradicts that line of thought. For example, with regard to ideological consistency and constraint, many have challenged Converse's notion that a vast majority of the public has nonattitudes on various issues (Judd and Milburn 1980; Judd, Krosnick, and Milburn 1981; Nie and Andersen 1993; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). Also, a comprehensive review of the public opinion literature (Kinder and Sears 1985) concluded that although there is considerable evidence of fuzzy thinking on the part of many citizens about political issues, there are times and issues when nonattitudes disappear completely. For example, in the mid-1970s virtually everyone expressed a stable and consistent opinion on busing, equal rights for women, and abortion (Kinder and Rhodebeck 1982). "Whether Americans shrug or become impassioned when confronted with policy alternatives has therefore much to do

with the nature [and perhaps the political timing] of the policy itself" (Kinder and Sears 1985, p. 668).

The question then becomes, for the people who think about the political world in ideological terms, does it mean anything when they do? Other research has shown that once an individual organizes her belief system along ideological lines, the liberal-conservative dimension exerts a clear, pervasive effect on subsequent political attitudes and behavior. Ideological identification has been shown to influence candidate evaluations (Levitin and Miller 1979; Jacoby 1986), propensity to vote as well as voting choice (Jackson 1975; Knight 1983), issue attitudes (Jacoby 1991), political participation (Jacoby 1989; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979), and political perceptions. Partisan identification, the best predictor of voting behavior, has also been shown to be an importance source of policy orientations (Jacoby 1986; Markus and Converse 1979). More recent research has

shown that the more clearly ideologically polarized partisan environment of the 1980s and 1990s (Rohde 1991) has led to a clearer linkage between issue positions and partisan orientations (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998), especially in the South (see Table 4).

These findings, however, do not necessarily signal the actual presence of ideology in citizens' belief systems. Similar kinds of effects could arise, even if people employ liberal-conservative terminology in nonideological ways (Levitin and Miller 1979; Jacoby 1986, 1995). Ideological identifications could also be serving as symbolic tendencies (Sears et al. 1980), group identifications (Conover and Feldman 1981), or cognitive schemas (Jacoby 1991). These may be completely different psychological animals than an ideological identification that constrains behavior in and of itself. Put simply, there seems to be no clear consensus on exactly what kind of political and/or psychological characteristic is represented

Table 4 Cross-Tabulation of Party Identification by Ideology in 1972 and 2000

1972	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Overall Partisan Distribution</i>
Democrats (including leaners)	71%	53%	34%	54%
Independents	10%	12%	10%	14%
Republicans (including leaners)	20%	34%	56%	34%
Overall Ideological Distribution	25%	38%	36%	
2000	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Overall Partisan Distribution</i>
Democrats (including leaners)	79%	52%	26%	50%
Independents	7%	14%	8%	12%
Republicans (including leaners)	14%	34%	67%	37%
Overall Ideological Distribution	27%	32%	41%	

by ideological identification (Jacoby 1995).

Conclusion

As an abstraction, ideology is a unique attitudinal structure; in public opinion, however, ideology resides somewhere in the attitudinal linkage between the foundational values of political culture and the more affective and malleable single-issue stances made salient by the events of the day. A. Campbell et al. (1960), in their research on the American voter, even argued that because of the lack of ideological constraint in the electorate, issues were nothing more than short-term factors that, when salient, only barely swayed the powerful effects of partisan attitudes on the way to the vote. These short-term factors can affect electoral results, depending on partisan balance, the candidates involved, and the power of the issue in the public opinion of the day.

In summary, ideological thinking does seem to be important for understanding the political behavior of at least a subset of the American electorate, especially with regard to a tendency on the part of the electorate to be consistent, though not perfectly so, in some political views and orientations (Zaller 1992). Although only a small part of the polity engages in political abstraction marked by an active use of ideological dimensions of judgment or high levels of constraint among idea elements or issues, a supermajority of American citizens do indeed classify themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Although this ideological identification is distinct from ideological thinking, it has been shown to have an impact on many political attitudes and behaviors. Although it is somewhat controversial, ideological identification re-

mains a fundamental attitude structure in the American system.

Kyle L. Saunders

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Latino Voices

With Latinos being the largest minority group in America, it is fitting to study the values, culture, and politics of this large and diverse group. Some estimate that Latinos of all nationalities will comprise approximately 24.5 percent of the U.S. population in 50 years (Conde 1998).

In order to demonstrate the complexity of the diversity within the Latino community, a comparison of different Latino groups' assimilation into American culture will help explain the differences of opinion on many issues. Given that Latinos speak the same language and share similar cultural traits, it would seem that their political attitudes would be quite similar. This is not the case, however, and this entry will attempt to address how and why Latino public opinion varies across groups.

The Latino National Political Survey

The Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) arose out of an effort to ascertain the real views of Latinos in the United States. Too often, media personnel and scholars purport to speak for Latinos but fail to distinguish the views of the three major groups. The LNPS, among other things, is a targeted survey aimed at further understanding the diversity and com-

plexity of the Latino community. The LNPS is a compilation of questions involving such information as “Latino political values, attitudes, and behavior” (De la Garza et al. 1992) along with important demographic information (see Tables 1–4).

Cuban Americans:

Historical Background

Unlike other Latinos, Cuban Americans primarily came to the United States following Fidel Castro’s revolution of 1959. They came to avoid political persecution,

Table 1 Concern with U.S. or Homeland Politics, by Origin (U.S. Citizens)

<i>Focus</i>	<i>Mexican American</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban American</i>
More with Homeland	2.4%	14.6%	3.7%
Equal Concern	8.2%	30.0%	19.8%
More U.S.	89.4%	55.4%	76.5%
Totals	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Latino National Political Survey, 1990.

Table 2 Partisan Identification by National Origin (U.S. Citizens)

<i>Party Identification</i>	<i>Mexican American</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban American</i>
Strong Democrat	31.2%	37.2%	14.4%
Not Strong Democrat	28.6%	26.4%	5.1%
Closer to Democrat	7.2%	7.4%	6.0%
Independent/Other	11.5%	11.5%	5.7%
Closer to Republican	5.5%	3.6%	4.8%
Not Strong Republican	11.6%	7.2%	16.2%
Strong Republican	4.4%	6.7%	47.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Latino National Political Survey, 1990.

Table 3 Ideology by National Origin (U.S. Citizens)

<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Mexican American</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban American</i>
Very Liberal	4.9%	7.0%	3.6%
Liberal	11.6%	12.3%	13.1%
Slightly Liberal	12.1%	9.2%	6.3%
Moderate	35.4%	24.7%	22.5%
Slightly Conservative	14.8%	16.3%	14.3%
Conservative	15.4%	22.7%	34.2%
Very Conservative	5.8%	7.8%	6.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Latino National Political Survey, 1990.

Table 4 English as the Official Language, by National Origin

<i>English Should Be the Official Language</i>	<i>Mexican American</i>	<i>Puerto Rican</i>	<i>Cuban American</i>
Agree	44.4%	48.8%	40.0%
Disagree	55.6%	51.2%	60.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Latino National Political Survey, 1990.

as well as to seek economic opportunity. Cuban Americans, especially in south Florida, primarily focused their energies on economic advancement and the overthrow of Castro (Portes 1984). Most Cuban American immigrants settled in Miami; the majority of others settled in Union County, New Jersey. During the 1960s, many other Latinos turned to anti-establishment politics, while Cubans saw the United States as a safe haven until Castro left (Gann and Duignan 1986).

Cuban American Opinion

Cuban Americans are the most Republican of all Latino groups. This has to do primarily with concerns regarding U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. Traditionally, the Republican Party has been more supportive than the Democratic Party in tightening the trade embargo on Cuba. In addition, the Republican Party was perceived as more anticommunist during the Cold War. Better than two-thirds of Cuban Americans oppose U.S. relations with Cuba, but surprisingly, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans also oppose U.S. relations with Cuba (at 56.3 percent and 59.7 percent, respectively).

The LNPS shows that Cuban Americans are more likely to vote than any other Latino group. They are also tolerant of abortion rights and support a fairly liberal domestic agenda (De la Garza et al.

1992). At the same time, however, Rodolfo De la Garza notes that their party affiliation seems based on issues of socioeconomic class (1992). Bruce Cain et al. (1991), in their analysis of how Latinos and Asians acquire partisanship, state that many Asians fleeing communist regimes and Cuban Americans will be more likely to become Republican. The "*foreign policy concerns hypothesis* [emphasis added] thus predicts that as immigrants from these countries learn about U.S. politics, they become increasingly supportive of the Republican party" (Cain et al. 1991). Furthermore, previous research indicates that Cuban Americans acquire Republican partisanship because of their "anticommunist, pro-defense attitudes" (Brischetto 1987). The idea that Cuban Americans are indifferent to domestic politics contradicts the LNPS data that show 76.5 percent of Cubans are more concerned with U.S. politics, whereas only 3.7 percent are concerned with foreign policy issues. However, 19.8 percent are concerned equally with both situations. Although many Americans and even scholars think that Cubans are more concerned with foreign policy, the LNPS data do not suggest this.

Interestingly, 47.8 percent of Cubans surveyed classified themselves as strong Republicans. This figure exceeds the number of Puerto Ricans and Mexican Ameri-

cans who claim to be strong Democrats by approximately 10 percentage points and 16 percentage points, respectively. In addition, Cuban Americans born in Cuba are less likely to be Republicans, yet Cuban Americans who speak at least some Spanish are more likely to be Republicans. It appears that immigrants who left Cuba after 1959 but before the Mariel boatlift in 1980 are more likely to identify as partisan Republicans.

Moreover, interviews on Calle Ocho in Miami showed that the most important concept for Cuban Americans was *Cubanismo* (Menchaca in De la Garza 1994). This term represents the view that politicians must be tough on Fidel Castro and support efforts to overthrow him. Only Democrats who support this notion have any chance to win in local Miami elections. Unlike other Latino groups, Cuban Americans are not as critical of the Republican Party, according to interviews done on Calle Ocho. Survey data and extensive research have not definitively determined the reasons for how and why Cuban Americans think and vote the way they do. Spanish-language media also plays a substantial role in the transmission of views to Cuban Americans and other Latinos.

*Mexican Americans:
Historical Background*

Mexican Americans are the most numerous and oldest Latino group living in the United States. Much of the Southwest was part of Mexico until the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (Gann and Duignan 1986). This treaty ceded to the United States what ultimately became eight states. Many Mexicans living on this land remained and incorporated themselves into the United States. Once Americans began to arrive in these new states, racial

prejudice emerged. Some Americans viewed them as “cowardly, ignorant, lazy, and addicted to gambling and alcohol” (Gann and Duignan 1986). Unfortunately, many of these same stereotypes exist and have made their way into today’s political discourse. Mexican Americans currently represent 32 percent of the electorate in Texas and California.

Because Mexican Americans have the longest history in the United States and comprise almost two-thirds of Latinos, their views are of particular interest. The LNPS is the first step in the analysis of Mexican American views and values. In Table 2, LNPS researchers asked respondents their partisan identification and coded the responses so as to measure the intensity (weak to strong) and direction (Republican or Democratic) of their identification. The number of not so strong Democrats is nearly 30 percent for Mexican Americans, more so than any other Latino group. Older Mexican Americans tend to be stronger partisans, while Spanish-speakers are more likely to be weak partisans (Uhlener and Garcia 1998). Mexican Americans are more likely to vote for Democratic candidates but are not as intense in their support for the Democratic Party as Cuban Americans are for the Republican Party.

As Mexican Americans become more educated, they are more likely to identify as Democrats (Uhlener and Garcia 1998). The LNPS finds that Mexican Americans are more likely to identify themselves as Americans than as Latinos. Mexican Americans are not as religious or intent on preserving the Spanish language as the other Latino groups. Mexican Americans are not as likely to vote as either Puerto Ricans or Cubans. Behind only Cuban Americans, 65.4 percent of Mexican Americans support capital punishment,

and the vast majority of Mexican Americans polled support increased government spending on education, health care, and environmental protection.

As noted in the previous section, many elements of society have charged that Mexican Americans are slow to assimilate because they lack the values of individualism and patriotism. Yet others claim that Mexican Americans have a communitarian perspective that is simply not compatible with economic individualism (Abalos 1986). John Tanton, founder of the interest groups Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), U.S. English, and Zero Population Growth (ZPG), noted the following: "Will Latin American migrants bring with them the tradition of the *mordida* [bribe], the lack of involvement in public affairs, etc? Can homo contraceptivus compete with homo progenitiva if borders aren't controlled? . . . Perhaps this is the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught by those with their pants down!" (reprinted in Chavez 1991).

This example of animosity is, according to some researchers, why Mexican Americans are more likely to associate with the Democratic Party. Thus, the *minority group hypothesis* states that, because of discrimination, immigrants become more Democratic the longer they reside in the United States (Cain et al. 1991). This finding, however, does not apply to immigrants from communist countries, such as Cuba and Vietnam. Because the Republican Party is seen as more anticommunist, immigrants from communist countries tend to grow more Republican through the years.

In the Latino Political Ethnography Project (LPEP), researchers found that political parties did not actively court

Mexican American neighborhoods. To the extent that the major political parties used Spanish-language media, reminding voters to turn out to vote seemed to be the only effort (Menchaca in De la Garza 1994). Certainly, mobilization is important, but too often the assumption is that minorities, like Mexican Americans, do not vote on the issues and do not need to know about them. If votes are assumed won by any political party or coalition, then effective representation will suffer.

Public opinion researchers found that community-based organizations (CBOs) played an important role in political mobilization. Mexican American activists formed much of CBOs at the height of the Chicano movement during the 1960s. These organizations, however, have played an important role only in the Pilsen Mexican American community in Chicago (Valadez in De la Garza 1994). Similar organizations in Magnolia (in Houston) have not played an important role in political mobilization. LPEP researchers found that Catholic priests supported efforts by these organizations to stimulate political activism in the Pilsen community.

Puerto Ricans: Historical Background

Unlike other Latinos, Puerto Ricans are already U.S. citizens before entering the contiguous United States. The majority of Puerto Ricans have settled in New York City, where they first migrated following the Spanish-American War in 1898. Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens following the enactment of the Jones Act in 1917. It was not until after World War II that Puerto Ricans migrated en masse to New York City (Gann and Duignan 1986). Puerto Rican immigration to the United States has been attributed to "the economic policies of the United States and

the island's government, which has encouraged industrialization and capitalist investment" (Hero 1992). Unlike other Latinos, Puerto Ricans have not fared well in terms of economic prosperity. Scholars differ as to why this is the case. Puerto Ricans are discriminated against more so than other Latinos because of their dark skin (Rodriguez 1988). Others discount race and prejudice and blame poor family structure for the economic hardships of Puerto Ricans (Chavez 1991). Like today's Mexican American immigrants, Puerto Ricans have come to the mainland for economic improvement and prosperity, but they have not succeeded as a group in obtaining the American dream.

According to the LNPS, Puerto Ricans were more likely to call for increased spending on government programs than are Mexican or Cuban American respondents. Puerto Ricans were also the group most likely to support restrictions on abortions and least likely to support capital punishment. Do note, however, that the majority of Puerto Ricans support capital punishment. One would assume, therefore, that Puerto Ricans would be more amenable to conservative Republican appeals on social issues. Puerto Ricans have been much more willing to vote for Democratic candidates, however. Puerto Ricans do support increased government support for the poor and see the Democratic Party as more willing to implement programs designed to help the economically disadvantaged.

Unlike Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans are more likely to be Republican with higher levels of education, and gender has an effect on party choice. The gender gap becomes apparent in the Puerto Rican community in that men are significantly more likely to identify themselves as Republicans. Although

Puerto Ricans hold some socially conservative views, they are much more likely to support Democrats than other Latinos. Older Puerto Ricans are more likely to be strong partisans. A breakdown of white and black/mulatto Puerto Ricans demonstrates that darker-skinned Puerto Ricans follow the minority group hypothesis model: they are more likely to become Democrats with increasing educational levels (Uhlener and Garcia 1998).

In recent elections, Puerto Ricans supported Democratic candidates in large numbers. In 1996, former President Clinton captured 93 percent of the Puerto Rican vote (Falcon in De la Garza et al. 1999). Mayor Rudolph Giuliani captured 37 percent of the Puerto Rican vote in his successful mayoral reelection campaign in New York City. Michael R. Bloomberg also captured almost one-half of the Latino vote in this year's mayoral election. One could argue that these numbers merely indicate the failure of the Republicans at the national level and the success of liberal Republicans at the local level. Puerto Ricans clearly do not vote on any single issue, but the survey data and election choices seem to be somewhat counterintuitive. With numbers exceeding the rate at which African Americans vote for Democratic candidates, many Puerto Rican elites are concerned with responsiveness and the fear that votes may be assumed won without any persuasion (Falcon in De la Garza et al. 1999).

In Puerto Rican neighborhoods, researchers found attitudes similar to those of Mexican Americans. Puerto Ricans were interested in having elected officials of their own ethnic background, as they believed this would lead to more responsiveness (Menchaca in De la Garza 1994).

Overall Findings: Intergroup Tension or Voces Unidas?

Given the differences among the major Latino groups, what issues, if any, are likely to galvanize support within the community? According to the LNPS, most Latinos classify themselves as moderate to slightly right of center. Cubans claim to be the most conservative, but on some issues they are as supportive of government spending as the other Latino groups. Puerto Ricans are the most Democratic, but they are not overwhelmingly liberal. Survey data have not clarified the inherent intricacies of Latino public opinion. Latino public opinion is a bundle of inconsistencies that will only befuddle Americans in the future. With the booming population growth of Latinos, researchers will find it difficult to classify *the* Latino position on public policy issues as stable, unchanging, and predictable. Recent research reveals that, among all three Latino groups, the *learning theory* of partisanship holds. That is, the longer a Latino/a lives in the United States, the more likely he or she is to be a member of the Democratic Party (Uhlener and Garcia 1998). Although this analysis may be true under the minority group hypothesis, and thus affecting Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, this generalization cannot be transferred to the outlying Cuban American community. The foreign policy hypothesis mentioned earlier is more convincing with respect to immigrants from communist countries. Scholars of African American politics can easily predict voter preferences in any given election, but Latinos have swayed to and fro by narrowly supporting President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and overwhelmingly supporting President Bill Clinton in the 1990s (Gann and Duignan 1986). For the Republicans

to ignore and the Democrats to expect the Latino vote would be politically unwise.

Based on the data, Latinos are a diverse group. Although there is hardly an intergroup tension, no evidence of solidarity appears to exist, either. Latinos would likely galvanize into a coherent block if immigration policy and, to a lesser extent, English-only policies become salient. According to the LNPS data, all Latino groups are in favor of bilingual education and reasonable immigration standards. Very few, if any, Latino community activists are proposing policies aimed at drastically cutting immigration levels or building walls on the border.

Voces unidas! Perhaps Latinos literally speak the same language, but when it comes to public opinion, Latinos are as diverse as the American public.

Jason P. Casellas

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The Middle East

U.S. public opinion about the Middle East is a relatively recent development. Only since the 1950s has the public taken note of this region. But the Middle East since then has become a big issue and a source of continuous conflict. This is true in part because of the Israeli/Palestinian crisis, but also because the region is the largest producer of oil in the world—and America is its largest consumer.

Coincidentally, Middle East oil began to be of vital importance to the U.S. economy about the same time that the Zionist movement culminated in the creation of the Jewish homeland (Israel) in the Palestinian region. This fact has led to a disconnect between U.S. public opinion, usually highly supportive of Israel, and more tempered U.S. public policy with regard to the oil-producing Arab nations of the Middle East. Although democratic theory indicates that public policy ought to flow from public opinion, in this case public opinion has often been at odds with U.S. financial interests in the region.

The Appearance of the Middle East in U.S. Public Opinion

In 1948, the United States had clearly emerged as a major global power both economically and militarily; as such, it became a major consumer of Middle East

oil. Simultaneously, the state of Israel, having been declared in the Balfour Declaration in 1917, was finally realized.

For the first time, the Middle East appeared on the agenda of U.S. public opinion. The Middle East became synonymous with rich oil sheiks and the Holy Land, where the post-World War II Jewish Diaspora was resettling. By 1955, the year that Gallup first measured Middle East awareness in the United States, 61 percent of the public was aware of problems in that region. Since that time, Americans have continued see the Middle East as a region of import, with awareness consistently above 50 percent. Awareness has been even higher at times when war between Israel and its Arab neighbors has been threatened or begun, or when oil prices increased rapidly. More recently, U.S. public awareness of the Middle East reached its highest level ever, with terrorism coming to New York City on September 11, 2001.

U.S. public policy has reflected the degree of awareness in the public, and the Middle East has consistently been among the largest recipients of U.S. aid in the world. In the Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and Palestine have benefited the most from U.S. aid (in 2001, Israel received \$2.8 billion, Egypt \$2.2 billion, and the Palestinian Authority \$800 million). It is interesting to note that while candidates compete for credit in delivering aid to Israel, assistance to Arab states is usually unaccompanied by fanfare. This demonstrates the duality present in the U.S. response to the region. Although U.S. engagement has reflected the importance of the region to the public, no clear Middle East policy has been established with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Presidents have engaged in their own policy toward the Middle East in an ad hoc

manner, often responding to events rather than following a long-range plan.

1948–1966: Formation of Public Opinion in the United States

During the two decades immediately following World War II, while Americans were still forming opinions on the Middle East, public opinion tended toward affinity with the new country of Israel. In part this was due to the kinship between the Jewish and Christian faiths, in part out of remorse over the Holocaust, and in part due to linguistic and cultural ties. Most of the Diaspora was European, whereas Arabic practices remained as unintelligible to most Americans as the Arabic language. Hence, while oil was seen as important to the U.S. economy, public opinion grew out of the affective link many Americans had with the Jews. From the onset, this caused problems for U.S. public policy. U.S. oil interests in the region were threatened as early as 1948, when the Arab League decided that it would not allow the construction of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline because of U.S. support of the United Nations partition plan for Palestine. Though the pipeline was eventually completed, the pattern of U.S. support of Israel threatening the flow of oil, or at least its price, continues to the present.

1967–1979: The Decade of Conflict in the Middle East

In the 1960s, the Israeli-Arab conflict heated up, and on the eve of 1967, war was fast approaching. Most Americans who were aware of the problems in the region overwhelmingly favored Israel. By 1969, following the short war of 1967 and the tumultuous aftermath, awareness skyrocketed to 85 percent with, again, the cognizant favoring Israel by similar




Figure 1 Public Opinion about the Middle East

margins. In 1972, a shocked world watched on television (courtesy of the new satellite system used to broadcast the Summer Olympics in Munich) as Arab militants took Israeli team members hostage, ending in a botched rescue attempt that left five assailants and eleven Israelis dead. By 1973, when both Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, aware-

ness of the Middle East peaked at 94 percent, a level to which it would not rise again until Operation Desert Storm and the September 11 bombings (awareness would come close in 1979, during the hostage crisis and oil shortage, at 92 percent). Again, the vast majority of Americans continued to side with the Israelis, and after substantial U.S. support for

Israel, the Arab nations responded with threats to cut oil supplies—as in 1948, the threats had no real impact.

But in the late 1970s, two events marked U.S.–Middle East relations. Just as Jimmy Carter was beginning his presidency, an oil crisis rocked the U.S. and world economies as Arab nations, finding a common voice in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), began to regulate production. This event was further exacerbated on November 4, 1979, when Iranians stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took 66 American hostages. On the day that Jimmy Carter left office, the situation had only begun to improve.

1980–1988: The Reagan Years

On January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn in and the American hostages in Iran were released. At the same time, the oil crisis was already fading into history. Quite unexpectedly, these events happened concurrently with the first shift in U.S. public opinion on the Middle East. U.S. preference for Israel declined slightly vis-à-vis Palestinian sentiment during this period. Instead of lashing out at the Arab world in light of the oil crisis, Americans blamed the oil companies and the government. At the height of the oil crisis, in 1979, only 13 percent of the U.S. public blamed OPEC nations for the high oil prices; 65 percent of Americans blamed oil companies and the U.S. government for the oil crisis!

What led to a shift in public opinion? The answer lies in the changing terms of the debate. What was initially defined as an Israeli-Arab conflict began to be reshaped as an Israeli-Palestinian debate. After it became clear that Israel could defend itself as a nation and would survive, the debate no longer settled on

state-to-state conflict but rather on Israel and its Palestinian population. This shift was mirrored by a slight increase in support for the Palestinian position, with 18 percent of Americans overall beginning to side with the Palestinian cause.

Nevertheless, this shift was moderate at best. The Middle East began to fade back to 1955 levels of awareness, with only 59 percent of Americans cognizant of the situation in the Middle East by 1985. With the Cold War reaching a pinnacle, Americans turned their attention elsewhere, like Central America and the Soviet Union. In the American National Election Surveys of the most important problem, the Middle East fell from a 1979 high of 34 percent of respondents to an average of only 12 percent during Reagan's last three years in office. Nonetheless, while Reagan paid little heed to the situation in the Middle East, his approval ratings slipped with regard to the Middle East. In 1983, 42 percent of Americans said they disapproved of Reagan's handling of the region. Only two years later, his disapproval was up to 59 percent—though reflecting a much smaller group of aware Americans.

By the end of the Reagan years, most Americans continued to favor Israel, but a shift had begun.

Aftermath of the Cold War: Searching for Balance

Just as Iran sprang onto the map for most Americans in the failing years of the Carter administration, so also did Iraq during George H. W. Bush's first and only term. This was complementary to the end of the Cold War, when the simple us-versus-them dichotomy ended. In many ways, the fight to rebuke Saddam Hussein was a fight *on behalf* of Arabs. The United States joined the rest of the Arab

world to push Saddam out of Kuwait and in so doing dispelled the concept that all Arabs are the same. Bush's campaign to let Americans know how important Operation Desert Storm was to democracy paid off when, in the aftermath of the very short war, his approval ratings skyrocketed. At the culmination of Desert Storm, Bush's approval ratings were among the highest in history for a U.S. president at 84 percent (Gallup Monthly Polls, 1991, p. 437). Americans were also left with the image that the United States had many friends in the Arab world.

Desert Storm and the end of the Cold War focused more and more attention on the value of liberalism, especially in light of the war to reestablish the sovereignty of the Kuwaiti people. As Americans began to look more and more closely at Israel, Palestinian advocacy groups became more common in the United States. As the region and its problems became more familiar, the strong Israeli bias eroded to some extent. By the time Bill Clinton took office, Americans were more divided than ever—still strongly favoring Israel, but not as universally. These shifts were well reflected in Bush's linkage of aid (at least rhetorically) to Israel to concessions to the Palestinians.

Conclusion

There are three driving forces behind U.S. public opinion toward the Middle East. First, U.S. public opinion is affective in nature. There is little discernible linkage between the economic value of oil and Arab/Palestinian sentiment (though there has been some effort to make this a central issue in the post-September 11 debate on energy development in the United States). Oil is an important commodity, but it is not sufficient to galvanize or

shape American sentiments. Much more potent has been a sense of identification with the two parties. As Americans traditionally identified with Israelis, so followed public opinion. Although this affective link seems to have lessened, Americans are quick to identify again with Israel when they see reprehensible acts like suicide bombings. Post-September 11, Americans are even more sympathetic to Israel in light of their own losses.

Second, and in many ways linked to the first, has been the shift in U.S. public opinion resulting from education. There has been a great deal of media coverage of the Middle East. Americans no longer find Arabs and Islam unfathomable. Their cultures and practices are much more familiar than in the past, having been prominent in the media for a sustained period of time. Americans are more apt to distinguish among different groups of Arabs and among Arabs and Persians and Southeast Asians.

The third reason reflects demographic change. As noted above, at the conclusion of the Clinton years, Americans began to identify more with the struggle of the Palestinian people—but this was not a homogeneous development. This trend was especially true among African Americans and Hispanics. By the time Clinton left office, 69 percent of Americans were aware of the problems in the region, with 11 percent of these people in favor of a Palestinian homeland. But that is only part of the reality of what U.S. public opinion reflects: this number is even higher among Hispanics and African Americans. These groups traditionally are more sympathetic toward the Palestinian cause and reflect increasing levels of anti-Semitism. According to the Anti-Defamation League, while 17 percent of Americans are anti-Semitic (defined here as

anti-Jewish—in itself a rise from 12 percent in 1998), 35 percent of Hispanics and African Americans are anti-Semitic. This may, in itself, be a troubling sign. Hispanic Americans make up the fastest-growing minority in America. These results could show the future of U.S. public opinion toward the Middle East. If this trend continues, the repercussions will be reflected in public opinion and in foreign policy.

Timeline

November 2, 1917—Balfour Declaration; the British pledge support to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

1937—British partition plan is proposed.

1946—Saudi King Ibn Saud helps United States gain support for the construction of the Trans-Arabian oil pipeline.

1947—UN partition plan (Res. 181); civil war between Palestinians and Israelis.

1950—Trans-Arabian oil pipeline is completed.

1953—The United States helps to reinstate the shah of Iran.

1955—Gallup begins polling on the Middle East.

1956—Egypt seizes control of the Suez Canal in response to the withdrawal of U.S. funding from the Aswan High Dam; Israel then attacks Egypt via the Sinai.

1967—The Six Day War (or June War) erupts between Israel and a combined Arab force composed of Egypt, Israel, and Syria. On the first day Israeli forces carry out air strikes on the Arab air force, successfully destroying most of their aircraft. Fighting stops after the UN Security Council calls for a cease-fire. As a result

of the war, Israel captures Jerusalem, Bethlehem, a large portion of the Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip.

October 6, 1973—War among Egypt, Syria, and Israel.

October 21, 1973—OPEC places oil embargo on the United States.

February 1, 1979—Ayatollah Khomeini leads successful revolution and takes power from the shah.

June 28, 1979—OPEC raises price of oil by 16 percent.

November 4, 1979—Iranian students occupy the U.S. embassy and hold 66 Americans hostage for 444 days.

September 1980—Iran and Iraq go to war. As a result of this war there is a substantial decline in the amount of oil exports from both countries. The Iran-Contra scandal takes place during the Iran-Iraq War.

January 21, 1981—American hostages are released from Iran.

1988—Iran-Iraq War ends; Reagan administration condemns Iraq for using chemical weapons against the Kurds in northern Iraq.

June 1989—Ayatollah Khomeini dies.

1998—Clinton peace process culminates in the Wye River Accords, a precursor to a comprehensive peace plan that subsequently fails.

September 11, 2001—The World Trade Center and the Pentagon are attacked by hijacked civilian aircraft; the attacks are linked to Osama Bin Laden.

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Partisanship

Partisanship, or party identification, is among the most fundamental constructs in the formation of American public opinion. Early scholars of partisanship defined it as a “psychological identification,” a “sense of attachment,” and an “affective orientation” toward a party (Campbell et al. 1960). Although ongoing debate surrounds the exact nature of the relationship between partisanship and citizens’ political preferences and behavior, it can generally be understood as having a marked impact on U.S. politics. As such, it is important to understand a number of issues relating to the development and the utility of identification with a political party.

First, the origins of party identification must be examined. Second, the function of partisanship in organizing political preferences and guiding political behavior is important. Third, the strength of the attachment must be assessed, and finally its stability.

Origins: Socialization and Rational Choice

Loyalty to a political party is initially acquired via socialization processes, although the parties themselves rarely

engage in mobilization of this nature. Childhood experience is the formative influence on the development of partisan identification, which tends to reflect the individual’s immediate social surroundings. Parental and other familial guidance, whether conscious or otherwise, has a powerful impact on determining early attachments to parties. Children of Democrats overwhelmingly express preferences for the Democratic Party, while children of Republicans call themselves Republicans. These orientations develop long before children are capable of identifying the content of party identification; many elementary school students are able to state party preferences despite an inability to recognize issues or interests correlated with party platforms. Substantive information is not acquired until early adolescence, by which time party loyalties are already somewhat established (see Beck 1974; Beck and Sorauf 1992; Luskin et al. 1989).

The *heritability* of partisanship is limited, however, for two reasons. One is that other social influences—educational environment, churches, community groups, and *social identities* such as socioeconomic status, race, and gender, among others—raise issues and provide information that conflicts with early party identification (see Erikson et al. 1989). Social identities are often highly predictive of party identification, as data from the 2000 American National Election Study illustrate (see Table 1).

The effect of social networks and the political environment—the politics of those with whom we interact on a regular basis—has also been well established. Political preferences, including partisanship, are often influenced by the social context in which individuals receive and

Table 1 Demographic Characteristics and Party Identification

<i>Demographics</i>		<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Total No. of Respondents</i>
Education	Less than 12 years	55%	15%	30%	683
	More than 12 years	46%	9%	44%	1,088
Household Income	Less than \$50,000	55%	13%	32%	828
	More than \$50,000	46%	9%	45%	665
Social Class	Working Class	56%	13%	30%	765
	Middle Class	45%	9%	45%	921
Race/Ethnicity	African American	83%	8%	7%	205
	Asian	52%	13%	35%	31
	Native American	42%	5%	53%	19
	Hispanic / Latino	58%	14%	28%	93
	White	44%	12%	44%	1,370
Gender	Women	54%	12%	34%	1,002
	Men	45%	11%	44%	774
Census Region	Northeast	53%	12%	35%	312
	North Central	50%	11%	39%	444
	South	48%	13%	39%	642
	West	51%	10%	39%	378
Religion	Protestant	53%	6%	42%	120
	Catholic	49%	12%	39%	100
	Jewish	93%	0	7%	15
	Other	48%	18%	34%	62

Data drawn from the 2000 American National Election Study.

Party identification summary variable collapsed into three categories:

Democrat = Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent-Democrat

Independent = Independent Independent

Republican = Strong Republican, Weak Republican, Independent-Republican

discuss political information (see Wald et al. 1988; MacKuen and Brown 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).

A second limitation on partisanship's heritability involves "economic voting." The effect of this may be most pronounced in early adulthood, when party loyalties are most fluid. Here, individuals hold parties up against political reality and evaluate their performance in a utilitarian way (Beck and Sorauf 1992). In some cases, citizens may incorporate "retrospective" examinations of party

performance and subsequently bring their partisan preferences in line with the result (Fiorina 1981). Thus, while socialization is instrumental in forming early party identification, it is not the sole source of partisanship. Early attachments can be mediated by social networks, social identity, and rational calculations of the utility of party platforms.

Function of Partisanship

Partisanship is important in U.S. politics because it shapes political opinions and

behavior. Issue positions and vote choice are two key areas in which party loyalties tend to have an overwhelming impact. Economic voting theories offer one explanation for these effects. However, an alternative explanation is found in social psychology theories of information processing, particularly those that provide *dual-process models* for the way partisanship is utilized.

Essentially, dual-process models claim that individuals process information in one of two ways. *Deliberative processing* involves careful thought that utilizes as much information as possible. *Superficial processing*, however, involves the use of heuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, such as stereotypes, for making decisions. A number of variables influence which route will be taken for any given decision, including individual characteristics—such as cognitive capacity, political knowledge, and motivation—and situational characteristics—for example, the amount of time and energy that is accessible at that moment (Petty and Wegener 1998; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). When information is processed heuristically, the individual will rely more heavily on stereotypes, and in the political context, partisanship is a powerful cognitive shortcut. Evidence suggests that much of the time citizens rely on partisan stereotypes in making political decisions—such as vote choice—and evaluating issues (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). In fact, it appears that these stereotypes can sometimes exert a determinative influence even in the face of information that is inconsistent with them (Rahn 1993).

Another way of conceiving the function of partisanship involves the *rational choice*, or economic models, of decision-making (mentioned above among the sources of partisanship). This was first

posited, famously, in Anthony Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* and assumes that voters make cost-benefit analyses of political decisions and their consequences (Downs 1957). Both retrospective and prospective evaluations of party performance influence this process, perhaps via an "online" or running tally of the difference in future benefits that an individual might expect from either party (Fiorina 1981; MacKuen et al. 1992). Citizens seek to maximize these benefits and regularly update their partisan preferences according to their own calculations of the parties' performance and expected future utility.

The fact that individuals are capable of incorporating new information beyond what is presented in a partisan package is not disputed—but it would appear that this rational learning process is at least heavily mediated by partisan biases (Bartels 2002; Green et al. 2002; Zaller 1992). For example, in 1936, survey researchers noted that 83 percent of Republicans believed that President Franklin Roosevelt's policies were "leading the country down the road to dictatorship," whereas only 9 percent of Democrats felt the same (cited in Green et al. 2002). Some sort of *reciprocal process*, whereby party identification and issue or candidate information influence each other, seems likely (Page and Jones 1979).

Strength of Partisanship

Despite the presence of strong competing forces, partisanship virtually always emerges as the most powerful predictor of vote choice and issue positions. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, the strength of partisanship appeared to be leveling off. Particularly, political scientists pointed to the rise of split-ticket voting and the increasing numbers of

independents as major indicators of partisanship's decline (see Broder 1971; DeVries and Tarrance 1972; Niemi and Weisberg 1976). However, more recent research has demonstrated that the strength of partisanship in the electorate at large probably remained relatively stable; any decline may only have occurred among nonvoters, not voters (Bartels 2000). Social identity theories of partisanship are instructive here. When party identification is conceived of as an element of one's *self-concept*, akin to religious or ethnic identity, it is easier to explain the strength of partisanship in the midst of political crises that can cause great shifts in other political opinions (Green et al. 2002). Identifying with one party and voting for another due to overwhelming circumstances is not ruled out by a conception of social identity as the underlying force of partisanship.

Furthermore, any assessment of declining strength of partisanship must take account of *measurement* issues. Party identification is traditionally measured with 100-point feeling thermometers, or, more often, with a 7-point scale such as that used by the American National Election Studies: 1 = Strong Democrat; 2 = Weak Democrat; 3 = Independent: Democrat leaning; 4 = Independent Independent; 5 = Independent: Republican leaning; 6 = Weak Republican; 7 = Strong Republican.

Although the numbers of those self-identifying as independents on this scale have increased in recent decades, recent research employing "implicit attitudes" techniques reveals an even stronger—and more predictable—attachment to party among Republican and Democratic leaners than among those identifying as weak partisans (McGraw 2002). The implicit tests predict attachments above and

beyond traditional self-report measures and, as such, may indicate that any drop-off in partisanship attributed to increasing numbers of independents may be more reflective of individuals asserting their right to remain officially unaffiliated than of an actual decline in partisan loyalties.

Stability of Party Identification

If partisanship is so strong and persistent, is it possible for anything to shift it? Much research has dealt with the question of *realignment* and *dealignment* in the U.S. electorate. *Realignment* is an aggregate-level concept, referring to an abrupt period of change during which the voting coalitions in the electorate undergo a massive and enduring shift from one party to the other. These moments are initiated by a critical election and are bracketed by long periods of relative stability in voting coalitions (Nardulli 1995). Realignment can occur on a national level, or in subgroups of the electorate, such as regions (e.g., the shift from Democratic to Republican in the South since the 1950s). The history of partisan shifts in the United States includes five periods of stability, punctuated by realignments. These are defined by Charles Stewart as follows (see Table 2).

Realignment periods provide further evidence that voters are not simply knee-jerk partisans but are capable of assessing political information and shifting affiliations in a context of overwhelming need for change.

Dealignment, as evidenced by the rise in split-ticket voting and independent identifiers, was for some time said to describe partisan politics since the 1960s. One explanation of dealignment divides the stages of a party system into a three-generation cycle (Beck 1974; Beck and Sorauf 1992). By this account, the first

Table 2 Party Systems

<i>Period</i>	<i>System</i>
1789–1821	“Experimental System”
1828–1854 or 1860	“Democratizing System”
1860–1893	“Civil War System”
1894–1932	“Industrial System”
1932–?	“New Deal System”

stage is the realignment generation itself. The second generation inherits the strong partisanship of the first but passes down a weaker version to the third generation. It is the newest members of the third generation in the electorate who instigate the emergence of a new party system—they lack the experiences that concretized the partisanship of their parents and grandparents, and they perceive the major parties’ platforms as irrelevant (Beck and Sorauf 1992).

Today, it appears that a very gradual realignment may have occurred beginning in the 1980s, arguably without the impetus of a critical election. Increased ideological polarization in government may be responsible for this. Issues that have come to dominate the electoral landscape since the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 have tended to be more ideological than economic in nature (e.g., abortion, the death penalty, women’s rights, gay rights, prayer in schools, etc.). Coupled with increased media coverage of electoral conflict, and a drawing-together of the two major parties on economic and public interest issues, ideological polarization has become more salient to citizens (Abramowitz 1995; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Observable partisan shifts over this period have indeed involved younger voters, who may be updating their partisanship with the ideological information

they receive (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). In sum, it appears that although partisan attachment can indeed be influenced by political context, it remains enduring and relatively stable. Those most likely to change loyalties are those who are least committed: the newest voters.

Conclusion

Although early studies identified partisanship as a profound influence on political opinion and behavior, subsequent evidence indicated some decline in its effect. The most recent work, however, has returned to the notion of partisanship as a powerful motivating force. Particularly, the conceptualization of partisanship as an element of *social identity* has provided an explanation for a number of seemingly contradictory phenomena (Green et al. 2002). This incorporates socialization processes and also allows for voter learning. Public opinion may shift, but it is the individual’s perception of which desirable or undesirable groups are aligned with a party that leads to partisan stability or change. The party identification of younger voters is therefore less stable due to the rapid acquisition of a great deal of reference group information (Green et al. 2002).

Realignment is conceived as a tipping point during which the public image of parties must shift entirely, resulting in

changing party identification (Green et al. 2002, p. 139). However, it is imperative to continue seeking more sophisticated methodological tools for studying partisanship. The *causal direction* of models presenting partisanship as an influence on opinions and behavior is particularly important here. Thus far, political scientists have been unable to adequately ascertain whether political information and ideology cause partisanship, or vice versa (Fiorina 2002). Furthermore, superior controls for candidate positions and for the problems of third-party identifiers are necessary (Fiorina 2002).

Party identification remains a serious, and provocative, concept in the study of U.S. public opinion. Further research is necessary to determine some of the questions relating to the source, function, strength, and stability of this construct in influencing political opinion and behavior.

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Pseudoscience Beliefs

This entry examines pseudoscience beliefs among the U.S. public. These beliefs are important to understand, partly because they provide one way to study what kinds of evidence and arguments people find compelling enough to support pseudoscience assertions; partly because pseudoscience practitioners regularly present claims on public expenditures or political support; and partly because the general public provides input to government officials and elects officials who influence many areas, including normal or mainstream science.

Pseudoscience beliefs are cognitions about material phenomena that are generated and maintained through means *other than* scientific evidentiary processes, such as control groups or eliminating alternative causal hypotheses. Thus, *biblical* creationists extensively cite scripture or exhibit relics, essentially relying on anecdotal evidence. Although astrologers, psychologists, and political scientists assess and predict individual personalities (Aquarius is eccentric), social relations (Taurus is better off with Pisces than with Gemini), or volitional acts (it is good to make work decisions today), astrologers consult planets and other heavenly phenomena, whereas social and behavioral scientists conduct experiments, surveys, and personality assessments. Alternative medicine practitioners use magnets, herbs, and touch, which may elevate patients' spirits but also lack systematic research and even violate scientific knowledge about the body.

Nonetheless, pseudoscience practitioners often claim that they are scientific. Astrologers point to extensive use of computer programs for forecasting horo-

scopes, and creationists cite research on fossils and relics. These claims may occur because although the general public's basic science knowledge is not high, Americans respect and are interested in science (Miller 2000; National Science Board 2002; Shamos 1995). By asserting kinship to science, pseudoscience practitioners claim to provide analytically valid products, services, and explanations, thus making them contenders for consumer dollars and public school curricula.

Not all Americans benefit equally from scientific and technological advances. Individuals must be able to afford and maintain new medicines, medical procedures, and technologies and possess the knowledge and skills to utilize them effectively. In contrast, access to pseudoscience can be easy but the costs diverse. Although reading one's daily horoscope in the newspaper or on the Internet is cheap, psychic hotlines cost dearly. Alternative medicine can be as near as one's health food or crystals store, but again the products may be expensive.

In this entry I scrutinize support for pseudoscience beliefs. I analyze *who supports these beliefs more often* and *how pseudoscience support relates to political actions and issues*. Finally, I examine the implications of support for pseudoscience for educators, government officials, and public opinion researchers.

Who Supports Pseudoscience?

Intuitively, we might think that only ignorant people, often equated with the poorly educated, support pseudoscience, partially because such individuals may be less knowledgeable about mainstream science. Technological advances, such as the Internet, may appear too costly for the less educated to access. The less edu-

cated may be more fatalistic and thus more open to appeals that stress luck and supernatural forces. However, many scholars vividly recall the American White House in the late 1980s, when First Lady Nancy Reagan consulted astrologers to advise her husband. Raymond Eve and Dana Dunn (1989) found that many high school biology teachers endorsed biblical creation rather than evolution. Further, forms of pseudoscience differ. Research by John Taylor, Raymond Eve, and Francis Harrold (1995) and Erich Goode (2002) suggests that individuals who support astrology and creationism are not the same as those who believe in alien abduction.

Below I analyze data from the Surveys of Public Understanding of Science and Technology conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to describe who supports pseudoscience and some political correlates of pseudoscience belief. U.S. national surveys about science and pseudoscience date from at least the 1950s, but the greatest available information about these topics appears in this NSF archive, which began in 1979, was directed through 1999 by Jon D. Miller, and is coordinated with several international surveys.

The U.S. archive comprises 21,965 interviews with representative adults at least 18 years old in 11 surveys (1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001) of the lower 48 states. Case bases ranged from 1,574 in 2001 to 3,193 in 1981. Survey respondents were interviewed in person or through randomized telephone surveys after 1979. Completion rates in contacted households ranged from 51 percent (2001) to more than 70 percent in earlier years. Items monitor science and technology

interest and knowledge, science-related activities, pseudoscience beliefs, and attitudes about science policy. The NSF surveys have several advantages over other data sets because they comprise national representative adult samples, rather than the more typical convenience samples (students, activist groups, university faculty); they have several questions about pseudoscience (rather than the most frequent item about biblical creationism); and they have policy-related items, such as voting, contacting elected officials, and attitudes toward government funding.

In 2001, nearly 60 percent of American adults believed that "human beings developed from earlier species of animals," 28 percent agreed "some numbers are lucky for some people," one-third said that astrology was "somewhat" or "very

scientific," and 29 percent answered "true" to a statement that some UFOs were "spacecraft from other civilizations." I concentrate on these four items because they have the longest time series. But I note in passing that in 2001, 60 percent of Americans agreed that "some people possess psychic powers or ESP," 89 percent agreed that "there are some good ways of treating sickness that medical science does not recognize," and half said that magnetic therapy was "sort of" or "very scientific." Just from these results, we can see that pseudoscience beliefs are common, supported by about one-quarter of the population, to nearly all American adults.

Pseudoscience beliefs are unevenly distributed among the U.S. adult population. Prior research suggests that predic-




Figure 1 Percent Agreeing Astrology Is Scientific, by Gender and Ethnicity




Figure 2 Percent Agreeing Numbers Are Lucky, by Gender and Ethnicity

tors such as education, ethnicity, and gender relate to science knowledge and thus may also predict pseudoscience belief. In the NSF data, better-educated individuals more often supported evolution or more often rejected astrology, lucky numbers, and hovering alien spacecraft. Women more often than men believed astrology was scientific or rejected evolution. Sex differences on the astrology items or evolution persisted even when educational level was considered. There were no sex differences on either the lucky numbers or the UFO-alien item. Some of these results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 4 on support for astrology, Figures 2 and 5 on lucky numbers, and Figures 3 and 6 on evolution support.

Age also made a difference. I used five age groups (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–64, and 65 and older) to examine pseudoscience support and detect any nonlinear effects of age. Younger people more often read a horoscope or said astrology was scientific; they also more often endorsed a UFO-spacecraft connection than older adults; and 18- to 24-year-olds most often supported lucky numbers. Older adults more often rejected evolution. Although those aged 25 to 44 were slightly better educated than older or younger adults, controls for neither education nor gender diminished age differences; the only effect of these controls was to slightly reduce the number of very young adults who endorsed lucky numbers.




Figure 3 Percent Agreeing with Evolution Theory, by Educational Level

Data on race were available for analysis in the 1999 and 2001 surveys. Although ethnicity did not influence *how often* one read a horoscope, blacks and Hispanics endorsed astrology or lucky numbers more than nonblacks (mostly whites) or non-Hispanics. Even after controlling gender, age, and educational level, these ethnic differences persisted. Hispanic background affected neither the evolution nor the aliens item. Keep in mind that the U.S. Hispanic population is very diverse; for example, there may be unmeasured differences among Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican Americans.

Finally, being black did not affect the aliens item; however, black respondents more often rejected evolution. Controls for education, age, and gender reduced the overall racial difference from about 13 percent to 8 percent.

The persistence of ethnic differences on evolution, astrology, and lucky numbers, despite gender, age, and education controls, and the persistence of gender differences on the astrology and evolution items, despite education or age controls, suggest American subculture differences. For example, Eve and Harrold (1994) and Eve and Dunn (1989) propose




Figure 4 Percent Agreeing Astrology Is Scientific, by Educational Level, Gender, and Ethnicity

that women and minorities are more traditional, endorse religious systems over scientific explanatory systems, and support astrology more often than men or high-status whites. In addition, more blacks than whites are fundamentalist or charismatic Christians; members of these denominations more often support a biblical view of creation regardless of educational level. In examining gender differences on astrology, Susan Carol Losh (2001) suggests that individuals who lack relative control over their lives may find pseudoscience systems that purport to read the future attractive, because this

information seems to allow them to plan. For example, compared with high-status white men, even well-educated women of any color face employment discrimination. The assertion that status factors affect perceived control, and thus the appeal of explanatory systems that relatively emphasize predetermination or luck, may extend analogously to American blacks and Hispanics.

What Is the Influence of Pseudoscience Support on Political Involvement?

As we have seen, pseudoscience supporters seem alike only in that they have rel-




Figure 5 Percent Agreeing Numbers Are Lucky, by Educational Level, Gender, and Ethnicity

actively less education than those rejecting such beliefs. Other social differences depend on the particular pseudoscience. Some, such as astrology, show sex differences; others, such as endorsing lucky numbers, show very little; some items, such as astrology and lucky numbers, are affected by ethnicity; others, such as equating UFOs with aliens, are not. Young adults more often support evolution but seem to ecumenically accommodate astrology, aliens, and lucky numbers, too. Constellations of beliefs and particular social characteristics can be important if they relate to how individuals participate in policy processes.

In the hubbub of the political process, politicians may differentially attempt to placate particular stakeholders, who may

be seen as more or less influential. For example, do those who reject evolution vote or contact public officials more often? Do individuals who suspect UFOs are really alien spacecraft feel funding for space exploration is too low? Do those who endorse lucky numbers or astrology participate less in the political process or express differential support for space, education, defense, environment, science, or medical research funding? And if differences by belief do exist, are these caused by possible ideological distinctions, or are they really due to correlates of belief such as age, ethnicity, gender, and education?

For example, in these data, older or well-educated persons or Hispanics more often said they contacted public officials,




Figure 6 Percent Agreeing with Evolution Theory, by Educational Level, Gender, and Ethnicity

whereas females and blacks did so less often. Women and blacks felt that funding for educational improvement, environmental cleanup, and medical research was too low. Whites and men more often felt space funding was too low; Hispanics and men supported more funding for science research, and Hispanics wanted more defense spending. Below I discuss how pseudoscience beliefs related to funding priorities and political participation. I present the net relationships among these variables after controlling age, education, gender, and ethnicity. It is important to note that *all* surveys, including those in 2001, predated the September 11, 2001, attacks, events that

probably changed the priorities for spending on defense.

Questions about voting in a recent presidential or local election were asked in the NSF surveys through 1990. Data about contacting a public official are available nearly every year, as are perceptions about whether funding levels for space exploration, the environment, medical or science research, educational improvement, and defense are too little, too much, or about right.

Individuals who supported astrology and lucky numbers voted or contacted public officials less than those who rejected these beliefs. Although controls for gender, age, and education reduced the




Figure 7 How Pseudoscience Belief Related to Voting (1979–1990) (percents are adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year)

differences, those who rejected astrology were still about 5 percent more likely to vote than those who said it was “very” or “sort of” scientific; those who rejected astrology also contacted a public official 3 percent more often. After demographic controls, lucky numbers supporters voted about 3 percent less and contacted public officials about 4 percent less than those who rejected lucky numbers.

An individual’s stance on evolution did not affect voting, although evolution supporters contacted public officials slightly more often. These individuals were more often male or better-educated, and education and gender controls eliminated any

belief effects. Individuals who saw a UFO-alien connection voted or contacted public officials slightly less often than others, but again these differences disappeared when age, gender, education, and ethnicity were controlled. These results are presented in Figures 7 and 8.

Thus, essentially *less fatalistic* individuals who rejected astrology and lucky numbers voted or contacted public officials more often. Politicians who wish to appease religious right voters need to realize that individuals who rejected evolution (especially net of gender and educational variables), were no more likely to vote or contact public officials than




Figure 8 How Pseudoscience Belief Related to Contacting a Public Official (1981–2001) (percentages are adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year)

evolution supporters, although *their electoral choices, or the issues they support*, may differ. And those who suspected aliens were cruising the skies remarkably resembled those who did not in political participation, once age, education, gender, and ethnicity were controlled.

Support for pseudoscience *did* relate to topical areas individuals supported for funding; some belief differences remained even after controls for background or social status factors. Here I focus on those individuals who believed funding for diverse topical areas is “too little” versus other respondents who said “too much” or “about right.” The effects of belief that I present were all controlled for the effects of gender, age, study year, education, and (when available) ethnicity.

Although those who said astrology is scientific generally supported the same issues as other respondents (controlling background factors), those who believed “some numbers are lucky” were 7 percent more likely to believe that funding for medical research was too low, and 3 percent more likely to say funding for educational improvements was too low, compared to those rejecting lucky numbers. Net of background characteristics, evolution supporters were 5 percent more likely to support space exploration funding, 9 percent more likely to support science research funding, and 4 percent less likely to support defense funding than evolution rejecters. Some of these findings are illustrated in Figures 9 and 10.




Figure 9 How Pseudoscience Belief Related to Feelings about Defense Spending (1981–2001) (percentages are adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year)

Discussion and Implications

In this entry, I examined determinants and political correlates of several pseudoscience beliefs. Clearly, these beliefs appeal to significant portions of the U.S. adult public. Some research (see, e.g., Stempien and Coleman 1985) indicates that pseudoscience appeals, such as those for biblical creationism, use persuasive techniques that the general public finds more vivid and compelling than the rather dry and circuitous explanations that typically form the stuff of science.

Many pseudoscience beliefs, such as support for astrology or lucky numbers, differentially correlated with personal characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, educational level, age, and gender. Fur-

ther, net of gender, education, age, and ethnic controls, some pseudoscience beliefs related to voting, contacting political officials, and supporting funding in different sectors, such as science and defense.

There are several implications for educators, industry, and public officials. Because women, young adults, the poorly educated, and some minorities more often support certain pseudoscience areas, educators may want to ensure that no group is left behind in science education. Special attention and inclusion are probably needed to encourage many members of these groups to remain in science and math classes.

Selective endorsement of pseudoscience has implications for policymak-




Figure 10 How Pseudoscience Belief Related to Feelings about Science Spending (1981–2001) (Percents are adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year)

ers. Many pseudoscience beliefs had small but statistically significant effects on voting, contacting political officials, and funding support. For example, those who supported evolution more often expressed concern about funding science, space exploration, and education, whereas those who rejected it more often supported defense spending. For those who employ segmenting and targeting techniques, this information may invite further study. School boards may wish to ensure that voters understand the differences between science and pseudoscience theories.

Pseudoscience is not necessarily bad. Astrology can be an entertaining conversational icebreaker, and some forms of

alternative medicine have received medical science research support—but none of these pseudoscience areas uses the rigorous theory testing, representative samples, control groups, and self-correcting processes that we know as the scientific method. When individuals confuse science with pseudoscience, they become vulnerable to exploitation from self-serving contenders who masquerade as scientific practitioners. They may eschew traditional medicine to use folk remedies and delay needed medical care, thus endangering their health. Their children may be taught that any conjecture is a theory, regardless of whether its assertions can be empirically tested.

Very little research on the U.S. adult public examines pseudoscience opinion. Yet the prevalence of many ersatz science beliefs; their relationships with gender, ethnicity, age, and education; and their relationships with aspects of the political process indicate that these beliefs can be important. Greater understanding of pseudoscience beliefs should benefit educators, public officials, and the general public.

Acknowledgments

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Susan Carol Losh

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Religion

Ever since a small band of colonists, composed mostly of a minority religious sect, first settled the Eastern Seaboard of what would eventually become the United States, religion and religious beliefs have shaped and reshaped public opinion here. Until recently, however, political science mostly ignored the role that religious beliefs play in shaping public attitudes. Although scholars paid lip service to religion by noting denominational influences on partisanship and voting habits, the study of politics through the use of religious lenses was severely undervalued.

Today, the discipline has begun to recognize the importance of religious beliefs in determining public attitudes (Green et al. 1996; Guth et al. 1997; Layman 1997, 2001; Wilcox 2000). Religious denomination and commitment play an important role in shaping how people feel about a

range of issues. If one divides Americans based on “high” and “low” religious commitment—how often people pray and attend services—significant attitudinal differences emerge. The remainder of this entry explores the effect that denomination and strength of religious commitment have on contemporary attitudes.

Religious Beliefs

Compared to the citizens of most other modern industrial nations, Americans are a very religious people. Nearly two-thirds admit to religion being very important in their daily lives, whereas only 16 percent of Britons, 14 percent of French, and 13 percent of Germans concur. When denomination and degree of religious commitment are taken into consideration, however, there is wide disparity of opinion among Americans regarding the perceived importance of religion. For instance, clear majorities of white evangelical Protestants (100 percent and 79 percent of high- and low-commitment, respectively) and black Protestants (94 percent and 78 percent of evangelicals and mainliners, respectively) note the importance of religion in their lives. White mainline Protestants and white, non-Hispanic Catholics, however, have dramatically more diverse views. Among the highly committed, 100 percent of Catholics and 95 percent of Protestants cite the importance of religion in daily life. Among their low-commitment brethren, only 27 percent of Catholics and 22 percent of Protestants agree. Amazingly, almost as many seculars (16 percent) as low-commitment Protestants and Catholics admit that religion is important to them.

A plurality of Americans (43 percent) believe that the Bible is the actual word of God but that it should not be taken liter-

ally. Thirty-six percent, however, favor a literal interpretation, and 14 percent argue that the Bible was written by men and, therefore, cannot be considered the word of God. A clear pattern emerges when viewing beliefs about the Bible through high- and low-commitment lenses. Though denomination still appears to influence opinion, the more highly committed are much more likely than the less committed within each major religious tradition to believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible. Falling above the mean, 78 percent of high-commitment white evangelical Protestants, 74 percent of black evangelicals, and 49 percent of both black mainline Protestants and low-commitment, white evangelicals believe in literal interpretation. Falling below the mean, 32 percent of high-commitment, white mainline Protestants, 31 percent of traditional Catholics, 16 percent of low-commitment mainliners, 14 percent of Liberal Catholics, and a fraction of seculars (6 percent) adhere to this viewpoint.

Religious Beliefs and Society

As the United States is a relatively religious nation, it is not surprising that a majority (by a 51–28 percent margin) believe religion has too little influence in the world. Nonetheless, strong variation exists among religious subgroups. For instance, highly committed, white evangelical Protestants are most likely (78 percent) to describe the world as too little influenced by religion. Similarly, 67 percent of all black Protestants, 64 percent of less-committed evangelicals, and roughly half of highly committed, white mainline Protestants (51 percent) and white, non-Hispanic Catholics (50 percent) agree. Conversely, only about two-fifths of low-commitment mainline

Protestants (44 percent) and Catholics (42 percent), and only 23 percent of seculars, agree.

Similarly, by a margin of 58–36 percent, Americans believe their country is strong because of the religious faith of its people. Again, however, clear differences emerge when comparing the views among and within denominations. For instance, 71 percent of seculars argue that U.S. society would be strong regardless of religious faith. A majority (52 percent) of low-commitment, white, non-Hispanic Catholics and a bare plurality (48 percent) of low-commitment, white mainline Protestants agree. However, 83 percent of all evangelicals (89 percent of high-commitment, 76 percent of low-commitment), strong majorities of high-commitment Catholics (76 percent) and mainliners (72 percent), and black Protestants (71 percent) believe the strength of its citizens' religious faith is the foundation of U.S. society.

Most Americans (61–35 percent) also believe that children are more likely to be moral when raised with a religious faith. Among high-commitment groups, 93 percent of white evangelicals, 83 percent of white, non-Hispanic Catholics, and 71 percent of white mainline Protestants agree. Seventy-seven percent of less-committed evangelicals and two-thirds of all black Protestants also subscribe to this view. Low-commitment, white mainliners are split on this issue as only a slim majority (51–45 percent) agree. Conversely, a minority (46–50 percent) of low-commitment, white Catholics and only 22 percent of seculars agree.

Americans are strongly divided (50–47 percent against), however, on whether belief in God is necessary for one to be moral and possess good values. Providing further support for the view that strength

of religious commitment affects beliefs, however, majorities of high- and low-commitment, white evangelicals (68 and 55 percent, respectively), black Protestants (66 percent), high-commitment, white Catholics (54 percent), and a plurality of high-commitment, white mainline Protestants (49 percent) argue that belief in God is needed for one to be moral and retain good values. Joining a strong majority of seculars (82 percent), majorities of low-commitment, white Catholics (66 percent) and mainline Protestants (65 percent) disagree. Only one in three of these Catholics (33 percent) and mainline Protestants (32 percent) agree.

Controversial Issues

A close examination of contemporary issues makes evident the current divide among and within religious communities. Americans, for instance, support the death penalty 67–26 percent. Among white evangelicals, though, support is slightly stronger among the highly committed (76 percent); low-commitment members (74 percent) also show strong support for the death penalty. Also falling above the national average, strong majorities of low-commitment, white mainliners (79 percent) and Catholics (80 percent), as well as seculars (72 percent), favor state-sponsored execution for heinous crimes.

Falling below the national average, high-commitment, white mainliners (62 percent) and non-Hispanic Catholics (64 percent) are less likely than their less-committed brethren to support the death penalty. Among white mainline Protestants and Catholics, then, religious intensity appears to lessen support for the taking of human life by the state. Perhaps more of these individuals place that responsibility solely with God rather

than government. Conversely, the strong support of all evangelicals may be the result of their focus on individual morality. As such, those who commit murder have not only violated society; they have acted against God, and, therefore, must pay severely for their crimes. The only group to oppose the death penalty, perhaps because a disproportionate number of those put to death by the state are African Americans, are black Protestants (55 to 38 percent). Interestingly, however, among Americans who oppose executions by the state, 42 percent cite their religious beliefs as the main reason for their opposition.

Although the public generally opposes (57–35 percent) allowing gays to marry, 89 percent of highly committed, white evangelicals oppose such unions. Similarly, 71 percent of low-commitment, white evangelicals, 70 percent of black evangelicals, and 63 percent of traditional Catholics oppose gay marriage. Falling on the other side of the debate, only 30 percent of seculars (nearly two-thirds support them), 31 percent of liberal Catholics, and 49 percent of black mainline Protestants oppose such unions. White mainline Protestants are in the middle, as the highly committed fall at the national average of 57 percent opposition, and the less-committed oppose it 52–40 percent. Among those who oppose gay marriage, 65 percent (80 percent of the highly committed) admit that religious convictions strongly shape this view.

Another controversial topic that provides a clear view of the religious divide is stem-cell research. The general public supports federal funding of stem-cell research by a 50–35 percent margin. Falling well below the national average,

less than one in five (19 percent) high-commitment, white evangelicals support it (58 percent are opposed). Although they fall below the mean, a plurality (49 percent) of less-committed, white evangelicals favor federal funding. Also below the national average are highly committed, white Catholics (44 percent) and blacks (39 percent). Conversely, seculars (64 percent) and low-commitment, white mainline Protestants (65 percent), white Catholics (57 percent), and blacks (62 percent) favor federal funding for stem-cell research. Although they fall above the national average in their support for federal funding, highly committed, white mainline Protestants (51 percent) still are less likely than their low-commitment brethren to support it.

Americans also support (67–27 percent) providing generous government assistance to the poor. However, clear differences emerge when viewing this level of support by religious tradition and strength of religious commitment. Black Protestants (87 percent), high- and low-commitment, white, non-Hispanic Catholics (68 percent and 70 percent, respectively), and seculars (67 percent) fall above or at the national average. White mainline Protestants (62 percent of high-commitment, 61 percent of low-commitment) and evangelicals (59 percent of high-commitment, 64 percent of low-commitment) fall below the national average favoring generous government assistance to the poor. Though they are relatively minor, we should expect to see these differences among denominations because evangelicals tend to stress individual morality and are more likely to view the circumstances of the poor as resulting from individual failures. Conversely, the Catholic and mainline Protestant traditions tend to

stress social justice and responsibility and view the plight of the poor as the result of societal failures. Additionally, as a higher percentage of blacks than whites receive government assistance, it is not surprising that black Protestants strongly favor such assistance.

Allowing faith-based organizations to apply for federal funding for social services also receives strong support (70–26 percent) from Americans. Falling above the national average, strong majorities of high- and low-commitment, white evangelicals (71 and 76 percent, respectively), white, non-Hispanic Catholics (78 percent of both Traditionalists and Liberals), and mainline (80 percent) and evangelical (82 percent) black Protestants support allowing organizations to apply. Although still constituting majorities, high- and low-commitment, white mainline Protestants (59 percent and 67 percent, respectively) and seculars (57 percent) fall below the national mean. Despite this majority support across religious categories, the public has some reservations about allowing certain religious groups to apply for federal funding to provide social services. Indeed, pluralities (46 percent of Americans) oppose allowing Muslim and Buddhist organizations to apply for such funding (38 percent approve for each group), and 41 percent are opposed to allowing Mormons to apply. Six in ten Americans also are concerned that such programs might lead to religious groups proselytizing those who receive their aid, and 68 percent worry that such an initiative would result in too much government involvement with religious institutions. The latter may help explain why fewer high-commitment, white evangelicals and mainline Protestants than their lower-commitment brethren favor this program.

Mixing Religion and Politics

Given Americans' strong sympathies for religion and religious causes, as well as their general disapproval of atheists (only 34 percent approve of this group), it is not surprising that 70 percent of registered voters believe it is important for the president to have strong religious beliefs. Indeed, a 49 percent plurality of Americans would not vote for an atheist if nominated by their party. Examining other minorities provides a clear contrast, as 94 percent of Americans would cast their presidential ballot for a Catholic, 92 percent for a Jew, and 79 percent for a Mormon (Servin-Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999).

Despite their desire for a religious president, no matter the tradition, the public remains evenly divided over issues surrounding church and state. For instance, when asked if the government should take steps to protect America's religious heritage or ensure a high degree of separation between church and state, 48 percent chose the former and 47 percent the latter (Servin-Gonzalez and Torres-Reyna 1999). This even split is somewhat reflected by examining specific issues closely related to church-state matters. For example, the public remains split on whether houses of worship should express their views on social and political questions. Half of respondents think they should, whereas 44 percent oppose such politicking. However, clear majorities of high- and low-commitment, white evangelicals (74 percent and 52 percent, respectively), black evangelicals (67 percent), and traditional Catholics (52 percent) support church political activism. Opposing such politicking are 59 percent of white, mainline Protestants (51 percent and 61 percent of high-

and low-commitment, respectively) and 56 percent of liberal Catholics and seculars. The middle group is mainline, black Protestants who are almost evenly split: 49 percent in favor, 46 percent opposed.

By a margin of 64 percent to 28 percent, however, Americans remain wary of pastors expressing their political views from the pulpit. Registering above the national average, 35 percent of highly committed, white evangelical Protestants, 34 percent of black evangelical Protestants, 31 percent of traditional Catholics, 31 percent of mainline black Protestants, and 30 percent of low-commitment, white evangelicals support clerical politicking. Surprisingly, even 30 percent of seculars support clergy expressing their views. Falling below the national average, only 26 percent of high-commitment, white mainline Protestants, 25 percent of liberal Catholics, and 16 percent of low-commitment, white mainline Protestants support political speeches from the pulpit.

Additionally, a clear majority of the public (70 percent) opposes church support of candidates for political office. However, only a 48 percent plurality of high-commitment, white evangelicals subscribe to this view, whereas 42 percent favor endorsements. Additionally, only 58 percent of black Protestants oppose church endorsements, while 34 percent support them. Nonetheless, strong majorities of high- and low-commitment, white mainline Protestants (79 percent and 77 percent, respectively) and Catholics (70 percent and 75 percent, respectively), and strong majorities of low-commitment, white evangelicals (74 percent) and seculars (75 percent) believe churches should refrain from endorsing candidates.

The importance of religion and strength of religious commitment also is clear when examining the 2000 presidential vote. Although Republican George W. Bush and Democrat Al Gore essentially tied at 50 percent of the popular two-party vote, the various major religious traditions tended to strongly prefer one candidate over the other. The same was true when level of religious commitment is taken into consideration as the more highly committed of each tradition were more likely to support Bush. Indeed, the Republican's best support came from highly committed, white evangelical Protestants (78 percent of the two-party vote). He also received the support of most low-commitment evangelicals (71 percent), high- and low-commitment, white mainline Protestants (56 percent and 52 percent, respectively), and traditional Catholics (55 percent). Strongly supporting Gore were both mainline and evangelical black Protestants (97 percent and 96 percent, respectively), Jews (81 percent), liberal Catholics (62 percent), and seculars (59 percent).

Conclusion

This entry illustrates how religion and religious beliefs strongly shape Americans' attitudes toward contemporary issues. Although religious denomination appears to influence political and social attitudes, one's commitment—or lack of commitment—to a faith may be as—if not more—influential in determining these attitudes. Indeed, today low-commitment mainline Protestants and Catholics often share more views with seculars than with their high-commitment brethren. Additionally, the latter often have similar views to those of evan-

gical Protestants. As such, this chapter provides further evidence for an increasingly strong religious divide among those Americans who are highly committed to religion and those who are not.

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Science

During the twentieth century, science dazzled the world. It produced outcomes such as cloning and space travel—the stuff of fantasy barely a century before. No wonder Americans express such considerable interest in medicine, science, and technology (National Science Board 2002). In 2000 alone, the United States spent about \$264 billion on scientific and technical research and development.

In modern industrial societies, sizable proportions of that support emanate from national governments. Public opinion about science may help legitimate conducting and funding research. It may also relate to individual quality of life. For example, scientists may communicate more effectively with informed citizens or the scientifically literate may adopt better health practices (see Miller 2000; Yankelovich 1991). Further, pseudo-science practitioners, such as faith healers and creationist scholars, vie for political clout, consumer dollars, and cultural influence. A combination of low basic knowledge and attitudes supporting science may create a citizenry easily swayed by and overly trusting of ersatz science claims.

Basic science knowledge means *factual comprehension*, a fundamental vocabulary about topics typically taught in upper grades of elementary school,

such as simple atomic structure or bacteria (see Sunal and Sunal 2003). Grasping these basic terms is important because understanding or contributing to policies about the environment, medical research, and nuclear power is difficult if one lacks even a rudimentary knowledge of atoms, bacteria, viruses, and oxygen creation.

I do not examine other forms of science literacy, such as understanding what control groups do or reasoning processes, although these are important. This is largely because there is less information about these topics among the general public. Many studies in this area use students from kindergarten to college instead of nonstudent adults. *Support for science* means *positive attitudes* toward science processes (e.g., experiments), organizations (e.g., research laboratories), and scientists.

In this entry, I examine Americans' interest in science and technology, their levels of elementary knowledge, and their attitudes about science at the turn of the millennium. Science knowledge or attitudes toward science are not randomly distributed among Americans. Men and the well educated appear both more knowledgeable and more positive. For example, the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) Center for Public Policy conducted national telephone interviews addressing attitudes toward the life sciences in 2001 and 2002 (Funk 2002). Better-educated adults and men more often said that science was essential to improve the quality of life and less often agreed that science created social problems. Males and the college-educated more often recognized that scientific controversies can stimulate theoretical advances, and their confidence in science was *strengthened*, not weakened,

when scientists disagreed among themselves.

Finally, I examine how basic science knowledge and attitudinal support relate to two fundamental aspects of civic involvement: voting and contacting public officials. Politicians often scrutinize different social stakeholders when formulating policy, so even elemental forms of participation are important. For example, public school board members may try to reconcile views from scientists, teachers, religious leaders, and laypersons in creating science school curricula.

Science Knowledge

For describing science knowledge and attitudes, I analyze data from the Surveys of Public Understanding of Science and Technology conducted by the National Science Foundation (NSF). This archive, spanning 1979 through 2001 and directed by Jon D. Miller through 1999, contains the greatest amount of cumulative information about U.S. public opinion and knowledge about science. It comprises 21,965 interviews with representative adults at least 18 years old in 11 surveys (1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001) of the lower 48 states. Case bases ranged from 1,574 in 2001 to 3,193 in 1981.

NSF survey respondents were interviewed in person or through randomized telephone interviews after 1979. Completion rates ranged from 51 percent (2001) to more than 70 percent in earlier years. Items monitor science and technology interest and knowledge, science-related activities, pseudoscience beliefs, and attitudes about science policy. This archive is special because it comprises national representative adult samples, rather than the more typical convenience samples (e.g., students or activist groups), and it

has many questions about basic science knowledge and science attitudes as well as policy-related items such as contacting public officials.

As Figure 1 (from the NSF data) shows, more than half of American men in 2001 described themselves as “very interested” in scientific or medical discoveries and new technological developments. More than 70 percent of women said they were very interested in new medical discoveries. These proportions steeply dropped when adults described *how well informed* they were. Exempting medical discoveries, less than 20 percent of Americans considered themselves very well informed. Although C. Funk’s (2002) items used a different question format, which can influence the results, 40 percent of Americans in the 2002 VCU sur-

vey said they had “a lot” of interest in scientific or medical discoveries, but fewer than 10 percent described themselves as “very informed.”

And Americans do have gaps in basic knowledge. Using the NSF surveys, majorities of both sexes in 2001 knew that the center of the earth is hot; the continents are moving; oxygen comes from plants; light travels faster than sound; antibiotics do *not* kill viruses *and* bacteria; humans and dinosaurs lived at different times; the earth traverses the sun; and smoking causes lung cancer. Fewer than half the women knew that lasers focus light (not sound) waves or that electrons are smaller than atoms. Such topics are first taught in primary school, so when I add these 10 items (available from 1988 through 2001; each




Figure 1 Interest and Self-Described Informedness by Gender, 2001 (N = 1564–1574)

correct answer counts 1 for a possible total of 10), I call the sum the Basic Science Knowledge score.

Figure 2 shows how the Basic Science Knowledge average (mean) score varied by time, gender, and ethnicity. Because other variables also affect science knowledge (e.g., younger or college-educated adults had higher knowledge scores), these means were adjusted for age and educational level using a statistical technique called Multiple Classification Analysis. The averages in Figure 2, and in other figures presented below, show the net, or adjusted, effects of predictors such as gender and ethnicity. If adjustments had not been made for age and education, the original impact of gender on science knowledge would have been 16 percent larger, that of ethnicity 14 percent larger,

and study year 29 percent larger. In these data, ethnicity is only available for 1999 and 2001.

The male adjusted average Basic Science Knowledge score was 7.33, while women's adjusted mean score was 6.35. Non-Hispanic whites averaged an adjusted mean score of 7.23, significantly higher than the Hispanic average of 6.07 or the (non-Hispanic) black average of 6.00. Although the average adult scored about one-half point higher on basic science knowledge in 2001 than in 1988, the gender and ethnic average differences remained constant over time. Education also was influential: individuals with less than a high school degree averaged only five out of 10 items correct, compared with a mean score of eight for those with a graduate degree.




Figure 2 Basic Science Knowledge by Gender, Ethnicity, and Year (mean scores adjusted for age and educational level) (Gender Analyses N=13,436 Ethnic Analysis N=3398)




Figure 3 Attitude Support for Science by Gender, Ethnicity, and Year (mean scores adjusted for age and educational level) (Gender Analyses N=20,975 Ethnic Analyses N=3432)

Typical Americans were not the only ones with knowledge gaps. When they analyzed data from their mailed national survey of high school biology teachers, Raymond Eve and Dana Dunn (1989) found that many teachers weren't sure what constituted scientific evidence (e.g., fossils in evolution) or a solid scientific theory.

Attitudes toward Science

Generally, the U.S. public is positive about science. In 2001, about half felt the benefits of scientific research strongly outweighed the risks. More than three-quarters agreed that science and technology make life healthier and easier, create "more opportunity," or make "work more interesting." Majorities at least

moderately endorsed biotechnology applications in food and genetic testing. Although cloning evoked some reservations, almost half supported animal cloning. (In the VCU Life Science Study, a majority of Americans rejected human cloning, both generally and in medical research.)

We also appreciate scientists. In 2001, about 90 percent agreed that scientists work to benefit humanity or want to make life better. Only one-quarter felt that scientists are "odd and peculiar people." In fact, at some point, 46 percent of men and 37 percent of women had even considered becoming a scientist.

Nevertheless, as Funk has noted about the life sciences, Americans harbor ambivalent feelings. In the NSF 2001 sur-




Figure 4 Relationships between Basic Science Knowledge and Positive Science Attitudes (partial correlations adjusted for age, study year, and educational level)

veys, half the respondents agreed that “we depend too much on science and not enough on faith,” 40 percent agreed that science “makes our way of life change too fast,” 45 percent agreed that people would do better living a “simple life without so much technology,” 31 percent agreed that technology creates an “artificial and inhuman way of life,” and 30 percent even felt that technological discoveries will destroy the earth.

I used the four attitude questions with the longest history in the NSF archive to create a Science Beneficial Index. Three items date back to 1979, and the fourth began in 1981. They address whether science makes life healthier and easier, how

much the benefits of science outweigh the risks, whether science makes life change too fast, and whether we depend too much on science and not enough on faith. All were rescored to make *high scores indicate positive attitudes*, and then the scores were averaged. Final mean scores ranged from 1 (highly negative effect) to 5 (highly positive).

Figure 3 shows how the Science Beneficial Index average varied by time, gender, and ethnicity, adjusting for age and educational level. Had these adjustments not been made, the effect of gender on science attitudes would have been 14 percent greater and that of ethnicity 18 percent greater. Any effects of study year




Figure 5 Basic Science Knowledge of Those Who Voted: 1988–1990 (mean scores adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year) (N=4043)

remained constant. Men were slightly but consistently more positive about science than were women, and non-Hispanic whites were slightly more positive toward science than Hispanics or blacks. Individuals with graduate degrees had an average score of 3.9 out of 5, compared with a mean of 3.2 for those lacking a high school diploma.

How Do Basic Knowledge and Attitudes Relate?

We tend to like what is familiar to us—and public opinion about science is no exception. Figure 4 shows the correlation coefficients between Basic Science Knowledge scores and the Science Benefi-

cial Index scores. The partial correlations were adjusted for age, study year, and educational level. A correlation coefficient of 1.0 means that we can perfectly or exactly predict from one factor (e.g., basic knowledge) to a second (e.g., science attitudes). The original correlation for all respondents in 1988–2001 was moderate and positive (0.33): people with higher basic science knowledge scores tended to hold more positive attitudes about science. The *adjusted* partial correlation for everyone at 0.21 was still positive but weak. Correlations were similar for women and men. However, non-Hispanic whites had a stronger relationship between knowledge and attitudes (0.33) than either




Figure 6 Support for Science of Those Who Voted: 1979–1990 (mean scores adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year) (N=1,501)

blacks (0.19) or Hispanics (0.25). This also held for the adjusted partial correlations, which were weak for whites (0.21) but practically nonexistent for blacks (0.11) and Hispanics (0.13).

Knowledge, Attitudes, and Civic Engagement

One argument for basic science literacy is that better knowledge prepares citizens for a greater, more intelligent involvement in public affairs. But do those with higher levels of science knowledge, or more positive attitudes, even participate more in the democratic process? Voting and contacting public officials are considered simple, basic steps in civic participation. Figures 5–8 take an introductory

look at such issues. Once again, I use the NSF archive and adjust for variables that influence science knowledge, science attitudes, and civic engagement: age, education, gender, and survey year. For example, men are more likely to contact a public official, and the better-educated are more likely to vote. Data on voting in a recent local or federal election are available from 1979 through 1990; an item on whether the individual contacted a public official in the past year is available from 1979 to 2001.

Conclusion

Most Americans are interested in science, although men are relatively more attracted by scientific discoveries or new




Figure 7 Basic Science Knowledge of Those Who Contacted a Public Official: 1988–2001 (mean scores adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year) (N=13,411)

technology, while women are more interested in medical developments. By and large, the general public views science as beneficial and scientists as constructive figures. However, a large minority harbors reservations, particularly in areas such as nuclear power and biotechnology (Funk 2002). The public holds moderate levels of elementary science knowledge.

Attitudinal support for science is only weakly related to elementary science knowledge, and the relationship between knowledge and support among blacks and Hispanics is very small. Positive attitudes toward science, without a corresponding base of knowledge, can create vulnerability to pseudoscience appeals from political, alternative medicine, religious, or

other sources. These institutions often claim to be scientific but typically use anecdotal evidence or authoritative assertion without following the processes used by normative science, such as representative samples, control groups, and the evaluation of competing hypotheses.

Individuals with higher levels of science knowledge or positive opinions about science are slightly more likely to be good citizens. Although the effects were small, those who had voted or had contacted a public official also were more knowledgeable and more positive overall about science. Since many public decisions about education (e.g., science curricula), defense (anticipating biological terrorism), medicine (stem-cell research),




Figure 8 Support for Science of Those Who Contacted a Public Official: 1979–2001 (mean scores adjusted for gender, age, educational level, and study year) (N=20,862)

and agriculture (genetically engineered vegetables) involve science and technology, policymakers need a clearer picture of just who their stakeholders are.

Non-Hispanic white Americans and men are slightly but consistently more knowledgeable and favorable toward science than are blacks, Hispanics, and women. The relationship between basic science knowledge and science attitudes was also slightly stronger for whites than it was for blacks and Hispanics. Although group differences narrow when educational level and age are controlled, ethnic and gender gaps persist across time.

Gender and ethnic differences in science knowledge and attitudes deserve

further study, partly because these groups receive less overall science training and less often hold scientific and technological jobs. Controls for age and educational level are only a beginning. For example, factors such as one's major field of education (e.g., life sciences), liberal arts versus vocational or professional training (e.g., nursing school versus biology), and one's occupation (e.g., biologist) may be important. Further, the NSF data do not include variables related to religion, such as religious intensity. Prior research on more limited samples indicates that individuals who are more traditionally religious have lower levels of science knowledge and are less positive

about science (e.g., Ellison and Musick 1995; Funk 2002).

One controversy among those who study public opinion on science, and even among scientists, is whether the general public is capable of full participation in policy decisions about science. Some scholars (Miller 2000) believe an informed citizenry is both possible *and* vital for policy discussions in democratic societies. They point out how increased education not only affects the individual's own levels of science knowledge or science attitudes but also those of his or her children and the next generation. Others (Shamos 1995) assert that the general public cannot attain a level sufficient to contribute intelligibly to science policy debate. Perhaps the best that can be expected is public *appreciation* for scientific experts and their decisions.

Daniel Yankelovich (1991) vehemently opposes creeping expertism and advocating the unquestioning trust of experts, scientific or otherwise. He believes the general public can and should be involved with the values related to the production and implementation of scientific research and in setting priorities for governmental funding. His Public Agenda organization is dedicated to disseminating information on diverse topics (including scientific and technological developments) to ordinary citizens and explicitly including them in public debate. Greater understanding of the public's basic knowledge about science, and its attitudes toward science and scientists, can thus contribute to setting goals for citizen participation in governmental processes.

Acknowledgments

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Susan Carol Losh

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September 11, 2001

During the 1990s, beliefs about a growing rift between the United States and Western Europe on issues of national security gained increasing acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1999, the Brookings Institution published a volume

arguing that the disappearance of the Soviet Union, weakening economic ties, and dissimilar international roles were combining to push apart the United States and its European allies. Likewise, the editor of Germany's influential weekly *Die Zeit* remarked that Europe was beginning to engage in "unconscious" strategic balancing against the United States. Although a common Cold War threat generated parallel U.S. and European interests, he argued, the dissolution of that threat revealed divergent and often competing worldviews.

This view intensified after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Initial sentiments of unity (notably, a declaration from the French newspaper *Le Monde* that "we are all Americans") quickly dissipated as commentators in prominent policy journals such as *Foreign Policy*, *Washington Quarterly*, *National Interest*, and *Policy Review* asserted that the attacks had caused Americans and Europeans to view international security problems in fundamentally different ways. Polls suggested that after September 11, Europeans and Americans began to diverge sharply in their opinions about U.S. foreign policy (see Figure 1). When France, Germany, and others refused to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it seemed that the Western alliance's epitaph had been written.

The transatlantic split thesis contained at least four specific claims:

1. After September 11, Americans were more prone than Europeans to favor the use of force as a solution to foreign policy problems. Europeans preferred to rely on negotiation and diplomacy to resolve conflicts.
2. Americans and Europeans disagreed about the nature and importance of international threats.
3. Having been victimized by terrorism, Americans harbored less patience for international law and international institutions. As a consequence, they tended to favor unilateral action; Europeans relied on multilateral cooperation to accomplish foreign policy objectives.
4. Americans tended to favor an active international role for themselves; Europeans were less willing to assume the burdens of global leadership.

Did the 2001 terrorist attacks instigate (or exacerbate) these conditions? What follows is a review of polling records on each of these four issues in the year following September 11. No new surveys were conducted for this entry; instead, each section marshals a variety of publicly available data in an effort to paint a broad picture of U.S. and Western European public opinion on national security issues during this period. The emphasis is on U.S. allies in continental Western Europe (as opposed to Britain and Eastern Europe); consequently, survey statistics labeled "European" represent a calculated average of results from France, Germany, and Italy.

The Use of Force

Europeans widely condemned the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy promulgated by President George W. Bush; it endorsed military action to "forestall or prevent" the emergence of threatening adversaries. Newspapers throughout the region urged European leaders to imple-




Figure 1 Public Disapproval of President Bush's International Policies

Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

ment counterbalancing initiatives that would suppress the "dangerous" and "arrogant" proposals contained in the document. These reactions reinforced for many observers the conclusion that September 11 had rendered Americans less timorous than Europeans about advocating military force as a solution to foreign policy problems. The following section examines this claim.

Cross-national surveys conducted in June 2002 offer an initial test of the assertion that American citizens had become more prone to favor military

action. These surveys, conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in six European countries and the United States, asked individuals whether or not they would approve of the use of force to achieve particular foreign policy objectives.

In both Europe and the United States, significant majorities supported the use of force to advance a variety of objectives (see Figure 2). More than 70 percent of respondents in both surveys supported military action to destroy terrorist camps, uphold international law, assist




Figure 2 Views on the Use of Force for Specific Goals

Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

famine-stricken populations, and liberate hostages. Americans were more willing to use force for only two objectives (to destroy terrorist camps and to ensure the supply of oil); for the other four goals, Europeans supported military action more willingly than did Americans.

Questions about general preferences, of course, offer only limited insight into the nature of public opinion. Public approval of abstract policy goals may not translate into support for specific military missions. For this reason, it is useful to compare public opinion regarding the use of

force in individual cases. Two recent and highly debated cases (Serbia in 1999 and Iraq in 2002 and 2003) are considered below.

NATO air strikes against Serbia in 1999 provoked intense controversy in official circles, but poll data suggest that this debate obscured broad public support for the decision (see Figure 3). In France, Germany, and Italy, support for the attacks exceeded 60 percent a few weeks after the operation began. Surveys conducted at the same time in the United States also revealed well above 50 percent approval. August 2001 surveys regarding President Bush's decision to keep troops in Bosnia and Kosovo displayed a similar pattern: a majority of European respon-

dents approved of the announcement, whereas slightly fewer Americans supported it. If anything, Europeans appeared more enthusiastic than Americans about military action in the former Yugoslavia. This observation is consistent with the results in Figure 2 that illustrate a greater willingness among Europeans to use force to end civil wars.

Did the September 11 terrorist attacks reverse this pattern? If so, one would expect to find signs of comparative U.S. aggressiveness in the prelude to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, Americans initially appeared to be more inclined to support military action against Iraq: an April 2002 survey by the Pew Center reported that 69 percent of Americans




Figure 3 Support for Military Action in the Former Yugoslavia

Sources: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, U.S. Information Agency, CBS News.

supported military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power (as opposed to not supporting it), while European support for an attack was concurrently much lower (46 percent in France and 34 percent in both Germany and Italy).

When respondents were given more than a dichotomous choice, however, alternative interpretations emerged. A September 2002 questionnaire by the Pew Center revealed that Americans preferred a diplomatic approach to Iraq over immediate invasion by a wide margin. Although 36 percent of respondents indicated a preference for an immediate invasion, 62 percent held that the United Nations (UN) should first be given the opportunity to disarm Iraq peacefully. CBS News polls as late as February 2003

affirmed these results, although the numbers supporting swift military action jumped in the weeks prior to the war's onset (see Figure 4). This observation contravenes the September 11 hypothesis, which would seem to predict high levels of aggressiveness in the months after the attacks but expect this posture to diminish as the memory of the terrorist attacks grew fainter over time.

When presented with the prospect of UN weapons inspections (prior to their resumption in November 2002), many supporters of military action turned skeptical. Seventy-seven percent of respondents to a September 14, 2002, ABC News poll agreed that the United States should hold off attacking Iraq if it agreed to allow weapons inspectors into the country.




Figure 4 U.S. Support for Invading Iraq

Sources: CBS News, CNN/Gallup/USA Today.

Similarly, although prewar polls showed widespread support for military action (as opposed to no action), in the event that Iraq did not cooperate with UN weapons inspectors, a November 24, 2002, CNN/Gallup/*USA Today* survey showed that only one-third of respondents preferred immediate military action over returning to the UN for authorization.

The performance of the September 11 hypothesis with respect to the use of force is therefore mixed. On the whole, Americans appeared more willing than Europeans to use force in Iraq, but they retained patience for intermediate diplomatic measures rather than insisting on war. Indeed, the *Washington Post* and ABC News reported on September 26, 2002, that a majority of Americans were more concerned that the Bush administration was moving too quickly toward military action against Iraq. Even after September 11, the moral legitimacy of military action seems to have been an important consideration for most Americans: when the *New York Times* inquired about defensible reasons for attacking other nations, only 41 percent of Americans held the view that the United States should be able to attack another country without being attacked first, while 47 percent disagreed. The Europeans who protested President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy so strongly might thus have more sympathizers in the United States than the editorial pages may have led them to believe.

Threat Perception

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, foreign affairs commentator Robert Kagan (2002) argued in an influential article that "Europeans and Americans differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable versus an

intolerable threat." Is it the case that threat perceptions differ across the Atlantic, and did September 11 impact these perceptions? Both cross-national and time-series survey data can help answer this question.

The 2002 CCFR survey revealed striking similarities between Americans' and Europeans' views of serious threats (see Figure 5). On both continents, international terrorism ranked as the threat most often identified as "critical" ("very important" in the European survey). The importance of terrorism was also reflected in the results of an April 2002 Pew Center survey, which reported that 67 percent of Americans and 61 percent of Europeans were either "very worried" or "somewhat worried" about the possibility of Islamic terrorism in their country. Problems in the Middle East also ranked highly on both continents: Iraqi weapons of mass destruction placed second in both surveys, while the Israeli-Arab conflict and Islamic fundamentalism claimed the next two spots (albeit in different order).

To be sure, comparable threat rankings coincided with important differences in threat perceptions. Most notably, the intensity of threat perception was significantly greater in the United States: in seven of the eight international issue categories covered by the survey, more Americans than Europeans felt threatened by the problem. For example, although Europeans and Americans appeared to agree that international terrorism constituted the greatest threat to their security, more than 90 percent of Americans saw it as a critical threat, whereas less than two-thirds of Europeans did. Likewise, the Indo-Pakistani conflict ranked similarly in both polls (fifth in Europe and sixth in the United States), but Americans considered it critical at a rate almost twice that




Figure 5 Percentage Classifying Geopolitical Threats as Important

Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

of Europeans. Most striking was the gap in perceptions regarding China: more than three times as many Americans rated China as a critical geopolitical threat.

Differences in the intensity of threat perceptions had important ramifications for policy preferences. For example, although Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction ranked as the second

most important threat for both Americans and Europeans, the Pew Center reported that 81 percent of Americans considered this a “very important” reason to justify attacking Iraq, as opposed to only 53 percent in Europe. In addition, European reaction to President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address, in which he termed Iraq, Iran, and North

Korea an “axis of evil,” was sharply negative in comparison to the reaction of Americans. Only 24 percent of Europeans surveyed approved of his classification, compared to 56 percent in the United States. Equivalent ordinal rankings thus did not necessarily translate into comparable policy views.

Consistent with the September 11 hypothesis, American perceptions of ter-

rorist threats appeared to have become comparatively more acute since the attacks (see Figure 6). In 1998, 84 percent of Americans saw international terrorism as a critical threat to the United States, but by mid-2001 this figure had dropped to 64 percent before shooting up to 91 percent nine months after September 11. At the same time, fears of weapons of mass destruction increased slightly, while fears




Figure 6 Percentage Classifying Threat as Major after September 11

Sources: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.

regarding China and Russia both remained stable.

Multilateralism and International Institutions

President Bush’s announcement of the country’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001 suggested to many that September 11 had ushered in a new era of U.S. unilateralism. Such sentiments were bolstered by President Bush’s apparent disregard for UN authority while considering and conducting the invasion of Iraq. Yet the data below suggest that September 11 did not persuade the U.S. public that the country must act alone more often. Rather, Americans remained supportive

of—even insistent upon—obtaining international support first.

In 1998, the CCFR reported that 72 percent of Americans believed that in general the United States should not take action in responding to international crises without the support of its allies. By 2002, this figure had dropped to 61 percent, but those opposing unilateral action remained firmly in the majority. The same percentage of respondents believed the lesson of September 11 was that the United States must work more closely with other nations to fight terrorism.

Skepticism about acting unilaterally was apparent in polls regarding U.S. action against Iraq (see Figure 7). A CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll in late September




Figure 7 Should the U.S. Wait for Allies before Taking Action against Iraq?

Sources: CBS News, *New York Times*.

2002 indicated that only 38 percent of the country would support an invasion of Iraq without allied support; with allied participation, however, this figure jumped to 78 percent. Concurrent *Newsweek* polls suggested that about 60 percent of the country believed it was “very important” to obtain allied support before attacking.

Americans’ desire to obtain UN support for attacking Iraq was similarly strong. The *Newsweek* surveys noted above registered nearly identical numbers regarding the importance of UN approval, and CNN reported in September 2002 that 68 percent believed it was necessary for the Bush administration to obtain a UN resolution before attacking Iraq. An August 2002 *Los Angeles Times* poll confirmed that about two-thirds of the nation agreed that the United States should attack only with the support of the international community. Even more striking, a September 23, 2002, poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes suggested that 64 percent of Americans believed the United States should only invade Iraq if it was able to obtain *both* allied support and UN approval.

Surveys regarding general support for the UN confirmed that it continues to enjoy broad public support in the United States. Sixty-eight percent of Americans surveyed by Gallup in early 2001 believed that the UN should play a “leading” or “major” role in world affairs, and according to the Pew Research Center, 46 percent viewed strengthening the UN as a “top priority” for the United States. The 2002 CCFR poll reported that 77 percent of Americans supported strengthening the UN—a level of support even higher than that in Western Europe (75 percent).

Attitudes toward withdrawal from the ABM Treaty also illustrated U.S. support for multilateralism, albeit less convinc-

ingly. Although the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the treaty was vehemently opposed in Europe (74 percent disapproved, according to the Pew Research Center), Americans did not appear to widely support this move. A CBS News/*New York Times* poll showed in March 2001 that support for missile defense dropped from 67 percent to 33 percent when respondents were informed that the United States would need to break the ABM Treaty in order to build such a system (a comparable poll a year earlier recorded a drop from 58 percent to 28 percent). Following President Bush’s withdrawal announcement (which occurred after September 11), CNN/Gallup/*USA Today* recorded a higher—but nevertheless submajority—44 percent approval rating of the decision. Notably, however, 26 percent expressed no opinion about the decision, suggesting that missile defense provoked more public opposition in Europe than in the United States, even though outright support was low in both places.

International Roles

A final question is whether the American public preferred a more active international role for itself than the European public as a result of September 11. Public opinion data from 2002 provide solid disconfirming evidence for this claim. The CCFR found that 82 percent of Americans wanted the United States to exert “strong leadership” in world affairs, while 85 percent of Europeans desired the same role for the European Union (EU). Indeed, 72 percent of Western Europeans took the view that the EU should become a superpower like the United States.

Public opinion data thus suggest that claims of a transatlantic divide on national security issues are accurate in

some respects but exaggerated in others. First, even after September 11, strong support remained in both the United States and Europe for diplomacy, multilateralism, and international institutions, although Americans were less likely to require these intermediate steps before using military force. Second, Americans and Europeans prioritized threats in similar ways, although Americans tended to perceive those threats more intensely. Finally, publics on both continents firmly backed international activism. Assertions about a widening gap between the United States and Europe thus appear to be overstated. As the invasion of Iraq illustrated, important differences exist, but too many fundamental similarities remain to speak of an inherent disunity between the United States and its allies.

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Social Context

Public opinion research is inherently interested in collectives—groups of people—rather than individuals in isolation. Scientific, random-sample surveys allow researchers to count the number of individuals who express opinions about candidates and issues and thus infer collective sentiment from this aggregation. However, when social scientists try to explain why a respondent espouses a particular view, many choose to investigate individual characteristics and psychological attributes that give rise to her opinions and attitudes, taking less interest in the ongoing social processes that influence her decisions. A common observation about survey research, particularly public opinion polls conducted at the national level, is that they abstract individuals from the political settings and social environments where they develop these attitudes. A prominent student of public opinion and social context, Robert Huckfeldt (1986, p. 1), suggests opinions and behavior of individuals "cannot be explained apart from the environment in which they occur."

Textbook discussions of political opinions recognize the socially contingent nature of attitude development, often dis-

cussing childhood socialization within families, as well as the importance of educational and religious experiences. The people who surround us—parents, clerics, fellow worshippers, classmates, and teachers, among others—help shape our public opinions and beliefs.

An early investigation into the influence of social context on publicly expressed opinions is Swedish political scientist and journalist Herbert Tingsten's (1963 [1937]) influential study of voting and the strength of party support across voting districts in Stockholm. He found that in precincts with high working-class densities, Socialists received a disproportionately large share of votes. In districts with smaller minorities of working-class voters, the party received a disproportionately smaller share of votes. If voting for the socialist list was merely an expression of an individual's class interests, he might have observed socialist voting in direct proportion to the population of working-class precincts in voting precincts. Instead, the S-shaped relationship Tingsten identified between class composition and voting suggested to him that social context had an effect on the choices of voters. The composition of a voter's election district affected his choice in the election: an individual surrounded by working-class voters was more likely to vote for a socialist candidate regardless of his own class interests. Similarly, a voter surrounded by more affluent neighbors was less likely to vote socialist independent of his class interests.

Contextual Understandings of Public Opinion

Scholars who study the influence of social context on public opinion generally agree that people are interdependent, with individual opinions at least partially contin-

gent upon the environment created by other proximate people, their traits, and views. Social interaction, both direct interpersonal experiences and indirect interaction a person has with others by observing their traits and behavior, drives contextual effects. Another useful way to describe a contextual effect, then, is in terms of social influence: an individual is persuaded or affected by the recommendations, actions, and attributes of the people who surround him.

An individual's social context is frequently defined using the political and geographic units within which he resides. For example, in their study of social context, John W. Books and Charles L. Prysby (1991, p. 3) concentrate on the influence of attributes of collectives defined by geographic units, particularly the small but delimited areas such as counties, precincts, and neighborhoods. They argue these are appropriate for their study of social context and individual opinion because definitions of context not linked specifically to geographic units may be overly broad. However, scholars often supplement this geographic understanding of an individual's context with a more explicit consideration of the people who share environments not necessarily defined by political geography, like workplaces, churches, and clubs.

Multiple Levels of Opinion and Action

One of the premises that underlies contextual analysis is that individuals are simultaneously members of nested aggregates of people located within geographic boundaries: an individual lives in a house, perhaps with a family. This house and its residents are located on a block within a neighborhood and voting precinct. These neighbors are located within a town, city, or village, which is set within a county,

and so on, aggregating eventually to congressional districts, states, regions, and the nation.

Books and Prysby (1991) review three general classes of contextual attributes thought to affect public opinion. First, public opinion and behavior are influenced by the compositional attributes of social contexts, expressed as a mathematical function of individual-level measures. Living near a great number of Democrats, for example, has been found to influence an individual's opinions about political issues and candidates. How can we assess how Democratic a given area like a neighborhood or voting precinct is? A compositional measurement strategy might average the percentage of the Democratic vote in that voting precinct during several elections. The measure is a reflection of individual partisanship mathematically combined.

A second category of relevant contextual factors includes the structural characteristics of communities that are the product of social behavior and interaction within a geographic unit but are not measured by averaging across the attributes of individuals. A recent study (Oliver 2000) examines the influence of population density on interest in politics and attitudes about political participation. The residents of dense areas are less interested in politics and less likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways. Population density is influenced by the residential choices of individuals but is not computed by averaging across each person's denseness.

Third, global characteristics not derived directly from the individual properties or behaviors of residents of a geographic unit may also affect public opinions. In their analysis of beliefs about the economy, Books and Prysby (1999)

find that such a global attribute of state contexts—economic conditions in a person's state—affects her opinions about the national economy. When a person is surrounded by a social context suffering a lower unemployment rate, he tends to think national conditions are worse than they might actually be, potentially affecting a range of relevant public judgments.

Although many studies of contextual process have relied primarily on data collected at the aggregate level, these examples show that scholars are increasingly interested in cross-level inference and studies designed to bridge individuals with the collectives they form. This requires data collected at multiple levels of observation, including both individual and aggregate data collected at the county, neighborhood, or precinct level. These studies reveal interesting effects. In their study of the 1948 presidential election, researchers at Columbia University found that the strength of an individual's opinions increases with the unity of opinions among his close associates. One of their most important findings is a "breakage effect," wherein individuals whose immediate discussion group is divided tend to vote with the majority of the larger community (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, p. 116).

Studying Relationships among People: Networks and Discussants

As noted above, a principal mechanism thought to drive contextual influences on opinion is social interaction. One useful way to characterize an individual's patterns of social interaction is to study her social network—the people with whom she regularly interacts and discusses public affairs. Early political science scholarship on social influence, particularly the Columbia University studies, gravitated

toward primary groupings of family members, perhaps augmented with close friends, as the locus of political influence. Extended by others (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), this research advances a social cohesion model of influence: intimacy, shared interests, respect, access, and trust draw people to agree with each other on political matters. Social influence operates across social networks made up of members with weak ties as well. In fact these weak ties may actually be the source of more persuasive information due to the relative homogeneity of networks composed of individuals with strong social ties. Investigators incorporating these kinds of weak and strong social ties have identified contextual effects among neighbors (Orbell 1970), members of voluntary associations (Putnam 1966), and coworkers (Finifter 1974).

Still others find patterns of social influence on the opinions of people who have little face-to-face interaction with others in their social contexts. Individual opinions may be influenced by biases in the information environments (Orbell 1970) communicated impersonally and indirectly, for example, by yard signs and bumper stickers (Burbank 1997).

Group Politics in Context

Alternatively, racial, ethnic, religious, and other social reference groups can also meaningfully affect an individual's publicly expressed views. Social surroundings can also affect feelings of association with reference groups. An individual's sense of linked fate with other African Americans, which connects individual and group interests, is modestly strengthened by his involvement in a religious community but weakened by living in a more urban environment (Dawson 1994).

A classic study of southern politics by political scientist V. O. Key Jr. (1949), conducted in the years just prior to the civil rights era, also explores the influence of group politics and context on public opinion and political behavior. He found that as the proportion of minorities grows in a county, the intensity of group-level competition increases, affecting the racial antipathy of whites toward African Americans, political rhetoric, and political participation. Key argued that when the minority is small, it represents less of a threat to the interests of the majority. Increased numbers imply an increased threat—a minority group that is more competitive in the job market, in the expression of political will, and in social situations. This increased threat leads to increased animosity toward minorities by those in the majority. Other scholars have revisited and elaborated on this contextual effect in the U.S. South (Glaser 1994) and across the United States (Huckfeldt and Kohfeldt 1989). However, direct social interaction among members of different races also affects racial attitudes. In addition to the finding that whites living in social settings with large populations of minorities may feel threatened, we know that people who regularly interact with members of other races grow increasingly tolerant of and friendly to them (Allport 1954).

Concerns about Context and Cross-Level Inferences

Although these findings and understandings of contextual processes convincingly demonstrate a connection between environments and individual opinions, other students of political and social behavior remain skeptical. Some critics of this research challenge the premise underlying contextual research, suggesting that

explaining individual behavior requires individual-level variables (Hauser 1974). Others argue that context affects opinion and behavior but that these effects are minimal. However, most criticism of contextual studies involves the methodologies employed.

Research that explores the relationships between multiple phenomena observed at the aggregate level, such as the number of working-class people in a voting district and the number of socialist voters, is often exposed to what is known as the ecological fallacy: aggregate, ecological data may not support valid inferences about opinions, behavior, or causal processes operating at the individual level (Robinson 1950). Scholars continue to develop techniques aimed at reducing the problems associated with ecological inference in order to more effectively use aggregate data analyses (e.g., King 1997).

But when we find correlations between the attitudes of individuals and the attitudes of other people in relevant political geographies or political discussion networks, a regular *modus operandi* for contextual researchers (Kenny 1998), how certain can we be that anything remotely like influence drives the correlation? Individuals might choose social environments based on criteria correlated with the particular attitude or behavior of interest. Researchers C. Achen and W. Shively (1995, p. 223) provide an example of geographic self-selection that can produce apparent contextual effects with a simulation involving residential choices and support for school funding.

Conclusion

Research using dynamic models of opinion change and public opinion data collected from the same people participating

in panel studies over time suggests that contextual effects driven by social interaction and conversation are as influential on the opinion decisions as individual concerns (MacKuen and Brown 1986). Thus one prominent reviewer of the opinion literature concludes that “public opinion is not only an achievement of individual psychology, but the product of a complex and multilayered social experience as well” (Kinder 1998, p. 817). A fuller understanding of public opinion incorporates individual characteristics and motivations, as well as a decisionmaker’s social surroundings. Independent of the magnitude of contextual effects on public opinion, their existence on any level has important policy consequences. One clear concern among students of public policy is the role racial context plays in shaping individual and collective opinion about social spending.

Perhaps the bulk of research on social context’s influence on public opinion has focused on racial attitudes and party identification, but other policy-relevant opinions are affected by context as well. Individual opinions about the economy (Books and Prysby 1999), crime (Gates and Rohe 1987), police and law enforcement (Weitzer 2000), and evaluation of other community services (Hero and Durand 1985) have been shown to be susceptible to the influence of social context.

Although questions remain about the mechanisms that underlie contextual process, as well as the optimal approaches to assessing the influence of social context on individuals, the evidence in this long line of social science research informs our understanding of public opinion and continues to provoke interesting questions and new findings.

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Social Security

Created during a severe economic depression in the 1930s, the Social Security program has grown over the years to become one of the largest and best known federal programs in the United States. Despite Social Security's role in reducing poverty, many citizens fear that it is in danger because of financial difficulties looming on the horizon. Of particular concern, when the 76 million workers in the baby-boom generation begin to retire, there will be fewer workers available to support more retirees who will be living longer than in the past. These fiscal worries mean that in the twenty-first century, citizens and political leaders will be faced with important but complex decisions about the future of Social Security. One consideration likely to factor into future reforms will be public opinion. The next four sections on public opinion toward Social Security review levels of support, confidence, knowledge, and attitudes toward major reform options.

Support for Social Security

Surveys of the American public reveal overwhelming and broad support for the Social Security program. *Support* has typ-

ically been defined as willingness to endorse public spending on the program (Cook and Barrett 1992). By that standard, Americans are firmly behind Social Security because they overwhelmingly prefer to spend at least the same or more on the program. The National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has regularly asked Americans whether "we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount" on Social Security. Figure 1 shows that with the exception of just three surveys in the mid-1990s that captured a temporary downward trend, more than half of the public prefers more federal spending on the program and at least another third wants to keep spending at current levels. At no time in the nearly twenty years that this question has been asked has the percentage wanting to cut spending on Social Security gone above 10 percent.

The strong majority support for Social Security spending can be seen in other surveys and across demographic groups. The National Election Studies (NES) surveys conducted by researchers at the University of Michigan have asked a different group of randomly selected Americans a similar question since the early 1980s. Every year the survey has been fielded, fewer than 5 percent preferred spending decreases while most wanted to see it increased. An NES survey in the fall of 2000 revealed that support for spending does not differ greatly by age group as many might assume. Overall, 62 percent wanted to increase spending, 32 percent said it should remain the same, 4 percent preferred to decrease it, and another 2 percent said they did not know. Figure 2 illustrates how respondents under 30 years old support Social Security spending increases as much as older cohorts. Levels




Figure 1 Social Security Spending Preferences

Note: The question wording was “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on . . . Social Security?”

Source: National Opinion Research Center/General Social Survey.

of support for spending increases among those under 30 is slightly more than what it is for individuals in their 30s and much more than what it is for those who are over age 65. The only age group that supports increased spending more than Americans under 30 are those who are in their 40s, of whom approximately 65 percent want to see spending increased.

Support for Social Security extends to a willingness to pay the taxes needed to fund the program. A survey conducted by ABC News and the *Washington Post* in 1983 found that only 26 percent thought that Social Security payroll taxes were too high, while 54 percent thought they were about right, and 11 percent thought

they were too low. Seven years later the proportion stating taxes were too high rose to 38 percent, but 48 percent said taxes were about right, and 11 percent thought they were too low. Despite the regressive nature of the Social Security payroll tax, whereby low-income people pay proportionally more of their income than the wealthy, most see the federal income tax, which is actually progressive in nature, as the least fair. In five surveys conducted by Gallup from 1988 to 1994, nearly a quarter of American adults rated federal income taxes as the least fair, while Social Security taxes were tied with state sales taxes for third least fair after local property taxes.




Figure 2 Spending on Social Security by Age Group

Note: The number of respondents in each age group appears in parentheses. The question wording was “Next I am going to read you a list of federal programs. For each one, I would like you to tell me whether you would like to see spending increased or decreased. . . . What about Social Security?”

Source: National Election Study, 2000.

Confidence in Social Security

Although most citizens express support for Social Security, concerns about its future are widespread. Since the 1970s, Americans have wondered whether Social Security will be there for them when they retire. The data trends in Figure 3 show a series of similarly worded surveys on questions about confidence in the future of the Social Security system. Even accounting for a few years when the questions were not asked, there was a notice-

able decline in confidence from 1975 to 1978. The net proportion of respondents who were “very” or “somewhat” confident in the future of Social Security hovered under 40 percent from 1982 to 1986. Confidence rebounded somewhat in the late 1980s and 1990s. On a related series of questions, the proportion of respondents stating they were very or somewhat confident that “the Social Security system will continue to provide benefits of at least equal value to the benefits received




Figure 3 Confidence in Social Security

Note: More than 1,000 respondents participated in each survey. The question from 1975 to 1994 was “How confident are you, yourself, in the future of the Social Security system? Would you say you are very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at all confident?” From 1996 to 2002 the question was “How confident are you that the Social Security system will continue to provide benefits of at least equal value to the benefits received by retirees today? Would you say that you are . . . very confident, somewhat confident, not too confident, or not at all confident?” The only exception to this was in 1996 and 1997, when the wording changed from “. . . of equal value . . .” to “at least equal value. . .”

Sources: Data prior to 1996 are from Baggette, Shapiro, and Jacobs (1995). The “Monitoring Attitudes of the Public” survey sponsored by the American Council of Life Insurance and conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White (1975–1982), and the Roper Organization/Roper Starch Worldwide (1983–1994). For later periods, the sponsor was the Employee Benefit Research Institute and the American Savings Education Council. These surveys were conducted by Mathew Greenwald and Associates (1996–2002).

by retirees today” increased every year from 1996 to 2001 before dipping slightly in 2002.

Confidence can also be interpreted as the degree of perceived problems and the scope of changes needed, if any. Four times throughout 1998 and 1999, Princeton Survey Research Associates (PSRA) asked a randomly selected sample of adults across the nation whether they thought the Social Security program was

heading for trouble. As shown in Table 1, a majority in each year said the program was heading for major trouble. Only 10 percent claimed the program was secure and solid. The second question in Table 1 reports the responses to the perceived size of changes need. Almost 60 percent in each of the surveys thought that big changes were needed. By contrast, fewer than 8 percent of respondents thought no changes were needed.

Confidence in Social Security varies by demographic subgroup. Most confident of all are senior citizens and those with low levels of income and education. The higher confidence for seniors and the less well educated remained stable in the 1990s. As many suspect, young people are less confident about the future of Social Security. However, it is the 35–49 age group, not those under age 35 as many assume, who are the most pessimistic when it comes to the future of Social Security. The 35–49 age group in the March 1998 PSRA poll is roughly 10 percentage points more likely to think the program is heading for trouble and the most likely group to think that big changes are needed (67 percent). By contrast, the 18–34 age group looks a lot like the 50–64 age group, and both of these age groups are moderately concerned

compared with those over 65, who are the most optimistic.

Knowledge about Social Security

Social Security resembles many other political issues in that people hold a lot of information about some aspects of the program while they are relatively uninformed about other aspects. For example, with facts relating to eligibility standards, knowledge levels are quite high. According to the findings in four surveys conducted in 1998 and 1999 by PSRA, more than 80 percent of Americans know that workers of any age who become disabled are eligible for Social Security benefits. Between 70 and 80 percent know that children and spouses of employed deceased workers are eligible for benefits. Fewer than 70 percent in each of the four surveys are aware that people can retire in

Table 1 Perceptions of Problems with Social Security

<i>Perceptions of SS Problems</i>	<i>Mar. 1998</i>	<i>July 1998</i>	<i>Feb. 1999</i>	<i>May 1999</i>
Degree of Trouble with System				
Major Trouble	55%	52%	53%	57%
Minor Trouble	29	29	31	30
Secure and Solid (No Trouble)	10	10	10	9
Don't Know/Refused	6	9	6	5
Size of Changes Needed				
No Changes	7	4	3	4
Small Changes	30	29	30	33
Big Changes	57	60	61	58
Don't Know/Refused	6	7	6	5

Note: Percentages do not always sum to 100% due to rounding. The question wording for the first item was "Some people now think the Social Security program is heading for financial trouble in the future, while other people think the program is basically secure and solid. What is your view? Do you think Social Security is headed for major trouble, minor trouble, or do you think the program is secure and solid?" Question wording for the second item was "Which of the following comes closest to describing what you think is needed to keep the Social Security program out of trouble in the future? Do you think this program needs no changes, small changes, or big changes?"

Source: Princeton Survey Research Associates. N = 1,200 for 3/98 and 7/98. N = 1,000 for 2/99. N = 1,001 for 5/99.

their early 60s and receive benefits. According to the data in these surveys, Americans generally understand who benefits from the Social Security program.

On other areas, important facts relating to the future of Social Security are not well-known. According to PSRA data in 1998 and 1999, fewer than one in five Americans knows that Social Security comprises about 20 percent of the federal budget; many more think it is much smaller (between 33 percent and 40 percent in the four surveys). The pay-as-you-go structure of Social Security also is not well understood. Only about 40 percent of the respondents know the correct response, which is that some of the money is used immediately to pay benefits for current retirees while the government borrows the rest by issuing treasury bonds. However, almost as many people inaccurately believe that the government spends the rest without any obligation to repay the money. Another misconception concerns the main reason for any upcoming trouble. Most citizens (between 41 percent and 47 percent) think the Social Security program faces financial problems in the future because the federal government has spent the Social Security reserves. Far fewer realize that the main reason for the fiscal difficulties, according to the board that runs the Social Security program, is that the ratio of retirees to workers has been dropping steadily, leaving fewer workers to support more retirees (Rubin et al. 1998).

Inaccurate views about the budget, the structure, and the main reason for problems all contribute to another popular misunderstanding. Even in the absence of changes to Social Security, most experts expect that by the 2030s, beneficiaries will still be able to receive three-quarters of the benefits promised to them (Rubin

et al. 1998). However, few members of the public share this view. According to the last set of polling data (see Table 2), most expect much less, including one-third who think that the program will run out of money completely within two decades. Only 10–12 percent in four PSRA surveys in the late 1990s knew the correct answer: without any changes, Social Security would still have enough money to meet three-quarters of its obligations.

Other surveys have found similar lapses in public knowledge about Social Security. In 1979, only 25 percent of the public knew the Social Security payroll tax rate. Social Security is one of the most efficient programs in the federal government, with fewer than 1 percent of its budget going to administrative expenses (Rubin et al. 1998). Yet in a 1997 PSRA poll, only 7 percent knew that Social Security's financial difficulties did not stem from fraud and abuse. Scholars who have investigated the distribution of knowledge on Social Security by demographic characteristics have found that it follows common sociodemographic lines (Jacobs and Shapiro 1998b). The most affluent and educated tend to be the best informed. Age does not reliably improve knowledge, except with respect to eligibility facts. To some extent, citizens admit that their understanding of the Social Security policy debate is not "excellent" or even "good." Most say it is only "fair" or "poor," and they blame the media for providing too little coverage.

Potential Reform Options

Public policy proposals to reform Social Security can be broken down into three major categories. The first set of proposals seeks to reduce expenditures by limiting benefits. These include proposals to limit the benefits going to wealthy individuals,

Table 2 Public Opinion about Social Security Reform Options

<i>Social Security Policy Reform</i>	<i>Aug. 1998</i>	<i>Feb. 1999</i>	<i>May 1999</i>
Raise Retirement Age			
Favor	23%	24%	22%
Oppose	74	74	74
Neither/Don't know/Refused	3	2	4
Reduce Cost of Living Adjustment			
Favor	34	37	40
Oppose	61	56	53
Neither/Don't know/Refused	5	7	7
Reduce Benefits for Wealthy			
Favor	54	54	58
Oppose	40	40	37
Neither/Don't know/Refused	6	6	5
Increase Payroll Tax Rate			
Favor	40	44	44
Oppose	54	50	50
Neither/Don't know/Refused	6	6	6
Raise SS Earnings Cap			
Favor	60	59	61
Oppose	29	28	29
Neither/Don't know/Refused	11	13	10
Individuals Invest SS			
Favor	52	55	58
Moderately Oppose	16	18	16
Neither/Don't know/Refused	10	8	9
Government Invests SS			
Favor	40	36	40
Oppose	48	53	52
Neither/Don't know/Refused	12	11	8

Note: All PSRA questions began with the following statement: "Now I'd like to get your opinion on some specific proposals for how Social Security might be changed in the future. If I ask you anything you feel you can't answer, just tell me. Do you favor or oppose the following proposals. . . . (INSERT—READ AND ROTATE). Do you strongly (favor/oppose) this proposal, or moderately (favor/oppose) it?" Specific questions were age: "Gradually raising the age when a person can collect full Social Security benefits to age 70"; cost of living: "Cutting the amount that Social Security benefits go up each year for changes in the cost of living"; wealthy: "Reducing Social Security benefits for people who have retirement incomes over about \$60,000 per year"; payroll tax: "Increasing the payroll tax that workers and employers each pay into the Social Security system from 6.2% to 6.7%"; earnings cap: "Collecting payroll taxes on earnings up to \$100,000 per year, instead of the current cut-off of about \$72,000"; individuals invest: "Changing Social Security from a system where the government collects the taxes that workers and their employers contribute to a system where individuals invest some of their payroll tax contributions themselves"; and government invest: "Changing Social Security from a system where the money in the trust fund is invested in government bonds to a system where some of the money is invested in the stock market."

Source: Princeton Survey Research Associates. N = 2,008 for 8/98, N = 1,000 for 2/99, N = 1,001 for 5/99.

increasing the retirement age beyond age 67, and reducing the annual cost-of-living adjustment. Second, some proposals attempt to raise revenue by increasing tax rates. The two major forms of this kind of proposal are those that increase the payroll tax rate and those that raise the amount of earnings subject to taxation. A third type of reform seeks to increase the rate of return on the money being set aside to pay for benefits. Various forms of privatization include having individuals or the government invest some of the money used to pay benefits.

The public is only barely aware of all three varieties of Social Security reforms. The graphs in Figure 4 show that most members of the public have not heard a lot about any of these proposals. In the

May 1999 PSRA survey, only with the proposal to raise the retirement age did even a third of the respondents hear a lot about it. The public has only a vague sense of awareness of most other proposals. Majorities claim to have heard nothing or do not know about the proposals to reduce the cost-of-living adjustment and raise the earnings cap. In all but one of these seven options, more than a third of respondents are completely unaware of proposals that may affect them directly as either workers or potential beneficiaries.

Irrespective of their self-proclaimed levels of awareness, many Americans are still willing to offer opinions on the same seven policy proposals. Table 2 presents the results of these surveys at three dif-




Figure 4 Awareness of Social Security Policy Reform Options

ferent time points. By large margins, Americans do not want to raise the retirement age. A decisive 74 percent opposed this idea. Reducing the cost-of-living adjustment is also unpopular, with more than 50 percent opposing this policy. However, Americans do not oppose all benefit cuts. A majority favors reducing the benefits of the wealthy in each of the surveys.

Tax increases are notoriously unpopular, but here the public again both confirms and defies the conventional wisdom. Indeed, there is substantial resistance to a uniform increase in the Social Security payroll tax rate. Opinions can be found on both sides of the issue, but most do not favor raising payroll tax rates. A different state of opinion exists when it comes to the generally positive view toward raising the earnings caps. In 2003, the maximum amount of earnings subject to the Social Security tax increased to \$87,000 from \$84,900 in 2002. These levels vary each year based upon changes in average wages, and any earnings up to these thresholds, but not beyond them, are taxed for Social Security purposes. With roughly 60 percent support for raising the earnings caps, this may be an area where policymakers can raise revenue for Social Security in the future.

The idea of completely privatizing or making the Social Security system voluntary is unpopular. Nevertheless, Americans are willing to entertain the idea of partially privatizing Social Security by diverting some of the payroll tax to fund individual accounts. Most polls dating back to the mid-1990s show that a majority favors some form of privatization if individuals can control the investment decisions. As one example, a Gallup poll in January 2000 asked, "A proposal has been made that would allow

or require people to put a portion of their Social Security payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts that would be invested in private stocks and bonds. Do you favor or oppose this proposal?"; 62 percent said they favored the idea of private investment accounts.

Support for partial privatization diminishes when survey questions mention investment risks or potential benefit cuts needed to finance the transition to private accounts. In two surveys conducted by Hart-Teeter Research for the *Wall Street Journal* and NBC in 1998 and 1999, support fell into the low 40 percent range, and opposition rose above 50 percent when the question included the phrase "others think that [privatization] is too risky and could leave some people without adequate money for retirement if the stock market were to decline in value significantly." A related proposal is to have the federal government invest the Social Security Trust Fund in stocks rather than treasury bonds. This reform option shares the goal of increasing the rate of return but lacks the element of individual control. The public has not greeted this proposal with enthusiasm. However, if risks are limited and investment decisions are insulated from political decisions, support for government investment generally rises.

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Terrorism

The events of September 11, 2001, marked a turning point in gauging American public opinion on terrorism. Polling has entered a new era of massive data collection with regard to public opinion on terrorism and related issues such as homeland security, airport security, risks to civil liberties, and the war on terrorism. This entry provides an overview of the poll data available today and, whenever possible, highlights the differences

between public opinion before and after September 11, 2001. The data were collected from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online library (POLL) and the Gallup organization.

Homeland Security

Homeland security refers to the effort to secure the U.S. homeland from future terrorist attacks. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration released the *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book>), a plan for protecting the United States from future terror attacks. When considering homeland security, there are three key measures of public opinion: public assessment of the risk of a future attack, public confidence in the U.S. government to prevent future attacks, and public concern of a local attack.

It is important to assess Americans' perceived risk of a future attack since the perceived threat can influence support for policymaking (Huddy et al. 2002). As the data in Table 1 suggest, the perceived threat of future attacks was at its highest immediately after the attacks of September 11. In October 2001, 53 percent of Americans thought it was very likely there would be a major terrorist attack in the United States. This figure is up from 23 percent in 1991. However, the perceived threat shortly after the attack diminishes to pre-September 11 levels by January 2002, when only 18 percent of Americans reported a major attack as being very likely. In October 2002, close to the one-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks, this figure rose almost 10 percent to 27 percent.

Like assessments of the risk of a future attack, the public's confidence in the U.S. government to prevent future attacks may also influence levels of support for

Table 1 U.S. Public Assessment of the Risk of a Future Terrorist Attack

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>% Very Likely</i>	<i>% Somewhat Likely</i>	<i>% Not Too Likely/ Not at All Likely</i>	<i>% Don't Know/ No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
March 1989 <i>ABC/Washington Post</i>	26	54	19	1	1,525
January 1991 <i>CBS/New York Times</i>	23	50	21	6	1,348
October 2001 <i>CBS/New York Times</i>	53	35	10	2	1,024
January 2002 <i>CBS</i>	18	47	33	2	1,060
October 2002 <i>CBS/New York Times</i>	27	47	22	3	1,018

Note: Question wording pre-9/11/01 was "In your opinion, how likely is a major terrorist attack in the United States itself in the near future? Is it very likely, somewhat likely, or not at all likely?" Post-9/11/01: "How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack on the United States within the next few months: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, not at all likely?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

foreign and domestic policies. Perhaps surprisingly, more Americans—35 percent—expressed a great deal of confidence in the U.S. government to prevent future attacks shortly after the September 11 attacks than at any other time before or after. Notably, the number of Americans expressing a great deal or a good amount of confidence in the U.S. government to prevent further attacks was consistently higher after the September 11 attacks than before (see Table 2).

Approximately 74 percent of Americans think a future terrorist attack on the United States is either very likely or somewhat likely (see Table 1), but many Americans are not personally concerned about a terrorist attack where they live. As Table 3 shows, only 32 percent of Americans report feeling personally concerned about a terror attack where they

live. This figure is up only 12 percent from pre-September 11 opinion. In addition, Americans do not seem to be changing personal habits because of the threat of terrorism. In October 2001, only 27 percent reported they would change any aspect of their personal lives or activities in order to reduce their chances of being a victim of a terrorist attack.

Civil Liberties

Scholars, pundits, and the public alike have expressed concern that some civil liberties may be suppressed or lost as a result of the U.S. government's efforts to combat terrorism. In late September 2001, 63 percent said it was necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism. This percentage is greater than at any other point before or after September 11 (see

Table 2 U.S. Public Confidence in the Government to Prevent Future Attacks

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>% A Great Deal</i>	<i>% A Good Amount</i>	<i>% A Fair Amount</i>	<i>% None at All</i>	<i>% Don't Know/No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
May 1995 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	12	24	51	12	1	1,011
August 1996 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	12	21	49	16	*	1,514
September 2001 <i>Washington Post</i>	35	31	30	3	1	1,215
January 2002 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	18	40	37	6	1	1,507
September, 2002 ABC	12	38	43	6	*	1,011

* Signifies less than .5%.

Note: Question wording pre-9/11/01 was "Generally speaking, how much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to prevent terrorist attacks against Americans in this country: a great deal, a good amount, only a fair amount, or none at all?" Post-9/11/01: "How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to prevent further terrorist attacks against Americans in this country: a great deal, a good amount, only a fair amount, or none at all?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

Table 3 U.S. Public Assessment of Personal Concern about a Local Attack

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>% Yes</i>	<i>% No</i>	<i>% Don't Know/No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
July 1995 CBS/ <i>New York Times</i>	20	79	1	1,209
October 2001 CBS/ <i>New York Times</i>	26	71	3	1,024
January 2002 CBS	22	77	1	1,060
October 2002 CBS/ <i>New York Times</i>	32	67	1	1,018

Note: Question wording pre-9/11/01 was "Do you personally feel any sense of danger from terrorist acts where you live and work, or not?" Post-9/11/01: "Would you say you personally are very concerned about a terrorist attack in the area where you live, or not?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

Table 4). Forty-nine percent expressed a similar opinion shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In contrast, in 1997 only 29 percent expressed a similar opinion. It appears that the public's willingness to concede civil liberties varies based on the temporal proximity of an attack (Huddy et al. 2002).

Since September 11, several courses of action designed to prevent future terror attacks have been suggested and debated. These policies include monitoring communications such as telephone conversations and e-mails and the issuance of national identity cards. Public opinion regarding these potential policies suggests that support varies widely based on the specific policy or action. For example, when asked whether or not they approved of allowing the U.S. government to monitor personal phone calls and e-mails in efforts to curb terrorism, only

26 percent of Americans approved of the action. And while a majority (56 percent) reported favoring a national ID system shortly after September 11, only 29 percent favored allowing police to stop people on the street at random in order to search their possessions. So whereas almost half of the public seems willing to give up some civil liberties in general, opinion varies widely based on specific policy proposals.

The War on Terrorism

Americans appear to be relatively optimistic in their judgments regarding the U.S. campaign against terrorism (Huddy et al. 2002). Pro-U.S. assessments of who is winning the war on terrorism peaked shortly after the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan. In January 2002, 66 percent of Americans reported the United States and its allies were winning the war

Table 4 U.S. Public Assessment of Personal Willingness to Give Up Some Civil Liberties in Order to Curb Terrorism

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>% Yes/ Necessary</i>	<i>% No/ Not Necessary</i>	<i>% Don't Know/ No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
April 1995 <i>LA Times</i>	49	43	8	1,032
April 1997 PSRA/PEW	29	62	9	1,206
September 2001 PSRA/ <i>Newsweek</i>	63	32	5	1,005
January 2002 PSRA/PEW	55	39	6	1,201
August 2002 PSRA/ <i>Newsweek</i>	47	47	6	1,005

Note: Question wording was "In order to curb terrorism in this country, do you think it will be necessary for the average person to give up some civil liberties, or not?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

on terrorism; 25 percent said neither side was winning the war; and 7 percent said the terrorists were winning. In April 2002, however, the percentage assessing the United States and its allies as winning the war dropped to 47 percent. By January 2003 only 35 percent reported the United States and its allies to be winning the war. Forty-four percent thought neither side was winning, and 16 percent thought the terrorists were winning (see Table 5).

Despite the over-time variations in public opinion regarding who is winning the war on terrorism, public approval of how President George W. Bush has handled the war remained relatively consistent subsequent to the events of Septem-

ber 11. Since October 2001, at least 70 percent of Americans report approving of the way Bush is handling the U.S. campaign against terrorists and terrorism. American support of Bush peaked at 88 percent in January 2002, shortly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. By February 2003, public opinion returned to levels exhibited shortly after September 11—when 74 percent of Americans approved of Bush's handling of the war. Although opinion concerning Bush's handling of the war on terror remained roughly constant through early 2003, Bush's overall approval ratings dipped considerably from September 2001 to February 2003. In September 2001, 90 percent of Americans reported approving of how George W.

Table 5 U.S. Public Judgment of Who Is Currently Winning the War on Terrorism

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>% U.S. and Allies</i>	<i>% Neither Side</i>	<i>% Terrorists</i>	<i>% Don't Know/No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
October 2001 Gallup	42	44	11	3	1,011
November 2001 Gallup	53	33	11	3	1,005
January 2002 Gallup	66	25	7	2	1,015
April 2002 Gallup	47	39	10	4	1,009
July 2002 Gallup	39	43	16	2	1,013
October 2002 Gallup	32	44	21	3	1,002
January 2003 Gallup	35	44	16	5	1,003

Note: Question wording was "Who do you think is currently winning the war against terrorism: the United States and its allies, neither side, or the terrorists?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

Bush was handling his job as president, as opposed to 70 percent in June 2002 and only 61 percent in February 2003 (see Table 6).

Conclusion

The events of September 11, 2001, marked a watershed moment in the collection of American public opinion on terrorism. Unfortunately, comparing pre- and post-September 11 data is often difficult because of different question wording and subject matter. And while the events of September 11 were extremely salient to the American public shortly after the attacks, it appears that at least some issues surrounding terrorism are not as salient afterward (see, e.g., Table 1). This

is notable because declining salience may influence subsequent domestic and foreign policies designed to prevent terrorism—say, an invasion of Iraq or the handling of terrorism-related detainees.

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Table 6 U.S. Public Approval of President Bush's Handling of the War on Terrorism

<i>Date and Source</i>	<i>Approve/ Support</i>	<i>Disapprove/ Oppose</i>	<i>% Don't Know/ No Answer</i>	<i>N</i>
October 2001 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	79	16	5	1,024
January 2002 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	88	10	2	1,507
April 2002 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	81	18	2	1,207
September 2002 ABC	74	24	2	1,011
December 2002 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	79	20	1	1,209
February 2003 ABC/ <i>Washington Post</i>	74	23	4	1,001

Note: Question wording was "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that George W. Bush is handling the U.S. campaign against terrorism?" Respondents come from national sample of adults unless noted otherwise.

Source: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research's online Public Opinion Location Library (POLL).

Trust in Government

Trust plays an integral role in public opinion. Consumer confidence, a leading economic indicator, is a measure of how trusting people are of the economy. When consumer confidence is low, producers of consumer goods usually scale back production. When it is high, producers usually increase production. Trust is also important in guiding our daily interactions with other people. As author Robert D. Putnam (2000, p. 135) writes, "Honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of social life." Thus, the more trusting in people we are, the less likely we are to get into conflict with other people. But there is no more important role for trust than the link it provides between government and the American public.

Trust in government is something to which pollsters and politicians alike have devoted a lot of attention, with good reason. Distrust, or cynicism, is associated with a host of attributes and behaviors that are seen as detrimental to our popular form of government. On this topic, nationally syndicated journalist and best-selling author David S. Broder wrote in the July 6, 1994, edition of the *Washington Post*, "It saps people's confidence in politics and public officials, and it erodes both the standing and the standards of journalism. If the assumption is that nothing is on the level, nothing is what it seems, then citizenship becomes a game of fools and there is no point in trying to stay informed."

Democracy depends on a reliable connection between the government and the governed. Trust in government, or political trust, is fundamental to the viability of this connection. But as will be seen below, there are other components to this connection. The trust we have in our fellow citizens and in the media plays a

crucial role in connecting the public with government officials.

The looming specter over the ensuing discussion is that political trust has sunk to record lows in recent years. Despite a few peaks in the faith Americans put in government, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the level of trust that we put in our government remains relatively low.

What Is Political Trust?

Definitions of political trust have varied widely. Some have called it support for government, others confidence in government. But within all of these different conceptualizations there is some common ground. *Political trust* is a basic evaluation of the government based on beliefs of what people think the government ought to do. Because nearly everyone has a different opinion as to what tasks the government should be performing, it makes political trust a rather pliant concept. In addition, the government of the United States is composed of a multitude of people and agencies, each with different tasks. For instance, people usually have views as to what local governments should be doing that are separate from their views on what the federal and state governments should be doing. Because of this and other reasons, political trust is a much more complicated component of public opinion than it appears to be at first glance.

It is helpful to think of political trust as two related concepts. The first has to do with the *commitment* that people see a political actor has in protecting their interests. Whether this commitment is guaranteed by fear of losing a political office or a shared set of values, the representation of one's beliefs within the political system is a large component of

political trust. But there is another consideration, and that has to do with *competence*. This second concept is important because the public may have confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court as a dispenser of jurisprudence but is likely less confident in the Supreme Court's ability to negotiate free trade agreements with other countries. Should this restriction in their trust regarding the Supreme Court feed into their overall trust in the government? Clearly, the answer is no, and it appears that most people's feelings of trust are conditional upon competence.

Another important distinction in political trust is between diffuse support and specific support. Scholar David Easton (1965) became the first to differentiate between these two types of trust. *Diffuse support* refers to the level of trust that the public has in the system of government. It is a measure of how confident people are that the political regime represents their interests. Unlike specific support, this form of trust is not conditional upon governmental performance. *Specific support* refers to the satisfaction people have with governmental outputs and the performance of those in government. It is closely associated with partisanship and ideology because people are usually more satisfied with government when people who think like them are in power.

Trends in Political Trust

How much do you trust the government? If you are the average American, your answer is likely not much.

Since 1964, the University of Michigan has regularly asked people how trusting they are of the federal government as part of the biannual National Election Studies. Those responses have been used to construct an index of political trust. The

index ranges from a low of 0, indicating no trust in the government, to a high of 100, indicating high levels of trust in government. Table 1 below traces changes in the index from 1964 to 2000.

As can be seen, there has been a noticeable decline in the average index score since people were first asked how trusting they are of the federal government. In the 1960s, Americans were generally more trusting of the government than they have been in subsequent years. In 1966 the index topped out at 61.05. Since that time, trust has decreased considerably, leveling off in the 1970s to about 30. In the 1980s, people became more trusting of the federal government, but this trend proved to be short-lived. After reaching a high of 46.63 in 1986, the index returned to the same levels that had been witnessed in the 1970s. And in 1994, the index hit an all-time low of 26.17.

So what has caused the American public to become so distrusting of the gov-

Table 1 Political Trust Index, 1964–2000

1964	51.65
1966	61.05
1968	45.15
1970	39.20
1972	37.69
1974	29.47
1976	30.46
1978	29.40
1980	26.62
1982	31.32
1984	37.62
1986	46.63
1988	33.82
1990	29.07
1992	28.51
1994	26.17
1996	31.62
1998	34.32
2000	36.40

ernment over the last 40 years? There is a lot of disagreement over the answer to that question. Experts do agree on the short-term influences on political trust.

People are more trusting when their party controls the White House. Because trust is an evaluation of government based on what people think the government ought to do, and the presidency is the most visible branch of government, people trust the government more when they see the president acting in their interests. This is an especially important component of specific support not only because it plays such a large role in guiding trust in government but also because it has been so reliable over the last 40 years.

The economy also influences political trust. The rise in political trust witnessed in the 1980s is often attributed to the improvement in economic conditions that happened during that time. However, the 1990s saw a strong economy as well, but no sizable increase in trust was witnessed. How can that be? Like many other important components of public opinion, political trust is susceptible to a multitude of influences. Although the strong economy of the 1990s would normally help bolster trust in government, the scandals associated with the presidency of Bill Clinton (Monica Lewinsky, Whitewater) likely worked in opposition to the economy.

When one was born seems to have a marked influence on how trusting one is of the government. A 1998 study commissioned by the Pew Foundation found that there is a generation gap in the public's levels of trust in government (Pew Foundation 1998). Those who came of age in the 1960s and later are considerably less trusting in government than those who lived through the political

events before that turbulent age. What is interesting about this difference is that it is driven by two mechanisms. Older people make judgments based on governmental performance, whereas younger people judge government based on the quality of leadership.

Trust in Different Institutions

The decline in trust witnessed over the last 40 years has not been equal across the different institutions of government. Whereas public confidence in the presidency and the Congress has waned, trust in the Supreme Court has actually increased. A series of Gallup polls showed that more Americans trusted the Supreme Court in 1997 than they did in 1972. State and local governments have not suffered from the same erosion of trust that the federal government has since the 1960s. In 1972, people were more trusting of the federal government than they were of state and local governments. By 1997, those roles had reversed (Pew Foundation 1998).

Closely associated with political trust is the trust that the public puts in the news media. Because a reliable source of accurate information regarding politics is necessary for the proper functioning of a popular government, the chief providers of that information—the news media—are often held to the same standards as the government.

These high standards have led the media to be judged as less trustworthy than most of the institutions of government. Although TV news has been seen as increasingly trustworthy, it and the press are still seen as relatively untrustworthy institutions (Taylor 2002).

These low levels of media trust are cause for some concern. Recently, scholars Joanne M. Miller and Jon A. Krosnick

(2000) demonstrated that trust in the media source often determines whether or not an individual uses information from that media source in constructing opinions about the president. When people trust the media, they use information provided by news media outlets to update their opinions on the president. When people do not trust the media, they are more likely to fall back on party identification in choosing whether or not to support the president. With levels of trust in the media so low, it is possible that more people are relying on their party identification than on news information to form their opinions about the president.

Ironically, while these low levels of trust in the media have been witnessed, some authors have implicated the media as the source of declining trust in all institutions. In *Spiral of Cynicism*, Joseph A. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1997) argue that by concentrating on motives rather than on policies, the news media have encouraged Americans to always look for the ulterior motives behind what people do. This, they argue, has led many to be unable to take the activities of our nation's leaders at face value.

Social Trust

In addition to general feelings about how trustworthy the government and the media are, most people have opinions on the trustworthiness of people in general. This general opinion is called *social trust*.

Like political trust, it is often better to think of social trust as judgments on the trustworthiness of specific groups and how well they are perceived as performing their social roles. For instance, one's coworkers are often judged trustworthy or untrustworthy based on how reliably

they perform their job, how often they show up late to work, and how well they work with others. One's neighbors, by contrast, are often judged on their friendliness, courteousness, and willingness to lend a hand. Thus, unless you happen to work with your neighbor, you are unlikely to consider your neighbor untrustworthy because he is often late to work.

In 2000, scholars Nancy Burns and Donald Kinder explored the differences in social trust based on the social roles people play. They found that Americans are slightly more trusting of their neighbors than they are of their coworkers (Burns and Kinder 2000). Interestingly, these authors found significant differences in how trusting people are based on age, residency, and education. Older people are more trusting than younger people, and midwesterners are more trusting than people from the South and the Northeast. Also, the more educated a person is, the more likely she is to trust her neighbors, coworkers, and—especially—people in general.

Education also plays a role in connecting social trust with political participation. In general, the less educated are less likely to vote or otherwise participate in politics than are those with more education. However, Burns and Kinder found that those less educated who do participate in politics are usually more trusting of people in general than those who do not participate in politics.

It bears noting that these findings are preliminary. Evidence linking social trust with civic and political activity is rare. A notable exception is the book *Bowling Alone*, by Harvard professor Robert D. Putnam (2000). In *Bowling Alone*, Putnam examines Americans' participation in civic and social groups from the 1970s to the 1990s. What he finds is that Amer-

icans were much less active in the 1990s in everything from political parties to bowling leagues. Putnam blames television for the decay in social trust and participation in social institutions over this period of time. Although he is not entirely successful in connecting social trust, civic activities, and political participation, he does rightly point out that in order to understand political trust, it is often necessary to understand how engaged a person is with society in general.

Political Trust since September 11

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Americans have looked at government in a very different light. These changes have been felt no more strongly than in regard to the trust that most citizens have in federal government. However, it turns out that this trust is conditional upon the government pursuing policies that people see as protecting them from the further threat of terrorism.

A poll conducted in the spring of 2000 by ABC News and the *Washington Post* showed that a mere 30 percent of respondents trusted "the government in Washington to do what's right." This level of support is consistent with other polls covering this topic over the same period of time. In late September 2001, after the attacks, 64 percent of respondents said that they trusted the federal government.

It seems only natural in a time of crisis that the federal government should experience such an increase in support. Presidents especially have enjoyed increased levels of trust during times of international conflict. These effects were labeled rally-'round-the-flag effects by presidential scholar John Mueller (1970, p. 21). But ABC News was not convinced that this explained the significant increases in trust observed after the attacks.

In January 2002, ABCNews.com changed the format of the question slightly to discern if the public instilled more trust in the federal government in some instances than in others. In this poll, respondents were asked if they trusted the government "when it comes to handling national security and the war on terrorism" and "when it comes to handling social issues like the economy, health care, Social Security and education." Sixty-eight percent of respondents said they trusted the government in regard to national security and terrorism, but only 38 percent said they trusted it to handle social issues.

Interestingly, Republicans were more trusting than Democrats in regard to both issues. Eighty percent of Republicans trusted the government's handling of national security, whereas 62 percent of Democrats indicated support. As to the government's handling of social issues, 48 percent of Republicans and 32 percent of Democrats said they trusted the government. Presumably, this gap in trust is due to partisan effects normally associated with specific support. Democrats traditionally support governmental programs addressing social issues. However, at a time when Republicans control the White House and the Congress, they seemed less willing to trust the government to effectively administer such programs.

What makes the ABCNews.com findings so interesting is that a CBS/*New York Times* poll conducted at roughly the same time used the more conventional wording that did not distinguish political trust by policy issue. The results of this poll indicated that general feelings of trust in government had returned to their pre-September 11 levels. In January 2001, CBS and the *New York Times* found that two-thirds of Americans (67

percent) trusted the government only some of the time or never. In October of that year, only 44 percent indicated low levels of trust. By January 2002, however, 61 percent indicated such distrust.

Taken together, these two polls demonstrate that while general levels of political trust remain relatively low—even after September 11—trust in government is conditional upon the specific roles that the government performs and upon the political conditions of the day. This is consistent with findings from the 40-plus years that people have studied political trust.

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The United Nations

The United Nations (UN) is often characterized as representing the public opinion of the world community as a whole. Yet how is it that the world can speak with one voice? Obviously, direct public opinion polling is not conducted en masse to identify the sentiment of the international community on a particular issue. Theoretically, public opinion should play an important role in the policy positions and attitudes adopted by member governments on issues before the United Nations. However, there is growing evidence in the literature to suggest that public opinion toward the United Nations is the single most misread subject by U.S. policymakers (Kull and Destler 1999; Luck 1999). In this light, the following analysis will investigate the contours of public opinion toward the United Nations as it has developed over time. Specifically, special attention will be devoted to the following: overall evaluations of the performance of the United Nations, opinions of UN military intervention, and discussion of attitudes toward UN funding.

With nearly a 60-year history of research, there is tremendous breadth and depth of information regarding public attitudes toward the United Nations. A full picture of the relationship, however, does not begin on October 24, 1945, when the UN Charter was formally ratified. Rather, one must first look to the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations, to identify the origins of U.S. attitudes toward global governance. The League was proposed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1917; he believed that such an organization would foster international cooperation and prevent future wars. Despite Wilson's effort and the weight of public opinion in favor of the League, which Wilson noted was 80 percent in support, a reluctant U.S. Senate failed to reach the two-thirds majority needed for ratification (Luck 1999, p. 279). Without the presence of the United States, the League garnered few victories and ultimately faded from the international scene.

In the late 1920s and through the 1930s, public and elite opinion concerning the promise of an international organization charged with ensuring global peace was negligible. A survey conducted in 1937 by the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), established by George Gallup, found that only 26 percent of Americans wanted the United States to join the League of Nations. Compare that with the fact that once the hostilities of World War II broke out, AIPO found that 87 percent of Americans expressed approval of joining an organization to maintain peace. Additionally, throughout the war support for joining such an organization averaged approximately 85 percent (Scott and Withey 1974, p. 11).

The public was not alone in its desire for a new organization that would uphold the principles of peace. Two months after the June 1944 Allied invasion of Nazi-occupied France, the United States hosted a series of meetings that established the general principles of the United Nations. Considerable effort was put toward forming an institution that would shape the postwar political landscape. Fortunately, the lessons of the failed ratification of the League were not lost. The administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt used data from Gallup polls to sell the ratification of the UN Charter to the Senate in 1945. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio stated that the selling of the UN Charter by the government was, in effect, turning it into "a vast public-pressure group to destroy our constitutional processes," and that the lobbying was constructed on such a scale "as to destroy the whole legislative process of intelligent consideration" (quoted in Franck 1985, p. 8). Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana complained of "polls based upon propaganda" and of "fake polls" that forced the Senate into a position without any room to maneuver (quoted in Luck 1999, p. 258). With limited argumentation against ratification, Taft, Wheeler, and all but two other senators quickly voted to accept the UN Charter. It could be said that this near-unanimous affirmation did not run very deep, and U.S. commitment would be severely tested in the years that followed the UN's birth. If U.S. policymakers' opinions of the United Nations wavered so soon after the organization's creation, what can be said of the public's view? The following presents the contour of public opinion toward the UN over time.

*Evaluations of UN Performance:
The Beginnings of the Cold War*

The overwhelming public support for the UN was short-lived. Although the public was in favor of U.S. membership in the organization, they expected it to deliver on its promises. As early as 1946, a majority of Americans were dissatisfied with the progress of the United Nations. Polls conducted by AIPO, the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and the Survey Research Center (SRC) in the years that followed World War II identified a public that did not approve of the performance of the United Nations (Scott and Withey 1974). The tide of negative opinion would shift with two early challenges of the Cold War: the Berlin blockade and the Korean War.

Discussions of the lifting of the Soviet blockade on Berlin through traditional diplomatic channels did not go well. Ultimately, the United Nations was used as a forum for negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the efficacy of the organization in the negotiations is debatable, lifting the blockade was perceived as a victory for the UN in peacefully resolving a dispute between two of its members. With the blockade over, a clear majority of Americans were satisfied with UN performance.

The Korean War was a high point in evaluations of the UN during the Cold War. It would take another 30 years for approval ratings to reach the same levels as they did when the UN Security Council authorized the collective defense of Korea. A poll fielded by NORC in 1950 found that 49 percent of the population agreed with the fact that the UN rightfully intervened in Korea, and 76 percent were satisfied with the way the situation

was handled (Scott and Withey 1974, p. 47). The war challenged the new organization's peacemaking capabilities, but it emerged as a cornerstone of the international arena.

In 1953, Gallup began to ask the question "Is the United Nations doing a good or bad job?" Of any question asked regarding U.S. sentiment toward the UN, this particular question has been asked most consistently. Figure 1 illustrates the trend of the responses. The majority of the U.S. population throughout the 1950s held positive evaluations of the UN, though the margin of positive to negative evaluations began to narrow. On its face, there does not seem to be any discernible patterns in the historical record of responses. Yet when one investigates the reasons for the fluctuation in attitudes, a pattern does emerge. What one finds is a surprising amount of American attention toward the agenda and activities of the United Nations. That is, if the public was inattentive, there would likely be little change in its evaluation of the organization regardless of the issues it dealt with or its activities.

*Rating the United Nations:
The Rise of the Third World*

What accounts for the erosion of clearly positive evaluations of the organization after the 1950s? What began within the United Nations in the 1960s was, in effect, a change in ownership. The business of the UN in the 1950s was one of reconstructing Europe and establishing a postwar world order. What was forgotten, at least as perceived by the average state in the world, was the great promise of the United Nations to lift up and improve the status of third world states. Under the leadership of Secretary-General




Figure 1 Approval of UN Job Performance, 1953–2002

Source: The majority of the data from 1953 to 2002 are from *The Gallup Poll Special Reports: World Affairs*. A poll from the Associated Press conducted September 14–18, 2001, by International Communications Research and two polls from CBS News in November 2001 and September 2002 round out the data.

U Thant of Burma (Myanmar), the UN General Assembly promoted the economic and social development of third world countries, which represented the numerical majority of votes. Prior to this shift, the third world voting bloc was a middle ground of sorts, between the East and West (Franck 1985, p. 131).

The first time a majority of the American public gave poor marks to UN performance was in the mid-1970s. The public was responding to UN performance in general, but it was also undoubtedly responding to the emboldened third world in particular. Specifically, it was a

decade in which the impact of the Middle East crises would be felt around the globe. The UN was ineffective in fostering peace in the Middle East. Peacekeeping forces that had been stationed in the Sinai, and which had kept the peace for over ten years, were withdrawn at the request of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. The effect of the withdrawal was the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which was followed by another war in 1973. The impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War was brought home to Americans in the form of the first of many Arab oil embargoes. Consequently, the public perceived third world countries

as pushing around both the United Nations and the United States.

The fact that in 1975 a majority of Americans thought the UN was performing poorly was largely due to General Assembly Resolution 3379 (November 10, 1975), which stated that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination." The United States and most of the major powers distanced themselves from this resolution, which was a thinly veiled attack on the state of Israel. Control of the organization was seen as residing with the third world, led by Arab nations, and was in direct contradiction of U.S. interests.

More of the same agenda-setting by the third world would continue through the 1980s. Less-developed nations pressured the UN and its subsidiaries to lower and reschedule payments on international loans or to outright forgive debts. As illustrated in Figure 1, 53 percent of the public felt that the UN was doing a poor job trying to solve the problems it faced. Another factor contributing to the low level of confidence was the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The Security Council was hamstrung by reciprocal vetoes cast by those two states, and the organization as a whole was not perceived as effective in promoting peace between the superpowers.

The Performance of the UN in the Post-Cold War Era

The early 1990s ushered in a resurgence of positive evaluations of the United Nations. In 1991, the world community would rally around the UN in its efforts to help the Coalition expel the Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The 1990s, however, also brought a number of peacekeeping missions that would severely challenge the organization. For instance, a 1994 poll conducted by the Program on

International Policy Attitude (PIPA) found 84 percent of Americans in favor of the idea of UN peacekeeping, whereas a year later that percentage dropped to 67 percent (Kull and Destler 1999, p. 96). In addition, Figure 1 illustrates the fact that the majority of Americans gave the UN high marks in general, until the organization was caught in the Bosnian quagmire in the former Yugoslavia in 1995. It was not that the public believed that the UN should not be there or should withdraw. In fact, it was just the opposite, as evidenced in a number of polls conducted by PIPA that found that a majority favored strengthening the mission to allow peacekeepers to use force to protect Bosnians.

Generally, when it comes to military intervention for peacekeeping, the U.S. public is strongly behind the United Nations. Throughout the 1990s, surveys conducted by PIPA, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Roper, and Gallup found a strong majority of Americans supporting peacekeeping, as well as support for a U.S. troop commitment to those operations. U.S. leaders tended to view unilateral U.S. interventions to be a more preferable method than using the United Nations (Kull and Destler 1999, 79).

The 2000s brought renewed positive evaluations of the United Nations. This upward trend reached its apex in the days and weeks that followed September 11, 2001. One week after the attacks, an Associated Press poll found that 64 percent of Americans thought the UN was doing a "good job," the highest historical level. Much of the support was due to the anticipated role the UN would play in combating international terrorism. PIPA and Gallup found Americans very supportive of a UN-sponsored police force to conduct terrorism investigations, efforts to freeze terrorist assets, and to hold ter-

rorists accountable in international courts (PIPA 2002). It is interesting to note, however, that one year after the attacks, the majority of Americans find the UN doing a poor job on trying to solve international problems. The low ratings are likely due to frustration over the efforts to eliminate terrorism and the evolving crisis in the Middle East.

Financing the United Nations

Funding for the United Nations is an issue that demonstrates a consistently wide opinion gap between leaders and the public. Although the founders of the United Nations believed that the organization was a central component for international peace, they were not so certain how it would be funded. It was understood that those states that had a greater ability to pay would commit greater amounts of funding, yet there is no mention in the UN Charter of exactly how ability would be determined. Contrast policymakers' hesitancy to the attitude of the American populace. When asked in 1943 whether they would be willing to pay more in taxes to fund an international organization designed to promote peace, roughly 75 percent of the public agreed (Scott and Withey 1974, p. 12).

The percentage of the UN budget supported by the United States would remain relatively constant until the 1990s. Beginning roughly in 1992, there was growing sentiment in Congress that the United States was paying too much of the budget, especially in peacekeeping, and was wasting money in an inefficient organization. Subsequently, the United States stopped paying dues and by 1999 had accumulated \$1 billion of dues in arrears. Eighty percent of members of Congress surveyed believed that Americans had a negative view of paying UN dues, despite the fact

that PIPA polls continually had a clear majority of Americans in favor of paying (Kull and Destler 1999, p. 75). Moreover, surveys conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide for the UN Association of the United States found that in 1995, 30 percent of respondents would be less likely to vote for a candidate who did not support paying UN dues, which increased to 41 percent in 1996 and 49 percent in 1998. It is evident that the American people favor a well-funded UN, a fact that has begun to be acknowledged when policymakers in 2001 decided to partially pay UN dues.

Conclusion

Throughout its history, the UN has enjoyed high evaluation marks from the U.S. public, at times very low marks. This is not to say that Americans want out of the United Nations. In fact, surveys conducted by Gallup and the National Opinion Research Center from the early 1950s to the present have asked Americans if the United States should give up its membership, to which they have typically responded against by a majority of eight to one (Scott and Withey 1974, p. 16; Luck 1999, p. 263). Thus, while it may be the case that the evaluations of the UN fluctuate over time, Americans view U.S. membership in the organization as important. Furthermore, it can be argued that the UN is perceived by the public as a permanent and necessary fixture of the international community and that the public pays close attention to its efficacy.

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Welfare

The American welfare state has its roots in the Great Depression of the 1930s. With the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal government took on increased responsibility for the poor, the elderly, and the unemployed. Among other things, the Social Security Act created a program called Aid to Dependent Children, which would later become Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The cornerstone of AFDC was the guarantee of cash assistance to the needy, although it included a number of social services (e.g., employment assistance) that were designed to move recipients into long-term employment. Sixty years later, growing dissatisfaction with AFDC resulted in reform of the nation's welfare system. In 1996, Congress enacted legislation that eliminated the federal guarantee of cash assistance and

instead gave each state control over its own welfare programs.

Few programs have undergone the sort of transformation that America's welfare system has. Fewer still have been as vilified. Since President Richard Nixon first decried the welfare system as "a monstrous, consuming outrage," countless numbers of politicians have engaged in welfare-bashing. However, these types of statements belie the complexity of public opinion on this issue. Most Americans think welfare should be cut, but they also say the government should do more to help the poor. Moreover, these seemingly contradictory attitudes reflect uniquely American values, especially economic individualism. Accordingly, opinion about how to reform welfare reflects the public's belief in individual responsibility as well as a genuine concern for those most in need.

Support for Spending on Welfare

Since the 1970s, the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago has asked members of the public about their preferences regarding welfare spending. The question examined in this first section reads: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, welfare, are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?" Figure 1 shows the response to this question over time.

At all points in time, the percentage of people saying that we spend "too much" on welfare is greater than those saying the amount is "about right" or "too lit-




Figure 1 U.S. Public Opinion on Spending on “Welfare”

Note: The question was “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, welfare, are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?”

Source: National Opinion Research Center/General Social Surveys, 1973–2000.

tle.” Moreover, the gap between those saying we are spending too much and those saying too little remains substantial over this entire period. The low point occurred in the middle to late 1980s, when the difference between individuals saying too much and those saying too little was 16 percentage points. The high point occurred in 1974, when the gap soared to 48 percent. At this time, five times as many people said we were spending too much as too little.

National economic and political conditions play an important role in this overtime variability in welfare spending preferences. During the mid-1970s, inflation was seen as overshadowing unemployment as a major economic problem.

Political scientists Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro link the “anti-welfare publicity of the 1970s and early 1980s” directly to lower levels of support for the program. Following this same logic, it is no surprise that the percentage of individuals saying we are spending too much on welfare rose during the early 1990s. In the 1992 presidential election, Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas campaigned on the pledge to “end welfare as we know it.” Welfare reform also was a central part of the Republican Party’s 1994 campaign manifesto, the Contract with America. The relatively lower level of individuals responding “too much” during the 1980s likely reflects the fact that President Ronald Reagan launched a far-

reaching effort to scale back social welfare programs.

Despite this variability, on average 48 percent of the public said we were spending too much on welfare over the 1973–2000 time period. There is, in other words, a relatively strong dislike for spending on welfare in the United States. What is the source of this persistent dislike? Given the cross-national differences in the size of our welfare state compared with other industrialized democracies (Kingdon 1999), an important part of the explanation is political culture. Dislike of welfare stems from our nation's tradition of self-reliance, economic individualism, and hostility toward government (McClosky and Zaller 1984). Americans are committed to the belief that each individual is responsible for his own well-being. For example, since the mid-1980s, fewer than 20 percent of the public agreed with the statement that the government "should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans" (Weaver, Shapiro, and Jacobs 1995). Yet 96 percent of the public agreed with the following statement in the 1989 National Election Studies pilot survey: "People should take advantage of every opportunity to improve themselves rather than expect help from the government."

Support for Spending on the Poor

Despite opposition to spending on welfare, there is strong support for the principle of government assistance to the needy. Americans want people to be self-reliant but want the government to come to the aid of those who cannot help themselves. Figure 2 reveals that public opinion undergoes a dramatic change when we ask people if we are "spending

too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance to the poor."

Since the 1980s, a clear majority of the public has favored increasing assistance to the poor. With the exception of the mid-1990s, only a very small minority of the public (around 10 percent) want to decrease assistance to the poor. Tom Smith, senior study director at the National Opinion Research Center, looked at a number of public opinion surveys and found that, on average, support for assistance to the poor is 39 percentage points higher than for welfare (Smith 1987).

Given the dramatic reversal in public opinion across Figures 1 and 2, differences in people's attitudes about "welfare" and "assistance to the poor" deserve further examination. Individuals are more likely to support programs and services if they believe the recipients are deserving (Cook and Barrett 1992). And yet studies of public opinion show that many Americans think welfare recipients could get by without welfare if they really tried. In a 1986 national public opinion survey, Fay Lomax Cook and Edith Barrett (1992) found important differences in perceptions of need across social welfare programs. Although 89 percent of the public thinks Social Security recipients need the benefits, and 85 percent of the public thinks Medicaid recipients need them, only 69 percent stated that AFDC recipients need the benefits.

The Cook and Barrett study reveals that welfare recipients are seen as undeserving in a number of other ways. Compared with recipients of Social Security and Medicaid, survey respondents were more likely to say that AFDC recipients have other sources of income to meet their needs, do not want to be indepen-




Figure 2 U.S. Public Opinion on Spending on “Assistance to the Poor”

Note: The question was “We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, assistance to the poor, are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance to the poor?”

Source: National Opinion Research Center/General Social Surveys, 1973–2000.

dent, and do not use their benefits wisely. More recent data support these conclusions. A 1994 survey sponsored by *Time* magazine and CNN found that 66 percent of the public agreed with the statement that “most people receiving welfare payments are taking advantage of the system.” Only 34 percent said recipients were “genuinely in need of help.” Thus, one important source of the difference in attitudes regarding welfare and assistance to the poor is the perception that welfare is a program that rewards the undeserving poor.

There is evidence that racial stereotypes also play a role in generating opposition to welfare in America. This re-

search is based on the 1991 National Race and Politics Study conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of California–Berkeley. Analyzing these and other national surveys, Martin Gilens has found that the American public thinks that most people who receive welfare are black and that blacks do not have the same work ethic as other Americans. Not too surprisingly, a number of studies have documented that public perceptions of welfare recipients are mistaken (e.g., Hochschild 2001). For instance, a survey of Illinois residents revealed that only 10 percent of respondents knew the percentage of the federal budget that goes to welfare. When it came to questions about the

total percent of the population on welfare, the percent on welfare who are African American, the average annual welfare payment, the percent on welfare for more than eight years, and the percent on welfare with less than a high school education, a majority of respondents chose the wrong answer (Kuklinski et al. 2000). National surveys show a similar pattern, with fewer than 20 percent of the public being able to state the percentage of the population below the poverty line or the percentage of blacks, children, and women who qualify as "poor." There is no doubt that the public's perceptions (or misperceptions, as the case may be) about poor people and the programs that serve them have an impact on public opinion about welfare.

Attitudes about

How to Reform Welfare

Despite the passage of the 1996 welfare reform bill, the law was set to expire in 2001, forcing elected officials to return again to the subject of how to address poverty in the United States. As a result, public attitudes about how best to reform the nation's welfare system continue to be important. This final section highlights public attitudes regarding some of the most prominent reform proposals.

Current welfare policy stipulates that recipients are required to work within two years of receiving welfare benefits, and recipients generally are ineligible to receive cash benefits for more than five years. A 1994 survey sponsored by NBC and the *Wall Street Journal* showed that 82 percent of the public favored proposals that would require recipients to work and would limit benefits to two years. One year later, an NBC/*Wall Street Journal* poll revealed that 62 percent of the public rated "getting people into the work force"

as the single most important goal for reforming the welfare system. At the same time, the public clearly is divided on how far they are willing to go to encourage work. A survey by Harvard University and the Kaiser Family Foundation during 1994 revealed that 44 percent of the public said, "we shouldn't let people who can't get or hold a job go hungry or homeless and we need to continue payments to these people." Approximately the same amount (43 percent) agreed with the statement that "we should have a firm limit on how long people can stay on welfare, regardless of the consequences, in order to get them to work."

Many participants in this debate maintain that the key to moving people into long-term employment is providing recipients with job training. In the abstract, mandatory work programs and job training garner strong support from Americans. A 1995 national survey conducted by the Public Agenda Foundation found that 77 percent of the public said job training was "absolutely essential" to improving welfare. Results from CBS/*New York Times* polls in 1994 and 1995 show that nearly 90 percent of Americans think the government should create work programs for people on welfare and require them to participate. But when the Harvard/Kaiser poll asked people whether they would be willing to pay more taxes or see other programs cut in order to provide job training or public-sector jobs, barely a majority said yes. Almost the same amount (40–45 percent) said they were unwilling to make such sacrifices. Support for job training remained strong as late as 2000. In that year a national survey sponsored by Jobs for the Future revealed that 77 percent of the public said the "government should help people develop skills and get jobs where they

have opportunities for advancement." Whether or not Americans will be ready to pay for these services when Congress reconsiders the 1996 reform bill is less certain, however.

Given the strict time limits that were enacted into law in 1996, the impact of the law on children has emerged as an important issue. According to a 1996 *U.S. News and World Report* survey, 46 percent of the public said they expected the 1996 law to help children of welfare recipients. This is more than double the number of people who said the law would hurt children (21 percent) or would have little effect (20 percent). At the same time, stricter measures, such as ending benefits for unmarried mothers and placing their children in orphanages, are not palatable to most people. When the Harvard/Kaiser poll asked respondents if they favored a proposal to end all welfare benefits for unmarried mothers and their children, even if it meant that some of the children would be sent to orphanages, 66 percent opposed this idea. (In a similarly worded 1994 *Time/CNN* poll, 72 percent rejected the orphanage option.) Survey respondents also rank child care as an important priority. According to the Public Agenda Foundation survey, nearly 70 percent said providing child care while mothers worked was "absolutely essential" to improving welfare.

Finally, being "deserving" continues to be an important consideration for people as they ponder how to reform welfare. A 1996 NBC/Microsoft survey asked respondents about the most important goal for welfare reform: "Getting undeserving welfare recipients off of the welfare system, even if it means stopping benefits to some deserving recipients or, making sure that welfare benefits are maintained for those who deserve them, even if it

means some undeserving welfare recipients will get benefits they should not." Almost a majority (47 percent) said it was more important to make sure benefits were maintained for those who deserve them. Thirty-nine percent thought it was more important to get undeserving welfare recipients off of the welfare system. Similarly, the Harvard/Kaiser survey reveals that a majority of the public is opposed to ending welfare payments if the job a person takes pays a wage that makes it difficult to support her family. At the same time, the Public Agenda Foundation poll found strong support for "surprise visits" to homes of welfare recipients "to make sure they deserve their benefits." Thus, the American public seems willing to extend a helping hand to those in need, but it remains ever vigilant about making sure benefits do not go to the undeserving.

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Women Presidential Candidates

Despite being the world's oldest democracy, the United States has never elected a female president or a female presidential nominee of a major political party. Although other developed and developing countries, including Britain, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, and Pakistan, have elected female presidents and prime ministers, the United States has been late in encouraging women's political participation as voters and officeholders. Women did not gain the right to vote until the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1920. And, although women comprise roughly 50 percent of the population, they remain significantly underrepresented as elected officials in Congress

and state legislatures. Why have so few women held elective office, especially at the highest levels of government? This essay will briefly examine those women who have sought presidential and vice presidential nominations, track public support for a woman presidential candidate, and finally, identify factors that may help explain why the United States has yet to elect a woman chief executive.

According to the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), at least twenty-one women have sought the presidency, thirteen of whom sought either the Democratic or the Republican party nomination (CAWP 2003). In 1872, nearly 50 years before women could legally vote, Victoria Woodhull became the first woman to run for president, as a candidate of the Equal Rights Party. Another first occurred in 1964 when Margaret Chase Smith became the first woman to receive votes in a major party's presidential primary. Smith competed in Republican primaries in at least six states and received 27 first ballot votes at the Republican National Convention before removing her name from consideration after the first ballot (CAWP 2003). In 1984, Representative Geraldine Ferraro became the first woman vice presidential nominee of a major political party when she was named by Walter Mondale as his running mate. Mondale's attempt to gain support for his candidacy by putting a woman on the ticket did not bear fruit, as voters handily reelected Republican Ronald Reagan to a second presidential term. More recently, in 1999, Elizabeth Dole formed an exploratory committee to pursue a bid for the Republican nomination but never competed in any presidential primaries or caucuses, having dropped out of the race in October 1999 citing a lack of funds. Former First Lady

and U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice have been touted as contenders for the Democratic and Republican nominations, respectively, in 2008, but neither has expressed any formal interest in seeking the presidency.

*Public Support for a Woman
Presidential Candidate*

The limited number of women presidential candidates has not prevented pollsters from measuring public support for a woman president. For more than sixty years, opinion polls have tracked the public's willingness to support a "qualified" woman candidate. The question, first asked in 1937 by a Gallup poll, stated, "If your political party nominated a woman for president, would you be willing to vote for her if she were qualified for the job?" Since then, Gallup polls and the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago have asked this question of the public at least once in subsequent decades. Table 1 indicates support levels for qualified women presidential candidates from 1937 to 2003.

In 1937, just 20 years after the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchising women, only one-third of respondents indicated they would vote for a qualified woman presidential candidate while the remaining two-thirds of respondents indicated they would not. Prior to World War II, Americans showed little inclination to vote for a woman running for president, even if she were qualified for the office. In the decades that followed, public support for a qualified woman candidate increased. By 1955, slightly more than half of respondents sampled (52 percent) indicated they would vote for a qualified woman while

44 percent of respondents remained opposed to such a candidate. Twenty years later, in 1975, more than three-quarters of respondents (78 percent) said they would vote for a woman while 19 percent said they would not. Public support for a qualified woman candidate again increased during the 1980s to over 80 percent although that level of support dipped slightly in 1984 (to 78 percent support) the same year that Democratic presidential nominee Walter Mondale named Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate. During the 1990s, public support for a woman president climbed to over 90 percent and peaked in 1999 when 92 percent of respondents indicated they would vote for a woman while 7 percent of respondents indicated they would not. In the 21st century, after the events of September 11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, public support for a woman executive dropped slightly to 87 percent support and 12 percent opposition.

*Public Support for Women
Presidential Candidates as Compared
with Other Qualified Candidates*

At the same time that Gallup polls tracked the public's willingness to support a woman presidential candidate, Gallup also tracked the public's willingness to consider a Jewish, Catholic, or black (question first asked in 1958) presidential candidate. Table 2 shows for selected years the percentage of respondents indicating they would support a qualified presidential candidate who was Catholic, Jewish, black, or a woman. Over time, respondents have supported a Catholic or a Jewish presidential candidate at a higher level than a black or woman candidate. In 1937, more than half (60 percent) of respondents said they would vote for a Catholic presidential

Table 1 Public Support for a Woman President, 1937–2003

Question: If your political party nominated a woman for president, would you be willing to vote for her if she were qualified for the job?

<i>Year</i>	<i>Month</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>	<i>Survey Organization</i>
1937	February	33%	64%	3%	Gallup
1945	November	33	55	12	Gallup
1949	September	48	48	4	Gallup
1955	February	52	44	4	Gallup
1958	September	54	41	5	Gallup
1959	December	57	39	4	Gallup
1963	August	55	41	4	Gallup
1967	April	57	39	4	Gallup
1969	March	53	40	7	Gallup
1971	July	66	29	5	Gallup
1972	July	70	25	5	NORC
1974	April	78	19	3	NORC
1975	July	78	19	3	NORC
1977	July	77	20	3	NORC
1978	April	79	18	3	NORC
	July	76	19	5	Gallup
1982	July	83	13	3	NORC
1983	April	84	13	3	NORC
	April–May	80	16	4	Gallup
1984	July	78	17	5	Gallup
1985	July	80	17	3	NORC
1986	July	84	13	3	NORC
1987	July	82	12	6	Gallup
1988	April	85	12	3	NORC
1989	April	82	13	5	NORC
1990	April	87	10	3	NORC
1991	April	87	9	4	NORC
1993	April	87	9	4	NORC
1994	May	90	8	3	NORC
1996	May	91	7	3	NORC
1998	June	90	6	3	NORC
1999	February	92	7	1	Gallup
2003	May–June	87	12	1	Gallup

Note: For each year, the Gallup poll reports a sample size of approximately 1,500 adults surveyed from a nationwide, random poll conducted over the telephone. Sample size of NORC surveys varies depending on the year, from 1,372 to 2,992 respondents in the years identified in this table.

candidate while fewer than half of respondents indicated they would support a Jewish or a woman candidate (46 percent and 33 percent, respectively). By 1967, more than eight in ten voters indi-

cated they would support a Catholic or a Jewish presidential candidate, yet a little more than half of voters indicated they would be willing to support a black or a woman presidential candidate. Nearly 30

years later, support levels among voters topped 90 percent for each of the four groups of presidential candidates. In 1999, 95 percent of respondents indicated they would vote for a black presidential candidate, 94 percent indicated they would vote for a Catholic presidential candidate, and 92 percent indicated they would vote for either a Jewish or a woman presidential candidate.

In the 21st century, support for Catholic, Jewish, black, and women presidential candidates remains largely unchanged. In May of 2003, Gallup polls reported that more than nine in ten voters would support a Catholic or black president nominated by their party (93 percent and 92 percent, respectively) while more than eight in ten voters would support a Jewish or woman president nominated by their party (89 percent and 87 percent). It is worth noting that even in the 21st century, about 10 percent of respondents indicated they would not support a

Catholic, Jewish, black, or woman presidential candidate. In sum, however, over the last several decades voters appear increasingly willing to support presidential candidates who are neither male nor white nor Protestant.

Factors Affecting Women's Electoral Bids

Although voters may be willing to vote for a qualified woman presidential candidate in theory, it is less clear whether voters support women candidates in practice. What is certain is that voters use stereotypes in evaluating candidates. The effect of gender stereotyping works in two ways. First, voters perceive women candidates as more liberal than men candidates of the same party (Koch 2000). Women Democrats are perceived as more liberal than male Democrats while female Republicans are perceived as more liberal (or less conservative) than male Republicans. As a result, McDermott (1997) has

Table 2 Public Support for Qualified Presidential Candidates by Religion, Race, and Gender

Question: If your political party nominated a _____ for president, would you be willing to vote for him/her if he/she were qualified for the job?

Year	Catholic	Jewish	Black	Woman
1937	60	46	not asked	33
1958	67*	62	37*	54
1967	90	82	53	57
1978	91	82	77	76
1983	92	88	77	80
1999	94	92	95	92
2003	93	89	92	87

Source: Gallup Poll, selected years.

* Question asked multiple times in 1958 for this category. Results reported are from a survey conducted September 10–15, 1958. For each year, the Gallup poll reports a sample size of approximately 1,500 adults surveyed from a nationwide, random poll conducted over the telephone.

found that liberal voters tend to prefer women candidates while conservative voters prefer male candidates. Second, voters use gender stereotypes to infer a candidate's expertise (or lack thereof) in issue domains. Voters generally perceive women candidates to be more adept at handling issues like education and welfare while voters perceive male candidates to be better at handling issues like national security, defense, and the economy (Burrell 1994; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; Leeper 1991). Presidents serve as the commander in chief of the armed forces and are generally credited with, or blamed for, the state of the economy. Thus, voters may prefer that men, not women, serve as president because the issues that dominate the presidency are precisely those over which men are identified as having greater expertise.

The effect of gender stereotyping has electoral implications. Women candidates tend to do well when the electoral context is favorable to their issues and worse when the electoral context is unfavorable to their issues, such as when an election occurs in the midst of a war or foreign policy crisis (Kahn 1996). In light of the events of September 11 and a sluggish economy, not to mention wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the recent electoral context does not bode well for women candidates, especially women running for president. Lawless (2003, p. 2) finds that citizens "prefer men's leadership traits and characteristics, deem men more competent at legislating around issues of national security and military crises, and contend that men are superior to women at addressing the new obstacles generated by the events of September 11th." Together, these preferences translate into lower levels of willingness to support a qualified woman presidential candidate.

The prospects for the United States electing its first woman president in the 21st century are mixed. On the one hand, public opinion polls indicate a greater willingness among the American public to support a qualified woman candidate. At present, about nine in ten Americans indicate they would support a qualified woman presidential candidate. A candidate's gender is no longer an automatically disqualifying factor like it was in previous decades. And, as women have gained election to Congress and governorships, they have increased the number of women in the candidate pool from which potential presidential candidates are drawn.

At the same time, public support for a woman president may be conditional on the electoral context. In other words, voters will support a woman presidential candidate when the election is dominated by issues like education or health care but will be less likely to support a woman when issues like the economy or war are most salient. Previous research has shown that when voters are worried about the state of the economy and national security, they prefer male candidates to women candidates. An economic recession and recent wars have shifted voters' attention away from issues that speak to the stereotypical strengths of women candidates. So while voters may be willing to support women presidential candidates, at least in theory, and a greater number of women elected to national office are poised to run for president, an unfriendly electoral context may keep women out of the race and further delay citizens' opportunity to elect the first woman president of the United States.

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Section Three: Key People, Institutions, and Concepts

Caddell, Pat

Pat Caddell achieved renown as a pollster for President Jimmy Carter. In his capacity as campaign tactician and unofficial White House adviser, Caddell became the original celebrity public opinion analyst. Though other pollsters had important roles with presidents and developed reputations among political operatives and students of politics, Pat Caddell was the first to gain widespread media attention and public notoriety. Referred to as “the boy wonder of political polling” (Rosenthal 1987, p. B8), Caddell received intense scrutiny for both the nature of his advisory role and the quality of his public opinion analysis. On the one hand, Carter’s political critics questioned the propriety of Caddell’s relationship with the president. Was Carter relying too closely on a pollster, one without an official position in the government at that? On the other hand, academic analysts wondered whether Caddell was simply providing the Carter White House with polling data to inform decisionmaking or was trying to affect policy through his presentation and interpretation of the data. I sort through the controversies generated by Caddell’s role as pollster and presidential adviser in this biographical survey, and place his career as a pollster into the context of the evolving relation-

ship between public opinion polling and political leadership.

The period of Pat Caddell’s maximum influence on U.S. politics dovetails with the rising prominence of political polling in the national consciousness. Caddell’s emergence marks a shift in the popular perception of public opinion and polling. Before Caddell made his mark, few among the public or even in the academy would associate pollsters with politicians. Few, even among sophisticated observers of politics, thought it possible or desirable for pollsters to interpret the national mood for elected officials. Instead, polls were seen more as indicators of the politician’s skill at leading the public (see Lipset 1966, p. 20). Not only was Caddell more closely associated with Carter than were his predecessors with the presidents they served; he had a reputation for offering broad interpretations of the national mood from polling data. Unlike most of his predecessors, Caddell did more than just report the numbers to his clients; Caddell used polling results to substantiate his conception of the national mood. Since he did not limit his advice to reporting indices of approval for general postures or specific policies, critics charged that Caddell’s work breached the wall between polling and policy advocacy.

Caddell's Background

Patrick Hayward Caddell was born on May 19, 1950, in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The son of a U.S. Coast Guard officer, Caddell spent his youth in the vicinity of Coast Guard stations in Falmouth, Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; and Jacksonville, Florida. He displayed an early affinity for polling, sampling his fifth-grade classmates in Charleston to predict that Nixon would carry the city in the 1960 election. His interest in the craft of polling developed further in high school, with Caddell producing a "voter election model" of the Jacksonville area as a math project during his junior year. Caddell began earning his professional stripes as a pollster by the time he was 18 years old, conducting polls for Fred Shultz, speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, and a local Jacksonville TV station for the 1968 election.

Although polling is a combination of interpretive art and the science of sampling, Caddell did not devote his undergraduate years at Harvard to improving his mathematical and statistical skills. In an interview with Charles Mohr of the *New York Times* Caddell claimed that he only "lasted five minutes" in the one statistics class he attended at Harvard, finding that "whatever they were doing and I was doing had nothing in common" (quoted in Mohr 1976, p. 28).

Caddell graduated from Harvard in 1972, having compiled a record described by a former professor there as "not outstanding" (Mohr 1976, p. 28). During his time at Harvard, Caddell was already honing his talents as a professional pollster, working on the 1970 Ohio gubernatorial campaign of John J. Gilligan, and shortly thereafter establishing his polling

firm, Cambridge Survey Research, with fellow Harvard undergraduates John Gorman and Daniel Porter. As his college graduation approached, Caddell was busy working on the presidential campaign of George McGovern. Inconveniently, Caddell had to take care of one outstanding graduation requirement prior to commencement—passing a swimming test. In a revealing display of initiative, Caddell sought out the political author and member of the Harvard Board of Overseers, Theodore W. White, during the California primary to witness his swim in the hotel pool and report back to Cambridge on Caddell's aquatic competence.

The above anecdote introduces an essential aspect of Caddell's professional persona. Along with a well-defined interpretation of public attitudes, Caddell's gumption and guile helped propel him and his political patrons to greater success. A similar example of Caddell's willingness to seize the initiative comes from his work for McGovern during the crucial Wisconsin primary. Caddell's knowledge of what precincts in Milwaukee NBC was using in its polls led staffers to concentrate volunteers in those areas to improve McGovern's standing in state-wide surveys.

National Politics

Caddell got his start in national Democratic Party politics when McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart hired him to do a poll in New Hampshire. He joined the campaign armed with data from surveys conducted by Cambridge Survey Research supporting the conclusion that Vietnam and the assassination traumas of the 1960s had destroyed "the overriding belief that we were a nation of special people, that we could always bend events

to our will, that things in America always got better" (quoted in Stroud 1977, p. 196). The tenor of these findings would define Caddell's message as a pollster throughout his time in the political limelight. The McGovern campaign was impressed with Caddell's emphasis on broad themes as opposed to the standard statistics provided by pollsters, while McGovern himself was taken with Caddell's analysis that the public was disaffected and dissatisfied with the state of U.S. politics. Caddell made a favorable impression on the McGovern team, leading former McGovern lieutenant Frank Mankiewicz to extol his virtues: "He was young, he was cheap, we thought he was brilliant, and we were right" (quoted in Rosenthal 1987, p. B8).

Political campaigns were not the only venue where Pat Caddell's polling expertise was in demand. Caddell produced a separate quarterly national opinion survey for business and other clients called *Cambridge Reports*. Here, Caddell once again combined his entrepreneurial gifts with his polling acumen to provide Fortune 500 companies with his reading of the national psyche and where it was heading. *Cambridge Reports* also permitted clients to pay for a few questions as part of an omnibus survey, with the client just receiving and paying for their fraction of the larger survey. As his influence in the world of politics grew, however, his relationship with corporations that could profit from Caddell's access to elected officials came under scrutiny.

Caddell and Carter

Jimmy Carter's successful campaign for the presidency catapulted Pat Caddell into the national spotlight. Caddell's movement from McGovernite to member

of Carter's inner circle again reflects a combination of his entrepreneurship and his reading of the polls. Some critics charged Caddell with opportunism for switching ends of the Democratic Party spectrum. Although it's easy to inject the entrepreneurial aspect of Caddell's personality to explain his decision to work for a more promising candidate, one needs to recognize that Carter was the contender who best fit Caddell's sense of what the country was looking for in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era. Thus, in Carter, Caddell found a candidate who was best positioned to assuage the public's distrust of politicians and help restore Americans' faith in themselves. Carter's identity as the honest, "untainted outsider" reflected the alienation found in Caddell's polls (Moore 1992, p. 137).

Caddell first met Carter in June 1972 during an Atlanta campaign stop with McGovern. After a late-night session in the kitchen of the governor's mansion discussing politics with just Carter and some of his closest aides, Caddell concluded Carter "really understood what was going on in the country" (quoted in Stroud 1977, p. 192). Caddell rapidly became the only non-Georgian in the candidate's intimate circle, widely regarded by those inside and outside the campaign as being crucial to Carter's success. Armed with Caddell's emphasis on the public's alienation and distrust of politicians, and the political skills of his Georgia aides, Carter took the improbable journey from "Jimmy who?" to president-elect. A presidential campaign focusing on alienation and mistrust worked for an outsider, but applying this theme to the task of governing and maintaining Carter's political viability would be problematic.

Caddell chose not to join the White House staff. Instead, he served as a consultant paid through a \$40,000-per-month Democratic National Committee White House political fund. In an interview with Stroud, Caddell revealed ambivalent feelings about power. Although he admitted enjoying and being fascinated with power, he told Stroud that he did not wish to devote the energy required to be at the seat of power, confessing, "I'm a dilettante" (quoted in Stroud 1977, p. 197). Being out of the White House did not insulate Caddell from criticism, however. Though lacking official status, Caddell became, according to William Schneider, "the first true Pollster General" (1997, p. 7). Simultaneously, Caddell was earning money from corporations that could benefit from the access or cachet of having a relationship with the Pollster General. Prominent columnists such as Jack Anderson and William Safire questioned his integrity, as his firm's clients included corporations and foreign governments that had a clear interest in government policy. Carter's team also became sensitive to its image of being too focused on polling and public relations, leading to meetings with Caddell being held off White House grounds and perhaps contributing to a decline in polling frequency in 1978 and 1979 (Katz 2000). Sometimes the pollster's dual roles led to problems in effecting the president's legislative agenda, as when a *Cambridge Reports* poll commissioned by the American Retail Federation was used to oppose Carter's labor bill in Congress (Dewar 1978).

The infamous malaise speech provides the most controversial incident of Caddell's White House tenure. Carter's July 15, 1979, "crisis of confidence" address

was the culmination of an internal battle to define the sources of President Carter's political woes. Some, like Vice President Walter Mondale, viewed Carter's problem as stemming from the bad economy and the perception that Carter's response had been ineffectual. Caddell, by contrast, saw Carter's political difficulties as "part of a fundamental alienation toward government" (quoted in Moore 1992, p. 149). Public mistrust was pervasive, and not just of politicians, but of institutions broadly. For example, Caddell's polling on the energy crisis found the public blaming fuel prices and the oil companies rather than scarcity for the nation's energy woes (Jimmy Carter Library, *Cambridge Report* 1977, p. 143). Thus, instead of giving yet another speech on the energy problem as planned, Caddell argued in his "Apocalypse Now" memo to the president that Carter give a speech emphasizing the theme of alienation that had permeated his polling for years. Carter sent Caddell a handwritten note expressing his appreciation for Caddell's work on the speech, praising him as "a great ally to have in fighting our crisis of confidence" (quoted in Tenpas 2000, p. 118).

For the first few days after the crisis-of-confidence speech, Caddell's advocacy of a focus on alienation seemed vindicated. Carter's handling of the resignations of five Cabinet members a few days later, however, spoiled whatever goodwill the president gained from the speech. Events in Iran and Afghanistan later that year would present new challenges to Carter's prospects for reelection, and make a reelection campaign based on alienation and mistrust of Washington rather hopeless for an incumbent to pull off. Instead, Carter campaigned by portraying Ronald Reagan, in Caddell's words, "as a man

too dangerous to be President" (quoted in Moore 1992, p. 154).

Conclusion

Following Carter's 1980 defeat, Caddell advised other Democratic candidates but soon retired from political campaigns. His legacy can be traced to his role as pollster to Carter and more generally to his transformation of the position of pollster in American politics. Although Caddell may deny that "polling had any great influence on policy" (Rosenstiel 1993, p. A5) in the Carter White House, in memos and other correspondence Caddell advanced his own interpretation of public concerns. In the Carter White House no one had the polling expertise to challenge Caddell's assertions about public opinion. Subsequent White House pollsters may have shared this agenda-setting advantage, but future staffs were better equipped to contest the interpretation of polls (see Heith 1998; Shapiro and Jacobs 2001).

Caddell did not excel at the scientific aspect of polling; he is not known for introducing new sampling techniques or means of interpreting data. Rather, he was able to tease out an interpretation of the national mood from his surveys and persuade political leaders that a pervasive alienation among the electorate needed to be given political voice. That he was able to convince politicians ostensibly keyed into the mood of the electorate of what the public wanted, turned on its head Walter Lipset's idea that the polls told a politician how good he was. Instead, the pollster was telling the politician what the polls meant and what to do about them. Caddell's record on political tactics and quality of advice is uneven, but he left an enduring legacy by institutionalizing a position without

which a modern president cannot politically survive.

Andrew Z. Katz

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Cantril, Hadley

Hadley Cantril was a social psychologist whose approach to public opinion research reflected a long-standing interest in the nature of human perception. His search for the determinants of opinion led him to study social movements and to look into ways of improving polling methods. He was the first to provide polling information on a regular basis to the White House. His surveys outside the United States confirmed his belief that U.S. foreign policy can be more effective if it takes international as well as American public opinion into account. His research in perception advanced psychology's understanding of how individuals relate to the world around them.

Hadley Cantril was born in 1906 in Hyrum, Utah. Raised in Portland, Oregon, he graduated from Dartmouth College in 1928, valedictorian of his class. He received a doctorate in social psychology from Harvard University in 1931. After appointments at Dartmouth, Harvard,

and Columbia, he taught at Princeton University for two decades, resigning in 1955 to establish the Institute for International Social Research. He received honorary degrees from Dartmouth and Washington and Lee University. He and his wife, Mavis Katherine, had a son and daughter. Hadley Cantril died in 1969.

Early Work in Social Psychology

Cantril was part of the second generation of modern social psychology in the United States, which was coming into its own in the mid-1930s. Social psychology was charting a course between the perspectives of sociology and individual psychology by elaborating its premise that the study of human behavior must encompass both the social context in which people live and the uniqueness of each individual.

Cantril's early research explored the nature of attitudes, a topic high on social psychology's agenda. His doctoral dissertation at Harvard had looked at how the general points of view people have relate to the content of their attitudes about specific matters.

His work in the late 1930s took place against the backdrop of economic dislocations lingering from the Great Depression and the growing prospect of war in Europe. As explained in *The Invasion from Mars*, Cantril found that the unsettled times were among reasons some listening to the radio Halloween night in 1938 thought they were hearing a news report about aliens landing on Earth rather than an Orson Welles adaptation of the H. G. Wells fictional classic *War of the Worlds*.

The times were also pressing the questions of why people are drawn to social movements such as the fascism then taking root in Germany and Italy and

whether something similar could happen in the United States. In *The Psychology of Social Movements*, Cantril studied followers of the Nazi Party and four movements in the United States. He found they felt threatened by economic uncertainties and were attracted to overly simplified visions of a new order. More important, he described the different ways people become vulnerable to the appeals of a social movement.

The Systematic Study of Public Opinion

As reflected in his book on social movements, Cantril was trying to account for the different ways people come to the views they express and upon which they sometimes act. He was intrigued, therefore, by how social psychology might make use of the public opinion polls that had just captured the headlines by correctly anticipating Franklin Roosevelt's victory in the 1936 election. Although the idea of interviewing a cross section of the public had taken hold in advertising research and polls for news organizations, academic social psychology had not yet seen its potential.

In the course of preparing several articles at the request of the *New York Times* and a review of the 1936 polls for *Sociometry*, Cantril concluded that polling methods held great promise, especially if they could be refined to shed light on the *frames of reference* through which people view the world. He had been impressed by the imagination of George Gallup, who had established the American Institute of Public Opinion a year earlier. In fact, proximity to Gallup's organization was a major factor in Cantril's decision to accept an appointment at Princeton University in 1936.

Cantril established the Office of Public Opinion Research (OPOR) at Princeton in 1940 under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to study the determinants of opinion. He used three approaches. First, he studied differences of view among subgroups within poll samples that might help explain what lies behind opinions. Second, he repeated questions in sequential polls to examine when opinions change or hold steady and why. In addition these trends provided up-to-date information on public thinking throughout World War II. Third, OPOR's frequent surveys were a chance to assess the effects of varying the way issues are presented to respondents in poll questions. Cantril thought it was important to test the reliability of small samples (as few as 100 or 200 cases). Small samples might be the only way of conducting surveys quickly given the logistical challenges of in-person interviews before the era of phone polls.

Polling's first archive resulted from the value Cantril saw of having data from many polls in one place. In addition to all OPOR surveys, the archive grew to include data from the American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion Research Center, among other organizations. Cantril later transferred these holdings to Williams College as one of the building blocks of its new Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Findings from surveys in the OPOR archive are published in his compilation *Public Opinion: 1935–1946*. Many of OPOR's research projects are described in *Gauging Public Opinion* by Cantril and his OPOR colleagues.

Polling for the Roosevelt White House

As the war spread across Europe, it became clear to Hadley Cantril that

information being gathered by the Office of Public Opinion Research could be of considerable importance to decisionmakers in Washington. In particular he was concerned by poll results indicating that Americans were not prepared for what the war could require of the United States. He arranged a meeting in the fall of 1940 with one of President Franklin Roosevelt's anonymous assistants who was extremely interested in findings Cantril reported, as well as his suggestions for how the president might deal with the situation. Thus began a steady flow of polling information and counsel to the Roosevelt administration throughout World War II. The White House was particularly interested in charts tracking trends on nearly two dozen questions.

As the first to bring information about public opinion to the White House on a regular basis, part of Cantril's contribution was to help FDR's aides make effective use of poll results. Cantril took the initiative regarding the timing and content of most surveys and memoranda, and his reports always highlighted implications of findings. Funding for his surveys in the United States was not provided by FDR's political supporters but by Gerard B. Lambert, a retired businessman living in Princeton who was concerned about the course of the war.

One of Cantril's polls outside the United States was in connection with the Allies' need to establish a base in North Africa from which to launch an attack on Italy. In June 1942 Cantril quietly conducted a survey in Morocco to help determine how to minimize resistance to an Allied landing from the Vichy French, who controlled most of Morocco and were not opposing Hitler. Interviews with a sample of key Vichy military per-

sonnel and civilians showed that deep-seated distrust of Britain would surface if British forces were involved, whereas the kind of American-only landing that took place five months later would meet less opposition.

In 1943 Cantril and OPOR were asked by the State Department to conduct surveys on topics such as public support for the idea of a United Nations. As the war drew to a close, Cantril was eager to return to teaching and writing full-time. In mid-1945 he arranged for OPOR's contract to be transferred to the National Opinion Research Center.

The Transactional Approach to Perception

Immediately after the war, Cantril turned to a book with Muzafer Sherif on how social norms and values become part of the sense of self that people develop. *The Psychology of Ego-Involvements: Social Attitudes and Identifications* was published in 1947.

In 1946 Cantril was introduced to Adelbert Ames Jr., with whom he would collaborate for the next decade in developing the *transactional approach* to the study of human perception. Ames, an expert in physiological optics, had demonstrated that images appearing on the retina of the eye have meaning only because of what people assume they are seeing based on their experience, not something intrinsic to the images themselves.

In other words, perception involves a *transaction* between an interdependent individual and environment rather than an *interaction* between two independent entities. As discussed in *The "Why" of Man's Experience* and numerous other publications, Cantril thought this insight had profound implications for psychology and opinion research.

390 Key People, Institutions, and Concepts

In the early 1960s Cantril learned of independent research by William K. Livingston at the University of Oregon Medical School, which found the same transactional process taking place in the way the central nervous system attributes significance to messages coming in through the senses. Cantril and Livingston planned a book on the concept of transaction in psychology and the newly emerging brain sciences. Both men died, however, before the book was completed. *Psychology, Humanism, and Scientific Inquiry: The Selected Essays of Hadley Cantril* includes three articles that give a sense of the book's intended scope.

In Cantril's thinking the study of perception should cover the full range of human experience. This included what he called the *value qualities* of experience, such as the beauty of a sunset, the reality of faith, or love for a partner. But as psychology ventured into this humanistic realm, Cantril argued it should not abandon the rigor of scientific inquiry. His writings on this point are also included in *Psychology, Humanism, and Scientific Inquiry*.

Perception, Polling, and International Affairs

Hadley Cantril's interests in perception, public opinion, and government policy converged at many points in the postwar years. In 1948 he accepted the invitation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to convene a panel of social scientists to examine the sources of tensions among nations. The panel's report, *Tensions That Cause Wars*, was published in 1950. *How Nations See Each Other*, published three years later, was based on surveys in nine countries.

In 1955 Cantril resigned as Stuart Professor and chairman of the psychology department at Princeton to set up the Institute for International Social Research under a grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

The institute's program was based on the idea that insights from psychology could add an important dimension to the making of U.S. foreign policy. The first step was to understand how people in other countries see themselves and others. This led the institute to conduct public opinion surveys in more than a dozen countries around the world. Early institute surveys, reported in *The Politics of Despair*, focused on the discontent of French and Italian voters.

Later surveys were designed around the *self-anchoring striving scale* Cantril devised, which used a sketch of a ladder to ask respondents where they thought they were at present between a best possible life (top of the ladder) and the worst possible state of affairs (bottom of the ladder). Ratings for the past and future then gauged how far people thought they had come and what they thought might lie ahead.

Comparisons across countries and cultures were possible because all respondents used the same ladder scale yet "anchored" their ratings in their own conception of the ideal and worst situations. Cantril brought results of the surveys together in *The Pattern of Human Concerns*.

One institute survey illustrated Cantril's thesis that there are *psychological requirements* that need to be taken into account if U.S. foreign policy is to succeed. His colleague at the institute, Lloyd A. Free, completed a survey in Cuba in 1960, a year after Fidel Castro

came to power. He found the Cuban people very optimistic about Cuba's future and only one in ten critical of Castro. Free's report, which had been available to senior U.S. officials, was overlooked in planning for an invasion of Cuba that assumed the people would rise up against Castro once anti-Castro exiles landed in Cuba. That calculation was proven fundamentally misguided when the Bay of Pigs invasion failed in 1961. Cantril's account of his work of interest to policymakers, including the FDR White House, appears in *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research*.

In *The Political Beliefs of Americans*, Cantril and Free uncovered the paradox that many who are conservative in their general views about government are liberal regarding support for its specific activities.

Albert H. Cantril

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Converse, Philip E.

For more than forty years, Philip E. Converse has been a driving intellectual force in the study of public opinion. Beginning with the 1960 publication of the revolutionizing *The American Voter*, followed closely by the seminal paper "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in 1964, Converse has consistently produced stimulating, high-quality research on American and comparative public opinion. Born in 1928 in Concord, New Hampshire, Converse earned his bachelor's degree at Denison University in 1949, his first M.A. (English literature) in

1950 at the State University of Iowa, and his second M.A. (sociology) and his Ph.D. (social psychology) at the University of Michigan in 1956 and 1958, respectively. He has taught at the University of Michigan since 1960, where he is currently professor emeritus in political science, and has also been director emeritus of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University since his retirement in 1994.

The American Voter

Following his doctoral degree and subsequent appointment as study director at the Survey Research Center (University of Michigan) in 1958, Converse began his scholarly career by collaborating on *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), generally considered the most important work in American voting behavior research. The Michigan school, as the authors came to be known, revolutionized the field with the first mass-based survey measures, propelling the study of voting behavior far beyond tiny samples and individual elections. The group provided a novel metaphor, the *funnel of causality*. The axis of the funnel represents a time dimension. Immediate determinants of the vote—attitudes toward parties and candidates—are located at the narrow end. As one shifts back along the axis, progressively broader and more distant variables are encountered: membership in social categories and groups, partisanship, and personality. Shattering the myth of the independent, informed voter, their results showed that party identification played a powerful role in predicting attitudes among sophisticated and unsophisticated voters alike. Further, the authors demonstrated that public attitudes lacked ideological constraint—mass attitudes did not adhere to a liberal-

conservative continuum. Despite energetic criticism from many corners, the most contemporary research on party identification has largely returned to these initial findings (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

As noted by Larry Bartels, it is difficult for an outsider to disentangle individual contributions to a project of this magnitude. Like Bartels, we must turn to the sequel, *Elections and the Political Order* (Campbell et al. 1966) for clues. Produced by the same team, this volume reiterated and expanded on much of the theoretical foundation of the previous work. In addition to two collaborative pieces on French voting behavior, four essays in that volume reveal what was already Converse's primary interest in the social psychological determinants of voting behavior: partisanship, ideology, and religion.

The Nature of Belief

Systems in Mass Publics

Converse's most well-known, widely cited, and controversial contribution to the field of political behavior appeared in *Ideology and Discontent* (1964c): "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." Building on his burgeoning understanding of the limits of citizens' ideological constraint, and utilizing increasingly sophisticated survey techniques, Converse drew on cross-sectional and panel data from 1956 to 1960 to conclude that the vast majority of citizens have little or no belief system consistency or coherence. Several findings supported this radical conclusion. First, few Americans use the liberal-conservative continuum to inform political attitudes. Second, most are unable to identify basic ideological terms. Third, attitudes are not temporally consistent; survey responses

vacillate significantly from one panel wave to the next. Finally, individuals rely heavily on social cues; social groupings are central to the belief systems of the masses.

These extraordinary findings had clear, uncomfortable ramifications for democracy. In the absence of what political scientists had long assumed to be universally understood ideological labels, attitudes and vote choice could not be clearly predicted. Survey responses may be little more than an instant random choice made to avoid the appearance of ignorance. Of course, revisionist critiques appeared immediately, challenging Converse on several grounds. Methodologically, the piece was attacked for poor operationalization (Lane 1973), for unreliable measures (Achen 1975), and for being time-bound (Nie and Andersen 1974). Ultimately, however, Converse's initial findings that Americans are relatively uninformed, largely lack stable and predictable opinions, and are influenced by social groupings have remained fairly robust, as reflected by the virtually inevitable citation in each new public opinion study.

Partisanship

The extent and utility of party loyalties in the United States form another influential theme in Converse's work, exemplified by the 1976 publication of *The Dynamics of Party Support* (Converse 1976). Diving into what had become a more contentious subfield since 1960, Converse expanded and revised several key assumptions about realignment and partisanship in this book. In a departure from Paul Allen Beck's (1974) socialization theory, which posited a *generational* explanation for partisan realignment, Converse returned to the *life-cycle* the-

ory proposed in *The American Voter*. The central assumption was that the longer an individual retained a party loyalty, the stronger that loyalty would be, and the less susceptible to realignment forces.

Responding to Paul Abramson's (1976) cohort data critique of the life-cycle theory, Converse employed a unique data set of tabulations "drawn progressively from twenty-nine national samples of the adult population conducted by the Survey Research Center [at the University of Michigan] between 1952 and 1975" (Converse 1976, p. 161). The set contained some 40,000 individual observations and allowed Converse to refute Abramson on methodological grounds. Rather than analyze only the very young (notoriously difficult to capture in survey data) and the very old (whose partisanship may have diminished concurrently with their interest in politics), Converse argued that more intermediate observations were necessary. By examining both a *steady-state* era (1944–1965) and one that involved significant *period effects* (1965–1976), Converse was also able to incorporate sociopolitical upheaval into his analysis (the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement).

Notably, even in the absence of additional period effects, the findings suggested that mean partisan strength would still be markedly lower in the future than at the end of the steady-state era in 1965. Converse provided rigorous support for Abramson's conclusion that the future electorate would be less attached to political parties and thus more susceptible to realignment. The study also supported Paul Beck's assertion that the direction of partisanship is informed by generational effects. The meticulous, creative scholarship for which Converse was by then well-known thus provided timely clarifi-

cation of important methodological and substantive issues.

Comparative Studies

Having earned his second M.A., in French studies, Converse was uniquely positioned to conduct research on comparative public opinion. French politics and voting behavior have been a key interest for the scholar since 1961. His outstanding 1986 book with Roy Pierce, *Political Representation in France*, was the culmination of decades of interest (Converse and Pierce 1986). The winner of the 1987 Scholarly Achievement Award from the North Central Sociological Association, cowinner of the 1987 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award, and winner of the George H. Hallett Book Award in 1996 from the American Political Science Association, the work was hailed as a masterpiece of comparative public opinion research.

The book centered on French politics in the late 1960s, but it was received as a groundbreaking study of legislative and representation issues in France and the United States. Applying the substantial body of work on the relationship of ideological and partisan forces with citizens' attitudes to the French citizenry, Converse and Pierce analyzed these influences in conjunction with those of social class, religion, and Gaullism. The short-term effects of political upheaval were also examined. Finally, the most substantive section of the book dealt with the French representation system. Drawing on the *diamond model* of former Michigan colleagues Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, Converse and Pierce outlined a variety of theoretical models of representation with which to analyze the French citizen and candidate data.

Notable findings included the similarity of French citizens to Americans in terms of the widespread disorganization of their political beliefs. The multiparty system, previously thought to provide a more coherent framework for attitude structure, was apparently no more useful in that sense than the American dual party system. Furthermore, for those French citizens who developed it—about half—party identification was as predictive of attitudes as it was in the United States. However, the other half of the electorate utilized a relatively content-free left-right position, or an attitude toward Charles de Gaulle as the centerpiece for political preferences. Of great interest was the discovery of a small group (about 15 percent) of politically active and ideologically aware citizens embedded in the French electorate. These citizens, the authors argued, provided *signal* clarity in the midst of the *noise*. Fore-shadowing the work of others (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987) on social networks and communication flow, the study suggested that aggregate political attitudes of smaller constituencies could be accurately predicted from these small numbers of politically aware citizens. As usual, an impressive clarity of focus characterized the complex analysis throughout, shedding much light on areas of paramount interest.

Measuring Public Opinion

Converse has long been a powerful intellectual force behind the development of increasingly sophisticated measures of public opinion. Within two years of finishing his Ph.D., he coauthored his first piece on the design and conduct of survey research (Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). Just four years later, he reported on

the development of repositories of social science data (Converse 1964a), calling on readers and institutions to add to these. What followed was years of close involvement with the Survey Research Center, the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, and the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, as well as the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford.

A series of articles appeared in the ensuing decades, dealing with issues such as sampling techniques (Converse 1964b), the availability and quality of American survey data (Converse 1966), the accuracy of polls and surveys (Converse and Traugott 1986), emerging trends in public opinion (Converse and Markus 1979), and the temporal order of instrument administration (Pierce and Converse 1990). A watershed moment for this subfield was the 1979 publication of the *American Social Attitudes Data Sourcebook* (Converse et al. 1979). A companion to the *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook* (Miller et al. 1980), this volume included a vast array of data collected by the Michigan Institute for Social Research during the previous three decades. A creative, carefully planned and presented work, it has provided the impetus for much research in the years since.

Professional Service and Accomplishments

Alongside his reputation as an inspired and painstaking scholar, Converse concurrently developed a distinguished record of contributions to vital research centers and to academic societies, serving on numerous boards and committees. Accordingly, he has been showered with

more than twenty awards and honors, from institutions as prestigious as the National Science Foundation, the American Association for Public Opinion Research, the American Political Science Association, and the National Academy of Sciences, to name a few. Most recently, he received the Warren E. Miller Award for Meritorious Service to the Social Sciences from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research in 2001.

Converse is also renowned for his collegial approach to other scholars, reflected in his frequent calls for social scientists to adopt a *cumulative approach* to research. In a 1996 address upon receipt of the James Madison Award from the American Political Science Association, Converse repeated this exhortation, reminding political scientists to avoid the "disputatious style" resulting from intellectual faddism and attempts to disprove previous theories definitively (Converse 1996). His legacy is thus one of high-quality research and professional service and of a constructive attitude to debate. His retirement in 1994 was a loss to the field, although he continues to collaborate on a variety of projects and has also branched out into other intellectual endeavors.

Stephanie C. McLean

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Exit Polls and Election Projections

State election projections prior to 1967 were derived from the vote returns available at polling places. When an election was over and the polls closed, voting officials opened a machine, or tallied paper

ballots, or whatever else they had to do to arrive at a vote count. That count was then made available to whoever was at the polling place at the time. The TV networks, starting in 1962 at CBS, for the most part used statewide samples of voting precincts to make projections of elections for governor, senator, president, or whatever other state elections were of interest.

The problem with this method was that the flow of sample precinct vote returns into a computer-based estimation model could not be counted on to be random. There was concern that election analysts would be misled by the results from the earliest sample precincts as they trickled in on election night. It was possible using this method to overrepresent urban areas, for example, where the vote was often available more quickly than in rural areas. In the days when network projections were based on nonrandom quota samples, the reporting pattern of precincts was not important. In 1967 only CBS News was using random samples to represent a state. The precinct-based estimates had very small sampling errors, but soon after the polls closed, the possibility of being misled by partial samples was too big a risk to be ignored. What was needed in addition to an election estimate from sample precincts was an early estimate that would let analysts know what to expect. All that was required of the other estimate was a reliable indication about the direction of the race. The exact margin of victory was not as important.

Preelection polls were frequently available but were judged to be too unreliable for election night guidance. Two alternatives were tested in the November elections of 1967. The first was telephone surveys on Election Day. The intention

was to interview a probability sample of voters at their homes after they voted. However, this did not work well. Too few people were available at their homes after they voted.

The First Exit Polls

The second alternative was exit polls. The idea came from research conducted by George Fine. Fine interviewed movie patrons as they were leaving a theater after a test showing of a new film. The Election Day goal was to interview a sample of voters as they were leaving the polling place. This approach would remove two of the problems of preelection polls. People interviewed preelection might not vote, even though they had every intention of doing so. They also might change their minds about their vote choice.

There has been extensive research on exit poll methods conducted over the years at CBS and at the network election projection consortium, but none with the impact on current methods of the experiments that were done in 1967. Those experiments led to many of the exit poll methods still used today. The experiments were conducted for elections in Kentucky, Philadelphia, and Cleveland. In Kentucky, for the governor's election, a random subsample of 10 precincts was sampled from among the larger sample, where official vote returns were being collected in order to test the new system designed by CBS's new election team. Ten precincts were designated in both Philadelphia and Cleveland, where they were holding mayoral elections. Those precincts were not a random sample.

Interviewers were hired and trained and sent to the polling place in advance of Election Day. They were told to locate the nearest phone that they could use to

call in the results on Election Day. They also sketched the layout of the polling place and discussed with their supervisors where they would stand to conduct the interviews with voters. They were told to work the first 50 minutes of each hour and then use the 10-minute break to tally the vote marked on the questionnaires. They were told to approach every n th voter and to use one of three methods to ascertain whom a voter voted for. The methods were varied by precinct or, in some cases, within the precinct. The methods were: the vote question was asked directly; the voters were offered a paper ballot to designate their choice; or voters selected a colored chip to symbolize their candidate. The day before the election, a full dress rehearsal was staged.

There were a number of questions to be answered by the tests that day:

1. Is it possible to get a reliable estimate by interviewing voters as they leave the poll?
2. Which of three interviewing methods worked best?
3. Could the results from the polling place be relayed to the computer center in New York quickly enough to be timely?
4. Will voters respond?
5. Are there legal or political barriers to conducting exit interviews?

The results showed that reliable estimates could be made if the vote reported to the exit poll interviewers was weighted to reflect the number of voters in the precincts. The weight could be the number of voters going to the polls that day or the number of registered voters. The weighted average error within each of the three locations was less than 2 percentage points. The average error was sig-

nificantly lower when 100 or more voters were interviewed at a polling place.

Giving voters a ballot to complete produced the lowest average error. Asking voters whom they voted for was almost as good, except refusals were highest. The chip technique was not nearly as precise. The refusal rates were about the same with the ballot and chip interviews. The number of refusals varied from one location to the next but had a minimal effect on the overall results. The refusal rates were: Kentucky—21 percent, Philadelphia and Cleveland—33 percent each.

The Kentucky results were phoned in to a processing center and entered into a computer in time to produce estimates at poll closing time. This provided assurance that the exit poll estimates would be available when vote returns started coming in.

There were no official or legal barriers or objections to interviewing voters. There was interference in one Philadelphia polling place. "The voters, on entering this polling place, were told to vote Democratic and at the same time were informed not to allow themselves to be interviewed" (George Fine Research Inc. 1967).

Projections on Election Night

The successful tests led CBS to use exit polls extensively in the 1968 primaries and the general election. They were used for their original purpose: as guidance for the estimates made from official vote returns in sample precincts. At no time did CBS use an exit poll to announce a winner on the air. In 1970, exit polls also were used as an analytic tool. With the addition of questions on the exit poll it was possible to know which constituencies voted for which candidates, what

issues mattered to voters, and what voters wanted from their newly elected officials. Election night analysis would no longer be dependent on analyzing precinct-level votes or the self-serving interpretations of the candidates.

An exit poll is not much different from having vote returns in sample precincts. However, one important difference is that an exit poll is conducted in only a subsample of the sample precincts that are used to collect vote returns. This is mostly due to cost. It costs almost four times as much to have an interviewer at a polling place all day as it does to collect the vote from a precinct official after the polls close. An estimate based on exit poll reports of the vote is not nearly as accurate as one based on the same size precinct sample using real vote returns. The exit poll has within-precinct sampling error and bias due to nonresponses and response error. A typical projection based on an exit poll might require a margin between the two leading candidates of 8 percentage points or more in order to be reliable. With real votes in the same number of precincts the margin could be about 3 or 4 points lower for the same level of assurance.

The other source used for projections is the vote tally by county. There is no sample model here, just the accumulation of precincts within counties. This is the unofficial vote tally reported by the media on election night.

The first projections on election night come from exit polls and are available at poll closing time. These are useful for the more wide-open races. After the polls close the official vote by precinct is available and is used for somewhat closer races. For the very closest races the county data are modeled and used to make projections.

The 1980 Election

Although CBS may have used the exit polls for analysis and as guidance for their projection models, NBC changed the game. The first exit poll done at NBC was in 1973. I. A. "Bud" Lewis tells of interviews he did at polling places for NBC in the 1964 California presidential primary. The results of those interviews were not used systematically to make an estimate, and there is no record of NBC doing further interviews at polling places until 1973. (It was NBC that introduced the term "exit polls"; before that they were known as Election Day surveys.) ABC did its first exit poll in 1980.

The 1980 presidential contest between challenger Ronald Reagan and President Jimmy Carter was expected to be a close race. However, exit polls on Election Day showed something much different. Ronald Reagan won a resounding victory by about 10 percentage points. He won 45 states and 489 out of 538 electoral votes. NBC projected Ronald Reagan's victory over Jimmy Carter at 8:15 P.M. Eastern time, almost three hours before the West Coast polls closed. They announced Reagan victories in 22 states that had closed their polls. Those states gave Reagan exactly 270 electoral votes. NBC made 11 of those projections based on exit polls.

For the 1980 election CBS and ABC used actual vote returns for their projections and not exit polls. ABC went on the air about 9:50 P.M. with their presidential victory announcement. CBS was the laggard. It did not have enough electoral votes for Reagan from states that had closed their polls until 10:20 P.M., which was after Carter's ill-timed concession. From 1982 on, all three networks used exit polls along with vote returns in sample precincts to make projections.

400 Key People, Institutions, and Concepts

Exit Poll Controversy

A controversy about the projections started as a result of the 1980 NBC projection, although the public, the media critics, and Congress blamed all three networks equally. The focus of the controversy was exit polls. There were a series of congressional hearings that went on through 1985 about the effect of so-called early projections. The networks were announcing the winner of the presidential election before the last polls closed in the western states. Since they started making state projections in 1964, the networks were announcing the winner state by state after the vast majority of polls in a state closed. They would add the electoral votes from all states that had closed their polls, and when one candidate had a majority, they announced a presidential victory.

The critics thought they had a good case against the networks for influencing election outcomes. The networks thought they were acting responsibly by holding their state projections until the time when public officials were publicly announcing the vote counts for a state.

The first protest over projections was in 1964 following the Lyndon Johnson landslide over Barry Goldwater. In that contest there were no exit polls. Nonetheless, the controversy was the same. Congressional hearings followed that election and went on through 1967. Frank Stanton, president of CBS, proposed a 24-hour voting day as a way around the controversy, a proposal that was ignored for 21 years. All projections before voting is completed in the West don't always result in controversy. There was a presidential projection at 8:30 P.M. Eastern time in 1972 in a widely expected landslide for Richard Nixon over George McGovern. There was no contro-

versy then or for an earlier projection in 1984, when Reagan won handily over Walter Mondale.

Although there were many studies about these projections, none demonstrated any effect on the outcome of an election. In 1985 a deal was struck between the networks and the House Election Task Force headed by Al Swift (D-WA). Swift and minority chair Bill Thomas (R-CA) wanted to calm the perception that there was a problem. Reworking Stanton's 24-hour voting day, they proposed that the polls in the continental states all close at the same time—at 9 P.M. in eastern states, 8 P.M. in central states, and 7 P.M. in all western states. To accomplish this they would delay the end of Daylight Saving Time by two weeks in the Pacific Time Zone. In return the networks would abide by their past practice of holding projections until a vast majority of polls in a state closed. In addition, the networks agreed not to hint at the outcome of an election prior to the time for a projection. The House approved the Swift-Thomas proposal in three successive sessions. However, the Senate failed to act.

2000 Election Controversy

There was no further controversy until the 2000 election. By that time the networks formed an election consortium along with the Associated Press known as Voter News Service (VNS). VNS and all six of its sponsors mistakenly declared Al Gore the winner over George W. Bush in the Florida presidential contest. The projection was made at 7:50 P.M., 50 minutes after 95 percent of the polls in the state had closed. Nonetheless, Billy Tauzin (R-LA), chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee on Telecommunications, held hearings in

which he claimed the network projection of Gore affected the outcome in Florida. He also claimed there was a systematic bias in the order in which projections were made, and that the exit polls were biased in favor of the Democrats.

Tauzin's claim that the projection 10 minutes prior to the time when the last 5 percent of the state's polls closed had an effect on the outcome was taken seriously by some critics and by the networks, even though the charge defies logic. As a result, the networks pledged that for future elections they would wait for all the polls to close in a state before they make a projection and not just the vast majority. There has been no similar pledge from voting officials that they will wait for all the polls to close before they start making official vote returns publicly available.

The networks challenged Tauzin's other charge—that there was systematic bias in the order in which states were projected. Tauzin claimed before the hearings that states Gore won were announced promptly while states that Bush won were delayed and that this gave voters the impression that Gore was doing better than Bush. Although there was some basis for Tauzin's claim, a review of the statistical results that analysts were looking at convinced Tauzin to withdraw his charge at the hearings.

The Future of Exit Polls

Since their inception, exit polls have become a staple of elections not only in this country but also worldwide. This author has successfully conducted them in Russia and Mexico for all their national elections since 1993. An international conference to discuss the use of exit polls was held in Brussels in 2001 with the joint support of the

European Parliament and the Japanese Hoso-Bunka Foundation. In the United States, new techniques may be needed for election projections because absentee voting and early voting are increasing in popularity. Exit polls only include those who vote at the polls on Election Day. The absentee and early voters will have to be represented by other survey methodologies in the future.

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Framing Questions

The results of public opinion polls may vary widely for reasons independent of changes in the public's opinion on a given topic. Aside from flaws in survey methods, chiefly myriad problems that can bias samples, question wording effects are among the largest contributors

to variations in findings not tied to actual changes in public opinion. Question wording effects occur for several reasons, including the use of confusing or ambiguous questions, biased questions, wording that triggers one standard of judgment rather than another in the mind of the respondent, and the lingering effects of early questions on late questions appearing within the same survey. The influences of question wording and order are related to but should be distinguished from interviewer effects. An example of the latter is male respondents' greater reluctance to admit extramarital affairs to a female interviewer than to a male interviewer.

Confusing questions may include the use of unclear terms, double negatives, and queries that, upon close inspection, ask more than one question at a time. Biased questions include one-sided questions that assert a potentially controversial premise or propose an answer, questions that offer asymmetrical or unbalanced arguments and counterarguments, and questions that offer a leading set of response options, among other problems in this category. One type of bias that often leads respondents to rely on one standard of judgment rather than some other is referred to as *framing*. For example, a question about the possible issuance of a parade permit to a neo-Nazi group might frame the issue as one of public safety or free speech. Both are legitimate concerns, but one may lead respondents to a very different conclusion than the other.

The tone or connotations of certain words in survey questions also can influence respondents. More people are likely to agree with a proposal to "not allow" a certain behavior than to "forbid" that same behavior. Likewise, support for

spending on "aid to the poor" typically runs higher than support for spending on "welfare." Question order or context effects also can occur, as respondents inadvertently can be prompted to assign greater weight than they otherwise would to one or more considerations by the mention of those considerations in earlier parts of the interview. Also, to expedite an interview or to avoid confessing ignorance, many respondents will offer answers that do not necessarily reflect their true opinions when confronted by confusing, complex, or factual questions. Failing to provide explicit "don't know" options in question language can lead large percentages of respondents into agreement or disagreement with fictitious events or objects in surveys. Filters, discussed below, can substantially overcome this problem of insincere responses.

Recognizing the various problems posed by question wording and context effects can help those who gather, interpret, and consume public opinion survey data to avoid errors in discerning the public's preferences.

Examples of Question Wording Effects

One example of trouble caused by unclear questions appeared in 1992 in the Roper Organization's question about the occurrence of the Holocaust. The question was rewritten and asked again in 1994, with very different results. The first version of the question posed a double negative: "Does it seem possible or does it seem impossible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened?" To this flawed version, 22 percent of respondents said it is possible the Holocaust never happened (Ladd 1994). When rephrased two years later ("Does it seem possible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never

happened, or do you feel certain that it happened?"), only 1 percent said it is possible the Holocaust never occurred. The percentage of respondents saying they did not know also dropped from 12 percent to only 8 percent with the clarified version of the question. (See Fowler 1992 for discussion of unclear questions.)

Beyond questions that are confusing, the tone of a question also can affect survey responses. Mentions of highly salient or emotionally charged terms can lead to significantly changed responses. A pair of questions from the late 1970s asked about U.S. troop deployment to a Vietnam-like situation and found very different results based on whether or not mention of a communist takeover was included in the question. "If a situation like Vietnam were to develop in another part of the world, do you think the United States should or should not send troops?" To this version, 18 percent said the United States should send troops. When the words "to stop a communist takeover" were appended to the end of the question, support for troop deployment rose to 37 percent, a 19 percentage point increase.

A more recent illustration of this phenomenon comes from the National Opinion Research Center's 2000 General Social Survey. When asked if the federal government spends "too little," "too much," or "about the right amount" on "welfare," 21 percent said "too little." However, when asked a parallel question about "assistance to the poor," 64 percent called federal spending "too little," a 43 percentage point difference based on question wording. Numerous other examples on this particular issue exist from the 1960s forward (Smith 1987).

An extensive collection of experiments in question wording effects is found in *Questions and Answers in Attitude Sur-*

veys (Schuman and Presser 1981). Also helpful is *The Psychology of Survey Response* (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000).

Closed-Ended versus Open-Ended Questions

When survey questions name a single issue and ask respondents to rate its importance as an issue that government should address, responses to these closed-ended questions often cluster near the upper end of the scale (i.e., "very important"). However, when respondents are asked in open-ended fashion to name the most important issues facing the country today, the vast majority of issues receive relatively few mentions, typically less than 5 percent, with a few exceptions such as the economy and education. Poverty provides one example. During the mid- to late 1990s, poverty rarely garnered more than 5 percent of the "most important problem" mentions in the Gallup Organization's periodic poll. However, when the question how important poverty is was asked in isolation, a pair of polls from 1996 recorded between 54 percent and 62 percent indicating poverty as "one of the most important" problems facing the country (Shaw and Shapiro 2002). Thus, looking only at closed-ended questions on a given topic might lead one to suppose an inflated public concern with that topic.

Filter Questions

Few respondents want to appear uninformed, even during an anonymous telephone interview. Therefore, many respondents will offer an answer despite their lack of knowledge or opinion on a given question. With this in mind, pollsters often include explicit "don't know" options as part of factual or otherwise

potentially challenging questions. Without emphasizing the acceptability of saying one does not know, large percentages of respondents will indeed offer answers not based on solid information. In 1983, researchers at the University of Cincinnati contrived the "Monetary Control Bill" and asked 1,200 randomly selected people about their support of or opposition to this legislation. Forty-six percent voiced either support or opposition to the bill (21 percent for, 25 percent against). That the bill did not exist did not prevent these people from offering an opinion on it (Bishop et al. 1986).

In early 1995, the Roper Center asked a pair of questions about the U.S. Department of Education. The first version asked respondents if they favored or opposed "eliminating the Department of Education." The second version added at the end of this question the phrase "or don't you know enough about this to have an opinion?" The simple forced-choice version revealed 36 percent support for elimination, 57 percent opposition. Seven percent said they did not know. The second version found 23 percent favoring elimination, 31 percent opposition, and fully 44 percent choosing the "don't know enough" option. Thus, more than one-third of respondents who stated they either favored or opposed elimination likely would have said they had no opinion if invited to do so.

An earlier example of the difference made by a filter comes from a 1974 survey question asking about Israeli-Arab peace talks (Schuman and Presser 1981). To the standard version of the question, 23 percent of respondents indicated they did not know whether or not "the Arab nations are trying to work for a real peace with Israel." In contrast, when the phrase "do you have an opinion on that?" fol-

lowed the standard question, the percentage of those responding that they did not know rose to 45 percent.

Question Order Effects

The response to a given question in a survey is typically the product of both long-term and more recent considerations in a respondent's mind. Thus when a person indicates support or opposition to a given legislative proposal, she typically brings to bear both long-held beliefs and recent messages on that issue (Zaller 1992). Because survey interviews resemble conversations, they contain messages that can contribute to a respondent's current stock of considerations that will be brought to bear in answering the next question. These effects are called *context effects*, because the context in which later questions are asked is created in part by the questions asked and answered earlier in the interview. Context effects are driven by two related but distinct mechanisms: transference of meaning and induced changes in the importance of relevant considerations. A battery of questions asking about support for spending on various governmental programs will likely influence one's response to a subsequent question about support for increased taxation, assuming the respondent supports increased spending on at least some of the programs asked about earlier. However, if the taxation question precedes the spending items, support for increased taxation likely will be weaker (Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988). In this case, respondents are reminded, through the course of the interview, that support for increased spending logically implies increased taxation to pay for those programs, thus the meaning or implication of support for spending is transferred to the subsequent taxation question. Simi-

lar evidence has been found in questions regarding public trust in government (Lock et al. 1999). This phenomenon has also been referred to as an assimilation effect, as respondents usually strive to offer consistent answers within a given interview (Schwarz et al. 1991).

The importance of various considerations can also be raised in the process of an interview. When asked how closely they follow current affairs, respondents tend to depend in part on whether or not they recently have been reminded of their objective level of knowledge of current events. George Bishop and colleagues (1984) discovered 15–20 percentage point differences in respondents' likelihood to say they follow current affairs "most of the time" depending on whether that subjective estimation was solicited before or after being asked a battery of factual questions. In this case, being humbled by being forced to confess they did not know the answers raised the salience of their own ignorance. This had significant effects on respondents' answers about how closely they followed public affairs, regardless of whether these two parts of the experiment were separated by a substantial buffer of other, unrelated questions.

Response Scale-Induced Effects

In addition to influences produced by the language and sequence of the questions in a survey, the format of the response options can steer respondents to answer in somewhat predictable ways. The most common pattern seen in scale-induced responses is a clustering around meaningful points on a scale: the middle, the poles, and often decimals on numeric scales. A 1994 survey by the Tarrance Group asked about a proposed constitutional amendment to ban abortion.

Respondents were offered a 1–10 scale, with 1 meaning that such an amendment would be "the worst thing that could happen" and 10 being "the best thing that could happen." Twenty-eight percent said one, 29 percent gravitated to the opposite pole (10), and 20 percent adopted the middle position (5). No more than 5 percent located themselves on any other single place on the scale, despite the ready availability of those seven other options. A similar pattern appears in the 1996 American National Election Studies. There, respondents are asked to rate the warmth of their feelings toward specific groups and institutions, including the military. Despite a continuous scale ranging from 0 (cool) to 100 (warm), fully 74 percent of respondents offered scores falling neatly on a factor of 10 in this question about feelings toward the military. Fewer than one-tenth of 1 percent offered anything other than a factor of five. Although understandable—we count by 10, therefore we think most readily in groups of 10—these clusters thwart the intended fine gradations of the scale.

Framing Effects

Steering survey respondents to apply one standard of judgment over another when answering questions is referred to as *framing* or *priming*. The framing of a question helps an audience determine what the issue is about and what it is not about. For instance, when people are asked to evaluate the president's job performance, there are many dimensions along which that evaluation might occur. They may evaluate the president as a leader in international relations, as a protector of public education and the environment at home, or as a fiscal manager of the federal budget process. Within a

single individual, evaluations may be more positive along one dimension than another. Framing effects have been documented widely in experimental survey research, though scholars disagree about the precise causal mechanisms underlying framing effects.

Survey questions often frame issues in one-sided or two-sided fashion. By providing an argument in the question language on only one side of an issue, respondents are asked implicitly or explicitly to consider the question through the provided perspective and through that perspective only (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997). Such questions commonly risk serious bias in the results, since many people find it more comfortable to agree with the interviewer (whom they may implicitly identify as the author of the question) than to disagree. This tendency to engage in yea-saying is referred to as *response acquiescence* and may be minimized by avoiding agree-disagree response formats, among other strategies.

Alternatively, framing questions in two-sided fashion, that is, providing two sides of the argument, appears to prompt respondents to think through a wider range of considerations before answering. Offering two or more sides to an argument as part of the question also helps to minimize response acquiescence by legitimizing dissent. These two mechanisms—prompting more varied considerations and legitimizing dissent—appear especially important among poorly informed respondents, where the impact of framing is more dramatic. More highly informed respondents tend to have their minds made up already and are generally less influenced by framing (Zaller 1992).

Framing effects that often concern survey researchers also have a counterpart

in news coverage. Similar to a survey question leading a respondent to apply one standard of judgment over another, TV and newspaper reporting as well as political rhetoric has been found to exert significant influence on mass public opinion (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Gamson 1992; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).

Three causal mechanisms are thought to underlie framing effects. First is the elevation of the importance of targeted beliefs, including rendering a position more urgent or socially acceptable, such as prompting thoughts about paying down the national debt over thoughts of tax reductions. Second, targeted beliefs can be made more readily accessible. Individuals carry with them numerous considerations, but the most readily accessible considerations appear to influence individuals' responses more than less accessible ones. Third, framed messages may lead to actual belief change. They may, in short, persuade a person to change her mind. (Further discussion of framing appears in work by Entman 1993 and Nelson et al. 1997.)

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Gallup, George H.

Many years ago Lord James Bryce wrote in his *American Commonwealth* (1888) that the great obstacle to an informed democracy was the absence of a way to measure public opinion accurately and continuously; democracy was an exercise in guesswork. George H. Gallup helped overcome this obstacle in 1935 when he founded the Gallup Poll. Gallup "did not invent public opinion polling," wrote Adam Clymer in a 1984 obituary in the *New York Times*, "but he made it a serious force in American society and in the world. . . . He was a spokesman for his profession, defending polls and polling in lectures, before Congressional committees, and in books."

Gallup's legacy has been expressed in many ways. David Moore, author of *The Super Pollsters*, wrote that Gallup was "an evangelist for democracy who provided a way to bridge the gap between the people and decision-makers." One observer noted, "Gallup moved civilization to a higher plane by giving the common man a fair chance to be heard." Author Richard Smith ventured that Gallup helped "usher in the 'Information Age.'" One social commentator said, "While Gallup measured people in the aggregate, he cared passionately about them as individuals—he saw the best in them and wanted to urge them to new heights." Claire Mencke wrote in *Leaders and Success* in 1998 that Gallup "not only read the public's mind, he also helped shape it" by having provided

objective data on virtually every aspect of life.

Gallup was a student of democracy. In 1940 he wrote, with Saul Rae (later to become Canadian ambassador to the United States), the following in *The Pulse of Democracy*: “Democracy recognizes the essential dignity of the individual citizen. . . . It assumes that our economic, political, and cultural institutions must be geared to the fundamental right of every person to give free expression to the worth that is in him.”

Gallup believed that scientific survey research gave the public “a chance to be heard” and that its greatest contribution was “the redemption of the common man.” Gallup believed that “when the people are given a choice of alternatives and the reasons supporting each, they usually choose the best.” “People can be fooled,” he wrote, “when they must rely entirely on others for information, but not for long. When they have had access to the truth they will almost invariably come to a sound judgment.”

George Gallup was born in Jefferson, Iowa, on November 18, 1901. After earning his bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degrees at the University of Iowa, he taught 18 college courses in three academic disciplines, from freshman English to psychology of advertising to newspaper management, at four leading universities. He also began to apply survey research procedures to a wide variety of fields, devising the “reading and noting” research techniques for determining newspaper readership and conducting the first national survey of magazines to determine which ads attracted the most attention.

Gallup joined the New York advertising firm of Young and Rubicam in 1932 as head of its marketing research depart-

ment, the first department of its kind in the advertising industry. He continued his research into print media and established the first nationwide radio audience measurement using the telephone coincidental method, a technique he originated. Later, he developed the impact method, an aided recall procedure still widely used to measure television and print advertising effectiveness.

Gallup summed up his 15 years in advertising in a Young and Rubicam newsletter, saying, “I look back on my days at YandR with the greatest of pleasure. I can honestly say that I never spent a dull day there. And the professional standards and practices were as high as those I had encountered in my university teaching days. The people with whom I was associated were talented, bright, and witty.”

In the early 1930s, while still at Young and Rubicam, Gallup began his work in the field of public opinion and election polling. He was inspired in part by the desire to help his mother-in-law, Ola Babcock Miller, win election and then reelection as secretary of state for Iowa; she was the first woman to hold that office.

In the same decade, Gallup, working with David Ogilvy, pioneered a research program for Hollywood motion picture studios—measuring the appeal of movie story lines and titles, the box office draw of stars, publicity penetration, and audience reactions to previews, which culminated in forecasts of the box office receipts for specific films. He worked for many studio heads, including David O. Selznick, Walt Disney, and Samuel Goldwyn. He coordinated research for *Gone with the Wind* and *The Best Days of Our Lives*—two of the most important and successful pictures in motion picture history.

This fascination with research led Gallup into his primary interest: the Gallup Poll. Gallup founded the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1935, which evolved into the Gallup Organization two decades later. Since then, Gallup-affiliated or Gallup-owned organizations in the United States and abroad have assessed public opinion on an extraordinary variety of political, social, and economic issues, including the hopes and fears of people around the globe, their leisure-time activities, their morals and manners, and their religious beliefs. Many talented people helped build the Gallup Poll in the early years, but one in particular should be singled out—Paul Perry, who served as the Gallup Poll's chief statistician and, later on, as president of the Gallup Organization. Perry designed the basic sample frame for the Gallup Poll in the early 1950s, modified it for election survey purposes by incorporating the past precinct vote, invented the voter turnout scale, and adopted the secret-ballot method, which did so much to minimize the "undecided" problem in election polling.

The topics covered by the Gallup Poll during Gallup's lifetime closely reflected the turbulent events of this period. Many of the questions dealt with change and reform in different areas of life, for Gallup was an apostle of change, and his objective approach to measuring public opinion belied the passionate soul of a reformer. He sought the public's views on reform in education, in the criminal justice system, and in politics, including a better way of seeking out the ablest men and women for high political office. He surveyed the public on improvements in election campaigns, including the opportunity for the people to express their views more directly on important

national issues by means of state and national referenda.

With regard to many legislative issues and proposals, Gallup believed the people were often years ahead of their legislative leaders and sought to prove it. To use his own words: "Through nearly five decades of polling, we have found the collective judgment of the people to be extraordinarily sound, especially on issues that come within the scope of the typical person's experience. Often the people are actually ahead of their elected leaders in accepting innovations and radical changes."

During his long career, Gallup explored many dimensions of human life and society. He thought that the next great development in medicine would come through exploration of environmental factors associated with illness. This point was illustrated in a landmark survey he conducted dealing with infantile paralysis, in the era before the discovery of the Salk vaccine. Another survey dealt with factors related to old age, a study that included interviews with nearly 700 persons over the age of 95 in the United States and Great Britain. Still another pioneering study in the 1940s dealt with psychological well-being—in short, personal happiness.

Among his most ambitious projects was a global study conducted in 1976 to determine the quality of life in all areas of the world, a study that sampled populations embracing two-thirds of the world's 4 billion inhabitants. More recently, the international values survey series dealt with the social, moral, and religious attitudes of the peoples of most of the major nations in Europe, including the Eastern bloc, and around the world.

Gallup had many interests beyond public opinion polling; for example, in 1926 he helped found the Quill and Scroll Honorary Journalism Society for high

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school journalists, which now has many chapters worldwide. His lifelong concern for education led him to initiate annual surveys of public attitudes on the public schools, now conducted for Phi Delta Kappa Inc., the international education organization. The editors of the *Journal for High School and Middle School Administrators* wrote in tribute to his contributions:

Gallup's death leaves American schools with one less friend and supporter. He started his annual poll about American education in 1969. He believed that alerting education's decision-makers to the public's thinking about the issues was extremely important. He was right. Knowing the public's perceptions of our work is certainly one good measure of our effectiveness. We owe much to Gallup for helping to establish a national benchmark for American education.

Columnist Neal R. Pierce saw Dr. Gallup as "a democratic man, a fervid believer in the wisdom of the common men and women and how polling could and should let them influence haughty, distant government. He was also a civil activist encouraging people to do for themselves in their communities." And the *National Civic Review* reported:

Gallup's interest in finding out what citizens thought was matched only by his dedication to finding ways for citizens—particularly young people—to make those thoughts come alive in order to improve their state and local governments. The National Municipal League was the beneficiary of his insights and unflagging vitality over

four decades, in several official capacities and as long-time foreman of the All-American Cities Jury.

There were four key activating principles in Gallup's life: an egalitarian view of people, a willingness to seek and embrace change, innovative and creative thinking, and an affirmative outlook on life. In a tribute to Gallup, Albert Cantril wrote: "George Gallup thought and acted on a grand scale with ease." Armed with data and inspired by the wisdom of the American people, Gallup would frequently speak out on various topics in articles and speeches. Electoral reform was one of his key crusades. Gallup frequently pointed out that, if left to the public, the entire electoral process would be revamped. Clear restrictions would be placed on the amount of money spent by or for a candidate; there would be an end to the Electoral College; and a nationwide primary would be held on the same day in all 50 states, in which voters would choose the presidential candidates for their parties by popular vote.

In his role of reformer, Gallup constantly urged his readers or listeners to spend time reading. He said, "Many years of studying the public's reading habits have convinced me that unless one spends at least an hour and forty-five minutes a day reading books, magazines, and newspapers, he is not going to achieve as much success in life as he otherwise would."

Another major theme in Gallup's writing and in speeches was that the United States was losing the propaganda war. As early as 1950, Gallup wrote in a publication called *Vital Speeches of the Day* words that, in view of the events of the last half-century, could be regarded as prescient:

The most important struggle during the next 50 years—perhaps in the next 100 years—will be the struggle to win the minds of men throughout the world. There is no escape from this fact. Even the greatest victories on the battlefield will mean nothing if we do not win the war of ideas.

George Gallup received many awards and honors during his lifetime. In 1983, *Esquire* magazine selected Gallup as one of the “50 Who Made a Difference” in the twentieth century. In 1990, *Life* magazine named him one of “The 100 Most Important Americans of the Twentieth Century.”

Gallup died on July 27, 1984, at his summer home in Switzerland. During his lifetime, Gallup saw scientific polling, which he helped pioneer, spread to all areas around the globe.

The Gallup Organization was sold in September 1988 to Selection Research, Inc., in Lincoln, Nebraska. Gallup’s current CEO and president is James K. Clifton; its chairman is Donald Clifton.

Since the sale the Gallup Organization has grown dramatically, with revenues of \$200 million in 2002. Its fastest growing sector is management consulting: helping companies evaluate their employees and improve their relations with consumers.

At the time of the sale, the Gallup family, with the support of Selection Research, started the George H. Gallup International Institute in memory of Dr. Gallup. Its motto is “Ideas for Progress” and its mission is “to discover, test and implement new solutions to social problems in education, environment, health, religion and human values.” The founding of the institute was inspired by the words of Gallup: “The progress of mankind depends in large measure upon new

ideas, and the rate of this progress, in turn, depends largely upon the speed with which the ideas are disseminated.”

*Alec Gallup and
George H. Gallup Jr.*

Internet Surveys

The Internet is a powerful tool for communication, research, and entertainment worldwide. Despite the poor economic performance of many firms tied to the electronic economy, the Internet itself continues to grow and flourish. More people are connecting all the time and doing so with more sophisticated hardware and software as well as faster, more powerful, and more flexible wired and wireless networks. These trends make the Internet attractive as a means of communication.

There was once a time when to be considered serious in the world of survey research one had to be collecting interviews in a face-to-face setting with a national field staff of highly trained persons. The widespread availability of the telephone, software for turning questionnaires into computer programs, innovations in long-distance calling rates, and the advantages of centralized management and control made the telephone survey a serious competitor. Telephone surveys have not completely displaced in-person work, but they have turned in-person surveying from the only game in town to an expensive, high-end niche player.

Surveys now are primarily done by telephone in the United States. This is so because of the widespread availability of telephones across the country and the fact that most households have access to telephone service. This means the risks

that a telephone sample cannot be representative are minimal. Despite the widespread availability of telephones, however, there are continued worries that the proliferation of do-not-call lists as a way to foil telemarketers, use of cell-phone pricing schemes in which both the caller and the called both are charged, and various caller-ID and call-blocking mechanisms are trends undermining the telephone survey business. Interest in Internet surveys is one way that some are looking to help address these problems in the dominant mode of interviewing today.

An old saying among veteran survey professionals goes something like this: Clients can have their survey good, fast, or cheap; choose two. Can using the Internet really break out of this mind-set and promise a world of surveys where cheap, fast, and good will become the norm, as many technology futurists suggest? As appealing as surveying by Internet might seem, it is important to consider carefully the full range of opportunities and problems that face this particular mode.

Survey research typically aims to provide data about a carefully chosen random sample that are representative of a larger population of interest. Representativeness is a key value that is pursued by making sure that the sample is chosen via some random process and so is not self-selected or selected by interviewers because it is easier to get than some other individuals. Random samples are important in survey research because only through assurance that the population elements were chosen randomly can we justify the use of concepts such as sampling error of the survey. Sampling error is the root of the so-called margin of error statistics that have become familiar in

published versions of polls. It is widely recognized that random surveys have a margin of sampling error that relates to sample size such that as the sample size increases, sampling error decreases but does so at a decreasing rate. A randomly drawn sample of 600, for example, will have a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 4 percent at the .95 confidence level.

*What Do We Mean
by an "Internet Survey"?*

There are several possible meanings of this phrase. An Internet survey is one specialized case of "computerized self-administered questionnaires." Some (Ramos, Sedevi, and Sweet 1998, p. 389) use this phrase to mean all forms of computerized questionnaires that request information electronically from respondents without an interviewer being present and where respondents use their own or their organization's personal computer to respond. These authors delineated two forms: one in which a diskette containing a program and a questionnaire was mailed to the respondent and mailed back after completion, the other via electronic mail. Today's Internet surveys are a step beyond this in certain ways, at least for respondents in technology-rich environments.

One of the most common meanings today seems to involve a survey that is placed on a website; people either find it or are invited via e-mail or other means to go to the website to complete the survey. The difference is critical because it directly affects the issue of random sampling, which is the basis of survey research. A website that people can run into and complete some questions is self-selected, and the respondents cannot be randomly selected because they are self-

selected. A further problem is that many times people can complete the same survey again and again.

Sometimes Internet surveys are organized in a way very similar to that of traditional mail surveys, which typically depend upon lists, which are sampled via random procedures. As long as sampling is done via a random process and everyone has a chance of completing the survey, the study has a chance of being representative.

Opportunities for Internet Surveys

Internet surveys are attractive to many because they hold the promise of lower costs than traditional surveys. They can be more flexible and powerful than e-mail surveys as long as the sample has access to computers and skills in computer use. Although significant costs can be tied up in creating the questionnaire and basic technology to power the survey and database applications for the Internet, incremental costs are relatively low as survey volume increases, as long as the numbers are comparable to traditional surveys.

Internet surveys are typically self-administered but, unlike mail surveys, can be customized to take account of screening and to accommodate a variety of contingencies within the questionnaire. Online questionnaires can accommodate a variety of question wording experiments and randomizations easily.

As replacements for mail surveys, Internet surveys are attractive, as long as the target population has Web access and is comfortable with the use of computer technology. It's also necessary to assume that potential respondents have access to computer hardware, software, and networking capabilities that are sufficient to display the questionnaire materials in

the proper way and without extreme download times.

To be a participant today in an Internet survey one has to use the Internet on a regular basis. This is a limiting factor since only 56 percent of Americans report that they go online on a typical day (Pew 2002). The proportion is growing, however, as people turn to the Internet for information, entertainment, and keeping in touch with family and friends. The case for Internet surveys is thus more complex than just making a prediction that as use of the Internet grows, the ability to survey people will expand. There are various reasons why we should be cautious about the possibilities of this segment of the industry.

Problems with Internet Surveys

Internet surveys are limited by the availability of the Internet in everyday life. Millions of people do not have access. Millions more have access but at connect speeds that make intensive graphics applications uncomfortably slow. People connect to the Web with all manner of vintage hardware and software that displays even the simplest information in nonstandard ways. Most damaging is the lack of a uniform system for Internet addressing, which seems to make sampling akin to what we know in the telephone world impossible. Without access to random sampling and the statistical theory that underlies it, it is hard to imagine Internet surveys flourishing as a mode for high-end general population survey applications.

Internet surveys have a substantial place for applications that replicate mail surveys, particularly for membership groups for which membership and an Internet address are available. The latter qualification will be more common in

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high-tech settings such as schools and universities, large corporations, and professional associations.

Total Survey Error Approach

Total Survey Error (TSE) is a perspective that encourages an integrated concern with all the sources of quality and error in survey statistics, not just the familiar sampling error. It also provides a framework for the balancing of data quality and costs. In other words, TSE allows the explicit consideration of each source of error in terms of costs and the allocation of finite resources in terms of costs and benefits. Total survey error orients the field away from simple considerations of minimizing sampling error as the prime criterion guiding survey design and development. In doing so, it helps us understand more about details of research design.

Sampling Error

Sampling error is defined for a given sample only when the sample is random. Sampling error represents the random differences that exist between any sample, no matter how well chosen, and the population from which it is drawn. It is important to note that this type of error occurs due to the fact that one has selected a sample and not the entire population. Accordingly, sampling error is not the result of mistakes or errors and is not correctable. It is important to note that mistakes in sampling can increase sampling error. Except in relatively rare circumstances in which the sample size is a fairly large proportion of the population of interest, sample size is determined by rather simple formulas that are mainly a function of sample size (Lohr 1999). Thus, for large populations, the size of the sample, not the proportion of

the population that is sampled, determines the precision.

Nonsampling Error

In general, nonsampling errors are mistakes or errors due to survey system deficiencies. Sometimes they can be the result of conscious choices to use certain methods in a survey.

One key type of nonsampling error that is important for Internet surveys is *coverage error*. Coverage error is a type of bias that can result when the pool of potential survey participants from which the sample is selected does not include some portions of the population of interest. Coverage error can be of at least three types: omissions, inclusions, and duplications. *Omissions* in a typical telephone survey are nontelephone households. In the case of Internet surveys, omissions would be those potential respondents who cannot be reached by Internet, that is, nonusers. In case the pool of potential survey participants is supposed to be Wisconsin dentists, only those dentists who actually have Internet access and are e-mail users will be able to be reached. In the case of the general U.S. population, coverage error remains a huge and perhaps insurmountable problem for the typical Internet survey due to the large number of people who do not go online.

Duplications are another problem. Many people have multiple e-mail addresses for work, personal life, and recreational. Because Internet addressing is not standardized as 10-digit telephone numbers are, a scheme for sampling Internet addresses akin to Random Digit Dialing in the telephone world is simply not feasible at present.

A final form of coverage error is known as *inclusions*. In a typical telephone survey, inclusions might be businesses or

payphones instead of residential numbers. Many Internet addresses that one might be able to come by on lists cannot readily be separated into such categories.

In general, except when sampling from lists in known environments with high levels of technology use and a good level of adoption by users, Internet surveys may be highly subject to coverage error. This error is serious enough to cast serious doubts about the potential quality of most ordinary Internet survey efforts.

Nonresponse error is a bias that can result when data are not collected from all of the members of a sample. Nonresponse error, when it is nonrandom, can undermine the ability of a survey to be representative. Internet surveys can be problematic in terms of the whole unit (household) refusal, particularly if the e-mail invitation is buried in a cascade of unsolicited e-mail messages. Another type of nonresponse is within-unit, which is a type of nonresponse in which a gatekeeper precludes access to the respondent of interest. In a telephone survey, this might be a household member who answers the phone and tells the caller that the respondent is not available. In the online world it is more likely that each individual respondent would have his own e-mail account, and so it should be easier to contact each person individually. Error due to within-unit nonresponse might be minimized in Internet surveys.

When a respondent declines to answer a specific question, this is *item nonresponse*. Because Internet surveys are self-administered, like mail surveys, there is no interviewer to motivate and guide the respondent through the questionnaire. The interviewer presence may both motivate the respondent and cause additional effects, due to social desirability.

Online surveys, however, do present designers with certain options that may prove to be helpful with item nonresponse. For example, when the respondent tries to move on from a question without giving an answer, the program can ask her to please fill in an answer. Programs can be written to require an answer before proceeding to another question or section of the questionnaire, but such a strategy risks turning item nonresponse into a partial interview.

Processing errors, defined as inaccuracies that result from clerical or other mistakes in data handling, editing, and coding, are largely eliminated in online surveys, since responses are immediately and automatically turned into data upon completing the interview.

Measurement error is a phrase that captures distortions in the assessment of concepts of interest that can result from respondent misinterpretation, interviewer behavior, and questionnaire construction. Interviewer behavior is not an issue in online surveys, but respondent misinterpretation can be exacerbated in self-administered research designs without the guiding influence of an interviewer. Elements in questionnaire construction, however, are very important and need careful study in online environments (Dillman 2000).

As we have seen, Internet surveys show great promise in the areas of cost and convenience. They can be promising in terms of data quality because of the controlled routing of the respondent through the questionnaire, avoiding omissions and eliminating skip errors. Sophisticated programming can also require consistency checks and prompt respondents to clarify or correct responses that seem to have been given in error (Ramos, Sedevi, and Sweet 1998).

Applications of Internet Surveys

There are two major approaches to surveying the general population via the Internet. The first of these is that of Harris Interactive, which relies mainly on the Harris Poll Online multimillion-member database for large online surveys of U.S. adults at least 18 years old. Harris basically solicits e-mail addresses from many sources, including those who register at the firm's website (www.harrisinteractive.com). The firm also uses banner ads on the Web to recruit panelists as well as other opportunities. Harris is based in Rochester, New York, and its stock is traded on NASDAQ.

Harris uses proprietary Web-assisted interviewing software. Access to questionnaires is controlled with passwords so that only one questionnaire can be completed per e-mail address. Reminder invitations are sent to increase the number of respondents and improve the response rates. Respondents are also offered access to some poll results summaries. A key part of the Harris Interactive methodology is a proprietary weighting system for responses. Completed interviews are weighted according to target values obtained from the Current Population Survey and the Harris monthly national telephone poll. The company says it weights on demographic variables such as age, sex, education, race, and ethnicity. It also uses a variable that measures the propensity of an individual respondent to be online. How this is done is not entirely clear. Harris claims that its online results are similar to high-quality telephone polls and that the data are of high quality. Much is made of using advanced statistical techniques to compensate for the self-selected nature of the sample used, but the fact remains that the Harris approach is self-selected. The company offers more

conventional telephone polls for clients who want that, but it stresses the cost and speed advantages of its online efforts.

Knowledge Networks offers a clear, scientifically valid alternative to the Harris online panel and has been recognized by an innovator's award from the American Association for Public Opinion Research. Founded by Stanford University professors Norman Nie and Douglas Rivers, Knowledge Networks is a privately owned company based in Menlo Park, California. The key to the Knowledge Networks approach is that its panel of respondents is selected via a random sampling process using Random Digit Dialing (RDD) to reach potential panelists, whether they currently use online technology or not. Individuals are invited to join the Knowledge Networks panel and are offered WebTV to use for as long as they agree to answer a survey when they are asked, a frequency of about once per week. Respondents can stay in the panel for up to about three years, after which they are "retired" and new respondents are recruited. Panel maintenance and replenishment are ongoing activities to maintain geographic and demographic representativeness. The standard WebTV technology, a Microsoft Corp. product, provides a platform for the display of various graphical elements, including video, that can be studied in real time. Because the panel is founded on random sampling principles, the usual statistical criteria for sampling error apply, unlike the approach used by Harris Interactive, which relies on self-selected samples.

Knowledge Networks has been chosen as a platform for an innovative social science data collection infrastructure project funded by the National Science Foundation. Timesharing Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) is headquartered

at The Ohio State University, with telephone surveys to be conducted at Indiana University and online experiments with general populations to be conducted with the Knowledge Networks panel. More details on the TESS project and its use of general population experiments can be found at www.experimentcentral.org.

The Knowledge Networks panel is a powerful tool for experimentation and survey research, since it can combine the power of RDD surveys with multimedia experiments and do it in the comfort of the panel members' own homes. It is important to keep in mind that key issues with the panel are the effects of repeated interviewing and maintaining representativeness over time. It is also important that when comparing the response rates with standard telephone polls, one needs to look at more than just the response rate of the panel members themselves. That is, one might want to remember that potential respondents may not be reached or may drop out at each stage of the recruitment process. Users need to consider how representative that is for one's particular research purpose.

Conclusion

The future appears bright. There is a great deal of interest in using the Internet as a platform for survey research projects. Clients are attracted by the prospects of saving money and providing a convenient experience for their respondents. The asynchronous nature of the exchange suggests that it provides maximum flexibility to respondents.

As we have seen above, large corporations have made large bets on various schemes to popularize Internet surveys and turn them into commercially and critically viable mainstream options for clients. Knowledge Networks and Harris

Interactive are market leaders, with quite different approaches to the issue. Time will tell whether one or both will achieve the critical and marketing successes over the long run that will define the future of the field when we reach out to general populations via the Internet.

Gerald M. Kosicki

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Key, V. O., Jr.

Valdimer Orlando Key Jr. (1908-1963), an American political scientist, generated two sustaining contributions to the study of public opinion. With the 1961 publication of *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, Key reanimated the conceptualization and treatment of public opinion as a political concern. Methodologically, from the late 1940s through his death in 1963, he was a leading advocate for the scientific approach to politics, a movement later dubbed the behavioral revolution. During this time the study of public opinion became a

permanent part of the standard political science curriculum.

In *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, Key redefined public opinion as “those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed” (p. 14). He considered its formation and distribution in the context of politics and the activities of government. Although the study of public opinion was “once a major concern of political scientists” (p. vii), for the 20 years leading up to the publication of *Public Opinion and American Democracy* most of the work on public opinion and voting behavior was the product of sociologists and social psychologists. Key brought the perspective of a political scientist to this research. As a result, his work was considered a groundbreaking contribution to both political science and democratic theory. One reviewer accurately predicted that its publication would “probably stimulate the addition of a much-needed course in many [university] departments where public opinion has been neglected” (Prothro 1962, p. 790).

Public Opinion and American Democracy

Using national sampling data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, Key explored four core aspects of public opinion: patterns of distribution, properties, formation, and linkages of public opinion to the political process. He examined directional distributions—consensus, conflict, and concentration—as well as structural influences, such as geography, socioeconomic factors, and elite-mass stratification. Key considered intensity, stability, and latency as the fundamental properties of public opinion, and studied various agencies of opinion formation—most notably

the family, the educational system, and the media. He examined opinion clustering and its impact on governance, and analyzed political parties, interest groups, and other dynamic elements of elections and representation as mechanisms that organize and mobilize public opinion.

Public Opinion and American Democracy is significant in that it revitalized the treatment of public opinion as a political concept. Although the work does not actually present a master theory of public opinion and democracy, it does comprehensively link public opinion to the governing process through a three-part core argument: (1) the mass public opinion of the electorate is vitally important for American democracy; (2) the content of public opinion is generally directed by political activists—elites, leaders, and other influential people; and (3) for effective democratic governance, the respective roles of the mass public and the political elite must be respected. The work presented several conceptual contributions to the study of public opinion, including the politically important concept of latent opinion, as well as the premise that mass public opinion is elite-driven.

Latent Opinion and the Effect of Elites on Mass Opinion Formation

Key defined public opinion “in terms of its response propensities rather than fully formed opinions, on the grounds that politicians’ estimates of these propensities are what drive politics” (Zaller 2003). This definition reflects the concept of latent public opinion, that is, dormant attitudes that can be activated by appropriate stimulus. Key suggested that latent public opinion—which he called a “singularly slippery problem” (1961, p. 263)—

was empirically more complex and politically more significant than fully formed opinion. He hypothesized that the anticipation by political elites of opinion response was more powerful than their response to expressed opinion. Key further hypothesized that latent opinion could control political and governmental activity through “opinion dikes . . . which channel public action or which fix a range of discretion within which government may act or within which debate at official levels may proceed” (p. 552).

Public Opinion and American Democracy was also noteworthy for its finding that mass public opinion is formed by an inner core of influential elite opinion leaders and political activists, with the concomitant implication that responsibility, for both success and failure of public opinion, rests with those groups. Key’s famous aphorism on the formation of public opinion was that “the masses do not corrupt themselves; if they are corrupt, they have been corrupted” (p. 558). This point was so critical that he ended the book by suggesting that “if a democracy tends toward indecision, decay, and disaster, the responsibility rests here, not in the mass of the people” (p. 558). Similarly, Key later wrote that “the voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input.... If the people can choose only from among rascals, they are certain to choose a rascal” (Key and Cummings 1966, pp. 2–3). This sentiment broadly sums up Key’s core conclusions about mass public opinion—that it is in large part latent and it is formed by elite activists.

Aggregate Public Opinion and Voting

Key’s work on the interrelationship of public opinion and politics continued in

The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936–1960 (Key and Cummings 1966). In that work Key treated voting as an expression of latent opinion. He argued that the vote decision was a rational aggregate response to political campaign stimuli. This work continued Key’s political perspective on public opinion by analyzing the electorate in the aggregate, rather than through individual vote analysis, and focusing on “the parallelism of vote and policy view” rather than the origin of the vote decision (1966, p. 53). This approach stood in contrast to the prevailing wisdom of the day, most notably *The American Voter* (1960), whose University of Michigan authors decomposed the individual vote decision and considered voting a largely deterministic act predicated on social and demographic characteristics.

Despite a close professional history between Key and the Michigan school, a public intellectual rift in the treatment of voting as an expression of public opinion developed between them. Although they used the same basic data (and, in fact, Key wrote much of *Public Opinion and American Democracy* while in residence at the Michigan school’s Survey Research Center), they focused on different research questions and different units of analysis. To emphasize the difference in approach between himself and the Michigan school, in his review of *The American Voter* Key wrote that “if the specialist in electoral behavior is to be a student of politics [rather than sociology or psychology], his major concern must be the population of elections, not the population of individual voters” (1960, p. 55). Key evidently sought to stress this point by titling that review “The Politically Relevant in Surveys” (1960, emphasis added).

*Role in the Behavioral
Revolution in Political Science,
and Other Contributions*

Key received his Ph.D. in 1934 from the University of Chicago, where he studied under Charles E. Merriam, Harold F. Gosnell, Harold D. Laswell, and other members of the Chicago school. There, he was educated in the application of statistical and experimental methods to the study of politics and political behavior, a perspective that greatly influenced his approach to the study of public opinion. Together with other notable Chicago graduates of his time—Gabriel A. Almond, Avery Leiserson, C. Herman Pritchett, Herbert A. Simon, and David B. Truman—Key advocated the empirical approach to studying politics. One biographer wrote that “in the postwar years . . . Key led the charge to establish the behavioral approach to the study of politics and government as the accepted standard in American political science” (Lucker 2001, p. 317). His advocacy was essential in generating the movement later dubbed the behavioral revolution. It was during this time that the political context became firmly entrenched within the study of public opinion.

Two works in particular illustrate Key’s dedication to the scientific method and his concern for the role of public opinion in political science. His landmark study, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949), resulted from massive original quantitative and qualitative data gathering. Key used geographical opinion analysis to investigate the political structures and political processes of the southern United States. In so doing, he broadly explored the prevailing racial opinions and attitudes of the area. In 1954, Key published *A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists*, which arose out of

his study of electoral behavior. That work was designed to introduce political science students to the quantitative data techniques that were, at the time, becoming indispensable to the study of public opinion.

Key’s impact on the study of both public opinion and political science was profound and long-lasting. He advocated the scientific approach to politics while serving as the first chairman of the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Political Behavior and the first chairman of the American Political Science Association’s Committee on Political Behavior. In addition to his works on public opinion, southern politics, and statistics, he authored the seminal textbook *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (five editions from 1942 through 1964) and others, and was the originator of the concepts of critical elections and political realignment. All of these works are notable for their empirical approaches as well as their theoretical contributions. In late 1963, he received posthumous recognition on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives, with specific citation to *Public Opinion and American Democracy* and *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*.

Dubbed “the quintessential political scientist” (Lucker 2001), Key made a considerable contribution to the study of public opinion. Although he approached the subject empirically with as much scientific precision as his day allowed, he is perhaps best remembered for his practical and realistic perspective. In that regard, he wrote that “to speak with precision about public opinion is a task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost” (1961, p. 8).

Marc D. Weiner

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Lippmann, Walter

Walter Lippmann is widely considered to be one of the most influential political commentators of the twentieth century. He has left an indelible mark on public opinion scholarship, being the first re-

searcher to write extensively about a difference between the "real world" and what people see in their heads. During his lifetime, Lippmann worked as a journalist, editor, researcher, author, political consultant, and political philosopher. He was the recipient of two Pulitzer Prizes (1958, 1962) and the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1964). Lippmann's political commentary greatly influenced public opinion for the better part of the century, and his ideas about public opinion revolutionized its study.

Lippmann was born in 1889 in New York into a privileged German-Jewish family. He was an only child who attended private schools and frequently vacationed in Europe. Lippmann's early education took place at Dr. Sach's School for Boys, an academy attended by wealthy boys of the same ethnic background. Despite its parochial nature, he was not raised as a religious person. His Jewish heritage was "inherited rather than affirmed" (Steel 1980, p. 7).

Lippmann's father was a real estate broker and clothing manufacturer whose investments allowed an early retirement. His mother was a graduate of Hunter College at a time when it was unusual for women to hold college degrees. During his childhood, Lippmann enjoyed a life of cultural stimulation and leisure afforded to only the wealthiest element of society. His parents had an active social life in New York during the winter and summered at spas in Europe. Young Lippmann was treated like a little prince, well groomed and overprotected (Steel 1980, p. 8).

Lippmann began his tenure at Harvard a few days shy of his seventeenth birthday and graduated Phi Beta Kappa in three years instead of the typical four. He started with an emphasis on art history

but shifted his focus to philosophy. Lippmann's friends attest that he was a self-assured youth whose confidence bordered on arrogance (Adams 1977, p. 15). He was not good at being "one of the boys," which, coupled with his Jewish heritage, excluded him from Harvard's prestigious social clubs (Adams 1977, p. 23). So he expended his energies elsewhere, writing for the *Advocate* and *Harvard Illustrated* and editing the *Harvard Monthly*. He also founded the Harvard Socialist Club; under his leadership the club was active in protesting low wages at the university and lobbying for social reform bills in the state legislature. Lippmann also volunteered at the Hale House and other poverty organizations in the Boston area. These experiences, contrasted with his privilege upbringing, made an impression on Lippmann that surfaced in his writings.

After completing his undergraduate work, Lippmann was recruited to pursue a master's degree in philosophy under the tutelage of George Santayana. He served as Santayana's assistant for one year but left Harvard a few weeks shy of earning a master's degree to work for the reformist publication the *Boston Common*. Lippmann left the academy because he feared that it would remove him from the "real world" that he longed to be a part of (Steel 1980, p. xiv).

Lippmann the Journalist

Lippmann's political astuteness made him one of the most influential and long-standing political commentators of his time. It is estimated that Lippmann wrote more than 10 million words of advice and analysis for the American public (Rossiter and Lare 1963; Steel 1980). "Every president from Woodrow Wilson to Richard Nixon either has per-

sonally sought his advice or has attended to it in his columns" (Luskin 1972, p. 2). Lippmann could have been many things with his privileged background and Harvard education, such as a politician or a professor. Instead, he chose to be a journalist and an active writer.

Lippmann's first foray into journalism with the *Boston Common* lasted only six weeks before he was recruited to work for renowned investigative journalist Lincoln Steffens at *Everybody's*, the nation's leading liberal publication. In Lippmann's writings, he was critical of what he saw as an entrenched two-party system and supported Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive (Bull Moose) Party in the 1912 presidential election. After a short stint working for a socialist mayor in New York, he became disillusioned with the practice of socialism in politics and turned his attention to writing.

Lippmann's first book, *A Preface to Politics*, was published in 1913, when he was only 24 years old. It was a survey of politics that expressed Lippmann's ever-evolving socialist sentiments, interwoven with Freudian lingo. *A Preface to Politics* received wide acclaim for its scope and thoughtfulness and catapulted the young author to national fame.

In 1914 Lippmann returned to journalism, cofounding the *New Republic* with Herbert Croley. This publication provided political analysis with a liberal, middle-class bent. Lippmann worked as the associate editor of the *New Republic* until he was appointed assistant secretary of war in Woodrow Wilson's administration in 1917. He was given this post for actively supporting Wilson's liberal agenda. In that same year, he married his first wife, Faye Albertson. He would later divorce Faye (in 1937) and marry Helen Byrne. Helen was the only person Lipp-

mann truly opened up to during his lifetime (Steel 1980).

In the Wilson administration, Lippmann, a pacifist, worked closely with the secretary of war in drafting policy. He was later recruited to work with Wilson's closest adviser, Colonel Edward House, and was appointed secretary to the inquiry, a confidential panel of Wilson war advisers. Lippmann assisted in drafting the Fourteen Points peace program, which was used in international relations following World War I. He earned a position as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. During the Paris visit, Lippmann was openly critical of the severity of treatment of the Germans, which caused a rift between him and the Wilson administration. He returned home and used the *New Republic* to rally public support in opposition to the Versailles Treaty and the proposed League of Nations. Despite being an integral part of the propaganda machine during the war, Lippmann later spoke out against government actions opposing "the sacred right of the people to know all the facts" ("Publicity at Moscow," a *Today and Tomorrow* column, December 22, 1945). This experience served as the basis for many of the ideas presented in his best-known book, *Public Opinion* (1922).

In 1921, Lippmann left his post with the *New Republic* to work for the *New York World*, where he stayed for the next decade. In 1931 he began his long-running syndicated column "Today and Tomorrow" for the *New York Herald Tribune*. This move to a conservative publication angered liberal readers throughout the nation, but despite such a tepid reception, Lippmann gained notoriety over the years as a fair-minded analyst. Lippmann's "Today and Tomorrow"

column ran for thirty years and earned Lippmann two Pulitzer Prizes, in 1958 and 1962. His fame allowed him access to the circles of the wealthy and powerful in New York City, but his writings remained true to his concern for "average" Americans.

In the 1960s, Lippmann was called upon to formally participate in politics once again. Lyndon Johnson recruited him as a speechwriter and awarded him the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1964. Many in the Johnson administration revered him, but his relationship with the president curdled when Lippmann was openly critical of U.S. involvement in Indochina. He left his last formal political position on contentious terms.

Lippmann's last "Today and Tomorrow" column appeared on May 25, 1967, and he and Helen relocated from Washington, D.C., to New York to "retire." Lippmann traveled abroad before returning to his birthplace, New York City. Helen died in February 1974, and Lippmann died in December of that same year. He was 85 years old.

Lippmann the Political Scholar

In addition to influencing public opinion through his newspaper columns, Lippmann greatly impacted the study of public opinion through his scholarship. He is considered by some to be the "most important American political thinker of the twentieth century" (Rossiter and Lare 1963, p. xi). Lippmann authored 22 books during his lifetime and presented revolutionary ideas about public opinion that continue to shape the study of this topic. His most enduring works are *Public Opinion* (1922), *The Phantom Public* (1925), and *A Preface to Morals* (1929), all of which reflect his support of liberal democracy.

Public Opinion, published in 1922, is Lippmann's most original and valuable work. Although mainstream political science at the time was analyzing the behavior of political institutions, Lippmann chose to analyze citizen behavior. In *Public Opinion*, he presents the influential idea that people respond to pictures that appear in their heads and that these pictures do not necessarily correspond to the real world. He argues that opinions are formed within a triangle of the actual event, the actor's subjective interpretation of the event, and the placement of the event in the actor's head with other symbols and pictures. The idea that people use personal maps to understand the world was unique at the time. This model has since become a staple in public opinion research and political psychology.

Public Opinion was also the first book to explicate the political implications of mass communication. Lippmann concluded that democracy itself is threatened by press manipulation of public opinion to the point that citizens cannot make sound decisions based on the information provided to them. According to Lippmann, public opinion is malleable on a mass scale via propaganda because the press filters information and people hold stereotypes that act as a barrier to accurate perception.

In *The Phantom Public* (1925), Lippmann came to terms with arguments presented in *Public Opinion* that liberal democracy is unworkable in light of the mass public ignorance. This book was criticized as overly pessimistic, a reflection of Lippmann's wavering faith in the ability of citizens to govern as a result of his wartime propaganda efforts under the Wilson administration. This book lucidly

reflected the loss of his prewar idealism that was apparent in his earlier writings.

A Preface to Morals (1929) is considered another of Lippmann's most important works. It was written during a time when the advent of advanced industrial society had displaced traditional values in the United States. The influence of this book was less academic and more journalistic in that it shaped public dialogue about modernity. In *A Preface to Morals*, Lippmann addresses the breakdown of authority, family, art, and religion in modern society. He concludes that American society was plagued with newer generations' failure to distinguish right from wrong, and that society will fall apart without shared moral imperatives. Lippmann offered his prescription for these ills: informed citizens with a conscience. *A Preface to Morals* was published in 14 different hardback editions and is included on several lists of the best non-fiction books of the twentieth century.

Lippmann's Double Life

Lippmann once said that he "lived two lives"—the life of a philosopher who reflects upon the world and the life of a journalist who grounds his philosophy in the "real world" (Rossiter and Lare 1963, p. xii). Lippmann's contribution to public opinion in both of these realms has been significant. As a political commentator, he was known for his pragmatism, starting off as a Socialist during his college years, then later adopting more liberal stances. He supported about the same number of Republican and Democratic presidential candidates over the years, depending upon their ability to handle the issues of the day. Lippmann the philosopher provided many insights into public opinion and politics in America

that continue to be relevant in today's world.

Caroline Heldman

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Miller, Warren

Warren Miller was a most unusual social scientist who produced public opinion research of the highest quality and also built enduring institutions and collections of resources for other public opinion scholars to use. He was an outstanding collaborator who understood the value of accumulating and sharing resources with others, as well as the need to train future generations of scholars. His primary area of interest was political attitudes and mass political behavior; he also worked in the area of representation and the legislative process. Although his

work began in the study of American politics, he contributed to a number of major comparative studies of voting and representation.

One of Miller's most strongly held beliefs was that empirical resources could and should be shared among scholars. Even though data might have been collected for a specific research question, they could provide a useful resource for secondary analysts who were interested in different questions. In fact, the accumulation of data in archives could supplement their value by opening up analytical possibilities that could not be supported by any individual study. Miller pursued these concepts actively and aggressively, and he became a world leader in the development of social science data archives. His career was highlighted by the formation of a number of significant institutions that continue to support social science research and training for an international community of scholars. He founded the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, now the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), and was its first executive director. He was a consultant to and sponsor of the European Consortium for Political Research as well. He was also a co-founder of the Social Science History Association. And he served as the president of both the American Political Science Association and the Social Science History Association.

Warren Miller was born and raised in Rapid City, South Dakota. His education at the University of Oregon was interrupted by service in the U.S. Army Air Force during World War II, but he returned to Eugene to complete his B.S. in 1948. He subsequently completed an

M.S. at Oregon before he entered the Ph.D. program at the Maxwell School at Syracuse. At the same time that he began doctoral studies, he also became affiliated with the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. He participated in the development of the first voting study conducted at Michigan, around the 1952 election, and he subsequently was an active member of the research team of every one through 1992. Warren was responsible for guiding the Michigan effort as an independent research project until 1978, appearing as the principal investigator on a long sequence of grant proposals to support the surveys. At that time he succeeded in converting the research program to the National Election Studies (NES), funded by the National Science Foundation as a collective social science data resource to be shared among all interested scholars rather than a product of and for Michigan scholars.

At the University of Michigan, Miller was a professor of political science and a program director in the Center for Political Studies, which he also founded and directed for 12 years. He was the executive director of the ICPSR and then of the Social Science Data Archive in the Institute for Social Research (ISR). In 1980, after remarrying, Miller became a faculty member at Arizona State University, where he finished his teaching and research career. He continued his affiliation with the NES as principal investigator and co-principal investigator.

Warren Miller joined the political behavior program at the Survey Research Center in 1951, and he contributed to all of the major projects involving electoral studies in the next decade that formed the basis for the Michigan school of quantitative political science. His own

dissertation research was based upon data from the 1952 election study, and he coauthored in succession *The Voter Decides* (1954), with Angus Campbell and Gerald Gurin, the major report on the first national study; *The American Voter* (1960), with Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Donald E. Stokes, the report encompassing the 1952 and 1956 election studies; and *Elections and the Political Order* (1966), a compilation of singly and jointly authored articles from the same three collaborators.

In these studies, the authors focused on the determinants of turnout and the link between citizens' own predispositions and their candidate preferences. This work crystallized the concept of *party identification* as one of the most important predispositions, and it generally expanded the study of voting behavior beyond personal demographic factors associated with the Columbia school to include social psychological attitudes like attachments to the parties, political efficacy, political ideology, and attitudes about issues and their relation to the evaluation of candidates. The authors conceptualized long-term and short-term factors that affected these choices, some of which were well internalized and others that represented responses to the particular candidates and the thematic content of a specific campaign.

Miller's master's thesis involved work on the scaling of legislators' votes in the U.S. Congress, and it initiated a long series of projects related to representation and roll-call voting. The most ambitious of these research projects, a study of representation in the United States with Donald E. Stokes, never appeared in book form but is reflected in "Constituency Influence in Congress," a jointly authored article published in the *Ameri-*

can Political Science Review (1963). One of Miller's most significant service projects when he was executive director of the ICPSR was to secure funding from the Ford Foundation to archive all of the roll-call votes taken in the U.S. House and Senate plus the basic county-level returns for elections to those offices, as well as for president and governor. These collections formed the basis for what eventually became the Historical Archive of the ICPSR.

In his dissertation research, Miller focused on *issue-oriented voting* and the degree to which citizens had strong policy preferences that translated into vote choices. This interest was eventually transformed into significant national studies of the relationship between these individual preferences and voting decisions for president and members of Congress. His interest in the representation process extended to another set of significant studies. He eventually became a participant or a stimulus for a number of mass-elite studies that involved surveys of citizens and their legislators in a number of democracies. One of his last contributions to this work was an introduction to a compilation of such research in *Policy Representation in Western Democracies* (1999). Another extension of this interest was his work with Kent Jennings on studies of the delegates to national nominating conventions and the relationship between their policy views and those of the mass membership of the parties. This work is published in *Parties in Transition: A Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters* (1986, with Jennings) and *Without Consent: Mass-Elite Linkages in Presidential Politics* (1988).

One of Warren Miller's last collaborations was with Merrill Shanks, involving

a return to the analysis of voting in presidential elections. Although broad in scope, *The New American Voter* (1996) focused primarily on the 1992 presidential election as an endpoint. The work is a broad empirical review of electoral behavior in the United States since 1952, following up on and extending the model employed in *The American Voter*. It is notable in using generational replacement as an explanation for recent patterns of declining turnout as well as for the shifts in regional partisanship observed in the American electorate. The *funnel of causality* in *The American Voter* was revisited and reconceptualized in a causally serial way with more sophisticated multivariate analyses of the attitudinal precursors of voting and their more general role in American political behavior.

Michael Traugott

Pollsters

Public opinion polling has become a centerpiece of elections and governing in the United States. Scientific polling became a regular part of politics in the 1930s, and today political figures from the president on down rely on polls and pollsters to make decisions. In recent elections, it is estimated that 15 percent of the money spent went to pollsters and their analysts (Wolfe 1997). Different types of pollsters are discussed here: pioneering pollsters, presidential pollsters, political party pollsters, major independent pollsters, and media pollsters.

Pioneering Pollsters

Scientific public opinion polling emerged during the 1936 presidential election when George H. Gallup predicted that

Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt would defeat Republican Alf Landon. Gallup, not yet 35 years old, a former journalism professor and cofounder of the American Institute of Public Opinion, based his prediction on random sampling. He issued a challenge to the *Literary Digest*, America's leading pollster at the time, that he could more accurately predict the election outcome. The *Literary Digest* used straw polling, a technique used by media organizations since 1896, which was believed to be particularly accurate because it included a large number of respondents. From 1916 to 1932, the *Literary Digest* had mailed more than 350 million solicitations to respondents (Moore 1995, p. 38). The *Literary Digest* predicted a Landon win that failed to take into account an income bias in its straw poll.

Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 with a landslide 61 percent of the vote, and the world of politics took notice of Gallup. During that election, researchers Elmo Roper and Archibald Crossley also predicted a Roosevelt victory using scientific polling methods. All three researchers would go on to notoriety in the field, but Gallup was catapulted to fame above the others because he promoted his findings. Crossley developed many early polling methods and invented the concept of radio ratings. Roper founded Roper Starch Worldwide and the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, two premier polling organizations.

Louis Harris was another important pioneering pollster. A graduate of the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, Harris went to work for Roper on a research project in 1947, then left Roper to start his own polling firm, Louis Harris and Associates, in 1956. This firm set

the stage for presidential pollsters to play an important role in campaigns during John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential bid by conducting frequent polls to guide campaign decisions.

Since the early days of scientific polling, presidential pollsters have become a staple in elections and governing, the political parties invest in opinion polling on a grand scale, polling has become big business, and major media organizations have established an in-house polling business or collaborated with reputable polling firms. The current era of polling began in 1979 and is distinct from the earlier polling era in that telephone interviews and focus groups are used extensively instead of face-to-face interviews. These techniques make it easier and cheaper to gather information quickly. Polling was revised once again with the advent of computer technology in the 1980s, which allowed for quick data gathering and reporting. During that decade, the number of polling firms tripled, reflecting a seemingly insatiable appetite for rapid delivery of public opinion information.

Presidential Pollsters

Presidential pollsters have become a virtual necessity during campaigns due to the rise of candidate-centered politics in place of party politics in the 1970s and the development of new polling technology. However, the use of polling by presidents while in office has varied significantly. Kennedy was the first president to use polling to test his messages before presenting them to the public (Green 2001, p. 4). Lyndon Johnson polled heavily and detected lack of popular support for the Vietnam War through opinion polls. Richard Nixon took presidential

polling to new heights and based some major policy decisions on public opinion, such as banning drilling off the coast of California. Gerald Ford ran few polls while in office and eschewed the use of polling data to make decisions. Jimmy Carter relied extensively on public opinion polling to craft messages and make policy decisions, and Ronald Reagan did so to an even greater extent. George H. W. Bush used polling during his election campaigns but ran only a few polls while in office. Bill Clinton polled like no other president to date, staking out policy positions and crafting agendas based on public opinion. His successor, George W. Bush, has also chosen to use polls while in office (Green 2001, p. 6). Presidential pollsters play an undeniably influential role in modern politics.

Pat Caddell

Pat Caddell, a Harvard graduate and prominent Democratic pollster, is best known for his work on Carter's 1976 campaign. His polling techniques were innovative in that he included questions probing beyond simple vote choice to feelings about candidates and policy issues. Caddell was able to provide a sophisticated understanding of voter support, which served as the basis for Carter positioning himself as a political outsider in the wake of the Watergate scandal. This strategy served him well in gaining the White House.

Caddell was more than just a pollster to Carter. He became a campaign and presidential adviser, a role that has been replicated by several presidential pollsters since. Caddell is also known for having shaped the ill-fated "New Coke" ad campaign in the 1980s and for advising the popular television drama *West Wing*.

Richard Wirthlin

Republican pollster Richard Wirthlin conducted polling for Reagan's 1970 gubernatorial reelection campaign and his later bid for the presidency. Wirthlin, an economist with a Ph.D. from the University of California–Berkeley, used polls to set the president's policy agenda. For example, Reagan decided not to cut Social Security based on Wirthlin's polling, and the president shifted his conservative agenda based upon polling evidence that the country was not behind him (Green 2001, p. 4). Similar to Caddell, Wirthlin became a trusted adviser to the president.

Wirthlin is credited with the first extensive use of tracking polls during an election campaign. Although he declined to formally work in the White House, he frequently conducted polls for the Republican National Committee and shared the results with Reagan during his eight years in office. He founded Wirthlin Worldwide in 1969 and currently serves as the chairman of this large survey research company.

Bob Teeter

Bob Teeter, a well-known Republican pollster, has played a role in presidential elections since Nixon's 1972 campaign. He served as the chief pollster and strategist for the Ford campaign in 1976 and as an adviser for both of Reagan's campaigns. Teeter was also the chief strategist and pollster for both Bush campaigns in 1988 and 1992.

Teeter is known for his use of marketing techniques in political campaigns. He conducted early experimentation with *constant polls*, a precursor to tracking polls, and combined telephone and personal interviews at a time when telephones were rarely used for polling.

430 Key People, Institutions, and Concepts

Teeter was the first to use *dial-turning*, or instant measures of audience reaction, during presidential debates and speeches. He is currently the president of Coldwater Corporation, a consulting and research firm, and conducts polls for NBC News and the *Wall Street Journal*.

Peter Hart

Democratic pollster Peter Hart's clientele list is long and distinguished, including Senator Edward Kennedy, Jay Rockefeller, Lloyd Bentsen, and Bill Bradley. He worked as a coder for Louis Harris and Associates after earning a bachelor's degree from Colby College.

Peter Hart is known for his innovative use of focus groups during Walter Mondale's 1984 race for the Democratic Party's nomination. Mondale had been trailing Gary Hart significantly prior to Peter Hart's discovery that voters preferred Mondale in terms of ability to handle international conflicts. Mondale ran a blitz of ads playing upon voter fears of international conflict. This ad campaign secured Mondale's nomination over Gary Hart. Peter Hart currently directs Peter D. Hart Research Associates and conducts polls with Republican pollster Bob Teeter for NBC News and the *Wall Street Journal*.

Irwin "Tubby" Harrison

Seasoned Democratic pollster Irwin "Tubby" Harrison, a Harvard lawyer turned pollster, aided Michael Dukakis in his 1988 presidential campaign. Harrison had worked for Dukakis years before during his bid to regain the governorship of Massachusetts. Unlike Caddell and Hart, Harrison was not able to secure a role as a trusted adviser in the Dukakis campaign. His advice, based on polling research, often went unheeded (Moore 1995, p. 188). Har-

rison currently directs his Boston-based research firm Harrison and Goldberg.

Fred Steeper

Fred Steeper, an influential Republican pollster, ran polls for George H. W. Bush in the 1988 and 1992 elections, worked for Bob Dole's 1996 campaign, and polled for George W. Bush's 2000 election. Steeper also worked on campaigns for Nixon, Ford, and Reagan. He is a graduate of Western Michigan University and did graduate work in political science at the University of Michigan. Steeper is known for his focus group research and currently provides information to George W. Bush's administration. He is a founder and principal in the Washington-based research firm Market Strategies.

Stanley Greenberg

Bill Clinton raised the prominence of polling during his campaign for the White House and while in office by relying heavily on polling by Stanley Greenberg and, later, Dick Morris and Mark Penn. Greenberg, a Harvard Ph.D., established himself as an indispensable adviser to the long-shot Clinton candidacy in 1992. Clinton's successful bid for the White House, despite being a relative unknown on the national political scene with personal issues, can be attributed at least in part to Greenberg's ability to identify key issues in the campaign. Greenberg, a former Yale professor and author, was eventually dismissed by the Clinton administration in favor of more activist advisers Dick Morris and Mark Penn. Greenberg is currently the chair of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research.

Dick Morris

Dick Morris, Clinton "pollster" and Democrat turned Republican consultant,

was a trusted Clinton adviser. Morris, who earned a B.A. from Columbia University, provided polling information for Clinton's 1978 gubernatorial campaign and advised the future president to establish a "permanent campaign" strategy. Morris is credited with crafting a credible Clinton reelection campaign for 1996 after massive Democratic losses during the 1994 midterm election. He resigned his post in 1996 with the White House amid allegations that he allowed a call girl to listen in on phone conversations with the president. Morris currently contributes a column to the *New York Post* and works as a commentator for Fox News. He is also the president of Vote.com, a popular political website, and author of several books on politics.

Mark Penn

Democratic pollster Mark Penn is best known for his work with Dick Morris during the Clinton reelection campaign in 1996 and for serving as an adviser to Clinton during his second term in office. Penn has worked for numerous Democratic clients, including Vice President Al Gore, the late Daniel Moynihan, and the Democratic Leadership Council. Penn advised on Ross Perot's bid for the presidency in 1992 and ran polling for Hillary Clinton's successful senatorial campaign in 2000. He is the current president of the research firm Penn, Schoen, and Berland Associates.

Jan van Lohuizen

The second Bush administration relies on polling data from experienced Republican pollster Jan van Lohuizen, while Steeper mostly provides focus group information to George W. Bush (Green 2001, p. 2). Van Lohuizen is currently the president of Voter/Consumer Research, a

firm that specializes in election polls and corporate market research.

Party Pollsters

A number of pollsters have aligned themselves with one of the two major political parties in the United States as the major parties have shown a willingness to spend vast amounts of money to monitor the attitudes and opinions of the American public. Major Republican Party pollsters are discussed first, followed by Democratic Party pollsters.

Republican Party Pollsters

Neil Newhouse founded and directs the Republican polling firm Public Opinion Strategies, which has evaluated presidential approval ratings for some 30 years. Newhouse's client list includes Senators Rick Santorum and Pat Roberts and Governors Jeb Bush, John Rowland, Bob Taft, and Jane Swift. He attended graduate school at the University of Virginia.

Republican pollster Tony Fabrizio managed Bob Dole's polling operation during his 1996 presidential campaign. Fabrizio is a partner at the research firm Fabrizio, McLaughlin and Associates. He has advised scores of other Republican campaigns and is contracted out for polling by the Republican National Committee and several conservative political organizations.

Linda DiVall, founder of a leading Republican polling firm, American Viewpoint, has a candidate list that includes the presidential bids of Bob Dole, Phil Gramm, and Elizabeth Dole. DiVall has also furnished polling data to Newt Gingrich. She makes frequent appearances on TV news programs representing Republican positions.

Republican pollster Bill McInturff, a partner at the research firm Public Opin-

ion Strategies, has an extensive client list. He has conducted polling for more than 40 national political figures, including John McCain, the Republican Governors Association, and the National Republican Senatorial Committee. McInturff is known for developing what he calls combat messages—strategic campaigns based on polling information and focus groups. He was a Republican Party operative prior to becoming a survey researcher.

Ed Goeas, president and CEO of the Tarrance Group, is considered one of the country's leading Republican political strategists. His client list includes Trent Lott and Dick Armey, among others. Goeas works with Democratic pollster Celinda Lake on the Battleground Poll. He and Lake also conduct polling for *U.S. News and World Report*.

Democratic Party Pollsters

Celinda Lake, president of Lake Snell Perry and Associates, is a leading Democratic strategist who advises the national party committees and many Democratic candidates, including Clinton in 1992. Lake is also a pollster for *U.S. News and World Report*. She holds a master's degree in political science and survey research from the University of Michigan. Lake is known for her work for women candidates and crafting messages that appeal to female voters.

Democratic pollster Mark Mellman is the CEO of the Mellman Group, a firm that conducts polling for Democratic senators, governors, and congressional members. His clients include Senators Barbara Boxer, Bob Torricelli, and Tom Daschle. Mellman's firm has also worked extensively on polling for citizen initiatives. Mellman earned an undergraduate

degree from Princeton University and a graduate degree from Yale University.

John Marttila and Tom Kiley manage Marttila and Kiley, Inc., a national survey research firm headquartered in Boston that conducts polls and offers strategic advice to Democratic candidates. Their client list includes Congressman Patrick Kennedy and Senator John Kerry. Marttila and Kiley also engage in research on public policy issues.

Democratic pollster Bill Hamilton (1939–2000) founded the survey research firm Hamilton Beattie and Staff. This well-respected company has conducted public policy research since the 1970s. Hamilton earned an M.A. in political science from the University of Florida and did graduate work in research design at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill.

Democratic pollster Douglas Schoen, founding partner and principal strategist for Penn, Schoen, and Berland Associates, served as the chief polling strategist for Clinton's 1996 reelection campaign. Schoen is a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard College and a graduate of Harvard Law School. He earned his doctorate in philosophy from Oxford University, England. Schoen provides polling data and advice to numerous Democratic candidates.

Alan Secrest is president of Cooper and Secrest Associates, the leading polling firm for Democratic House candidates. This firm is well-known in the polling community for pulling off upset victories.

Major Independent Polling Firms

The popularity of polling information in politics and the mass media has given rise to a number of major independent polling organizations. These firms pri-

marily conduct research on public policy topics and consumer or market research.

The Gallup Organization is the best-known independent polling firm in the United States. Founded by George H. Gallup, this firm has studied human nature and behavior for more than 70 years. The Gallup Organization now has more than 40 offices worldwide. George Gallup III, the son of the founder, currently manages it.

The Pew Research Center for People and the Press, formerly Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, is an organization that measures attitudes toward the press and public policy issues. This research center is sponsored by Pew Charitable Trusts, one of the largest philanthropic organizations in the United States. Andrew Kohut, former president of the Gallup Organization and founder of Princeton Survey Research Associates, directs the Pew Research Center. Kohut completed a B.A. at Seton Hall and did graduate work at Rutgers University.

Zogby International, the only polling organization to predict the 1996 election to the exact percentage point, is headed by John Zogby, a graduate of Le Moyne College and Syracuse University. Zogby started this firm in 1989, and it has rapidly become one of the most trusted polling organizations in the world. Zogby International runs polls for various news organizations, including Reuters, NBC News, MSNBC, the *New York Post*, Fox News, and Gannett News Service.

Louis Harris and Associates is a worldwide market research and consulting firm. Founded in 1956, this firm is a leader in Internet-based polling. Louis Harris managed the firm until Humphrey Taylor succeeded him in 1992. Taylor graduated from Trinity College in Cam-

bridge and has extensive polling experience in Europe. Louis Harris and Associates merged with another company under the name Harris Interactive in 1999 and has since acquired Total Research Corporation, the custom research department of Yankelovich Partners; Market Research Solutions Limited, a London-based company; and M&A Create Limited, a research firm in Japan.

Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin founded Wirthlin Worldwide in 1969. This firm has branched out from its original political polling work to market research. It is one of the largest polling operations in the world. Wirthlin is the CEO of this major independent polling firm.

Yankelovich Partners is a polling firm that specializes in lifestyle and consumer trends. It was founded by Daniel Yankelovich in 1958 and is currently headed by J. Walker Smith. Smith holds a Ph.D. in mass communications from the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill. Yankelovich Partners boasts an annual survey of American values and consumption patterns called the *Yankelovich Monitor*.

Elmo Roper founded the commercial firm of RoperASW, formerly Roper Starch Worldwide, in 1933. This firm has evolved into a major international polling firm, headed by Harry O'Neill, presidential pollster for Richard Nixon while he was in office. RoperASW is part of NOP World, a global research company with offices in different countries around the world.

Media Pollsters

Media organizations were the first to use polling, although unscientific, to gauge public opinion and predict elections.

Today, every major news outlet has either an in-house polling organization or an arrangement with a private polling firm. Media polling organizations have been innovative in developing advanced polling techniques. Exit polls, a polling technique that allows networks to call elections before all of the votes are tallied, were first introduced by media pollsters in 1967. The Voter News Service (VNS), a consortium of major media outlets, including ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox, and the Associated Press (AP), was formed in 1993. This organization gathers important, expensive Election Day polling information that is shared by VNS members.

Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) was the first media organization to establish a permanent polling operation, in 1967. This organization was originally headed by Warren Mitofsky, a doctoral candidate from the University of Minnesota, who developed a system to predict and report on elections. Mitofsky pioneered random-digit dialing and the use of extensive telephone sampling to gather public opinion information. Kathleen Frankovic, a professor and author with a Ph.D. from Rutgers University, has directed the CBS/*New York Times* polling organization since 1977.

Cable News Network (CNN) and *Time* magazine have teamed up to contract the services of Yankelovich and Associates to conduct public opinion polls. CNN and *USA Today* have also teamed up to purchase polling information from the Gallup Organization.

National Broadcasting Company (NBC) is paired with the *Wall Street Journal* in its polling efforts. Polling data and interpretation are provided to these news organizations by Republican pollster Bob Teeter and Democratic pollster

Peter Hart. Zogby International has also provided polling data for NBC.

American Broadcasting Company (ABC) has teamed up with the *Washington Post* to contract polling services from Chilton Research, a division of Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch, a major international research firm with more than 200 offices worldwide.

Fox News purchases polling information from Opinion Dynamics Corporation, founded by John Gorman in 1987, a veteran researcher who has worked in political and business polling for three decades. Fox News also contracts Zogby International for polling information.

Many major newsmagazines contract reputable polling organizations for public opinion information. Louis Harris and Associates runs polling for *Business Week* magazine, while Princeton Survey Research Associates furnishes polling data for *Newsweek*. *U.S. News and World Report* gets polling information from Celinda Lake of Lake Snell Perry and Associates, and *Time* contracts Yankelovich and Associates for public opinion data.

Caroline Heldman

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Question Wording and Context

The measurement of public opinion depends on survey research, and how questions are worded has arguably the most important effect on survey results and therefore the scientific measurement of public opinion. Survey question (and questionnaire) design has been the subject of hundreds of articles and books in the 60-plus years of survey research. Works in this area originated with such classics as *Gauging Public Opinion* (Cantril 1944) and *The Art of Asking Questions* (Payne 1951).

This entry outlines the reasons why scholars have studied question wording and effects, the methods of creating survey questions, the importance of evaluating survey questions before they are administered, and the common problems of research in the area of question wording—that is, the reliability and validity of survey questions. Questionnaire problems revolve around the questions themselves but also the response options provided. Finally, this entry outlines methods for testing questionnaires before they are fielded.

Cornerstones of Quality

Measurement: Validity and Reliability

Maximizing the reliability and validity is a central concern so that measurement error is reduced. Reliability means that questions receive consistent answers, if the concept of interest has not changed. Validity concerns the idea that one is measuring the concept that one intends

to measure—that the question reflects the meaning of the concept. Thus the survey researcher must define the concepts she is interested in measuring, in order for the respondent clearly to understand the objective of the question or questions (the researcher assists in operationalizing the concepts with questions). In his guide to creation of "good" survey questions, *Improving Survey Questions* (1995), Floyd J. Fowler notes that questions should have clear goals (measuring the concept of interest) so that when the question is written, all respondents should share the same understanding of the question (and, of course, share that understanding with the researcher).

Fowler says that those who design survey instruments should have a clear *response task* for the interviewee to accomplish. Not only should respondents have the information to answer the question; interviewees should also understand what the researcher is trying to ask and be able to access that information so they can actually answer the question. Two types of survey questions are generally asked: open-ended and closed-ended questions. In open-ended questions, no specific response options are offered. Respondents are asked to offer either a narrative answer or a brief answer to a question such as "In what year did you move to Des Moines?" Closed-ended questions offer specific response options to the interviewee; the options must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Although it depends on the type of data needed, some survey researchers recommend using closed-ended questions because they reduce respondent burden and because they are easier for the researcher to use because no coding or reading of long, complicated answers is required.

*Where Do Survey Researchers
Obtain the Questions Used?*

After the concepts to be measured and objectives of the questionnaire are clear, designing questions many times begins with brainstorming sessions and reviews of past questionnaires and research on the same topic. Those who design questionnaires will sometimes also use focus groups to help with questionnaires. This *developmental* use of the focus group's purpose is to interview those members of the target population so the researcher can discover what is really important to someone who might actually get asked the question. Further, how do respondents actually talk about the question or the concepts the researcher is interested in measuring? Focus groups provide a method that can help the survey designer ensure that respondents will have a shared understanding of the questions.

There are a variety of sources in which one can find questions from past surveys (Robinson et al. 1999), and many are even easier to access now that information is widely available on the Internet. For example, one can access the University of Michigan's American National Election Study questions by searching the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research's (ICPSR) data archives and accessing a codebook (www.icpsr.umich.edu). The same is true for studies such as the General Social Survey, available in the Roper Archives (www.ropercenter.uconn.edu).

In designing question wording, two precautions are needed. First, the type or wording of the question used may vary depending on the mode of a survey. That is, a question used for a self-administered questionnaire (Internet or mail survey) may differ from that used on a phone survey or face-to-face survey. Second, ques-

tions that have been used in the past should be reconsidered for clarity and ability to measure what the researcher thinks is being measured.

*Common Problems in
Question Wording, Response
Categories, and Ordering*

Most individuals are able to identify blatantly one-sided questions that may be, for example, on an interest group or partisan survey. These surveys may use loaded words to elicit certain responses. However, survey methodologists have consistently found that even slight variations of question wording can have significant effects on the results of the survey (see Schuman and Presser 1996, p. 276). Even harmless-looking, simple language may be interpreted differently than intended. Scholars have also identified a variety of question problems that may appear because they make the response task difficult or impossible. Even when one is using questions that have been used before, one may see these types of problems.

One of the most commonly known problems is *acquiescence bias*. When respondents are given agree/disagree questions, yes/no questions, or even true/false questions, they tend to give the positive answer or to be agreeable, no matter what the question. Scholars have identified many possible reasons for this phenomenon, including politeness, deference to those with perceived higher social status, and even *satisficing*, a theory articulated by political psychologist Jon Krosnick (1991), meaning that respondents pick the first satisfactory option (and agree) because they essentially do not think through assertions offered in questions. Many scholars have tried to correct for the problem in various

ways, but arguably the most successful way to deal with it is to avoid those sorts of questions.

Another such issue is *social desirability bias*. In an attempt to present herself in a positive light, a respondent may give the answer that she expects the interviewer would like to hear. These types of problems are minimized on self-administered surveys, but scholars note that the reported frequency of certain socially desirable behaviors still is higher than the frequency of those behaviors in actuality (or when compared with some "objective" standard). For example, the National Election Study has validated voting against official records and found that the reported rate of voting is much higher. Stanley Presser and Linda Stinson found that self-reported church attendance is much higher than church attendance analyzed in other ways, such as a time diary, where the focus of the questionnaire is not on the behavior of interest. (A time diary is a survey method whereby a researcher asks a respondent to detail activities and locations of those activities for a period of time, typically about 24 hours.) Wording a question in such a way that the respondent does not feel as if the reporting of a certain behavior is expected is one way used to address this problem. A typical voting question is similar to that asked on the 1996 Current Population Survey (Bureau of the Census): "In any election, some people are not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do not want to vote. Did you vote in the election held on Tuesday, November 5?" However, there is still overreporting of voting.

Similarly, respondents may be reluctant to admit they have little or no knowledge about an issue. The problem

of *nonattitudes* occurs when a researcher asks about a concept about which the respondent does not care or has no knowledge and therefore has no real opinion. However, respondents will give an opinion either because they will not say they don't know or the survey questionnaire does not give them the option. Again, making it safe to say, "I don't know" is an approach used to solve this problem. However, the interpretation of "I don't know" is unclear—does the respondent have no idea, or does the respondent have a lot of information but cannot decide? Yet another approach involves the use of screening questions to ascertain which respondents have adequate information or an actual opinion. Another dimension to the problem of nonattitudes is that scholars are divided about whether to include a middle position in response options in closed-ended questionnaires. Some scholars (Schuman and Presser 1996) note that many of those responses are "noncommittal" and therefore a middle option should not be included.

Another example of a questionnaire problem is the *double negative*, that is, cases when "no" means "yes." Probably the most cited example is when Roper conducted a survey for the American Jewish Congress. They administered the question "Does it seem possible or does it seem impossible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened?" In his book *Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know* (2001) Herbert Asher points out that 22 percent of respondents believed that the Holocaust may not have occurred. Roper conducted the survey again, removing the double negative from the question: "Does it seem possible to you that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never

happened, or do you feel certain that it happened?" The changed wording resulted in only 1 percent of respondents answering that it "seem[ed] possible that the Nazi extermination of the Jews never happened."

Another example where the response would be too difficult is in the case of a double-barreled question, such as "Do you still beat your spouse?" This question combines two separate questions, not allowing the respondent to distinguish between the two.

Similarly, hypothetical questions are difficult for respondents to answer (it takes imagination and projection), and make it difficult to ensure that the question elicits shared meanings (scholars know little about what the respondent is projecting). Converse and Presser (1986) suggest asking about respondent experiences directly, though hypothetical questions may be used in a limited fashion.

The use of jargon or unclear words may also be a problem for respondents. Although one understands that the use of jargon can affect respondent understanding, it may be surprising to discover that a question such as "Do you exercise or play sports regularly?" may cause problems. A respondent may have no idea what counts as exercise (see Fowler 1992). "When did you take your last vacation?" may be similarly problematic because definitions of vacation most likely vary among respondents. Adding information defining these concepts to the questions may help.

Another problem surfaces when survey researchers would like to ask a question that elicits the relative ranking of issues, concepts, or problems. Ranking the options and rating each option separately have both been proposed, but some argue that ranking is the better choice, espe-

cially in measuring political values. However, excessive respondent burden may result when the list to be ranked is long. When the respondent feels that none of the subjects is better (higher ranked) than another, a researcher may receive invalid answers to her questions when a respondent ranks the questions anyway. According to Jon Krosnick (1999) in his article "Maximizing Questionnaire Quality," rating is the better option because of a problem he calls *non-differentiation*. His theory of *survey satisficing* notes that respondents are not motivated to think about the ratings scales and may give the same answer to every rating question. He writes that the reliability and validity are improved by asking the respondents to rate items.

Although care must be exercised in the creation of the questions, creating response categories on closed-ended questions is also an important task to ensure reliability and ultimately validity of the questions. Research suggests that the order of the response categories is critically important. In fact, Schuman and Presser (1996) noted that in self-administered surveys, respondents display a primacy effect: they pick among the first response categories offered. In interviewer-administered questionnaires, respondents tend to pick the last response option offered—this is the *recency effect*. This could be explained by Krosnick's satisficing theory. If the questionnaire is administered via computer, then one solution to this problem is to random-rotate the response options to reduce the measurement error (bias) caused by this effect.

Aside from the effects of question wording, scholars have also documented that the question order—that is, question context—plays a significant role in the

validity of questions. Scholars argue that this is especially true when a question is not as salient to a respondent. Question order problems occur when there are two or more questions on the same topic within a questionnaire (Schuman and Presser 1996, p. 27). Schuman and Presser distinguish between *part-whole combinations* and *part-part combinations*. In part-whole question groups, there is one or more general item and one or more specific item; the general question is usually meant to summarize the specific one or ones. Among part-part groups of questions, there is the same level of specificity. Further research (Schuman and Presser 1996) revealed that, for example, answers changed when a specific question about approval of abortion in the cases of a serious defect preceded a general question about abortion. How respondents interpret items may depend on where in the questionnaire a measure is placed; consequently, scholars should use caution when comparing responses across surveys. The timing or the political context of a survey will also make a difference to responses provided; again, scholars should proceed with caution.

Pretesting the Survey Questionnaire

When funding and time are limited, it is tempting to many to forget the pretesting phase of questionnaire development. However, without fail, scholars argue that even simple wording or questions used previously should be pretested. In particular, pretesting helps maximize the reliability and validity of questions (and the entire questionnaire) and ensures they are meaningful to the possibly different populations upon whom they are used. In *Improving Survey Questions* (1995), Floyd Fowler explains that pretesting is needed to ensure that respondents have

shared understandings as to the question meanings and that they can perform the “tasks” presented to them. In addition, the researcher must ensure that the questions can be administered the same way every time (a special concern with interviewer-administered questionnaires). Converse and Presser (1986, pp. 54–55) also emphasize that pretesting checks the “flow” of the questions, the order of questions, the skip patterns, timing, respondent interest, and respondent well-being. At least one of four different types of pretests or methods of survey evaluation is recommended by most scholars.

Focus group discussions are used for survey development and for survey evaluation. These in-depth discussions can ensure a researcher covers the most widely used response categories and that these categories are identified clearly. Vague or jargonistic wording may also be identified with this method. For example, National Center for Health Statistics researcher Susan Schecter and colleagues (1993) used focus groups in a study of polio patients and discovered that polio survivors did not characterize their disease in the same way a doctor might. A change in the wording was necessary.

Another technique of evaluating a survey instrument is an intensive personal interview using information processing theory to gauge how the respondent thinks about the questions in a laboratory (a cognitive interview). There are a wide array of techniques used under this approach, but in general, respondents are asked to read the questions, then say out loud the process they go through to answer the question (a “think-aloud”). Another protocol might call for researchers to probe with follow-ups, asking the respondent to mention her understanding of the question, the definition of

certain terms, what things might have been confusing, and whether the respondent feels she can give a correct answer. Such methods have been criticized on the grounds that they do not reveal much more information than that gained in other ways. However, research on this approach continues.

Another method that is less used is that of expert panels. In this method, experts in survey methodology and subject-area experts are brought together for an in-depth discussion of the questionnaire. Experts are given the questionnaire several days in advance of the session. Researchers (Presser and Blair 1994) uncovered potential analysis problems as well as problems with questionnaire wording. However, other scholars (Czaja and Blair 1996) caution that this method should be used in conjunction with others; it is not a substitute.

The most widely used method is one where the survey is essentially practiced on a small scale with the same or similar target population (25–75 interviews). According to some (Converse and Presser 1986), interviewers (for interviewer-administered surveys) provide most of the data to evaluate questionnaires. There should be at least two phases: a developmental phase (test an early version of the questionnaire) and a polishing phase (polish the final draft). For self-administered questionnaires, replicating the mail survey or observing the respondent is recommended. In both cases, the respondent may be debriefed.

Conclusion

The idea behind questionnaire design is to maximize the reliability and validity of survey questions and reduce measurement error. Although the main focus here has been measurement error, it should

also be noted that reducing respondent burden in answering questions is also key to reducing item or survey nonresponses. The future of questionnaire research almost certainly will involve testing and understanding the cognitive processes respondents go through when they answer questions.

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Research Institutions

Public opinion institutions serve a variety of clienteles in modern economic and social life. In this entry, the institutions will be sorted into three categories: professional associations, for-profit businesses, and nonprofit/academic research organizations.

The professional associations in public opinion research are what the American Medical Association is to physicians, or the American Bar Association is to lawyers. The American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) and

the Council of American Survey Research Organizations (CASRO) are membership organizations. They have some common functions. Both publish periodicals with information valuable to members. Both provide frequent meetings for continuing career education and to share current research findings. Both set guidelines for ethical behavior in conducting, analyzing, and disseminating research findings. They also have some differences. AAPOR tends to have more academic members, whereas CASRO's members usually are for-profit market research firms.

Institutions also include academic and not-for-profit research organizations. Academic researchers conduct surveys with two goals in mind. First, they are hired as consultants and work in cooperation with a governmental agency, a not-for-profit organization, or a business firm to lend their expertise to some project. Second, and more important for the career progress of most academics, is the expectation that academics contribute new theories about opinion research. Academic analysts gain stature among their peers by finding better ways to measure opinion and by developing clearer understandings of how various types of people arrive at their views and uncovering ways in which various verbal cues or events alter public perceptions of social issues.

For-profit institutions find it productive to conduct surveys for applied research projects. They are interested primarily in developing for their clients improved marketing strategies, testing the effectiveness of product placement or packaging, and the like. Some will advise political candidates on persuasive word choices and inform paying news organizations about political and policy matters as well as how they might improve audience share.

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Other for-profit agencies will take governmental clients and produce data that advise government, for example, on how to better deliver services, meet public health needs, gain compliance with the law, or stimulate economic development.

Professional Associations

The American Association of Public Opinion Research is headquartered in Lenexa, Kansas, after recently moving from Michigan. Its 1,600 members are both academic and applied opinion researchers. AAPOR's publications, conferences, and Internet communications are catalysts for sharing ideas about how best to conduct polling.

AAPOR concerns itself with professional standards of research and ethics, standards for the treatment of survey participants, and the confidential treatment of respondents' identities. AAPOR's standards also give guidance for opinion measurement and appropriate statistical analysis. It discusses appropriate methodologies for collecting and reporting opinion data. It takes public positions on controversial issues such as "push polling." It contributes to the development of theories of effective survey development and opinion formation through conferences, a newsletter, and a journal.

AAPOR publishes a highly regarded scientific journal, *Public Opinion Quarterly*. AAPOR's membership automatically subscribes to *Public Opinion Quarterly* through annual dues. Before accepting an article for publication, a jury of experts decides whether a submission meets scientific standards, contributes to knowledge about opinion formation, or tells researchers something new about survey methodology. These articles often are of interest to academic

sociologists, political scientists, and economists. *Public Opinion Quarterly* also includes a book review section.

AAPOR holds annual meetings. These conferences include business meetings for the selection of officers and other administrative concerns. The annual conference also is an opportunity for researchers to stay abreast of developments in the fields of opinion research and statistical analysis. Participants present findings from scholarly research, which encourage practitioners to consider the range of issues from communication technology to types of response categories to word choices in the development of opinion research tools.

AAPOR's founders first met in the summer of 1946. Pioneering public opinion researchers such as Harry Field, Paul Lazarsfeld, Angus Campbell, George H. Gallup, and Harold D. Lasswell agreed to the importance of coming to grips with methodological issues and practical applications of this emerging science. An elected president and executive council make most routine policy and administrative decisions for AAPOR. The current executive committee is made up of members from academic, governmental, and for-profit research organizations.

The Council of American Survey Research Organizations is headquartered in New York. It was founded in 1975 and represents about 175 research firms. Its membership comes more from applied research organizations than from scholarly research institutions.

CASRO lobbies government on behalf of its membership. Like AAPOR, CASRO hosts periodic conferences, publishes several journals, and offers learning sessions for member organizations. CASRO's board of directors determines whether submissions merit publication.

Its publications focus on applied research strategies, advising practitioners on methods for improving response rates, and analyzing how survey research improves market share for products or services and how for-profit research firms can enhance income opportunities.

Like AAPOR, CASRO expects member organizations to abide by ethical standards. These include principles of honest reporting of data, disclosing serious distortions of research, ethical treatment of survey participants, using appropriate research methods, and accurately reporting data and methods to clients.

The board of directors and chair are elected from the organization's membership to govern CASRO. An administrative staff manages the day-to-day operations of the group's operations. Most of the current directors and committee chairs come from for-profit research settings.

Nonprofit and Academic Research Organizations

A great many universities and colleges are now in the business of conducting public opinion research. Students interested in sociology, political science, economics, marketing, and other disciplines are driving universities to create their own survey research laboratories. Quinnipiac University's Polling Institute has earned a reputation for accurately predicting election outcomes and measuring policy concerns in New England. The University of Illinois at Chicago's Survey Research Laboratory runs large-scale polls for governmental agencies and academics along with conducting seminars for nonacademics. The Ohio State University's Center for Survey Research aids in the learning function of the university and provides polling services for academics, not-for-profits, and for-profit institutions.

Though there are many high-quality survey research laboratories at universities across the United States, three are most prominent. The University of Michigan's biannual National Election Study (NES) is the most widely used by academic political scientists. The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago perhaps has the most prestigious name in public opinion analysis. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, affiliated with the University of Connecticut, has the largest collection of survey data.

The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut was founded originally at Williams College in 1947 and moved in the 1970s. Like much of what goes on in opinion research, George Gallup was instrumental in the Roper Center's early development, along with founder Elmo Roper.

The Roper Center boasts the largest opinion data collection in the world, with more than 14,000 surveys from the United States and abroad. It sees its mission as both commissioning polls and serving as a clearinghouse of polling data collected by other organizations.

Roper collaborates closely with faculty and students at the university; it helps sponsor studies in survey research and has several graduate research assistants. The Roper Center is located within the Institute for Social Inquiry at the University of Connecticut. An executive director manages daily operations. A board of directors gives guidance to the executive director. The board includes academics, researchers from public policy think tanks, opinion researchers from for-profit organizations, and other corporate sponsors.

Roper publishes *Public Perspective* magazine, which describes opinion trends in popular language. Feature articles are

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2,000 words or fewer. Articles often focus on news media's coverage of polls, political use of opinion research, and discussion of how polls are misused or misunderstood in Western politics. It also features tips on polling methods. Its paid circulation base is small, about 800 readers, but influential.

The National Opinion Research Center, headquartered at the University of Chicago, is one of the most prestigious institutions in the field of survey research. Its 2000 annual report boasts a budget of about \$46 million. Its 350-person permanent staff works from three offices, two in Chicago and one in Washington, D.C.

Since 1941, NORC has led the development of survey research design and statistical methods of analysis. Equally impressive are the fruits of NORC's ongoing surveys into population, labor, economic, health, education, and quality-of-life issues.

Among its best-known projects is the General Social Survey (GSS). This is a federally funded research project that has charted changes in attitudes and behaviors of U.S. residents since 1972. This survey measures attitudes about lifestyle and family, religious habits, feelings of physical or economic well-being, community attachments, and a wide range of other topics. This data collection is available to the general public.

In addition to GSS, NORC conducts research for academic, nonprofit, and governmental clients. Among its timely research interests are the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Florida's controversial ballot recount in the 2000 U.S. presidential election. Its research into enduring concerns delves into health, crime, education, labor, housing and family issues, and substance abuse.

The president of the university nominates the individuals who serve on the NORC board of trustees. Though a majority of the board is directly affiliated with the University of Chicago's faculty or administration, the board also has governmental officials and executives of for-profit corporations. The board then selects NORC's president, who oversees the daily operations and recommends senior staff appointments to the board. NORC's principal researchers usually have faculty appointments at the university. Along with social science researchers, NORC staff and project directors include specialists in aging, finance, medicine, urban development, and public health and medicine.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (formerly the Times-Mirror Center for the People and the Press) is not strictly a survey research organization. The center issues contracts to polling organizations, which report data to the center.

It sponsors, analyzes, and reports a variety of surveys relating to public policy, attitudes about news coverage, political leadership, and U.S. foreign policy. Its staff is responsible for issuing news releases and making reports to policy leaders with respect to the center's findings. It operates on a three-year, \$8 million grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts. Since 1995, the Pew Trusts have funded \$19 million in survey research through the Pew Research Center.

The Pew Research Center is governed by a board of directors, mostly academicians, who set research agendas and approve research projects for the following 12 months. It has a staff of eight under the direction of former AAPOR and Gallup Organization president Andrew Kohut.

The Pew Research Center is one of several organizations sponsored by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The children of Sun Oil Co. executive Joseph Pew and his wife Mary founded the Pew Trusts. Though each trust is a separate legal entity, the collective Pew Charitable Trusts governing board sponsors numerous projects concerned with culture, education, religion, society, health, and the environment. Since 1995, the Pew Charitable Trusts has funded nearly \$34 million in opinion research, including that managed by the Pew Research Center. In recent years, the Pew Trusts sponsored some \$230 million in philanthropic activities annually.

National Election Studies, for more than 50 years, has been the authoritative data set used to study the American electorate. The NES has collected data before and after each U.S. presidential and midterm election since 1952. This archive serves as a resource to more than 3,000 books, doctoral dissertations, and scholarly journal articles.

The NES surveys are conducted out of the University of Michigan's Center for Political Studies (CPS). In addition to the NES, the CPS is the administrative headquarters for the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), which is a repository of numerous data collections relating to society, crime, health, demography, history, economics, and foreign relations. The CPS also is the administrative home of *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

The Michigan studies' extensive questionnaire produces 4,700 variables on almost 2,500 individuals for each survey. The NES data sets offer an extended time series of data, which is useful in charting changes in attitudes over time. These variables include in-depth ques-

tions about religion, policy issues, perceptions of political candidates and interest group leaders, labor organizations, feelings of patriotism, the economy, race, crime, and personal well-being. The NES now conducts its random population surveys as well as panel surveys, where the same individuals are contacted over an extended period of time.

The NES research is managed first by a board of overseers, all academic social scientists. The board's charge is to ensure that the survey responds to a variety of research interests while maintaining its core set of questions. The principal investigators, also academicians, monitor the progress of the survey and data management. A staff of four handles the day-to-day production of the survey and management of data.

Funding sources were somewhat sporadic during the first half of the NES's history. However, in 1977 the National Science Foundation formally established the Michigan studies as a national research project and provided long-term research grants.

For-Profit Opinion Research Institutions

There are many highly qualified for-profit opinion research firms. The field of opinion research is growing with familiar names like Zogby, Arbitron, and Nielsen. However, two stand out as founding the industry, Louis Harris and Associates and the Gallup Organization. They are discussed here.

The Gallup Organization bears the name of the father of modern polling, George Gallup. It has a professional staff of 2,500 in 28 countries around the world. It is a privately held company; financial data are not disclosed.

Gallup's most widely known polls are concerned with public policy and political issues for academics and news organizations like CNN and *USA Today*. Gallup, however, refuses political polls commissioned by political parties or advocacy groups. The Gallup Organization wishes to be seen as independent from political influences in its policy polling. Though its political surveys may be its most familiar products, customer satisfaction measurement is the largest part of business. Businesses commission Gallup polls to guide personnel decisions and improve staff morale, measure customer satisfaction, and assess marketing programs.

In addition to providing research to paying clients, many of Gallup's results are available to the general public via the Internet and through a weekly e-mail briefing. Gallup researchers also publish books on opinion and management issues.

Gallup is in the midst of building a 50-acre Gallup University campus in Omaha. The university uses Gallup research to conduct training seminars on personnel management and organizational performance for corporate leaders. Gallup reports that 100,000 people have signed up for its Gallup Path training programs in 2002.

Harris Interactive, Inc., is a publicly traded firm based in Rochester, New York. It has a regular staff of 800 full-time workers stationed in six U.S.-based locations as well as Britain and Japan. It had annual revenues of \$100 million for the fiscal year ending in June 2002.

Originally conducting opinion research in face-to-face conversations, Harris now prides itself on \$50 million in technology used to collect opinions through e-mail

and Internet survey research. Now, Harris conducts research in focus groups, by mail, over the telephone, and via the Internet. In addition to political and policy polling, Harris is involved heavily in market research for automotive, travel, financial services, pharmaceutical, and health care businesses.

Originally called Louis Harris and Associates, the firm was hired by John F. Kennedy to poll for his 1960 presidential campaign. However, in 1963 founder Louis Harris quit polling for partisan campaigns and began his news column "The Harris Poll." The Harris Poll gauges confidence in social institutions and feelings of alienation from government and the like. Today it is a syndicated feature, frequently appearing in *Business Week* magazine.

In 1969, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette (DLJ), an investment banking concern, acquired Harris and Associates. In 1975, DLJ sold Harris to the Gannett Corp., a media conglomerate. The Gordon S. Black Corp. acquired Harris in 1996. In 1999, the firm was reorganized under the name Harris Interactive, when it became publicly traded. Since then, Harris Interactive has acquired at least four other market research firms.

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 Gallup World Headquarters. 901 F Street NW, Washington, DC 20004, 202-715-3030, www.gallup.com.
 Harris Interactive. 135 Corporate Woods, Rochester, NY 14623-1457, 877-919-4765, www.harrisinteractive.com.

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NORC. University of Chicago, 1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, 773-256-6000, www.norc.org.

The Pew Charitable Trusts. 2005 Market Street, Suite 1700, Philadelphia, PA 19103-7077, 215-575-9050, www.pewtrusts.com.

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 1150 18th Street NW, Suite 975, Washington, DC 20036, 202-293-3126, people-press.org.

The Roper Center. 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1164, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1164, 860-486-4440, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.

Roper, Elmo

Elmo Roper (1900–1971) was a true pioneer in the fields of market research and public opinion polling. His experience in the 1920s managing a jewelry store in Creston, Iowa, with his brother was not a financial success, but it taught him the value of understanding what his customers wanted.

Beginning in the early 1930s with analysis of consumer demand for his employer, the Traub jewelry company, he was doing market research before it had a name. In 1933 he cofounded Roper, Cherington, and Wood, one of the first market research firms, and despite problems getting business leaders to try new ideas during the Depression, the new venture managed to survive. Roper and his partners literally helped develop the industry from the ground up, serving as interviewers and grappling with the issue of how to make data more accurate.

Although some magazines and newspapers had been doing mail surveys since the turn of the century, Roper and other researchers, such as George Gallup and

Archibald Crossley, had developed and were experimenting with the idea of sampling instead. Since the goal of a survey is to obtain data representative of a larger whole, mail surveys had a crucial problem—there was no way to be sure who would send back a postcard and who would just throw it away. Sampling is the idea of trying to make sure that different groups are all represented in the data in proportion to their actual size in the overall population. Sampling thus increases the accuracy of the final conclusions and produces what is often called *scientific polling*.

Although the advantages may seem straightforward enough today, in its day sampling was a revolutionary concept. In an era when the major problem was convincing most businessmen that an outside consultant could tell them anything useful about their products and customers, Roper and his associates used their personal connections to get some clients who could convince others to try this strange new idea.

Those same contacts led to Roper being named director of the *Fortune* magazine survey in 1935, which was the first regularly published public opinion survey using the new scientific polling techniques. In the pages of *Fortune* Roper worked hard to explain these new methods and the theories behind them to readers. As he and his associates made discoveries such as the effects of question wording and question order on responses, he educated readers and helped give his fledgling industry credibility and publicity. Gallup's organization debuted later that year, and what was once a curiosity began to gain acceptance. The market research business also continued to develop, and ideas moved from there into public polling efforts.

Polling Comes of Age

The first great triumph of these new polling techniques came with the presidential election of 1936. Prior to the vote, the venerable *Literary Digest* mail survey predicted an Alf Landon victory over Franklin Roosevelt, whereas the *Fortune*, Gallup, and Crossley polls forecast a win for FDR. Although the *Digest* survey was familiar with the idea of making the sample representative, it overlooked the fact that the base of respondents—drawn from automobile and telephone ownership—was skewed toward upper income brackets and thus overestimated support for Landon. In the actual election, Landon won two states against Roosevelt's forty-six in one of the largest landslides in U.S. history.

The *Literary Digest* succumbed to the Depression shortly thereafter, but pollsters were here to stay. Now firmly established in the public consciousness, polling became less of a novelty after this victory, and the success also helped further legitimize market research. The two industries would continue this synergy, each enhancing the other's reputation, for years to come.

World War II was a crucial period for polling and market research. The government began to use the new techniques, notably when Roosevelt commissioned Roper and Gallup to survey public support for the proposed Lend-Lease deal with Great Britain. As the United States entered the war, Roper was tapped by William Donovan to be deputy director of the Office of Strategic Services, the first U.S. intelligence agency, to use his network of personal connections to recruit the best men for the new organization. He helped convince George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower to utilize opinion research in the military, survey-

ing soldiers' opinions on various aspects of life in the armed forces as an aid to policy decisions.

Roper also worked for the Office of War Information, the Office of Production Management, the Army, and the Navy, and his company did work for the government, surveying the general public in order to prioritize wartime production and plan for the eventual transition to a peacetime economy. The fact that the government was willing to put its weight behind scientific polling methods for something as important as the war effort was a powerful endorsement that pollsters and market researchers were able to cite to potential clients after the war.

The public polling side of the industry also gained further acclaim during this period, predicting the Roosevelt victories in 1940 and 1944 with increasing accuracy. In fact, accuracy itself became a point of contention, with some critics arguing that polls would depress voter turnout because everyone would already know who was going to win. By the next election, however, that would hardly be the question—and the triumphs of 1940 and 1944 would instead look like an invitation to overconfidence.

Crisis of Confidence

If the 1936 election was the first great triumph for scientific polling, the presidential contest of 1948 marked its greatest public crisis. Although the enduring popular image of that election is the reelected president holding aloft the "DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN" headline, a more apt example in this case was the *Detroit Free Press's* banner the morning after, which read "TRUMAN 304, POLLSTERS 0" (in reference to the number of electoral votes he had won). Roper and the other pollsters had found that Thomas Dewey's lead was

so large in late summer and early fall that they decided it was insurmountable. In the words of Roper's "What People Are Thinking" column on September 9, "My whole inclination is to predict the election of Thomas E. Dewey by a heavy margin and devote my time and efforts to other things," specifically looking more closely at the issues to see why Dewey was so far ahead. Although he did caution that a war or other crisis could rally support for the president, or that a misstep by Dewey or a remarkable comeback by Truman could alter the equation, Roper concluded that "Mr. Truman's campaign is not likely to evoke any electoral miracles and Mr. Dewey is not rash." Consequently, he and the others stopped polling on the horserace question and completely missed the late shift of sentiment behind the whistle-stopping Harry Truman in the greatest come-from-behind victory in U.S. electoral history.

From editorial cartoonists and comedians to newspaper editors and elected officials, the backlash was intense. Roper's and Gallup's columns were dropped by many newspapers, and some wondered if the industry would ever be able to recover. In the midst of the furor, Roper became a leader in both the public and private struggle to redeem polling in the nation's eyes, a calm voice amid derision and invective. In his columns and dozens of private letters, he argued that the basic worth of public polling had already been proven, but the crisis showed there was still much to be learned about the proper use of this new tool. Roper waited to comment on the possible reasons for the debacle until a special Social Science Research Council commission of pollsters and social scientists could meet and examine the question, and he helped lessen the hysteria as much as possible.

The eventual conclusion was that the pollsters had not only stopped polling too soon (an obvious problem); they had failed to realize the uncertainties inherent in 1948's exceptionally large number of undecided voters, assuming that they would either not vote or that they would break according to the decided vote and thus favor Dewey. In fact Dewey's support proved exceedingly soft, and Truman's campaign heroics gathered him most of the fence-sitters and the upset victory.

The commission's acknowledgment of the industry's errors helped stem the tide of public criticism somewhat, though it would take time for polling to escape the echoes of the 1948 debacle. It took successful predictions of succeeding elections, particularly the closeness of John F. Kennedy's victory over Richard Nixon in 1960, to bring pollsters back to respectability in the public eye. On the market research side of the industry, Roper worked tirelessly behind the scenes to reassure his commercial clients that the concept was still valid, and the goodwill he and his organization had accumulated in the business world served him and the rest of the industry in good stead.

Legacy and Vision:

The Future of Polling

Roper tried to move beyond the horserace aspect of predicting electoral winners after 1948, with only limited success, as the media would make it an issue every four years at least. He became a perennial TV election analyst, and the Roper organization continued to grow. Roper was one of the most visible faces of the public opinion industry during the next two decades and was influential in other ways as well: although they became personally estranged over the cir-

cumstances of his departure from the firm, now-famous pollster Louis Harris was a product of Roper's company, leaving in 1956 to found his own business.

Even as early as the war years, Roper was thinking of the future of polling and of how the data he and the others were acquiring could best be put to use by political scientists and historians. The answer to that question came after the war with the founding of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at Williams College. In 1946, Roper began to store his organization's data at Williams for researchers to use, and over the next decade he convinced Gallup and Crossley to include theirs as well.

This repository was the world's first social science data archive, founded with a mission of making available in one location the breadth and depth of information necessary for analysts to make intelligent, responsible use of public opinion data. The center has also fulfilled an educational role while expanding its collection to include hundreds of thousands of questions from the United States and dozens of other countries. In its current home at the University of Connecticut, the Roper Center is the largest archive of polling data in the world and has partnerships with every major survey organization. None of this would have come to pass without Roper's vision, hard work, and a good deal of his own money.

Besides ensuring the continued existence of the Roper Center, Elmo also outlined a vision for the use of polling in the future. Deeply concerned at the increasing public disregard for what he dubbed "the Learned Man," Roper argued, in many of his frequent articles and speeches, that public opinion research should be used to discern areas of public ignorance and misconceptions in order to

set national educational priorities. Although the Roper Center has fulfilled one part of his vision for the future of polling, making data available for researchers, the public aspect remains to be implemented.

Elmo eventually retired to his home in Redding, Connecticut, leaving the firm in the capable hands of his son, Burns W. Roper. Their organization remains one of the nation's preeminent market research companies. Roper also cofounded International Research Associates, one of the first firms to combine resources in public opinion research from across the globe. He continued to fundraise for the Roper Center and various liberal causes until the end of his life. He particularly favored the North Atlantic union movement, advocating greater political union of the NATO democracies in opposition to the challenge presented by the Soviet Union.

Roper was a member of more than two dozen boards of directors by the late 1960s, from such companies as Tiffany's and Spiegel to the Fund for the Republic and a variety of charitable organizations, as well the United States Citizen's Commission on NATO. He was a founding member of the Connecticut Civil Rights Commission. He did not like to fly, taking ocean-liners when he visited Europe, and was a lifelong advocate for strengthening and preserving America's railroad system. Though he never completed college, he received three honorary degrees and was in constant demand as a speaker as long as his health permitted. He died on April 30, 1971.

Carl W. Brown, Jr.

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Sampling

No public opinion researcher can accurately and precisely observe everything that might be relevant to his study, whether it be the entire target population, the depth and sincerity of all self-reported attitudes, or all of the behaviors that an individual undertakes. However, social research, especially good public opinion research, rests on direct observation of individuals. This presents a conundrum, especially if the goal of social science is to explain, predict, and generalize about the attitudes and behaviors of individuals or other units of analysis under study.

Sampling, then, is best defined as the process of selecting units of analysis (i.e., the case that is being studied, which can be individuals, organizations, etc.) from a general population of interest. In turn, by making observations and generalizations on that sample or samples, we may fairly generalize the results back to the population from which those subjects were chosen.

The Historical Role of Sampling

More often than not, when we think of sampling, the first thing that comes to mind is public opinion polling. This is because the population that pollsters would like to generalize to is usually so large that sampling is the only option; also, polling is one of the few opportunities researchers have to discover the accuracy and precision of their estimates come Election Day. Public opinion researchers also have an opportunity that many other types of researchers covet: the ability to resample the population as many times as they would like (provided they have the wherewithal). This, in turn, allows them to *replicate* analyses to confirm findings. Add to these points the almost ubiquitous media presence of polling organizations, and one can safely say Americans are familiar with at least this part of sampling in public opinion research.

Since 1948, the Center for Political Studies (CPS) has conducted national opinion surveys in conjunction with every presidential election and has sponsored a national midterm election survey since 1954. The sampling error (discussed below) associated with these studies is small, with better than 1,200 persons interviewed in each survey. Together, these National Election Studies (NES) constitute the single most valuable and consistent source of research data available to scholars of public opinion. Since many of the same questions have been used in the surveys over time, these data provide an unparalleled view of American attitude change.

The NES surveys have become the public opinion survey of record among academic researchers, but not necessarily among the press and other political consumers. Because the media are more

concerned about short-term news-making trends, they need opinion data much more quickly than every two years. Many private polling firms, such as the renowned Gallup Organization, have been attempting to measure the attitudes and behaviors of the American populace almost every week for more than seventy years. Many news-oriented organizations, such as the Associated Press, TV and radio networks, and print media agencies also have their own polling organizations or work in conjunction with private firms in an ongoing effort to understand and capture public moods on many relevant issues of the day.

The Evolution of Public Opinion Polling

The technique of sampling has evolved in its precision and accuracy over time, but even today, it is still an imperfect enterprise. Mistakes like the miscalculations of the *Literary Digest* in 1936 in incorrectly coronating Alf Landon president (because the *Digest* only polled automobile and telephone owners who were neither nearly as prevalent nor as diverse in 1936 as they are today) to the then-flawed sampling practices of the Gallup Organization's poll in 1948 (which reported Thomas Dewey would defeat Harry Truman in a landslide) illustrate that surveys are not perfect.

However, even with today's increased technology and expertise, this risk continues to be an intrinsic part of the sampling and polling business. For instance, until the 1988 election, the major news organizations did their own exit polling and made their election predictions independently, and they did it rather successfully and competitively, though the costs of doing such work were quite high. In

1990, the three major networks and CNN formed the Voter Research and Surveys (VRS), combining their exit polling operations as a cost-saving measure. In 1993, with the addition of the Associated Press to the original four networks, the VRS became the Voter News Service (VNS). By 1996 Fox had joined, and all six major news organizations were relying on the same data and the same models, rather than competing, to most accurately predict election results.

All six networks first called the 2000 election in favor of Vice President Al Gore based on their sampling data, then a few hours later reversed themselves, calling the election for George W. Bush, and finally admitting much later that neither candidate had clearly prevailed. Despite the networks' spending millions of dollars to upgrade the VNS following the double-miscall fiasco of 2000, the new 2002 VNS computer system failed, leaving network staffs and anchors to rely on their own experts and methods of interpreting whatever election night sampling data they could find. Unlike in 2000, the networks exercised extreme caution when calling the 2002 midterm electoral winners and in some instances declined to call winners even after candidates had phoned the victors to concede defeat. Although the networks were spared from more televised embarrassment, the malfunctioning VNS deprived the public of quality exit poll electoral analysis.

If We Cannot Always Get It Right, Why Sample in the First Place?

These mistakes are illustrative of the problems with sampling. Though many public opinion polls come off without a hitch, some do not because of sampling mistakes or bad data. Every time a polling organization or study undertakes

a project there is a possibility of error, and so they attempt to do everything to maximize certainty.

Of course, if public opinion researchers had the time, effort, and resources to ask every voter whom they had voted for on the day of the election, they would have known with more certainty how close elections were going to be. Researchers would have known with more certainty *not* to call the race for either candidate in 2000, and would have known with more certainty what the 2002 results would be. The quality of a sample, then, is related to the degree with which one can make conclusions about the results found in the survey with some certainty.

Researchers surely do not have the time, the resources, or the access to people to collect a good sample of all voters, let alone the entire population. In 1990, the Bureau of the Census spent close to \$5 billion to record demographic and other characteristics for 248,709,873 people. The bureau also estimates that more than 8 million were not counted, most of them children, people from racial and ethnic minorities, and poor people in rural and urban areas. At the same time, more than 4 million people were counted twice or incorrectly included in the census. Census data are used to reapportion seats in the House of Representatives and to allocate funds for federal programs. Local governments often rely on census data to determine the need for new schools, hospitals, and other facilities; therefore, inaccuracy and uncertainty can make a difference (White and Rust 1997; U.S. General Accounting Office 1997; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997).

In the years leading up to the 2000 census, a rigorous sampling plan was developed by the Bureau of the Census to completely redesign parts of it to reduce the

immense cost and improve accuracy. Despite an overwhelming consensus among statisticians favoring the use of sampling to improve accuracy, the proposal was highly controversial in Congress, which led to a vote to prohibit the substitution of sampling for direct enumeration until the Supreme Court ruled on the matter (White and Rust 1997; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997). So, what is this sampling technique that the U.S. government is afraid to utilize, even if the technique now used is imperfect?

The Logic of Sampling

Two interrelated concepts define the goals of rigorous results from good sampling practices: *generalization* and *external validity*. Generalization is the induction or the validation of multiple inferences derived from empirical observations to arrive at a theoretical causal principle, statement, or idea having general application.

External validity is “the approximate validity with which we can infer that the presumed causal relationship can be generalized to and across alternate measures of the cause and effect as well as across different types of persons, settings, and times” (Cook and Campbell 1979, p. 37). In other words, external validity is the degree to which the generalized conclusions in a particular study would hold for other persons in other places and at other times. Therefore, every effort to maximize external validity should be taken to ensure high-quality research. Although external validity problems may stem from other components of the study, researchers can maintain good sampling practices.

It should also be noted that the sampling logic also assumes a high quality of internal validity regarding the operational

definition, reliability, and validity of the empirical observations in the study. Sampling also assumes a clear unit of analysis. If any of these characteristics are flawed, the sampling mechanism is not responsible for the errant results: “garbage in, garbage out” most definitely applies.

Conducting the Sample:

Threats to External Validity

Researchers must take into account many possible problems that can threaten the external validity of, or the ability to generalize to, the sample of the population of interest. In this regard, “there are three major threats to external validity because there are three ways you could be wrong—people, places or times” (Trochim 2002; Cook and Campbell 1979). The best way to avoid this problem is to take good samples of the target population.

This is usually done using random selection inside the entirety of the target population, which allows the use of sampling statistics (discussed below), which have certain characteristics that allow assessment of certainty. Replication, or resampling, with different and multiple samples of the target population is also a good method to increase levels of certainty.

Types of Sampling

How one chooses a sample can matter. One can sit on Wall Street at 2 P.M. on Fridays and ask opinions on tax policy. If a researcher attempted to generalize the findings to the entire population, the researcher may have introduced *bias* to the results. Bias is when a systematic error threatens the external validity of sample results because of poor sampling methods, like the nonrandom sampling

techniques from the example above. Sample results may be biased for a number of reasons.

To eliminate as much bias as possible, efforts should be made to randomize people, places, and times. *Simple random sampling* is the basic sampling technique in which a group of possible and accessible subjects are selected for study from a larger group in the target population. Each individual is chosen entirely by chance, each member of the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample, and every possible sample of a given size has the same chance of selection.

However, purely random samples are not without their problems. A simple random sample will not adequately represent many population attributes (characteristics) unless the sample is large. Smaller groups, especially minority groups, may not be represented effectively in the sample, which creates concerns about generalizability. This can be avoided by using other types of sampling methods that attempt to maintain randomness while attempting to ensure a more representative sample; in other words, a trade-off can be made among complete randomness, the ability to generalize to smaller groups, and cost-effectiveness.

Interpreting the Results:

Statistics, Parameters, and Sampling Distributions

The results are always somewhat uncertain, since we have not had the opportunity to sample the entire population without measurement error. We call those results describing the sample a *statistic*. A *parameter* is a generalization for an entire population; to get a parameter, the entire population would have to be

involved in the study, whereas a statistic is derived from a sample of that population. Optimally, we would like a statistic to be as close to the parameter as possible. However, since it is almost impossible to know the parameter, researchers have to rely on statistics.

The logic of sampling assumes that there are an infinite number of samples that can be taken from a large population. One sample might yield a slightly different statistic than another, but the statistics should be similar enough to each other, especially over multiple samples. The more samples taken from the population, the more the distribution of the sample statistic, the *sampling distribution*, over all of those samples would resemble a bell curve or what is called a *normal distribution*.

The average of the sampling distribution is essentially equivalent to the pop-

ulation parameter. The standard deviation of the sampling distribution, or *sampling error*, tells us something about how different samples would be distributed, which in turn tells how far the statistic is from the parameter. A low sampling error means that we have relatively less variability, or range, in the sampling distribution and are therefore closer to the parameter.

Sampling Margin of Error: How Do Statistical Significance and a Confidence Interval Work?

Every survey contains some form of uncertainty or error. Even the 2000 census was flawed, demonstrating that any sample is subject to random error or potential measurement error. *Margin of error* is used as a general term to demonstrate the statistically derived rate of uncertainty associated with estimates




Figure 1 Relationship between Sample Size and Margin of Sampling Error (95% Confidence Interval)

based on consumer surveys and political polls, which is synonymous with the “plus or minus” quantity in a confidence interval.

The relationship among statistics, parameters, and margins of errors works because of the known statistical traits of a standard normal curve. Through statistical techniques, we can say with some certainty that, when our sampling distribution (assumed to be a normal distribution) is divided into sections by a certain number of standard errors above and below the mean, the area in each section is a known quantity. The areas above and below the mean can be added together to get the probability of obtaining a value within (plus or minus) a given number of standard errors. There is a 68 percent chance of a value falling within one standard error of the mean, a 95 percent chance within two standard errors, and a 99 percent chance within three standard errors.

There is also a direct relationship between survey size and margin of error; see Figure 1, which plots the 95 percent confidence interval for the relationship between sample size and margin of error. Notably, the larger the sample size, the smaller the margin of error. Many surveys usually aim for at least 1,000 cases, which has a margin of error of about ± 3 percent. At that point, sampling more also means more money, time, and other resources.

Public opinion polling is not the only place where sampling is appropriate. As long as the logic of sampling is applied correctly, we can make general statements with some certainty about any population large enough to be sampled effectively. The logic is the same, and that logic is very useful in gaining in-

sights into the empirical world when used effectively.

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Stokes, Donald E.

Donald E. Stokes (1927–1997) was an eminent scholar of electoral politics and the author or coauthor of a variety of classic works, including *The American Voter*, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” *Political Change in Britain*, and “Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces.” Stokes earned his bachelor’s degree from Princeton in 1951 and his doctorate in political science from Yale in 1958. He taught at the University of Michigan from 1958 to 1974 and at Princeton University from 1974 until his death.

The American Voter

Stokes’s scholarly career began with a bang when, only two years after arriving in Michigan, he appeared as coauthor with his Survey Research Center colleagues—Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Warren Miller—of the most important publication in the history of voting research, *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960). This book is the primary source of the ideas, problems, and data that have propelled most of the subsequent development of the field of voting behavior.

The American Voter portrays an electorate whose orientations toward politics were strongly shaped by party loyalties developed early in life; whose familiarity with and attachment to abstract ideologies and policy agendas were remarkably limited; and whose votes in specific elections reflected the overlaying of short-term forces—most notably, in the 1950s, the personal popularity of Dwight Eisenhower—on top of more persistent partisan alignments reflecting the social cleavages of the New Deal and even of the Civil War era.

In the decades since this publication, every major element of this portrait of the American voter has been subjected to energetic criticism and painstaking re-evaluation using new data, theories, and research methods. However, none of the hundreds of resulting scholarly books and articles has succeeded in making a significant dent in the central precepts and findings of the Michigan school of electoral studies. Although elaborations and modifications have been plentiful and productive, more ambitious revisionists have generally turned out to be attacking a caricature of the original argument, or to be even more time-bound in their perspective than the original authors acknowledged themselves to be, or to be simply wrong about the facts. By the standards of empirical social science, *The American Voter* has been a work of unsurpassed influence and staying power.

It is difficult for an outsider to disentangle Stokes’s specific contributions to the collaborative effort that produced *The American Voter*, though some of his earlier (Stokes, Campbell, and Miller 1958) and later (Stokes 1966) works signal his abiding interest in the interplay of long-term and short-term electoral forces emphasized throughout that work. His distinctive interests and skills emerged more clearly in subsequent publications, several of which were reprinted among the essays by the same team collected in *Elections and the Political Order* (Campbell et al. 1966). Stokes’s contributions fall into three categories: his brief but important essay “Spatial Models of Party Competition,” his classic articles with Warren Miller on congressional representation, and two pieces of the several he would eventually produce using aggregate-level data and simple mathematical

models to explore the broad historical dynamics of electoral systems.

Spatial Models of Party Competition
 “Spatial Models of Party Competition” (Stokes 1963) seems to have been one of Stokes’s own favorite works; indeed, it is the only one of his writings on electoral politics that he returned to long after it was originally written (Stokes 1992). The essay is, in the first instance, a penetrating appreciation and critique of Anthony Downs’s *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), tracing the antecedents of Anthony Downs’s theory in the work of others (Hotelling and Smithies), noting in passing the similarity between Downs’s framework and the framework developed by Duncan MacRae for analyzing roll-call votes and emphasizing the real limitations of Downs’s axioms of unidimensionality, fixed structure, and common reference. Stokes’s comments on the interchange between theory-building and empirical observation staked out a sensible middle ground in a conflict between formal theories of politics and empirical studies of political behavior.

However, the most enduring contribution of “Spatial Models of Party Competition” was the distinction between *position issues* of the sort encompassed by Downs’s theory and the *valence issues* that Stokes argued have been central throughout American political history, from the economic panics of the nineteenth century to the issues of Korea, communism, and corruption in 1952. Such valence issues, in Stokes’s parlance, link parties positively or negatively with values shared by the electorate as a whole, rather than the positioning of the parties on a dimension along which voters’ own preferred positions differ. Stokes anticipated the work of V. O. Key Jr.

(1966) and Morris Fiorina (1981) in noting that valence politics could turn either upon “past or present” (“retrospective”) conditions or upon “future or potential” (“prospective”) conditions. Stokes’s examples of valence issues include two that have become staples of subsequent electoral analysis: economic prosperity, and Madison Avenue technique and the art of image-building. In both cases, his insistence on the electoral significance of valence issues seems justified by subsequent scholarship.

Constituency Influence in Congress
 Despite the evident importance of valence issues in electoral politics, Stokes’s own treatment and terminology have often been acknowledged only in passing, or not at all, by those who followed in his footsteps. The same could hardly be said of his work with Warren Miller on congressional representation, which has been the acknowledged starting point for almost every subsequent scholarly investigation of political representation. The research reported in their article “Constituency Influence in Congress” (Miller and Stokes 1963) represented the first significant attempt to break out of the confines of survey-based voting studies to connect the behavior of voters with the broader operation of the political system. It necessitated a significant alteration of the sampling frame employed in previous Michigan surveys (to interview voters in a sample of 116 congressional districts, rather than in the nation as a whole) and an ambitious parallel survey of members of Congress and congressional candidates (to examine not only their own political views, but also their perceptions of their constituents’ opinions).

As pioneering scholarship goes, it was a remarkably rich and polished effort. Not

content to link mass and elite attitudes more systematically than anyone before, Miller and Stokes also developed an elegant model of the empirical connections they observed among constituents' attitudes, representatives' attitudes, representatives' perceptions of constituents' attitudes, and roll-call votes—and grounded that model firmly in the classic normative literature on representation as well as in previous empirical scholarship. At the same time, they did not fail to notice a single vivid, politically significant tree in their forest of correlation coefficients: the ouster of Representative Brooks Hays, a prominent moderate on civil rights issues, in a conservative Arkansas district in which every one of the 13 voters in their sample (as against 24 percent in other districts) had read or heard something about both Hays and his successful write-in challenger.

As with *The American Voter*, subsequent scholars who have criticized or even superseded various aspects of Miller and Stokes's work on representation have often failed to notice how innovative and ambitious their project was for its time, or how profoundly it has continued to shape the thinking and research even of those who aspire to revise or overthrow it. In that sense, as in others, both works are true classics.

Historical Dynamics of Electoral Systems

The third, and perhaps the least appreciated, of Stokes's contributions to *Elections and the Political Order* consisted of two articles: "Party Loyalty and the Likelihood of Deviating Elections" (Stokes 1962) and "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition" (Stokes and Iversen 1962). Both of these pieces employed mathematical models—the for-

mer a normal error model and the latter a random walk model—to capture important aspects of long-run electoral dynamics. If election outcomes reflect a combination of long-term partisan divisions and short-term forces, Stokes asked, how frequently should we expect the "minority" party to win? And in the longer term, how likely is it that a given era's minority party will be able to regain electoral parity? Those deceptively simple questions, while derived from the central findings of survey-based voting studies, raised important new problems for our understanding of political history on a larger scale.

These two articles, along with Stokes's subsequent pieces "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects" (Stokes 1965), "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces" (Stokes 1967), and "Cross-Level Inference as a Game against Nature" (Stokes 1969), present a picture of a perceptive, imaginative, and ambitious scholar struggling to invent or adapt the analytical techniques he needed to further expand the horizon of his field. Taking as a starting point the central findings of *The American Voter* on party identification, short-term forces, and the nature of electoral competition, he aimed to extend those findings in time and space and to plumb their implications for the broader political system. Although richly detailed survey data could be mined with great skill in *The American Voter* to reveal the contemporary traces of a few decades of political change, or in "Constituency Influence in Congress" to outline the nature of the relationship between voters and their representatives, Stokes's historical questions required him to distill the essence of electoral dynamics primarily from aggregated election returns. To do so using the analytical tools and theories of the 1960s was a feat

even Stokes could only partially accomplish. Partial though it was, the accomplishment represents one of his greatest scholarly achievements.

Of these pieces, the most complete and impressive was “Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces,” in which Stokes used congressional election returns covering nine decades, plus comparable data from Britain, to document historical changes and systemic differences in the relative importance of national and local factors in electoral turnout and voting behavior. Here are the evolution of party systems, the profound impact of presidential versus parliamentary institutions, the electoral basis for responsible party government, the rise of the modern mass media, and the “vanishing marginals” of subsequent congressional election scholarship—all encompassed in twenty highly readable pages with nine tables and figures. One would be hard-pressed to find a more impressive display of originality, erudition, and analytic resourcefulness in the whole literature of voting studies.

Political Change in Britain

Stokes's last significant work of electoral scholarship, written in collaboration with David Butler, was *Political Change in Britain* (Butler and Stokes 1969). In many ways this book harkened back to *The American Voter*, embracing more completely than any of the Michigan school's other international collaborations the model of a comprehensive, survey-based analysis of national voting behavior in a particular political era. The analytical framework of *The American Voter* was elaborated in *Political Change in Britain* to distinguish more explicitly among generational changes in the composition of the electorate, fundamental

shifts in partisan loyalties, and the effects of candidates, campaigns, and valence issues in specific elections. The fundamental findings of the earlier book regarding the limits of issue awareness and ideological competition, the structuring role of parties, and the interplay of long-term and short-term forces were reiterated and extended. At the same time, the distinctive features of the British electoral system—the prominent role of social class and trade unions, the impact of a nationalized partisan press, and the distinctive interplay of national and local forces in a parliamentary system—received prominent attention both in their own right and for the light they shed on broader theoretical questions of cross-national interest. Finally, Butler and Stokes exploited their panel survey design to provide a more direct analysis of political dynamics than in *The American Voter*, approaching a synthesis of the historical and systemic perspective of Campbell, Key, and Stokes himself, on the one hand, and the campaign-specific analyses of the Columbia school and the Nuffield studies on the other.

Stokes at Princeton

Having reached the pinnacle of his scholarly field, Stokes by 1970 was turning his attention to academic administration and institution-building. In 1974 he left Michigan to return to Princeton as dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs—a position he was to hold for 18 years. Stokes guided the school through a remarkable period of growth and diversification, nearly doubling the size of the faculty and adding specialists in geography, demography, sociology, urban planning, and science policy to the existing

core of economists and political scientists. He also stimulated the creation of a rich array of new courses in undergraduate and graduate programs, including courses on the mass media, the American city, quantitative analysis, ethics and public policy, geography and public affairs, science and technology, and organization and management.

Stokes's efforts immersed him in a long-term commitment to the intellectual and organizational revitalization of the professions of public administration and policy analysis. His contributions were recognized by his election to the presidencies of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, and the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration. He also received the Elmer B. Staats Award for a distinguished career in public service.

Stokes served as vice president of the American Political Science Association and was a recipient of the Association's Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award. He was also a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the National Academy of Public Administration, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and was a former Guggenheim fellow, among many other professional honors.

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The Study of Public Opinion

Public opinion has long existed as a concept, but systematic study of this topic emerged only recently in the past century (Korzi 2000, p. 1). Early scholarship emphasized the role of public opinion in governance and democracy. The behavioral revolution of the social sciences in the 1930s and 1940s enabled sociological and psychological research to eclipse earlier normative questions. The sociological perspective views public opinion as a product of communication and social interaction. The psychological approach uses personality and attitudinal variables in assessing public opinion. Economic theories surfaced in psychological research in the 1950s. This approach is primarily concerned with questions of the rationality of public opinion. Major scholars from each perspective and their contributions to the understanding of public opinion are summarized here.

Normative Approach to Public Opinion

British historian James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* (1888) is considered to be the first systematic assessment of public opinion. As with many early writings on this topic, Bryce focused on normative democratic questions. He posited that citizens are generally disinterested and inactive in politics, a problematic situation given the important role he thought they should play in the political arena.

Political scientist and later Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell was the first American to write about public opinion in the twentieth century. Like Bryce, Lowell's influential text *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (1913) examined normative questions. Lowell argued that only the opinions of informed citizens should be considered by elites. He

also distinguished between "private" and "public" opinion, the latter pertaining to opinions about issues that can be addressed through public policy.

Political commentator Walter Lippmann also entertained normative questions in his writings. In *Public Opinion* (1922), Lippmann concluded that citizens in modern society were bombarded with a sea of information that they could not proficiently negotiate. In his more pessimistic book *The Phantom Public* (1925), Lippmann advocated a very limited role for citizens in politics. He proposed that instead of placing governance in the hands of the uninformed masses, the public should follow the lead of well-informed social scientists on the issues of the day.

Philosopher and educator John Dewey responded to Lippmann's analysis with *The Public and Its Problems* (1927), evaluating citizens in a more positive light. Dewey was confident that given the proper resources, the common person could be involved in politics through public opinion in a meaningful way.

Sociological Approach to Public Opinion

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Chicago school dominated the study of sociology in the United States. Chicago researchers were the first to examine values and attitudes among the public, beginning in the 1940s. This line of inquiry was made possible by the development of quantitative scaling techniques and sophisticated sampling theory (Price 1992). Later, researchers from the Columbia school dominated sociological public opinion research.

Chicago sociologist Robert E. Park introduced the sociological approach to public opinion in his 1904 book *The*

Crowd and the Public and Other Essays. Park sought to understand public opinion in a broader, scientific, sociological context, as a product of social relations. Later researchers would use his ideas extensively.

Chicago sociologist Herbert Blumer, the founder of *symbolic interactionism*, built upon Park's ideas in conceiving of public opinion as a social collective, a group that is loosely structured, brought together by a common public disagreement (Blumer 1946). Blumer's and Park's model of public opinion as a sociological process in which society adapts to changing circumstances through discussion has been labeled the *discursive model* (Price 1992, p. 23).

Princeton professor Harwood Childs's influential article "By Public Opinion I Mean . . ." (1936) presented public opinion as an aggregation of individual opinions as opposed to viewing public opinion from a group or societal level. A later book by Childs, *Public Opinion: Nature, Formation, and Role* (1965), also gained notoriety for identifying approximately 50 different definitions of public opinion in existing research.

Columbia sociologist Paul Felix Lazarsfeld is considered the founder of social survey research. His most influential work is *The People's Choice* (1944), coauthored with Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet. This book analyzed media influence on public opinion using survey data. The authors found that opinion leaders have greater influence than the media when it comes to vote choice. Lazarsfeld's 1954 *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*, coauthored with Berelson and William McPhee, replicated this finding.

Sociologist Robert King Merton worked closely with Lazarsfeld at Columbia Uni-

versity. The Lazarsfeld-Merton duo is best known for "Mass Communication, Popular Taste and Organized Social Action" (1948), on the manipulation of public opinion by business and other interests. Merton was also the first researcher to study bureaucratic red tape and the concept of anomie.

Political scientist V. O. Key Jr. was unusual for his time, joining the public opinion fray from a sociological perspective in the 1960s when the field was dominated by quantitative psychological research. Key called for a broader assessment of the dynamics among citizens, groups, and leaders instead of just focusing on individuals (Key 1961).

Psychological Approach to Public Opinion

Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922) was an early and influential book on public opinion from a psychological perspective. Focusing on how individuals form opinions, he concluded that opinions develop within a triangle of the actual event, the actor's subjective interpretation of the event, and positioning of the event in the actor's head with other symbols and pictures. The psychological approach to public opinion gained dominance several decades later with the advent of sophisticated survey and experimental techniques.

Two competing schools have dominated the psychological approach to public opinion since the 1950s: the Michigan voting model approach and rational choice models. According to the Michigan school, background characteristics, primarily party identification, influence public opinion and vote choice. For rational choice theorists, people vote for the candidate who is closest to their beliefs on issues the voter finds salient.

Michigan social psychologist Angus Campbell was the lead author of *The American Voter* (1960), coauthored with Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes. This seminal work used data gathered from the 1948 through 1958 elections. *The American Voter* was important for the questions it asked and for its methods. The authors' heavy reliance on survey data heralded a new era of reliance on quantitative methodology. This book was a response to the Columbia school's sociological claim that the electorate was shifting to the right ideologically, which handed the election to Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952. Campbell and his coauthors countered that people do not tend to think in terms of ideology; rather, they consider more immediate Election Day influences. They proposed a *funnel of causality*, with events closest to the election having the greatest impact, and argued that ideology was a remote factor compared to more immediate influences like candidate evaluation.

Political scientist and psychologist Philip Converse coauthored *The American Voter* (1960) and wrote the influential chapter "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" (Converse 1964). That article delves more deeply into questions from *The American Voter*. Converse found that respondents change opinions from survey to survey and hold ideologically inconsistent views. He concluded that citizens are "innocent of ideology."

Yale political scientist Robert E. Lane's *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (1962) countered the innocent-of-ideology claim. He argued that long, probing interviews were a better way to gauge respondent ideology than survey data. Using these methods, Lane detected

latent ideological themes in public opinion and called for a revision of the "innocent" thesis.

Warren Miller, political scientist and coauthor of *The American Voter* (1960), founded the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and the American National Election Studies (ANES). Miller coauthored the important article "Constituency Influence in Congress" (1963) with Stokes, which laid the foundation for studying linkages between elected leaders and citizens/public opinion.

Political scientist Donald Stokes, coauthor of *The American Voter* (1960), also coauthored the *American Political Science Review* article "Constituency Influence in Congress" (1963) with Miller. Stokes served as the program director of Michigan's ICPSR from 1958 to 1974.

Political scientists Norman Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik wrote the influential book *The Changing American Voter* (1976). This book impacted public opinion research by arguing that the politically charged environment of the 1960s made Americans less innocent of ideology. Their analysis has generally been accepted, although this debate wages on, primarily on methodological grounds.

Political scientists John Zaller and Stanley Feldman are pioneers in research on how opinions are formed (Feldman 1988; Zaller 1992; Feldman and Zaller 1992). They discovered that people make up opinions on the fly when asked about topics they have not thought about before. These opinions are based on whatever considerations come to mind. In Zaller's model, on-the-fly opinions come from randomly accessed information held in long-term memory. Zaller's and Feldman's research calls into question the accuracy of survey research and

sheds light on the deep influence of elites on mass public opinion.

Schema theory developed in response to findings that opinions do not appear to be organized by ideology. Schema theorists propose that opinions are structured by cognitive frameworks of knowledge about a group, an event, a person, or an abstract concept, which include both knowledge of concept and associations to related concepts. Psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelly Taylor authored *Social Cognition* (1984), the most comprehensive examination of schema theory to date. They propose that schemas provide a mental shortcut in terms of what an individual filters in and thinks about pertaining to a concept.

Michigan psychology professor Donald Kinder has made several major contributions to public opinion research. In "Public Opinion and Political Action" (1985), Kinder and David Sears examined the lack of issue consistency in the American public and found that group attachments influence individuals' political leanings. In *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (1996), Kinder and Lynn Sanders found that white Americans' attitudes about racial policies are determined by what role they think the government should take in ameliorating inequalities. In *News That Matters: Television and American Public Opinion* (1987), Shanto Iyengar and Kinder investigate ways in which news coverage frames public policy issues through schema. They find that TV media influence public opinion through agenda-setting and priming.

Psychologist David Sears is best known for his research on "symbolic racism" (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Sears et al. 1997). *Symbolic racism* is defined as negative attitudes held by

white Americans toward African Americans based on feelings that blacks "violate traditional American values such as individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline" (Kinder and Sears 1981, p. 416). Sears has also produced several other major texts, including *Public Opinion* (1964), co-authored with Lane, and *Political Cognition* (1986), coauthored with Richard R. Lau.

Political scientist Paul Sniderman and sociologist Thomas Piazza authored the major text *The Scar of Race* (1993), which demonstrates how easily people can be talked out of positions they have taken. Sniderman also coauthored *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (1991) with Richard Brody and Philip Tetlock. Using sophisticated experiments, the authors found that people make sense of politics using mental cues and shortcuts.

Political scientists Scott Keeter and Michael X. Delli Carpini coauthored the influential book *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters* (1997). They analyzed fifty years of polling data and found major knowledge inequalities among different groups in society. Keeter and Delli Carpini also discovered that more informed voters have fairly stable, consistent opinions and are better at filtering out irrelevant information from media and elites.

Economic Approach to Public Opinion
The economic approach to public opinion mainly focuses on the rationality of the public. Political scientist Anthony Downs's seminal work *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) introduced the rational choice perspective in public opinion research, focusing on individuals' decision processes that reflect the

most efficient way to achieve an end. Downs argued that citizen preferences are stable over time because people will systematically rank their alternatives and choose the most preferable alternative. Downs assumed that individuals behave rationally.

V. O. Key Jr. addressed the rationality of public opinion in his important work *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960* (1966). Key presents his *reward-punishment thesis* that voters reward the party in power when the economy is prospering and punish the incumbent party if the economy is declining.

Political scientist Morris Fiorina is noted in public opinion research for his rational choice *retrospective voting model* (Fiorina 1981). Retrospective voting is the idea that people make vote choices based on an evaluation of the past performance of candidates and political parties. Fiorina posits that voters require little information about candidates and parties; rather, they consider their personal well-being in recent years when making their vote choice.

Political scientists Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro examined the rationality of the public in their pathbreaking book *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (1992). The authors analyzed 44 years of survey data and found that public opinion on policy issues is fairly stable over time. Page and Shapiro also found that government officials often respond to public opinion.

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Survey Methods

Survey researchers are interested in what questions to ask and how to ask them. There are two general ways to present questions to respondents: interviewer-administered (an interviewer conducts the interview) and self-administered (the respondent completes the survey him/herself). Thus the five basic survey designs fall into both of these categories. Traditionally, interviewer-administered surveys include telephone surveys, personal interview surveys (face-to-face interviews), and group-administered surveys. Self-administered surveys include mailed surveys and electronic surveys (including e-mail and Web surveys). Increasingly popular are mixed-mode surveys—where two or more different modes of administration are used. The designs differ in mode of administration and in the way that the questionnaires are structured, how people respond to them, the settings in which they are administered, and cost. This entry discusses five types of survey administration, as well as mixed-mode surveys, as well as their advantages and disadvantages, and concludes with a discussion of computers and new technologies in the administration of survey research.

Selecting a Mode of Administration

In survey design and administration, survey researchers are influenced by practical considerations such as time and money. Methodologically, researchers also try to minimize three of the four types of errors found in survey research, articulated by University of Michigan survey methodologist Robert Groves (1989). The four major types of survey error are *coverage error*, *sampling error*, *measurement error*, and *nonresponse error*. Although there is little one can do

about sampling error (error based on chance) other than change the sample size or the method of sampling, the decision of survey administration can affect measurement error, coverage error, and nonresponse error. Measurement error deals with the validity and reliability of the data. *Validity* is whether the researcher is measuring what she purports to measure. Reliability is whether the researcher, asking the same question, receives consistent answers, given that the phenomena underlying the concept of interest have not changed. For example, in interviewer-administered surveys, one may be concerned that the interviewer may affect the quality of the responses. Evidence indicates that when surveys are self-administered, people are much more likely to report illicit behaviors such as drug use, a validity issue (Tourangeau and Smith 1996). However, with self-administered questionnaires, one might be more concerned with the order in which the questions are answered, with question context affecting the validity of the responses. Coverage error occurs when not all members of the target population are in the sampling frame. If a person does not have Internet access, she could not be in the sampling frame of most Web- or e-mail-based surveys. Finally, nonresponse issues (both individual item and survey instrument nonresponse) deal with whether the respondent chooses to answer particular questions or to complete the survey at all. Many experts argue that response rate is the most important factor to consider in deciding what mode of data collection to use. Concerns with nonresponse include whether a longer questionnaire will be completed and whether to provide monetary incentives to those participating in the survey.

Face-to-Face Surveys

Perhaps the oldest form of data collection is the face-to-face interview, where the interviewer asks the respondent questions in person. These are a commonly used means of data collection, though it is expensive and requires extensive interviewer training. Some argue that if money is not an issue, face-to-face interviews are ideal, particularly with the advent of computers. Computer-assisted personal interviewing, where the interviewer uses a laptop computer with the survey instrument programmed into it, has made it an even more practical mode of data collection. This helps standardize the interview, and since the computer has the skip patterns programmed, it is easier for the interviewer. In fact, computer-assisted personal interviewing has become the most common form of face-to-face interviewing, with many large federal government surveys adopting that method (Tourangeau and Smith 1996).

In terms of measurement error, this mode has advantages and disadvantages. It allows for a longer and more complex interview to take place. Another advantage is that the researcher may also monitor the respondent's surroundings and be able to note conditions that might affect responses. A major disadvantage is the possibility of measurement error due to interviewer/respondent interaction. First, standardization is a concern, because in order to engage the respondent and ensure higher response rates, the interviewer may interact uniquely with each respondent. However, each interview needs to be the same in order for the data to be reliable. Respondents may also answer questions differently based on the sex or race of the interviewer. One commonly cited example is that the sex of the interviewer may affect the attitudes toward abortion

that the respondent is willing to articulate. And having an interviewer present actually may increase the rate of social desirability bias (where the respondent gives the interviewer the answer she thinks the interviewer expects). Those who conduct face-to-face interviews may address this problem by providing an envelope of cards the interviewer does not see. The respondent answers sensitive questions on the cards, then seals them in the envelope.

All other things being equal (and they are generally not), interviewer-administered interviews are likely to obtain the highest response. Having an interviewer build a relationship with a respondent may make it more likely that a person will respond to a survey (Groves et al. 1992). The response rates to in-person interviews are commonly higher than telephone or mail surveys, once the contact has been made. However, finding all respondents at their home, or interviewing those in an inner-city area or a rough neighborhood, may pose response-rate problems because of interviewer reluctance to make repeated calls or go to certain areas. Forms of gatekeeping may also limit access (high-rise apartment security systems and gated communities).

Telephone Surveys

Telephone surveys have been the most popular form of survey administration since the 1970s. A new method of telephone surveys, using recorded questions administered via telephone, is becoming popular, using interactive voice response or touch-tone data entry (Dillman 2000). With traditional telephone surveys, the interviewers read questions to respondents over the phone and record their responses using computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). CATI made

telephone interviewing even more popular and practical, especially since it eliminated a data entry step and made call scheduling and respondent selection much less unwieldy. From an administrative standpoint, telephone surveys are a lower-cost and quicker method of data collection. Because phone surveys are usually conducted from a centralized location, the possibility of closer supervision of interviewers is possible, making better standardization of interviews possible (reducing measurement error).

A potential disadvantage is that measurement error may occur as a result of interviewer effects. Anytime an interviewer interacts with a respondent, there are likely to be effects from the social exchange. And in comparing survey modes, research by Jon Krosnick and his colleagues indicates that *satisficing*—that is, respondents choose response options with very little thought—is more likely to occur in telephone surveys than in face-to-face interviews (Green et al 2001). For example, they were more likely to give “no opinion” responses and more likely to show acquiescence response bias—to agree with multiple statements no matter what the content.

With general population telephone interviews, random digit dial sampling is most likely to be used. With that method, code and exchange numbers are obtained from a company, and the last four digits of the phone number are randomly generated. Thus, even individuals with unlisted numbers may be included in the sample. However, coverage error inevitably results from telephone surveys, because only about 94 percent of U.S. households have telephones—households in certain states such as Mississippi have coverage as low as 87 percent (Centers for

Disease Control 2003). Those who do not own a telephone tend to be significantly poorer and have less education, potentially biasing the results. Mobile phones have also caused some difficulty; the Telephone Consumer Protection Act does not allow unsolicited calls from an auto-dialer (Gillin 2002), which are commonly used by survey researchers. Some individuals use mobile phones as their only phone.

Another problem is that people are dodging calls from survey researchers using caller ID and other privacy technologies to screen calls, creating nonresponse errors. Researchers are working on specific methods to combat the problem of nonresponse in telephone surveys. By matching telephone numbers generated randomly with addresses, researchers are able to send advance letters and monetary incentives to many potential respondents (Singer et al. 1999). Interviewers commonly work to “convert” refusals—people who initially refuse to complete an interview may be convinced to change their minds (Czaja and Blair 1996, p. 191).

Group-Administered Surveys

Another type of in-person interview relies on respondents in a group setting, such as a classroom or other institution. It is a less expensive method of surveying, though the length of the questionnaire usually must be shorter because the researcher must be sensitive to potential time constraints. Response rate and coverage error are not commonly cited as problems with this technique, because most people will complete the survey. However, there is a potential ethical drawback if individuals feel they cannot refuse to do the survey.

Some measurement error may be reduced because they can be adminis-

tered anonymously. The reason for knowing the identity of respondents in surveys is for tracking respondents either to enhance response rate or as part of a panel design where the same respondents are surveyed more than once. It is believed that individuals will be more likely to give accurate answers to sensitive questions, and social desirability bias is reduced when data collection is anonymous. And since the same directions are given to all individuals, standardization of interviews is possible. However, because this type of survey is self-administered, the researcher cannot control the order in which the questions are perused and then answered. Further, respondents may cue off of each other in the group context, affecting validity.

Mail Surveys

In terms of resources, mail surveys are easiest to conduct, especially for those with little professional experience (Salant and Dillman 1994). Also, they are often less expensive, because they do not require an interviewer. In terms of measurement, self-administered questionnaires minimize interviewer effects. In general, such questionnaires tend to create a sense of privacy, because the respondent does not have to tell the interviewer about socially undesirable behavior. Thus, survey methodologists report an increase in the reporting of sensitive or illicit behavior (Tourangeau and Smith 1996). The respondent is also unaffected by the race or gender of the interviewer. There are several measurement challenges with mail surveys in that the researcher cannot control the order in which the questions are answered or whether the correct respondent within a household completed the questionnaire.

In terms of nonresponse error, mail surveys have lower response rates, particularly because people have the opportunity to examine the survey before deciding whether to complete it. Yet survey methodologist Don A. Dillman argues that since survey research is a social exchange process, multiple contacts with the same household or respondent can yield an acceptable, even high response rate for mail surveys—as high as 70 percent if his procedures are followed and depending on the population. His total design method and tailored design method recommend sending a prenotice letter, the questionnaire (with a personalized cover letter that explains the research), a postcard thank-you note/reminder, a replacement questionnaire, and a special request by telephone or other method designed to increase the potential respondents' perceptions that the survey is important (Dillman 2000, pp. 153–188).

The reason why this method is effective is social exchange theory (Dillman 2000). The theory posits that individuals respond to surveys because of the long-term rewards and not necessarily rewards specific to the action (p. 14). Dillman notes that three things are critical for predicting action: *rewards* (what a person expects to gain from an action), *costs* (what is used to obtain the reward), and *trust* (a belief on the part of the respondent that there may be long-term rewards for action). Multiple contacts enable this exchange. And by providing a monetary incentive, valuing the respondents' opinions, and liberally thanking the respondents for their help, survey researchers may hope to create a feeling of trust and an obligation to complete the survey. In particular, monetary incentives have long been used with great success in mail

surveys, including both prepaid and promised incentives and contributions to charity (Church 1993).

Item nonresponse is a potential problem with mail surveys even if the survey instrument is returned. In particular this may occur because the researcher has no control over the administration of the questionnaire. The respondent may choose to answer only certain questions or quit answering in the middle of the questionnaire. However, Dillman provides advice about how to design a questionnaire that people will be more likely to complete—both the graphic design of the questionnaire and the questions themselves.

Internet and Electronic Surveys

One of the most significant advances in survey research is the development of the Internet. Electronic surveys may be administered via the Web or via e-mail. With e-mail surveys, a message is sent to a potential respondent who marks responses and sends back the survey. With Internet surveys, the potential respondents are asked to visit or are directly sent to a website to complete the questionnaire. Electronic surveys have the tremendous practical advantage of eliminating postage and data entry costs.

Measurement issues are rather complicated. Compared to interviewer-assisted interviewing, computers help reduce social desirability bias and increase standardization of interviews (Tourangeau et al. 2000). People are more likely to give honest answers in self-administered surveys, possibly even more so when the individual is using a computer (Dillman 2000, p. 38). Newer research has focused on the interaction between humans and computers. Depending on the interface, computers may also induce interviewer-

type effects because of the potential social presence of the computer interface cost (Tourangeau et al. 2000). The argument is that in some formats the computer interface is similar to a human presence, especially with displays containing pictures of individuals or using gendered voices.

Another positive aspect is the ability of Web-based questionnaires to be complicated. The Web survey can allow the respondent to link to definitions and instructions. Pictures and sounds can be provided as well. Pull-down menus for long sets of response choices are available. This may improve measurement accuracy.

Coverage error is the most prevalent concern with Web and e-mail surveys. Although the Pew Charitable Trusts research project *Internet and American Life* reports that more than 60 percent of Americans have access to the Internet, that is still significantly fewer than those who own telephones. Thus, electronic surveys are not likely to be used for general population surveys soon but may be effectively used for organizational surveys where most or all of the sampling frame includes individuals with Internet access (Dillman 2000, p. 356). Another coverage issue is that some people simply do not possess the skills to use a computer or have limited skills (Dillman 2000, p. 358). Simple literacy may be an issue as well, since almost all instructions must be read (Krosnick and Chang 2001).

Many Web surveys are set up so that responding is open to anyone, posing a problem of self-selection and adverse coverage. In the words of Dillman, "The eagerness to design and implement Web surveys has also revealed a frightening downside: a willingness to equate large

numbers of respondents recruited by whatever means with survey accuracy" (Dillman 2000, p. 400). However, organizations such as Knowledge Networks use random-dial techniques to recruit respondents, then give the equipment necessary for Internet surveys (Nie and Erbring 2000). Organizations such as Harris Interactive recruit panels through a variety of techniques. Research conducted by Jon A. Krosnick found few differences between the data collected by these organizations and data collected via a standard random-dial telephone survey (Krosnick and Chang 2001); Internet surveys may represent a viable alternative to telephone methods.

Mixed-Mode Surveys

Different modes of survey administration can yield different responses to the same question. Thus, some researchers believe that mixed-mode surveys—those using more than one survey administration technique—should be avoided. However, others argue that the strengths of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses in another. Most of the objectives of mixed-mode surveys cited by Dillman (2000, p. 219) involve reducing the costs of survey administration or increasing the response rate within a sample (Dillman 2000, p. 222). Dillman notes that as people are increasingly able to screen out telephone interviews and otherwise privatize their time, using multiple modes may be the preferred method of gathering data.

Several factors, particularly the influence of interviewers, can influence how people respond to questions, making reliability of multiple modes questionable. One example is the tendency to select the first response offered in mail surveys and the last response offered in telephone sur-

veys (*primacy* and *recency* effects; see Dillman 2000, p. 228). Although many of the issues are those of mental stimulus, other factors may be as simple as whether the "don't know" option is included or not. To address such issues, Dillman notes that surveyors should use *unimode designs*. The goal of unimode designs is to provide the same mental stimulus (verbal or graphic) to each respondent, regardless of the mode of the survey.

Conclusion

As computers and Internet access become more widespread, it is likely that e-mail and Internet surveys will become more common and popular. Computers have revolutionized data collection in survey research, both for self- and interviewer-assisted interviewing. Self-administered mail forms may be optically scanned. Another new form of self-administered survey allows for audio computer-assisted self-administered interviewing and is used in interactive voice response surveys (Tourangeau et al. 2002; Dillman 2000, chap. 11). Computers will continue to elicit changes in the design and administration of survey questionnaires as researchers strive to reduce coverage error, worry about the measurement issues of validity and reliability, and work to improve response rates.

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Part 3

PUBLIC OPINION IN
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Section One: Comparative Perspective

Beginning Democracies

The recent wave of democratization in the third world presents public opinion researchers with exciting opportunities and daunting challenges. Ongoing work investigates how opinions, values, and behaviors come together to influence economic development and stability in new democracies. The institutional, cultural, and economic characteristics of these nations make studying them attractive but also exacerbate the problems researchers face, particularly in the area of sampling and questionnaire design.

Early Public Opinion Research in the Developing World

George Gallup's success in the United States, coupled with scholarly interest in the effects of government propaganda and commercial advertising, encouraged the emergence of polling in nonindustrialized countries (Lazarsfeld 1952–1953). Domestic media outlets and sociologists trained in the West ran the first surveys in Eastern Europe immediately following World War II. Beginning in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, governments subsequently established domestic research institutes modeled after Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion. Surveys conducted by these institutes measured attitudes toward political parties and successfully predicted election results (Henn 1998).

In Latin America, the success of the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics, founded in 1942, led to a proliferation of public opinion polls and firms in that country during the 1947–1957 period (Olsen 2000). Academic and government surveys began in the rest of the Southern Cone by the late 1950s (Girard 1958). The development of surveys did not spread across the region equally. Most surveys were urban-focused, with many samples restricted to capital cities. Opinion research was especially slow to become widespread in the Andean countries (Koenke 2000). Early research focused on topics that are again of interest to scholars, including value changes in new regimes, the role of elite opinion in socially stratified economies, and attitudes toward economic modernization (see the 1958 special issue of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, "Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas"). One area of research that is currently underdeveloped involves comparing public opinion during this previous democratic wave with the trends currently being documented in new democracies.

Public Opinion and Authoritarian Regimes

In authoritarian regimes, polling was not always embraced. It was often seen as a "mechanistic and manipulative imperialist invention" (Wilson 1958, p. 230) and

banned in the Soviet Union as a “Western pseudoscience” (Kwiatkowski 1992, p. 358). As communist parties took power in Eastern Europe, the early opinion research centers were suppressed. The Hungarian government, for example, prevented the publication of poll results that showed the Communist Party’s vote total in the 1948 elections was lower than expected (Adams-Schmidt 1952).

Tolerance for opinion research varied over time and among communist countries. In the early 1960s, the Soviet Academy of Sciences sponsored a series of sociological studies studying economic and political attitudes (Henn 1998, p. 157). Public opinion research also flourished in Eastern Europe during the same period but fell back into disfavor following the Prague Spring (Connor and Gitelman 1977).

A second round of public opinion research in communist states emerged in the late 1970s (Welsh 1981). The pioneer was Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze, who created the independent Public Opinion Council in 1975 (Slider 1985). Following his success, the Soviet constitution was amended in 1977 to endorse responsiveness to public opinion. By the early 1980s, research centers existed in the Soviet Union’s major public universities, and Soviet and Western scholars regularly collaborated on research.

The coups and military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s reduced the public dissemination of surveys in Latin America. However, most of the military governments commissioned private polls to evaluate programs and design public relations campaigns. During periods of political openness, some military governments allowed public polling (Smith and Turner 1984). For example, after 1975, Gallup Brazil measured electoral support

for the government and opinions on proposed political reforms such as direct election of the president. In Chile during the 1975–1980 period, Pinochet’s government commissioned private polls by Gallup and allowed for restricted media and NGO polling throughout the 1980s.

Very little of the data collected during the authoritarian period has been made available to researchers, and its quality is questionable. In addition to issues of sampling strategy, inherent in the data are difficulties of obtaining an accurate measure of public opinion in an authoritarian society.

Polish researchers found that poll respondents in communist countries generally associated opinion researchers with the state’s governing apparatus and propaganda (Przbylowska and Kistelski 1998), leading respondents to fear that their opinions would not be kept anonymous. Third persons were also a common presence in interviews, especially those conducted in the workplace. Krystyna Lutynska links an unwillingness to criticize the regime’s performance to the fact that 46 percent of Polish surveys conducted from 1966 to 1968 occurred with a third party present (Lutynska 1969).

Failures to ensure response anonymity combined with regime repression to exacerbate *spiral of silence* effects. A spiral of silence occurs when respondents do not express their true opinions because those opinions contradict majority opinion or some social norm and they fear being stigmatized for voicing unpopular sentiments (Noelle-Neumann 1984). In authoritarian states, social norms are replaced with official government positions and potential penalties for expressing opinions contrary to those positions. Because pollsters are perceived to have ties to government, respondents faced

pressures to limit their responses to opinions supportive of the regime.

Empirical evidence from authoritarian countries immediately prior to the transition to democracy confirms the strength of the spiral of silence. Katherine Bischooping and Howard Shuman (1992) compare the vote intentions of potential voters approached by pollsters from an institution commonly perceived as having ties to the governing Sandinistas with those approached by independent or opposition pollsters in the 1990 Nicaraguan presidential elections. Respondents to progovernment pollsters were more likely to express support for the government's presidential candidate than respondents in other polls. This led many media polls incorrectly to predict victory for the Sandinista candidate. Similarly, expressed regime support in Bulgaria was 15 percent lower in surveys conducted by academics than in those conducted by the government (Welsh 1981). Ironically, the Polish government's decision to hold elections in 1989 was influenced by government-sponsored polls that overstated the communist government's public support (Kamiński 1999).

Associating the poll with the state led to low refusal rates in the early opinion surveys because people feared public reprisals for their refusal. Instead, respondents in authoritarian regimes were especially likely to answer "Don't know," especially to politically sensitive questions (Henn 1998).

What confidence can one place in the data collected in authoritarian states? Data collected in authoritarian regimes should be treated in the same way as other data with measurement error: while the expressed *levels* of regime support are untrustworthy, *trends* in the data reflect changes in societal support.

Two researchers (Smith and Turner 1984) reviewed polls published prior to government plebiscites in military regimes and showed that levels of support expressed for the government position were higher in polls than those expressed by secret ballot. This is what the spiral of silence predicts. However, changes in the level of support documented in polls systematically mirror changes in economic events and trends of social unrest. Furthermore, Barbara Geddes and John Zaller (1989) show that while expressed levels of progovernment positions were higher in government polls in Brazil, the bias was roughly the same among respondents of all social groups.

Current Opportunities to Study Public Opinion

In the wake of the democratic transition, public opinion polling has reached a new zenith in the developing world. Polls are literally everywhere. Although it is impossible to document the number of pollsters currently working in new democracies, two recent studies provide a snapshot of the growth of public opinion research. Matt Henn (1998) documents polling by the media, parties, and government in *every country* in Eastern Europe. Friedrich Welsch and Frederick Turner (2000) outline the growing role of polls in Latin American elections, leading one observer to argue that while polls were once a "folkloric diversion," we should now consider elections "a war of surveys" (Koeneké 2000, pp. 157–159).

Electoral democracy served as the catalyst for much of this development. Parties and incumbent officials facing an uncertain electoral environment hired professional campaign consultants, often from the United States. These consultants brought with them a reliance on

polls (Koencke 2000; Bowler and Farrell 2000). Furthermore, an open competitive environment encouraged the media to seek readers by reporting electoral standings during campaigns. The demand for polls by parties, the government, and the media created opportunities for local polling firms to develop and multinational firms to set up shop.

As in the developed world, the quality of polls depends upon the resources invested in them. In most developing countries, the costs of doing a nationwide sample are greatly increased by the lack of transportation and communication infrastructure, limiting access to voters in rural areas. With the exception of more developed Latin American democracies, nationwide surveys tend to be restricted to those undertaken by political parties. Media and academic surveys, except those immediately prior to an election, are usually limited to urban samples. Non-nationwide samples lead to errors when support for candidates or attitudes is divided along urban-rural lines, as it frequently is in newly industrializing societies.

Unfortunately, political parties are generally reluctant to release their private polling results. Even if regular surveys are conducted by commercial firms, as in Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, those firms face no incentives to share or archive their data. Polls available for secondary analysis, then, are generally restricted to media polls with their limited and nonrandom samples and shorter and rarely pretested questionnaires (Henn 1998, chap. 8). Media polls are also designed to describe the horserace aspects of the campaign and hence often lack questions providing theoretical leverage on voter motivations. The advantage media polls have is that obtaining these

surveys is relatively straightforward, though many newspapers do not archive their poll data for more than a few months.

A second data source in new democracies is a series of cross-national polls modeled after the Eurobarometer. These four annual surveys consist of samples of approximately 1,000 voters drawn from a sample designed by firms within each country. Beginning in South America in the late 1980s, studies have been conducted in Latin America (Latinobarometer), Russia and the Baltic States (New Russia Barometer and New Baltic Barometer), and Eastern Europe (New Europe Barometer and New Democracies Barometer). An Afrobarometer was created in 1999 and the East Asia Barometer debuted in 2003. Each region's questionnaire has historically been written independently, but the organizers of these various polls recently created an umbrella organization, Global Barometer (www.globalbarometer.org), to create common questions and design comparable indicators. The content of the survey varies systematically, creating time-series data on topics such as the economy, regional integration, political participation, and ethnic tensions.

These studies have two weaknesses. First, sample completeness varies across countries. In the Latinobarometer, potential respondents selected in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile are drawn from cities whose populations represent only 75 percent of the country due to the difficulty of conducting surveys in rural areas; in Venezuela and Colombia that proportion declines to one-half. This problem is much smaller in the European samples but more severe in Africa. It is also difficult to obtain the data for those not at a subscribing or sponsoring institution.

Data from the Eastern European and Russian surveys conducted prior to 1995 are available online as a cross-tabulation or frequency. The same type of data from the Latinobarometer with a four-year time lag is available for purchase. Gaining access to the full data sets for more advanced statistical analysis is possible by specific request to the organizations that sponsor the survey, but access is generally limited to academic projects and comes with restrictions on its use.

The increase in polling agencies and academic research centers with trained interviewers allows for a third option: commission and design your own survey. This option is vastly less expensive in developing democracies than in developed ones and allows for greater specificity in question topics than those used by the various barometer studies and media polls.

Challenges in Measuring Public Opinion

Writing in 1987, pollster Robert Worcester speculated that in another 50 years writers would “perhaps chronicle the development of public opinion research in what we now know as the third world to first world standards” (Worcester 1987, p. S84). Since the mid-1990s, there has been significant progress in the areas of sampling design, question wording, and interviewer training. Henn’s interviews with pollsters in Eastern Europe (Henn 1998, chap. 9) found that most used large samples and some form of random selection of respondents.

However, serious challenges remain. Difficulty in transportation combines with a lack of household phones to make obtaining nationwide samples difficult. Areas with high levels of crime and poverty also are significantly undersam-

pled, with some pollsters avoiding them by making use of quota samples (Henn 1998, p. 190). Low levels of literacy require that the interviewer be creative to obtain responses (Birmingham and Jahoda 1955). Some additional problems of polling in industrializing societies that might not be as obvious are worthy of mention.

First, many new democracies lack well-developed census and geographic data on which to design sample strata. A lack of geographic data makes sample stratification less precise and requires pollsters to either accept larger margins of error or increase their sample size (Wilson 1958; Hahn 1993). Exacerbating matters are rapid population shifts in many of these countries, especially toward urban areas, making what census data do exist rapidly out-of-date.

Measurement issues also arise in the process of questionnaire design. Many researchers, including those involved with the Global Barometers, assume that questions carry the same meaning across contexts. Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1966–1967), however, showed that identical questions in cross-national surveys do not necessarily tap into equivalent opinion dimensions. One cannot assume even that terms such as “left” and “right” have the same meaning in different political settings (Lipset et al. 2000, p. 38). To avoid this problem, they encourage scholars wishing to create comparable measures to use multiple questions, some of which are unique to each country. Because of linguistic and cultural differences within many countries, a similar procedure might be required for single-country polls as well.

Inexperience with polling requires interviewers to teach respondents about

the process of taking polls and help them build confidence while not biasing their responses (Wilson 1958). Interviewers must also be trained on the importance of accurately recording responses for the accuracy of the study. Although this usually goes without saying in developed democracies and we believe interviewer falsification is relatively rare in new democracies, there are documented examples of interviewers correcting responses that they feel place their country in a bad light. There are also cases of interviewers inventing interviews that did not occur, possibly because of deceitfulness or because they do not want to disappoint the researcher (Wilson 1958; Carrasco 2002).

Once researchers deal with these methodological problems, questions remain about whether respondents are reporting their true opinions. Henry Landsberger and Antonio Saavedra (1967) showed that low levels of education increase the effect of *response set*, a form of bias where respondents voice an opinion when they do not actually have one. In their study, survey respondents in Chile with the lowest levels of education exhibit greater response acquiescence than those with higher levels of education. Respondents with low levels of education are also more likely to give extreme answers. As the question topics become less tangible, opinion instability increases at the fastest rate among low-education voters. These results suggest that extra care should be taken in interpreting the opinions of those in areas with low levels of education.

The most difficult challenges for measuring public opinion, however, are created by the very nature of mass opinion in developing societies. The fall of repres-

sive regimes released social and cultural pressures while rapid economic change and dislocations created new interests and alignments. Although these processes create a wealth of opinions to be measured, such opinions often lack the historical and institutional anchors of ideology, partisanship, and social class that guide public opinion in developed democracies. Because voters do not have a way to frame new information or to cue their retrieval process, responses are prone to high levels of inconsistency and hence lower internal validity. It is also not always clear if the respondent has been exposed to the values surveyors are attempting to measure prior to receiving the survey (Bashkirova and Hesli 1993). Even with these concerns, however, there is much to be optimistic about. Arthur Miller et al. (1995) found that political views among the mass public in the former Soviet Union had achieved fairly high levels of consistency and stability. Not surprisingly, those individuals who participate most in politics demonstrate the highest levels of opinion stability.

One methodological approach that remains underemphasized in developing democracies is the use of panel studies. In a panel study the same group (panel) of respondents is interviewed at repeated intervals. Because we have repeated observations of the same people, researchers can quantify attitude stability and the effect of social and political events on individual opinions. A group of researchers, coordinated by Chappell Lawson and Alejandro Moreno, implemented a panel study during the 2000 Mexican presidential campaign (Lawson et al. 2000). Although this study has provided valuable insights into how campaign coverage in the media and strategic behavior

by voters helped Vicente Fox defeat the long-governing incumbent party, it was also marked by an extremely high proportion, when compared to panel studies in industrialized countries, of first-round respondents who could not be reinterviewed in subsequent rounds. Despite the methodological difficulties, however, panel studies present opportunities for researchers to examine more closely the process of individual opinion change as it changes and to quantify the importance and stability of the trends currently being documented by surveyors.

Conclusion

As we highlight these various challenges, we do so with great optimism. Polling of some sort is being conducted in essentially all democratic regimes and is even emerging in the remaining authoritarian regimes such as China (Shi 1999). Research in the wake of democratization provided remarkable insight into many important issues, including how values change and how voters respond to economic crises. There is a growing awareness of the methodological and epistemological problems inherent in doing research during periods of opinion change. As scholars take into account the methodological issues highlighted in this piece, the result will be a more in-depth understanding of democratic transitions as well as potentially more responsive politics.

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Developing Countries

This entry describes how undemocratic political institutions and the specific economic conditions in developing polities distort the quantity and quality of public opinion polls as compared with developed democracies.

Understanding the determinants of survey research is a relevant issue as it considers the specific role of public opinion in shaping politicians' agenda; thus it affects how resources are distributed in a given society. Moreover, observing how public opinion research behaves outside of democratic environments reveals polls as instruments for political and societal actors achieving their specific goals. In that respect, a useful analysis can be derived from comparing case studies across countries and time, then observing how public opinion research changes as the degree of democratization and economic development is modified.

I briefly illustrate the analysis with the Mexican case and other experiences from Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, which offer an interesting historical "laboratory." In the next paragraphs, I first describe survey research in authoritarian regimes, differentiating the circumstances for independent and government polls; second, I explore the role of survey research in the process of democratization; third, I look at the determinants of polling in economically developing nations; at the end are my conclusions.

Independent Polls in Authoritarian Regimes

Independent public opinion research is a common feature in most modern democracies. Opposition parties are assiduous consumers of polls; electronic and printed

media systematically publish polling results on governments' evaluation and electoral preferences; and polls constitute a useful research tool for academics as well.

Nevertheless, polling is also a widely used tool in authoritarian regimes and, even more, in semiauthoritarian polities transitioning toward democracy. However, given that published polls may work as citizens' coordination devices, independent polls in these regimes struggle with state repression, as those in power will attempt to obstruct society's synchronization on relevant issues. Due to this circumstance, the quantity and quality of public opinion polls are distorted in authoritarian regimes as related to nations under higher rule of law.

Repression is exercised in different degrees. The extreme case is absolute suppression of independent polls. This was the context in Mexico during most of the Revolutionary Institutional Party's (PRI) authoritarian regime (1929–2000), when oppressing independent expressions was the norm; thus, there were few incentives for polling. It was not until the late 1980s that the first isolated attempts to poll were made by non-governmental sources, which represents a lag of about 50 years as compared to the United States (Basañez 1995). Analogous cases occurred in Brazil and Peru. Survey research began its significant development in Brazil by the late 1940s; the 1964 coup d'état abruptly stopped independent polling research (Olsen 2000, pp. 70–71). In Peru, systematic electoral polls began in 1963, but shortly after were deterred by the 1968 military coup (Conaghan 1995, pp. 230–231). A similar situation took place in former communist regimes in Central and Eastern

Europe. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for instance, a booming field of public opinion research in the 1940s was gradually obliterated by the state after the imposition of communist regimes (Henn 1998).

Consequently, as the "hardness" of a regime varies, so varies the number of public opinion polls. This is clearly observed in Latin America, where changes in polling have been inherently linked to the waves of democratization and authoritarianism in the region. Polling research flourished in the 1960s when many countries lived under democratically elected governments. From a sample of 627 polls in 10 Latin American countries from 1947 to 1986, 60 percent were conducted in the 1960s. In contrast, in the 1970s, along with a proliferation of military regimes in this zone, the number of polls dropped to half (Harris 1990). It was not until the 1990s, when many countries regained their democratic status, that polling research was widely recovered in Latin America. Similarly, in less "orthodox" communist countries, independent public opinion polls were more developed, such as in Poland (Huszczko 1977).

In addition to the relatively diminished number of polls in authoritarian polities, the quality of polls executed in circumstances of reduced rule of law is, at best, doubtful. Information from polls may be distorted by implicit or explicit state repression.

Implicit repression comes from respondents' fear of the state, which may punish preferences different from those of the regime; in this case interviewees tend to provide progovernment biased answers, despite having divergent "true" opinions and preferences. A good example is electoral polls during the 1990 presidential

election in Nicaragua. On that occasion, many preelection polls conceded a safe advantage to the official candidate, Daniel Ortega; however, the election resulted in a 14-point victory for the opposition's candidate, Violeta Chamorro. One of the main explanations for such divergence was severe distrust of interviewees, who feared reprisals from the state; this generated a progovernment bias in the results (Bischoping and Schuman 1992).

In addition to citizens' fear of the state, researchers, pollsters, and the media itself may also avoid *ex ante* state reprisals by not allowing themselves to question and publish on "delicate" topics that may displease the elite in power.

On the other hand, explicit repression considers the state taking positive action to hamper poll execution and publication. During the late 1980s and early 1990s when independent pollsters and the media first attempted to conduct and publish electoral polls in Mexico, the state responded by actively obstructing them. For instance, governmental advertising, which is a vital publicity source for privately owned media, was revoked from those companies hurting the government's interests (Aguayo 1995; Trejo 1997).

Government Polls in Authoritarian Regimes

In all types of regimes, elites in power need to know society's preferences. In that sense, both politicians and public officials commonly use survey research as a source of private information on public opinion. Thus, polls by the state are a means to advance the goals of those in power. One plausible assumption is that, independently of regime type, a politician's goal is remaining in power as long as possible. This does not preclude politi-

cians from having policy interests; however, keeping their power position is a necessary condition to pursue such policy projects. As a result, the implications for society of government polling are qualitatively different in democratic and authoritarian regimes. In a democracy, given that politicians require votes from constituents to remain in power, institutions determine a set of feasible policies with a greater degree of connection between policy-making and public opinion as compared with authoritarian regimes, where such connection becomes distorted by a deficient rule of law.

That citizens' preferences have less weight in policy-making in nondemocratic regimes does not imply that such governments do not care about society's preferences and opinions; actually, they are key to their survival, though in a different manner than in democratic nations. Although in democracies governments attempt to persuade clusters of citizens coordinated on some specific issue to vote for them, in authoritarian regimes, politicians are interested in breaking down such aggregations of individuals in order for the regime to survive. Therefore, one possible characterization of public opinion polls in undemocratic polities is a sort of thermometer for measuring *ex ante* and *ex post* collective reactions against regimes' transgressions on citizens' rights.

Hence, as long as there is some potentially coordinated opposition to the current authoritarian regime, governments have incentives to poll. For instance, Mexico's privatization and open trade policies, especially as related to the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), promoted by President Carlos Salinas in the early 1990s, considered systematic and intense polling research from his gov-

ernment. Salinas's administration used such information to design massive media campaigns for gaining public support of his policies by dissolving strong leftist opposition clusters (Moreno 1997). In the same period, early market reforms in China in the late 1980s were closely followed by public opinion polls sponsored by the communist government (Crespi 1989, pp. 44–46). A more dramatic use of polls was the case of Peru's president Alberto Fujimori, whose decision to execute a coup on his country's legislature was partially made on the basis of poll information (Conaghan 1995). Even in former European communist regimes, public opinion research from the government started to develop in the early 1960s (White 1964).

Public Opinion Polls and Democratization

The development of independent polling is closely related to democratization. As rule of law augments, conditions for polling become increasingly better for independent pollsters, which, indirectly, generated an increase in government polling as well, because its survival is now more threatened.

However, given that regime transitions are usually not smooth, the implementation, or reimplementation, of systematic survey research in a polity considers several adjustment issues derived from an oversupply of polling firms struggling to capture the high costs associated with survey research. As a result, the first stages of public opinion research are commonly completed under unstable market conditions.

This phenomenon has been present in Mexico since 1991, configuring a market with cyclical behavior: firms tend to mushroom as elections draw closer, dis-

appearing immediately after election day. This is partially due to increasing political competence but, most importantly, due to the existence of generous public funding for electoral polls, which has certainly helped survey research development; nevertheless, it has also been systematically abused due to a deficient monitoring in the use of resources (Trejo 1997). This situation has had a considerable impact on poll quality as a whole. Even in the recent 2000 presidential election where the party in power lost the presidency for the first time since 1929, there were numerous failures in published polls to forecast the opposition's victory. Some were technically explained; however, others showed a suspicious pro-government bias.

Consequently, polls may be systematically used as campaign bullets, creating a "war of polls" among candidates, as has existed in Brazil since the military dictatorship was overthrown in 1975 (Olsen 2000), and also in Venezuela, where this dynamic has escalated to considerable dimensions (Koeneke 2000, pp. 157–158).

There is not a standard response by governments to this phenomenon. Furthermore, governments' intervention does not seem to have been successful. In Mexico the reply to polling market instability has come from the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), a public organ, which has attempted to "regulate" the market for polls. The results have not been especially positive. It established, among other rules, a prohibition on publishing polls five days before election day to avoid purposely biased polls in media in the last days of electoral competence; however, the effect is that polls have become privileged information for those elites who can finance them, while keeping the rest of the citizens ill-informed

(Basañez 1997, pp. 186–187). A similar circumstance exists in Brazil, where the legislature sets new rules one year before every election; those rules are usually ad hoc, designed to satisfy politicians' needs while raising pollsters' uncertainty (Olsen 2000, p. 77).

Fragile political and economic conditions in countries shifting toward democracy generate a slightly different context for polling as compared to full democracies. Consequently, polling techniques should reflect this fact. Even in advanced democracies such as the United States and Western European countries, there is a lively debate on and systematic improvement in the accuracy of polling instruments. In developing countries survey research techniques are usually imported from the United States, then are craftily adapted to local specific contexts, although with no guarantee of immediate success. Appropriate polling technology certainly requires a scientific basis; however, it has a significant trial-and-error component as well. Nicaragua in 1990 is an extreme case in point, as I already indicated.

Polling in Developing Countries

There exists a high empirical correlation between regime type, in terms of democratization, and economic development. Thus, in addition to those biases in survey research derived from authoritarianism, resource scarcity in developing polities generates diverse distortions in the quantity and quality of public opinion polls.

A nation's precarious economic conditions allow only minimal private resources to be devoted to independent polling. Consequently, most survey research funds will likely come from the state. In nondemocratic nations, this cir-

cumstance may limit the scope and frame of public opinion research, as authoritarian governments will tend to deny resources to independent pollsters that may hurt their interest, either from the media, academia, or political oppositions.

Furthermore, as the relative price of polls is higher in poor nations than in developed countries, the struggle for polling resources is magnified. Even though labor may be cheaper in developing polities, communication infrastructure is deficient, which increases exponentially the direct costs of polling. For instance, home phones are usually not widely available: by the mid-1990s only around 40 percent of Mexican homes had phones, 35 percent in Brazil, 20 percent in Romania, and 17 percent in Hungary, although in developed nations the proportion of homes with a phone is around 90 percent. This circumstance implies that nationwide representative polls must be conducted through face-to-face interviews, which is relatively more expensive and time-consuming than phone interviews, which are the standard method in developed nations. Therefore, fewer polls are done than if phones at home were widely available.

Furthermore, face-to-face interviews imply a less efficient monitoring of interviewers, thus increasing the likelihood of nonsampling errors, such as "falsified" questionnaires (interviews that were not actually executed and questionnaires filled out by the interviewer herself) and inaccurate sampling procedures when selecting interviewees.

Widespread poverty may also generate biases in respondents' answers, thereby diminishing poll quality. As poverty tends to be highly correlated with low levels of schooling and limited access to information, responses may not be en-

tirely consistent and transitive (implying that it is not clear to the pollster if they are the result of sincere or random responses). This leads to measurement problems regarding policy issues and increases nonresponse rates as the survey topic increases in complexity.

Moreover, poverty conditions in significant segments of the population produce a high potential for citizen co-optation by politicians. This generates a distortion between individuals' true preferences and their actual behavior. This phenomenon is especially observed at election times. If bribes are widely offered on election day, which is a common practice in authoritarian regimes, electoral polls made days before the election will tend to significantly diverge from the final outcome; as this phenomenon is difficult to measure, preelection polls may be mistakenly disqualified.

Conclusion

The absence of a state censoring apparatus on the flow of information, and a highly developed infrastructure in democracies, make public opinion polls a systematic and reliable information source for governments, opposition groups, and society alike. On the other hand, public opinion polls in developing countries under not fully democratic regimes face a much tougher environment. Repression by the state and scarcity of resources directly reduce the number of independent polls in such polities. Furthermore, fear of the state and widespread poverty generate numerous potential biases in interviewees' responses, thus diminishing poll quality.

As a practical consequence, an external observer of polls made in polities facing these conditions, reduced rule of law and poverty, should be cautious when dealing

with survey research information, as polls might be substandard in such a context. Nevertheless, the direction of the bias might be inferred by considering the specific conditions under which public opinion polls are made.

Given that survey research may be characterized as a useful means to increase the likelihood of politicians remaining in power, in authoritarian regimes polls may work as a deterrent to democratization—as opposed to democratic regimes, where survey research may enhance democratization because of the incentives politicians face in incorporating public opinion in decision-making. Similarly, during a polity's democratization process, independent polls that are made public may help citizens further resist transgressions by the regime, and also constitute a useful tool for opposition groups' strategy formation. Hence, polls should not be considered as a democratizing instrument per se. This implies differentiating between public opinion polls as measurement instruments and the specific normative role of public opinion in democratic political institutions. Highlighting this difference allows observers of survey research to better understand the actual uses of polling research.

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Industrial Democracies

In representative democracies an understanding of public attitudes is important because public opinion is thought to link citizens and their elected officials. Public opinion is the means by which the public is seen as having some ability to control those who govern. Yet those who govern are able to influence the public's opinion formation process, the content of the opinions, and the attitudes of their constituents. This cyclical process influences the type and manner of policy debates that take place in the public sphere (Alvarez and Brehm 2002).

In the roughly 70 years since the beginning of systematic polling, scholars studying public opinion in mature democracies have come a long way from the simple straw polls once used to erroneously predict a landslide victory for Alford Landon in the 1936 presidential election (Crossley 1937). Nonetheless, the systematic study of public opinion is best labeled as an incomplete science. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994, p. 9) note that "the content of 'science' is primarily in its methods and rules, not the subject matter." In the history of opinion polling, the end goal of understanding the public's attitudes toward key issues of the day and the role these opinions play in

representative democracies has remained constant. However, the methods used to study public opinion, to understand what is being measured, and to analyze the data collected all have changed over time. Today, survey researchers and pollsters use sophisticated techniques and have managed to improve scholars' ability to reconcile what they observe in survey responses with both the commonly understood meaning of public opinion and the complex concepts they are attempting to measure.

The purpose of this entry is to provide an overview of key issues the researcher should consider when undertaking research on public opinion in advanced industrial democracies. Using specific examples from the literature on racial attitudes and partisanship, this entry is concerned with the successes opinion scholars have had in understanding the meaning of public opinion, formulating the concepts one wishes to measure, writing questions that capture such concepts, and interpreting the answers people give to pollsters. However, despite such successes, we will also show that students of public opinion have not refined their methods to a degree where they feel confident that they fully understand the opinion formation and reporting process.

Public Opinion: A Matter of Definition
Floyd Allport's (1937) classic article on the meaning of public opinion discusses the many misuses of the phrase *public opinion*. He notes that when discussions on public opinion take place, one senses that consensus arrives through some supernatural medium that magically appears in the population. For example, popular media may report that the public

favors the president on issue *x*. In issuing such a statement, Allport (1937, p. 8) notes that the term *public* is misused to represent all in a population, whereas in reality “the statement that the verb [to favor] implies will often be true only of a part of the aggregate concerned.” Such a proclamation neglects the obvious fact that “the public” is composed of individuals with varied opinions and ideas.

Other difficulties involve the need to specify the ideal composition of the group whose opinions and attitudes are being sampled. As an example, do pollsters wish to understand attitudes toward civil liberties held by those who fall within the geographical boundaries of France or only those who are French citizens? It is indeed an open question as to what constitutes a “public.” Is Herbert Blumer’s (1946, p. 189) definition of a “public” as a self-aware group of individuals who “are confronted by an issue, who are divided in the ideas as to how to meet the issues, and who engage in discussion over the issue” applicable in a society where, as recent work by Robert Putnam (2000) notes, social and political interactions are declining? In modern times, what constitutes a “public” may be moving from the deliberative discussions of the masses that were reported to take place in the coffeehouses of old Europe (Glynn et al. 1999, chap. 2) to the occasional questioning of random autonomous individuals by a survey researcher.

The notion that most of the public does not arrive at opinions through deliberation has driven researchers to look at how attitude formation influences what is generally thought to constitute public opinion and the methods used to measure this opinion. Since the advent of public opinion polling, scholars have gen-

erally followed the assumptions of the *rationality school*, believing that public opinion comes about as an end product or verdict of an informed public on an important question after deliberation on the matter (Habermas 1989). However, it is overly optimistic to assume in the current era that all issues will be discussed and deliberated in public and that such reflection will form the basis for individual attitudes that eventually constitute public opinion.

Recent work by John Zaller (1991) marks a radical departure from the view of attitudes as largely fixed. He takes a critical look at the assumption that individual opinions are fixed and are the product of rational deliberation. Zaller (1991, p. 1215) judges that public opinion is a “marriage of information and values—information to generate a mental picture of what is at stake and values to make a judgment about it.” Zaller’s “Ambivalence Deduction” (1993) contends that citizens draw on a number of conflicting attitudes when they answer survey questions and frequently offer pollsters opinions that will differ over time and situation. In work with Stanley Feldman, Zaller (1992, p. 579) asserts that opinions are not fixed and that people respond to opinion polls “on the basis of whatever ideas are at the top of their heads at the moment of answering.” The implication is that citizens answering opinion polls can be influenced by what information they are given and how it is presented to them. Consequently citizens may report different opinions on the same issue depending on circumstances. The view that attitudes are not fixed and that they may be grounded in a variety of issue positions that are most salient during the administration of an opinion survey

makes proper conceptualization of any concepts under investigation extremely important.

What Is Being Measured

The first task of the researcher in questionnaire construction is to properly specify the theoretical concepts to be measured. For example, how does one conceptualize racial prejudice in a period in which many citizens no longer express blatantly racist statements? As Howard Schuman et al. (1997) note, the percentage of Caucasian citizens expressing negative attitudes toward marriage between races, African American neighbors, and African American candidates for public office has declined precipitously. However, researchers such as David Sears and Donald Kinder (1971) believe that while overt statements of hostility toward African Americans have declined, a "new" or "symbolic" racism has emerged in its place. This form of racism, write Kinder and Sears (1981, p. 416), "is based upon moral feelings that blacks violate such traditional American values as individualism, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline."

Given the idea of symbolic racism, scholars interested in whether the public practices this form of modern prejudice need to hypothesize what specific traits differentiate this prejudiced portion of the public from the nonprejudiced. Kinder and Sears's definition appears to link antiblack affect and moral traditionalism. However, Paul Sniderman and Philip Tetlock (1986) argue that no clear causal ordering links these two terms.

Difficulty in theorizing about concepts such as symbolic racism can increase when it comes time to operationalize (measure) them. For example, questions that purport to measure symbolic racism

may sound similar to those that measure political conservatism. Thus, David Sears and Jack Citrin (1982) used questions that asked about opinions on busing to achieve school integration to operationalize symbolic racism, whereas Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) reason that such an individual may instead be a philosophical conservative who believes that government-mandated busing will only heighten racial tensions.

Even nontechnical terms that appear in everyday usage can prove challenging to conceptualize and measure. By way of illustration, researchers such as George Belknap and Angus Campbell (1951–1952) note that there are two distinct ways to theorize partisanship. Some people take positions on issues and then choose a party whose issue positions they see as closest to their own attitudes. Other individuals use their partisan identification as a lens to inform their attitudes on popular questions of the day. In the past 50 years, most researchers have conceptualized the partisanship of Americans using the latter framework. However, this conceptualization is not necessarily apposite for other nations. Thus, Marianne Stewart and Harold Clarke (1987, 1998) note that this view of partisanship as the "unmoved mover" has little empirical support in studies of party identification in Canada.

Measurement and Question Validity

Different conceptualizations of key concepts influence the choice of questions that survey investigators make. With respect to partisanship, early surveys measured partisanship by asking the respondent a single question about his political party choice if a presidential election were held that day (Belknap and Campbell 1951–1952). However, subse-

quently, the standard question on partisanship is phrased, "Generally speaking, in politics today do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?" (Ladd and Hadley 1973). Researchers such as Andre Blais et al. (2001) find the "generally speaking" form of the question best captures the concept of partisanship as an enduring orientation, but they also observe that question wording influences the distribution of partisan identifications in an electorate. Also, Warren Miller (1991) previously argued that some of the decline in partisanship noted by scholars such as Martin Wattenberg (1984) can be attributed to changes in question wording and measurement rather than substantive changes in partisan identifications in the electorate. Moreover, consistent question wording over time gives researchers doing statistical manipulation the ability to separate errors in measurement from actual changes in partisan affiliations of citizens (Green and Palmquist 1990).

When opinion polling is used to inform citizens and public officials on what people believe about key issues, their fundamental long-term beliefs, and so forth, the internal and external validity of the questions being asked to measure key concepts must be a concern. Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley (1966, p. 5) note that "external validity asks the questions of generalizability: To what populations, settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables can this effect be generalized?"

Thus, researchers should consider that at times findings that are valid for broad populations do not apply to select sub-populations. More specifically, research by Thomas Cavanagh (1985) and Katherine Tate (1993) indicates that the parti-

sanship of white Democrats and Republicans is correlated with variations in income, whereas the latter variable does not differentiate between African American Republicans and Democrats. The question the surveyor needs to ask is how the differences previous researchers have found regarding the partisanship of African Americans and whites should influence surveys that have different target populations.

Questions investigators have used to delineate attitudes toward racial prejudice and symbolic racism have also raised internal validity issues. Specifically, Richard Zeller and Edward Carmines (1980) label as threats or content validity questions on racial prejudice that do not necessarily measure what they are intended to measure. Moreover, as observed previously, the questions used to establish the presence of symbolic racism do not fall within a clear domain of content for the attitude of symbolic racism. Awareness of such threats is essential to students of public opinion in advanced industrial democracies.

How Respondents Respond

As noted above, Zaller's (1993) view of survey response hypothesizes that individuals formulate opinions from the numerous items of information that are salient at the moment they are questioned by the interviewer. Opinion statements that respondents give are hypothesized to be the result of the "RAS" process whereby, according to Gregory Markus (1994, p. 634), people "'receive' new information, decide whether to 'accept' it, and then 'sample' from their store of considerations at the moment of answering questions." The RAS model marks a major change in the way researchers think about public opin-

ion in that it contends that opinion formation is at least in part a function of the respondent's cognitive engagement or awareness of politics and government. In the brief description of the model below, the differences in opinion formulation among those with high and low levels of political sophistication become apparent.

The model posits that those who are more politically aware are more likely to pay attention to and will better understand the information that they are being exposed to. Politically active individuals are more likely to comprehend how the news they receive is framed (Dalton et al. 1998). Moreover, the politically aware will heavily discount political information that is not in accord with their political predispositions. In contrast, the politically unsophisticated are accepting of messages that are both contradictory and consistent with their political views. Both types of messages become part of the information that these individuals draw from in the opinion formation process (Hurley 1994).

When answering a pollster's question, the respondent draws from the pool of information that she has most recently accessed. For example, a person is hypothesized to be able to remember and utilize the information on school busing that was in the papers and on the news in the previous 24 hours rather than something that the person read 20 years ago. Zaller and Feldman (1992, p. 586) note that "individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that happen to be salient at the moment of response." Hence, investigators have come to believe that opinion formation and responses to questions on political beliefs are functions of the level of political awareness an individual has, the types

of messages the individual is willing to receive, and the information about an issue that is on the respondent's mind when surveyed.

The theory of survey response and opinion formation proposed by Zaller appears to be at least partially supported by preliminary studies done by scholars such as Russell Dalton et al. (1998). However, survey researchers must be cognizant of the fact that different populations may use different routes in the opinion formulation and response process. As with other survey design issues, the theoretical underpinnings of what the researcher is attempting to measure should guide her selection of the response model. In turn, the choice of response models may require different question wording and formats in the preparation of the survey instrument.

Conclusion

This entry reviews fundamental topics on measuring public opinion. In undertaking an opinion survey, the researcher should explicitly state which opinions she wishes to measure and the reasons why the population she chooses to sample from constitutes a "public." Once those two issues are decided, careful consideration must be given to the construction of the questions. The wording of questions must capture the concepts the researcher is interested in measuring. Moreover, the surveyor needs to bear in mind that questions that are applicable to measuring issues in one population may not be appropriate in another population.

The view that the beliefs of individuals are fixed no longer is a given in public opinion research. Zaller's work holds that the opinions people express are frequently dependent on which opinions are mentally accessible to them at the time

of the interview. However, recent research by Alvarez and Brehm (2002) finds that the public does hold a number of core values that they rely upon when answering the pollster. In most situations, they find that respondents experience little value conflict, and they rely on either one core value or mutually reinforcing core values to generate most opinions reported in surveys. However, under conditions of uncertainty, variations in response of the type hypothesized by Zaller (1993) are likely to obtain. Such variance can increase under conditions in which the interviewer forces the citizen to confront value conflicts (Alvarez and Brehm 2002).

Perhaps the most important contribution of recent research (Alvarez and Brehm 2002) is that it combines the notion (Zaller and Feldman 1992) that responses citizens give may vary depending on time and circumstance with the idea that for many issues respondents rely on their core values in formulating their answers. This linkage may well set the public opinion research agenda for the next generation. Regardless, students of public opinion in mature democracies share the goals of their predecessors. They want to delineate the public's attitudes on essential issues as accurately as possible. However, the methodological tools have changed and will continue to evolve because the study of public opinion is still an unfinished science. That should not constrain scholars in the field from continuing to contribute to an endeavor that delineates and strengthens the varied linkages between representatives and represented in contemporary democracies.

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Integration: Using the Eurobarometer to Measure Support

The march toward a deeper and wider European Union (EU) raises important questions about how the publics of different member states perceive the process of integration. Do people consider themselves citizens of Europe, their home state, or both? How much support is there for the integration project generally? What factors encourage public support for different aspects of integration, such as the euro or the expansion of the EU to new states? Is individual support based on individual economic circumstances, the national macroeconomic context, or both? How do sociocultural

attitudes, such as views on welfare or women's rights, affect support?

In order to study these questions, researchers often use the Eurobarometer (EB), a public opinion survey that has been conducted twice annually since 1973 by the European Commission in all member states of the EU. The Eurobarometer allows for international comparability over time across standard variables, several of which have been included since the first few surveys. In addition to a standard battery of questions, each Eurobarometer includes specific questions in a variety of issue areas, such as social and economic aspects of integration or the quality of life and health in the Eurozone.

This entry looks at how researchers have chosen or constructed dependent variables using the Eurobarometer to analyze different questions about support for the European project. A *dependent variable* is what the researcher explains using independent or explanatory variables. For example, a researcher interested in how party affiliation affects support for European integration might choose a dependent variable that asks respondents whether they are for or against European integration and an explanatory variable that asks which party they voted for in the previous election. Utilizing these variables, a researcher could test whether those on the left are more or less supportive of the European project than those on the right.

Choosing the Appropriate Dependent Variable

In deciding which dependent variables to use in their analyses, researchers must balance theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, the dependent variable should fully capture what the researcher is trying to explain. For exam-

ple, one of the standard variables included in most Eurobarometer studies evaluates respondents' view of the benefits of European integration ("benefit/not benefit"). The wording of this question is the following: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" Respondents can only choose among the following options: benefited, not benefited, and don't know. Using this variable to capture even general sentiments can be problematic. A dichotomous variable such as this one does not allow respondents to express mild displeasure with the European project. Since most mainstream parties and governments support the EU, most people would see at least some benefit to integration. These variables also do not provide a baseline from which to make comparisons. For example, whether a country has benefited from the EU may depend on the time period, that is, pre-Maastricht Treaty or pre-Single European Act. Further, perhaps a respondent recognizes the economic benefits of the European Union but questions the loss of national sovereignty. It is hard to gauge what a respondent means by benefiting from the EU without some kind of anchor point or understanding of which type of integration the respondent is considering. In order to avoid many of these problems, researchers have turned to other variables or constructed indices from several similar variables.

Many others, however, continue to use dichotomous and trichotomous variables such as "benefit/not benefit" in their analyses despite the theoretical drawbacks due to practical reasons. For instance, many problems require long time-series variables. Matthew Gabel (1998) uses the following question as his depen-

dent variable: "Generally speaking, do you think that [our country's] membership in the European Union is. . . ." Respondents can choose among: a good thing, neither good nor bad, a bad thing, and don't know ("good/bad"). This variable has been available continually since 1975. Since Gabel is trying to explain how an individual's relative market position or skill level affects support for European integration across several different time periods, the availability of the dependent variable over time is necessary.

Problems arise when questions about significant integration issues are only available in one or a few Eurobarometers. For example, some researchers may be interested in support for specific integration issues, such as the euro. Support for the euro is not continuously available in the Eurobarometer, so researchers may only use those surveys in which it is present, such as EB54 (October–November 2000). Yet another problem is that the explanatory variables can differ substantially across Eurobarometers, limiting researchers to the explanatory variables that are common to all the surveys under review. For example, EB44.3OVR (February–April 1996) contains variables about individual support for welfare policies, which may affect support for European integration because individuals may fear eventual convergence of social policies in the Eurozone. Considering this to be a potentially important explanation of support for European integration, Adam Brinegar, Seth Jolly, and Herbert Kitschelt (forthcoming) use EB44.3OVR but unfortunately may not test the significance of the explanatory variable across time.

Now we discuss the trends in measuring public support for European integration with an eye to the theoretical and

practical reasons why researchers choose the variables they do. We also argue in favor of an alternative dependent variable—Overall European Integration View (OEIV). OEIV has several virtues: it moves beyond ambiguous dichotomous and trichotomous variables, permitting individuals to choose among alternatives that more closely match real-world choices about integration; it is anchored in current perceptions of the process of integration; it allows for more response variance compared to other measures; and it is available in a substantial number of Eurobarometers, permitting researchers to do longitudinal or time-series analysis.

Trends in Measuring Support for European Integration

The most commonly used dependent variables are consistently available over a long period of time and are generally dichotomous or trichotomous, such as the benefit/not benefit and good/bad questions. Some authors also construct additive indices, which increases the number of possible responses. For example, Leonard Ray combines the benefit/not benefit and good/bad questions, creating an index that varies from 2 to 6. This variable contains nearly all of the same problems as simply using good/bad or benefit/not benefit but has the benefit of increased variance. Gabel and Harvey Palmer (1995) use good/bad as well as another dichotomous variable that is worded as follows: "In general, are you (very much/to some extent) for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?" ("for/against").

One reason for doing this is that they are all correlated to some degree, which means that the variables vary together in the same way. So, for example, if good/bad is correlated with benefit/not benefit, then as a respondent's perception of

integration as “good” increases, her perception of integration as having benefited her country also increases. A correlation of 1 means that two variables are perfectly correlated and measure the same thing, whereas a correlation of 0 indicates they are perfectly uncorrelated and measure completely different things. In the EB44.2Biz (January–March 1996), for/against has a .447 correlation with good/bad and a .4397 correlation with benefit/not benefit. Some have used the high collinearity among variables to justify using only one of them. For example, Christopher Anderson (1998) uses only the good/bad variable in his study of the domestic effect on attitudes toward European integration for this reason. But while they all measure the same underlying concepts, a polychotomous variable increases response variance.

Marco Steenbergen and Bradford Jones (2002) create an index using benefit/not benefit and “desired speed.” This latter variable is always preceded by “current speed.” The wording of current speed is “In your opinion, how is the European Union, the European unification, advancing nowadays?” Respondents can choose from 1, which equals a “standstill,” to 7, which is “runs as fast as possible.” For desired speed, respondents are asked: “And which corresponds best to what you would like?” and they are provided with the same answers as before. This additive index provides as much variance as a combination of good/bad, benefit/not benefit, and for/against and allows individuals to make a choice about how fast they would like integration to proceed, but is not fully anchored in a current evaluation of the European project. However, the fact that current speed always precedes desired speed may help provide

some baseline by conditioning respondents’ opinions.

These indices can be created across many—though certainly not all—Eurobarometers. But those who are interested in using one Eurobarometer alone may have more flexibility in developing dependent variables that more closely reflect the object of interest based on which non-standard variables are included in the survey. Robert Rohrschneider (2002), for example, creates a variable called “EU-wide government” from three separate indicators concerning attitudes about the European parliament. But even when researchers use their own indices, they frequently test the results against the standard variables because so much of the literature on public support for integration is built on them. For example, Rohrschneider adds three dichotomous variables—including the standard good/bad questions—into his index to test the robustness of his model.

When using most variables it is a generally accepted practice to place the respondents who answered “don’t know” in the middle. This allows researchers to keep the opinions of many respondents in the analysis, increasing statistical significance. The problem with this method is that it may add some ambiguity into the variable. We do not have a good idea of what any individual respondent means by “don’t know,” thus perhaps reducing the precision of the estimations to varying degrees.

In Figure 1, we evaluate the trends in these variables across time by charting the aggregate mean scores of the two most commonly used variables—benefit/not benefit and good/bad. Both exhibit fairly stable patterns with scores ranging from 2 to 2.5, though the graphs show a

decline in support since 1991. But given the multiple problems with these variables and the constructions developed from them, how can we create an index that gives us more leverage over public support for European integration?

Overall European Integration View

OEIV is an attempt to more precisely measure support for the European project by anchoring individuals' perceptions in their own baseline evaluation of the

progress of integration. For this reason, OEIV combines both current speed and desired speed, creating a 21-point scale (see Table 1). Although scholars may employ desired speed alone without much loss of precision (as desired speed and OEIV are highly correlated), OEIV still provides a stronger theoretical construct from which to evaluate support for European integration.

The theoretical basis for this variable is explained in Table 1, which shows four




Figure 1 Tracking "Good/Bad" and "Benefit" across Time

Table 1 Constructing Overall European Integration View (OEIV)

	DESIRED SPEED: SLOW	DESIRED SPEED: FAST
PERCEIVED SPEED: SLOW	2 STATUS-QUO CONTENTED I: SLOW, BUT ADEQUATE	4 MILITANT ADVOCATES: WANT TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS
PERCEIVED SPEED: FAST	1 MILITANT OPPONENTS: WANT TO SLOW DOWN INTEGRATION	3 STATUS-QUO CONTENTED II: FAST AND ADEQUATE

different categories of respondents: militant opponents, status-quo contented I, status-quo contented II, and militant advocates. This is a much more accurate representation of the options on the political agenda, since the yes/no choice on European integration is no longer a realistic option for European citizens. The militant opponents are dissatisfied with the fast speed of integration and would like to slow it down. The status-quo contented I supporters of European integration see the process as being slow and are satisfied with the pace of reform. The status-quo contented II supporters also support the current pace of reform but consider it to be fast, not slow—and they want to keep it that way. Militant advocates believe the pace of reform is slow and should be speeded up. This variable was developed to show how individual assessments of integration depend on their national economic system (Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt forthcoming). But OEIV would be equally appropriate as a general assessment for any other deepening or widening questions. Like many other variables, however, it is not available in all data sets, becoming first available in 1986 and sporadically since then.

Similar to the good/bad and benefit/not benefit questions, OEIV does vary over time for the available years (see Figure 2), showing a decline in support since 1994.

Also, the international differences in support are quite interesting (see Figure 3). Some states, such as Italy and other relatively less wealthy southern European states, strongly support a faster speed for the integration of the EU, whereas others—such as Great Britain—take a much more cautious approach. Although both have benefited from membership in the EU and believe it has been good in the simple good/bad sense, there are widely diverging ideas about the necessity of proceeding at such a fast pace. This is reflected in the UK's decision to opt out of the euro and Italy's efforts to lower its budget deficit in time to meet the requirements imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact.

Simple correlations also suggest that OEIV is different from the standard dependent variables. In the EB44.2Biz survey, OEIV is correlated with good/bad at .23, benefit/not benefit at .32, and for/against at .49. OEIV is correlated the most with for/against, most likely because it asks respondents to evaluate "efforts




Figure 2 Tracking OEIV across Time




Figure 3 OEIV by Country (1996)

being made to unify Western Europe" and is not simply a rough calculus of the total benefit or good arising from the European project. However, one may also view the lack of correlation between the different measures of support for European integration as suggestive of a lack of salience of the issue for most European citizens.

Conclusion

The choice of dependent variable in analyzing the EU is of substantial importance because it should accurately reflect the theoretical concerns of the researcher in the most appropriate way possible, given practical limitations across time and space. Specific policy questions—such as support for widening of the EU—often seem to be most appropriate, but the lack of time-series data on most issue-specific dependent variables makes it difficult to employ them. Also, theories developed using specific policy questions might not be applicable across all issue areas, limiting the generalizability of some theories tested on issue-specific dependent variables.

Researchers thus have traditionally used simple dichotomous and trichotomous variables alone or in combination that often contain substantial measurement error because of the ambiguity of

the questions, their inconsonance with most individuals' preferences over European integration, the technical problem of inserting "don't knows" into the middle of the questions, and the lack of a baseline from which to evaluate the process. Although researchers have nonetheless made significant advances in our understandings of a variety of subjects, the use of more precise dependent variables will increase theoretical rigor and, to a variety of extents, empirical estimations of support. OEIV represents one possibility to bring researchers closer to more precisely measuring and explaining public support for European integration.

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World Opinion

World opinion is a concept with ancient roots. References to it appear in the Old Testament, Greek antiquity, and during the Middle Ages (Niedermann 1995). Cardinal Richelieu in 1630 argued that international opinion had social-psychological meaning for a country's international and domestic politics, by likening states to individuals concerned with public opinion and the judgments of their peers. As a result, nations strove to avoid a negative reputation and isolation from the international community (Niedermann 1995, p. 280).

Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham echoed these ideas in the final decade of

the eighteenth century, stating that "public opinion is peace-loving . . . and public opinion is a useful instrument, the main driving force to achieve international organization" (Herberichs 1966, p. 627). James Mill, a disciple of Bentham's, described processes of international opinion in 1823 that would be supported by the approbation of other nations if violated. He argued that if an international law were published, "the intelligence of the whole world being brought to operate upon it, suggestions obtained from every corner, it might be made as perfect as possible . . . the eyes of all the world being fixed upon the decision of every nation with respect to the code, every nation might be deterred in shame from objecting to any important article in it" (Herberichs 1966, p. 634).

These ideas influenced theorists and policymakers at the fourth Hague Convention in 1907, which wished to recognize the "principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established by civilized peoples, form the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience" (Herberichs 1966, p. 634). Hence, despite its ancient usages, "world opinion" came to be associated with the Wilsonian idealism following World War I, when its proponents, inspired by the optimism of writers in the early twentieth century, predicted it would restrain the behavior of nations (Davison 1973). This idealism was shattered in the wake of World War II, however, when "mere opinion" proved inadequate for warding off genocide and other atrocities in the international realm. Indeed, in an ironic footnote to Wilsonian optimism, the *International Herald Tribune* printed a story in 1936 about how Adolf Hitler was attempting to affect "world opinion"

about Germany by hosting the Olympics that year.

Such occurrences caused the term *world opinion* to fall into general disfavor among analysts and social scientists. Leo Bogart (1966) and Hans Morgenthau (1962) both rejected the concept in the 1960s. Even as late as 1986, Hamid Mowlana refuted the possibility of a global consensus in international opinion, noting that while it had become “fashionable in the literature to apply a variety of terms to the world stage as a whole, with phrases such as ‘international community’ and ‘international system.’ It is . . . doubtful, whether the aggregation of states alone possess the *common values and assumptions*, which are by definition the essential conditions of community” (Mowlana 1986, p. 176, emphasis added).

Revisiting the Concept of World Opinion

Journalists and certain international relations theorists resurrected the concept of world opinion at the end of the 1980s, partly in response to the winding down of the Cold War and the globalization of communications. Instantaneous transmissions from anywhere in the world have allowed actions that governments formerly kept clandestine to be displayed in full view of global media networks. Absent the Iron Curtain, which implied secrets that needed to be hidden from the other side, freer information flows expose the actions of citizens, nations, and leaders to the world’s judgment. The world stage described by Mowlana has never been so open to scrutiny by so many people. Also, the end of the East-West conflict allowed the discussion of world opinion to change from a purely

ideological weapon employed by one side to garner support into a potential force on a global scale.

The common usage of the concept of world opinion was illustrated in a study of the *International Herald Tribune* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* during the months of February, March, and April 1986. During this period, the former referenced world opinion directly or indirectly 103 times, and the latter referenced it 67 times (Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 1990, p. 307). This research also revealed consistent terminology for world opinion between the two newspapers. The basic components of this terminology are as follows:

- a moral component, which refers to values shared among nations;
- a pragmatic component, which refers to interests shared among nations;
- the power of world opinion, which refers to its apparent influence on world events and nations’ behaviors;
- the nation’s image, or reputation, in world opinion, as it is perceived by itself and other nations;
- the world considered as a unit, such as an international community, which may judge and respond to other nations’ behaviors; and
- the threat of international isolation, which operates as a potential punishment for nations that do not heed the dictates of world opinion.

The newspapers’ discourse defines a process of world opinion involving these components. The moral component provides value-driven justification for condemning a given nation or action; the

pragmatic component contributes to the power of world opinion to influence events, by convincing nations that what is moral is often also consistent with the common interest. At stake for the subject country is the nation's image, or its reputation in world opinion; indeed, citizens tend to integrate their nation's international image in their construction of national identity (Rusciano and Ebo 1998). Finally, errant nations or leaders are threatened, or punished, by international isolation from the world community or some other entity that defines the world as a unit. One may summarize the global opinion process in a preliminary definition of *world opinion*: it "refers to the moral judgments of observers which actors must heed in the international arena, or risk isolation as a nation" (Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 1990, p. 320).

Subsequent research has also shown historical and regional variations in the components specific nations' media emphasize in their references to world opinion. In a study of the 1995 Beijing Women's Conference, for instance, the *People's Daily* tended to downplay the threat of international isolation, in part because traditional ideas of national identity integrated separateness from other nations (Rusciano and Fiske-Rusciano 1990). Similarly, the *Hindustan Times* tended to de-emphasize the world as a unit in its discussions of world opinion on the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 due to reluctance to accept world condemnation of India's actions (Rusciano 2001). In these and other cases, the *construction* of world opinion intersects with perceptions of its *content* when a nation is subjected to negative judgments by other countries. A nation's interests on the issue under discussion may influence its perceptions

of the structure and substance of world opinion.

Measuring World Opinion

Despite its common usage, world opinion has eluded rigorous scientific measurement. Part of the problem lies in agreeing upon what is being measured. As Christopher Hill notes, there are "two important and diverging meanings of world opinion . . . opinions of states, individually and collectively, and the opinions of people, beyond their national identities" (Hill 1996, p. 115). The former refers to the opinions or attitudes that are usually attributed to individual nations, considered as a whole, within an international community. The latter refers to opinions or attitudes held by individual citizens in unison with citizens of other nations, so that they form a "global public" separate from the nation-state.

One approach is to consider the two meanings as pieces of the same process of world opinion. Opinion publics exist on many levels, up to and including the national society; global opinion merely adds another public opinion on the international level. Also, the nation-state fulfills a special purpose in the dissemination and communication of world opinion, acting as the agent through which much of world opinion is expressed or directed. National identity is one means through which individual citizens may be isolated internationally through their association with an isolated country. International opinions of individual citizens are affected, in part, by the opinions of their governments.

These suggestions imply that investigating world opinion requires more creative means than survey research on public opinion within nations or their

subgroups. The former must include media content analyses, since the opinions of states may be charted through extensive research into different-quality newspapers. But content analyses alone are insufficient to overcome the problem described by Hill. Even if it is assumed that the major media outlets reflect the opinions of leaders (or "nations," in Hill's term), one cannot be sure that they also reflect the opinions of citizens within the country.

Similarly, projects like the World Values Study or the International Social Survey, taken alone, are also insufficient measures of world opinion. Responses from all the respondents included in these ambitious studies can be added together into a "global sample" of opinion, but the result would be an artificial construction. International surveys tend to be comparative surveys within different nations rather than surveys of a global opinion process.

A comprehensive approach would combine the previous two by following issues on the international agenda in quality international newspapers and time-series surveys within the relevant nations. The former could trace the opinions of nations while the latter could trace the opinions of individuals for a given period. The researcher would then measure their correlation over time and other issues regarding the process of world opinion.

Robert Worcester once warned that researchers who endeavor to study world opinion should not construct their research design like a Rolls-Royce but rather something along the lines of an all-terrain vehicle. Any approach for studying world opinion must have the flexibility to maneuver around the obvi-

ous and hidden obstacles researchers will encounter.

Conclusion

The reemergence of world opinion as a subject for serious academic and political discussion requires several qualifications. First, the Wilsonian ideal of world opinion as a means of controlling nations' behavior and enforcing peace should be declared dead. Global opinion may temper a nation's actions in certain instances, but it is perhaps best described as one consideration leaders must take into account when formulating policies.

Second, the appearance of world opinion, and an international community based loosely around it, does not imply the demise of the nation-state. It is more likely that participation in a global public will add one more layer to citizens' identities, alongside such associations as ethnicity, religion, family, country, and others. As ever, there may be interactions between these levels of identity. Hence, world opinion about a nation's reputation could affect the way that country's citizens view their own national identity (Rusciano and Ebo 1998).

Third, world opinion heralds neither the dawn of a Utopian era nor the "end of history," to borrow Francis Fukuyama's (1996) term. History may now be written in part as a record of the changing boundaries of the international community. This is not the evolutionary history described by Fukuyama, which progresses toward some ultimate consciousness. Instead, consciousness may be defined partly according to the changing directions of world opinion—and if the direction of public opinion within nations is any guide, one will be challenged to perceive any clear pattern in these changes.

Any search for the true nature of man, measured in terms of a universally accepted set of values reflected in world opinion, seems unlikely to go to completion. Instead, one encounters an ongoing negotiation among different nations regarding the content and structure of world opinion.

Finally, world opinion may hasten, or even mark, the demise of the closed society. Economic development appears to be forcing the opening of communications to previously isolated peoples; the ability of leaders to censor the signals their citizens receive diminish accordingly. Such a transformation will likely increase the potential influence of world opinion, as it transforms the manner in which nations and their citizens conceptualize their economic, social, and political boundaries.

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Section Two: Countries and Regions

Argentina

Mass surveys are the most common device used to determine public opinion in Argentina. At present, these surveys are generally conducted in a professional manner employing state-of-the-art techniques in areas such as sampling, instrument design, interview protocols, and interviewer supervision. However, there is variation in the quality and professionalism depending on the public opinion firm involved. One reason for this, and a principal weakness of the survey industry in Argentina, is the lack of any national association (such as the American Association for Public Opinion Research) that establishes and enforces a series of standards of survey quality and norms of professional behavior. As a consequence, while many Argentine public opinion firms are capable of providing, and do provide, a level of quality comparable to that provided by firms in countries like the United States, many other members of the polling industry fail to meet even minimal professional standards (particularly in the interior of the country outside Buenos Aires).

The Role of Public Opinion Polls in Argentina

Today, public opinion polls play an important role in Argentine society. This influence is because polls provide politicians, businesspeople, and others with crucial

information on the interests and concerns of the citizenry. Politicians utilize survey data to design election campaigns and messages, craft a political image, and even decide which issues they will emphasize or downplay.

Public opinion polls are conducted on a frequent basis. The major national dailies (i.e., *Clarín* and *La Nación*) each publish results from a national public opinion survey contracted by the newspaper at least once a month, fortnightly during the election campaign season. In addition, the major national public opinion firms (approximately 10) will conduct about a dozen private national surveys each month for other clients. The results of some national surveys will be released to the media, but a majority will not. In fact, members of the media are constantly scrounging for poll results and will contact the major public firms "to see if they have any new data" that the reporters could use for a report. In general, however, members of the mass media have an instinctive distrust of surveys that they themselves do not contract, since they fear the results have been manipulated to the benefit of the client (e.g., a politician, a national or provincial government, a private company).

A related problem is the media's generally poor job of interpreting and disseminating the results of public opinion

surveys. For example, changes in candidate vote intention that are not even remotely statistically significant often are presented in banner headlines such as "CANDIDATE X SURGES AHEAD WHILE CANDIDATE Y'S SUPPORT PLUMMETS." Furthermore, the newspapers (and even worse, TV news shows) often fail to provide basic information on the survey, such as the sampling universe, survey method (e.g., telephone, face-to-face), margin of error, and client for whom the survey was conducted.

*The Evolution of Public Opinion
Polls in Argentina: 1983–2002*

From 1976 to 1983 Argentina was governed by a military dictatorship, and public opinion polls were for all intents and purposes not conducted. In fact, even prior to the 1976 military coup, public opinion polls were rare in Argentina, generally carried out only by academics for purely academic purposes (e.g., the pioneering work of José Miguens).

In 1983, Argentina returned to democracy with the election of President Raúl Alfonsín. Very few polls were conducted during the 1983 election campaign. Furthermore, reflecting the low esteem in which surveys were held by most of the political and economic elites, the few polls that were conducted, which predicted an Alfonsín victory, were generally dismissed due to the elites' conviction that the presidential candidate of the Peronist Party (which had never lost a national election) would win.

Following the democratic transition in 1983, the polling profession began to develop in Argentina, with several Argentines who had been trained in the United States and Western Europe (as well as some trained at home) founding public opinion firms. A noteworthy char-

acteristic was their strong identification with one of Argentina's major political parties (the Justicialist [Peronist] Party and the Radical Civic Union), with Peronist-linked consultants working only with Justicialist Party candidates and governments and Radical-linked consultants only working with Radical Civic Union candidates and governments.

The 1990s witnessed the expansion and professionalization of the polling profession in Argentina, with many local firms establishing official ties with prominent international polling firms such as Gallup, MORI, and SOFRES. At the same time, many of the firms began to develop a nonpartisan approach to the business, openly working with multiple political parties. Although many other firms remained associated with distinct political parties, even these firms began to develop a greater professional and independent profile.

Following his election in 1989, President Carlos Menem launched a profound economic reform program that featured market liberalization, economic stabilization, a substantial lowering of tariffs, and the privatization of public utilities and enterprises. Almost without exception the government-run utilities and companies were badly run, providing poor service and draining government resources. The country's privatization and stabilization program attracted foreign investment and resulted in economic growth and increased consumer demand.

As a consequence, the early to mid-1990s were a boom for the public opinion industry in Argentina, as private companies (many of which were foreign multinationals) and politicians increased their demand for services. The consequence was growth in the number of firms as

well as the establishment of several firms in the interior.

During this period pollsters also began to be considered as important talking heads, regularly appearing on TV and radio programs to provide expert commentary on the state of public opinion across a variety of topics. It was virtually impossible to watch news programs in the evening and not see at least one interview with a pollster.

The Private Nature of Argentine Public Opinion Surveys

In contrast to the United States and many other countries, in Argentina the generation of public opinion data is almost exclusively carried out by private companies. Universities, generally lacking resources, conduct virtually no polls, and even then they are not national in scope. Similarly, there is no institution in Argentina where the polls of private companies are archived; institutions such as the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan, the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, and the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research at the University of Cologne do not exist. As a consequence, virtually no data are available for general scholarly use (an exception is a small set of polls archived at the Roper Center, but these only cover the period of 1991–1996). Furthermore, as the topics of most polls are dictated by the needs of particular clients, there is a general absence of the same questions asked frequently over a period of time (i.e., longitudinal data), which makes many types of scholarly analysis difficult or impossible.

This lack of an archive is in large part a consequence of the absence of non-profit institutions dedicated to the

archiving and dissemination of public opinion data. It also stems from the reluctance of many pollsters to publicly release data, due to the wishes of their client or to avoid placing their methodology and results under scrutiny. An additional reason is the absence of polls conducted by academic institutions.

A positive advance in the 1990s was the development of a small number of master's programs in public opinion research as well as the incorporation of courses on public opinion in public policy and public administration programs. These programs have helped train Argentines in the techniques needed to conduct public opinion surveys and consume public opinion data. With a few exceptions, however, these programs have not actively supported scholarly public opinion research or provided scholars the ability to conduct their own surveys designed to study specific aspects of Argentine public opinion.

Nonsurvey Methods of Assessing Public Opinion

Although the mass survey approach is the dominant and preferred method in Argentina, at least six other sources are also employed: focus groups, Internet surveys, TV call-in surveys, content analysis of newspapers, attendance at mass rallies, and election results.

Focus groups are used in Argentina by political candidates, governments, and private companies to assess public attitudes toward a variety of issues. Their use stems from economic reasons (they are much less expensive to conduct than mass surveys) and from an affinity among Argentines for qualitative methods. This qualitative method is common among contracting organizations that lack the funds to pay for a mass survey but are endeavoring to better understand the

opinions of their target audience (e.g., consumers, municipal-level voters, political party members). In general there is a tendency among Argentine survey research firms and their clients to place too much confidence in the results gained from focus groups, often incorrectly treating levels of opinion in these groups as equivalent to results obtained from representative mass surveys.

In recent years, Internet surveys have grown in popularity in Argentina, with the major newspapers' websites (www.clarin.com.ar, www.lanacion.com.ar) presenting new questions (and the responses to those questions) on their websites on a daily basis. Many TV shows also conduct their own phone polls by asking viewers to call in to register their opinion on a specific issue, the results of which are often treated as being representative of national public opinion.

Another method of measuring of public opinion is through the content analysis of articles in Argentina's largest daily newspapers. Much of this content analysis focuses on the evaluations of specific individuals (normally politicians). This focus on coverage is explained by the strong opinion held by most politicians that newspapers, and mass media in general, have a powerful ability to influence public opinion.

An additional method is to count the number of people in attendance at mass rallies or events (e.g., campaign speeches, popular protests, strikes, campaign launches). This method was more prominent in the past than it is today. Nonetheless, organizers still try to ensure as large a turnout as possible (often paying people to attend) to bolster their claims of popular support for their candidacy or issue.

Election results are another method to measure public opinion. Large election

majorities are used by candidates and political parties as evidence of widespread support, whereas significant drops in support at the voting booth are often employed by opponents (both within and outside the party) as evidence of the lack of legitimacy of a candidate, party, or intraparty faction. In recent years the percentage of null and blank votes cast in the general elections (as well as the level of voter abstention) has been used as a barometer of public support for incumbent political parties and candidates. This was the case in the 2001 congressional elections, in which the number of null votes reached a record high.

Cleavages That Divide Public Opinion

During the past quarter-century different cleavages have divided public opinion at distinct points in time. The end of the 1976–1983 military dictatorship was dominated by a democracy-dictatorship cleavage, with advocates for democracy on one side and supporters of military dictatorship on the other. This cleavage lasted until the mid-1980s.

This democracy-dictatorship cleavage was replaced by a strong economic cleavage, with supporters of neoliberal policies on one side and opponents of neoliberalism on the other. This neoliberal/anti-neoliberal cleavage lasted until the late 1990s, when it was moved aside by a cleavage that separated those who demanded greater government transparency and less corruption from those who were willing to accept a lack of transparency and a certain degree of corruption in exchange for effective governance. This cleavage separated the population during the second administration of President Carlos Menem (1995–1999), with Menem's supporters in the latter category, his opponents in the former.

The final cleavage emerged during Argentina's recent economic, political, and social collapse. It divides those who continue to support the traditional political parties and mainstream politicians and those who support new parties (or no party) and populist politicians.

The Role of Public Opinion Polls in the Design of Public Policy

Although politicians engage in widespread use of public opinion polls to design their electoral campaigns and to develop their message and behavior in government, they generally do not use these polls to decide which public policies to implement and which public policies not to implement. Polls are thus used much more as part of the politicians' permanent campaign than as devices to learn which policies citizens want and do not want.

Many other groups utilize public opinion data. Principal consumers include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and foreign countries, and academics. Many NGOs employ public opinion data, but the primary NGO consumers are concerned with the fight for greater government transparency and against government corruption.

International organizations and foreign governments utilize public opinion data to gauge public attitudes toward different policies (e.g., dollarization), evaluations of their organization or country, and evaluations of different Argentine politicians (e.g., presidential candidates). Whereas twenty years ago only a handful of Argentine academics employed public opinion data to study topics of interest, at present a growing number of scholars employ data to better understand a variety of aspects of Argentine politics.

Conceptual Foundations of Public Opinion

There is little understanding of what the conceptual foundations of public opinion are in Argentina. For pollsters, public opinion is whatever the survey results say public opinion is. This lack of understanding derives from the general absence of academic public opinion polls and the dearth of a critical mass of research scholars engaged in the study of Argentine public opinion. This lack of a conceptual foundation for public opinion has a pernicious effect in that it allows for the continued belief that public opinion in Argentina is something that can be easily manipulated and hence is unstable.

Conclusion

The use of public opinion data will continue to grow in Argentina. It is of paramount importance that the Argentine public opinion industry improve its level of professionalization. In particular, Argentina desperately needs a professional organization that will allow the public opinion industry to set and enforce standards. Also needed is an enhanced role for the country's universities in the field of public opinion, both in terms of training and methodological advancement and of analyzing and improving scholarly understanding of the determinants, nature, and consequences of public opinion in Argentina.

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Belgium

Despite the relative scarcity of polls, political polling has become more and more important in Belgium. Reasons for this increase are threefold: the occurrence of a number of crises, which are said to have made politicians more sensitive to public opinion; a 300,000-person

protest march against the malfunctioning of the justice system in the aftermath of the Dutroux pedophilia scandal; and the occurrence of a food safety crisis just before the 1999 election that had a deep impact on election results and led to the ousting from power of the Christian Democrats for the first time since 1958. In general, the traditional party landscape has undergone profound changes, which are threatening the dominance of traditional parties (Liberals, Socialists, Christian Democrats) and make voting behavior volatile and unpredictable. Finally, the current government (Verhofstadt I) devotes more attention to communication and image.

In this entry, we outline the legal framework regulating the publication of polls. Following an overview of the main polls in Belgium, we discuss political parties' attitudes toward opinion polling. Some attention will be given to other sources of information on public opinion, as well as to methodological problems with polling. We will finish by presenting the main issues in current political and public opinion.

Legal Framework

The publication of polling results is regulated by the law of July 18, 1985, on the publication of opinion polls. It has been modified by the law of June 21, 1991. Concerns over the quality of polling were at the basis of both laws. They provide for the founding of a commission on opinion polls to draft quality criteria for polling and a code of ethics for polling institutes, as well as to supervise the practice of polling. A parliamentary question in 1995 criticized the fact that the commission still hadn't been composed, and no sign of this commission has been heard up to this day (Van de Kamer 1994–1995).

Article 5 of the 1985 law should be considered the most important element: it forbids the publication and diffusion of polling results and their discussion or explanation for a period of 30 days prior to elections, in order to protect the voter from dishonest practices and to avoid manipulation. The most important innovation in the 1991 law was the abolition of this restriction. In changing the requirement, the parliament recognized the considerations of those who wrote the 1985 law, but legal and practical requirements led to its abolition. First of all, there was growing concern over the constitutionality of the law: such a prohibition of publication is said to violate freedom of the press. Regardless, it would have been difficult to sue media who published results prior to elections because of the procedures involved in suing the press. In daily practice, there had been several cases in which the publication prohibition was not honored, but no action was taken because the commission was never installed; there was also a conviction that the accused would win her case on unconstitutionality. Furthermore, a prohibition on publication was judged as unnecessary since scientific research still hadn't proved that publication of polling results prior to elections actually influences voting intentions. It was therefore decided to take the prohibition on publication prior to elections out of the law. In 1992 an attempt was made to reintroduce the buffer period (van de Kamer 1991–1992).

Instead, the 1991 law put more emphasis on technical requirements for polling and restricted the use of the title "opinion polling institute" to persons and institutes respecting the quality criteria and code of ethics (the title can be granted by the minister of economic

affairs). Manipulations of polls can lead to a cancellation of the homologation of the institute, and the commission can order a public rectification. The inactivity of the commission, however, ensures that the law has no real deterrent effect.

The law stipulates a number of conditions for the publication of the polls. When a poll is published, the commission should be informed about:

1. the name and nature of the commissioner of the poll;
2. the name of the person or institute that did the polling;
3. the aim and subject of the poll, as well as the targeted population;
4. the period in which the interviewing was done;
5. the method of interviewing;
6. the number of interviewers;
7. the method of sampling;
8. the size of the original sample and the number of interviews completed;
9. a distribution of the sample according to the size of the municipality in which interviews were done, as well as the number of municipalities;
10. the composition of the respondents according to sex, age, income, class, profession, and any other characteristic that may influence the answer, both before and after weighing the sample, as far as such data are available;
11. general information on the confidence interval in relation to sample size;
12. general information on the methods of extrapolation;
13. the questions asked, as well as the answer categories; and

14. the frequency distribution of the answers, as well as the number of missing answers.

The publication itself (e.g., in a newspaper) should contain the information under 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13, and 14. The publication should respect the anonymity of the respondents. The preconditions on the publication itself are in general respected very well.

General Political Polls

The leading political opinion poll in Belgium is a quarterly poll by the French-speaking newspaper *La Libre Belgique*. Since the beginning of the 1980s, this reputable newspaper orders a poll for its “political barometer” every three months. For this poll, 2,000 Belgians are interviewed: 750 in Flanders and Wallonia, and 500 in the Brussels region. This is exceptional, since polling is rarely done in both French- and Dutch-speaking parts of the country. Questions deal with trust in federal and regional governments to solve problems, voting intentions, and the popularity of individual politicians.

Practically every Belgian newspaper gives some attention to the results of this poll, which makes it by far the most influential. It has become a point of reference for legitimizing one’s party or policy. Publication of the results is also an important moment for politicians because of the popularity rankings; it is often a matter of prestige to be ranked high. This poll is a very good illustration that “polls have become a symbolic weapon in the political game” (Billiet 1993).

However, every publication of polling results engenders criticism of reliability, as well as discussions on their use in democracies. Criticism centers on methodology (mainly from academics) and the

fact that political parties can make very selective use of the results.

In the months and weeks prior to elections, many newspapers, magazines, and TV stations order polls to accompany election-related reports. On Election Day, exit polls are organized to garner information on vote changes: how did someone vote in this election compared to the last election? This allows for making tables showing which party lost to which party, something that is relevant in a multiparty landscape.

In 1991, partly as a result of the so-called Black Sunday—the breakthrough of the extreme right and populist Vlaams Blok—the initiative was taken to organize the General Election Study (GES). The main aim was to probe voting motivations: what is the profile of those voting for party X, both sociodemographically and sociologically, and what could be the reason why people switched parties or have remained loyal to their party? Originally, the GES was a panel study, for which a number of people were questioned after every parliamentary election.

Other Polls

One of the best-known recent polls in Belgium is the most disputed one. In June 2000, liberal politicians in the federal government insisted on sending a questionnaire to all Belgians over 16 on reform of public administration. Sending and handling 8.2 million questionnaires turned out to be a huge expense. Immediately after the two-page questionnaire was sent, criticism on methodology started: confusing answer categories, steered responses, loaded questions, multiple topics in one question, and so on. The number of methodological mistakes made the Copernicus poll a subject for undergraduate exams. Poor methodology, absence of

sociodemographics, and a response rate of 9.2 percent (still more than 750,000) made the results useless. However, the right answer on every question was in most cases obvious, which resulted in massive support for government plans. In this case, a poll was used as a marketing instrument for government policy, and the results could be used to counter resistance to administrative reforms. Initially, the government planned to hold a referendum on reforming public administration, but bad experiences with referenda and numerous objections led to the poll, which in fact resembled a referendum by mail (Tegenbos 2000).

Interest groups use polls to support their actions, but their impact is limited. The best-known example is the magazine of the general medical practitioners, which invites readers to fill out questionnaires on medical issues. These polls normally receive considerable attention. Other examples are a poll on the future of Belgium by the antiseparatist movement B-Plus, as well as polls on numerous issues by opinion magazines.

Polls and Political Parties

There is an uneasy relationship between polls and political parties. Opinion polls owe part of their bad reputation to the UNIOP/UNISOP affair in the 1980s. The UNIOP/UNISOP scandal, in which the reputed UNIOP/UNISOP polling agency was used for illegal election campaign financing, raised concerns over the close relations between political parties and polling institutes. The size of the country means that political parties have limited budgets. Ordering polls is not a daily practice. Parties often rely on generally available surveys and open sources (analysis of polls published in the media, studies by universities, etc.).

The Flemish Liberal Party (VLD) took a somewhat different approach: in May 2002 it ordered a poll on topical issues (crime, voting rights for immigrants, ideological neutrality of education) to help the party determine the possibilities for new alliances. The VLD is one of the few parties ordering its own polls. In 1995 its questionnaire on policy issues provoked commentaries on methodology. The initiative should be categorized as a publicity stunt and not as a poll. Massive participation gave the party a financial headache.

The Flemish Socialists are leery because of the difficulty of keeping the outcomes of polls secret. In this way, financial efforts by one party benefit other parties (Lombaert 1991, p. 66). If a party does opinion research, it tends to keep the results secret as strategic information.

Survey Polls

A number of scientific surveys have considerable influence. The absence of a political polling tradition gives administrative polls and surveys more importance, such as the yearly general survey by the Administration of Planning and Statistics, part of the ministry of the Flemish Community. Since 1996, this administration has organized a large-scale survey on sociocultural changes in Flanders. Many questions deal with politics, and the results are used for policymaking and policy planning. This survey is a good and popular source for the administration, politicians, and political parties.

Results of scientific surveys make headlines often, especially because many surveys are ordered by the government. This makes them difficult to ignore. One example is the research by Brussels Free University on social capital in Flanders (e.g., Elchardus et al. 2001). Within a

short time the results and recommendations of the study permeated political discourse and policy.

Methodology

Distortion in reporting voting intentions is one of the recurrent themes. Polls underestimate the support for the extreme right Vlaams Blok, since answers are influenced by social desirability. Unfortunately, users of polls seem to forget this phenomenon every time a new poll is published, trumpeting the end of the rise of the extreme right. The election show on the commercial TV network VTM about the 2000 municipal elections is a good example: results of exit polls became available almost immediately after the closure of polling stations, predicting a loss for the extreme right in Antwerp, a traditional stronghold. The election results themselves showed an *increase* in votes for the extreme right. Other predictions also proved to be incorrect.

In Belgium, discussions on polls and referenda are related. In referenda and in polls, considerable attention is given to minimal response rates and representativity. Criticisms of both initiatives are similar: one-sentence questions are a simplification of reality, participation is not always representative, and so on.

The influence of university social science and methodology departments in survey research is strong, which means that attention is given to reliability, quality, and the like. As for commercial polling, no companies specialize in political polling because of the limited demand.

Academic research tries to avoid underrepresentation of certain groups by using samples taken from the civil registry, which contains all inhabitants and in most cases a recent address. Commer-

cial polling companies do not have the opportunity to use this registry because of legal and privacy concerns.

The Issues

Belgian politics centers on socioeconomic, ideological, and cultural-linguistic issues. These three cleavages are said to be fading away, but they have an important place in the interpretation of polling results through depolarization, the process in which ideological adherence to a single party throughout one's lifetime begins to disappear, leading to a decline of the three traditional parties (Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals).

Communitarian issues center on conflicts of interest between the language communities (French and Dutch). At the same time, Belgium has evolved from a central state to a federal state via state reforms that started in 1970. Language issues led to the fall of several governments and gave rise to political parties with nationalistic programs. In its early period, nationalism was also one of the core issues of the extreme right. Despite the perceived importance of language-related and nationalist issues, polls show that Belgians are at best indifferent toward these issues. Actually, when asked in 1996 about their first group affiliation, the number of people identifying themselves as Belgian was about equal to the number of people identifying as Flemish. In a similar survey in 2002, 42.2 percent identified themselves as Belgian, 28.4 percent as Flemish (APS 1996–2000). Despite federalization, polls never showed majorities in favor of it, which makes the federalization process elite-centered. Although a recent study revealed that a transfer of competencies to the regional level is supported by 46.5 percent, only 9.2 percent actually spoke

out in favor of Flemish independence (Meersseman and Depickere 2002).

Recently, new issues have popped up. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the *kloof met de burger* (cleavage between citizen and government) was the core concern, not least because of the rise of the extreme right. The latter phenomenon has increased attention to safety issues and immigration. Dramatic events forced politicians to take note: on October 20, 1996, 300,000 Belgians participated in the White March demonstration in remembrance of the victims of Marc Dutroux, a pedophile/murderer responsible for the death of several children. The demonstration called for drastic changes in the courts and police and was the basis for police reforms that followed. Safety, together with immigration, is a core issue for the extreme right.

Some months before the 1999 parliamentary elections, a food safety scandal arose when it became known that harmful substances had been mixed with fodder and had entered the food chain. The issue was at first ignored by the government, but food inspection agencies soon took the blame. Public sensitivity to all food-related issues increased in Belgium and led to a triumph for Green candidates in the elections and the ousting of Christian Democrats from government for the first time since 1958.

The purple coalition (Liberals, Socialists, Greens) came to power in 1999 and is devoting more attention to communication with the public and is thus more sensitive to public opinion. Liberals are key actors in polling and referenda.

Conclusion

There is a limited polling tradition in Belgium, but one can say that the importance of polls is increasing. Parties' finan-

cial instability is one issue. In the event of a poll organized by the government or a political party, data-gathering is often confused with marketing. As a result, scientific surveys and some media polls attract considerable attention.

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Brazil

The objective of this entry is to provide an overview of the core themes that orient

the study of public opinion in Brazil. Therefore, the purpose is to identify cross-cutting controversies that structure the debate of two central topics: correlates of vote choice and political culture. But first, given the increase in the number of studies and the wealth of distinct methodological approaches being employed, a few words of caution are necessary.

First, important studies that barely touch on the debates discussed here will not receive due attention. Some emphasize topics that are indirectly related to public opinion are more about political communication and political persuasion.

In addition, most studies about public opinion in Brazil, especially the ones I focus on here, predominantly rely on survey data. However, several other research strategies have been used in collecting data that are related to the study of public opinion in Brazil. Some rely on participant observation to assess how local-level activists influence voters' opinions in two Rio de Janeiro slums (Gay 1994); some use focus groups to evaluate citizens' reception of television messages (Porto 2001); and others do content analysis of media electoral coverage (Lima 1993; Miguel 1999) and politicians' rhetoric (Figueiredo et al. 2000). Even though such studies offer important contributions, they are not directly linked with the controversies discussed here.

Thus I will highlight the initial studies conducted by Brazilian social scientists during the military regime, going back to Glaucio Soares's work on the ideological basis of vote choice in 1965. I then discuss the explosion of public opinion research after the inauguration of the first civilian-led government of President José Sarney in 1986 and after the 1989 direct elections for president. The two main topics are: (1) the structure of vote

choice, which refers to the ideological underpinnings of voting and to the role of political parties in affecting voting decisions; and (2) the study of political culture, or the mass public's set of political values.

The emergence, decline, and renaissance of trends in the literature are related to historical events in Brazilian history. The first wave of public opinion studies, which focused on electoral behavior, occurred when elections were once again becoming a relevant political event in Brazil (Lamounier 1989). In 1965 the military regime created a two-party system, with one party supporting the government, holding a majority of the seats in the lower and upper houses, and an opposition party being allowed to exist, but with very little influence. As Bolivar Lamounier points out, in the 1974 election for the lower and upper houses the opposition party gained seats in both houses, threatening the hegemony of the government party. Not coincidentally, this saw the first wave of studies about electoral behavior.

In the 1980s, political liberalization and an increase in popular participation blossomed with direct elections for governor in 1982, the victory of a civilian for president in the indirect 1985 elections, the Constituent Assembly elected in 1986, and the promulgation of the 1988 Democratic Constitution. This was a time when democracy was being institutionally built in Brazil. A corresponding curiosity among Brazilian scholars was whether citizens held a compatible set of political values that could sustain institutions over the long haul. The result was a shift to studies about political culture.

Finally, the current emphasis on electoral behavior is related to the beginning of biannual elections after 1990—with

concurrent elections for state and national offices in the legislative and executive branches and midterm elections for offices at the municipal level. With elections occurring periodically, there was an upsurge in interest in electoral behavior.

I conclude by pointing out the increase in public opinion studies in Brazil and the resulting impressive data accumulated. There are two main causes for this: (1) the diffusion of independent polling firms and research institutions throughout most Brazilian states; and (2) the existence of national polling firms that routinely collect data representative of the entire country. These firms offer periodical surveys about elections, government evaluation, and many other diverse topics.

The First Wave of Public Opinion Studies: The Structure of Vote Choice

The main examples of the first wave of public opinion studies in Brazil are the now classic city-level studies of vote choice in the late 1960s and 1970s (Soares 1965; Cintra 1968; Lamounier 1975, 1978, 1980; Lima 1978; Lima and Dias 1981; Cew 1978; Reis 1978; Trindade 1975, 1978). The overarching goal was to test hypotheses about the structuring elements of mass belief systems and the ideological consistency of vote choice in Brazil, similar to earlier studies on U.S. voting behavior conducted at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan (Campbell et al. 1960).

Brazilian social scientists, mostly from universities in São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro became the central figures of this first wave. Such studies attempted to assess the internal consistency and coherence

of mass belief systems by verifying correlations among ideological predispositions, party preference, and candidate choice.

Brazil was under military rule, with restricted democratic rights, during the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, an opposition party—Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB)—was allowed to exist in order to pose a façade of democracy for the regime. The existence of this opposition party, though, as Lamounier (1989) points out, was not merely figurative. In the 1974 elections for the lower and upper legislative houses, the MDB obtained meaningful victories in the most populated and economically modernized states. This sheds light upon scholars' interest in explaining vote choice during the 1970s.

Three main issues set the agenda during this first phase: the social basis of vote choice, or how consistent party loyalty and social cleavages were during the 1964–1979 two-party system; the coherence of party preferences during the two-party system with those of the previous, multiparty period that existed from 1945 to 1965; and the ideological basis of party choice.

Voters from low-income urban areas tended to identify with the opposition party, mainly because of the weak performance of the government in improving standards of living. Intellectuals supported the opposition party due to less pragmatic and more ideological reasons: the opposition party stood for the opening of the system to democratic competition. Hence, the idea that the opposition party was the party of reform cohered with the social cleavages that supported it.

Scholars also found consistency of party preferences between previous and

contemporary party systems. There was a clear continuation between those who supported the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB) in the 1945–1964 period and those who supported the MDB during the military dictatorship, both seen as left-wing parties. The same could be said about the supporters of conservative parties Uniao Democratica Nacional (UDN) in the previous period and Alianca de Renovacao Nacional (ARENA) during the dictatorship.

However, the optimism about the formation of strong party identification during the military regime was shattered by findings related to the ideological underpinnings of party loyalty. Some scholars (Lamounier 1975, 1978, 1980; Reis 1978) forcefully argued that voters frequently misunderstood policy proposals and ideological positions. Voters, especially those with lower educational levels, had difficulty identifying the key differences distinguishing the parties. Party affiliation was defined by vague impressions of how well the governing party was performing, instead of ideological preferences about how the political system should work.

These findings became conventional wisdom. Nonetheless, a few scholars challenged this using data from the 1960s and 1970s. Kurt von Mettenheim's book *The Brazilian Voter* (1995) and Antônio Lavareda's *A Democracia nas Urnas* (1991) seem to agree that there was a process of increasing sophistication among Brazilian voters, indicated mostly by the awareness of ideological positions. Even though ideological evaluations did not predominate, there were signs that individual predispositions would crystallize in time. In fact, this controversy prevails in the current debate about electoral behavior.

The Second Wave of Public Opinion Studies: Democratic Values and the Consolidation of Democracy

Direct elections for state governors in 1982, the victory of a civilian in the indirect presidential elections of 1985, and the promulgation of the 1988 Democratic Constitution set a new research agenda. The second wave of public opinion studies looked at evaluating democratic values, or whether the population had the "right" set of political values to support the consolidation of the recently born democratic regime. These values were defined as the presence of support for democratic institutions, interest in participating politically, and willingness to vote in elections.

The tradition of cross-city comparisons was replaced in the 1980s by a second wave focusing on political culture by using national samples. A cornerstone in the study of political culture in Brazil is José Álvaro Moisés's book *Os Brasileiros e a Democracia* (1995). The influence of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's cross-national studies of political culture (1963) is evident in Moisés's work. According to him, Brazilians supported democratic institutions by highly valuing voting in elections; by praising honest, direct, competitive elections; and by passionately criticizing corrupt politicians. The picture painted by Moisés is optimistic regarding the prospects of democracy in Brazil.

But Moisés's approach was challenged by Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos (1993) and Elisa Reis (1995), scholars from the Rio de Janeiro University Research Institute. They pointed out the persistence of certain authoritarian, intolerant beliefs among Brazilian citizens. A central point was that Brazilians held an

ambiguous set of values. Democratic institutions and voting in elections were praised by the population but coexisted with old practices that stubbornly resisted change: racial discrimination, intolerance toward diverging political opinions, and lack of interpersonal trust among citizens. The discussion about political values has changed to one of social capital, or citizens' propensity to join distinct forms of collective action (Baquero 2001) instead of political culture.

The Third Wave: The Return of Electoral Behavior Studies and the Search for Voters' Rationality

The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s saw a resurgence of studies focusing on vote choice. The first direct elections for president in 1989 contributed to this, but the occurrence of periodic elections throughout the 1990s explains the renewed interest. Voting became routine in Brazil during the 1990s, and explaining vote choice became a concern among scholars.

Another factor was an explosion of small parties. Legislation regulating party existence was lax during the period, with few barriers to the existence of parties. The result was an increase in parties, most with no social or ideological basis, and a consequent decline in party identification. Elections became candidate-centered, relying extensively on TV and radio advertising (Meneguello 1994; Rua 1995, 1997; Lima 1993; Baquero 1997; Miguel 1999). The growing identification with political parties faded away with the new party system that arose in the 1990s.

Voters during this period are seen as unable to identify distinct policy proposals. Levels of party identification were low, and retrospective evaluations of can-

didates are seen as the central explanation for vote choice (Baquero 1997). Hence, the decline in the ideological basis of vote choice, already detected during the end of the military dictatorship, was exacerbated. During the 1990s, contingent events that occur immediately prior to elections determine outcome. This was the case in the 1994 victory of Fernando Henrique Cardoso preceded by the real stabilization plan (Rua 1995; Meneguello 1994). (On Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso during the presidential elections in 1989 and 1998, see Lima 1993; Straubhaar, Olsen, and Nunes 1993; Miguel 1999.)

In the late 1990s this consensus was challenged. André Singer (2000) points out that ideology, measured by voters' self-placement in a left-right ideological spectrum, influences voting for left-wing parties, especially the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Andrew Baker's (2002) analysis of presidential popularity during the first term of the Cardoso administration, and Glaucio Soares's (2000) analysis of the 1998 elections for governor of the Federal District, indicate that policy preferences were central determinants of support for the president and vote choice. According to these authors, voters were capable of judging parties according to ideological positions and policies. The title of Soares's article, "In Search of the Lost Rationality" (2000), precisely summarizes the findings of these new studies about electoral behavior.

Such studies closely follow the occurrence of historical events. Central to these arguments is the emergence and strengthening of the PT as the main left-wing opposition party in Brazil. Supporters of PT candidates strongly identify with the party, appear to favor policies

that are defended by the party, and take ideological positions consistent with those that the PT stands for.

However, one recent study has disagreed. Alberto Almeida (2001) criticized Singer's claim that ideology matters. Almeida claims that self-placement in an ideological spectrum is meaningless when it is not correlated with preferences about ideological issues; that's what he finds in his survey of Rio de Janeiro. Therefore, Almeida argues that Singer's measure of ideology is neither reliable nor valid and that better measures of ideology are necessary.

Conclusion

The main practical result of the debate about electoral behavior and political culture in Brazil is the accumulation of an impressive amount of data. Brazilian scholars have built strong foundations for the accumulation of knowledge about public opinion.

The increasing number of market-oriented polling firms and university-based public opinion research institutes is the essence of this process. The next necessary phase is the unification of these data sets. Steps in this direction have already been taken in the Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública (CESOP) of the University of Campinas. CESOP holds one of the largest databanks of Latin America, with the full collection of electoral surveys done by DataFolha, also offering access to the Roper Center and ICPSR data sets. CESOP also publishes an important journal about public opinion in Brazil, *Opinião Pública*. Nonetheless, CESOP does not store data sets from other research institutes, polling firms, and independent researchers from throughout Brazil. There are huge amounts of data, but only a minimal per-

centage is available to the general public and scholars.

Another necessary step is periodic surveys, following the example of the National Election Studies in the United States and the British Electoral Surveys in Great Britain. Alberto Almeida and Zairo Cheibub, researchers from the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro, are articulating the creation of the Brazilian Electoral Studies (PESB). The 2002 elections were the first in which PESB was implemented.

Finally, the debate about Brazilian political behavior and political culture can offer a broader theoretical contribution to the discussion of public opinion. Debates about electoral behavior and political culture in Brazil shed light on themes such as the impact of common citizens' views on the effectiveness of regimes in recently democratized countries and insights about vote choice in environments of multiple political parties and open-list proportional representation. Both methodologically and theoretically, the study of public opinion in Brazil has a promising future.

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Bulgaria

For 45 years Bulgaria was the most loyal Soviet ally in the former Eastern bloc. After the fall of communist dictator

Todor Zhivkov in November 1989, Bulgaria began its rocky transition to democracy and capitalism. The end of communism also heralded significant changes in the way public attitudes are formed, measured, interpreted, and reported in this southeast European country.

Under the previous communist regime, many of the results of public opinion research were considered to be a state secret. Opinion polling was carried out by polling specialists of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the social sciences academic departments, various government agencies, and the official trade unions. The more important survey results were reported to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, where they were often classified as confidential, so relatively few of the collected polling data appeared in the mass media of the press, radio, and television. The Committee of State Security (the secret police) conducted clandestine public opinion research of its own, reporting to the government in Sofia its survey findings, especially those on antiregime attitudes. Although frequently veiled in secrecy, such surveys helped train a large cadre of professional public opinion researchers in Bulgaria, especially after 1960.

Because the regime suppressed through censorship much of the news it considered to be antigovernment, a great deal of political information was transmitted by word of mouth, which helped create underground public opinion in the country. Since many Bulgarians may have opposed communist rule but were afraid to express their oppositional attitudes openly, especially to strangers, antiregime public opinion cannot be said to have developed in any measurable degree. Western polling experts were rarely, if

ever, allowed to conduct public opinion research in Bulgaria, and transgressors were usually expelled from the country. The Munich-based Radio Free Europe was the only outside source to collect and publish more reliable polling data on the distribution of mass opinions in communist-governed Bulgaria.

Public Opinion under Democracy

Nationwide random sampling of public opinion remains the principal method of measuring popular attitudes under the new, democratic authorities, but government censorship has been abolished. Opinion polls are still extensively used by the government, but their results are no longer treated as a state secret. Polls are now conducted mostly by commercial and academic practitioners—some sponsored by local newspapers, others by private firms, and still others by foreign polling organizations and foundations. Foreign-trained Bulgarian professional opinion researchers have imported the most modern Western methodology of opinion polling, including sophisticated procedures of defining the universe (the body of people being studied in a poll), choosing a scientific sample, framing a questionnaire, interviewing participants in the sample, tabulating polling results, and analyzing results. Because the media publish all kinds of poll statistics, including nationwide surveys of opinions on current political and social issues, there is a widespread impression that public opinion polls are conducted almost every month, if not more frequently. Yet it is difficult to judge to what extent this public impression corresponds to reality, since in the new political circumstances no one keeps track of pollsters' activities. Although many of the polling organiza-

tions do have monthly schedules of representative surveys, an impoverished economic environment and lack of permanent and reliable clients have forced Bulgarian pollsters to charge rock-bottom prices or even nothing at all for their public opinion studies, which are often part of more profitable market research.

Much like the new, independent mass media, postcommunist Bulgarian politicians rely heavily on polls, since few, if any, can afford to conduct their own. In fact, the importance of opinion polls has grown, particularly since the introduction of competitive democratic politics. Today, the principle of *vox populi-vox dei* has become, in theory at least, almost sacrosanct. No politician ever makes a public speech without referring to the will of the people as expressed in opinion polls. However, Bulgarians have grown skeptical and cynical about the shameless manipulation of election polls and opinion surveys by professional politicians, public relations experts, and spin doctors.

Polling Organizations in Bulgaria

There are many competing agencies involved in undertaking representative sample surveys in Bulgaria, and their number is growing, but the vast majority of them remain small. Most have found it more cost-effective to combine market and media surveys with noncommercial research to obtain information on opinions about political issues. Among the few exceptions to this trend is the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), a nonpartisan, independent public polling organization founded in late 1989 to facilitate democratization in Bulgaria by monitoring popular attitudes and serving as a watchdog of the postcommunist

institutional reform process. CSD is dedicated to the values of democracy and market economy, as well as the official goal of Bulgaria's successful integration into the European Union and NATO. Vitosha Research is a social and marketing survey research company affiliated with CSD. Since conducting pioneering independent preelection and postelection surveys in 1990 (exit polls were banned that year), Vitosha Research has built a reputation for providing accurate and high-quality polling analysis compatible with international standards.

The Balkan British Social Surveys (BBSS), founded in 1991, is the first privately owned and now the biggest market, media, and public opinion research organization in Bulgaria. It is a full member of Gallup International. Through a network of affiliated and joint ventures in other Balkan countries and in Ukraine, BBSS has emerged as the regional leader in southeastern Europe in providing multicountry public opinion research. Other important private organizations doing public opinion survey research in Bulgaria are GfK Bulgaria, a Bulgarian subsidiary of the German GfK Gruppe, which was set up in 1994; Alpha Research, a member of the European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR) as well as of the Bulgarian Sociological Association; MBMD Research Institute, also an ESOMAR member; and Market Test, a member of both ESOMAR and Global Market Research, which was established in 1995.

Most of the public opinion research agencies in Bulgaria are dependent on political parties and special interests. Every major political party is linked to one or more polling organizations. The sole exception is the National Center for Public-Opinion Research established by

the National Assembly in 1991, which is the only polling agency partially independent from political influences since it is directly subordinate to parliamentary control.

Foreign public opinion survey specialists now have free access in Bulgaria to conduct sample surveys on absolutely any issue at any time. But in nearly all cases, local research organizations are hired to collect survey data, including for such foreign-sponsored polling projects as the Central and Eastern Euro-Barometer; the New Democracies Barometer (now renamed the New Europe Barometer); the Comparative National Elections Project; the Times-Mirror Center for the People and the Press, East/West Poll; Corruption Indexes; and the Political and Economic Index, among others.

Apart from representative sample surveys, an array of other research tools and techniques are used to collect information about public opinion, including qualitative research instruments such as focus groups, projective methods, in-depth interviews, desk research, and so on. Since the beginning of the transition, public attendance at political rallies is carefully monitored and widely publicized in the media to gauge the extent of mass support for a particular politician, political party, public issue, or the government. Elite interviews with local politicians enlisting their informed judgments about popular attitudes are also used. Finally, election results are widely utilized to tap into the mass public's mood and thinking at a particular point in time, since popular elections are seen as the best expression of public opinion in a democratic polity and society—the equivalent to the general will concept of the eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Major Domestic Issues

The introduction of Western-style democracy and capitalist economy is an issue that has long divided the public's thinking in Bulgaria. The postcommunist regime has so far performed unsatisfactorily in the national economy, raising serious doubts among survey respondents about the merits of democratic authorities. As a result, the euphoria associated with the inauguration of democracy has given way to frustration, disappointment, anger, apathy, and even longing for the good old days of communism. As responses to survey items concerning retroactive assessments of the previous regime and economy indicate, nostalgia for the political stability, economic security, and relative prosperity of the old system is much more widespread now than at the beginning of the transition.

There has been in particular a substantial decline in popular acceptance of the market economy. Judging from the replies of Bulgarian respondents from 1990 to the present, the free market has lost much of its previously considerable popular appeal. This is especially true among older respondents, including the large number of pensioners in Bulgaria, the less educated, and rural Bulgarians, who are adversely affected by market reforms that have eroded their economic security and previously guaranteed living standards.

Sociotropic pessimism about the current state of the national economy is matched by equally negative egocentric (or individual) evaluations of one's household situation. In poll after poll, absolute majorities of Bulgarians report that their family's economic condition is worse now than it was in the pretransition past. Such widespread negative responses to economic and social items are linked to

sharply lower popular satisfaction with the functioning of democracy. In the recent New Europe Barometer I (2001), only 2 percent of Bulgarian respondents said they were "very satisfied" with the way democracy works in their country; 25 percent were "fairly satisfied," 42 percent "not very satisfied," and 30 percent "not at all satisfied." Bulgarians are also unhappy about official corruption; 74 percent of Bulgarian respondents in the same sample think that most or nearly all public officials are corrupt and take bribes.

At the same time, public opinion surveys show that there is relatively limited attitudinal support among the mass public for antisystem extremists of either the left or the right. In spite of the mass discontent, an absolute majority is supportive of democracy as the best system, especially among the younger generation, the educated, and urban Bulgarians. Though widespread, disenchantment with the current regime and especially its economic policies has not resulted in the loss of democratic support. Bulgarian respondents continue to favor representative democracy while harboring misgivings about the new capitalist economy and the performance of the current regime.

Other issues that have divided the Bulgarian public are integration into Europe and future NATO membership. Although there has been a significant and stable level of public support for integrating into the European Union (EU), the question of joining NATO has been more controversial and divisive, especially since NATO's intervention in the civil war in Bosnia and the bombing of Yugoslavia. Public opinion polls show that only recently has mass support for membership in NATO grown to more than half of Bulgarians

polled. Because the old image of the North Atlantic alliance has persisted, particularly among older Bulgarians and those on the left, the government has ruled out holding a popular referendum on Bulgaria's entry into NATO.

Another issue dividing the public is the sizeable ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The educated sectors of society, particularly urban intelligentsia, want full respect for the civil and political liberties of Muslim Turks, whereas many ordinary Bulgarians, especially those living in predominantly Turkish areas, vehemently oppose giving too many rights to non-Bulgarian minorities, fearing that this would encourage anti-Bulgarian separatism. The major political parties have avoided entering into a formal coalition with the predominantly Turkish party the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), fearing that anti-Turkish attitudes among Bulgarian voters will lessen their own electoral appeal. Public opinion polls show that the MRF has a public image as a polarizing political force with a hidden separatist agenda and that many Bulgarian respondents resent its ability to play the role of political powerbroker by taking advantage of the fragmentation of Bulgaria's political party system and national legislature.

Public Opinion and Government

Bulgarian politicians are known to be as poll-driven as their American counterparts. Very few, if any, politicians are prepared to challenge openly the dictates of public opinion, even if they consider it to be uninformed, unthinking, fickle, selfish, or based, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's words, on the passions of men. Although public opinion does not appear to influence the details of most government poli-

cies, it obviously sets limits that Bulgarian policymakers can ignore only at their peril. For instance, no elected politician has dared to endorse giving administrative and cultural autonomy to Muslim Turks in Bulgaria, which is anathema to all nationalistic-minded Bulgarians.

Nor can government officials afford not to respond to widespread popular demands for fighting crime and corruption, increasing social welfare expenditures, and cutting income and real estate taxes. Politicians also try to avoid or postpone decisions that they believe fly in the face of public opinion. For example, fearing a public backlash, successive postcommunist cabinets have reluctantly implemented International Monetary Fund recommendations for economic austerity and balanced budgets by cutting social spending and raising government taxes and user fees. Still, Bulgarian policymakers have ignored or rejected strong popular pressures for holding a referendum on the status of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria on the grounds that human rights issues should not be resolved by public opinion.

Public opinion seems to be more effective in influencing policymaking at the local level, as local government officials tend to yield more easily to popular pressures for safer and cleaner streets, better roads, improved schools, and more doctors and hospital beds. By contrast, public opinion seems to play a more limited role at the national level—partly because of the inability of most ordinary people to understand the complexities and dynamic interdependence of many of the issues facing the national government, such as the long-term benefits of Bulgaria's participation in the World Trade Organization, the European Union, and NATO. At the same time, public opinion has been a

useful check on governmental authority—even at the national level. The Bulgarian public has resisted the more blatant attempts by the national government to carry out its postcommunist reform program at the expense of lower- and middle-income citizens, who have seen retail prices and government taxes soar while personal incomes have stagnated or even plummeted. Whenever the government has remained passive or indifferent to public demands for immediate social relief, the result has been periodic outbursts of popular discontentment, anger, and protest, which have occasionally toppled the party cabinet of the day in a sort of Lockean self-defense by the outraged citizenry.

With few exceptions, polls have been successful in forecasting election results in nearly every postcommunist election. One of the notable failures was the June 10–17, 1990, parliamentary election, when most polls predicted a victory by the anticommunist Union of the Democratic Forces (UDF), but it was the ruling Socialists (former Communists) who won the vote by a fairly large margin. Another such failure was the presidential election of November 11–18, 2001, when all the major polls gave incumbent president Petar Stoyanov (UDF) a substantial lead over all his rivals—only to see him go down in defeat in the runoff ballot at the hands of socialist leader Georgi Parvanov. Still, politicians, journalists, and other public commentators continue to rely on polling data, particularly on the eve of elections, to analyze emerging trends in public opinion.

Conceptions of Public Opinion

Academic sociologists are the ones who have most often explored the conceptual foundations of public opinion. Although

the dominant view before November 1989 was that there could be only one public opinion on an issue at any one time, now there is the recognition that there may be many different public opinions existing on a given issue at the same time. One body of public opinion may be predominant, but this does not mean that other organized opinions do not exist—a pluralism of opinions based on class, religion, gender, age, ethnicity, region, ideology, and political affiliation. It is also recognized that even homogeneous public opinion can be composed of individual opinions that are rooted in different interests and values. In other words, rather than being a function of group opinion, public opinion may actually develop on an individualistic basis and may be more reflective of individual tastes and preferences.

Conclusion

The future of public opinion research in Bulgaria is linked directly to the future improvement of the ailing national economy. If the country's economic situation improves, so will the national market for polling services, making it profitable for polling organizations to conduct public opinion surveys outside the area of market research.

Rossen Vassilev

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Canada

A puzzle in Canadian politics is that Canadians who are similar in many ways but who live in different regions behave differently in the political sphere. Political observers, realizing the salience of regional identities, especially in electoral behavior, worry about the fragmentary nature of the Canadian polity (see Clarke et al. 2000; McRoberts 1995, 1997). Some suggest that it may be misleading to speak of a *Canadian* public. Rather, they suggest, the appropriate unit of analysis in public opinion research is the regional, and not the national, community (i.e., Gidengil et al. 1999). However there are good reasons to be skeptical about this claim: Canada's electoral laws create incentives for office-seekers to mobilize supporters along regional lines. As a result, electoral returns exaggerate political differences among Canada's regions.

The patterns of consensus among Canada's regional communities suggest that there is a coherent Canadian public, at least in regard to what issues Canadians identify as most important. Using the Canadian Election Study data for elections held from 1974 to 2000, this discussion identifies these issues and tracks their salience over time. Finding that the Canadian public is responsive to changes in the sociopolitical context, this discussion questions whether there are regional differences in the issues Canadians identify as most important. Finally, finding few cross-regional differences of opinion, this discussion suggests that there is no general trend toward increasing divergence among Canada's regions. Rather, in spite of recent regionalized party politics, there continues to be cross-regional agreement on what issues are most important. Where the few regional differences in opinion emerge, they seem more indicative of short-term reactions to the objective differences among Canada's regions than of evidence of deep-rooted discord. How, then, is the highly regionalized party system accounted for? It is to this question I return in the final section.

The Lack of Consensus in Canadian Electoral Politics

To some readers, the emphasis on agreement may seem misplaced. Indeed, it stands in sharp contrast to the emphasis on fragmentation in the study of Canadian politics. To clarify, this discussion considers the patterns of consensus on what the important issues of the day are, and not agreement about how these issues should be addressed. In doing so, it is assumed that disagreement about *how issues are addressed* is less fundamental than disagreement about *which issues are*

important. This may be especially true when governments derive the majority of their electoral support from a minority of regions. If publics are defined in terms of common interest, there may be as many publics as there are issues (Allport 1933). The crucial question for this analysis is whether the boundaries of the issue publics correspond to Canada's regional boundaries: do Canadian regions share common interests?

The balance of contemporary wisdom in public opinion research emphasizes the salience of regional identities. One factor is the highly regionalized distribution of support for Canadian political parties. In the 2000 election, for example, the incumbent Liberal Party drew almost all of its support from central Canada, predominantly Ontario. The next largest party, the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance Party, was elected exclusively in Canada's western provinces. The Bloc Quebecois contested seats only in Quebec. Support for the Progressive Conservatives and New Democrats was somewhat more broad but remained concentrated in central and eastern Canada. This pattern of regional voting first emerged in the 1993 election but characterizes well the distribution of support for Canada's political parties throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s. It is not surprising, therefore, that contemporary students of Canadian public opinion emphasize regional identities.

There is good reason to be skeptical of the differences between Canada's regional communities: Canada's electoral rules create incentives for parties to mobilize support through regional identities (although Cairns [1983] referred to the strategies of the provincial parties, his argument applies equally well to regional parties competing in national

elections). That is, parties can achieve considerable electoral success by claiming to represent the particular interests of that region to the federal government. This claim is especially persuasive when support for the governing party is regionally concentrated.

Figure 1 provides some insight into the dynamics of regional representation. Reporting the effective number of provinces upon which the governing and chief opposition parties rely for their electoral support, this figure tracks the increasing regionalization of party support. Note that the Liberal Party has maintained a fairly constant and regionally concentrated basis of support throughout the period. In fact, from 1974 to 2000, on average, 80 percent of the Liberal Party's seats were elected in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. As a result, the burden of cross-regional consensus-building has fallen largely on the opposition parties throughout this period. Until recently, the Progressive Conservatives acted as brokers among Canada's regions, maintaining a significant cross-regional basis of support, and effectively represented about half of Canada's provinces. It is not surprising, therefore, that with the electoral defeat of the Progressive Conservatives and the stability of Liberal Party support in central Canada, the parties mobilized regional identities in their bids for office. The resulting highly fragmented party system may exaggerate differences in the political priorities of Canada's regional communities.

There is some evidence in public opinion research that the perceived cross-regional differences are less fundamental than recent electoral returns indicate. Differences in the support for parties are real and cannot be attributed to differences in the social characteristics of




Figure 1 Effective Number of Provinces Represented by Government and Opposition Parties, 1972–2000

Note: The Effective Number of Provinces ($ENP=1/\hat{A}p_i^2$, where p_i is the proportion of party seats elected in the n th province) reports the number of provinces upon which the governing and opposition parties rely for their electoral support. The parties are indicated: L—Liberal Party, PC—Progressive Conservatives, RE—Reform Party, CRCA—Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance.

Sources: For elections held from 1974 to 1988, data reported in Frizzel (1989) are used. Data for elections after 1993 are taken from the Elections Canada *Official Reports*.

Canada's regions (Gidengil et al. 1999). However, there appear to be few cross-regional differences in political priorities: although some analysts have concluded that there are important cross-regional differences, they are surprisingly subtle and generally reflect short-term reactions to political context (see Gidengil et al. 1999). (A notable exception, of course, is in cross-regional patterns of support for Quebec: this will be considered below.) Further, it seems that political culture contributes to a fairly small proportion of the cross-regional differences in support for Canada's parties (Gidengil et al. 1999). Rather, voters tend to be responsive to the politics of the day in assessing their prior-

ities, suggesting that there may be the potential for cross-regional agreement.

Research Strategy

Now I evaluate the patterns of consensus among Canada's regional communities through the analysis of data collected by the various Canadian Election Study (CES) teams. Since 1974, the CES has included a question asking respondents to identify the "most important problem" in Canadian politics. Methodological tables are included at the end of this discussion and provides the question wording and other details. There are, however, several advantages to using these data. First, these items offer the important advantage

of open-ended responses. That is, respondents could identify any issue they felt to be important and were not confined to closed-response categories (see Geer 1991). Second, these data were collected immediately after election campaigns, when political priorities are most salient. In combination, these features of the data—open-ended responses and the timing of data collection—ensure that if there are important differences in the interests of Canada's regional communities, they will be apparent in this analysis.

Which Issues Are Important to Canadians?

There are several pivotal events in the 1974–2000 period. First, the 1970s and early 1980s were tumultuous years in Canadian history. On the one hand, the 1970s are characterized by increasingly strained relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada, culminating in the 1981 referendum on sovereignty association and the patriation of Pierre Elliot Trudeau's 1982 Constitution Act without Quebec's endorsement. On the other hand, Canada shared in the economic hardship of this era, which was characterized by stagflation and increasing energy costs. Second, scholars also draw attention to the pivotal events of the late 1980s and early 1990s in their accounts of Canada's disunity. Among these are the failure of several initiatives to bring Quebec into the constitution (the Meech Lake Accord was rejected by the Manitoba and Newfoundland legislatures, and the Charlottetown Accord was defeated in a 1993 referendum) and an ailing economy (which many attributed to the 1988 free trade agreement with the United States). In 1995, Quebec held (and narrowly defeated) a second referendum on secession. In short, this analysis considers a period

in Canadian politics in which there was visible strain on the relationships between Canada's regional communities and the federal government.

Not surprisingly, the dynamics of public opinion at the national level reflect the turbulence of the period. Figure 2 reports the proportion of respondents who identify each issue as most important in each election. First, it is clear that no issue has dominated the Canadian political agenda throughout this period. Unemployment, for example, was identified as most important by very few respondents in 1974, 1979, 1988, and 2000 but was the most frequently identified issue in the 1984, 1993, and 1997 elections. Second, as evident in 1988, there is the potential for considerable consensus on the importance of key issues (i.e., the free trade agreement). Together, these findings suggest that Canadians assess their political priorities often and in a responsive way. However, few issues are identified by a majority of respondents. Are different regions identifying different issues?

The 1997 Election

To evaluate this possibility, consider a case in which there is a large variance in the identification of the most important issues. In the 1997 election, four issues were prominent in the campaign and throughout Canada's regions, each supported by fairly sizable proportions (see Nevitte et al. 1999 for a comprehensive analysis of this election). How were these issues prioritized by region? First, as seen in Figure 3, unemployment and job creation issues were at the top of the agenda in nearly every region. Second, economic management is ranked second west of Quebec (and in Quebec when issues regarding Quebec's role in the federation are excluded), although social services




Figure 2 Most Important Issues, 1974–2000

Note: This figure reports the proportion identifying each issue type as most important, for each election year. Please refer to the methodological tables for the details of question-wording, response coding, and study design.

Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1974–2000.

are clearly a higher priority in the Atlantic region. Finally, and not surprisingly, issues relating to Quebec's role in the Canadian federation are most salient within Quebec but are not identified with markedly different levels of salience in the rest of Canada. In each region outside Quebec, it is the fourth issue on the political agenda.

How should these patterns be interpreted? The most important finding is that in one of the most regionalized elections (see Figure 1; this election resulted in a government with the most concentrated electoral base in this period) there was considerable cross-regional agreement about the rank-ordering of policy issues.

Localism in Political Priorities

Recognizing that rank-ordering may be generally maintained across regions, what accounts for cross-regional variance in the proportion of each region identifying a particular issue? By accounting for this variance, the explanation may be extended to account for cases in which the rank-ordering of issues differs across regions. As seen in Figure 3, although unemployment issues were most frequently identified in most regions, there is considerable variance in the proportion identifying this issue. Fred Cutler (2000, 2002) suggests that the ordering of political priorities reflects not only personal interests but also concern for the interests of those in one's immediate surroundings.




Figure 3 Most Important Issue by Region, 1997

Note: This figure reports the proportion identifying each issue as most important. Please refer to the methodological tables for the details of question-wording, response coding, and study design.

Source: Canadian Election Survey, 1997.

Differences in the proportions identifying a particular issue likely reflect differences in the respondent's local environment. In regions where objective conditions make an issue particularly salient, respondents are more likely to identify this issue as most important.

Figure 4 reports the proportion identifying unemployment issues as most important, by region and for each election since 1974. As in Figure 2, these proportions vary considerably across elections. Note that the cross-regional differences in these proportions vary as well. In some elections, there is a nearly 30 percentage-point difference in the frequency with which unemployment issues are identified, whereas in other elections this gap is

narrower. Note that the greatest cross-regional differences in the frequency with which unemployment issues are identified occur when the issue is highly salient across all regions. In the 1997 election, it was generally agreed that unemployment issues were most important. The cross-regional rank-ordering of issues, at least with regard to the primary importance of unemployment, is generally coherent in the 1984 and 1993 elections as well. Therefore, the fluctuating variance in the proportion of respondents identifying unemployment issues cannot be attributed to differences in the rank-ordering of salient issues.

However, when the frequency with which unemployment issues are identi-




Figure 4 Patterns of Consensus: Unemployment and Job Creation

Note: This figure reports the proportion identifying “Unemployment or Job Creation” as the most important issue for each election year. Please refer to the methodological tables for the details of question-wording, response coding, and study design.

Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1974–2000.

fied is compared with actual unemployment rates (see Figure 5), it is clear that local context plays an important role: not only are the overtime trends parallel (the correlations between the frequency with which unemployment issues are identified and unemployment rates range from 0.7 in the west to 0.9 in Atlantic Canada); the rank-ordering of regions is roughly consistent (with the exception of Quebec in the late 1970s). This finding suggests that where cross-regional differences in the political priorities emerge, they may reflect pragmatic responses of Canadians to their differing environments. Further, even where differences are substantial, there remains the potential for cross-regional consensus on which issues are

most important. Finally, when it is not clear whether or how a particular issue will vary in its effect on the regions, as is often the case with foreign policy issues (see Figure 6), cross-regional differences are considerably reduced.

Patterns of Consensus

Similar results hold for each of the salient issues identified in Figure 2 (see Figure 7). First, the salience of each issue waxes and wanes throughout the period and generally from one election to the next. Second, Canada’s regional publics move together in response to their shared political context. That is, rarely does an issue increase or decrease in salience in only one province. Rather, Canadians




Figure 5 Unemployment Rate by Province, 1976–2000

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 2002002, “Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by sex and detailed age group; Unemployment rate; Both sexes; 15 years and over (Rate).”




Figure 6 Patterns of Consensus: Foreign Affairs

Note: This figure reports the proportion identifying foreign affairs (including relations with the United States) as most important in each election year. Please refer to the methodological tables for details of question-wording, response coding, and study design.

Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1974–2000.




Figure 7 Patterns of Consensus: Economic Management (Excluding Employment)

Note: This figure reports the proportion identifying economic management issues as most important for each election year. Please refer to the methodological tables for the details of question-wording, response coding, and study design.

Source: Canadian Election Studies, 1974–2000.

across all regions recognize the salience of a particular issue. Third, the rate at which Canadians recognize the salience of an issue is tempered by the characteristics of their local environment. By consequence, it is when issues are most salient at the national level that cross-regional gaps emerge. Rarely, however, does this imply differences in the rank-ordering of issues. Nor is there evidence that the Canadian regions are becoming increasingly divergent. In sum, in spite of objective differences among Canada's regional communities, the patterns of public opinion reflect consistent cross-regional consensus, at least with regard to political priorities.

One obvious source of disagreement, however, remains: the role of Quebec in

the Canadian federation. It is instructive, however, that only once (in 1979) did Quebecers most frequently identify issues relating to Quebec's role and distinctiveness as most important. Surprisingly, in spite of the seeming importance of this issue to the success of the Reform Party (and its successors) in the west (Blais et al. 2002; Gidengil et al. 1999; Nevitte et al. 1999), it is ranked fairly low among the region's priorities. That Quebecers consistently identify issues that are agreed upon to be most important across Canada indicates that the patterns of consensus in Canadian public opinion include Quebec.

How are these findings reconciled with Canada's highly regionalized party system? There are two possible explanations. First, most obviously, although Canada's

regions agree on which issues are most important, they disagree on how they should be handled. Looking to other research however, a second, more plausible account presents itself: Harold D. Clarke and his colleagues (2000, p. 229) find that links between parties and issues are lacking. That is, although voters have clear conceptions about which issues are most important, their vote decisions have little to do with the parties' positions on the issues. Indeed, in the 1997 election, few voters found any of the parties close to them on their most important issue (Clarke et al. 2000, p. 230). When this finding is considered in light of the potential for cross-regional agreement identified in this discussion, it becomes clear that Canada's highly regionalized party system is not inherent to the Canadian polity but to Canada's parties. In other words, the patterns of consensus uniting Canada's regional communities provide evidence in support of a coherent *Canadian* public.

The Data

This analysis draws heavily on the Canadian (National) Election Studies. Since 1965, the leading scholars of Canadian politics (often with invaluable international assistance) have collaborated in the design and administration of a nationally representative public opinion survey to allow for the analysis of voter decisionmaking. Data sets for elections prior to 1997 were retrieved from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research archives at the University of Michigan (www.icpsr.umich.edu). The 1997 and 2000 data were retrieved from the Canadian Election Study, archived at the Université de Montréal (www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-ec/ces.html).

Prior to and including the 1984 study, the data were collected in personal interviews shortly after the election. Beginning in 1988, interviews were conducted by telephone, and the study included a campaign period component that includes a number of the standard items. For consistency of comparison, the post-election item is used in this analysis for these elections.

The 1979–1980 election study includes a panel component of respondents interviewed in 1974, in addition to a fresh cross section. For consistency of comparison with the other studies, this analysis includes the fresh cross-section respondents. As no new respondents were added to the 1980 study, it is excluded from this analysis. All data are weighted according to the instructions provided in the study documentation.

Canada's Regions

To allow for sufficiently large sample sizes, the smaller provinces are grouped according to region in the following way: Atlantic region (Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick); Midwest (Manitoba and Saskatchewan); and West (Alberta and British Columbia). The Territories, which regrettably were not included in the earlier studies, are consequently excluded from the analysis. The data used in this analysis are taken from the following CES items.

Coding of Response Categories

To allow for overtime comparison of the importance of different issues, it was necessary to create broader response categories than those provided. Table 1 provides examples of the types of issues that were coded in each category. Note that the patterns reported in the sections

Table 1 Question Text

<i>Year</i>	<i>Variable Label</i>	
1974	V92	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Now, I would like to ask you some more specific questions about the recent federal election. What, in your opinion, was the most important issue to you, personally, in that election?
1979	V1154	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Now, I would like to ask you some more specific questions about the recent federal election. What, in your opinion, was the most important issue to you, personally, in that election?
1984	VAR065	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the 1984 federal election. What, in your opinion, was the most important issue in that election?
1988	F1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First, what is the most important issue in this campaign to you?
1993	PESA1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the campaign, what was the most important issue to you personally?
1997	PESA1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What was the most important issue to you personally in this election?
2000	PESA1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What was the most important issue to you personally in this election?

Table 2 Examples of Issue Types

<i>Management of the Economy</i>	<i>Unemployment and Job Creation</i>	<i>Social Services</i>	<i>Foreign Affairs</i>	<i>Role of Quebec in Canada</i>	<i>Specific Comments or Criticisms</i>	<i>about Candidates and Parties</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inflation Cost of living Wage & price controlling/freezing Mortgage/interest rates Taxes (general, income, or sales) Corporate taxes, taxing, profiteering Foreign investment/control Prices Wage prices (in general) and wage prices (of specific items) and wages Value of the dollar 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unemployment insurance Unemployment/jobs/employment Job creation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education—expensive unnecessary expense/control of education spending Education Health programs/hospitals Old age Pension Care/help for aged/old 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Canada's relations with rest of world/foreign affairs, trade Armed forces/national defense Testing of warheads/nuclear power Free trade agreement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Separatism Bilingualism/French Unity Quebec's dominance of government, pampering of Quebec, French power, need more representation from west 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political apathy Same party controlling federal & provincial government To change the government/general dislike Discouraged with political system/government/running of government/civil service/government spending Majority government/stable government Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The leader The candidate/the party The party (platform) “Getting rid of Trudeau”

above hold for the specific issues identified in each election.

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Chile

Public opinion polls have taken on a central role in Chilean politics and society. Poll results are regularly used to support certain views, oppose others, evaluate legislative initiatives, assess the government's popularity, and anticipate future electoral scenarios. Although polling is such an essential component of the public debate, the professionalism and ethical standards of many polling companies are far from satisfactory. In recent years, polling techniques have improved and a handful of highly reputable companies have emerged. Yet there are several problems that need to be overcome to make the field more reliable and accountable.

Below I present a brief history of polling in Chile. I then describe the most important polling companies operating today. I also discuss the role polling has played in recent elections, underlining the close links between certain political parties and many polling companies. Finally, I address how polling influences the political agenda. I conclude with an assessment of the challenges that the public opinion polling needs to overcome to consolidate its position as a reliable source of information of the public will and as an accountable and self-regulating discipline.

A History of Polling in Chile, 1958–2001

Public opinion polls date back to 1958 when sociologist Mario Hamuy conducted a study of political views and culture in the Santiago metropolitan area,

where 32 percent of Chile's 7.4 million inhabitants lived. Others joined Hamuy in the 1960s, experimenting with different sampling strategies and exhibiting different levels of accuracy (López and Martínez 1999). Polls were first used in presidential elections in 1964, when Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei defeated Socialist Salvador Allende 55.7 percent to 38.6 percent. Because conservative parties opted out of the election to make it easier for Frei to win, there was little uncertainty about the results of that election during the campaign and, naturally, there was little polling done. Six years later, the presidential election was hotly contested. Several polls were taken during the campaign, mostly covering Santiago or the three largest urban centers (Santiago, Valparaíso, and Concepción), which together comprised slightly more than 60 percent of the national population. Salvador Allende edged out conservative Jorge Alessandri by 1.5 percent (36.3–35 percent). Alessandri supporters, relying on polls that showed him ahead in Santiago, had anticipated a close victory. In the end, Alessandri did win in Santiago (38.1–34.5 percent) but lost so decisively in northern Chile that Allende became the plurality winner (Urzúa Valenzuela 1992, p. 639).

In 1973, the Pinochet dictatorship, established after the military coup that overthrew Allende, temporarily halted public opinion polls. Although a dynamic marketing field developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, political polls were not conducted until the mid-1980s. There were several regularly held nongovernmental polls to measure unemployment and poverty, particularly in Santiago, but surveys scientifically designed to assess political views were not conducted. As 1988 approached, the year that Pinochet's

custom made constitution mandated a plebiscite to choose between democratic transition and eight more years under Pinochet, more attention was paid to political attitudes of Chileans. The Latin American School of Social Sciences (FLACSO) conducted a poll in Santiago in late 1986 (Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo/FLACSO 1987), and the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), a conservative think tank financed by different businessmen, conducted its first poll in early 1987.

The field got crowded as the October 1988 plebiscite neared, with several companies publicizing their results, but not their methodologies. Most of those mushroom companies disappeared after Pinochet lost overwhelmingly in the plebiscite. In the 1989 presidential and parliamentary elections, new companies appeared, but polling was seen as part of the electoral strategy of the candidates rather than as an accurate description of electoral preferences. Because most polling companies were associated, or directly owned, by politicians from different parties, their reliability and accuracy were regularly questioned by the mass media. The 1990s witnessed the consolidation of polling as a legitimate and reliable tool to assess public views, though new companies have continued to enter the market in election years with bold claims and predictions. Reputation has increasingly become a central component of polling companies, but the lack of a regulatory framework and the absence of a national professional association of pollsters make it difficult for the public to easily distinguish between legitimate pollsters and those with methodological, ethical, and conflict-of-interest problems, given their poor polling and sampling techniques or their association with particular candidates.

Polling Companies in the 1990s and Beyond

There are several established companies with good reputation that are reliable and rigorous. The most dependable public poll is conducted twice a year by CEP, the not-for-profit conservative think tank. Modeled after the Brookings Institution, CEP regularly produces publications intended to influence public policy and promote free-market ideals. Although CEP also conducts special polls to measure national attitudes on moral values and other current affairs, its regular poll has acquired an uncontested national legitimacy. The CEP poll is also the only truly national poll. Although 86 percent of Chileans live in urban areas, CEP is the only polling company that incorporates the rural population in its sampling.

Feedback, Benchmark, Gemines, MORI-Chile, and Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Contemporánea (CERC) are also household names for the mass media and social and political actors. Although more than a dozen other companies were active in producing preelection polls for the December 2001 parliamentary election, most new companies either suffer from lack of credibility for their close association with certain political parties or will have to endure the untrustworthiness of having wrongly predicted election results. In fact, a few companies have been pushed out of the market because of erroneous electoral predictions. Gallup-Chile erred so dramatically in all electoral predictions from 1988 to 1992 that it lost its credibility and was forced to close. Other companies that have suffered from credibility are Gemines, Adimark, MORI, and CERC. Adimark teamed up with TV networks to conduct exit polls for the 1993 presidential and parliamentary elections. Because of the lack of an ethical

code of conduct and no regulatory framework, TV networks rushed to air the exit-poll results before voting ended. Because the bulk of the exit-poll predictions were wrong, and as a result of the public outcry for announcing the results before voting ended, TV networks have refrained from conducting exit polls since. As a result of the gaffe, CEP terminated its relationship with Adimark and began to conduct its polls on its own, further consolidating its position as the most respected polling company in Chile. To be sure, the vote-counting process in Chile takes little time. In all elections since 1989, the results have been known within a couple of hours after precincts close, reducing the demand for accurate exit-poll results. Yet the bad reputation earned by past exit polls makes it difficult to reposition that tool in the eyes of the public.

A few media outlets have begun teaming up with polling companies to conduct their own studies. Canal 13, the Catholic Church-owned TV network, recently teamed up with *El Mercurio*, the most influential newspaper in the country, and OPINA S.A. (a private polling company) to conduct period polls in Santiago and other major cities. *La Tercera*, the second most influential newspaper, has teamed up with Feedback to conduct polls on the political views and attitudes of Chileans.

Political parties have also relied on private polling to inform their platforms. The conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) has strong links with Benchmark and Gemines, companies partially owned by active UDI militants. The conservative group National Renewal (RN) relies on Fundación Futuro, a private foundation owned by Sebastián Piñera, a former RN senator and current party pres-

ident. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC), member of the governing center-left Concertación coalition, is closely associated with MORI and CERC, owned by PDC militants. The Socialist Party and the Party for Democracy (PPD) have close ties to Feedback. The presidency has also made good use of polling since the return of democracy in 1990. In fact, no former president used polling more consistently to inform his public agenda than current leader Ricardo Lagos. Lagos's personal pollster, Javier Martínez, is believed to conduct weekly surveys to assess the president's popularity and the electorate's perception of government's initiatives.

*Other Polls and Surveys
Conducted by the Government
and Nonprofit Institutions*

Other organizations and institutes also conduct regular polls. The government's CASEN poll, conducted every two years, measures poverty and the effect of public policy efforts to eradicate it. First conducted in 1987, CASEN has gained a reputation of rigorousness and reliability. With more than 50,000 households surveyed and more than 200,000 interviews, the CASEN poll can also be defined as a minicensus. The University of Chile's department of economics has conducted a quarterly poll in Santiago to measure unemployment for more than 20 years. More recently, the United Nations Development Programme began conducting a detailed poll to measure human development. Its Human Development Report is produced every two years and is considered one of the most reliable assessments of deeper societal changes in perceptions and attitudes. Fundación Paz Ciudadana, a not-for-profit organization concerned with preventing crime and strengthening

civil society, conducts annual polls to assess the effect of government policies to reduce and combat crime.

Most recently, *Latinobarómetro*, a Latin American company with headquarters in Chile, has also widely publicized its findings. Although the *Latinobarómetro* is designed to conduct similar polls in all of Latin America, using an international network of existing polling companies, its Santiago location is an indication of how much the field has developed in the country in recent years.

Public Opinion Polls and Political Campaigns

Naturally, the reliability of the polling industry is affected by how close their electoral predictions are. In the most recent presidential election (December 1999), the candidate of the ruling Concertación coalition, Ricardo Lagos, faced the popular leader of the conservative opposition, Joaquín Lavín, and four other candidates. After a hotly contested cam-

paign where Lagos's and Lavín's camps put out polling results showing them ahead, the first round of voting resulted in a razor-thin victory for Lagos, sending the election into a runoff. Lagos went on to win 51.3 percent to 48.7 percent, but the closeness of the first vote cast a shadow of doubt over the methodology and accuracy of some of the most prominent polling companies.

Table 1 shows the electoral predictions of the most important Chilean polling companies. Only CEP conducted a nationwide poll based on probabilistic sampling, with the rest conducting either Santiago only or all cities with more than 40,000 inhabitants, which covers about 70 percent of the national population. Because not all companies report margins of error, they are not included in Table 1. Many companies came very close to the final first-round results, but their credibility was initially put into question because they were associated with the conservative candidate (as in the case of Futuro,

Table 1 Public Opinion Polls Predictions for 1999 Presidential Election

<i>Company</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Lagos</i>	<i>Lavín</i>	<i>Others*</i>	<i>Null/ Blank/ Undecided</i>	<i>DK/ NR</i>
Benchmark	Nov 1999	42.7	39.8	11.4	6.1	
CEP	Sept–Oct 99	39.9	38.2	5.4	13.7	–
CEP**	Sept–Oct 99	46.4	44.4	6.2	2.9	–
CERC	Dec 1999	45.0	39.0	12.1	1.8	2.1
Futuro**	Nov 1999	47.0	47.0	7.0	–	–
Futuro	Nov 1999	45.0	45.0	7.0	4.0	–
Gemines	Nov 13–23, 99	41.7	41.5	5.2	–	11.6
MORI	Nov 17–24, 99	42.0	36.0	17.0	–	5.0
Actual Vote	Dec 13, 1999	48.0	47.5	4.5	–	–

* Includes Arturo Frei, Gladys Marín, Sara Larraín, and Tomás Hirsch.

** Excluding null and blank.

Sources: Espinoza 1999; Ministerior del Interior 2002; CEP 1999, 2002; CERC 1999.

Benchmark, and Gemines). The CEP poll, conducted a month before the election, overestimated the support for alternative candidates, but it might well have been that many of those who intended to vote for other candidates changed their minds in the days before the election. The polls conducted by CERC and MORI also overestimated the vote for alternative candidates but predicted a larger margin of victory for Lagos. Both polling companies have been associated with the PDC, and their predictions were harshly criticized by other pollsters as being more of a campaign stunt than an accurate picture of the electoral preferences of voters.

The support for alternative candidates was of particular importance given that three of the four alternative candidates were leftists widely considered as taking votes away from the candidate of the Concertación. Because the Chilean constitution mandates a runoff if no candidate gets more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round, the electoral strength for leftist alternative candidates was pivotal for the second round. The MORI poll grossly overestimated the support for the four alternative candidates, attributing 11 percent to the three leftist candidates and 6 percent to the conservative candidate. In the end, the combined vote for Joaquín Lavín and the alternative conservative candidate was 47.9 percent, much higher than the 42 percent predicted by MORI. Despite the errors in predictions, the 1999 presidential elections showed the importance polls have gained in influencing political campaigns. The two leading candidates conducted weekly private polls to assess the effect of their campaigns, and the press reported enthusiastically the results of almost any poll released by reputable and emerging companies.

Although most polling has been historically conducted through face-to-face interviews in the respondents' residences, some companies, most notably Fundación Futuro, have recently begun to use computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) to reduce costs and speed the time spent interviewing. Those companies have been severely criticized because only about 60 percent of Chilean households have telephone lines and more than 20 percent live below the poverty line. Yet with the appropriate sampling corrections, the problem can be minimized, and accurate and reliable information can be gathered at a much lower cost. It is highly likely that, as time progresses, more and more companies will move from expensive and time-consuming home visits by interviewers to the less expensive and faster CATI model.

Public Opinion Polls as a Source of Knowledge and History

After more than 15 years of active polling and after 12 years of continuous democratic rule, the information gathered over time by public opinion polls has allowed for the creation of a sizable databank of information on political attitudes, values, and views of Chileans over time. There are two time-series data that constitute the most cited and trusted evaluations of politics and of the economy by Chileans during the 1990s. The presidential approval index and the evaluation of the country's economic conditions are widely used as snapshots of the social and political mood of Chileans over time. Both time series have been constructed based on questions periodically asked by the CEP poll.

The presidential approval rating series (Figure 1) begins with data from one year after President Patricio Aylwin's inaugu-

ration in March of 1990. Aylwin was a member of the PDC, one of the Concertación coalition parties. His successor, Eduardo Frei (March 1994–March 2000), was also a PDC and Concertación president. Ricardo Lagos, a Socialist and Concertación president, was inaugurated in March 2000. Most analysts agree that the honeymoon following the transition to democracy ended around 1995, when disapproval ratings began to increase. Many have also noted that despite having enjoyed unparalleled economic prosperity during the 1990s, Chileans were discontented with the presidential leadership. President Lagos, by contrast, has governed during times of international economic hardship, yet his approval ratings have risen to levels similar to those enjoyed by Aylwin during his honeymoon.

Figure 2 shows the individual perception of the national economic situation. Although the country's GDP doubled dur-

ing the 1990s, discontent with the economic outlook began to rise after the end of the Aylwin period (March 1990–March 1994). The economic recession that hit the country in 1999 (the first in 15 years) dropped negative evaluations to more than 60 percent. Although the economic recovery has been weak in the years since, discontent with the economic situation has eased, even though it remains slightly above 50 percent.

Conclusion

The field of political polling is thriving in Chile. Many companies are active, and several new ones enter the market when demand increases during election years. Yet even though the techniques used and the methodological approaches utilized have improved since the first polls were conducted, they are not as accurate as in industrialized nations. Although the creation of an association of pollsters that




Figure 1 Presidential Approval Ratings in Chile, CEP Polls, 1991–2002

Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos 2002. (CERC has also tracked presidential approval ratings since 1990, but its samples are not probabilistic.)




Figure 2 Individual Perception of the National Economy, CEP Polls, 1991–2002

Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos 2002.

can oversee and promote good practices and share methodological information would serve Chile well, some companies in the field have achieved a level of legitimacy. They are central actors in the public debate and influential voices in shaping the public agenda.

Patricio Navia

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China

The first public opinion poll in China was conducted on October 10, 1942, the Double Tenth, the national holiday of the People's Republic of China. It was con-

ducted by *Ta Kang Pao*, a newspaper with a circulation of about 10,000 in the city of Hengyang, Hunan Province, mainly to attract readers by assessing public opinion on the most vital political problems at that time (Schreiner 1943). Although the survey had validity and reliability problems (more than half of the respondents were under 20; more than 90 percent were men), it did give an early start to opinion research in China.

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, however, the promised dictatorship of people's democracy did not encourage the open public expression of opinions. Before the 1980s, there were literally no academic or scientific studies of public opinion in China. Instead, Chinese government officials used panel discussions (Rosen 1989, 1991), participant observations, and direct personal experience to assess what the general public might want. Such investigative trips (*shicha* or *diaocha*) are often used by government officials even today. Local officials staged many events, producing overreporting, underreporting, and entirely fabricated numbers to their advantage.

By 1978, China had begun to implement an open-door policy toward the outside world under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Reformers needed to assess public opinion on various social issues in order to push reform policy and fight antireform forces within government. Crude but simple survey research began to appear (Rosen 1989, 1991). Not until the mid-1980s, however, did more sophisticated scientific public opinion polling appear, because the Chinese government found it was necessary to assess what the general public had on its mind in order to deepen the ongoing economic and political reform.

The Mandarin term for public opinion was not widely used until the Thirteenth Chinese Communist Party National Congress of October 1987 at which Zhao Ziyang stressed the need for public opinion to play a "supervisory role" (Rosen 1989, 1991). Chinese newspapers soon began to distinguish between scientific polling and the earlier unscientific polls. Important leaders, including General Secretary of State Zhao Ziyang, Vice Premier Wan Li, and senior reform economist Wu Jinglian, expressed the importance of—and showed their support for—scientific opinion polling. As Stanley Rosen has pointed out, Wan Li even called for legislative measures to protect researchers in policy-related research and to ensure their relative independence from political forces. Because of such official support, a number of prominent public opinion research centers were established in China during the 1980s. Some of these were funded by the government, including one of the most important research centers, the Economic System Reform Institute of China—established by Zhao Ziyang in 1984 as a think tank to give advice on economic reform—which conducted 14 influential large-scale national surveys from 1984 to 1986. Private survey centers were also set up. Public opinion research was booming.

The 1980s was another period when new research methods were tried and used in China. During the Tiananmen Square movement, from April 15 to June 4, 1989, pollsters were very active and provided a number of outstanding reports about citizens' attitudes toward the student demonstrators. After the government crackdown, however, a large number of pollsters were arrested. Some of them fled to other countries. As a result, public opinion research on political

issues in China became very sensitive (Rosen 1989, 1991).

The few months after the crackdown in June 1989 proved to be an anxious period. The beginning of the 1990s, however, brought the commercialization process to China. Deng Xiaoping's Southern Talk in 1992 established the tone for China to continue its reform with bolder and larger steps. As a consequence, many market research firms were established whose major focus was to explore the consumption patterns, lifestyles, behaviors, and values of consumers. Gallup China, for example, was established in 1991 as the first foreign survey research organization licensed to do business throughout China. Gallup had some initial difficulties in opening the branch because the Chinese government was concerned that sensitive political and social questions would be asked. Only after Gallup asked Henry Kissinger to lobby on its behalf did it finally obtain a 20-year license (Laris 1994). Much research on public opinions about political issues can also be considered market research, because selling an idea is not much different from marketing a product that people would not otherwise buy. Although marketing research is often used in China for various consumer products, most marketing firms in China are not allowed to ask political questions.

The institutions that conduct survey research or public opinion polling in China are often of three types (Tang 2001). One type is the government or semigovernmental institution, like the State Statistics Bureau, the Economic System Reform Institute of China, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the labor unions, and women's and youth organizations. These organizations often have branches with full-time employees at and above the

county level. Their networks enable them to conduct national surveys very effectively. A second type is the academic institution, including the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) and various universities and other research institutions throughout China. A third type is the private commercial company, ranging from large, well-established foreign firms like Gallup to more modest firms and mom-and-pop companies that have only one or two researchers (Laris 1994; Tang 2001).

Political Sensitivity

Most of the surveys conducted by private firms center on consumer concerns; crime, take-home pay (Laris 1994), and political issues are still risky. Foreign researchers must submit their questionnaires for approval by the provincial statistics bureau (or the national statistics bureau if it is a nationwide survey). Foreign enterprises and researchers cannot conduct surveys on political issues and even social issues. In 2002, the National Bureau of Statistics of China stipulated that

organizations and individuals from outside the territory, subsidiaries of foreign enterprises and resident representative offices of foreign enterprises within the territory and resident institutions in China of other foreign organizations shall not, by their own, conduct social survey activities within the territory of China. Where there is a need to conduct such surveys, they shall be conducted by domestic institutions with the qualification of conducting foreign-related social survey. Institutions without such qualification shall not be commissioned for any survey.

Since early 2000, the National Bureau of Statistics has allowed foreigners to conduct surveys without having to submit the questionnaire to the government for approval; survey results do not have to be reported to the government as long as political items are not included in the survey (Smith 2000). Determining what is political may be difficult, which in turn increases the risk of polling in China.

Without government approval and cooperation, academic research institutions often have difficulties recruiting participants and getting them to answer questions (Bian, Tu, and Su 2001). Survey institutions have to obtain the cooperation of the public security bureaus in order to obtain the governmental registration information about a household and the names of its residents. Officials working in these bureaus are often suspicious of survey researchers. In urban areas, without the involvement of the residential council, residents often feel uneasy talking to researchers. The mere presence of residential councilors, however, makes it more likely for participants to use official rhetoric to answer questions.

Domestic firms enjoy more freedom to conduct surveys on social problems if they conduct joint research with government agencies and national or provincial statistics bureaus. *The Horizon*, for example, has conducted surveys on topics like rural-to-urban emigrant workers, the changing composition of state-run and private enterprises, social welfare and security, and youth attitudes and beliefs (Horizon et al. 1997).

The Concept of the Public

The idea of “the public” is usefully developed by Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1989), who considers it an arena where people

can get together to debate and discuss issues of public concern or common interest. A domain is public in that it is universally accessible; it holds critical and rational debate, which might be opposed to authority, and the opinions of all the people may be equally voiced and heard despite their actual inequality in status or knowledge. In other words, the public is a place where everyone is allowed to take part in the discourse, everyone is allowed to pose questions about any assertion, and no one is prevented by any internal or external coercion from speaking or questioning. In this sense, it is fair to say that China does not have a public or publics that are independent of the state; there is high penetration between state and society. In the words of Andrew Nathan, “It is hard to say whether the state penetrates society or society penetrates the state” (1995, p. 226). For this reason, people express opinions in public—as well as in survey and market research and public opinion polls—that might not reflect their true opinions because they do not want to get into trouble with the government. Even without sampling problems and other validity problems, this should be a great concern for those who might wish to do polling on political issues in China.

If we treat the public in a somewhat looser sense, however, where opinions can be exchanged or debated, China can be said to have semipublic spaces—meeting places among friends, colleagues, and family members. Because such interpersonal channels play a very important role in disseminating rumors, gossip, ideas, and opinions, the influence of such semipublics cannot be underestimated. The current political cultures and social environments in China make interpersonal conversations even more important. In

China, one can say anything in private, but one cannot say things in the wrong place at the wrong time (Nathan 1995). Meetings among friends are generally considered to be private. Because talk with friends is less likely to intentionally mislead others, interpersonal conversation and personal experiences carry more weight than do media reports and campaigns. The mass media of China—since the 1980s—have lost credibility for not reporting the truth.

Research Methods

Starting in the mid-1980s, sampling techniques like simple random sampling, stratified random sampling, random cluster sampling, and systematic sampling have been used in China (Tang 2001). Focus group discussions have begun to be used in research related to consumer products. Because of the low penetration of the telephone, especially in rural areas, surveys are often conducted through person-to-person interviews. But as China Telecom began to lower the fee for telephone installation, the number of household telephones increased rapidly. In big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, most households have at least one telephone. Telephone survey methods like random digital dialing have also begun to be used in China.

Computer-assisted telephone interviewing has also been introduced. Surveys in China have sampling and validity problems because many researchers are not formally trained, nor do Chinese universities offer courses on survey research methodology. In recent years, an increasing number of researchers trained in Western countries have returned to China. They often conduct surveys sponsored by non-Chinese foundations. Foreign scholars have begun to advise and

collaborate with domestic researchers in conducting polling research in China. Such expertise should help the Chinese to improve their own knowledge and competence in scientific survey research.

The Role of Public Opinion under Nonelected Government

The Chinese Communist Party still exerts tight control over the country—government, congress, judiciary, military, and media. From the national to the village level, measures and policies are implemented to ensure that positions above deputy are held by Communists, reportedly totaling more than 50 million nationwide.

Although there were some tentative elections at the township level (Manion 2000) or village level, there are still no general elections in China. Except at the village and township levels, all officials are promoted through the bureaucratic systems, which means that public opinion does not have direct influence on the promotion or recruitment of government officials or politicians. Instead, the views of colleagues, subordinates, and superiors are much more important. Whenever someone is considered for promotion, his past work is also reviewed—often based on paper reports and on the reports of officials in higher positions who interview the candidate's colleagues. Because no systematic study has been done on this subject, it is difficult to know how much influence the opinions of colleagues and subordinates will have on candidates.

The general public might also be asked to report complaints anonymously, but without open files and studies it is difficult to assess how much such opinions influence promotion. We would argue that government officials are more likely

to choose to offend the public whenever there is a choice of either offending the public or offending superiors, fellow officials, and subordinates. Complaints about the rude and unresponsive treatment of citizens by officials are not uncommon.

Although Chinese politicians are less likely to conduct their own private polls than are their Western counterparts, reports show that President Jiang Zemin did hire pollsters to tell him how he was doing in recent years (Chu 2002). Jiang kissed babies and sang at banquets with the intention of creating positive and amiable images. For politicians publicly to show that they care about such public opinions can be working to their own advantage. Bo Xilai of Dalian City opened a mayor hotline directly to answer people's questions and concerns, an innovation widely reported throughout China.

In a nondirect election system, politicians do not conduct political campaigns or run political ads. Even local elections are conducted through work units (e.g., government, military, and business organizations). Voters are often not informed about candidates except for a brief introduction. Although voting results might influence who will be elected, they often do not affect what positions the elected candidates will attain. It is also not uncommon for the number of candidates to equal the number of available positions so that voting does not matter much except when two candidates are equally strong or weak in past achievements, political backgrounds, and personal networks. Votes are often not counted in public and citizens are often not informed of final voting results. Citizens in general are not serious about voting. It is reasonable to conclude that public opinion plays a lim-

ited role in political issues, and thus election results do not reflect the public's thinking; expert opinions are often sought to help decide important issues.

Public opinion in China plays at the most a consultative role. As in most communist countries, public opinion in China serves to educate the general public. As Rosen (1989, 1991) puts it, communist parties—regardless of countries—need to understand public opinion and how to manipulate it without undermining popular support. For example, even in China's Guangdong Province—one of the most liberal and open places—where surveys have often been conducted to determine public opinion regarding environmental issues, it is reported that “most municipal government authorities have indicated that wider public consultation . . . was both undesirable and unnecessary given the general lack of knowledge about environment protection” (Lo and Leung 2000, p. 701). This is consistent with the views of Chinese researchers and social elites, most of whom think that the ideal government would be to care about—but not be driven by—public opinion, because government officials should make decisions based on their own expertise and multiple information channels, in addition to public opinion.

To maintain social control in China, all organizations and clubs are required to register before they can hold meetings. Attendance at rallies—meetings of sports fans, for example—is allowed, and attendance at academic meetings is encouraged. Any meetings with political purposes that are not supported and pre-approved, however, can be risky, which limits the interpersonal influence of public opinion. It must be noted that Chinese government officials have become increasingly tolerant of criticism.

Nevertheless, as Chinese society becomes pluralistic, public opinion has increased in importance. Although public opinion does not directly influence political outcomes or governmental policies, it is fair to say that politicians pay attention to public opinion because they do not want to have too poor a public image. It must also be said that public opinion plays an increasing role in market research, advertising, and consumer products.

*The Role of the Mass
Media in Disseminating
Public Opinion Research*

Media play a limited role in disseminating public opinion polls in China. One reason is that all media—including newspapers, cable and broadcast television, radio, books, magazines, and journals—are run, censored, and controlled by the party and the state. The Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, the General Administration of Press and Publishing, and their nationwide branches were established to ensure that what is published and aired does not oppose the agenda of the party. Those who publish or broadcast politically incorrect material might be warned, disciplined, fired, or even put in prison; their organizations suffer too. Just before the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party National Congress in November 2002, for example, control over the Internet and publishing tightened. Corruption, social injustice, and antiparty materials were not allowed. Newspapers like *Southern Weekend* and *Beijing Youth Daily*, which dare to report negative news—and are also influential—often irritate officials of the propaganda department, even though they often win the hearts and support of readers. In 2000, the General Administration of Press and Pub-

lishing issued Notice No. 1288, strictly forbidding printing and publishing politically incorrect articles and books. Under such tight controls, it is difficult to hear different voices.

The commercialization of the 1990s led Chinese media to be less driven by ideology than by commercial benefits—especially after Deng Xiaoping's Southern Talk in 1992. Rather than remaining dependent on the government for funding, most media organizations are required to be self-reliant. As long as media do not cross over the line, that is, do not "sing a tone opposite to the government," they enjoy much press freedom. A lot of paid news has also emerged. Media quickly lose credibility because many Chinese simply do not believe what is reported. However, in theory, all media are the mouthpieces of the party, whose main function is to help the state and government build a socialist society (Li 1991).

Governments at various levels have for decades conducted surveys, but the results are often not published. Dozens of government organizations, led by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, conduct surveys on social and political issues. Government agencies that conduct surveys often turn in survey findings to the government, but government officials may not bother to look at them. Because media are state-run and controlled, less risky surveys could be published, but negative results on sensitive issues are not found in newspapers due to censorship or self-censorship. Thus journalists and news people play limited roles in influencing public opinions and disseminating radical new ideas.

Survey results can be found in newspapers, magazines, and academic journals, but they might also appear in specialized

journals (*Zhuan Kan*) and internal publications (*nei bu kan wu*). Access to internal publications is restricted to people of a certain social status, depending on the nature of the publication. As Rosen puts it, survey findings appearing in publications of this kind might well represent some particular group interest and might be opposed to government policies. It must be noted, however, that in the 1980s—when government officials had a high expectation of public opinion research supporting the reform agenda—newspapers like *People's Daily*, *China Youth Daily*, and especially the *World Economic Herald* published many opinion reports not considered favorable to the government.

Major newspapers and websites occasionally include survey items to attract subscriptions. Subscribers might simply clip out or download the survey and mail their responses to the publisher. Although such hopelessly flawed samples are unrepresentative of any known population, results are often reported anyway. Internet portals such as www.sina.com and www.sohu.com often include a few survey questions on current hot issues. It must be noted, however, that although Internet providers are not necessarily government-affiliated, the Chinese government now censors Internet content and generally obtains the cooperation of Internet providers in China.

Important Issues That Divide the Public's Thinking

Important issues that long divided and dominated people's thinking include the one-child policy, the Three Gorges Dam, and China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO)—formerly the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). When the one-child policy was

first implemented, it encountered great resistance. The government spent a lot of money and time educating the public and reiterating the benefits of having only one child. Even today, the one-child policy is often violated—especially in rural areas. China's entry into the GATT/WTO was first welcomed with enthusiasm because the public knew very little about it. The only channel of information was through official media and documents, which advocated that the GATT/WTO should provide citizens with consumer products at lower prices. The GATT/WTO division of the Foreign Trade Ministry sent delegates to universities, TV stations, and companies to lecture on the benefits of joining the GATT/WTO (Pearson 2001). Other interest groups, however—like China Telecom and the automobile industries—later realized that the GATT/WTO could harm their interests. By sending representatives to the meetings they managed to voice their concerns and objections. For the Three Gorges Dam, for example, arguments on one side were that it should not be built because it would destroy the environment as well as many cultural relics. Huang Wanli, a hydraulic expert at Qinghua University, voiced the strongest objection. However, because the dam had already been selected to be built, no public discussion was allowed.

Once the central government has taken a position on an important issue, it is considered taboo to voice objections and to have an open discussion about the negative side unless the government gives silent agreement. In China, public opinion often means *elite* opinion; not everyone is given a chance to voice an opinion. Even some elite opinions are not heard by the public. The government will adopt opinions that it favors; opinions it

dislikes are often not allowed to be widely expressed.

Factors Influencing Public

Opinion and Its Future

China experts generally agree that China has now begun to evolve into a pluralistic society—one in which different values and opinions are tolerated. People enjoy more freedom in making personal choices, especially in consumer products and lifestyles. Now, given alternative information sources—including the Internet and telephone, with their capabilities to sustain interpersonal communication among people living in different countries—and also the loss of the credibility of the Chinese mass media, the role of government in shaping public opinion is becoming more and more limited. As students of the mass media, we agree that media still play an important role in the cultivation of public opinion over time, in that dominant values and attitudes in media function as gravitational forces to pull diverse values and ideas into mainstream orientation (Gerbner et al. 1980, 1994). Even though the marketplace of ideas is still not part of the political culture, people and officials do become more tolerant of differences. And although the official rhetoric stresses one voice for government issues, in party meetings there is democratic debate about issues of common concern.

In addition to mass media, interpersonal conversation—via social networks of friends, family members, and colleagues, as well as via the Internet and telephone—plays an influential role in shaping public opinion. E-mail has become an important way to spread alternative views, even though the Chinese government continues to apply a tight e-mail filtering system.

Conclusion

In summary, we argue that public opinion is something both definable and tangible. Although little direct study has been done on this particular aspect of public opinion, China experts closest to the field agree that opinions can be measured. Public opinion is often considered an aggregate of people's individual ideas and an existentially public set of beliefs and values shared by many—thereby generating general consensus on many political, economic, and social issues.

We think public opinion will be more and more important in China—especially as China becomes more pluralistic. We see this already in consumer products. The importance of public opinion, however, will remain limited unless major changes take place in the political system. Mass media will play a limited role in reporting, shaping, or reinforcing public opinion unless the media gain credibility.

In short, public opinion is a double-edged sword for the one-party system (Rosen 1989, 1991). Although public opinion provides the government with information about the public that might well strengthen its rule, it risks fostering the legitimization of public opinions that might undermine governmental control. Unless far-sighted government leaders are determined to take such risks, public opinion may remain little more than ritual, decoration, and entertainment in modern China.

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Costa Rica

The measurement of public opinion in Costa Rica has flourished since systematic opinion polling began in the late 1970s. Polls have become an essential part of Costa Rican political life, favored by a climate of political stability, democratic life, and competitive and honest elections since the civil war of 1948. Costa Rica has enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted constitutional democracy and political stability in Latin

America. All thirteen elections from 1953 to 2002 have been held regularly and peacefully. The political system, still ruled by the 1949 constitution, has high legitimacy levels, in spite of recent weakening symptoms and an abrupt decrease in voter turnout to 70 percent in the 1998 elections and to 68.8 percent four years later. Voter turnout was nearly constant at a mean value of 81 percent in the period 1962–1994 (see Seligson 2002).

Polls and Politics

Public opinion research in Costa Rica is probably best known through the reports of polling companies like UNIMER and CID Gallup, whose syndicated releases appear regularly in the media. These polls measure public opinion with respect to the performance of the incumbent president, current political, social, and economic issues, voters' attitudes and preferences, and public opinion over time. Poll results divulged by the media have made politics more interesting for the masses even during off-year elections. Pollsters and journalists are better able than ever to document citizens' feelings, concerns, and preferences. Polls have led to more informed reporting and analysis of campaigns, personalities, and issues, as well as improved analysis of election results in judging the public's thinking on current issues.

Public opinion on several important issues has changed since the effects of the crisis of the 1980s, increasing political corruption, and globalization pressures, for example, on privatization, state control of the economy, and perceived legitimacy of the political system. Although there is a strong opposition to privatizing strategic state-owned entities, more and more people are willing to accept a gradual opening of markets to

private companies, national and foreign. Traditional politicians and parties have been accused of not representing the true interests of the people, and new spaces for popular participation have been demanded. Representing current strong sentiments against political corruption and traditional politicians in the 2002 elections, the new Citizen Action Party became a real alternative to the two traditional parties, the National Liberation Party (PLN) and the Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC). As a result the reigning two-party system was seriously weakened.

The public's right to be informed is frequently voiced by Costa Rican journalists. Citizens should be as informed as public officials are. The more information the citizen has, the more able she is to make full use of her rights. This applies especially to public choice. Based on these principles, the newspaper *La República* joined the TV news program UNIVISION and CRN network to offer—since November 1993—a news service for the elections. This news service, never seen before 1994, consisted of a weekly publication of the results of a national public opinion poll evaluating current voter preferences, incumbent government policies, and other current issues that might affect voters' decisions. For a quick report of the polls, CID Gallup, the sponsored poll company, introduced the innovation of combining telephone interviewing (35 percent of the sample) with traditional face-to-face interviewing.

The Beginning of Election Polls

The formation of public opinion in Costa Rica is determined, mainly, by the media, especially television. The media influence the national agenda and serve as interme-

diaries of the people and interest groups. Traditionally, political parties have used all means available to influence public opinion: the media, rallies, external signs (flags, posters, leaflets, pamphlets), and door-to-door canvassing. Currently, however, attendance at rallies has lost importance. Flags have also disappeared by the mutual agreement of parties to reduce campaign costs. Since the mid-1960s, the main parties have commissioned private polls to measure their current support and to identify the main issues to design their campaign propaganda. The first preelection polls were not made public. Newspapers began reporting polls conducted by the various parties since the 1974 elections. The wide discrepancies in the polls were described by a newspaper headline as opinion polling war.

Systematic opinion polling began in 1974 during the administration of President Daniel Oduber (1974–1978). Within the newly created Information Office of the Ministry of the Presidency (OIP), the Public Opinion Unit carried out a systematic program of opinion research polling to provide the president and its immediate collaborators with objective information for decisionmaking. The OIP also aimed to periodically divulge polling findings to improve the understanding of public opinion in Costa Rica (Ramírez 1976). Among the many issues surveyed were the perception and evaluation of the performance of the incumbent president and public entities, the main current problems affecting the population, evaluation of past versus current economic situation, and future expectations. The OIP conducted seven annual opinion polls every year from 1975 to 1981 before being closed just before the February 1982 elections, during the administration of Rodrigo Carazo (1978–1982). The reasons for its closure

came from the controversy generated by the release of poll results by the OIP during the electoral campaign of 1982 and the unfavorable evaluation of the incumbent government.

In the private sector, CID Gallup, the pioneer in public opinion polling in Costa Rica and Central America, was founded in 1977. Since February 1979, CID Gallup has conducted opinion polling studies quarterly and without interruption. In July and December 1981, *La Nación* published two preelectoral CID Gallup polls. The second poll conducted face-to-face in-home interviews of a final sample of 1,015 individuals over 18 years old in the metropolitan area and the rest of the country. The poll results agreed in general with the presidential election results of February 1982 but overestimated the lead of the winner. The technical term *margin of error* was introduced at this time to assist the public in interpreting poll results. An important feature revealed by the polls was the significant size of undecided voters. A national sample polled by the OIP in November 1981 found a high proportion of undecided voters (32 percent). This group has received increased attention in the analysis of preelection polls and is one of the main targets of party propaganda.

Measurement of Public Opinion

The measurement of public opinion in Costa Rica has been possible by the broad public support and willingness of Costa Ricans to participate in polls. The need of polling has increased with the competitiveness of elections. More polling companies participated in the 1990 elections: UNIMER, Breedy and Asociados S.A, Demoscopía S.A, Borge and Asociados, and Investigaciones Psicosociales. UNIMER—founded in 1986

as a marketing research and opinion polling company—and CID Gallup eventually became the two major polling companies in Costa Rica. UNIMER, CID Gallup, and Borge and Asociados have also developed political polling in the other countries of Central America.

Polls sponsored by TV news programs and newspapers are conducted systematically every three or four months, more frequently just before elections. Most polls interview individuals over 18 years old using national samples ranging in size from 1,100 to 1,400. The main polling companies select their samples using census segments. These are chosen with probability proportional to size. The selection of individuals within each segment is not truly probabilistic and follows no systematic procedure of probabilistic quotas. Individuals may be selected using the last birthday method, or loose quotas controlled only by sex and age. Usually the country is stratified in five or fewer regions. The usual margins of error reported are 3 percent or less. Some polls use face-to-face home interviewing; others combine it with telephone interviewing. In spite of the low percentage of telephone ownership—54.3 percent of households according to the 2000 census—most pollsters are willing to pay the price of possible sample bias in order to take advantage of lower cost and more rapid execution of the poll.

Opinion polling and surveys are conducted by polling companies for different types of clients. The media polls are just one important subtype. Other clients are political parties, candidates, NGOs, and private companies. There is also academic polling. At the University of Costa Rica, the Institute of Social Investigations has carried out research on citizen participa-

tion, street protests, and youth political involvement. For the 2002 elections, voters were polled on Election Day to investigate the motives behind their vote choices. The University of Costa Rica also has a permanent research project on the evolution of the structures of public opinion. Initiated in 1988 as an academic effort to understand the conflicts of Costa Rican society, the project surveys public opinion on topics of conflict chosen through an analysis of the media. Typical conflict-provoking topics are corruption, labor relations, citizen insecurity, privatization reforms, child abuse, gender relations, drugs and sexuality, and performance of public institutions and personalities (Poltronieri and Piza 1989). The Institute of Social Studies in Population at the National University has surveyed public opinion since 1980, making it a periodic activity since 1994. Among the wide diversity of topics examined are environmental problems, political participation, current political and economic situations, satisfaction with public institutions and the political system, domestic violence, human rights, and quality of life. These topics come from monthly surveys that measure the national pulse by telephone interviewing, as well as from surveys that measure opinion on current social and economic crises, each semester, by telephone and face-to-face interviewing.

Controversies in Election Polling

Some major criticisms have been leveled against polls: they tend to oversimplify issues, distort public opinion, and put too much pressure on the government. Pre-election polling and exit polls have been charged with influencing the election process. The excessive use of polls for propaganda purposes, and for predicting

the presidential election, has also been criticized for not contributing greatly to the democratic process.

PUSC leaders during the 1994 election campaign voiced serious concerns. They questioned CID Gallup for apparent inconsistencies in successive polls and suggested the manipulation of poll results to confuse public opinion. Telephone interviewers were accused of introducing bias against the PUSC. CID Gallup justified the use of telephone interviewing combined with face-to-face interviewing. Telephone interviewing facilitates the contact of upper- and middle-class households, and results may be appropriately weighted. Exit polling was also criticized. An exit poll by Borge and Asociados, divulged in a 6 P.M. special edition of *Al Día* at the close of the elections, gave a 5-point lead to PLN candidate José María Figueres over PUSC candidate Miguel Ángel Rodríguez. Since the actual lead was only 1.9 points, the release of the exit poll was criticized as risky. The controversy resulted in legislation being added to the Electoral Code in 1996. Since then, the publication of poll results is banned two days before Election Day or on Election Day. Poll companies must also register at the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones within fifteen days of the official opening of an election campaign and must provide evidence of their professional competence.

The poll results for the 1998 elections were much more controversial. Preelection polls gave a 10-point lead to Miguel Ángel Rodríguez, the PUSC candidate, over PLN candidate José Miguel Corrales. Rodríguez won, but the actual lead was only 2 points. Poll companies were therefore criticized by PLN leaders for the gross overestimation of Rodríguez's lead.

Stronger questioning was directed toward Telenoticias Canal 7, a television station, for having made known exit-poll results at 4:30 P.M., 90 minutes before the elections closed. The exit poll by CID Gallup gave Rodríguez a 10-point lead. For the PLN defeated candidate, the exit poll influenced the election results: PLN supporters lost interest in casting their votes once they knew the exit-poll results. PLN congressmen considered this to be a form of manipulation of public opinion and an abuse of press freedoms. Criticism was also directed at a special edition of *Al Día*, which offered results of an exit poll by Borge and Asociados giving Rodríguez a 7-point lead. The divulging of exit polls caused great concern because it was clearly a violation of article 85 of the Electoral Code.

A new controversy was generated during the 2002 election campaign by the publication in *La Nación* on December 9, 2001, of a poll conducted by UNIMER. In the survey, 29.5 percent supported the presidential candidate of the PUSC. There was a virtual tie between the candidate of the PLN (22 percent) and the candidate of the new Citizen Action Party (21.6 percent). For the first time, there was a high probability of a second round in a presidential election. PLN leaders questioned the abrupt change from previous UNIMER poll results and were especially concerned by the composition of the sample, which for them biased results in favor of the Citizen Action Party. The results of the February 2002 election confirmed poll predictions and the need for a second round for the first time in Costa Rican presidential elections. Poll predictions for the second round between the PUSC and the PLN, held two months later, were also con-

firmed. Polling companies thus regained some of the prestige lost in the elections of 1994 and 1998.

Conclusion

Polls, like democracy, are imperfect but are a useful instrument to voice public opinion on national issues. Public opinion polling, wisely pondered, favors democracy. It has reduced the excessive reliance on commentators who before the emergence of polling interpreted the public pulse by relying on biased samples of persons, intuition, and limited information. In spite of the trivial uses of polls and the possibility of their dishonest use, they will continue to be the best way of measuring the sentiments of the people on a variety of issues. Competition among polling companies, improvements in polling methodology, and society demands for more reliable information will have in the long run a positive impact on the performance of the polls. Public opinion will grow in importance in the future as the political system opens more spaces to political participation. Public opinion expressed through the media (e.g., TV debates), and street protests like the one staged against the reform of the national utilities company, which inflicted a serious setback for Rodríguez, will continue to influence the national agenda.

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Czech Republic

Czech attitudes, scholars argue, have become remarkably crystallized (Vecerník and Mateju 1999; Vlachová 2000; Vecerník 1996). Contrary to the tabula rasa thesis, which holds that communism wiped out democratic values and fostered unstable public opinion (see Whitefield 2002), attitudes in the Czech Republic have been consistently unambiguous and consistently democratic.

This entry examines public opinion in the Czech Republic. It will look at the historical context surrounding popular attitudes and major elections since the 1993 split of Czechoslovakia. It will discuss the opinions of Czechs about democracy, the market, the government,

and membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, as well as the relationship between the values of Czechs and vote choice after the fall of communism in 1989. It will conclude with a brief discussion of survey research in the Czech Republic.

*Brief Political History
of the Czech Republic*

Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic and Slovakia, was founded in 1918 under the presidency of T. G. Masaryk. In 1939, Nazi Germany invaded and established a protectorate in Czechoslovakia. In 1948, after the end of World War II, the Communist Party won 38 percent of the vote in Czechoslovakia. Holding most of the key positions in the government, it gradually managed to mute anticommunist forces. The Communist Party had fully seized power by February 1948 (Linden and Pohlman 2003; Wolchik 1998).

The orthodox rule of Antonín Novotný brought economic stagnation in Czechoslovakia in the 1950s. Facing a challenge within the party, Novotný was replaced by reformer Alexander Dubcek in 1968. Dubcek immediately began to implement economic and political change that would guarantee freedom of religion, press, assembly, speech, and travel. As Dubcek himself put it, he sought "socialism with a human face" (Linden and Pohlman 2003; Bugajski 2002; Wolchik 1998). Dubcek's reforms fostered citizen engagement in the country for the first time in almost two decades.

Worried about what these reforms might mean to their own countries, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, East Germany, and Poland invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Dubcek was removed and replaced by Gustav Husák, a hard-line Communist,

in 1969. The "normalization" of the next two decades was characterized by strict adherence to a conservative command economy and firm control over all aspects of life (Linden and Pohlman 2003; Bugajski 2002; Wolchik 1998).

Normalization, however, produced a growing intellectual dissident movement. In 1977, the movement produced Charter 77, a group and manifesto that criticized the government for failing to protect human rights. Czech citizens mobilized to protest the regime in the fall of 1989 after witnessing popular challenges to the regime in Hungary, Poland, and East Germany. Charter 77 and other groups united to become Civic Forum, an umbrella group that demanded an end to communist rule. Civic Forum quickly gained the support of millions of Czechs, as did its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence. After a meager attempt to suppress the uprising by force, the regime capitulated, marking what is now known as the Velvet Revolution. In a first exercise of democracy, Czech citizens elected the playwright, philosopher, and dissident Václav Havel president of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989 (Linden and Pohlman 2003; Bugajski 2002; Wolchik 1998).

A coalition government of former dissidents and intellectuals was formed in December 1989 to facilitate the transition, followed by the first free elections in Czechoslovakia since 1946 in June 1990 (Bugajski 2002). As anticipated, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence won landslide victories. Although Civic Forum had successfully facilitated regime change, it was ineffective as a governing party. Civic Forum soon split into the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and Civic Movement (ODA), led by dissident economist Václav Klaus and President Václav

Havel, respectively. As finance minister, Klaus engineered Czechoslovakia's often-praised voucher privatization program (Wolchik 1998), and by the end of 1990 ODS was the most popular party in the Czech lands (Linden and Pohlman 2003).

Milestones in Czech Elections

The newly democratic federated Czechoslovakia was not to last long. In the June 1992 parliamentary elections, Klaus's ODS won in the Czech lands on a platform of economic reform. Klaus was appointed prime minister in the Czech region. Vladimír Mečiar's party, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), became the most popular party in the Slovak region by appealing to Slovak nationalism. Mečiar became prime minister in the Slovak lands. Though Havel spoke vigorously against it and the majority of citizens did not want it, it was Klaus's inclination to let Slovakia go. In the latter half of 1992, Mečiar and Klaus devised the provisions of the Velvet Divorce. The country officially split into two on January 1, 1993 (Bugajski 2002; Bútorová and Bútor 1998; Wolchik 1998).

In January 1993, Havel was elected the first president of the Czech Republic. The 1996 parliamentary elections brought Klaus's reappointment as prime minister in a minority coalition. Klaus resigned as prime minister following the collapse of the ODS-led coalition in 1997, the consequence of mounting dissatisfaction with his economic reforms amid allegations of corruption. The new government was a Social Democrat (CSSD)-led coalition with Miloš Zeman at the helm. Despite Klaus's frequently voiced skepticism, the Czech Republic applied to join the EU in 1996 and began negotiations in 1998 (Linden and Pohlman 2003). The country also became a full member of NATO in March

1999. Havel was reelected president in 1998 (Bugajski 2002).

The parliamentary elections of 2002 gave the most electoral votes to CSSD, chaired by Vladimír Špidla after Zeman's retirement from party chair. However, CSSD had to form a coalition with the centrist Christian Democrats and Freedom Union in order to maintain the government. The new coalition's agenda was the full integration of the Czech Republic into the EU. The Communists (KSCM) came in third in the election with 41 seats, their best result since the Velvet Revolution. In December 2002, the Czech Republic was formally invited to join the EU after the summit in Copenhagen. In the same month, Havel's tenure as president ended. After three rounds of voting, Klaus was elected the second president of the Czech Republic in February 2003, succeeding his longtime political adversary (Linden and Pohlman 2003).

Public Opinion Trends

With the collapse of communism in 1989, sociological research, including public opinion polling, began to flourish once again in the Czech Republic. Political scientists and sociologists increasingly study Czech public opinion, its antecedents, and its role in the political system. A number of polling institutes conduct regular surveys of political attitudes in the Czech Republic. Prominent firms include the Center for Public Opinion Research (CVVM), Taylor Nelson Sofres Factum, and Stem/Mark (STEM), which conduct surveys for the Czech Institute of Sociology, as well as for such international and regional databases as the Applicant Countries Eurobarometer (formerly Central and Eastern Eurobarometer) and the New Europe Barometer (formerly New Democracies Barometer).

Attitudes toward Democracy and the Market

Important to the stability of democracy are popular attitudes and beliefs about the market. Some scholars argue that these attitudes and beliefs also may help us predict voting behavior (Vlachová 2000; Vecerník and Mateju 1999). One such predictor of vote choice is satisfaction with one's household economic situation. Until the late 1990s, Czechs were far more satisfied with their household economic situation than their Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) counterparts. In 1991, 58 percent were satisfied with the economic performance of their family, but by 1998 this figure had dropped to 53 percent (Haerpfer 2002).

Attitudes toward the market economy are also important predictors of support for democracy and are thought to predict vote choice (Vlachová 2000). Compared to the rest of Central Europe, Czechs have been among the most enthusiastic about the market economy. As early as 1991, 57 percent of Czechs supported the market system, rising to 71 percent in 1996 (Haerpfer 2002). Not surprisingly, Czechs also rank the socialist economy much worse than the market economy. Forty percent of Czechs rejected the command economy in 1998 (Haerpfer 2002).

Czech citizens are among the most democratic in the CEE, according to an index of individual-level democratization (Haerpfer 2002). However, Czechs have grown increasingly dissatisfied with how the government works. From 1991 to 1996, 71 percent to 78 percent of Czech citizens gave positive ratings to the democratic government, but after the fall of Klaus from the prime ministership in 1998, support for the government dropped to 56 percent (Haerpfer 2002). Support for democracy as a political system varies

according to sociodemographic characteristics; men, the young, the educated, citizens from large cities, and the less religious are more likely to support democracy (Haerpfer 2002).

Attitudes toward "Others"

Attitudes toward others are also thought to affect support for democracy and vote choice. Czechs' perceptions of threat from other ethnic groups and minorities are dwindling. In 1992, 44 percent of Czechs perceived a threat; in 1998 this number decreased to 24 percent (Haerpfer 2002). Still, Czechs continue to perceive immigrants and refugees as a problem for peace and security. In 1992, 38 percent perceived a threat, a figure that remained the same in 1998 (Haerpfer 2002).

Attitudes toward the Roma (gypsies) are a politically sensitive issue in the Czech Republic. A poll in 2003 indicated that although 75 percent of Czechs acknowledge that Roma have difficulties finding employment and have fewer opportunities in life, they overwhelmingly consider living with the Roma to be problematic (80 percent). Also, 37 percent of Czechs say that the Czech majority should be more tolerant toward the Roma, whereas 40 percent say that the Roma should change their lifestyle. People with higher education, a better standard of living, and the religious tend to have a more positive view of minorities in general (*Ceská tisková kancelár*, March 11, 2003).

The Velvet Divorce, many scholars argue, was a political decision that was largely unsupported by Czechs and Slovaks (Bútorová and Bútor 1998). As recently as 2003, half of Czechs (50 percent) believed that the split could have been prevented. A majority (65 percent) said they were against the split in 1993,

and 54 percent consider the split a mistake today. Many (52 percent) believe that relations between Czechs and Slovaks were better prior to the split (CTK January 2, 2003).

The issues that Czech citizens identify as a problem can tell us about their perceptions of quality of life in the postcommunist era. The most important problems in 2003, according to the majority of Czechs, include unemployment, agriculture, corruption, and economic crime. In contrast, they positively evaluate the range of goods and services available, the environment, developments in foreign relations, and progress toward European Union entry. Such positive evaluations have not improved the extremely low level of efficacy, however; 90 percent of Czechs believe that they have no possibility of affecting problems at a broad level (CTK, March 10, 2003).

Ideological Self-Identification, Values, and Vote Choice

Though there is some debate about whether ideological values and self-identification predict voting behavior (see Tóka 1998), scholars continue to study the relationship between ideology and voting behavior in the Czech Republic (Vecerník and Mateju 1999; Vlachová 2000; Vecerník 1996). Such studies have defined left political ideology as valuing a stable order, social protection, and equality. The right ideology values new opportunities, free competition, and acceptance of social disparity (Vecerník 1996).

Self-identification on the left-right ideological continuum is a strong and stable predictor of vote choice in the Czech Republic. Czechs' self-placement on the left-right axis has remained remarkably stable since 1991, shifting slightly to the right of the ideological continuum

(Vecerník and Mateju 1999). This position is similar to the positions of other European countries, and it distinguishes the Czech Republic from other CEE countries. By 1995, left-right self-identification became strongly linked to the evaluation of one's personal economic standing, the perceived legitimacy of the economic system, the perceived fairness of inequality, and general evaluations of capitalism (Vlachová 2000).

Ideological self-identification predicts vote choice more strongly than values in the Czech Republic. This is because citizens' declared positions on the left-right axis do not correspond to their social and economic values. In general, most citizens who identify themselves on the right actually have leftist values (Vecerník and Mateju 1999). Consequently, having leftist values does not mean voting for leftist parties.

Attitudes toward EU Membership and NATO

Until recently, approval of EU membership has not exceeded the 50 percent mark (Pohlman 2003). However, what seems to be a lack of support for membership actually may be an artifact of too few response categories in survey questionnaires (e.g., respondents are only allowed to indicate support or rejection instead of intensity of support or rejection). When broken down by intensity, more Czechs appear to support EU membership than previous studies report. Indeed, most Czechs respond that they support EU membership, but just a little bit. In 1994, 33 percent of Czechs strongly supported EU membership and 56 percent somewhat supported it (for a total of 89 percent). These figures remained steady through 1998, when 33 percent of Czechs strongly supported and

47 percent somewhat supported EU membership (for a total of 80 percent; Haerpfer 2002). In 2002, while 69 percent of Czechs supported EU membership in total, the majority of supporters only supported it a little (37 percent), fewer supported it somewhat (22 percent), and a mere 8 percent strongly supported it (Pohlman 2003).

Polls indicated that approval was rising sharply at the referendum on EU membership in 2003. This is particularly noteworthy, given that the reported polls forced respondents to choose between only two response categories—yes and no. In February 2003, 59 percent would vote for EU membership in a referendum (CTK, February 24, 2003). In March 2003, a record 79 percent of Czechs agreed with EU membership (Gazdik 2003). Men, those living in urban centers, the young, those with the highest levels of education, entrepreneurs, and those who have higher levels of household income are most likely to support EU membership (Gazdik 2003; Haerpfer 2002).

The Czech Republic joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1996. In that year, 63 percent of Czechs considered NATO membership to be a good thing. Support increased to 67 percent in 1998 (Haerpfer 2002). In 2002, 61 percent of Czechs continued to support NATO membership (CTK, November 27, 2002)

Polling in the Czech Republic

Public opinion polling has a long, but interrupted, tradition in the Czech Republic. Public opinion polling first began there in the 1930s. In 1946, the Gallup Institute inspired the creation of the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IVVM) in the Czech lands. Public opinion polling was severely limited and politicized under the communist regime.

After 1989, commercial survey research and public opinion polling firms emerged alongside academic public opinion institutes (Krejci 2001).

Major polling firms in the Czech Republic include CVVM (the Center for Public Opinion Polls, formerly IVVM), Stem/Mark, Taylor Nelson Sofres Factum, and GfK. These firms regularly employ some of the most sophisticated technology available, including the capacity to conduct computer-assisted telephone interviewing. The quality of polling agencies' work is supervised by SIMAR, the Association of Marketing Research Agencies in the Czech Republic.

Today, it is possible to access a number of public opinion surveys using the Czech Sociological Data Archive (SDA) at <http://archiv.soc.cas.cz>. Open to the public since 1998, the SDA regularly produces the report "Social Trends," and it is now available to customers who conduct research. In 1999 it became an independent department of the Institute of Sociology at the Czech Academy of Sciences, and in 2001 it became a member of the Council of European Social Science Data Archives.

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Estonia

Estonia does not have a tradition of multiparty democracy with free expression of public opinion. The first period of independence (1918–1940) started with an ultraparliamentarian political system, frequent elections, and plebiscites and ended with the period of silence under the authoritarian regime set up in 1934. Following almost five decades under Soviet occupation and ideological control of communist authorities, there was limited space for public expression of different views and opinions.

Sociological studies in Estonia started during the "Khrustsov thaw" in 1960 (Keen and Mucha 1994). It happened at the same time as in Leningrad and Moscow. Estonia was opened to the West, and Western ideas penetrated more easily than in the rest of the Soviet Union. Also important was the relatively open ideological atmosphere and tolerance of Estonian authorities compared with other places in the Soviet Union. Kääriku seminars organized by Ülo Vooglaid turned out to be major discussion places for leading Soviet sociologists like J. Levada, V. Yadov, I. Kon, and others.

The leading role in the development of Estonian sociology was played by the Laboratory of Sociology at Tartu University founded by Vooglaid in 1967. Vooglaid,

together with Marju Lauristin, developed the school of mass communications and public opinion research, one of the leading directions of sociological research. In its heyday the laboratory had a permanent staff of more than 20.

Empirical research was conducted first by the local newspaper *Edasi* and later by Estonian Radio and Television. Since 1970, Estonian Radio has quarterly collected audience information and perceptions of different topics. Regular data collection led to the first electronic database in the 1960s and the first all-Estonian network of interviewers. Sophisticated methodology of content analysis was used. The Laboratory of Sociology also reestablished a national consciousness that brought its activities in conflict with the leadership of the Communist Party. As a result the Laboratory was forced to close down in 1975 (Titma 2002; Hoyer, Lauk, and Vihalemm 1993). Opinions were considered to be dangerous for the regime and were not allowed in polls until 1984, when these questions first passed censorship in an Estonian Broadcasting Data Processing Center survey (Kivirähk 1992).

A new impetus was seen after the dramatic political changes initiated by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. Following the Singing Revolution (1988–1991), a peaceful evolutionary movement toward regaining independence, supported by the Estonian media, brought public opinion to center stage. It was the golden era of public opinion polling in Estonia. The polling costs were relatively low, and the results of monthly polls were regularly discussed in newspapers and TV specials. It was a legitimizing force in Estonia's fight for freedom and free society. In these years private

polling companies were established. There was a radicalization of the idea of national sovereignty and a restoration of the private sphere, including private property for people. The public debate developed from the universal idea of protecting local environments against the central bureaucracy and preserving the national cultural heritage. Just consider the fact that more than 96 percent of Estonians supported independence in 1990 (Kivirähk 1991; see Table 1).

The Republic of Estonia

The debate caused one of the biggest cleavages in Estonian public opinion. The Movement of Citizens' Committees carried the idea of legal continuity and restoration of the prewar Republic of Estonia (1918–1940), including property rights, was Euro-Atlantic in its foreign policy choices, demanded radical de-Sovietization, and felt nostalgia for the prewar agrarian way of life. The Popular Front advocated a new Estonian state, taking a kind of realpolitik approach concerning changes in the national composition of population (the share of non-Estonians grew from 12 percent in 1934 to 35 percent in 1979) and changes in the economic and social life that had taken place during the Soviet years. This approach tried to make peace with the 50-year Soviet history in domestic policy and was hoping to profit from close ties to former Soviet republics or some kind of neutrality in foreign policy. Although weakened, these patterns are still visible in Estonia and affect the formation of party coalitions. The key issue was giving or refusing Estonian citizenship to non-Estonians (mainly Russians) who had moved to Estonia during the Soviet era and a majority of whom had been against the idea of

Table 1

What kind of political status would you want Estonia to acquire in the future? (%)

	<i>Apr '89</i>	<i>Sept '89</i>	<i>Jan '90</i>	<i>Mar '90</i>	<i>May '90</i>
<i>Estonians</i>					
a union republic within the present federation (USSR)	2	2	0	1	0
an independent state in a confederation (USSR)	39	31	15	9	2
an independent state outside the USSR	56	64	81	87	96
don't know	3	3	2	2	3
<i>Non-Estonians</i>					
a union republic within the present federation (USSR)	54	37	20	24	21
an independent state in a confederation (USSR)	25	47	52	45	46
an independent state outside the USSR	5	9	17	21	26
don't know	14	7	9	8	7

Source: EMOR (in Kivirähk 1992).

reestablishing Estonian statehood (see Table 1). From the beginning of the 1990s the attitude toward non-Estonians has seen dramatic change, from outright rejection to integration into Estonian society (see Table 2).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union created conservative attitudes. Today the opinions of non-Estonians and titular nationals have become similar, except on language, citizenship, and some foreign policy. More than 170,000 non-Estonians

Table 2

There are different views about what should government do on the issue of non-Estonian non-citizens. Which of the following statements is closer to your opinion? (%)

<i>Estonians</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1997</i>
Government should concentrate on supporting the integration of non-Estonians without citizenship into Estonian society	36	63
Government should concentrate on supporting majority of non-Estonians without citizenship leaving Estonia	55	28
Don't know	9	9

Source: EMOR 1994, 1997.

live in Estonia without any citizenship; more than 88,000 are citizens of the Russian Federation. Still, a significant part of the Russian population in Estonia is oriented toward the consumption of the Russian mass media. After independence, interest in politics fell among Estonians from 91 percent to 58 percent and among non-Estonians from 74 percent to 47 percent during 1989–1996 (Lauristin et al. 1997). New problems concerning everyday life and building institutions moved to the top of the agenda. Shock therapy created socioeconomic divisions.

These are reflected in the different attitudes of younger and better educated people, who tend to support liberal values, freedom of choice, and individual responsibility, and the elderly and less educated, who want to see equality in society and put more hopes in the state. Today socioeconomic differentiation is growing as a part of the public discourse.

Estonia started to orient itself toward integration into the European Union (EU). A referendum scheduled for 2004 polarized public opinion. Although there has been a long-lasting pro-EU consensus,

there is also skepticism. The non-Estonian population is more pro-EU than Estonians. So only a vague majority of citizens is going to vote for union (see Table 3).

Negative attitudes toward European union are closely correlated with the overall dissatisfaction of respondents with their socioeconomic situation and the performance of government. As the main political goals for the transitional period, joining EU and NATO, seem to be achieved, public debate about future strategic goals has started.

Nature and Role of Public Opinion in Estonia

Because Estonia is a small society (with a population of 1.36 million) with a history of dramatic changes and adaptation, public opinion lacks strong institutional roots. Individualistic, it is not precisely definable and is dynamic. It is affected by mass media and several opinion leaders. In such a small country, society is transparent and social control is direct and personal. Public opinion (via mass media and elections) is fulfilling a control function. Although there are few politicians who do not pay attention to public opinion

Table 3

If there would be a referendum tomorrow about Estonia joining the European Union, how would you vote? (%)

All Estonian Citizens Who Are Allowed to vote (18 Years and Older)

	Apr '96	Apr '97	Nov '98	May '00	Oct '01	Jun '02
for joining	47	32	27	34	38	43
against joining	24	23	14	26	27	31
will not participate	19	13	13	8	21	12
don't know	19	32	46	26	14	14

Source: Saar Poll.

before elections, the opposition takes advantage of it. Still, only a few politicians have stepped down under public pressure. Estonian sociologist Raivo Palmaru, who has studied the influence of media on election results, gives media and journalists a special role in the formation of public opinion in Estonia. His content analysis of printed media before elections showed strong correlations between the positive assessment of political parties and election results. On the basis of his comparative survey he found that Estonian journalists' political self-identification differs from the views of the population; journalists represent the right. He also found that Estonian journalists consider themselves to be politicians far more than their colleagues in Germany and Great Britain do (Palmaru 2001).

Public opinion data are collected before and after every election. The results of local, parliamentary, and presidential elections are analyzed in the media and used to judge the state of public thinking. For some municipalities there exists a longitudinal database that contains information about electoral participation of all voters through six elections (1992–1999). But all election data are not scientifically studied as of yet. Public opinion is a control mechanism for companies' reliability, planning marketing activities, and so on. Estonian sociologists are successful in developing public space for their research results. Two main dailies are using a lot of sociological data. Sociologists initiated a public debate on social inequality and poverty in Estonia. The prime minister and members of parliament met with social scientists and discussed the problem. Two nationwide known pollsters—Juhan Kivirähk and Andrus Saar—themselves belong to the cluster of opinion

leaders as commentators on poll results and as columnists.

The media publish nonrepresentative polls on daily highlights. Every day newspapers publish letters from readers; on radio talk shows ordinary people can call and express opinions openly.

Growing Importance of Public Opinion

There have been only two national referenda—about restoring independence (1990) and approving the constitution (1992). Rallies are becoming popular tools of voter mobilization among parties again. In 2001 more than 100,000 people attended a rally organized by opposition parties against the government's plan to privatize Estonian power plants. All major parties announced their support for reforming the presidential election system for the 2006 elections. This year Tallinn introduced and institutionalized municipal referenda as a part of its governing system.

Leading Opinion Research Companies

Estonian sociology changes mainly on the grounds of the practical needs of society. The market economy led to the transformation of opinion polling firms into market research companies with opinion polling units. Today, three major private polling companies follow the International Chamber of Commerce/European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (ICC/ESOMAR) rules, providing full-scale professional research services and tools. The largest is EMOR Ltd. (Estonian Market and Opinion Research Centre Ltd., established in 1990), which conducts bimonthly nationwide omnibus surveys with samples of 500 respondents ages 15 to 74 using Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) or Com-

puter-Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI) technology. With its own interviewer network and 30 researchers, it is a major institution carrying out data collection and preliminary analyses of data. Together with its partners Baltic Data House (Latvia) and SIC Rinkos Tyrimai (Lithuania), EMOR offers services in the Baltic region as well. Since the beginning of 2001, EMOR has belonged to the Taylor Nelson Sofres Group (TNS). EMOR is a member of the Gallup International Association. As a private company it does not make its data public and does limited scientific analyses. The second major provider of a monthly omnibus is Saar Poll Ltd. (established in 1988). Saar Poll is smaller than EMOR and is used by many researchers as a data-collecting service. It is oriented toward public opinion and election studies. The network of cooperation partners of Saar Poll covers Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Russia. The third competitor is Estonian Surveys Ltd. (ES Turu-uuingute AS), founded in 1994. Estonian Surveys also carries out monthly nationwide omnibus surveys.

Before 1990, Estonian sociology was empirically oriented, and this tradition continues today. Public demand for sociological knowledge is concrete and ignores purely scientific long-term efforts. State and private institutions provide resources for pragmatic tasks. Traditionally the main subscribers for professionally conducted public opinion polls are national newspapers, state institutions, and political organizations. Before elections, political parties often order private polls and sometimes focus group surveys.

In 1993 a team of sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, and human geographers from Tartu University made up an initiative group for creating a databank of social sciences and began to work

out how to save research materials collected by the Estonian social scientists during previous decades. The databank was officially formed as an interdisciplinary center for the faculty of social sciences in early 1996, and it began to function as a national social science databank—the Estonian Social Science Data Archives (ESSDA). In 1997, ESSDA became a full member of the European Council of Social Science Data Archives (CESSDA). Public opinion data are presented partially in CESSDA and are located at polling firms.

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Finland

Opinion polls have a long history in Finland. Most polls are conducted by commercial opinion institutes, only a minor part by the government's statistics bureau. Many of the polls can be used for research, although most are not made for that purpose. In fact, survey-based electoral studies have never been systematically conducted in Finland. Studies of the electorate are relatively rare. The continual financing of such projects never won approval in the parliament or the Academy of Finland, the public research grant institute. As a result, research projects have only occasionally received financial support for such purposes.

When Finland became a member of the European Union in 1995, pressure grew

for more comprehensive and coordinated information about opinions. One poll is the continual Eurobarometer. In January 1999 the Finnish Social Science Data Archive (FSD) started to operate as a national resource center for social science research and teaching as a separate unit of the University of Tampere. FSD provides a wide range of services from data archiving to information. Its primary goal is to increase the use of existing social science research data by disseminating them throughout Finland and internationally. Much of the chaotic situation in polling, research, and documentation is now better administrated and coordinated.

Polls in the Past

The first attempts to gauge public opinion date to the early 1930s with surveys on living conditions among the farming population. After World War II the situation changed when Finnish Gallup was founded in 1945. Polls were made on Finnish alcohol consumption and related issues. Surveys were also made in social research; some monitored opinions. Analysis was facilitated by computer albeit the data had to be stored and the program had to be run with punch cards. Some polls were used in dissertations in the mid-1950s.

The first poll in Finland planned and made by a political scientist was undertaken around the presidential election in 1956. It was a panel study where 430 interviews were completed some weeks before the election; 410 were reinterviewed after the election. The sample was drawn from a student population in Helsinki. Although the sample was drawn from a coming elite (students) and not from the electorate, the experience was useful for a larger project (Pesonen

2002, pp. 32–44). In 1958 a new poll followed the panel method. This study focused on parliament elections, and the sample was drawn from a register of voters. However, the survey was geographically restricted to a city in the middle of Finland. A total of 501 interviews were completed (Pesonen 1965, pp. 23–25; Pesonen 2000, pp. 32–44).

During the 1960s, commercial opinion polls increased, new opinion poll institutes were founded, and the computer technique was developed. Although the polls mainly served commercial interests, the demand for polls on politics and society increased as well. The biggest national newspaper began to publish polls regularly. Polling results became a news item not only in newspapers but also on TV broadcasts. In addition, polling results became linked to political decisionmaking. As a result of media attention, citizens' preferences had to be considered by government in the formal decisionmaking process. Therefore the polls intensified the interaction between voters and elected officials. Agenda-setting was no longer a party affair alone; the media could now do it in the name of the citizens, and political leaders had to respond.

In Finland, foreign affairs after World War II were firmly in the hands of the president and the government elites close to him. However, the leading Finnish national newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, conducted a poll in 1969 about Nordek, the planned Nordic free trade union. In 1972 a poll was conducted about the Finnish free trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC, a part of the European Community prior to the European Union [EU]) (Suhonen 1991, pp. 15–16). In both polls a majority of the respondents were in favor of an agreement. The Nordek

Union plan failed as the Finnish government in March 1970 decided not to sign the draft treaty it had approved only six weeks earlier. The reason given was not to violate the coming EEC negotiations (Wendt 1981, pp. 662–664). Finland became a member of the EEC after unofficial Soviet approval. The fate of Finnish foreign policy was in the hands of the Soviet Union at that time. Negotiations with the Soviets were an elite affair, but thanks to polls the opinions of the citizens were known to the main political actors. The polls could not change the foreign policy directed by the elite, but the elite could not control the polls.

Parties Begin to Act

During the late 1960s, television became the most important information source to voters at elections. Party propaganda was not permitted, but parties were invited to participate in debates. In addition, news was sent daily to viewers. Television became a more important source of political information to voters than party organizations were.

Parties started to buy services from polling institutes. Information was needed on voters' party preferences and their opinions about government politics. In addition, parties took the opportunity to test campaign themes in advance. Therefore they also needed information about undecided voters, potential new voters, and competing parties (Suhonen 1991, pp. 16–17). This information was for internal use and was not published. Since 1973 the four biggest parties, the Conservatives, the Center Party, the Social Democrats, and the Communists, all share the same market research agency, Finnish Gallup, in their preparation of campaign strategy. The findings are exclusively for the use of those four

parties, and each has its own special role in the research. No serious conflicts have appeared. Each party has the option of commissioning separate questions as part of the common questionnaire (Sundberg and Högnabba 1992, pp. 82–99). During this period the Communists vanished and were replaced with the Left-Wing Alliance, which continues as a partner with the other three parties. After a delay, results from the joint poll are released for research. The competing parties have managed to share the results and the bills without serious complications.

During the period from 1973 to 1990, except for the years 1985 and 1989, the polls were made by interviews. The survey samples covered between 1,000 and 2,000 structured interviews. In 1991 a Gallup channel was introduced where some 1,000 selected respondents were offered a personal computer with Internet service. The wired respondents have since then answered the electronic interviews. This system gives information quickly but is criticized for ignoring those who cannot master a PC, and the sample is not random. To cope with the latter problem, the Gallup institute has a system where respondents are replaced after a certain time period.

The polls available for a larger public include questions about electoral behavior, concerns about politics, opinions about the government and parties, and questions about actual political themes. Questions have also been posed about economic development, the chairman for the party, citizens' involvement in politics, and opinions about local politics. The polls have only occasionally been conducted directly after parliamentary elections. Therefore these polls can generally not be used for election studies, as they lack questions on party voting and

participation. It is, however, possible to make a time series on certain variables. Hence, these polls have been used for scientific research, and the polls have been referred to in a number of publications.

The Absence of Systematic Election Studies

Instead of surveys, aggregate data were used to analyze change and stability in the electorate. Several books have been published since 1956, when this method first was used in Finland. The method has one advantage: it gives the researcher the opportunity to use old election data and link them to new data. In addition, it provides the opportunity to correlate social, economic, demographic, and cultural data with relevant dependent political variables. As historical statistical sources are good in Finland, the ecological method has been successful. Efforts have been made to improve the model by the introduction of the ecological inference model, which opens the way for individual interpretations of ecological data (Berglund and Thomsen 1990).

The last election study by political scientists was conducted in 1991. It was a panel study and resulted in a well-documented book on electoral behavior in Finland (Pesonen, Sänkiaho, and Borg 1993). Two years later an edited book in English was published wherein data from this study were used (Borg and Sänkiaho 1995). A survey instrument similar to that used in the Finnish study was administered to a random cross section of the populations of Austria, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States from late 1973 to spring 1976 (see Pesonen and Sänkiaho 1979; Matheson 1979).

In addition, polls have been conducted to cover political behavior in local elec-

tions, presidential elections, and European Parliament elections. Only a few of these polls are available at the FSD data archive.

From an international perspective, Finnish data are often lacking, and therefore Finland cannot be included in large cross-country studies. In addition, international trends in political behavior cannot properly be investigated with Finnish data. Finland is not a member of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), which is a collaborative program of cross-national research among election studies conducted in more than 50 countries. However, the prospects are good for joining the organization. This will be a crucial step toward a more systematic study of the Finnish elections and enhance cooperation with other research teams involved in election studies in the CSES program.

In addition, a survey of the 2003 parliament election was planned. This time the initiative comes from political scientists, who will have responsibility for the study. Due to the lack of resources the survey will not be a panel study, but it will include different components. Occasional studies of other elections are available. Finnish Gallup conducts most of the studies. Since 1992, polls have been conducted about administration and politics in local government.

In 1996, Finnish Gallup conducted an election study around the joint local and European Parliament elections. The respondents were asked if they voted in both elections or only in one. They were also asked about their party and candidate preferences. Nonvoters were asked why they did not vote. The local elections were also studied by researchers, who asked questions about party preferences. Nonvoting was also studied, and

the respondents were asked to state why they did not vote. The results from this survey have been analyzed and published in three different publications in Finnish (Borg 1997, 1998; Oulasvirta and Brännkärr 2001).

In 1999 the European Parliament elections were held jointly with the 14 other member states. A poll was conducted by Finnish Gallup. Questions were raised about voting behavior, party advertisements, and the respondents' perceptions of them. The results of this survey were published in an edited book written in Finnish (Pesonen 2000).

The 2000 presidential elections were investigated by Finnish Gallup in polls conducted after the elections. Similar questions were asked. These included how the respondent voted, the importance of mass media in the vote decision, and the importance of the campaign. One article written in Swedish has been published using data from these polls (Carlson 2002).

The president elections in 1994, 1988, and 1982 have been studied in interviews. The poll included similar types of questions as presented in the 2000 election. However, the system of electing president was different in 1982, as the voters elected 300 electors who were given the task to elect the president. This poll resulted in a book written in Finnish (Sänkiaho 1983).

Other Polls

Besides these polls, the Finnish Social Science Data Archive handles and stores a variety of miscellaneous polls. One is the International Social Survey (ISSP), which started in 1985 and Finland joined in 2000. All data from these polls are available for research at the FSD (www.fsd.uta.fi). The World Values Sur-

vey (WVS) has been conducted since 1981 in four waves. Finnish Gallup has been a partner in this project from the beginning. So far only the year 2000 poll is available at the FSD archive.

The Center for Finnish Business and Policy Studies (EVA) is a private study center—a think tank—founded in 1974 and funded by the key business organizations in Finland. EVA's reports and pamphlets are policy-oriented but written from a practical point of view. Since 1992, polls have been conducted to research changes in attitudes to the European integration. Furthermore, polls include questions about the EU membership, the future of EU, the European Monetary Union, the European Parliament, and Finland's security politics. The polls are available at FSD.

The FSD archives other polls. Among these, polls are conducted to research cities and the services they provide, including city government. Polls have been conducted to research security politics and attitudes about foreign political and security matters. Polls have also been conducted to investigate juvenile delinquency. Family barometers have been conducted since 1996 to monitor family relations. A social barometer is also available. Besides these polls, a variety of occasional interviews are available at the FSD archive.

Conclusion

Polls have been conducted in Finland since the mid-1940s. However, most polls have been conducted by professionals for commercial or nonscientific use. The situation changed with the foundation of the data archive FSD in 1999. Its main purpose is to serve researchers with data. The data archive serves also as a link to other archives around the globe

and acts in close cooperation with them. The 2003 election study looks promising, and hopefully Finland can be knitted into the international community of electoral research.

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France

As in most liberal democracies, public opinion drives a great deal of political and policy decisions in France. There are several cleavages in society around which public opinion is divided. There are also key sectors of society whose opinions on politics are particularly important. Public opinion is measured in a variety of ways in the country. Perhaps the most obvious method is through public opinion polls. A second way is with the use of referenda. The French have also been known to take to the streets and protest to express opinions. Public opinion plays an important role in the governing of the country and will likely

continue to play an ever-increasing role in the future.

Origins of French Public Opinion

When describing the origins of the modern party system in Western Europe, well-known political scientists Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) believed that the party systems of the 1960s were based on key cleavages or divisions in European societies that formed much earlier in Europe's history. Many of the cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan highlighted are still relevant in France today. Class continues to be of enduring importance in French society. The French, like their British neighbors, are very conscious of living in a society divided into classes. In France, unlike in Great Britain, there are widespread resentment and antagonism toward the upper classes. This leads French people to have attitudes that are resistant to policies that benefit the wealthy.

Although class is an important cleavage in France, class identification is changing. Between the 1970s and mid-1990s, class identification dropped by about 10 percent (Almond et al. 2002). This decline has been most pronounced among blue-collar workers. Workers now identify regularly with the middle class. This suggests that we may see an increase in the number of people holding middle-class values and middle-class opinions. Nevertheless, the recent influx of immigrants into France is serving to reinstitute and reinforce a sense of division among classes in France.

Possibly race may supplant class as an important cleavage in society around which opinions differ. Some fear that racism in France is a growing problem. Recent (2002) electoral support of right-wing National Front candidate Jean Marie

Le Pen, who used anti-immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric, helped to reinforce this view about French opinion. During the 1990s, however, a public opinion poll published in the French newspaper *Le Monde* found that French citizens were no more racist than citizens in other liberal democracies. Nearly 60 percent of respondents held that they did not have racist attitudes. Whether this has changed remains to be seen.

France also has an urban/rural divide. Urbanization came later and more slowly to France. Compared to other European countries France does not have many large cities outside Paris (Almond et al. 2002). Most cities in France boast fewer than 1 million residents. Paris is the exception at nearly 10 million residents. That said, the majority of French people live in urban areas, with more than one-sixth of the entire nation living in the Parisian metropolitan area (Safran 1995). This has created differences in opinion between those in Paris and those in the rest of the country.

Although France is now a largely urban country, the agricultural sector continues to remain economically and politically important. France has more cultivated acreage than any other country in the European Union (Almond et al. 2002). Agriculture is an important sector of the French economy; the opinions of farmers tend to be listened to at all levels of government. A hotly contested issue is the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a subsidy for agriculture, particularly agricultural modernization. The French, perhaps more than any other European country, have incredibly strong opinions in favor of the CAP. These opinions are held not only by farmers but by city-dwellers as well. A nostalgic feeling toward agri-

cultural workers helps to explain why many city dwellers in France express support.

French opinion is upheld by several other themes. First, the French seem to be burdened by history. They often superimpose feuds of the past onto conflicts of the present (Almond et al. 2002). As a result, French opinions are deeply influenced by the events of yesterday. In the words of Charles de Gaulle, one of France's most famous leaders, the French are "weighed down by history."

The French also tend to distrust government and politics. They are often characterized as possessing alienated political attitudes. For example, recent polls (October 2002) suggest that more than half of those polled believe that the government does not "listen to people like them" (www.bva.fr). Although this is the case, the French also have almost paradoxically high expectations for their government (Almond et al. 2002). The same poll found that more than half believed that the government was doing a good job (www.bva.fr).

Key Interest Groups in French Society

Key interest groups tend to cluster around key divisions found in society. France is no exception. French workers have considerable confidence in trade unions to defend their interests during labor conflicts (Almond et al. 2002). Membership in labor unions declined sharply during the 1970s and 1980s and leveled off in the 1990s.

Business interests also are represented in France. Since World War II, most French business and trade associations have been housed under one dominant confederation called the *Mouvement des Entreprises de France* (MEDEF, the Move-

ment of French Business). Although well organized, MEDEF has not had much political influence because of internal ideological struggles and because of other movements (Safran 1995).

The French agricultural sector is represented by the Fédération Nationale des Syndicats Agricoles (FNSA, the National Organization of Agricultural Unions). Due to its dominance in the agricultural sector and the importance of agriculture in France, the FNSA carries weight with French policymakers.

Measuring French Public Opinion

Perhaps the most widely known method of assessing public opinion in most democratic polities is the public opinion poll. French people also express themselves through national referenda and through protest.

Public opinion polls have become increasingly important in France. There are several main polling agencies or groups that regularly track public opinion on a variety of aspects ranging from presidential preference to feelings about racism. The majority of these groups are private organizations.

Started on December 1, 1938, after founder John Stoetzel met George Gallup in the United States, L'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) has been providing information on French public opinion on a variety of topics ever since. The agency was banned during World War II but was quickly reinstated upon de Gaulle's return to Paris. The results of IFOP's polls are publicly available online (www.ifop.com) and have also been cited in various news sources. IFOP remained the main voice in French public opinion for nearly 30 years. The 1960s, however, marked the influx of more private agen-

cies onto the polling scene in France. SOFRES was created in 1963, BVA was created in 1970, and IPSOS was created in 1975. These four private polling agencies, IFOP, SOFRES, BVA, and IPSOS, represent the four largest polling agencies in France and some of the largest polling agencies in the world. They conduct opinion polls on political attitudes, and their results are regularly reported in newsmagazines and newspapers as well as on their respective websites.

SOFRES (www.sofres.com), like IFOP, is a private polling agency. It is part of the Taylor Nelson group and is the largest polling agency in France and the fourth largest polling agency in the world. The agency conducts polls on politics and elections as well as polls that tap other veins in society, marketing research, and economic polls. SOFRES polls are used by the news media. SOFRES has also conducted polls for American news outlets ABC News and the *Washington Post*.

BVA (www.bva.fr) refers to itself as an institution for marketing and opinion. Like IFOP and SOFRES, it regularly conducts polls about executive popularity. These polls are ongoing and conducted at regular intervals. *Paris-Match* currently has a contract with BVA to provide this barometer. BVA has also conducted polls for several other French newsmagazines and newspapers and public interest groups.

IPSOS (www.ipsos.fr), like the agencies described above, focuses on several key areas, including public opinion on politics, elections, political figures, and policies. IPSOS also has ongoing barometers that measure feelings toward political activities. IPSOS also provides information for various news sources and is commissioned regularly by newsmagazines

and newspapers to conduct various political polls.

The government and French political candidates and officials pay close attention to polls, particularly the barometers. Although French politicians keep an eye on polls, France is unique in that it places restrictions on polling during elections; findings may not be published during the week preceding an election. In an age of electronic media, this restriction has in actuality become a formality. The restrictions apply to French news outlets. Polls can be published in other newspapers and on Internet sites that are not French. Polls are even conducted by and published by French-speaking Swiss firms, making the information accessible in France.

Referenda

A referendum is the principle or practice of referring measures from the legislative body to the electorate for approval or rejection. In France, this has been used nine times since the beginning of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Table 1 presents referenda and outcomes. Although participation rates in most referenda are high by U.S. standards, they remain low

compared to turnouts in French presidential and legislative elections, which run between 75–85 percent and 70–85 percent, respectively (Safran 1995). The French highly regard representative government, and referenda were used by the two Napoleons to extend their powers. Recent polls suggest, however, that the referendum as a form of political participation is gaining popularity among the French electorate (Almond et al. 2002).

Protest

Protest has been an effective means of expressing political opinion in France. The French are known for their expressive protest style, and protests in France have been an effective way to communicate public opinion to government leaders and to change policies. For example, in 1987, protests by college and high school students forced the government to withdraw proposed legislation for university reform. Student protest also caused the government in 1994 to withdraw plans for a youth minimum wage (Almond et al. 2002). Massive demonstrations by rail workers in 1995 forced the government to abandon a plan to reorganize the railway system. Perhaps most visually memo-

Table 1 French Referenda

<i>Year</i>	<i>Referendum</i>	<i>Result</i>
1958	Adoption of Fifth Republic Constitution	passed
1961	Algerian self-determination	passed
1962	Evian Agreements	passed
1962	Direct election of president	passed
1969	Reform of regions and Senate	failed
1972	Enlargement of European Community	passed
1988	Autonomy for New Caledonia	passed
1992	Adoption of Maastricht Treaty	passed
2002	Shorten presidential term to 5 years	passed

rable were the protests by French truckers that shut down freeways in protest of rising oil and gasoline prices. These protests and resultant public pressures forced the government to lower consumer taxes on fuel (Almond et al. 2002).

Conclusion

Politicians in France watch the polls. Polling numbers give them a good indication of the feelings of their constituents. Polls enable politicians to focus on the issues that the public thinks are important. Public opinion polls show that the French are concerned with unemployment, violence and crime, education, social inequality, immigration, and issues related to the European Union (Safran 1995; www.sofres.com; www.bva.fr; www.ipsos.fr; www.ifop.com).

At the end of 2002, chief among the average French citizen's concerns was the economy. More than half of the electorate had a pessimistic outlook, believing that the economic situation in France will likely deteriorate. Likely, economic concerns and government response to a downtrend in the economy will guide voter choice in coming elections.

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Germany

German politics and public policy have not always been receptive to the influences of public opinion. Germany's federal governing structure, neocorporatist policymaking tradition, and strong political parties have translated into a governing system that tends to draw heavily upon regional elites, party leaders, and business and labor union leadership for decisionmaking. Germany is much younger as a nation than most other large West European countries. Bismarck's "blood and iron" unification brought together a patchwork of regionally distinct states into one empire in 1871, but it came at the expense of parliamentary control. Indeed, the nation's early history under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm did not foster democracy. When democracy did take root during the Weimar Republic, economic depression, lack of civic engagement, distrust of politicians, and political maneuvering all combined to destroy republican government in favor of Nazism. Only after an economic miracle, heavy investment by democratic allies, and strong domestic democratic leadership did the West German citizenry begin to exemplify democratic political beliefs and participation.

Different trends have converged since then to provide a greater role for public opinion in West Germany. The important Basic Law endowed parties with a vital and stabilizing role in the democratization of West Germany. Over time, however, more and more West Germans began to consider themselves partisan independents and became attracted to social movements like peace and environmentalism. Just as this trend matured, the former East German citizenry shocked the world as the voice of the people ended the division of the two Germans. Thus

the German public has fundamentally changed; the importance of German public opinion has expanded.

Understanding German politics requires a firm grasp of public opinion. Because of the role of parties, the institutional structure, and the 1990 unification of East and West Germany, such a grasp is not easily achieved, despite high-quality polling firms and academic studies of German public opinion. Nevertheless, its growing importance to German politics cannot be ignored.

Public Opinion Polling in Germany

Following the failure of democracy in the Weimar Republic and the horrors of the Nazi era, post-World War II Allied occupiers and German leaders feared that the German citizen would not become a good democrat. Consequently, perhaps no other country has had its citizenry polled so extensively from its inception as a nation than the post-World War II Federal Republic (West Germany). The Soviet satellite East Germany was not as interested in polling, as the government's confidence was high that East Germans would accept communism. The growing division and ultimate separation of Germany drove the Allies' and German democratic leaders' goals of purging Nazism and communism from West Germany while developing democracy among its citizens. Judging the success of this enterprise required studying political attitudes.

Early post-World War II results of such surveys were not encouraging, as many West Germans' memory of the Weimar era led to a distrust of democratic politicians and apprehension about embracing a new democratic governing system. Change came by the mid-1950s, however. Due to the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle) and the deft political

skills of West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, polling results demonstrated that Germans slowly had begun to accept the new system (Baker et al. 1981). The eventual softening of socialist appeals and acceptance of capitalism and limited government by the Social Democratic Party furthered the approval of the political and economic system. West Germans, especially the post-World War II generation, who were not nearly as reluctant to discuss politics or to push their political views, began to participate in new ways. Often this participation tried to mobilize public opinion on noneconomic and/or unconventional issues. These trends led political opinion surveys to shift their focus from whether West Germans *could* be democrats to instead capture opinions about politics and the dynamics of electoral politics.

The dramatic changes of 1989 further changed Germany's political dynamics and demanded a new direction in assessing public opinion. Not only were the demonstrations in East Germany a new and revolutionary manifestation of public opinion in the east; unification also brought with it the need to assess the new eastern electorate as well as the attitudes toward unification among the western electorate. Again, pollsters were required to study the democratization of a public while continuing to assess the growing fluidity toward policy issues in the west. Furthermore, without firm party allegiances, the electoral and policy attitudes of the eastern electorate were often fickle.

Despite strong parties and political institutions that buffer German politics from public opinion, unification, new social issues, changing electorates, regional distinctions, and high-quality polling have all converged to highlight

the importance of public opinion to German politics and the study of German public opinion.

German Government and Public Opinion

The east-west distinction adds to the regional flavor of German politics. The federal system only solidifies these differences. The federal structure of Germany's government means that land (state) governments reflect the regional flavor and political cultures of their citizens. For example, Berlin's cosmopolitan nature has traditionally attracted progressive elements of German society. In contrast, Bavaria has long been conservative in comparison. Given the importance of land government, it is not surprising that many key German political leaders are the premiers of their land. Regional distinctions are important because land governments appoint members of the Bundesrat, Germany's second house of parliament. Although the Bundesrat does not have the legislative power of the Bundestag, Germany's primary legislative house, it does have oversight of legislation that affects the states. Thus, regional political pressures influence government at the state and federal levels.

Regionalism does not overwhelm politics, because German political parties dominate the parliamentary process in the Bundestag. The Bundestag is organized around party *Fraktionen* (party groups or caucuses), which provide party leadership, committee membership, and tight party discipline in voting (Dalton 1993). Members do not typically bend to public opinion if that opinion runs counter to their party's position. The federal chancellor, as leader of the major party that received the largest proportion of seats in the Bundestag, along with the

junior governing party partner, relies on party discipline rather than public pressure to pass his coalition's agenda.

Interest group influence on policy lessens the influence of public pressure on policy. Unlike the U.S. pluralist system, where numerous interests simultaneously compete to pressure government on issues informally, German interests follow the neocorporatist model (Dalton 1993). Neocorporatism in Germany means that particular interests in society coalesce to form *peak organizations*. For example, industrial trade labor unions do not lobby government on their own; they come together for centralized representation under one large labor organization. Business interests do the same. Rather than influencing policy informally, both labor and business peak organizations are formally brought together with government officials to forge policy in areas such as labor law. Accordingly, elites in high-level meetings often make policy, which leaves a marginal role for public opinion. Because neocorporatism deals primarily with economic issues, however, many of the social issues that grew in importance in the 1990s did not lend themselves to neocorporatist policymaking. Consequently, policies were frequently brought to light through protest and other manifestations of public opinion.

Social Movements, Public Opinion, and New Politics

As in most democratic societies, public opinion is often exhibited on the streets rather than at the ballot box. In fact, the measure of the health of a civic and democratic culture extends beyond voting patterns to other expressions. Since the 1960s, Germans have been active in political protest against issues such as the Vietnam War, U.S. missiles in Germany,

restrictions on university admissions, environmental degradation, nuclear energy, women's rights, and U.S. military action in Iraq. Examining several years of survey data reveals that in the mid-1970s less than 10 percent of West Germans reported participating in political protests. By the year 2000, the *World Values Survey* reported that this number had nearly doubled. A significant portion of the German population views political protest as a valid and mainstream way to articulate political opinion.

Collectively, these types of new political issues are referred to as *Bürgerinitiativen*, or "citizens' initiatives." The growth of the citizens' movements led some to ask if a politics of protest in Germany illustrated a widening gap between formal political representation and grassroots democratic sentiment. Others argued that the protests are vital to represent minority opinions and are politically acceptable and vital to healthy representative democracy. Further, earlier citizens' movements recently have found expression through more traditional political channels. For example, the Green Party copied the grassroots tactics of the *Bürgerinitiativen* in organizing local political chapters.

In the 1960s and 1970s, Germany saw the growth of a New Politics movement. These groups generally challenged traditional interests such as business, labor, religion, and agriculture and focused on lifestyle and quality-of-life issues. Academic scholars generally refer to the shift as one toward postmaterialist attitudes. Postmaterialist movements that took hold in Germany include the environmental movement, women's movement, peace movement, and gay and lesbian movement. The interest groups associated with postmaterialist issues typically

do not lend themselves to the neocorporatist model. Rather, their goal is to challenge traditional interest groups by mobilizing public opinion.

New social movements founded on postmaterialist values have seen memberships grow, and they provide a way to gauge the values and opinions of the electorate. In other words, one can examine membership and participation in social movements to gauge opinion; environmental groups are perhaps the most visible in Germany. The growth of the environmental movement in the 1970s, coupled with the antinuclear sentiment fueled by the Chernobyl disaster of the mid-1980s, propelled the environmental movement to the forefront of public debate. Memberships have increased steadily since the 1970s.

German Political Attitudes and Political Behavior

Germany's political parties played a vital role in the democratization of Germany. Christian Democrats, the center-right major party, dominated early post-World War II elections and government. The post-World War II Social Democrats began as a party committed to socialism but softened their political appeals in the late 1950s. The parties have differed on government involvement in the economy, social welfare, and so on, but both are generally centrist. The main junior coalition party, the Liberal Party (FDP), had been the kingmaker when it joined the main governing party in coalition. Indeed, its switch to support the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) from the Socialist-Democratic Party (SPD) functionally ended the ability of the SPD to govern in the early 1980s.

At the same time, the Green Party emerged as the champion of postmateri-

alist issues. In recent years, the realist wing of the party has dominated, and in 1998 the Greens joined the SPD as junior party; for the first time Greens governed at the federal level. The more fundamentalist wing, disillusioned by realist tactics, in some cases became disassociated and returned to protests. The former Communist Party in East Germany has also competed in German elections since unification. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) has argued for a much more aggressive social welfare system.

With five parties, the issue positions become challenging. For example, in debate over social welfare spending, the SPD pushed for more social welfare programs, but West Germans in the 1980s had become less responsive. To compete against the CDU in the 1990s, the SPD successfully moved away from these appeals. Nevertheless, this has cost the SPD eastern voters; just as eastern voters joined the electorate following unification, the SPD abandoned the social safety net.

Fewer Germans consider themselves to be members of political parties. Western Germans have de-aligned, and eastern Germans were never involved prior to 1990. This means that more and more Germans rely on economic and political conditions and appeals made during electoral campaigns.

Consequently, gauging the pulse is challenging and important. Regional and state elections provide clues. And many polling agencies ask the "Sunday question" and track it over time. The Sunday question basically asks the voter which party she would vote for if the election were held the following Sunday. Fluctuations in the Sunday question findings are significant, and the press and public pay close attention. There is a fluidity in Ger-

man citizens' attitudes, and it is important to track attitudes to understand electoral dynamics.

The smaller parties, particularly the Greens and Liberals, also have an important role. German federal elections actually have two ballots. The first is a vote for a district representative. The second is a vote for a party generally. Together the two ballots decide the number of seats each party is allocated. To receive parliamentary seats, however, each party must cross the threshold of 5 percent of the second (party) ballot. Since neither of the major parties ever captures a majority of the vote, they need to have a coalition to form a government. These smaller parties, however, often worry about whether they will meet the 5 percent threshold. As a result, these parties closely follow the results of the Sunday question in polls. If it appears as though reaching the 5 percent threshold may be in doubt, the party will ramp up its appeals and even try to attract supporters from the major party. This strategic voting ensures that the junior party can form a coalition.

These examples demonstrate how public opinion findings actually play a role in parties' appeals and voters' behavior. German electoral public opinion polls not only reflect opinion; they provide information for major parties to change appeals. Thus, German pollsters have become central to explaining elections.

Measuring Public Opinion in Germany: Polling Agencies

State funding of political parties in Germany ensures that parties and their parliamentary groups have a continuous and long-term financial foundation, which enables party staff to conduct regular opinion polls. The funding also allows parties to outsource research to private

polling firms. Numerous German polling firms play some role in the assessment of public opinion, with some of the biggest highlighted below. Polls conducted by outside firms are used regularly by political parties and candidates and are published by major media outlets.

For example, the Institut für Angewandte Sozialwissenschaft (Institute for Applied Social Sciences) publishes election reports and reports on voter behavior for use by print and TV media. Public TV stations in Germany also conduct their own polls. For example, ZDF and ARD, both public TV stations, conducted polls about feelings toward parties in the 2002 elections. The Politbarometer series of polls has provided monthly polls since 1977. For consistency and time-series purposes, the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (Election Research Group) matches many of the questions in the Politbarometer to questions that have been asked over time on German National Election Studies series. The Politbarometer series also affords a consistent monthly view of attitude change in German politics.

Market research firms also have expertise. One such firm is the multinational corporation Taylor Nelson Sofres (EMNID). EMNID focuses on public opinions about political and social issues and has recently released polls about Berliners' attitudes toward local elections and candidates. Another is Infratest. Infratest regularly conducts the DeutschlandTrend, a barometer of German opinions about current issues.

Many opinion firms employ academics as well as career marketing and research professionals, and some firms straddle the divide between academia and the mainstream media, finding an outlet in both domains. The Institute für Demokratie Allensbach (IfD) is cited widely in

academic texts as well as in the mainstream media. IfD polling results are also internally published and available to the public.

Other academic research groups exist as well. The Center for Survey Research and Methodology (ZUMA) at the University of Cologne houses numerous data sources on German and other nations' public opinion. The Central Archive (ZA) provides a clearinghouse for such data as the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), German Election Studies, and numerous other data sources. Similarly, the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (Social Science Research Center in Berlin) houses numerous scholars specializing in German political and social attitudes. Many of the scholars at these institutes also served as primary investigators on the German Election Studies series.

Conclusion

It is difficult to speak of a monolithic German public opinion. The federal system accentuates regional attitudinal variance; no single German public opinion exists. This does not mean, however, that public opinion has entirely driven German politics. The neocorporatist policy-making tradition and the strength of political parties together have meant that public expression of opinion does not trump elite political debate in governing. Nevertheless, the public's attitudes increasingly become important with the emergence of new issues.

Social and political changes increased the importance of assessing political opinions. Polling shifted from assessing democratic Germany to tracking electoral attitudes, political opinions, and numerous forms of nontraditional political participation. Eastern Germans social-

ize into democracy, more Germans avoid party identification, and postmaterialist issues continue to drive political debate. The importance of gauging public attitudes thus grows. Indeed, German public opinion very much drives its politics, even if it does not control politics.

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Great Britain

British political culture and political institutions are not designed to be overly responsive to public opinion compared to other advanced industrial democracies. There are built-in buffers against the passions of the public, such as strong political parties, the power of the cabinet to dominate policy, and the ability of the prime minister to choose when to hold elections. The premium is on institutional stability, and British political culture is highly supportive of representative democracy, part of which is an accepted deference to political authority on the part of the public.

Nevertheless, public opinion increasingly plays an important role for Parliament, parties, electoral campaigns, and

the press. This has not always been the case, as stable class divisions within society have provided consistent, if lackluster, political competition in the past. In recent decades, however, decreased class-consciousness has led to fewer partisans, and parties have consequently had to broaden their appeals. Further, more sources and methods of tapping the public's attitudes have developed. There has been an increase in academic survey research, and such in-depth media polling exists that even the royal family is not immune from public judgment. Finally, regional devolution of some governmental power has meant more venues exist where public opinion may play a role. Thus, public opinion is receiving more attention from academics, the media, and politicians.

Public Opinion Polling, Survey Research Firms, and the Media

Britain has some of the most well-respected market research firms in the world. Each provides parties, media outlets, or the government with detailed (often monthly) omnibus survey results. These firms include Gallup, Harris, National Opinion Polls (NOP Research Group), Rasmussen, International Communications and Marketing Research (ICM), and Market and Opinion Research International (MORI).

In academia, British political scientists followed the shift toward post-World War II behavioral social science by concentrating increasingly on political attitudes. The classic example of this is the Nuffield electoral studies begun in 1963; the resultant British General Election Studies have become among the best survey-based electoral studies in the world. These studies are now centered at the University of Essex, which also houses

the European Consortium for Political Research, probably Europe's crown jewel of data holdings and survey research methodology. The British General Election Studies series includes cross-sectional election surveys as well as inter-election panels to follow individual-level dynamics of voting. In recent decades, the British Social Attitudes Surveys have provided another academic source of political data that closely tracks political attitudes over time and complements the British General Election Studies.

The Media and Reporting

Public Opinion

Media political polls play a central role in informing the public and the government as to the attitudes of the general public. Major newspapers frequently have worked with particular companies. For example, the *Telegraph* has used Gallup; *The Times* has used MORI; *The Guardian* has used ICM; the *Scottish Times* has used NOP; and *The Independent* has used Rasmussen. Television also closely covers public opinion, with Harris at times polling for ITN and NOP at times for the BBC.

These media polls typically do a decent job of reflecting the actual electoral outcome in terms of vote percentages, although significant mistakes emerged in both the 1970 and 1992 general elections. The technical explanations for the two failures differ, but both times most (if not all) major firms overcounted support for Labour and left a general public surprised by the election of a Conservative government, or at least by the margin of victory for the Conservatives. In 1992, most of these polls predicted a slight Labour lead (typically less than 2 percent), but the Conservatives won by more than 7 percent. These poor performances not only

shocked the survey research community; they led to a reevaluation of their methods. Some people remain uneasy about the validity of preelection polls in Britain.

In recent years, media outlets have provided frequent survey results. Often, the media report their own as well as other outlets' poll findings. For example, before the 2001 election, BBC television news followed many of these polls and, as is popular in the British press, aggregated them into a single "poll of the polls." Many of these companies include models of how many seats in Parliament will change hands based on the polling. There is considerable horserace coverage, but the mainstream media still provide higher-quality analysis about public opinion than that found in tabloids, which, as expected, tend to spice up headlines and stories with poll results without analyzing the broader political context.

Public Opinion, Political Parties, and Electoral Politics

Historically, British political parties have been strong, given their close connection to class differences in society and the institutional features of Parliament that support cohesive government. The cabinet enjoys strong support from its party's members of Parliament and may even push policy that is at odds with many of the party's backbenchers. Such partisan loyalty is not necessarily found in the public. With the fading of class-consciousness, more citizens refuse to identify with a political party. To reach these floating voters and to govern more effectively, parties have increasingly used political surveys to determine public opinion. This shift has altered the strategies parties use in campaigning as well as the core stances of parties in a few instances.

Political parties did not openly embrace public opinion surveys as electioneering instruments for quite some time. As political scientist Dennis Kavanagh (1995) and others have noted, British parties and political leaders felt surveys did not provide meaningful information for two key reasons. First, as representatives, members of Parliament did not feel they *needed* to survey their constituencies to understand their feelings toward politics. Second, consistent with British political culture's respect for representative democracy, political leaders did not equate their roles with parroting public opinion. Rather, the elected elite should lead the public debate rather than attempt to follow it. As Kavanagh notes, a third reason for the hesitancy in surveying the public for political and electoral reasons specifically involved the Labour Party. Labour, the representative of the working class and rival of business, neither had experience with nor trust in the business-developed field of market research.

This initial reticence has been brushed aside, however, and surveys now play a central role in campaign communications for both major parties. Most important, public opinion helps parties decide when to hold elections. Unlike in most other advanced industrial democracies, British prime ministers have the unique opportunity to call for elections when their party's popularity is at its highest. For example, Margaret Thatcher called for early elections in 1983 and throttled Labour by taking advantage of her high approval ratings, which had grown due to an improving economy and British success in the Falkland Islands War. In 1997, however, John Major did not have this luxury as his five-year term expired while his approval ratings were low. This led to a devastating electoral loss for the Conservatives.

The parties also rely on tracking polls to hone messages, target voters, and develop issue positions during campaigns. Parties pay particular attention to polls and focus groups in marginal constituencies—districts where party competition is close and where control of Parliament is often won. Electioneering depends heavily on these results, but gauging the electoral dynamics is not simple due to the presence of the Liberal Democrats as a third party. Furthermore, voters in marginal constituencies may actually use findings from early polls to alter their behavior through tactical voting. Often this means that Labour supporters in constituencies where Labour is weak may throw their support behind a Liberal Democrat in order to defeat the Conservative candidate. With the use of such tactics and dissimilar party competition in various constituencies, estimating voters' attitudes is difficult.

Public opinion affects parties beyond just their electioneering strategies, however. Parties increasingly have used findings from public opinion to temper or alter core party stances. Although Margaret Thatcher's economic policies emphasized privatization and less government involvement in the economy, her government never pressed privatization of the National Health Service because the government realized that despite the NHS's many problems and inefficiencies, the public backlash would be severe. Labour leader Tony Blair has pursued policies that conflicted with some of the socialist tenets of the party. Blair's reading of public opinion found that the middle class did not respond positively to Labour's out-of-step leftist policies, which had led Labour to be labeled as the Loony Left. Despite significant internal Labour party resistance, Blair pursued

centrist policies and referred to his party as New Labour, which trounced the Conservatives in two consecutive elections. Thus, parties have not only paid more attention to public opinion in electioneering; they also have used polling to chart, temper, and change core party positions.

Governing and Public Opinion in Britain

The British political system is heavily reliant on public opinion in policymaking both formally and informally. Formally, the British government follows public sentiment on particular policies directly through polling. The Office of Population, Censuses, and Surveys carries out surveys that track particular policies (mainly health and welfare). Other public surveys also touch on political features, such as the General Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey. These studies are often omnibus surveys or are specifically designed to highlight the effects of different public policies. Unlike media polls, these findings are less political than they are policy-oriented.

The government follows public sentiment informally as well. Despite the nearly unfettered ability of the cabinet to implement the policies it chooses, no prime minister or cabinet minister wishes to provoke a public backlash or prod a cabal of backbenchers from within his own party to sack the government. Close attention is paid to survey results reported by the media, and governments are typically quick to respond to negative poll numbers. One of the primary examples of a prime minister not following this conventional wisdom is Margaret Thatcher, who ignored the unpopularity of her policy to replace the property tax with a poll tax. Despite being the first

prime minister to win election three consecutive times, Thatcher was quickly tossed aside by the Conservatives, who were loathe to face an angry electorate following such an unpopular policy.

Two other informal means of public opinion exist. The opposition party may use the prime minister's Question Hour to challenge policies and rally their members and the public more generally against a policy. For the governing party, a cabinet member unsure of a particular policy may leak information to the media in order to test the public's receptiveness to it. British public opinion scholar David Broughton (1995) refers to such leaks as government policy trial balloons. In both cases, leaders assess public opinion before implementing policy strategies.

Alternative Mechanisms for Collecting Information on Public Opinion

Although peaceful political protest has a long history in British society, the last few decades have seen an increase in demonstrations. During the Cold War, the peace and nuclear disarmament movements conducted large marches through the center of London, with smaller sit-ins at nuclear weapons storage facilities. More recently, London has been the scene of large antiglobalization protests and animal rights demonstrations.

Violent political protest in Britain is rare, but it can be an effective way of informing politicians about the depth of public opinion on certain issues. The most famous recent example of this is the London riot against the imposition of the infamous poll tax in 1990; those violent demonstrations eventually led to the tax's repeal and the downfall of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister. British politicians cannot afford to completely

ignore public protests, as much as they might like to.

Political Issues

Historically, the two major British parties have been separated largely along class issues. Upper- and middle-class voters backed Conservative candidates, whereas working-class and poor voters supported Labour. Election winners were determined by how well each party could chase their voters to the polls and peel off the other party's marginal supporters. The salience of class as a divider of public opinion and party structure has declined significantly since the 1970s, however. This phenomenon has been driven by the disappearance of manufacturing and mining jobs in Britain and four consecutive Labour losses from 1979 to 1992. Labour leader Tony Blair recognized that Labour would need to broaden its appeal beyond its working-class supporters. To that end, Blair de-emphasized the importance of class issues in his first campaign by limiting union power within the Labour Party and removing Clause IV of the party constitution, which dedicated the party to the nationalization of major industries. Although many traditional supporters of Labour felt that Blair's changes were selling out the soul of the party, Labour's success at attracting middle-class voters in the 1997 and 2001 elections vindicated Blair's strategies. Class differences in voting patterns remain, but they are decreasing in importance.

Another issue that has influenced British public opinion is Britain's relationship with the European Union (EU). Great Britain was not a founding member of the organization that eventually became the EU and did not join the Common Market until 1971 (after two French-led rejections of their application). Mem-

bership in the EU has always been a controversial issue; the only national referendum ever held in Britain was in 1974 on whether the country should remain a member.

Many Britons equate EU membership with surrendering British sovereignty and fear a Europe-wide superstate where bureaucrats from Brussels will rule over even the most mundane aspects of British life. The Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party has been especially critical of EU membership. They irritated Prime Minister John Major by openly trying to impede British-EU relations. The Labour Party has been more open to European integration, but they see significant limits to it as well. After Labour took over in 1997, they fulfilled a campaign promise to fully incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. However, Britain is not a member of the European Monetary Union, and Prime Minister Blair has been deliberately vague about when Britain might be willing to vote on adopting the euro as its currency.

Another political issue that has divided British public opinion is the central government's relations with the political subdivisions of the United Kingdom. Many Scots have been agitating for increased political and economic rights since the late 1960s and have backed the Scottish Nationalist Party in national and local elections. The Conservatives firmly shut the door on any changes to the unitary structure of the British system, but Labour and the Liberal Democrats have been traditionally more sympathetic to devolution (the transfer of some powers from the central government to regional governments). One of the planks of Labour's 1997 election platform was a promise to hold a referendum

on the creation of a Scottish parliament. After the Labour victory, the Scots overwhelmingly voted to reestablish their own parliament in September 1997. On the same day as the Scottish referendum, the Welsh very narrowly (50.3 percent to 49.7 percent) agreed to the creation of a weak assembly in Wales as well.

Of course, the most contentious issue in this area is London's relationship with Northern Ireland. Since the 1920s, when the island was divided into the Republic of Ireland and Ulster (Northern Ireland), the fate of Northern Ireland has haunted the rest of the UK. Many citizens of Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) would be just as happy to be rid of Ulster. It is a constant drain on the finances of the country, makes Britain vulnerable to terrorist activity, and opens the country to human rights criticism for its handling of the Irish Republican Army and other terrorist groups. However, most Britons recognize that the majority of the people of Ulster feel as British as they do and that abandoning the province is not an option. The latest violent era ran from 1969 until the Good Friday peace accords in 1998, which called for the creation of a Northern Ireland assembly and a complex power-sharing arrangement to prevent the Protestant majority in the province from dominating the Catholic minority. The operations of this regional parliament have been suspended several times by London, however, because of partisan struggles within the assembly. The independence and survival of the assembly remain in doubt.

Finally, a set of postmaterial issues tends to divide British public opinion into opposing camps. Postmaterial issues are social, quality-of-life, and identity issues that have come to the fore after

the basic class-based economic issues have decreased in importance. Three examples of these kinds of issues are animal rights, race, and the survival of the monarchy. The simplest is whether the British monarchy should continue to exist. Some claim the institution is an affront to democracy and a waste of resources. However, most Britons revere the royal tradition, pomp, and pride, as well as the pounds from royal-seeking tourists.

A more contentious issue involves animal rights. Great Britain has more than 70 active animal rights groups who work on issues ranging from fur, vivisection, and the treatment of farm animals and pets to banning the time-honored tradition of fox hunting. The Scottish Parliament has prohibited fox hunting, and London introduced a bill outlawing the practice nationwide in 2003. This issue also highlights the rural-urban split in British public opinion, since many animal rights activists reside in urban areas where Labour support is strong.

Race and immigration have become important issues as well. Nonwhite immigrants began arriving from former Commonwealth countries in the early 1950s and comprised about 6 percent of the population in the 1990s. Further, Britain has long welcomed political dissidents, but the public has been less willing to accept economic immigrants. The general election in 2001 provided a backdrop for the debate concerning restrictions on immigration, and racial attacks, riots, and nationalist political parties all indicated that public opinion is still mixed on this issue.

Conclusion

The attention paid to public opinion by the British government, parties, press,

and academics has increased significantly in recent decades. Some of this follows from the technological advances in survey research methods and the creation of academic and media polls that track political attitudes. At first glance, this seems at odds with British political culture, parties, and well-established institutions, but significant changes in British politics drive this process. No longer are bread-and-butter economic issues of sole importance; this has shifted the basis of party competition. Add to this the recent limited devolution of political power from London, and together these dynamics have chiseled away at some of the institutional cushions that have long limited the influence of public opinion on the British polity.

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Hong Kong

Before its return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong had been under British colonial rule for some 150 years. The colonial government adopted the doctrines of laissez-faire, social noninterventionism, maximum personal freedom, and minimal democracy. The people of Hong Kong were politically apathetic and distrustful of the Beijing government. Socioeconomic progress

helped to reinforce political stability and compliance. Public opinion emerged as a new social force and an object of study in the late 1960s. It has taken on growing significance since then.

Two events were crucial to the birth and development of public opinion as a social force. The first was the riots of 1967. The unrest was a spillover from the Cultural Revolution in China. The turmoil, in tandem with the problems of governance churned up by modernization, compelled the government to strive to keep abreast of people's attitudes, beliefs, and values. The Urban Family Life Survey (Mitchell 1998), a series of government-funded studies launched in the mid-1960s, was the first of its kind to collect social information to help the formulation and evaluation of public policies. Social scientists at the University of Hong Kong (Hopkins 1971) and the Chinese University of Hong Kong (King and Lee 1981) dominated the field. These studies, mostly carried out by means of household surveys, focused primarily on such social issues as poverty, quality of life, political culture, family values, and so on. However, these academic works generated a limited response from society and the mass media.

The second issue was the 1997 change of authority. This movement began in the early 1980s and had an immense impact on Hong Kong's political landscape and culture. Public anxiety over the transfer of sovereignty, Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong's future, the introduction of representative government by the departing colonial regime, the Sino-British tussle over political reform, the rise of the sense of citizen entitlements, the growing demands for government intervention and provision, the decline of consensus politics, and burgeoning party

politics all contributed to bringing about a high degree of politicization. Since then, policy debates have been taken to the masses and the media. Public opinion has become a new form of political force. Society has thus been transformed into a market for the consumption of public opinion. The proliferation of channels for opinion expression and agencies for opinion aggregation has made the opinion poll an institutional player in the political realm, an industry, as well as a normal way of life. This entry focuses on the making of public opinion since the 1980s.

Mode of Expression

Hong Kong people tend to adopt a majoritarian conception of public opinion—an aggregate of the equally weighted opinions of disparate individuals. For active individuals and organizations, ways of voicing their opinions include letters written to authorities and newspaper editors, position statements advertised in newspapers, radio call-ins, press conferences, mass signature campaigns, and other open protest actions. For example, in May 1984, when the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (UMELCO) delegation and its position paper “The Future of Hong Kong” were criticized by the British foreign secretary in London as being unrepresentative of the views of the people, UMELCO appealed, via the mass media, for the support of Hong Kong people. In an age before fax and e-mail were widely used, UMELCO received 8,427 items of mail and telegrams from individuals, 1,509 from organizations. This forced the foreign secretary to concede that UMELCO did “reflect the true views of the Hong Kong people” (Chung 2001, p. 90). Today, various forms of collective action, such as

petitions, demonstrations, sit-ins, and marches, have become a standard instrument of popular politics. In accordance with the Public Order Ordinance, organizers of public meetings and processions are required to notify the commissioner of police. Police records show that the number of these applications in 2000 (1,691) was 541 percent higher than in 1987 (Lau and Wan 1997, pp. 60–61; Legislative Council 2001, p. 1151).

To pollsters, the most popular polling method is the sample survey by means of a structured questionnaire and telephone interviewing. The greatest advantages are money and time saved. This kind of study generally uses a support/oppose question to draw a summary description of public opinion on a particular issue. Other techniques, such as household surveys, content analysis, in-depth interviews, and focus groups, are mainly used by academic researchers to collect more comprehensive data. In general, professional pollsters and academic researchers are more rigorous in their sampling procedures, whereas political parties, grassroots organizations, newspapers, and magazines (with their often sensationalist reporting) opt for nonprobability sampling.

Major Actors

Currently, opinion polls are so common that nearly all kinds of organizations are involved in polling activities. Reporting on poll findings has become a routine feature of news media output.

The major sponsor of public opinion research is undoubtedly the Hong Kong government. There are two main types of governmental financial support. The first is research grants allocated to academic researchers. The cost of carrying out household surveys is so prohibitive that the majority of these studies are funded

via the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (www.ugc.edu.hk/RGC). Other, less costly academic studies are mostly sponsored via higher education institutions. Second, central and local government institutions, government departments, and advisory and statutory bodies have been active in commissioning various kinds of public opinion studies. Some departments also conduct polls of their own.

Principal pollsters include scholars and academic institutions, politicians and political parties, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), commercial polling firms, and marketing firms. Among these organizations, the credibility of academic pollsters is higher because they tend to have fewer vested interests and are basically nonprofit in nature. Popular academic pollsters that welcome the sponsorship and commission of research are the Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong (since 1991, <http://hkupop.hku.hk>), the Telephone Survey Research Laboratory at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies of the Chinese University of Hong Kong (since 1995, www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/tell.htm), the Research and Survey Programme at Lingnan University (since 1996, www.ln.edu.hk/rsp), and the Computer Assisted Survey Team at the Centre for Social Policy Studies of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University (since 2000, www.acad.polyu.edu.hk/~sscsp/cast.htm). Private research institutes offering polling services include the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute (www.hkpri.org.hk) and the One Country Two Systems Research Institute (www.octs.org.hk).

Political parties that are most active in conducting polls are the Democratic Party (www.dphk.org/index_survey.html)

and the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (www.dab.org.hk). The former adopts a steadfast anti-Beijing position, whereas the latter is progovernment and pro-Beijing. Since both parties are grassroots-oriented, their polls cover a wide range of topics with policy relevance.

Many NGOs, especially social welfare agencies, are engaged in opinion polling. One of the most prominent is the Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups. It launched a youth opinion poll series in 1993 and has so far completed 105 telephone polls and 27 in-depth studies on a variety of youth-related topics (www.hkfyg.org.hk).

Commercial polling firms and marketing firms also participate in public opinion polling. A list of marketing research companies in Hong Kong can be obtained from the Marketing Research Society of Hong Kong (www.mrshk.com.hk) as well as the World Association of Research Professionals (www.esomar.nl).

With a population of 6.7 million and an area of 1,100 square kilometers, Hong Kong in 2001 had 53 daily newspapers, a number of electronic newspapers, 709 periodicals, two free-to-air commercial TV companies, five subscription TV licensees, 12 nondomestic TV program licensees, one government radio-TV station, and two commercial radio stations (Information Services Department 2002, p. 364). The news media are the dominant channel for the communication and formation of public opinion. Since electronic media are closely regulated and monitored by the government, neither partisan politics nor explicit political stance is allowed in their news programs. As a result, their role is mainly to inform. The print media have fewer restrictions and exhibit stronger political positions. They

thus often serve as the major forum for public debates and public opinion wars during heated controversies. Before the Asian financial turmoil, some media sources (e.g., *Eastweek* magazine and *Apple Daily*) were themselves sponsors of opinion poll series. However, Hong Kong people have little trust in the news media in this respect. According to a territory-wide poll, 53.2 percent of the respondents replied that the press and media were not objective when reporting opinion surveys, as compared with 40.7 percent who thought otherwise and 6 percent who gave noncommittal answers. Only 8.5 percent of the respondents found opinion surveys conducted by the press and media to be most reliable (Hong Kong Federation of Youth Groups 2002, pp. 22, 26–27).

Dominant Themes

Polls undertaken by major polling institutions can be grouped into three types: time-series, or tracking, surveys; electoral surveys; and polls on specific issues.

Time-series, or tracking, surveys provide longitudinal data to chart and monitor social trends. Most of them are undertaken by academics and adopt a rigorous research design. For example, the most comprehensive data are drawn from a series of biennial territory-wide household surveys that was launched in 1988 by an interinstitutional research team comprising the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, and the University of Hong Kong. The research focuses on people's perceptions, feelings, values, and behavioral tendencies. Topics covered in the survey series include economic culture, education, family and marriage, gender issues, Hong Kong-mainland relations, housing, information technology, legal

culture, mass communications, medical and health issues, political culture and participation, popular culture, religious beliefs, social ideology and values, social life and networks, social stratification and mobility, social welfare, and work and work values (www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/INDICA/soclist.htm).

Another longitudinal study is the Hong Kong Transition Project. It focuses on the nature and direction of political development since the mid-1980s (www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp). This project, with its core members at the Hong Kong Baptist University, has tracked public opinion on political issues by means of telephone interviews twice a year since 1993.

Other time-series telephone polls on specific issues are, for example, Rating of the Chief Executive (since 1996), Rating of the Top Ten Legislative Councilors (since 1991), Rating of Political Groups (since 1991), and Public Confidence in Hong Kong's Future (since 1997), conducted by the Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong; Public Attitudes toward Performance of Key Government Officials and Politicians (since 2000), conducted by the Research and Survey Programme at Lingnan University; Public Attitudes toward the HKSAR Government (since 1996), Civic Awareness and National Identity in Hong Kong (since 1996), and Public Attitudes toward the Economic and Political Development of Hong Kong and Mainland China (since 1998), conducted by the Telephone Survey Research Laboratory at the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies; the Territory-wide Confidence Index (since 1996), conducted by the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute; and Telephone Opinion Survey (since

1983, on perceived problems in Hong Kong, evaluation of government's overall performance, and expectations about the general situation), conducted by the government's Home Affairs Bureau.

Electoral surveys are the second method. Elections based on universal adult suffrage have a short history in Hong Kong. The first such election was held in 1982. Direct elections prior to the 1991 Legislative Council maiden election were either of a very localized nature (e.g., the district board elections) or confined to the selection of members of public bodies with a very limited scope of responsibilities (e.g., the municipal council elections). Thus, even though the Legislative Council was not a powerful institution in the colonial political system, its elections drew the attention of academics, news media, and political parties for different reasons. For academics, these elections provide opportunities to conduct comprehensive studies of voting behavior (Lau and Louie 1993; Kuan, Lau, and Wong 2002). For political parties and politicians, poll findings are useful to them in political contests. For the news media as well as the general public, elections are regarded as a sort of horserace, and polls make the race more exciting. Nearly every major news medium has commissioned preelection polls to make its own predictions.

Polls on specific issues cover all aspects of sociopolitical life deemed to have policy significance; such surveys constitute the bulk of those conducted by political parties and NGOs. Because of budget constraints, political parties usually conduct the polls themselves. The scientific quality of these polls is low. Most of them fail to present the methodology, and the rest mainly rely

on automated telephone interviews. NGOs vary enormously in financial capacity, and so does the quality of their polls. Some large-scale organizations are quite resourceful. For example, the Hong Kong Council of Social Service has established the Standing Committee on Policy Research and Advocacy and is able to maintain its own research staff (www.hkcss.org.hk/research_statistics), whereas many poorer organizations simply undertake polling by means of street interviews or telephone surveys, with unknown methods, for purposes of publicity or advocacy.

Issues that have long divided the public's thinking include democratic reform, welfare provision, the relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland, the relationship between Hong Kong law and mainland law, and the role of the government in the economy.

Roles, Impacts, and Problems

The most alarming incident, Pollgate, in the local history of public opinion was of particular political importance. On July 7, 2000, the front page of a prestigious newspaper (*South China Morning Post*) reported a claim by Robert Chung, director of the Public Opinion Programme at the University of Hong Kong, that he had received political pressure from Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, through a special channel, to discontinue his polls on Tung's popularity and the government's credibility, presumably because Tung was upset at his declining ratings. Chung later named a pro-vice chancellor of the university as the special channel. The incident triggered a heated debate on academic freedom and government interference, and caused the appointment of an independent inquiry chaired by a member of

the Court of Final Appeal and televised testimony, and finally, on September 6, 2000, the resignation of the vice chancellor and a pro-vice chancellor.

At present, Chung and other pollsters are still tracking Tung's popularity. Furthermore, in Tung's policy platform for his second term of chief executive, he promised: "We should ensure that policy planning, development and implementation are in step with the times. In this respect, we need to . . . [put] in place an effective opinion survey system to ensure the highest level of Government awareness of community attitudes, sensitivity, and reaction to policy initiatives" (Tung 2002, p. 5).

In view of the ever-increasing significance of public opinion and the manufacture of consent in political advocacy, lobbying, and effective governance, it is of paramount importance to strengthen the scientific quality and credibility of public opinion research. At present, the news media are flooded with various kinds of poll findings, and polls have become a surrogate for public opinion. As mentioned above, many polls, particularly those conducted by political parties, are done in a crude and slipshod way. Disappointingly, the fact that a poll is conducted by a professional pollster is no longer a guarantee of quality. For example, in July 2002, 19 people working for ACNielsen, a market research giant in Hong Kong, were arrested by the Independent Commission Against Corruption for fraud after allegedly making up interviews for a three-year project commissioned by the Hong Kong Tourism Board (*South China Morning Post*, July 10, 2002, p. 3). The establishment of a professional body for pollsters, the establishment of codes of professional ethics and practice, and mass education on basic research methodology

are critical and long overdue in cultivating a research culture as well as in alleviating our research illiteracy.

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Hungary

Given its rapid and tumultuous period of democratization, Hungary has experienced a growth in the number and vari-

ety of polling groups and their topics of interest. For interested researchers, there are several public sources of information and collections on public opinion data sources.

Despite the significant Hungarian (Magyar) populations of the near abroad in neighboring Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, and Austria, Hungary, as the unit of analysis, refers to the present-day bounded nation-state. The focus here is on surveys concerning political attitudes despite a proliferation of market research and consulting groups who conduct ongoing and increasingly sophisticated product and preference research.

Pre-1989 Public Opinion Surveys

Following World War II, nationwide political opinion polls were conducted by the Hungarian Institute of Public Opinion Research (MKI) (see Adamec and Viden 1947; Schiller 1947). In the following decades, much of what is commonly considered scientifically rigorous polling disappeared as a result of the Soviet-imposed communist political and social organization. During the Kadar era (1956–1989), political attitudes remained essentially unaccounted for as research about the region and its citizens became, for the purposes of outside observers, limited to interviews of émigrés, defectors, and travelers. Until the 1980s, public opinion studies in Hungary and the other Central and Eastern European countries suffered from varied methodological reliability and overtly ideological research agendas.

At the outset of the 1970s, the political atmosphere limited the survey design in terms of direct political inquiry. Polling institutes simply designed questions to capture attitudes regarding short-term topics and issues; substantively interest-

ing and meaningful questions remained for the most part omitted. However, during this time, the Yugoslav, Polish, and Hungarian polling institutes (and their respective methods) began to establish reputations for methodological sophistication and, more important, reliability. In Hungary, the majority of polling was conducted by the Mass Communications Research Institute, the Central Statistical Office, and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (directed by Elemér Hankiss). Most visible was Hankiss et al.'s work, which focused on value change (1982), incorporating Ronald Inglehart et al.'s (1977) early argument of materialist and postmaterialist changes taking place in Western Europe.

Beginning in the 1980s, Hungarian social scientists found more frequent interaction with Western scholars and increased opportunities to publish their findings at home. A notable example of pre-1989 research is the work of László Bruszt (1988). Additionally, Hungarian and Polish researchers were contributing to studies in social stratification, value systems, and social psychology (see Hankiss et al. 1984, 1985; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Kolosi 1983). As in Western societies, much of pre-1989 public opinion in Hungary was driven by class-specific variables such as education, placement in occupational hierarchy, income, and place of residence (Tokés 1997, p. 3). Although mostly assessing broadly sociological and economic concerns, surveys became increasingly focused on the incumbent regime and its political outputs as the end of the 1980s neared.

As cited in Gábor Tóka's (2000) inventory, specific concerns of the history and methods of pre-1989 research in Central and Eastern Europe are outlined and analyzed in several publications (see Connor

et al. 1977; Kadzielski and Szostniewicz 1967; Kassof 1961; Kwiatkowski 1992; Lane 1971; Mason 1985; Mickiewicz 1972; Molnár and Békés 1968; Niemann 1993; Piekalkiewicz 1972; Sicinski 1963; Slider 1985; Szekfű 1972; Welsh 1981; Wilder 1963). However, this brief history is meant to highlight that despite the pre-1989 methodological sophistication and increasing reliability of data sources in at least some of the Central and Eastern European countries, wide interinstitutional variations suggest that the cross-temporal comparisons of pre-1989 and post-1989 data and the overall sampling techniques and reliability may be at best nominally dependable (see Tokés 1997; Hankiss 1990).

Public Opinion Surveys since 1989

The explosion of public opinion surveys in Hungary began just as the 1989 National Roundtable negotiations were being organized. Authors of polls and surveys did not hesitate to attempt to capture the new mood of democratic euphoria, asking formerly forbidden questions that captured the new political opinions and attitudes of Hungarians. Many of the early 1990s public opinion survey institutes included questions about the burgeoning political and economic changes and conducted surveys about little else. However, as the 1990s progressed, topical variation in surveys increased. As the institutionalization of democracy and ongoing liberalization toward a market-based economy seemed increasingly certain, surveys broadened their scope to include current topics that lined the trajectory of Hungary, such as questions about membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO, the personal and national prospects of continued develop-

ment, and perceptions of national and international events (the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer series).

In gathering public opinion survey data, several international groups and institutes have included Hungary in numerous cross-national studies. Many of them make their data publicly available for secondary analysis by scholars. For these groups, the design, actual survey questions, and methodology are widely known and frequently cited. In many cases, these surveys are conducted annually, although the larger ones are usually conducted two or three times a decade. Given the cross-national nature of these surveys, they typically rely on representative sampling techniques and in some cases panel data, but on the whole they exclude focus groups and in-depth, qualitative interviewing. Additionally, although most focus their attention largely on political attitudes of individuals, a wide variety of topics are included. The most significant are: World Values Survey (which additionally included Hungary—along with Moscow—in its 1982 survey); Gallup, specifically Gallup Hungary Ltd.; United States Information Agency (USIA); New Democracies Barometer from the Lazarsfeld Society in Vienna (although these data are not publicly available, except for secondary analysis); Central and Eastern European Eurobarometer; International Social Survey Programme (ISSP); East-West Comparative Survey of the Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press; InterMedia; and the New Soviet Citizen Survey of Miller, Hesli, and Reisinger. International sources for these and other large, cross-national surveys and additional data sources can be found at the following archives or institutes: Mannheim Centre for European Social

Research (MZES), Zentralarchiv, Inventory of Election Studies in Europe 1945–1995, the Roper Archive, Consortium of European Social Science Data Archive, and Inter-Consortium of Political Science Research.

Hungarian Public Opinion

Survey Sources

For the most part, in-depth public opinion surveys in Hungary have been a staple of research facilities and social science institutes. Many focus on political changes and resultant attitudes of individuals: Political Opinion Surveys (MKI); Modifications of Electoral Preferences (Gallup Hungary Ltd.); Omnibus (Medián and Marketing Centrum); Party Systems and Electoral Alignment (Medián); Institutionalization of Parliamentary Democracy (Erasmus Foundation); Values and Political Change (Modus); Social Justice Project, Representation, Political Consequences, The State and Its Citizens (TARKI); and Social Costs of Transformation (Szonda-Ipsos).

Hungarian data sources and survey institutes are also accessible, although a few may be limited in use to non-Hungarian speakers. These include TARKI—Social Science Data Archives and Social Research Informatics Center (including surveys on mobility, inequality, privatization, and reforms); Hungarian Academy of Sciences—Social Sciences, including the Humanities (Institute of Economics, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Center for Regional Studies, Institute of History); the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs; Institute for Central European Studies; Centre for Regional Studies; Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute (MKI); MTA/ELTE Mass Communication Research Group;

Medián; Modus; MEMRB; Szonda-Ipsos; the Local Democracy and Innovation Foundation at the Institute of Public Administration (Budapest); and the Erasmus Foundation at the Institute of Political Science (Budapest). Additionally, there are searchable catalogs of English-language specialized social science data archives of holdings online. The political opinion surveys of MKI are available through the archive of the Communication Theory Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences at Eötvös University. Many others are available through TARKI.

Another form of polling that has gained prominence since 1989 is election polling, including pre-poll and exit-poll techniques. Some of the key Hungarian studies are: Milestones (Opinions Before the [1990 Parliamentary] Elections); Hungarian 1990 Pre-Election Study and Hungarian 1990 Post-Election Study (Zentralarchiv Title); and the Panel Study of the 1994 Hungarian Election to the National Assembly (the “Agenda [1,2,3]” and “Opció [1 and 2]” Surveys) from the MTA/ELTE Mass Communication Research Group.

In addition to these sources of surveys and data, there are alternative sources of data (including nonpolitical topics) such as privately funded surveys (candidate- or issue-based) and the market research and consulting (product-based) research industry. Although most candidate- and issue-based research is not available for general use, some may be available and should be searched for by candidate or issue. Major market research and consulting companies in Hungary include ACNielsen; Ad Hoc Plus Research; AGB Hungary; GfK—Hungária Institute for Market Research; IMAS International;

INRA Hungary Co.; Ipsos-Szonda—Media, Opinion, and Market Research Institute; MASMI Hungary Market Research; Median Opinion and Market Research Ltd.; MEMRB Custom Research Worldwide (Hungary); Millward Brown Hungary; Research International Hoffman; Taylor Nelson Sofres Modus Business and Social Marketing Consulting Ltd.; Trend Market Research Company; and Ulteco Research Kft. Market Research and Consulting.

Recent Public Opinion Survey Research in and around Hungary

Since 1989, students of democratization have eagerly examined this region and the political attitudes of its citizens. Much of the initial scholarly assessment of political attitudes focused on the former Soviet Union. However, for Central and Eastern Europe, the few studies reflected the population's democratic euphoria and attitudes regarding the transformations (see Mishler and Rose 1996; Evans and Whitefield 1995). Survey results increasingly captured more variation among political attitudes, the individuals who hold them, and the divisions that underpin them (Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Hibbing and Patterson 1992; Kunioka and Woller 1999; Rohrschneider 1999; Waldron-Moore 1999).

Although less reliant on survey data, a great deal of research on Hungary (and Central and Eastern Europe in general) has been concerned with the development of citizens' political action space in which they can express their opinions. The study of social cleavages and the emergence of party systems has developed a literature on advanced industrial democracies (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose and Urwin 1970; Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984). Some authors have

sought to identify the emergence and/or continuity of major cleavages within these populations (Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt 1992, 1995). However, for many of the formerly flattened societies of Central and Eastern Europe, traditional social cleavages such as the rural/urban divide, ethnicity, and class demonstrated only marginal saliency. For this region, many imported theories have provided little in understanding the development and continued evolution of Eastern European party systems. In contrast to the development of Western European countries, in which latent social divisions gradually reached political saliency, the transitions of the Eastern European countries were abrupt ruptures of both the political and social organizations.

Some analyses have addressed the cross-national variation of parties and party systems (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Markowski 1997; Zielinski 2002). However, for Hungary, the frenzied decade of democratic transition and economic liberalization demonstrated few salient and persistent divisions within the population and only recently demonstrated a less fragmented and more stable party system. In sum, despite the attention to multifaceted political developments, there remains a gap in the literature regarding individual political orientations in Central and Eastern Europe, both as a determinant of party systems and as a general political phenomenon.

Impact of Public Opinion Surveys

Normative democratic assumptions aside, there is only sporadic evidence that public opinion serves as a powerful feedback mechanism for public policy. For Hungary, the constitutional construction of the new democratic institutions has, to some degree, insulated the policymak-

ing body from public and, some critics have argued, even parliamentary opinion. As such, the legislative body may be insensitive to the waxing and waning of public opinion. However, properly understood, the feedback process is twofold. First, politicians, as delegates of the population, are responsible for behaving accountably and in accordance with popular demands. Second, these same politicians, as trustees of the population, have been sent as representatives to attend to the workings of the state in place of popular participation. Therefore, the direct impact of public opinion on the policy-making process is in fact one step removed, weakening its role.

One form of public opinion communication is through the use of national referenda, the most recent of which concerned Hungary's membership in NATO. However, the scope of general referenda in Hungary has been fairly limited and rarely employed either nationally or locally. This infrequent use of referenda implies that public opinion, in the form of direct action by the public in communicating preferences on particular policies, holds little sway over policymakers, marginally impacting eventual outcomes. Additionally, it would not be unreasonable to argue that, given Hungary's recent history, newfound democratic institutions have provided a sufficient arena for citizens to legitimately access the legislative bodies, mitigating the need for extraordinary means of influence.

Given the explosion of data collection and the seeming limits as to its impact on policy, are public opinion surveys likely to increase in value or wane in the face of legislative inattention and lack of policy responsiveness? For scholars, the accumulation of data (specifically survey data) provides a valuable resource from which

to examine events that take place in transitional countries. To gain some understanding of the process of democratization and economic liberalization that has taken place in Hungary (among several neighboring nations), a paucity of data would most assuredly impede attempts at understanding and ultimately explanation. As for its policy relevance, public opinion may not rise to the level of overtly directing policymakers' decisions; however, correlating the popular mood and concurrent policies may provide some insight into the ultimate effectiveness of democratic politics in Hungary.

Conclusion

The ultimate goal of survey research is to measure stable attributes of individuals that exist independent of the measurement technology. Given the content of this volume, we would like to be able to assert that surveys, as a technique for estimating the nature of public opinion, are valid sources of information for both scholars and political actors.

Many scholars would argue that surveys as valid measures of public opinion remain a frequently employed and accepted means of tapping into the opinions, attitudes, and preferences of individuals. Having proven themselves willing to adopt democratic political institutions and a market-based economy, Hungarians and their assessments are relevant factors in examining policies, party performance, and the progress of democratization and economic liberalization. As these topics are of increasing substantive interest to regional, Western, and international scholars, the collection and analysis of public opinion surveys will continue.

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Iran

Public opinion in Iran is a difficult and important subject. I shall ask a series of questions, which shall include: What is the structure of public opinion in Iran? How does it work? How is it created? How has it developed?

What Is Public Opinion?

There is no agreement on the answer to this question in the social and political science literature on Iran. Public opinion is a complex of thoughts on issues of interest to people. This view suggests public opinion can affect personal and group behavior and government policy (Diusion 1995, p. 1); in this case, public opinion includes people's reaction to the issues, which are discussed in the form of statements and specific questions under interview conditions. Public opinion research measures people's ideas, behaviors, trends, beliefs, and attitudes. Public opinion is also associated with behavioral attitudes and voters' intentions, as well as their attitudes and thoughts on political parties, characters, and issues at hand (Lynch 2003, p. 55). The definition aims at presenting issues on people's views and goals on the basis of findings reported from field activities in a relatively small sample level based on scientific methods (Azadarmaki 1995, pp. 1–9).

Public Opinion Approaches in Iran

Public opinion is a tool for identification and survey of state programs. Public opinion is an institution in the social democratic process. Modernization is carried out from the top and via the government. Public opinion is an independent and influential institution in the social and cultural democratic procedure (Lynch 2003, p. 56). By publishing results found through public opinion, politicians have planned to improve social and cultural knowledge. In this case, public opinion is a tool of consciousness. Public opinion surveys in Iran have been used to identify success and judgments and as an open institution in developing the idea of democracy and establishing an open space (Terr and Spence 1973, p. 8).

The Development of Public Opinion Surveys in Iran

The public opinion survey, as an academic and organizational procedure, started in 1966 in Iran. With respect to the development process and main social changes, the polling industry underwent changes. The public opinion institutes in Iran changed in several stages.

From the time when economic renovation started in Iran in the form of four-year plans, an evaluation of the jobs and policies was taken into account. In particular, the Planning and Budget Organization was established after 1961, coinciding with an increase in oil incomes and taking development models from U.S. policies. In this period, since Iranian society was in the process of planned renovation, officials aimed at knowing the processes and results of the plans and governmental policies. The most attractive issue was land reform.

The institutionalization stage of public opinion was from 1976 to 1978. Several

social and scientific factors provided the institutionalization conditions. Questioning and data collection, data control, data analysis, and reporting were done using a scientific method. The issues included the effects of plans and policies directed land reform and people's views on governmental institutions and establishments, social and cultural changes, and social crises occurring in the villages, cities, and marginal regions.

The next stage continued from the Islamic Revolution until 1988. The centralized management did not observe any need for social and cultural development since the goals and duties were clearly set out in advance. Therefore, the opinion survey and research center offices remained in a semiclosed form without doing any special work and despite the forces from past.

In the next stage, to help the Council of Ministers in making decisions, the survey unit of the president's office started recognizing the viewpoint of social groups and people on the social and economic development plans. However, the studies were separated and temporary since the country was at war from 1980 to 1988. Although there were public opinions on the main issues and problems in society, people's positive, negative, or neutral judgments on the issues were not of basic importance in administering affairs. There was the possibility of changing and manipulating public opinion. Therefore, it was necessary to identify the status of public opinion in the society for the society managers and policymakers. In this stage, public opinion focused on the following questions: society's problems, government and social institutions, and threats and risks. The survey department that operated under the president's supervision from 1988 to 1993 worked in this direction.

The next stage was the developmental stage. After the war there was a need to have the participation of people, different classes, and the private sector in the development process of the country. The questions in the surveys during this period dealt with major problems; the social pathology of society; views of people and social groups on main issues; people's views on new issues; people's views on managers, organizations, and ministries; and the relationship with the West. The reports provided in this period were mostly distributed among ministry directors.

Seyed Mohammad Khatami's victory in the presidential election of 1997 was a new and unpredictable event. Reforms encouraged many people to raise new questions: Under what conditions did this event occur? Is it possible to prevent similar events and stop the process of reforms? What can be done for the young and how can they participate in the world? What issues are important to women and how can they be encouraged to show more participation?

Public Opinion Centers

Four major public opinion centers, directly or indirectly affiliated with the government, were established in Iran from 1966 to 2002. All have surveyed opinions about the government.

The Opinion Survey and Social Research Center was established at the Iranian Broadcasting Organization in 1966. The Opinion Survey Center of Broadcasting Organization was established as the Public Opinion Survey Unit in 1994 to study public opinions and the current viewpoints of society. (Establishment of this center was aimed at developmental goals and using scientific methods and organization. Training courses for inter-

views, questionnaire development, size of the sample, questioning, data input, analysis, and scientific reporting were done with the use of statistics, computers, and sociology.) The National Center of Studies and Public Opinion Survey started its activities at the beginning of 1996. It was first affiliated with the Ministry of Guidance but changed into an independent cultural institute in 1997. The main issue at the Center is to identify people's satisfaction with governmental plans to solve the main problems in society. The Ayandeh Institute was established in 1998 by an official permit of the Ministry of Guidance and continued its work until September 2002 on trends in political and social participation, religion, and other issues.

Methods of Testing Public Opinion

Four main approaches are used in testing public opinion: (1) quantity measurement of public opinion (Manza and Cook 2002, p. 632); (2) studying the inner personal thoughts that contribute to public opinion; (3) description or analysis of the political role of public opinion; and (4) studying communicative media that publish ideas on public opinion.

Questions include: On which subjects does public opinion have more sensitivity? To what extent (and sometimes intensity) has certain public opinion been accepted? In which geographic, religious, racial, economic, and social sectors does one find public opinion with more frequency? What are the trends and attitudes of public opinion? (Diuson 1995, p. 1). What social, economic, and demographic characteristics can be found in public opinion?

To survey public opinion in Iran, questionnaires and free interviews are the most common practice.

Survey Characteristics in Iran

In scientific-political and social terms, opinion surveys in Iran have the following characteristics. Thought survey has improved and changed with respect to the renovation process in Iran. The reaction and development of public opinion are in proportion to the renovation process, for renovation and modernization of society, according to governmental managers, require continuous and permanent revision. The major goal of opinion surveys is to identify Iranian people's satisfaction with development plans by the government.

The Strong and Weak Points of Public Opinion Survey in Iran

Public opinion survey in Iranian society can cause major problems for researchers. If there is interest in performing public opinion surveys, the Iranian government often opposes it. Opinion surveys need budgets, specialized staff, and organization. Informal opinion surveys in Iran have replaced social research to a large extent. The lack of serious participation of researchers and sociologists in this field is another problem.

The results of public opinion surveys made in Iran show a division between political and social areas, structural duality, class gaps, and an increase in consumption as well as cultural and social renovation and modernization. In this case, the findings of research reveal that Iranian society is in the process of cultural and social modernization. Other information gained by surveys is the formation of new social forces.

Conclusion

Opinion survey started in Iran in 1966 and has been considered by government

managers, politicians, and researchers. The opinion survey centers are affiliated with the government, and the results of research are mostly distributed among managers in the form of limited reports; some results are distributed through journals.

The opinion surveys employ scientific research methods, and data are mostly collected through questionnaires and direct interviews. Public opinion has been surveyed at national and regional levels, and the journal *Sanjesh Afkar* has been publishing since 1995.

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Ireland

Public opinion can be defined as a set of contexts "in which citizens formulate responses on the basis of ideas that have reached them and been found acceptable" (Zaller 1992, p. 2). In Ireland, as in many democracies, the ultimate expression occurs when the people, or at least the enfranchised section of them, are called upon to cast a ballot, whether in an election or a referendum. Each electoral contest produces a snapshot of public opinion on the day of the ballot, and given the wide disparities in voter participation/abstention across demographic groups in Ireland, it is not necessarily a representative one. The recent Quarterly National Household Survey module on voter participation showed a 48-percent-age-point disparity in voter participation across age groups (41.5 percent of 18- to 19-year-olds claimed to have voted, as compared to 89.8 percent of 65- to 74-year-olds), and a 35-point disparity across Principal Economic Status categories (51.9 percent of students, as compared to 87 percent of the retired). Public opinion polling, which can be defined as "the collective view [of a representative sample] of a defined population" (Worcester 2001, p. 2), allows us to create snapshots of opinion between voting opportunities, a picture of the mood of the electorate at any one time. How has this process developed in Ireland, and how has it contributed to the general democratic debate?

*Development of Opinion**Polling in Ireland*

The history of Irish market research begins in the 1950s, when Gallup and Nielsen established offices in Ireland. These were followed in the early 1960s by the indigenous organizations that were to eventually dominate Irish political polling—the Market Research Bureau of Ireland (1962) and Irish Marketing Surveys (1963; a more detailed account of the early development of opinion polling in Ireland can be found in Meagher 1983).

Concurrent with this, the Economic Research Institute (later the Economic and Social Research Institute, ESRI) was established in 1960, with a permit for conducting social research. Over the decades, ESRI has, through its Survey Unit, conducted a wide range of surveys on such topics as the economic and social circumstances of the elderly, social mobility, health care resources, poverty trends, and the labor market experiences of those leaving the secondary school system. Venturing into more sensitive territory, the ESRI also conducted a major study of attitudes on the problems in Northern Ireland (Davis and Sinnott 1979). In addition, ESRI has collected Irish data for many international projects, such as the European Values Survey (<http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/>), the International Social Survey Programme (www.issp.org/), the European Community Household Panel survey, and the European Social Survey (www.issp.org/).

Initially, polling in Ireland was largely confined to commercial market research, save for one or two isolated exceptions—a poll on attitudes to EEC accession in 1961 and one on attitudes to the Irish language in 1964 (Meagher 1983, pp. 111–112). The first poll to measure voting intention was not conducted until

1969, when the Labour Party commissioned Gallup to conduct a poll in the run-up to the election of that year. This survey enabled the first in-depth, quantitative analysis of Irish voting behavior, which found that Irish party alignments were a deviant case, conforming only weakly, if at all, to classic European cleavages. This “politics without social bases” (Whyte 1974) thesis provided the entry point to analyses of Irish politics for the next twenty years.

The first survey commissioned for publication during an election campaign was conducted in 1973, when the *Irish Independent* newspaper commissioned the Irish Mathematical Society (IMS) to survey attitudes on a range of issues current at the time. However, due to the difficulty of reliably converting estimates of votes into estimates of seats, caused by the complexities of the Irish voting system (the Single Transferable Vote variant of proportional representation [Sinnott 1999]), it was decided against tracking voter preferences. However, this initial reluctance was soon overcome, and IMS began tracking voter preferences as part of its ongoing omnibus survey in 1974 (Meagher 1983, p. 117).

Also in 1973, IMS conducted the Irish arm of the European Communities Study, the predecessor of the Eurobarometer series. This series, conducted at least twice per annum on behalf of the European Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/), covers a wide range of social and political attitudes, largely on EU-related topics such as European integration, the euro, common foreign and defense policies, as well as voting intention, life satisfaction, and left-right self-placement.

As the 1970s progressed, the scope of survey data began to spread from the

commercial and voting intention spheres into that of public policy. In 1973, the Committee on Irish Language Attitude Research, established in 1970 to examine public attitudes to government policies on the Irish language (Ó'Riagáin 1997, p. 32), commissioned the ESRI to conduct a national survey of language proficiency and the social and demographic characteristics of Irish speakers. The resulting report (CILAR 1975), and subsequent analyses of the survey (Hannan and Tovey 1978), identified a strong relationship between occupational class and support for the language (Ó'Riagáin 1997, p. 33).

The frequency of polls increased through the later 1970s and into the 1980s, as the major national newspapers began to treat the results more seriously. This process was not without difficulties. In 1977 there was still a great deal of distrust, which manifested in the decision of the Irish media not to publish the voter intention data of a set of polls that pointed to an election result that was at odds with the conventional wisdom of the day. These National Public Opinion surveys, conducted for the *Irish Times*, pointed to a convincing Fianna Fáil victory, despite a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries that was expected to secure a continuation of the ruling Fine Gael–Labour coalition (Penniman 1978, p. 134). The resulting Fianna Fáil landslide victory proved to be a watershed, and the reputation and visibility of polls improved thereafter. In 1982, Market Research of Ireland (MRBI) became the regular pollster for the *Irish Times* (Jones 2001, p. 309), while IMS provided a similar service to the *Irish Independent*, a situation that continues to this day.

The first exit poll was commissioned by RTÉ, the national broadcaster, for the 1981 general election, in two out of the

41 constituencies. The exercise would not be repeated until 1997, when RTÉ commissioned Lansdowne Market Research (established in 1979) to conduct the first national exit poll for the general election of that year, an exercise repeated for the presidential election later that year, the referendum on the Belfast Agreement (1998), and the general election of 2002.

In recent years, Irish polling companies have found themselves being integrated into larger multinational organizations. In the mid-1990s, MRBI was absorbed into the Taylor Nelson Sofres group, and in 2002, IMS was acquired by Millward Brown, reversing the experience of the 1960s, when MRBI, for instance, was founded by former employees of Nielsen (Jones 2001, pp. 1–4).

Until relatively recently, academic quantitative research on voter preferences and attitudes had been substantially based on newspaper-commissioned polls and on the Eurobarometer series. (See Sinnott 1995 and the studies of individual elections in the Ireland at the Polls and How Ireland Voted series.) However, in 2000, funding was secured for Ireland's first National Election Study (INES). The Irish National Election Study, funded by a grant under the Programme for Research in Third Level Institutions, is a joint project of University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin (see Marsh et al. 2001). The INES group commissioned ESRI to conduct this study following the 2002 general election, the data for which should be publicly available in 2004. The data will be deposited with the Irish Social Science Data Archive, which was established in 2000 as a repository for Irish and international social science data sets.

Methodology

Polls by IMS, MRBI, and Lansdowne have in general been conducted face-to-face, as the companies have well-established teams of interviewers in the field. More recently, however, telephone polling has found a place in Irish opinion polling. For example, since September 2001, the UK polling company ICM Research has been commissioned by the *News of the World* and *Ireland on Sunday* newspapers to conduct a number of telephone polls on topics such as attitudes toward terrorist organizations, abortion, and the Nice Treaty, as well as voting intentions during the 2002 general election.

Focus groups, which have been utilized by Irish political parties for much of the last decade (e-mail correspondence with Fine Gael), are growing in importance, as those parties become ever more sophisticated in their attempts to read the thoughts of the Irish electorate.

Use of Polls

If, in 1977 and previously, the media were overcautious in their use of the polls they commissioned, since then they have become much more confident and comprehensive in their exploitation of the data. In addition to the inevitable flurry of surveys during an election or referendum, the *Irish Times* and independent newspapers commission regular polls outside campaign periods. Publication of the results of these polls is usually spread over two or three days and is accompanied by a wealth of analysis and interpretation, not only from their own journalists but also from leading academics and representatives of the polling companies. Reaction to poll results inevitably becomes part of the news cycle also, leading to a situation where a poll can generate half a week's worth of news coverage.

Use of opinion polling is not, of course, restricted to the commercial sector. As noted above, elections and referendums provide the ultimate measures of public opinion, but the relevant actors in the public sphere utilize opinion polls and survey research on an ongoing basis. For instance, the Department of Enterprise and Employment commissioned ESRI to conduct a series of surveys from 1980 to 1999, examining the labor market choices of those leaving secondary school education. The results of the survey informed government policy in the area throughout the period.

Polls can be used by governments for tactical, as much as for policy, reasons. Following the defeat of the referendum on the Nice Treaty in June 2001, a series of polls were conducted for media outlets and by the government, political parties, and the European Commission office in Dublin, in addition to the ongoing Eurobarometer series. These analyses, which identified low turnout as being among the chief reasons for the defeat of the referendum (Sinnott 2001, p. i), informed the tactics of the vote-yes campaign for the second referendum in October 2002, when the treaty was comfortably approved.

Issues

The state of the Irish economy has dominated the political landscape for most of the period since the inception of polling, through the recessions of the late 1970s to early 1990s, the Celtic Tiger boom of the mid- to late 1990s, and the relative slowdown of the early 2000s. Chief among the concerns of the electorate was the unemployment problem, which peaked at more than 17 percent of the workforce in the mid-1980s and remained stubbornly above 10 percent for a further decade. Through the 1970s, inflation proved a

recurrent problem, twice topping 20 percent in that decade. The toll these problems took on the electorate can be seen in the campaign and exit polls that were conducted during the period, when substantial proportions of the electorate consistently named unemployment and/or inflation as the most important issues. As the economy improved from the mid-1990s into the 2000s, these concerns abated, as Figure 1 demonstrates.

By contrast, Northern Ireland, or the national question, ranked comparatively low on the electorate's list of concerns, even as the peace process developed through the 1990s (Figure 2). The comparative lack of urgency attributed to the issue perhaps helps explain why the electorate voted, in 1998, to approve the Belfast Agreement and to remove the

contentious articles of the Irish constitution that laid a territorial claim to Northern Ireland.

Conclusion

Opinion polls will continue to play an important part in Irish politics in coming years. One potential fly in the ointment may come from disgruntled politicians, unhappy with the results of polls. In June 2001, Fine Gael, after a sequence of depressing poll numbers for the party, tabled an amendment to the Electoral (Amendment) Bill 2001, which banned not only the publication but also the taking of opinion polls in the final week of an election or referendum campaign (Sinnett 2001, p. i). The torrent of critical media comment that followed the introduction of the amendment played a role




Figure 1 Perception of Most Important Issues in General Election Campaigns, 1969–2002: Economic Issues




Figure 2 Perception of Most Important Issues in General Election Campaigns, 1969–2002: Northern Ireland

in curtailing this attempt to restrict polling. This was the second attempt to ban opinion polls toward the end of an election campaign; the 1991 attempt was withdrawn for constitutional reasons (Sinnott 2001, p. i). Despite these occasional attempts to impose restrictions toward the latter part of campaigns, opinion polling has repeatedly proved its worth over the last 35 years in Ireland. With the increasing range and sophistication of tools available, it looks set to continue to play a crucial role in political strategizing, policy planning, and academic research in this country.

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Israel

Attitude surveys are the major means of assessing public opinion in Israel. They are conducted often, and their prominence increases dramatically during periods of crisis and at election time. In particular, the ongoing Arab-Israeli struggle has occasioned a plethora of surveys that are conspicuously displayed in the press, and they have spawned a considerable number of academic publications.

The Israel Institute of Applied Social Research (IIASR), founded by Louis Guttman in 1947, was the first and for many years only research center of its kind in the country. It obtained long-range support and recognition from the government—even after it constituted itself as an independent academic organization. In 1967, the IIASR established its Continuing Survey of Social Problems, which regularly tracked a series of social and economic indicators for an omnibus of public and private agencies. It also conducted large-scale studies under grants from national and international foundations such as Ford, MacArthur, Spencer, Kahanoff, AviChai, and others. In 1998, joined with the Israel Democracy Institute, it renewed its commitment to pursue future academic research and to

make its 50 years of cumulative work accessible for further analysis.

Only toward the end of the twentieth century did the universities of Bar-Ilan, Haifa, and Tel Aviv establish public opinion research initiatives. In the interim, most of the activity of public opinion research had devolved to private-sector organizations led by students of sociology, statistics, and psychology. The advent of the computer and the wide distribution of telephones facilitated the emergence of these organizations and put the IIASR at a competitive disadvantage. The commercial operations included Dahaf, Gallup, Geocartographia, Mahshov, Market Watch, Modiin Ezrahi, Panorama Markets, PORI, the Smith Institute, and Teleseker. These organizations concentrated on market research; policy and political research was dealt with as a specific application. Many of these institutes developed contacts with the mass media, and some newspapers, radio, and TV stations commissioned periodic surveys on a wide range of issues. Gone was the reliance by government ministries on a single source of public opinion research, as was the case in the early days of the IIASR.

Security and Domestic Concerns

Public opinion research was enlisted—indeed, its proliferation was motivated—by some of the central concerns of society: immigrant absorption, the security situation and the peace process, national and religious identity, economic well-being, intergroup relations, and voting and elections.

The Guttman Institute's pioneering research on the massive migration of the 1950s continued to occupy opinion and attitude research with each new wave of immigrants (Shuval 1963). With the

arrival of almost 1 million persons from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, Israeli survey researchers had to learn Russian in order to follow the adaptation of these new arrivals.

As for the security situation and the peace process, there are a number of examples of serious longitudinal studies stemming from the confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians over such issues as the territories, security, and the peace process. Research (Stone 1982) analyzed the data collected by the IIASR for the period 1967–1989 and focused mainly on mood and ability to adapt to the constantly changing situation. Others (Arian 1995; Shamir and Shamir 2000) focused on policy content and the security situation, and especially the annual survey of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University. The Tami Steimetz Center of Tel Aviv University issues reports in *Haaretz* by Efraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann in its monthly peace index.

The overlap between religious identities characterizes the dilemmas of Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state. Research (Shamir and Arian 1999) considered the attitudes that produce this overlap and probed the meaning of being an Israeli Jew in terms of religious practice and belief (Levy et al. 2002).

Economic well-being and intergroup relations were an important theme in the Continuing Survey of the IIASR. Research (Levy 1989) monitored the change in these social indicators in light of social and political events.

These studies supply a steady flow of public opinion research data into the public debate and are used by politicians in formulating their appeals. However, with the decline of academic work and the emergence of market-based question-

naires, some of the continuity in the monitoring of these factors has been lost.

Generalizations have been established regarding the social correlates of attitudes, especially regarding the security situation and the peace process. The best indicators of policy positions on these matters are religious observance and party preference. Those who take conciliatory positions are likely to be least observant and to support parties of the left, whereas those who adopt militant positions are likely to be more observant and support parties on the right. Other, weaker correlates of position on security issues are ethnicity (Sephardim tend to be more militant, Ashkenazim more conciliatory), class (the lower the class in terms of education, income, and occupation, the more the militancy), and age (the young tend to be more militant). Gender tends not to be related to these issues.

Surveys and Elections

Israeli politicians are voracious consumers of political surveys, especially at election time. They commission surveys, most of which are in-house productions and never published. They use surveys to position themselves in internal struggles over leadership roles, to fashion their work plan in the campaign, and to identify potential voters and wedge issues. The orientation of the politician to the surveys is frequently a function of their content (Doron 1998). According to a pollster who worked with the Labor party, Kalman Geier (Danielle Shani conducted interviews with Geier, Sever Plotzker, and Mina Zemach in summer 2002), Shimon Peres reacted to unfavorable findings in a survey during the 1988 elections by retorting, "Bring me 1,200 different respondents!"

The larger parties tend to duplicate their polling efforts during elections, working with more than one pollster. This muddies the clarity of the organizational chart and ensures difficulties in running the campaign. The failure was highlighted during the 1996 race for prime minister between Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu. Peres had no fewer than three groups polling for him (Caspit et al. 1996). During that same campaign, according to at least one version, his aides shielded Peres from survey results projecting his defeat.

Candidates and parties use surveys to attempt to influence the nomination of the candidate for prime minister or the composition of the party lists. Attempts to influence the nominating process were especially pronounced in the three elections (1996–2001) during which the system of the direct election of the prime minister was in effect. Sever Plotzker, the analyst of polls for *Yediot Aharonot*, Israel's largest daily, told of the pressure exerted on him by the camp of Ehud Barak in 1999 not to include the name of political newcomer Yitzhak Mordechai in a popularity survey so as not to enhance his visibility. This pattern repeated itself before the 2001 elections with the candidacy of Shimon Peres.

The most blatant use of surveys was recorded by the short-lived Center Party in 1999. Three of the founders of the Center Party saw themselves as the appropriate candidate for prime minister. The solution to the stalemate was to have a public opinion survey determine the candidate (Yanai 2002). Mordechai was chosen by this method. A few months later, and only two days before the election, a different survey convinced Mordechai to remove his name from the ballot to pave the way for a Barak majority, thus avoid-

ing the necessity of a runoff between Barak and Netanyahu. This plan to use surveys to determine the candidates in elections has sunk roots in Israeli politics and is evident in national races and in municipal politics as well.

Surveys influence voting behavior, according to Mina Zemach, an established pollster and observer of Israeli public opinion. Strategic voting was especially prevalent in the period (1996–2001) of the direct election of the prime minister. Voters abandoned candidates with lower probabilities of winning for those with greater probabilities (Mordechai votes moved to Barak; Benny Begin voters moved to Netanyahu). But even before the two ballots of the direct election of the prime minister, this process was at work. In the 1981 elections Yossi Sarid (a Labor leader at the time) called on voters not to vote for a small leftist party (ironically, a party he happens to head today) in order to ensure the likelihood that Peres would be asked to form the governing coalition. However, his call also motivated potential voters for a small right-wing party to vote for Yitzhak Shamir and his more centrist Likud list, thus ensuring Shamir's victory.

New lists get a sense from surveys of whether they should stand for election and run the risk of winning less than the minimum 1.5 percent needed for election. In turn, surveys aid voters in deciding whether they should vote for lists that might not pass the mandatory threshold.

The 1996 race between Peres and Netanyahu was turned around by the debate between the two, according to Geier. Going into the debate, Peres enjoyed a 4-point lead in the polls. At the debate's end, Netanyahu had closed the gap. More than 80 percent of those who

changed their vote intention and shifted from Peres to Netanyahu had watched the debate. But the significant impact, according to Geier, was not the debate itself but the reporting on the debate, especially the headline about a Zemach poll regarding the debate two days before the election. That headline read, "BIBI [NETANYAHU] WON" (Geier 1996).

The centrality of the surveys means that politicians exert considerable pressure on the pollsters to put a favorable spin on the wording and reporting of surveys. Mina Zemach reports that she withdrew from surveying for parties during elections some 20 years ago because of this unwanted pressure. Geier claims that certain parties released fictitious polls in order to influence the public's perception of the campaign. One researcher (Shamir 1986) studied the relations between research institutes and the funding body regarding the 1981 and 1984 elections. The Likud worked with Modiin Ezrahi in 1981 and Labor worked with Dahaf; each institute also did surveys for smaller parties and for the media. In 1984, both parties had freelance in-house pollsters. The difference, Shamir claims, is that the freelancer who only works for a single party is economically much more dependent on the goodwill of that party and tends to inflate the vote for the party (as measured by the prediction of the rate of success of appealing to undecided voters).

Prediction of the actual voting results is a crucial measure of the success of the survey. Mina Zemach was the only pollster who correctly predicted the 1977 Likud surprise victory over Labor. This was the first turnabout in Israeli political history and catapulted surveys to importance in the eyes of the politicians. Projection of the results is difficult because

almost three dozen parties run, results depend on the number of parties that pass that minimum, and the votes for unsuccessful parties are wasted in terms of deciding the distribution of seats.

Election studies are reported in *The Elections in Israel* series, edited by Asher Arian (and since 1984 with Michal Shamir), begun following the 1969 elections. A volume in that series has appeared after each election and reports on various aspects of the nomination of candidates, the election campaign, voting behavior, and coalition formation. The volumes have always included articles based on survey analysis.

Public Policy

If polls are important to politicians for election purposes, they are much less important in matters of governance. Sever Plotzker's assessment is that an op-ed piece has much more potential impact than the results of a poll. Although the Guttman Institute worked for government ministries, only since 1992 has the polling of opinions gained a larger audience in governing circles. Yitzhak Rabin, upon assuming the role of prime minister in 1992, was the first to appoint an in-house pollster.

Mina Zemach relates that Yitzhak Shamir, the prime minister before Rabin, was not at all interested in survey results. When informed that more than half the population was willing to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization, he answered, "Include me with the other group." When Zemach told Shamir that more than 80 percent supported the convening of an international peace conference, the answer came back that he did not agree.

Geier argued that prime ministers tend to downplay the importance of polls

while staying secretly attuned to them. He agrees that the turning point was 1992. With the Oslo Accords being considered, Rabin made more and more use of surveys, realizing that other sensors of the public mood were often unreliable. This was especially important for decisions that had to be ratified by the Knesset or by referendum. There is an increased role of surveys in the determination of the tactics of communicating public policies. The gradual, incrementalist notion of "Gaza and Jericho First" to implement the Oslo Accords was propelled by the fact that the public seemed ready to consider the possibility of accommodation with the Palestinians.

Surveys became even more important during the periods in which Netanyahu (1969–1999) and Barak (1999–2001) were in power. During the 20 months of Barak's administration, more than 100 surveys were undertaken in addition to the dozens received from other sources (Drucker 2002). There were surveys on every topic under consideration. Netanyahu's record was similar.

Raviv Drucker contends that the polls fed into policy decisions under Barak and not only the tactics of policy presentation. Barak was influenced by the polls in positions presented in negotiations with the Palestinians and the Syrians. For example, during the Shepherdstown talks with the Syrians the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal to the shores of the Sea of Galilee was raised. Barak's polls showed a strong rejection of that position and a 48–46 percentage split in support for withdrawing from all of the Golan Heights. Barak got cold feet and negotiations broke off.

A few months later, President Bill Clinton was to meet with the Syrian president, Hafaz al-Asad, in Geneva.

Barak had softened the Israeli refusal and agreed to have Clinton present a position that would allow Syria access to the Sea of Galilee while retaining a 400-meter stretch in the northeast corner of the sea, while claiming full sovereignty over it. A solution like this was acceptable to 43 percent of the population, his polls showed, while a narrower stretch was agreed to by only 34 percent. Al-Asad rejected the offer. Barak arrived at this bargaining position knowing full well that he was committed to submitting the details of the proposal to a referendum. Hence the guiding role of the surveys.

The use of surveys is especially prevalent in the prime minister's office, less so in other ministries. Even the Knesset under Speaker Avraham Burg has initiated a public opinion survey regarding the public perception of the legislature and its operations. In some local governments, surveys are also widely used.

The media have increasingly made surveys a central indicator of the campaign. Gabriel Weimann tracked the number of polls in the media from 1969 to 1996 and has documented their steady growth (Weimann 1995, 1998; see Tables 1 and 2). The number of reports on polls in the Israeli dailies during the three months prior to Election Day grew from 16 in 1969 to 437 in 1996. The average number of reports per newspaper grew more than fivefold, reaching almost five reports per day in 1996. In 1969, only 7 percent of the reports were found on the front page, compared to 29 percent in 1996. A most dramatic change was in the rate of sponsorship by the reporting newspaper, from none in 1969 to 56 in 1992.

The change is qualitative as well as quantitative, as seen in the content of the reports about polls. For example, there has been a steady increase in the number

of reports about polls forecasting the election results from 52 percent in 1973 to 95 percent in 1996, and a sharp decline in the number of polls that report on public opinion regarding campaign issues. Reports have also shifted from surveys about political parties to stories that focus on the popularity and personality of individual candidates.

Mass Media Effects

Surveys appear widely throughout the mass media, especially in print journalism. *Haaretz* published on a regular basis as early as 1973 surveys conducted by PORI, and by 1977 each of the three major papers had a contract with a public opinion research institute. In 2002, *Yediot Aharonot* and *Maariv* each reported on the results of a survey commissioned with Dahaf and Market Watch, respectively. Surveys are reported very frequently. The news-based radio station and the TV news shows also commission surveys.

Initiatives of university professors to adopt standards regarding the reporting of polls have met with resistance from some of those who conduct polls and those who publish them (Weimann 1998). The media in Israel rarely provide complete information on the surveys conducted. Weimann compared the information given about surveys by the Israeli media with that published in the United States. The differences are clear: in Israel only 31 percent of the reports on polls in 1996 included the wording of the questions, whereas in the United States it was more than double (71 percent).

Furthermore, pseudosurveys such as call-in polls or Internet polls are widespread. For example, in the past few elections the mass-circulation newspapers initiated a "mobile ballot-box" that was

Table 1 Change in Coverage of Polls in Israeli Media, 1969–1996^a

	1969	1973	1977	1981	1984	1988	1992	1996
Number of dailies reporting polls	3	6	8	11	13	15	15	16
Number of reports on polls	16	52	109	216	308	409	421	437
Average number of reports per newspaper	5.3	8.7	13.6	19.6	23.7	27.2	28.0	27.3
Average number of reports per day	0.1	0.6	1.2	2.4	3.4	4.5	4.6	4.8
Space allocated for polls (column inches)	172	512	1,297	6,927	8,122	9,365	9,411	9,603
Placement								
% front page	7	12	15	21	24	25	27	29
% inside page	93	88	85	79	76	75	73	71
Number of times polls mentioned on TV news ^b								
Channel 1							31	72
Channel 2								83
Average number of mention of polls in each TV news broadcast								
Channel 1							0.34	0.8
Channel 2								0.9

^a Data and explanations are from Gabriel Weimann, "Beware of Polls? A Survey of Election Surveys in the Israeli Media," in *Truth and Polls*, Kamil Fuchs and Shaul Bar-Lev (eds.), Haifa: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1998, pp. 126–127.

(1) The number of dailies reporting polls is out of the total number of dailies published in Israel. For example, in 1996 all the 16 dailies published in Israel reported polls.

(2) The number of reports on polls is the total amount of reports in the three-month period before Election Day.

(3) Average number of reports per newspaper. This is calculated by dividing row 2 by row 1, that is, the total number of reports divided by the number of dailies that report about polls. The result is the average number of reports in each of the dailies in the three-month period before Election Day.

(4) Average number of reports per day. This row shows the average number of reports on polls that were published per day, taking all dailies together. It is calculated by dividing row 2 by the number of newspapers in the three-month period before Election Day. For example, in 1996, $437/90=4.85$.

(5) Space allocated for polls is calculated by column inches. While total space of dailies has expanded through the years, it cannot explain the increase in thousands of percent in the space allocated for reports on polls.

(6) Placement. This row shows the percent of the total number of reports on polls on the front page, or in inside pages. For instance, in 1996, 29% of the total number of reports on polls were placed on the front page, and 71% in the other pages.

(7) Number of times polls mentioned on TV news: Channel 1 from 1992, Channel 2 from 1996. In the three-month period before Election Day, there were 83 times in which polls were mentioned in the main news edition of the second channel.

(8) Average number of mentions of polls in each TV news edition. This row shows the average number of times in which polls were mentioned on each daily TV news edition. It is calculated by dividing the upper row by 90, the three-month period before Election Day: $83/90=0.9$.

Table 2 Sponsorship of Polls (%) in Israeli Media, 1969-1992^a

Sponsorship by	1969	1973	1977	1981	1984	1988	1992	Rates of Change
								1969-73 to 1988-92
Reporting paper	0	9	37	47	48	48	56	11.55
Other papers	5	22	28	33	32	30	27	2.11
Political bodies	71	49	22	11	12	16	14	-4.00
Unspecified	24	20	13	9	8	6	3	-4.88
Total sponsorship	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	

^aAdapted from Gabriel Weimann, "Caveat Populi Quaestor: The 1992 Preelections Polls in the Israeli Press," in *The Elections in Israel—1992*, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 258.

situated each week at the center of a different city, with the "results" widely reported.

The wording of the questions, as much as the answers, provides insight into the priorities of the researchers and the thought processes of the society. Shamir et al. (1999) investigated Israel's self-image by looking at changes in questions regarding the status of Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states. They identify changes in discourse frames from a general abstract and simplistic frame to a concrete and policy-oriented one, noting a shift in discourse from land to people, exposing a fundamental value conflict that surfaced gradually.

Polls have become a permanent and very visible feature of Israeli political communication. There is no professional regulation or oversight of polls. The polls are especially influential during crisis periods and at election time. They have also become influential when determining the outer limits of a proposed policy and in the tactics of communicating the policy to the public.

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Italy

Historically, one of the dominant modes for the expression of public opinion in Italy has been the use of referenda. On June 2, 1946, Italians voted by referendum to decide between republic and monarchy. In it, 54.3 percent chose republic, with a margin of about 2 million voters. In the past 30 years, Italy has relied on referenda rather than the executive or the judiciary branches for some key decisions. In 1974, a referendum confirmed the right to divorce, as 58 percent of votes supported the 1970 law. In 1981, a referendum confirmed the right of abortion.

In the 1990s, there has been a very broad use of referenda. Yet the Italian electorate has shown an increasing frustration with this instrument. For the first

time in 1990, referenda regarding hunting and the use of pesticides did not reach the required 50 percent. In 1991, the first referendum on electoral reform took place, proposing a shift from a proportional to a majoritarian system. In light of the 1990 precedent, those opposed pursued a strategy of subtly encouraging abstention. The choice was thus presented as being between voting and abstaining. However, this proved to be a gross mistake, as 62.5 percent voted in the 1991 referendum, with the highest mobilization in the northeast, the heart of the demand for political reform; 95.6 percent supported the change, without significant territorial variation.

In January 1993, the Constitutional Court admitted new referenda for the electoral reform intended to introduce the majoritarian system in parliamentary elections. Given the results of the 1991 referendum, the opposition no longer encouraged abstention. Voters were drawn to the polls because other important issues were being decided, regarding drugs and party finances. Turnover was 76.9 percent; 82.5 percent voted for the reform. The reform that followed, however, betrayed the expectations of many, since mass parties that were losing support due to corruption scandals succeeded in undermining a pure majoritarian system and instead promoted a mixed system, which would allow them to use the proportional quota to protect themselves in case of defeat under the majoritarian system.

This conflict prompted a new wave of referenda in 1999 and 2000. These referenda, however, failed to support the constitutional transition. The parties that were developing a centrist position had vested interests against the majoritarian reform. Yet supporters and the opposition addressed public opinion by arguing

that their position was intended to promote reform, albeit in two opposite forms. The supporters proclaimed that a victory in the referendum was necessary to sustain a serious electoral reform. The opposition argued that the victory would have prevented additional changes, thus leading to a system worse than the previous, while an electoral defeat would force reform to pass through parliament and not the voting polls. Both of these public opinion strategies reflected the dominant interpretation—that the electorate supported reform—but was exasperated by the prospect of having to vote on seven questions of considerable technical complexity (see Fabbrini 2001; Donovan 1998). Therefore, ultimately, Italian voters refused with frustration the excessive delegation by parliament.

Electoral Change and the Media

The role of public opinion in Italy changed dramatically after the national electoral law changed from a proportional to a mixed majoritarian system in 1993. This period was so pivotal in Italian politics that it is often referred to as the beginning of the second republic (though this issue is debated by the Italian academia—see Calise 1994; Mannheimer and Sani 1994). The second republic, in addition to being identified with the passage from a proportional to a majoritarian system, is characterized by the Tangentopoli (political party and institutional corruption) crisis, the end of Christian Democratic power, and the repositioning of the former fascist right wing (Zolo 1999).

Following the electoral reform, there was a focus on political leaders and, consequently, a pronounced phenomenon of personalization of politics (Fabbrini 1999; Calise 2000). This shift led to the development of political marketing in cam-

paigns and to the skyrocketing use of political advertisements. Several observers refer to this phenomenon as an Americanization of Italian politics. Indeed, even the language used by politicians to communicate with the electorate has changed dramatically. In particular, the old cryptic language of Italian politics, heavily ideological and technical, with its complex lexicon and syntax, has given way to a populist language better adapted to capturing public opinion (Croci 2001). This shift, promoted by political entrepreneurs who wished to distance themselves from the past, indicates how political actors altered their register as the party system changed in order to maximize public opinion mobilization.

Traditionally, the Italian media has been subordinated to political power. Public broadcasting, for instance, is controlled by political parties, which appoint management and editors according to electoral results. The development of commercial networks in the early 1980s has promoted only limited media independence, since “the lack of a clear regulatory framework has obstructed the development plans of the private broadcasters, who were consequently forced to court the parties and to seek patronage from political leaders” (Mazzoleni 1987, p. 82).

The question of media independence has become even more vexing after the 1994 entrance into politics of Silvio Berlusconi, who controls the three major private channels as well as a significant share of the press. Berlusconi’s channels attract about 50 percent of the former audience of the public channels (Mazzoleni 1996). Yet Italian public opinion repeatedly indicated that it does not perceive conflict of interest to be a concern that would prevent Berlusconi from lead-

ing his party and covering elected offices (Mancini 2002). In addition to being directly controlled by the coalition in power, the state broadcaster has in recent years reneged on its original mission of public service, in order to pursue a competition for viewers with commercial TV. This has promoted a rising concern regarding the misinformation of the public (Mazzoleni 2000).

Furthermore, the major newspapers are owned by industrial groups. Hence, the media currently "serves the interests of industrial and political groups and wages an ongoing conflict between those favoring private enterprise and those who support state participants" (Pancini 2000, p. 1). This tends to be more pronounced in newspapers rather than broadcast media, although the discrepancy is diminishing.

Political broadcasting during campaigns is regulated by Law 515/1993, which imposes a series of financial and communication austerity measures. Among several requirements, the law forbids candidates from appearing in any television show except news and campaign debates, in order to maintain impartiality and guarantee equal shares of national TV time for each candidate. Yet this law has not provided a satisfactory solution. In particular, political candidates circumvented the law by starting the campaign *before* the start of the official campaign (Mazzoleni 1996). The result has been the emergence of an American-style "teledemocracy" (Marletti and Roncarolo 2000).

Despite this view, 60 percent of Italians declare that they are not influenced by political broadcasts (IPSO/ACNielsen-Cra 2000). In addition, Italians' trust in public broadcasting fell from 37 percent in December 2001 to 32 percent in April 2002, and Italians' trust in Berlusconi's broadcasting channels fell from 33 per-

cent to 28 percent (IPSO/ACNielsen-Cra 2002).

The Market for Public Opinion Research

Such politicization of the media also impacts polling results. Following the increase in political marketing, there has been an associated increase in private institutions conducting polls. Italian politicians have increasingly conducted their own polls, even in local elections. Before national elections, media presents almost daily often contradictory figures on public opinion and candidate popularity. Post-election debates analyze how the results reveal the public's thinking. Polling agencies, whether public or private, often have a covert party allegiance, and many political circles close to the candidates use the polls to influence public opinion (Mazzoleni 1996).

However, few institutions repeat polls regularly outside electoral polling, as most polls serve single issues and are only once-off investigations. Hence, during mandates the link between public opinion and the executive and legislative branch is less clear. Still, interest is developing in following public opinion outside electoral periods as a means of permanent campaigning (Marletti 2002).

Interestingly, usually polls are presented in a way that assumes public opinion as a measurable and individualistic feature of the citizenry. This reflects the relative change from the severe party hierarchy that existed before electoral reform.

More and more agencies work in political marketing and public opinion research. These polling companies conduct several sociological surveys, as well as surveys investigating political orientation, voters' expectations of parties and

candidates, exit polling, and projections. Since the change of electoral system, and in particular since Silvio Berlusconi entered politics, there has been a decisive boost in the use of public opinion research.

In 1991, the Italian Association of Market Research (ASSIRM) was founded. The 26 institutions of marketing research, public opinion surveys, and social research associated with ASSIRM in 2001 generated a total turnover of 314 million euros, with a year-to-year increase of 7 percent. This amount was 70 percent of the total Italian market. In 2002, the number of associated institutions increased to 33. And 43 percent of turnover was represented by computer- and telephone-based technologies (CATI, CAPI, Internet). The turnover in electoral surveys and public opinion surveys by institutions affiliated with ASSIRM has grown in recent years (see Figures 1 and 2).

More than 100 public opinion and market research companies in Italy are affiliated with the World Association of Opinion and Marketing Research Professionals (ESOMAR). According to ESOMAR estimates of world expenditures on research, Europe contributed 39 percent, of which Italy was fourth (7 percent) after the UK (27.3 percent), Germany (21.7 percent), and France (21.7 percent).

Italian total expenditures on public opinion research for 2001 were about 450 million euros. Of that, 90 percent was spent to investigate the citizen qua consumer. The remaining 10 percent was divided among electoral research (9 million euros), public opinion surveys (9 million), citizen satisfaction with municipal companies (mostly regarding local utilities, 12 million), and citizen satisfaction with government services (15 million, of which only 5 million is spent directly by the public administration).




Figure 1 ASSIRM Turnover (2000 Euro)




Figure 2 ASSIRM Electoral Surveys and Public Opinion Surveys as Percentage of Total Turnover (1995–2001)

Customer satisfaction research is conducted for about ten regions, six central ministries, the president of the council, and several municipalities.

The amount spent by the public administration to assess citizen satisfaction with government services (5 million euros) implies a per capita expenditure of only 60 euro cents per citizen. This rate of expenditure is a fraction of what the public sector spends in France, the UK, and Germany. Therefore, it is fair to say that public opinion research in Italy is still dominated by research on the citizen as consumer, rather than in the civic and political dimension (ASSIRM 2002).

Local administrations (municipalities, provinces, and regions) are more concerned with public opinion and citizen satisfaction regarding their services than is the central government. This result is

attributed to the increased accountability introduced by the change in the electoral law, which initiated direct elections at the local level.

Themes That Drive Public Opinion in Italy

The Italian political system is still in transition, and the role of polling and public opinion is still in flux. This instability reflects on the current frustration of Italians at their political system. In 2001, the Eurobarometer reported that Italians are the most dissatisfied of all European Union nationalities when it comes to faith in their country's version of democracy. Based on their experience of their own political system, Italians consequently wished that the European Union played a larger role in domestic affairs. Similarly, in recent years Italians

have developed a distrust toward the judiciary, which many see as excessively politicized. This was largely a reaction to the anticorruption fatigue that has followed years of scandals and trials throughout the 1990s.

Current polls focus on election-driving issues such as federalism, immigration (and its alleged connection with crime), conflict of interest, media independence, judicial independence, citizens' perception of politicians, the euro, labor law reform, political corruption, direct election and leadership, military intervention, health care reform, pension reform, and globalization.

Voters often align themselves with party platforms, in particular in response to issues of globalization, military intervention, labor policy reform, and the changing role of the welfare state, which have divided public opinion. These themes have been extensively covered by surveys and promoted most of the rallies and protests in the country.

Protests and demonstrations used to be a key manifestation of public opinion, crucial in Italian politics (see Tarrow 1989; Franzosi 1995; Locke and Baccaro 1999; Della Porta 1999; Lumley 1990). Traditionally, public opinion was mobilized by mass parties, above all through a party press that established the party line, by providing an ideological guide to followers. Communication was also developed around party gatherings, from mass meetings, to rallies in city squares, to annual festivals organized by parties. All of these forms of public participation attracted thousands of supporters and the curious. However, the role of rallies has declined in recent years, to the point that sociologist Ilvo Diamanti argues that Italians no longer know how to protest (Diamanti 2001). The following data from the

International Labor Organization provide insight into the decline of labor-related protest events (see Figure 3).

As these data and the preceding discussion show, protest has become less important. Instead, Italy has experienced the development of a public opinion democracy, despite lingering concerns about media control and conflicts of interest.

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


Figure 3 Labor Strikes in Italy 1971–1999

Note: There is a measurement change in 1996, but values are almost not affected. The only value affected in the 1996–1998 transition period is for 1997, 220 with the new measure, 203 with the old one.

Source: International Labour Organization, LABORSTA Labour Statistics Database.

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Japan

The first Japanese public opinion surveys were administered in the mid-1940s following World War II. Since then, surveys have been conducted extensively by government agencies, newspapers, broadcasters, academic research institutes, and private organizations. Stratified random sampling and personal interviewing methods are generally employed in Japanese surveys, and many of the national surveys taken over time may be utilized for time-series analysis because of similarity in wording and sample techniques.

The most comprehensive collection of survey questions in English is the Japanese Public Opinion Database (JPOLL). The JPOLL data are provided jointly by the United States–Japan Foundation and the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut and are accessible without fee at www.ropercenter.uconn.edu. JPOLL collects survey results from Japanese media agencies such as the *Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Daily*, and *Mainichi Shimbun*—all daily newspapers that frequently administer opinion polls. Several national

surveys, collaboratively administered by such agencies as CBS News, the *New York Times*, and the Tokyo Broadcasting System, are available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) to members at www.icpsr.umich.edu. In general, Japanese public opinion polls are reliable and valid measures of public sentiment across a broad range of issue areas.

The Context of Public Opinion Trends in Japan

Following defeat in World War II, Japan experienced great social upheaval and political and economic transformation. Dramatic shifts in the political and economic systems, and a high rate of economic growth unprecedented in the nation's history, have been accompanied by considerable changes in the way Japanese view themselves, other nations, and their place in the international system. Political changes have come about primarily as a result of democratic reforms included in Japan's post–World War II constitution, written and imposed by the occupation forces. Although the 1889 constitution guaranteed the citizenry freedom and liberty, civil rights were couched in language that qualified them severely. The 1949 constitution reflected much of the American political philosophy emphasizing civil liberties (Iokibe 1999). The status and power of the "divine" emperor was severely restricted, and the sovereignty of the people was established. Equality of the sexes and freedom of thought and conscience were stipulated, and democratization progressed in the economic sphere under the Land Reform Law.

At the end of the war, Japan's manufacturing base and infrastructure were virtually destroyed, the land was devastated,

and the people were starving. Economic aid and assistance from the governing nations—primarily the United States—and a determined population enabled Japan to rebuild its economy and attain economic growth rates unprecedented anywhere in the world. Sustained growth resulted in a sharp increase in national income, allowing citizens to buy more durable consumer goods, enjoy leisure activities for the first time, and also manufacture first-rate consumer goods for export (Reischauer 1984). Such advances were not without consequences, as levels of pollution and environmental degradation also began to rise. With time, the prices of consumer goods and land also increased. As a result of Japan's rapid economic development, significant changes to Japan's social structure occurred and are logically reflected in the opinions and attitudes of the people.

Japanese public opinion about the government, work, and foreign nations corresponds closely with fluctuations in the economy. Consider the following shifts in postwar social and political consciousness:

1945–1954: Evaluation of the various political and social reforms have not yet been undertaken and the daily life of the people was extremely difficult.

1955–1970: The effects of institutional reforms begin to take effect and Japanese citizens return to a comfortable existence. Improvements in the standard of living continue and conclude with a surge in investment.

1970–1980: The oil shocks of the 1970s dampen manufacturing output but also force Japanese corporations to streamline manufacturing

processes to conserve energy and give Japan an edge in the international market.

1980–1989: Frequently referred to as the bubble years, this period is characterized by steady growth rates, growing trade account surpluses, increased investments abroad, and soaring real estate prices. During this period Japan becomes the second largest market for U.S. goods.

1990–2000: This period is often referred to as the lost decade. Japan's bubble bursts in the early 1990s and an economic recession ensues (Yoshikawa 2001).

However, the impacts of structural and economic changes on the attitudes and opinions of many individuals are mitigated by the traditional mentality and societal expectations that characterize the Japanese way of life, which has changed little since prewar times. The traditional mentality has heavily influenced the direction in which changes have taken place. Thus, Japanese public opinion may be characterized as simultaneously modern and traditional. Consequently, interpreting the opinions and attitudes of the Japanese must take into account the dramatic social and economic changes and adherence to traditional norms.

Key Issues Dividing and Defining Japanese Public Opinion

Major issues such as defense, government structure, politics, and the Japanese bureaucracy shed light on the trends and dimensions of Japanese public opinion and the connection to social change. Perhaps the single most important issue that has divided and defined the Japanese public's thinking is national

security. Following defeat in World War II, Japan's postwar constitution, written by the Allied victors, prohibits Japanese remilitarization and involvement in an offensive war.

Article 9 of Japan's 1949 constitution is a renunciation of war and states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (Hayes 2001)

Historically, the Japanese public has shown little enthusiasm for remilitarization, and support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons is practically nonexistent (Van Wolfren 1989). However, attitudes toward Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the 1 percent of GNP budgetary constraint placed on the defense budget, U.S. troops based in Japan, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and a reinterpretation of article 9 of the constitution are more ambiguous and, at times, less consistent. These issues are constant reminders of Japan's past and present policy challenges regarding the role of Japan in Asia and in the international system.

More than 80 percent of Japanese surveyed consistently support the training and maintenance of the SDF but do not support a combative military role for the SDF. These attitudes may be explained in part by the fact that many people see the SDF as an emergency or disaster relief agency and a necessary force in the event

of an attack (McIntosh 1986). Polls also reveal a growing acceptance of the need for Japan to provide for its own defense (Langdon 1985). This view has become increasingly popular despite the U.S. pledge to protect Japan in the event of an attack, as stipulated in the 1951 U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Japanese public opinion on the agreement has fluctuated over time, ranging from violent protests against the treaty in the 1960s to general agreement that the treaty contributes to peace in the region. Recent polls reveal that one out of four individuals interviewed believe that the United States would not help Japan militarily if attacked.

The presence of more than 45,000 U.S. military personnel and U.S. bases on Japanese soil has been, and continues to be, a point of contention between the government and Japanese citizens (Drifte 1990). Repeated infractions and crimes committed by U.S. military personnel outside the bases contribute to much of the animosity that exists between the U.S. and Japanese governments on the issue of U.S. military bases in Japan. The rape of a 12-year-old Okinawa schoolgirl by three U.S. Marines in September 1995 reignited the issue, triggering demands for a reduction and scaling-down of the U.S. military presence on the islands (Yoshida 1999). Public opinion on this issue has had minimal impact on government policy. Although response rates may vary, a 1992 poll asked individuals what they thought should be done with the U.S. military forces stationed in Japan in the future. Three percent said U.S. troops should be increased, 27 percent said that the number of troops should stay the same, 46 percent said troops should be decreased, 16 percent thought U.S. troops should leave the

country, and 9 percent said they did not know (JPOLL 1992). The percentage of Okinawans who would like to see the number of troops reduced from their prefecture is substantially higher (Yoshida 1999). Despite objections to the troops, the national interest of the country formulated in Tokyo continues to clash with overall public opinion on the issue.

Reinterpretation of article 9 of the constitution—allowing Japan to increase its military spending and expand the role of the SDF—is a hotly contested issue. Polls consistently reveal a split in public opinion on the issue. A recent question asked by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* asked individuals: “If the United States started military action because a war or combat broke out in a region near Japan and Japan was to cooperate with the U.S. military forces, how do you think Japan should deal with the constitutional issue?” Twenty-six percent answered “amend the constitution if necessary,” 14 percent answered “interpret the constitution differently,” 42 percent said “deal with it using the current interpretation of the constitution,” 8 percent felt that “Japan should not cooperate with the U.S. military forces,” and 8 percent did not know (JPOLL 1997). The more conservative leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) generally support such a reinterpretation. Higher levels of nationalism and support for the idea of Japan playing a role in international relations commensurate with its economic power are issues regularly raised in the Japanese cabinet. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is an advocate of such a move, as is President George W. Bush. U.S. support for the idea is based on the assumption that Japan continues to follow the policy deemed appropriate by Washington. The current warming of relations between Japan and

China may lead Japan to act in its own interest, questioning U.S.-approved policy of the past.

U.S.-Japanese Relations

In the decade following the war, a surprisingly high percentage of Japanese possessed pro-U.S. feelings. For example, in 1950, 66 percent of individuals surveyed believed relations between the United States and Japan were either very good or good. These percentages began to dwindle in the 1960s, falling to the 30–40 percent level, and reached an all-time low of 20 percent in the 1970s. This sharp decrease coincided with U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and Japanese opinion generally held that the United States was the country most at fault in that conflict (Kojima 1975). During the 1980s and 1990s, the number of Japanese citizens who believed relations with the United States were good consistently ranged between 30 percent and 40 percent (JPOLL 1982–1997). Fluctuations in pro-U.S. feelings are negatively affected by incidents connected to U.S. military bases and personnel, as well as trade disputes between the two countries.

The Role of Public Opinion in the Governing Process

Generally speaking, decisionmaking in a weak leader is more susceptible and responsive to public opinion. This section highlights three factors to consider when evaluating the role of public opinion in policy decisionmaking in Japan: (1) a strong government, (2) Japan’s constitution, and (3) neo-Confucian social values. Combined, these institutional and attitudinal constraints limit the effects of public opinion on policy decisions in Japan.

Although Japan is a parliamentary democracy, the style of governance allows

much of the political process to operate outside the public view. Decisions are made through an extensive and time-consuming process of consultations and negotiations among government agencies and relevant interest groups (Kyogoku 1987). Instead of the vigorous debate that one hopes for in parliaments, decisions are instead made within the context of bureaucratic authority and among officials who usually have close personal ties (Reischauer 1984). On the few occasions when the political dialogue becomes public, the openness is due to the fact that the process of consensus-building and conflict management has failed to work properly. In these instances, debate can become raucous and may produce public demonstrations and occasionally violent protest (Hayes 2001).

The power of the Japanese bureaucracy is considered by many to be extraordinary. As Chalmers Johnson has observed, "the politicians reign and the bureaucrats rule" (1995, p. 138). The most generally accepted understanding of politics in Japan is a tripartite governance structure composed of politicians, corporations, and the bureaucracy (Curtis 1999). The strongest leg of the triangle is that of the bureaucracy working within an essentially corporatist system in which the state and the business community work closely together to guide industry and the economy. Compared to the United States, the power of the Japanese state over the market and of bureaucrats over politicians is extreme (Curtis 1999).

A function of political parties is to shape, inform, and act on public opinion. However, the Japanese system differs from other multiparty systems in that one party—the LDP—has been in a commanding position since 1955, losing power only once in 1993. As a result, a

strong sense of voter identification with political parties in Japan is missing, even for those parties where ideology is an important source of identity, such as the Communist Party (Foster 1982). The LDP's continual reign is due to the absence of viable competition, as opposition parties have historically not been equipped individually or collectively to challenge the LDP for power (Hayes 2001).

Although the Japanese are serious about their rights and freedoms, there has been less controversy and political friction than in the United States, where the notion of natural rights is the very basis of the republic. This may be due to the novelty of the concept of rights. Prior to 1945, neither judges nor citizens were accustomed to the notion of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech (Beer 1984).

Relatively new democratic institutions and values, and a dominant-party governing system fairly well insulated from opposition politics and protest, interact to mitigate the potential impact of public opinion on government policy. Further, models of human relations taught in neo-Confucianism are predominantly vertical and emphasize obedience and respect between parents and children, the old and young, teacher and disciple, lord and vassal. In addition, a high value is placed on harmony and consensus; the interests of the group (and the nation) prevail over those of the individual (Yamamoto 1999, p. 55).

Ultimately, when incorporating public opinion into the decisionmaking process, the Japanese state may be described as refractive (Curtis 1999). A refractive state absorbs demands from society and produces policies in response to them. To reach public policy decisions, the man-

agers of the state—the bureaucrats and politicians—bend and mold demands to conform as much as possible to their own values, priorities, preferences, and organizational interests.

Public Opinion about the State

Public opinion polls asking citizens about their feelings toward the government, policy issues, and political efficacy are regularly conducted, although their import on politics in Japan is suspect. Polls are frequently used by government officials to time elections and select candidates, but policy concerns of the public are generally filtered through the existing consensus within the ruling party. Although government officials are generally regarded highly in Japan, the public's assessment of government officials indicates dissatisfaction.

A nationwide opinion poll conducted in the early 1970s by the secretariat of the prime minister's office asked respondents to describe the image they held of the bureaucracy. Twenty percent of the individuals interviewed said that they viewed bureaucrats as "serious" (*majime*), 21 percent "hard" (*katai*), 9 percent "arrogant" (*ohei*), 13 percent "inefficient" (*noritsu ga warui*), 16 percent "unadaptable" (*yuzu ga kikanai*), and 14 percent that it "lacked a feeling of service" (*sabisu kokoro ga nai*). Only 3 percent of the individuals used the term *elite* (*kanryo erito*) (Johnson 1995).

In the late 1990s, it was difficult to find anyone in Japan who had anything good to say about the Japanese bureaucracy. Events in the 1990s profoundly damaged the bureaucracy's reputation. Abuse of personal relationships, as well as conduct that was morally reprehensible if not illegal (bribes and insider trading), angered the public and produced a level of

bureaucrat-bashing by the media and politicians that was unprecedented in Japan's modern history (Curtis 1999).

The image of elected officials has also become tarnished in the public's eye. In a 1998 opinion poll, the *Asahi Shimbun* asked 2,243 individuals, "What comes to your mind when you hear the word 'politician'?" The answer given by 45 percent of those interviewed was "unreliable" (*ayashii*). Thirteen percent of the individuals gave the answer "sly" (*zurui*), and 10 percent thought politicians were "arrogant" (*goman*). In a poll of 936 national voters, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* newspaper asked the question: "After seeing how Prime Minister Obuchi's Cabinet was formed, do you think the process of selecting the prime minister reflects Japanese public opinion a lot, somewhat, not a lot, or not at all?" Seventeen percent of the interviewees answered "a lot" or "somewhat," 41 percent replied "not a lot," and 39 percent answered "not at all" (JPOLL 1998). According to a 2001 opinion poll, a record 88 percent of Japanese said they are generally dissatisfied with Japanese politics (*Mainichi Shimbun*, January 4, 2001).

Conclusion

Growing dissatisfaction with the failed attempts on the part of politicians to revive the economy will continue to weaken the dominant Liberal Democratic Party in Japanese politics and force change. Whether the Liberal Democrats or the opposition parties decide to give greater consideration to public opinion in determining policy in the future remains to be seen. Public opinion polls will certainly continue to play a role in monitoring the interests, attitudes, and opinions of the Japanese public.

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Jordan

Survey research has been established as a standard tool for social scientists in democratic societies. Under authoritarian, semiauthoritarian, and semidemocratic regimes, independent survey research is either prohibited or manipulated. In the Middle East—a region that suffers under dictators of various character—public opinion polling is still weak. Under the politically authoritarian and economically liberalizing regime in Jordan, the frequency and technical sophistication of surveys have increased noticeably, creating significant outcomes, but a lot is left to be desired.

Before 1993 the Department of Statistics (DoS) had been the sole provider of information about population, trade, industry, unemployment, and poverty. Opinion polling was not an integral part of DoS work. Since 1993, survey methods have been used for purposes other than in the areas mentioned above. In this respect, other fields of research have become relevant to the liberalization process that took place in the country after 1989. These fields include measuring public opinion about preelection campaigns, the state of democracy, the extent to which civil liberties and political rights are safeguarded by the government, performance of parliament, government, political parties, civil society organizations, and traditional social organizations. Also, there has been a growing interest in the media and its influence on public opinion, especially among daily newspaper columnists about

traditional social values (authoritarian) versus modern values (democratic).

By and large, public universities, from the 1960s to the 1990s, remained distant from surveys in general and public opinion polls in particular. Although there have been some sporadic surveys carried out by university scholars, we could not observe a continuous and cumulative survey project tackling a particular issue over time. The lack of surveys is partially due to martial law being in force for more than three decades (abolished in the early 1990s). Yet another factor contributing to the underdevelopment of survey inquiry in Jordan was financial. Public universities' financial resources were insufficient to cover the costs of surveys. Moreover, intellectual debates that may involve discussion of survey research results were marginal and limited to a few social scientists, who have always lacked the availability of sufficient data usually required for such debates and were largely unable to carry out surveys.

During the 1990s, an academic research project was initiated and developed by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. In 1993, CSS carried out its first survey on democracy in Jordan, which was followed by another poll on the Israeli-Jordanian peace process. These two polls, along with a poll on women and political participation, were the primary step in establishing an ongoing research project designed specifically to investigate political liberalization in the country, focusing on its prospects and realities. The efforts of CSS to establish opinion polling as an effective and sound tool in studying sociopolitical phenomena were challenged by the old guard, financial resources, and some intellectuals. The old guard consists of members of the state apparatus who served in the

public sector under martial law and those who were linked to the security forces. They depicted the information obtained by polls as state secrets that could be used against the best interests of Jordan. This view was reinforced by conspiratorial thinking, often expressed by political activists, including some Islamists, Communists, and nationalists who projected polls as a covert method of intelligence used by the West and Israel to manipulate the country. For example, the results of a public opinion poll on the Jordan-Israel declaration of peace in summer 1994, which showed that around 80 percent of the population of those who reported an opinion supported a peace deal with Israel, were interpreted in a conspiratorial manner. To peace opponents (Islamists, some left-wing activists, and some nationalists) who have always thought that Jordanians will not support any peace deal with Israel, the poll did not reflect reality and was a conspiracy to serve Israel's interests. Such issues contributed to the debate's intensity about the validity and reliability of survey instruments in Jordan. Many columnists considered some of the CSS surveys superficial and unreflective of social reality, when the results of these surveys did not conform to their ideas about a reality. Others—and sometimes the same columnists—considered these surveys to be the most reliable instruments when they conformed to their ideas about a given subject.

Problems Facing Opinion

Polling in Jordan

Information provided about social, political, and economic values in the Arab Middle East in general and particularly in Jordan is still meager and lagging behind Europe, North America, Latin America,

Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. This deficiency is a problem for students of social science and policymakers alike. In this respect, Jordan, according to 1982 estimates, was far behind other Arab countries, with only 3 percent of survey research conducted in the Arab world carried out in Jordan, compared to 23 percent in Egypt, 18 percent in Tunisia, and 10 percent in Lebanon. Therefore, the incorporation of information about Arab societies into a wider comparative framework is underdeveloped. Although there have been some publications on political behavior and development in the Arab world, generalizable conclusions about such subjects require more surveys and investigations to integrate them into international and cross-national comparisons. The problem of data availability has been a major concern to Middle East experts and sociologists. In 1976, William Zartman observed the state of political behavior studies in the Middle East by saying, "the critical mass of research has been done outside the Middle East." He added that "data generation and analysis in the region remain to be done" and stressed the fact that a systematic study of the region was needed. More than twenty years later, prominent Middle East specialists like Mark Tessler and Mustafa Hamarneh repeated the same idea. What applies to the Arab Middle East is also applicable to the state of opinion polling in Jordan, although some of the problems are not equally shared by all countries.

Access to existing data archives in Jordan, as in any other Arab and most third world countries, is rather limited for political and procedural reasons. One obstacle is the overstretched bureaucracy in control of such data. Additionally, there is no national databank that con-

tains all available data or at least a directory of institutions and researchers who have collected data. Moreover, available data largely lack comparability. However, this points to the fact that there is a difficulty in data collection, accumulation, and processing. Although financial resources have less to do with the substance of survey research, they condition, restrict, and directly affect the ability of researchers to carry out opinion polls. Indigenous researchers interested in social and political issues have been unable to carry out independent surveys due to financial constraints. Public universities lacked the necessary funds for large-scale representative surveys. Due to the nonexistence of a national fund for research, university scholars who managed to conduct surveys are funded by external donations from international NGOs or research agencies. For example, almost all surveys conducted by the CSS were funded by international NGOs. This applies to most surveys in Palestine and Lebanon as well.

Opinion polls need an environment of freedom of speech. The conducting of opinion polls in Jordan, as in other Middle East countries, has been and is currently dependent on the state's approval, rather than any independent research agenda. Prior to 1989, free survey research could not be carried out in Jordan because every political subject was seen as sensitive, and there was much doubt on the government's part, and even the respondents' part, if they became aware that political matters were being considered. Sensitivity was reinforced by a tradition of political figures intervening in academic research. This is rooted in martial law in Jordan, where all institutions and their activities were closely observed alongside underground political parties

and professional syndicates. The situation has slowly changed as a result of the government's revised security doctrine. Since 1989, a more relaxed political atmosphere has encouraged researchers to go ahead (but without forgetting the possibility of being punished). Punishment could be severe if researchers were seen to have overstepped accepted limits. For example, Mustafa Hamarneh, the director of CSS, was fired because CSS carried out surveys and published results showing that more than 70 percent of Jordanians couldn't criticize the government openly because they feared government punishment. The government was disquieted by these results and ordered him to resign, which he did in July 1999. After a long and fierce political battle, he was reinstated in October 2000.

Many Jordanian politicians (and their clients) in the media did not like the

results of survey research on political matters, especially polls showing a decline in government performance (Figure 1). There have been some political attempts to block surveys on controversial issues. For example, studying Jordanian-Palestinian domestic and external relations was viewed by many politicians as controversial due to the complexity of the Palestinian question and its direct impact on Jordan's politics. However, political attempts to block survey research on such controversial issues failed; this survey was successfully accomplished. On this precedent, CSS pressed ahead with surveys on controversial issues. Thus, as soon as the state eased control over surveys, a quantitative leap was achieved, facilitating improvements in the overall quality of surveys. Since 1993 an annual comprehensive survey on democracy in Jordan has been conducted.




Figure 1 Evaluation of Governments' Performance (To what degree do you think the government will be capable of [has been capable of] shouldering responsibilities?)

Source: Centre for Strategic Studies, Evaluation of Governments' Performance (various surveys, 1996–2001).

The Meaning of Democracy

The increasing association of public freedoms and democracy far exceeds the association of democracy and socioeconomic and sociocultural attributes. As Figure 2 shows, in 2001 a majority (73 percent) of Jordanians defined democracy with reference to public freedoms, which represents an increase over percentages reported in 2000 and 1999. It seems that Jordanians prioritize the meaning of democracy; although they give a priority to civil liberties, other qualities of democracy are present in their political culture, and thus equality and justice were secondary in importance. These categories, although conceptually distinct in Jordanian public opinion, are not completely rigid.

Levels of Democracy

Jordanians give consistent scores to established democracies such as the United States and Israel (see Figure 3). This reflects the reality of democracy in societies where periodic elections, peaceful rotation of power, competition among political parties, and above all civil liberties and public freedoms are widely respected and constitutionally safeguarded. Had Jordanians held an ideological objection to democracy, they would not have given Israel a consistent rating over three years; that is, sharp fluctuations would have been present. This consistency holds up when they are asked to evaluate the levels of democracy in other countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria and within the Palestinian Author-




Figure 2 The Meaning of Democracy (In your opinion, what are the conditions/factors that have to be present in a country to describe that country as a “democratic country”? Open-ended question)

Source: Centre for Strategic Studies, *Democracy in Jordan* (various surveys, 1999–2001).

ity. Those places received relatively low scores (i.e., “not democratic”). Moreover, these scores are very close to, if not entirely consistent with, the Freedom House scores for those countries on freedom status. The mean scores indicate that Jordan’s level of democracy fluctuates at around 5 out of 10. Thus democracy at the institutional level lags behind public expectations; 94.4 percent of the Jordanian population believes that having a democratic political system is a very good or good way of governing the country. If we translate the mean score value of 5 out of 10 as 50 percent out of 100 percent and compare that to the desirability of democracy among Jordanians, we come up with a result of around 44 percent democratic deficit. Also, the mean scores point to the stability and

consistency of the population’s perception of democracy. Had the population been confused about the meaning of democracy, they would have given inconsistent scores for each of the countries included in the question in respective years.

Fluctuations in Jordan’s score on level of democracy from 1993 to 2001 fell within the range of 1 point. There were two years in which the score was above 5, in 1999 and 2000. That is, Jordan has barely passed the success threshold. These peaks reflect the sense of optimism that accompanied the inauguration of King Abdullah as successor to the throne. However, in 2001 the score dropped to 4.9 (from 5.7 in 2000). During this period the country had gone through an uneasy time due to the impact of the second Palestin-




Figure 3 Levels of Democracy in Nine Countries According to Jordanian’s Perception: Mean Score

Source: Centre for Strategic Studies, *Democracy in Jordan* (various surveys, 1993–2001).

ian uprising against Israeli occupation. Some disruptive and sometimes violent demonstrations by groups supporting the uprising encouraged the government to ban all political demonstrations and rallies—including peaceful ones—for fear that a spillover of violent demonstrations across the country would threaten security. Political parties, activists, and civil society organizations, including the Arab Organization of Human Rights, interpreted these measures as a deterioration of public freedoms. Also, on June 16, 2001, the government dissolved the parliament and postponed the general elections, to be held soon but not very soon. On August 15, 2002, elections were postponed until spring 2003. Many observers of Jordanian politics interpret the decision to postpone the election as the regime's fear that opposition (Islamic, pan-Arab, and leftist parties) will win a majority because of the Palestinian and Iraqi crises. The latest data available from Jordan strongly support this fear. Only 17 percent will vote for the Islamic Trend, and only 6.7 percent reported that the Islamic Action Front Party represents their aspirations. The latter figure is down from 70.5 percent in 1996, 66 percent in 1997, 59.5 percent in 1998, 60.6 percent in 1999, 52.4 percent in 2000, 18.5 percent in 2001, and 7 percent in September 2002.

Constructing Reliable and Valid Measures

Reliable and valid measures are crucial for the quality of surveys. *Reliability* of questions means that questions should give consistent measures in comparable situations and points in time. *Validity* means that the answers to the questions asked correspond to the theoretical concept they are designed to measure. Related to the questions of validity and

reliability are issues of quality control (i.e., pilot testing) and good training of interviewers. There are always some questions that simply do not work in the field, due to many reasons: chief among them, in Jordan at least, is the problem of conceptualization.

Scholars who are engaged in survey research usually refer to the vast body of literature produced in the West to operationalize social and political concepts. These concepts, if taken as they are, are often likely to be ambiguous to respondents, although they may be crystal-clear to the researcher. For example, if a respondent is asked to place herself on a political left-right scale, ambiguity is very high. A respondent might perceive it as a religious dichotomy, where left means extreme or radical Islamism; it might mean the lowest level of religiosity according to Islamic values. Again, a respondent might understand left as opposition to the regime, not only the government; this has to do with political socialization under 30-plus years of martial law, where all communist, Marxist, socialist, and pan-Arab parties were outlawed. According to this view, the right would be proregime. To illustrate this point, in the pilot study for the World Values Survey (WVS) conducted in Jordan in 1999, the left-right scale caused problems for respondents. In the WVS survey conducted in September 2001, 62.1 percent of respondents in Jordan reported "don't know" when asked about the left-right scale. Thus, this question cannot be taken for granted, unless operationalized in a different format like measuring support to state versus private-sector ownership of means of production, state versus individual responsibility, and support for well-known political parties or public figures aligned on the left and the right. Using

this method is likely to solve the problem. Data obtained through similar questions on the political left-right scale cannot be directly compared with results in the industrialized Northern Hemisphere.

Conclusion

Public opinion in Jordan is normally measured by survey research. On many occasions focus groups were organized before and after surveys to explore further dimensions. Polls have been utilized by the government to justify its policies. For example, the government argued that around 60 percent of the people do not care about elections in order to justify postponing the elections unconvincingly. The media (largely government-controlled) have always flagged what the government wants. Newspapers also pick poll's figures and results that please the government and publish them as front-page headlines. Other figures, often more important, are ignored or published in back pages. Columnists are more vigorous. They tend to analyze and conceptualize the results. In September 2002, CSS published its survey on democracy, and the government's papers highlighted the failure of political parties because it is the policy of the government to discredit opposition parties, particularly Islamists. If the regime continues to be authoritarian and polls continue to show dissatisfaction with government performance, it is likely that the regime will crack down on externally funded independent polling organizations, perhaps using foreign funding as a pretext (as in Egypt).

The sad reality is that few politicians rely on survey data. Polls are becoming popular but have a long road to catch up with Western Europe. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, international polling organizations conducted

some polls in the Muslim world. It is this kind of research that will improve polling in the Middle East, Jordan included. The World Values Survey also conducted surveys in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Iran, and Algeria during its fourth wave. This may be the first time that these countries have been included in a global comparative survey as comprehensive as the WVS.

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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

Students of public opinion face several challenges in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Similar to other states in post-

Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become more rather than less authoritarian since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Here expressions of public discontent are repressed while, at the same time, shows of popular support for the state are carefully staged by the central leaderships. Despite these challenges, however, public opinion research is possible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In this essay I review both the hurdles to and the methods by which scholars have conducted successful public opinion analysis in these two newly independent Central Asian states.

The Soviet Legacy and Its Effects on Public Opinion

During the Soviet period, public opinion proved an instrument for rather than a measure of state rule in Central Asia. Soviet power, like that of its tsarist predecessor, was at first tepidly received in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Reshaping the attitudes, beliefs, and identities of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, therefore, became a preoccupation of the Moscow leadership. Central Asians were to be remade into Soviets. And this metamorphosis was to be simultaneously achieved and affirmed by state-administered surveys and ballots.

The state—the only actor entrusted to study public opinion during the Soviet period—used surveys, notably the national census, to mold Central Asian identity. Soviet ideology held that identity, like the economy, passed through distinct stages in the march to communism. Just as out of capitalism arose the proletariat, so too central planners believed that out of nationalism would eventually emerge a new, Soviet-minded people. Problematically for Moscow, however, there were no nations in the

Central Asian borderlands. Thus, determined to create nations where there were none, Moscow used the all-union census of 1926 to decree the identities—Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen—by which we know the Central Asian states today. Through the national census, in short, Central Asia's ethnographic patchwork was rationalized to fit neatly into the Soviet state administration.

Much as with the rise of Soviet power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, so too was the collapse of the USSR accompanied by the manipulation of identity and public opinion—albeit with considerably less success. In March 1991, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, along with comrades elsewhere in the USSR, were asked if they were in favor of preserving the Union. The national referendum delivered the desired returns: 94 percent of Kazakhs and 95 percent of Kyrgyz voted yes, they would like to maintain Soviet rule. On the surface it appeared as if Moscow's early efforts to create a Soviet people had been successful; Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion, at least as reported by the state election commissions, was firmly behind the central leadership.

Nevertheless, despite this seeming groundswell of support in Central Asia and across the country (76 percent of all ballots cast were in favor of preserving the Union), the USSR ceased to exist by year's end—a reality that is instructive for those who might seek insight from state-run polls in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan today. With their backers in Moscow now gone, the leaders of newly independent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan turned to the familiar and conducted referenda to provide legitimacy for their personal rule. Nursultan Nazarbaev, the president of Kazakhstan, confirmed his leadership by polling 99 percent of the

popular vote. Askar Akaev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, won his country's election with 95 percent of the vote. Both presidents, still in power today, continue to win elections and public referenda with dizzying majorities. That these ballots, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) states, "fail to comply with OSCE commitments for democratic elections" appears to be of little concern to the Nazarbaev and Akaev leaderships.

*Expressing Public Opinion by
Other Means—Popular Protests*

Denied a voice at the ballot box, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz have repeatedly taken to the streets to express their displeasure with state rule. Although effective in dispelling the state-sponsored myth of universal support, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz have suffered severe costs for their public dissent. Protestors have been beaten, imprisoned, and killed for challenging the policies of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz regimes.

Protests were frequent in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the final years of Soviet rule. In 1990 in the northeastern Kazakh city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, for example, tens of thousands of protestors demanded the closure of a toxic gas-pewing nuclear plant. That same year, in the capital of Kyrgyzstan, protestors gathered in the central square to demand the resignation of First Secretary Absamat Masaliev, a leader whose years of misrule had fanned tensions between the republic's ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

Demonstrations continue in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Today, though, in contrast to the comparatively tolerant atmosphere of the late Soviet period, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz leaderships use coercion and force to dissuade widespread public dissent. In March 2002, Kyrgyz

security forces fired into a crowd of protestors, killing five. And in November 1999, in an effort at preemptive coercion, Kazakh police arrested 22 people who were allegedly fomenting secessionist aspirations among the ethnic Russian population in the north of the country. Given these and multiple other instances of state-led repression, the true extent of public discontent is almost certainly underrepresented by the few Kazakhs and Kyrgyz who do dare to protest authoritarian rule. Though more reflective than elections and referenda, popular protests nevertheless are an imperfect measure of Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion.

*Expressing Public Opinion by
Other Means—Independent Surveys*

Independently conducted surveys, in contrast to elections, referenda, and protests, have been considerably freer from government manipulation. Given this reality, scholars have increasingly turned to survey analysis as a means to study Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion. Survey research in Central Asia, however, does face several region-specific challenges.

Martha Brill Olcott, a scholar of Kazakh politics, notes for example that "growing restrictions on free political discourse" have created an environment of self-censorship. This environment has adversely affected Kazakhstan's independent journalists and has, at times, constrained independent survey researchers as well. Bahvna Dave, a political scientist who studies post-Soviet identity, found "a certain hostility and defensiveness" among subjects who were asked to answer questions relating to Kazakh language proficiency. Even more troubling, political scientist Michele Commercio discovered that certain polling organizations in Kazakhstan were hesitant to

administer her surveys. Her research into Russian minority perceptions of Kazakh ethno-nationalism, one polling agency from the northern city of Ust Kamengorsk explained, was too politically charged and might invite reprisals from the central government.

Commercio eventually did find a company willing to conduct her survey. Moreover, she discovered, as have other scholars of Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion, that survey respondents did not refrain from answering sensitive questions relating to Kazakh and Kyrgyz state rule. Eric McGlinchey (2003) likewise found in his investigation of Kazakh and Kyrgyz regime change that respondents were forthright in their evaluation of politics. Reviewing two 1999 surveys of over 1,000 respondents each, McGlinchey's study shows that over 70 percent of Kazakhs and 50 percent of Kyrgyz report that they are "not satisfied with the governance in their country." These findings stand in stark contrast to state-administered polls and referenda that typically claim returns of near-unanimous public support for Kazakh and Kyrgyz governance.

Assurances of respondent anonymity, combined with what thus far has been government inattention to survey research, have offered scholars and policymakers transparent windows into Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion and the nature of post-Soviet Kazakh and Kyrgyz regime change. Indeed, challenging opaque, state-administered polls, the view that independent survey research provides of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz state is rarely flattering. The World Bank's *Business Environment and Economic Performance* survey of enterprises and households, for example, documents widespread corruption among both Kazakh and Kyrgyz state officials. Polls conducted in 1995, 1996, and

2001 by the USAID contractor, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), find that a majority of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are dissatisfied with both the electoral systems in their country and a media that they perceive to be biased by state control. This government manipulation of elections and the media, the Kazakh Association of Social and Political Scientists (ASiP) observes, has led to pervasive apathy and a sense of powerlessness among voters. Less than one-third of eligible voters, a recent ASiP study finds, participated in Kazakhstan's 1999 parliamentary elections. Moreover, polls commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme and conducted by the Kyrgyz Center for Public Opinion in the run-up to Kyrgyzstan's 2000 parliamentary elections similarly demonstrate growing public apathy and unwillingness to participate in state elections. All these studies, be they commissioned by international development organizations or conducted by individual scholars, present alternative and arguably more realistic pictures of public opinion than the sanguine images proffered by Kazakh and Kyrgyz government pollsters and electoral commissions.

Predicting the Future of Kazakh and Kyrgyz Public Opinion

Problematically, however, if the past is any predictor of the future, this window into Kazakh and Kyrgyz public opinion may soon close. Just as state tolerance for popular protests was short-lived, some within the Kazakh and Kyrgyz polling community fear that so too will government inattention to survey research not last. Indeed, a Kazakh pollster (who, tellingly, requested his name not be printed) noted in an interview for this article that an increasing number of sur-

vey agencies have begun to shift their focus away from political studies and toward less sensitive economic and market analysis. Scholars and policymakers, nevertheless, continue to push forward with their studies of Central Asian public opinion. Central Asia researcher Eric McGlinchey, for example, is beginning an analysis of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik attitudes toward political Islam, and political scientists Pauline Jones-Luong and Kelly McMann are conducting a study of Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek perceptions of public goods and social welfare provision. How the Central Asian governments will receive these and other new public opinion surveys remains to be seen.

Eric McGlinchey

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Mexico

Public opinion research is relatively new to Mexico. Under the soft authoritarian rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for more than 70 years, Mexico has no record of domestically sponsored political polls prior to 1986. In fact, after the landmark publication of *The Civic Culture* by Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba in 1963, comparing Mexican political attitudes and beliefs with those in four developed nations, there was a dearth of research concerning public opinion in Mexico. So while there is some evidence that the PRI conducted internal polls, these data were not made available. As a result, the only publicly available scientific polls were conducted by either private foreign firms or the U.S. government (Camp 1996).

The simultaneous political and economic liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s radically altered the importance of public opinion research in Mexico. Independent pollsters began to demand the right to publish data in exchange for conducting PRI and government-sponsored polls. Closer economic ties with the United States led international news

outlets to begin to sponsor polls in Mexico. Greater political openness and an increasingly independent media also encouraged the growth of domestic public opinion research. This was reinforced by increased political competition, as PRI support eroded and opposition political parties won an increasing number of elections. Furthermore, survey research offered an important potential check on a pervasive impediment to democratization—electoral fraud. Now, after years of political and economic liberalization, domestic media outlets, research institutes, and international actors conduct routine surveys of Mexicans' political preferences. Given the opposition's historic victory in the presidential election of 2000 and the increased competition for political offices at all levels of government, public opinion research is likely to continue to expand rapidly in the future.

Measuring Public Opinion

Research into Mexican public opinion has grown nearly exponentially over the past 20 years. Although no domestically sponsored polls were conducted prior to 1986, the media now routinely present and analyze results from public opinion polls and researchers, both at home and abroad, using recent advances to study topics ranging from presidential approval to support for particular government policies (Harris Berlin 1990). The growth of this form of research is often linked to the successful use of polling prior to the surprising 1988 presidential elections, when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas abandoned the PRI and offered the most serious challenge to the PRI's single-party domination since its founding. Public opinion polls allegedly offered a check on the power of the PRI to engage in electoral fraud, and most were surprisingly accu-

rate in their predictions of a victory for the PRI's Carlos Salinas and the percentages each candidate received. Their predictive power, combined with the apparent ability to check electoral fraud, led to the expansion of polling in future electoral contests (Gamboa 1996).

The increase in the emphasis on public opinion research is most evident in the media. Mexico's leading newspapers, such as *La Jornada*, *Excélsior*, *El Nacional*, and *Reforma*, and the nation's two leading TV news outlets, Televisa and Televisión Azteca, all sponsor, report, and analyze political polls. Although certainly more prevalent during the campaign season, several of these outlets conduct routine polls of public support for elected officials and for government actions. For example, *Reforma* publishes presidential approval data on a quarterly basis, and another recent poll asked whether President Vicente Fox should be investigated for potential campaign contribution violations (Grupo REFORMA 2002).

Despite the growth in public opinion reporting in the Mexican media, it still faces several challenges. First, because the state provided approximately 20–30 percent of advertising revenues and also sponsored many of the polls, questions were raised concerning the independence of the research conducted. Second, many of the early polls reported did not include any information on the methodology used to carry out the poll, undermining the validity of the results. Even seemingly simple methodological issues such as the location of interviews and the proper ordering of questions were concerns. Third, news outlets tended to interpret rather than simply report the data, further undermining the independence of the process. Finally, Mexico's functional literacy rate, combined with the relatively

recent introduction of public opinion polling and the methodological concerns mentioned above, inhibited the utility of polls for most Mexicans (Basáñez 1996; Camp 1996, 2003; Trejo Delarbre 1996). Moves toward more universal reporting standards, combined with widespread use, facilitate understanding, but there is little research on how opinion polls are actually used by the public.

With democratization and the increased emphasis on public opinion, the number of agencies collecting public opinion data has grown extensively. Domestic pollsters can be classified into four groups: private organizations, the media, academics, and government agencies. Private organizations, such as MORI de México and Gallup México, conduct many of the polls reported in the media, although some media outlets, such as Reforma's Grupo REFORMA, conduct their own polling. Government agencies, ranging from executive agencies such as the Technical Advisory to the autonomous Federal Electoral Institute, have all conducted research into particular areas of public opinion. Similarly, academics at the National University's Institute of Social Investigation (Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales) and researchers at the University of Guadalajara conduct routine polls. International actors also collect public opinion data, although much of it is now done using domestic researchers. The *New York Times* and the *Los Angeles Times* conducted pioneering studies in the 1980s and continue to report on Mexican political trends. International foundations such as the Hewlett Foundation have been very supportive, and two international efforts, like the Latinobarometer and the World Values Survey, provide important cross-national and time-series components for researchers.

Despite the recent focus on polling, additional tools are used to gain insight into the public's thinking. Mexico has a long tradition of demonstrations and marches related to important issues of the day. In recent years groups hard hit by Mexico's market-oriented economic policies, especially peasants and laborers, have taken to the streets to protest economic decline. The most extreme examples appeared in the wake of several gubernatorial elections in the early 1990s. Accusations of electoral fraud led to demonstrations in the states of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, and Michoacán and the eventual removal of the victorious PRI candidate in each state, despite exit polls mirroring reported vote shares (Domínguez and McCann 1996). So while polls were hypothesized to be an impediment to electoral fraud, their use was insufficient to overcome accusations of cheating, even where PRI victories appeared genuine.

The Issues That Define and Divide Public Opinion

The rapid growth of public opinion research can be directly linked to political and economic liberalization. Prior to democratization there was little interest in public opinion, because it was thought to have little impact on policy outcomes. Similarly, Mexico's debt crisis and subsequent changes in the government's economic development strategy undermined the PRI's traditional pillars of support—the peasantry and the working class. The rapid expansion of public opinion research was chiefly the result of attempts to study the impacts of these two processes on Mexicans' political and economic beliefs. Consequently, these two areas form the bulk of research regarding public opinion in Mexico.

One area of the democratization literature focuses on the nature of Mexico's political culture. This began with Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*, with the idea that for Mexico to fully democratize, its citizens must hold democratic values. Surveys now support the hypothesis that Mexico's political culture favors democracy, as levels of political interest are higher than in many Western industrialized nations, interpersonal trust is among the highest in Latin America, and support for democracy is quite high, especially in the wake of the election of President Fox (see Table 1). Survey results also indicate that the public no longer prefers a strong leader to the rule of law and that differences based on education and gender have diminished. Furthermore, electoral reforms designed to curtail electoral fraud appear to have increased political efficacy, as polling data indicate a marketed increase in the percentage of Mexicans reporting that their votes will be respected (Camp 2003; Domínguez and McCann 1995, 1996; Kenney 2001; Klesner 2001; Latinobarómetro various years). Taken together, these surveys indicate a culture ready to support the democratic changes of recent years.

Mexico's democratization is also evident in the trends toward greater identifi-

cation with major political parties. Support for the PRI has remained at about 30 percent of the electorate throughout the 1990s, while support for the center-right National Action Party (PAN) has more than quintupled, from 6 percent in 1991 to 32 percent in 2000. Similarly, the leftist Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) increased its share of partisan identifiers from 6 percent to 10 percent. Furthermore, the distribution of partisan loyalty largely corresponds with expectations. The PAN's center-right policy positions tend to attract wealthier, more educated, more urban supporters. PAN also draws support from another traditional ally of conservative causes—women (note how this relationship does not hold in the United States). The PRI continues to draw support from its traditional supporters—poorer, less educated, and more rural Mexicans. After stealing many of the PRI's traditional allies in the 1988 campaign, the PRD lost many of these supporters, garnering the most support in Mexico City and in rural southern Mexico. Finally, exit polls indicate that the PAN did quite well with younger Mexican voters in the 2000 elections (Camp 2003). If they are able to capitalize upon this support, demographics favor their continued ascendancy in Mexican politics.

Table 1 Mexican Political Culture

<i>Political Interest</i>	1988	1991		1996	1997	1998	1999–2000	2002
Great	16	12	Interpersonal Trust	21	43	40	34	—
Some	23	21						
Little	32	34	Support for Democracy	53	52	51	45	63
None	29	33						

Sources: IMOP S.A. (Gallup) polls, May 1988 and July 1991, as reported in Domínguez and McCann 1996; Latinobarómetro press releases, various years.

Mexico's democratization coincided with a sea change in economic development strategy. The previous strategy, import substitution industrialization, led to heavy state involvement in the economy through protectionist barriers for domestic enterprises and direct government ownership of the means of production. This state-centric development model became untenable in the wake of the debt crisis, and the Mexican government adopted market-oriented policies liberalizing trade, supporting international finance, and privatizing many state-owned industries. Support for economic liberalization varies substantially in several key respects. First, support for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been positive. Polls conducted in 1995 and 1999 showed a large plurality of Mexicans held favorable opinions regarding the countries' commitment to the agreement. Similarly, a recent Latinobarómetro press release (2002) shows that Mexicans hold a slightly more positive opinion of the International Monetary Fund than the regional average. However, the privatization of state-owned enterprises has declined in recent years, from a majority favorable response in 1998 to an over-

whelmingly negative evaluation by 2002 (see Table 2). So, while Mexicans appear supportive of some aspects of market-oriented reforms, there is also evidence that support varies by area of reform.

The most intriguing recent research on public opinion in Mexico examines the intersection of political and economic liberalization. Numerous studies find that PRI identifiers were significantly more likely to also support the government's economic reform programs (Domínguez and McCann 1995, 1996; Kaufman and Zuckermann 1998). Additionally, presidential approval ratings during the late 1980s and 1990s tracked the country's economic roller-coaster ride. For example, support for market-oriented policies declined from more than 50 percent to 31 percent in the wake of the economic downturn in late 1994 and 1995 (Buendía Laredo 2001). Future research in this vein is likely given that Mexico's democratization offers voters the opportunity to choose a greater range of economic policies.

The Growing Importance of Public Opinion Research

More democratic elections encourage increased emphasis on political polling in

Table 2 Support for Economic Liberalization

<i>Area of Reform</i>	1995	1998	1999–2000	2002
NAFTA	48	—	47	—
IMF	—	—	—	5.66/10
Privatization	—	61	44	28

Sources: Latinobarómetro press releases, 1995, 2000, 2002. Reporting for privatization shifts from those who disagree and strongly disagree that privatization has been beneficial in 1998 and 1999–2000 to those who agree or strongly agree, but those who do not answer or do not know are not reported. Covarrubias y Asociados, S.C., July 1999, as reported in Piekarewicz Sigal, Reyes Heróles, and Palomo 2000.

the campaigns. Surveys demonstrate how campaign events affect candidate support. For example, the PAN candidate's superior performance in the 1994 presidential debate led to a significant boost in the polls (Trejo Delarbre 1996). Although electoral reforms greatly inhibit fraud, the use of scientific polling data still provides a check on vote tampering. If results vary substantially from polls, fraud is the likely source. Early controversies regarding the independence and methodology of public opinion polling have been largely curtailed, as more rigorous standards become the norm (at least in the media). There is one continuing impediment to continued growth in public opinion research in Mexico: functional illiteracy. Newspapers reach a relatively small percentage of Mexican voters, so television tends to be where most discussions of polling data occur (Camp 2003). Even here many voters lack the experience and education to interpret results. This inhibits the utility of polling data for many Mexican voters.

Although polls affect and are affected by campaigns, further examination of the interaction of politicians' decisions and public opinion studies is needed. Several polls demonstrate that Carlos Salinas's poverty relief program, *Solidaridad*, increased support for the PRI among recipients (Moreno 1996). Support for the PRI is linked to support for market-oriented reforms, but other relationships surely exist between government policy and public attitudes. For example, a recent survey conducted by the Grupo REFORMA (2002) shows that a majority of Mexicans favor continued investigation into allegations of illegal fundraising by the Fox campaign, despite a ruling ending the investigation. This may provide opposition parties legitimacy in

their continued calls for an investigation. What is unclear is whether politicians consult polls to craft campaign strategies, although there is indirect evidence that this occurs.

The use of public opinion data, especially polling and participation in demonstrations, receives significant recognition in the media. The independence of the media is often called into question, so early methodological concerns focused on whether electoral polls tended to favor PRI candidates. Years of experience and a multitude of polling agencies have allayed many of these fears. Although preelectoral polls receive much of the literature's attention, newspapers such as *El Nacional* track approval ratings for leading politicians, particularly the president, on a routine basis. Government control of leading news outlets still affected voter choice as late as 1997, as voters who watched more balanced TV coverage were more likely to vote for the opposition (Lawson 1999). With the end of the PRI's monopoly on power, future coverage is likely to be more balanced, reinforcing opposition gains.

Conclusion

With greater democratization the emphasis on public opinion research is only likely to grow. Political campaigns and public policy are more likely to be tailored to Mexican attitudes and beliefs, and voters' changing views of policies and politicians can now be tracked over time. Polls have helped curb electoral fraud, and increasingly rigorous methods have given polls greater legitimacy. Furthermore, greater standardization and an emphasis on readability are making polls more useful for an increasingly sophisticated electorate. Finally, the increase in public opinion research, particularly the

collection of time-series data, provides researchers with the opportunity to answer questions involving changes in public opinion due to alterations in the political and economic landscape. In sum, there appears to be a bright future for public opinion research in Mexico.

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The Middle East

Public opinion in the Middle East traditionally has been expressed through the lens of academics, journalists, political activists, experts, and other pundits. Polling and survey research are limited in scope, depth, and breadth for a variety of reasons. This primarily is associated with the feasibility of conducting polls or public opinion surveys that meet rigorous scientific and professional standards. Often the social, economic, and political contexts also undermine the integrity of the process.

The most vocal expressions of public opinion are in the streets—in demonstrations or riots. At other times, public opinion is gauged by listening to community leaders and respected individuals from various groups in society. The region has yet to develop a tradition of public opinion surveys.

Most public opinion surveys in the region tend to be carried out by institutions of higher education, affiliated research centers, or other associated organizations. We have seen an emergence of independent research organizations, both for-profit and not-for-profit, that have started to branch out into this field. As yet, this is a very young and nascent phenomenon in the region.

Challenges to Surveying Public Opinion

Some of the obstacles that hinder the systematic study of individuals' attitudes through survey data pertain to the application of survey methods. Problems and challenges to survey data collection often bring into question the reliability and validity of polls. However, the emerging trend has been in training of research professionals and the development of re-

search strategies that would allow them to address these challenges.

Problems with conducting public opinion research in the Middle East relate to issues of methodology and techniques of public opinion surveys:

1. Difficulty with sampling: the selection of a number of individuals who are considered representative of the population being studied.
2. Lack or limited number of adequately trained local researchers.
3. Limited financial support nationally and internationally.
4. Limited dissemination of the data and results from surveys.
5. Lack or limited ability and interest of the media to report on results of public opinion polls.

The primary issue is the limited ability to construct representative samples that will render data appropriate for rigorous analytic procedures. The difficulty of drawing a representative sample has led many pollsters to use college campuses to conduct their surveys. Most surveys adopt the use of convenience sampling. In most societies in the regions, availability and access to public databases, such as electoral registries that could be used to draw a random sample that would be representative of the total population, present major difficulties to researchers and pollsters.

Other methodological issues impact the ability to collect and analyze data on individuals' views. Researchers have to consider and be aware of ethical issues such as the impact of the researchers' values on the content and approach used in the field. This applies equally to local,

national, and foreign researchers. One of the more critical issues is securing the informed consent of survey participants. Respondents must be familiar with the purpose of the survey, who is carrying it out, and why and how the data will be used, so that they can make decisions about participating. The confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents must be respected if individuals are invited to freely express opinions about any of the issues included in the survey. This is particularly applicable in sociopolitical contexts that do not encourage dissent.

Researchers have to address obstacles to public opinion research that may be created by the government's concern about dissenting opinions and political opposition. This may have a dual impact on surveying opinions. On the one hand, the government may be reluctant to allow expression of opinions and would actively limit such research in the first place. On the other hand, individuals may be wary of repercussions if they speak freely and openly about contentious issues. This has even more critical implications if they do not feel confident that researchers will adequately protect their anonymity. In addition, participants often are not familiar with surveys, which is a relatively new phenomenon in the region, and are thus hesitant to share their views, particularly on sensitive issues.

Publications on Public Opinion

Most of the data and results of public opinion surveys are discussed in academic journals, conferences, seminars, and workshops. Most of the published results are found in conference proceedings, working papers, and unpublished manuscripts. Sharing experiences with survey methodology and analysis of

results is critical for the development of thorough polling methodology, as well as local expertise among practitioners and academics. However, there continues to be a gap between this selected audience and potential consumers of the results such as policymakers, decisionmakers, and the general public.

Websites of research centers are increasingly becoming the channels through which data and results of surveys are being made available to a wider audience (at least those who use the Internet). Reports published by centers that conduct the polls are published in periodicals such as *Middle East Policy*, *Israel Journal*, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, and *Middle East Focus*.

Access to survey data is limited, and while many data sources might already exist, they are not widely disseminated. There is a dearth of listings and directories of databases that students of public opinion can access to find out what individual researchers and institutions have produced. Although access to these resources is limited, many of the emerging think tanks and independent research organizations are starting to compile such information.

Examples of Public Opinion

Research in the Region

There has been a marked increase in the number, scope, and depth of public opinion surveys in the region. For example, public opinion surveys were conducted in Morocco and Algeria as part of a cross-national survey research project sponsored by the American Institute for Maghrib Studies, carried out in collaboration with social scientists at the University Mohammed V in Rabat, the University of Oran, and the University of Tunis (Tessler

2000). These data were collected through interviews with a representative sample of adults over the age of 18 in Rabat, the Moroccan capital. The interviews were conducted by female students enrolled in the master's program in sociology at Mohammed V University. These women received training and were also guided by an interviewer's manual that was prepared specifically for this project. Fieldwork was carried out from December 26, 1995, to January 15, 1996. Only two households refused to participate in the survey.

The 1990s ushered in a growing movement in public opinion survey research, primarily in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine as well as Morocco. Since the early 1990s, the Center for Strategic Studies in Jordan has conducted several surveys every year. It has conducted a series of polls on democracy in Jordan, the performance of the government of various prime ministers in Jordan, Jordanian-Palestinian relations, and Jordanian-Israeli negotiations.

In Israel and Palestine, two research centers focus on public opinion polls. The Center for Palestinian Research and Studies in Ramallah and the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center in Jerusalem have specialized in public opinion surveys covering a wide variety of topics on a regular basis during the course of the year. These centers, though new, have contributed significantly to both the methodology and content of public opinion surveys. Some of the topics included in their surveys are Jordanian-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, the democratization process, and women's perceptions of their role in public life. Politicians, economists, and the public at large have used these survey findings.

The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research is an independent, non-

profit institution that has focused on issues of direct concern to the Palestinian population, particularly domestic politics and government. It conducts several public opinion surveys every year on current social, economic, and political issues in Palestinian society. Since the mid-1990s, it has conducted more than 75 public opinion polls on a variety of issues. It has also conducted exit polls. The center has widely disseminated the results of its surveys on both the local and international arenas. Four public opinion surveys are conducted on an annual basis. These polls focus on issues of governance, reform, government performance, corruption, and political affiliation, as well as the peace process and relations with Israel.

For example, during 2000 and 2001, the center conducted multiple surveys on the Camp David Summit, the Mitchell Report, Palestinian views on the cease-fire, and peace negotiations, as well as attacks against civilians. It has also conducted surveys on Palestinian elections, participation of women, unemployment, the Palestinian Authority, and relations with Jordan. Since 1995, the center has also conducted joint public opinion surveys of the Israeli and Palestinian populations. In cooperation with the BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, the center has conducted a public opinion poll among Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1993, the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center also started conducting public opinion polls in Gaza and the West Bank.

Several cross-national public opinion surveys have been conducted over the last few years. For example, a study of attitudes toward international conflict was carried out in four Middle East soci-

eties: Israel, Egypt, Palestine, and Kuwait. The purpose of the study was to investigate the relationship among gender, feminism, and attitudes toward war and peace (Tessler and Warriner 1997). The data collected for each society were from a sample of urban adults. Research assistants and other intermediaries and fieldworkers conducted interviews. In Israel, they interviewed only urban Jewish adults; in Egypt the non-Muslim population was not included in the sample; in Kuwait only adult Muslim citizens were interviewed; and in the West Bank, respondents were based on probability sampling.

Public opinion surveys in Israel are carried out by a number of organizations such as Bar Ilan University, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, and the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion. Collaborative efforts are sometimes undertaken by more than one organization, such as the survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Research Studies and the Tami Steinmetz Center. In 1999, they conducted an opinion poll, using the same questions, with Israeli and Palestinian populations.

In 2002, Zogby International (a polling firm based in Washington, D.C.) and Abu Dhabi TV conducted an opinion survey in five Arab countries (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Egypt). They asked the same questions on regional cooperation, the Palestinian issue, and views on personal economic situations and future prospects. Data collection was carried out by face-to-face interviews. This method is the most prevalent method of conducting opinion polls in the region, except in Israel, where telephone interviewing may be used more often. The survey data were

released to the press (see Inter Press Service, October 9, 2002).

Several countries from the Middle East were included in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey that was conducted during 2002 in 44 nations to assess how the publics of the world view their lives, their nation, the world, and the United States. Countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt were included in this survey.

Use and Dissemination of Survey Data from the Middle East

Survey data collected in Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt, the West Bank, and Gaza are used to examine the relationship between gender and attitudes toward international conflicts. Researchers (Tessler and Nachtwey 1999; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999) used nine public opinion data sets that were collected over a nine-year period (1988–1996). Most of these surveys were conducted under the auspices of local universities such as Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Emirates Center for Strategic Study and Research, Palestinian Center of Research Studies, and the Market Research Organization of Amman. The data were primarily collected through face-to-face interviews carried out by research assistants in each country. Yet the data collected in these surveys are not representative of the general population, as they are limited to urban areas in certain countries, or Muslims in others (Tessler and Warriner 1997).

Conclusion

Public opinion surveys in the Middle East are a relatively young venture fraught with methodological and political challenges. More rigorous systematic study of public opinion in the region is

still necessary to provide a deeper understanding of the multitude of perspectives and views held by the different populations in the area. We need to develop original and innovative approaches to the study of public opinion to address the methodological, social, and political constraints existing throughout the region.

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The Netherlands

The way public opinion is thought about, who measures it, and how frequently depend upon the political institutions of a given country. Sources of power and the scope of authority in political institutions shape what the country's leaders need to know about public opinion and consequently how public opinion is measured.

The multiplicity and prominence of surveys in the United States, for example, are an artifact of modern democracy and the separation of powers. Candidate-centered electoral campaigns mandate that serious contenders for national office conduct their own polls. Between elections, the media track the popularity of leaders on a weekly or even daily basis. A parliamentary system like that of the Netherlands creates different incentives. There, the daily tracking of executive popularity is of less political relevance and so occurs with less frequency. Surveys are more likely to track public opinion on major issues than on political leaders.

The influence of political institutions on the measurement of public opinion in the Netherlands is suggested by the sea change that accompanied a major shift in political practice approximately 35 years ago. In this entry, I will show that the shift in the Netherlands from a highly structured consociational democracy to a more pluralistic and competitive political system led to a shift in who measures public opinion, how often, with what focus, and with what political consequences.

Public Opinion and the Dutch

Consociational Democracy (1945–1966)
Consociational democracy is a set of political practices sometimes found in countries where social divisions are highly structured. In the case of the Netherlands, the development of parliamentary democracy around the turn of the twentieth century occurred at a time when religious and social class identities were very powerful in the population. Being Catholic, Calvinist, or secular in belief, and having a middle-class or working-class background, defined one's social and political identity and determined one's views on political issues.

These religious and social groups came to be known as the pillars of Dutch society. The pillars developed during three waves of social and political mobilization in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. The Calvinist pillar mobilized first as a means of revitalizing its tradition of doctrinal strictness and religious fervor, as well as to restore the central role of Protestant belief in the nation's governance. The Calvinist pillar took the form of a linked series of mass-membership organizations, including trade unions, employers' associations, and other professional groups, leisure clubs, health insurance collectives, and so forth, all of which had Calvinist identity and church membership at their core. Catholic mobilization followed in a more defensive vein, drawing on a history of discrimination to persuade Catholics of the necessity of retreating to a collectively organized isolation. Socialist mobilization of the working class also took the pillar form, which by the early part of the twentieth century was the only means of stemming the loss of working-class loy-

alty to the two religious pillars. As Arend Lijphart (1975, p. 1) put it, "Each group has its own ideology and its own political organizations: political parties, labor unions, employers' associations, farmers' groups, newspapers, radio and television organizations, and schools—from kindergarten to university."

The societal organizations that made up the pillars built up a close link between pillar loyalty and support for political parties that represented their values. It was not uncommon for the faithful to be reminded from the pulpit of their obligation to vote for the "correct" party, and these reminders were particularly forceful in Catholic churches across the country. Herman Bakvis (1981, p. 81) notes that Catholic party memberships "were sold on a door-to-door basis or in blitzes in shopping areas. They were marketed much like other Catholic items, for example, calendars for missionary work."

Maintenance of the Dutch system of pillars was made easier by its electoral system, which encouraged fragmentation and narrow specialization among political parties. The best way to understand this is to contrast the Dutch proportional representation system with a majoritarian electoral system such as that used in the United States. Majoritarian and first-past-the-post electoral systems (such as single-member districts) encourage the formation of broad political coalitions. Political parties in such systems seek the support of the median voter in the electorate. Parties must be responsive to broad currents in public opinion.

In the Dutch system of proportional representation, by contrast, parliamentary representation can be won by parties that gain as little as two-thirds of 1 percent of the national vote. A political

party can achieve success without winning anywhere near a majority of the votes; it is sufficient to establish a much smaller following based on a much narrower segment of public opinion.

Faced with strong pillar loyalties among the public, each major Dutch party sought to retain the support of its own pillar voters without competing for the votes of other groups. The Dutch party system was for most of the twentieth century structured by four political currents: Protestant, Catholic, socialist, and liberal (secular middle class). These four currents spawned five major parties, including two parties representing different strands of Calvinist political thought and one party for each of the other three ideological traditions. Each of these parties took as its role the representation of its own separate and highly organized segment of society. Joseph Houska (1985) has written of the contrast between “hunter-gatherer” parties that move across the landscape seeking voters and “cultivator” parties that stake out a portion of the electorate and tailor their appeals exclusively to that group. Dutch parties in the era of pillars were quintessential cultivator parties, which had neither the interest nor the capability to raid rival pillars and mobilize their voters. Non-Catholics were not even allowed to join the Catholic People’s Party (KVP) prior to World War II—a truly unusual restriction for a political party in a competitive democracy.

In this highly specialized party system, public opinion did not need to be measured with any consistency, and all forms of contact between politicians and voters were limited. As late as the 1970s, members of the Dutch parliament (the Second Chamber) rarely contacted voters, either during campaigns or between them. A

survey of voters in 1956 showed that 65 percent preferred that candidates for office not contact voters during campaigns.

Nor did citizens need the kind of political information that comes from daily examination of the media or from intensive electoral campaigns. National surveys conducted from the 1950s to early 1970s showed a population with strikingly low levels of political interest and information (Andeweg 1993, p. 77). And yet turnout in elections was startlingly high, with more than 90 percent of the electorate voting on Election Day. Citizens were casting a vote based on their social identity; party support was a fixed choice, just as one’s religion and class identity were. Party strengths varied only slightly between elections. The fastest growing party of the interwar period was the Labor Party (SDAP), which grew from 20 to 24 seats, and swings of 4–5 percent led to talk of landslide victories and disastrous defeats. Even the enfranchisement of women in 1919 did not change this system; it simply extended it to the entire adult population. Elections had almost the character of a census of the population.

Public opinion, at least in the sense of a continuous tracking of popular views on issues of the day, is not important to politicians under these circumstances. There is little need to measure that which does not vary. One might even say that public opinion does not exist in such a setting. Instead of one public in the Netherlands, there were four: Catholic, Calvinist, socialist, and liberal. Members of each group read their separate newspapers, listened to their separate radio broadcasts, and—to a lesser extent during the first decade or so of television—watched their separate TV programs. The

development of parallel media channels simply reinforced the primacy of pillar identity in creating distinctive world-views among the different groups within Dutch society. Consociational democracy, then, represented the triumph of social structure over public opinion.

With society highly segregated into different groups, and with the members of each group unwaveringly loyal to the political views and organizations of that group, what did political leaders need to know about public opinion? For leaders of pillar-affiliated parties, it was important to have a good sense of the state of public opinion within their own pillar and particularly to know the extent to which they were free to formulate issue positions without straining pillar loyalties. The penalty for failing to pay sufficient attention to the sensibilities of members of the pillar would be to face a political challenge within the pillar. The major Protestant and Catholic parties suffered defections whenever dialogue between them seemed to compromise the core pillar principle of separation. The Roman Catholic Party of the Netherlands (RKPN), for example, was formed in 1972 in opposition to the growing dialogue between the Catholic KVP and leaders of the two Protestant parties, as well as concern that the KVP was softening its opposition to abortion. In the party's bid to strengthen its credentials among the Catholic pillar, the platform adopted by this challenging party in 1972 was identical to the platform of the KVP from the early 1950s.

The best way to prevent such defections, or to limit damage when they occur, is to remain in close contact with church leaders and with the leadership of other pillar organizations. This requirement led to the development of a dense

network of ties among, for example, Protestant leaders in politics, in the church, and in social and economic organizations. Research institutes set up by each party would hold symposia to explore such topics as the Catholic stance on the welfare state. It did not lead to an intense preoccupation with public opinion, since the leaders of each organization could be counted on to deliver their members.

As a consequence, the measurement of Dutch public opinion was exceedingly rare before the mid-1960s. The media were unlikely to sponsor such surveys because media outlets were themselves allied with one or another pillar. Besides, in a parliamentary system in which voters tended overwhelmingly to remain loyal to their pillars, the question "What does the public think?" was relevant on any given issue. The appropriate questions were instead: "What is the social democratic position?" and "What is the Dutch Reformed (Calvinist) position?" and so forth. Those questions were best answered by asking the leaders of pillar organizations rather than by conducting a survey.

The Dutch academy did undertake a national survey in 1956, in conjunction with the parliamentary election that year. But that effort did not become part of a sustained program of election studies funded by the Dutch national science foundation until the early 1970s. The Nederlands Instituut voor Publieke Opinie en het Marktonderzoek (NIPO), a charter member of the Gallup International Association, was founded in 1945 as a commercial enterprise to carry out market research and to examine public opinion on political and economic questions. As with its affiliated organizations in other countries, occasional surveys on

topics of public interest were published as a kind of loss leader to generate interest in the business of market research. Every 25 years these surveys are compiled into an interesting portrait of the evolution of Dutch public opinion on a variety of subjects (NIPO 1970; NIPO 1995). Despite these surveys, however, there was in the Netherlands no tradition of regular publication of tracking polls on the popularity of political leaders or on hot political issues. The consociational democracy system rested on organizations rather than on individuals, and public opinion was subsumed under pillar solidarity.

The Advent of Competitive Democracy

The conception and measurement of public opinion during the era of consociational democracy were predicated on the assumption that each citizen thought along the lines prescribed by her pillar identity. As long as the Dutch electorate remained loyal to the pillar system, and as long as parties limited themselves to maintaining the support of their own pillar clientele, there was no need to measure public opinion. The idea of a national public opinion, one that might fluctuate in response to events or new issues, did not make sense in that context.

In the late 1960s, though, the Dutch public began to change, and the idea of public opinion started to come into its own. The Dutch began to show the effects of three basic shifts in orientation that occurred more or less at the same time: secularization, deconfessionalization, and the decline of class conflict. Secularization meant that a declining proportion of the Dutch public continued to think of themselves as religious, a shift that led to upheaval particularly in the Catholic and Calvinist pillars.

Deconfessionalization meant that even those Dutch people who remained devout began to question the connection between their religious beliefs and their political views. Hanspeter Kriesi (1993, p. 65) has showed that by the end of the 1980s, two-thirds of the Dutch population wanted to live independently of church rules, a view that would have been rare one generation earlier. Finally, the spread of prosperity meant that the element of class conflict in the socialist versus liberal distinction came to seem dated. Contemporary economic issues were defined less by class conflict than by seeking ways of encouraging class collaboration to sustain prosperity in the trade-dependent Dutch economy.

Secularization and the decline of class conflict occurred throughout Europe as the first postwar generation came of age. Because of the centrality of religion and class to every part of social and political life in the Netherlands, though, these changes called into question the very basis of the political system. What had been a political culture of quiescence became an extraordinarily active one in the late 1960s, with a burst of demonstrations against housing shortages, against the marriage of the crown princess to a German, against the Vietnam War, and for a more active public involvement in politics. New political parties were founded that were completely independent of the Dutch pillars, and they further directed people's attention to issues that had tended to be neglected in a political system oriented to the defense of religious and class interests. Social change and the decline of the pillars created a newly competitive environment for Dutch parties. One researcher (Van den Berg 1981) estimates that the floating vote grew during the 1970s from 10 per-

cent of the electorate to 30 percent, a level that turned the Dutch cultivator parties into hunter-gatherers. Elections in the Netherlands became contests between party leaders touting distinctive issue packages. That transformation required parties to develop much more sensitive readings of public opinion.

The most significant of the new political issues was the condition of Dutch democracy itself. Led by a new political party, Democrats '66 (D66), many Dutch citizens began to question whether the consociational democracy was truly democratic. D66 criticized the dominance of the pillar mentality, which put a premium on group loyalty and stifled consideration of issues that cut across the divisions of religion and class. D66 proposed a series of constitutional reforms that would lead to a more direct translation of public opinion into policymaking, including establishment of a referendum process and having direct elections for mayors and for prime ministers. Each of the proposals for constitutional reform championed by D66 enjoyed at least 60 percent support among the public at one time or another in the first 10 years of the party's existence (Andeweg 1989, p. 54). Equally significant is the fact that Dutch public opinion was now being measured on such issues—and that it counted.

None of the major constitutional changes proposed by D66 to open up the political system were enacted. Experience showed, however, that it was not necessary to alter political institutions in order to change the role of public opinion in governance. As the Good Witch Glinda said to Dorothy after the Wizard of Oz sailed off without her in his balloon, "You could have gone home anytime you wanted to—you only had to say so." The Dutch public always had the

power to make their opinions count—they simply had to end their habit of voting faithfully along the lines of religion and class. The readiness of many Dutch voters to switch their votes between elections forced a responsiveness to public opinion that no constitutional reform by itself could have produced.

The increased relevance of Dutch public opinion for political life can be seen in Figure 1, on trends in the basis of voting choice. In the traditional Dutch system, elections were the opportunity to affirm one's religious and class identity. This is shown in the large number of citizens who stated in 1967 that their votes were cast on the basis of religion or class interests. (Note that in 1967 the traditional Dutch system had already begun to change, so that the trend line in Figure 1 understates the degree to which the traditional system was structured on class and religious lines.) By the end of the century, barely one-fifth of the Dutch electorate mentioned class or religion as the primary reason for voting choice. The performance of the governing coalition, or of specific party leaders, was far more often mentioned as key to making a voting decision. If we examine these trends by generational cohort, it becomes clear that younger voters are especially likely to cast their ballots based on the performance, issues, and personalities of the current electoral campaign, rather than based on religious or class identities (Rochon 1999, pp. 82–93). For the new Dutch voter, governmental performance on the economy, on the preservation of social welfare benefits, on the environment, and on other issues is now the determinant of the vote. Political leaders can no longer assume the support of a pillar constituency defined by religion and class.




Figure 1 Trends in First Reason Given for Vote Choice

This evolution in the relevance of public opinion for the success of Dutch leaders and parties has had a dramatic impact on the measurement of public opinion. A generation ago, it was considered to be bad form to bring an election campaign to the Dutch voter. Today each party has campaign teams, electoral slogans that have been tested in focus groups, and elaborate advertising campaigns. Newspapers and broadcast associations conduct surveys on a regular basis to track the popularity of the prime minister and of the governing coalition.

Politics has also become more personalized, and party leaders must watch their own poll numbers. Voter support for political parties now tracks closely with

the popularity of party leaders. From 1959 to 1971 no minister or president was also a party leader; instead, party leadership and governmental leadership were effectively separated. Party leaders sometimes declined to become prime ministers, judging their influence to be greater as leader of a parliamentary party. Modern electoral campaigns are, in contrast, contests among party leaders who compete as potential prime ministers, thus personalizing party choice to an unprecedented degree. Development of the media-centered campaign—including televised debates between the major party leaders—also contributes to the growing prominence of the party leader as articulator of the party's campaign themes.

Voters have responded as never before to the appeals of particular leaders. These range from the youthful and Kennedy-like Hans Wiegel of the Liberal Party in 1982; to the sober, hardworking, and slightly ruffled Christian Democrat Ruud Lubbers in 1986 and 1989; to the fatherly, moderate, inclusive Labor Party leader Wim Kok in the 1990s. Each of these leaders led his party to unprecedented electoral success by attracting support outside of the traditional constituency. The Liberals fell back after Wiegel, the Christian Democrats lost almost half of their support in the two elections after the retirement of Lubbers, and the Labor Party lost its hold on governmental power when Kok retired.

Just as increased electoral competition led to a new preoccupation with public opinion, so did the development of an extensive welfare state. The Social and Cultural Planning (SCP) Bureau was charged in the 1970s with carrying out research on health, housing, work, and leisure trends among the Dutch public as a means of securing the provision of appropriate social services. The surveys carried out by the SCP are to this day among the most comprehensive examinations available of public opinion on such issues as satisfaction with life, as well as on patterns of consumption and behavior.

Conclusion

The history of conceptualization and measurement of public opinion in the Netherlands suggests the importance of political institutions and party competition. In the Dutch system of consociational democracy, public opinion on issues of the day was not a major factor in governance, and so it did not tend to be measured. Policies were made by negotiations among leaders of interest

groups, and it was safe to assume public support for policies advocated by the pillar leadership.

The increased independence of the Dutch public beginning in the late 1960s brought with it a heightened relevance of public opinion. As contemporary issues and governmental performance became far more important to voting choice, party leaders began to pay more attention to public opinion. The relevance of the pillars for voting decisions declined precipitously, and political parties began to range more widely for electoral support. In addition, national surveys are regularly sponsored by governmental agencies as they seek to understand the social services needs of the Dutch public.

Public opinion, then, is not a single, fixed entity. The views of the general public, as embodied in the median voter, will have greater or lesser relevance depending on the electoral system and the extent of party competition. Public opinion on contemporary issues matters only when those issues are important in how people assess the current political landscape. Similarly, it is worth tracking public perceptions of party leaders only to the extent that assessments of those leaders are relevant to popular opinion on issues and on party support. *Whose* opinions are measured, and opinions about *what*, depend on institutional and cultural context.

Note

Dutch national election surveys have been conducted in 1956, 1967, and in each of the 10 elections held since 1970 (most recently in 2003). A panel study was conducted in 1970, 1972, and 1973.

Beginning in 1970, NIPO has done surveys at five-year intervals with the sponsorship of the Social and Cultural Planning Bureau of the Ministry of Welfare,

Health, and Culture. These have been done for the study of cultural change and public needs in terms of social services. NIPO also conducts political and market surveys on a regular basis. See www.nipo.nl.

The Steinmetz Archive is a repository for all national surveys and many smaller-scale surveys of specialized populations or local areas. See www.niwi.knaw.nl.

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New Zealand

Regular publication of public opinion polls came late in New Zealand. Since 1971, as in most other long-established democracies, public opinion polls have become the main means by which commentators and politicians estimate public opinion.

Prior to the polling era in New Zealand, elections provided the most reliable source of information about public preferences. Politicians took seriously the doctrine of the mandate whereby a party is expected to carry out public commitments made while campaigning for office (for discussion of this doctrine as understood and applied in New Zealand, see Mulgan 1978). Between elections, politicians relied on discussions with their constituents. In a small society, with representation based on single-member districts, members of Parliament prepared to listen could get a good qualitative sense of public opinion. One MP found "the public bar as good a checkpoint as any," in combination with discussion with key members of his party organization and local businesspeople (Tizard 1966, p. 165). There is early survey evi-

dence indicating that New Zealanders were much more confident in the ability of politicians to effectively represent their opinions in the prepoll era than in more recent times (Vowles 1998, p. 106).

*Development of
Polling in New Zealand*

Small-scale academic surveys were the first to ask questions about public opinion. There was a minor start in 1949 and a more substantial beginning in the late 1950s (Bean 1986). The Victoria University 1963 Election Study, while not national, did sample from areas representative of urban and provincial New Zealand. Much of its data survives at the individual level and can be obtained from the Australian Social Science Data Archive at the Australian National University in Canberra. The first nationally sampled commercial polls for which frequency data are currently available were conducted in 1969 and began publication in the country's major newspaper in 1971 (Murphy 1980). In 1975 the Heylen Research Centre conducted a major post-election study, together with a leading political scientist (Chapman 1999). In the late 1970s, the momentum increased, with regular polling by two organizations, the National Research Bureau for the country's largest newspaper, the *New Zealand Herald*, and the Heylen Research Centre for the country's most widely watched TV news program, beginning in January 1978.

Political scientists continued to conduct polls, usually small-scale, many in collaboration with newspapers in the latter stages of election campaigns (for details see Bean, Levine, and Roberts 1991; Aimer and McAllister 1992). An exception was a national postal survey in 1975 with useful opinion data (Levine and

Robinson 1976). A 1981 election study sampled from roughly the same areas as the 1963 Victoria study, allowing some early assessment of opinion change over time (Bean 1984). Individual-level data are available in Canberra for both the 1975 and 1981 surveys. Heylen mounted post-election surveys in 1978 and 1981, although they were not as comprehensive as in 1975 (Penniman 1980; Levine and McRobie 2002). Political scientists collaborated with a weekly business paper for a postelection survey in 1987 (James 1988).

The media-commissioned polls normally asked voting intentions, identified the most important political issues, estimated respondents' confidence in the economy over the next year, and asked a range of questions about political leaders, the format of which did not stabilize until 1979, when "preferred prime minister" began to be asked consistently. By the late 1970s, polls were monthly, except for the summer period. Single questions on particular current issues were also frequent.

Polling changed New Zealand politics in profound ways, although over the same period that television began to reshape political communication, making it hard to separate the effects. The most obvious change was a focus on political leadership also fostered by television. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the gap between support for Labour opposition leader Bill Rowling and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was a major focus of media commentary. Muldoon's advantage as an incumbent was not much appreciated, and in retrospect Rowling's polling as preferred prime minister compared well with more recent opposition leaders: he was widely perceived as a weak and ineffective leader despite other evidence to the contrary.

Polling in Contemporary New Zealand

The number of commercial polling organizations increased in the 1990s, although the two pioneers left the field. The National Research Bureau ceased political polling in 1992, and the Heylen Research Centre went out of business in 1993. However, Colmar-Brunton Research took over the Television One contract in 1994, TV3 commissioned CM Research (recently renamed NFO), and in 1997 the *New Zealand Herald* published polling by a new firm, Digipoll. Insight Research (now UMR Research) began polling for the *National Business Review* in 1992. Its data form the longest continuous time series, including a valuable question tracking electoral system opinion. In 2002 there were three different polls, each conducted monthly (only excluding January), and one less frequent poll (usually quarterly) in the *New Zealand Herald*. In 1999 some newspapers used polling to partly shape the agenda of their election coverage. In 2002 the *New Zealand Herald* did extensive qualitative research in a similar mode. The importance attached to political polling in New Zealand is consistent with the standard picture of the country as a small, populist democracy.

Polling now plays a major role in parties' election strategies and, sometimes, in the presentation and timing of political announcements. As for their own polling, political parties in New Zealand jealously guarded information about their budgets and campaign expenditures until 1996; since then, campaign expenditures, at least, have been required by law to be declared. Given this, there is no reliable information about the use of polls by political parties. One account has noted "virtually no use" before 1975

and that party polling was "very erratic" up to about 1980 (Murphy 1980, p. 168). There is evidence to indicate increasing use in the 1980s. Labour Party polling up to the 1984 election was confined to marginal electorate samples conducted largely by volunteers. Some qualitative research was commissioned prior to the 1984 election, after which Labour's polling moved to a professional basis. In government, Labour cabinets receive a weekly summary paper based on available public and at times specially commissioned polls. From 1996, national tracking polls during the election campaign replaced the marginal electorate focus. Campaign themes and their presentation are now regularly tested using focus groups. The National Party, usually the best-funded political party, was using similar methods in the 1990s, although it did no polling in 1987 due to lack of funds. From at least 1993 the National Party has been conducting tracking polls during election campaigns.

From New Zealand, a comprehensive political election study dates from 1990 onward, with data also archived in Canberra. It addresses various aspects of public opinion (Vowles and Aimer 1993; Vowles et al. 1995; Vowles et al. 1998; Vowles et al. 2002). The World Values Survey was put into the field in 1985, 1989, and 1998 (Gold and Webster 1990; Perry and Webster 1999), as was the International Social Survey Program in various years. Given all this, substantial survey data now exist for the analysis of public opinion in New Zealand.

Dimensions of Public Opinion

As estimated from factor analysis and scaling of a large number of survey instruments, the dominant pattern of public

opinion appears to be difference across the traditional left-right dimension, with increasingly attenuated roots in social structure across a partly employer/employee, partly rural/urban cleavage. Attitudes on the one side favor state intervention in the economy to foster social and economic goals; the other side favors a free market to produce better economic and social outcomes (Vowles et al. 1995; Vowles et al. 1998). Differences on this dimension have probably intensified since the 1950s and 1960s, when there was a consensus between the two major parties on modest levels of social expenditures combined with high levels of economic regulation. Radical deregulation since 1984 has probably more sharply polarized opinion on this dimension.

There is, however, a second dimension that can be generally described as *social liberalism* versus *social conservatism*. Here the trend has been away from high levels of social conservatism at the mid-twentieth century to a much more evenly divided society on such matters as civil rights by its end. This tendency most strongly shaped opinion in the 1980s (Vowles 1990; McAllister and Vowles 1994). Its salience appears to have declined with a reassertion of the economic dimension in the early 1990s. On its conservative side the dimension taps into defense of the traditional family, conventional morality, the monarchy, law and order, and identification with Britain and the United States in foreign policy and culture. On its liberal side this dimension has been associated with opposition to sporting contacts with apartheid-era South Africa, strong support for an independent antinuclear foreign policy, environmentalism, human rights, civil liberties, and an end to dis-

crimination on grounds of gender and sexual preferences. It underpins the development of the Green Party, all the more so after New Zealand's shift to proportional representation (PR) beginning with the 1996 election. There is a correlation between the two dimensions: the economic left tends to be more socially liberal, the economic right more socially conservative. That said, there is a wide scattering of individuals around this tendency, and a significant minority can be placed in the two dimensions the other way around (Vowles 1995).

The Influence of Public Opinion

The extent to which public opinion influences governments is a matter of debate in New Zealand, as elsewhere. The nature of public opinion itself is highly complex, a matter of intense debate (Bordieu 1979; Zaller 1992). Most pollsters and commentators in New Zealand generally understand that public opinion, as measured by polls and surveys, can fluctuate for a variety of reasons: for example, question wording and question order, not to mention political context. Polls themselves are often driven by elite-generated concerns of those who commission them, and the issues they address may be of minor interest to their respondents. Still, either for commercial reasons (maximizing circulation by reflecting their audience's concerns) or out of a sense of public responsibility, New Zealand media organizations sometimes commission poll questions that appear to reflect authentic grassroots concerns. But because in most cases the terms of debate are set by politicians and channeled through the media, polling is best seen as a way in which competing elite discourses are given approval or disapproval.

The extent to which poll- or survey-estimated opinions are stable and underpinned by coherent beliefs or values is dependent on how salient the issues are to individuals and their level of relevant political knowledge. At best, polls can be taken as snapshots that give an estimate of preferences within the context in which they were administered. As such, they provide important information that can generate inferences about public opinion, but they require careful interpretation and analysis.

Subject to these caveats, one could make a case that public opinion plays a more substantial role in the determination of public policy in New Zealand than in many other democracies. To sustain such a case with comprehensive comparative evidence would, however, be a major task. An argument against a claim of relatively responsive government in New Zealand could be constructed out of the period from 1984 to 1991, when governments consciously sought to promote policies of economic liberalization regardless of various estimates of contrary public opinion. However, the negative public response to this project was strong, providing support for a case that it violated key expectations of accountability hitherto embedded in New Zealand political culture. In part as a result, there was a campaign for change in the electoral system. This led to the replacement of the single-member district plurality electoral system by a form of proportional representation, mandated by a referendum in 1993. PR advocates intended the new system to reduce the power of governments by making it more difficult for them to be formed by a single political party and thus able to easily force through unpopular policies.

This raises the question of social movements and political activism as indications of intensely held opinions among minorities who, over time, can put issues onto the political agenda, argue against the interests of elites, and, ultimately, win their cause. Public meetings, demonstrations, mass protests, and continued advocacy of initially unpopular causes may induce longer-term shifts in opinion that may influence future if not current governments. Examples in New Zealand politics over the last decades include the Save Manapouri campaign of the 1960s and early 1970s. This prevented the destruction of a scenic lake for the purposes of generating electricity for the aluminum industry and set the scene for the emergence of a powerful environmental movement. The Resource Management Act of 1991 makes it much more difficult for such projects to be approved without full evaluation. The threat of demonstrations against sporting contacts with apartheid-era South Africa led one government to cancel a tour. Another that allowed the restoration of sporting contact faced huge demonstrations, and the government that followed it reintroduced a policy of effective discouragement. A public campaign for a nuclear-free New Zealand began in the 1970s and gained substantial success in the 1980s with the election of a government committed to antinuclear legislation. This led to New Zealand's exclusion from the tripartite ANZUS alliance and a downgrading of New Zealand's status in the United States from "ally" to "friend," much against the preferences of the majority of New Zealand's political and economic elites. The success of the antinuclear campaign has been such that from the 1990s onward almost all the political parties have viewed public opinion as too

great an obstacle in the way of change to the country's antinuclear legislation.

Another reform in the early 1990s led to a citizens' initiated referendum process, by which the verified signatures of 10 percent of those registered to vote can trigger a national referendum, although its results are not binding on Parliament (Catt 2001). Nonetheless, it can have a significant agenda-setting effect, most notably in the case of a referendum in 1999 to introduce harsher penalties for crimes of violence and to legislate for more recognition of victims' rights. Although those who were responsible for generating the referendum feel that not enough has been done, by 2002 there had been significant legislative changes in the direction they advocated. The change to the electoral system was mandated by referendum, and in 1997 the government held another referendum on changes to the taxpayer-funded pension scheme. This was defeated by a large margin, and the scheme was quickly buried. When the new electoral system was reviewed in 2000 and 2001, the parliamentary inquiry commissioned both qualitative and quantitative research to analyze public opinion on the matter. New Zealand politicians take public opinion seriously. They may not always follow it, but they fail to do so at their peril.

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Norway

A popular version of the history of Norwegian polling is that it is a direct import from the United States. There is some truth to that. For instance, the word *Gallup* has become synonymous with

opinion poll in the Norwegian language. The first well-known opinion poll institute in Norway was named the Norwegian Gallup Institute. This institute published its "Gallup of the Week" in a range of newspapers, among them the largest daily newspaper, *Aftenposten*. That regular column, which ran from 1946 to the mid-1980s, established the word *Gallup* as part of the Norwegian vocabulary.

However, contrary to popular perception, Norway has actually influenced U.S. polling in some ways as well. Opinion polls had a breakthrough in the United States in the 1930s. The sampling technique used by the pioneers was partly based on probability theory developed among European statisticians at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The invention of opinion polls was the result of a fortuitous combination of pragmatic entrepreneurs in the United States and statisticians from Europe, one of whom was a Norwegian.

Anders N. Kiær (1838–1919) was the first director of Statistics Norway. He argued that it was not necessary to conduct a full count when studying, for instance, the distribution of income and property in Norway. Instead, Kiær advocated the use of samples based on stratification. He presented the *representative method* for his European colleagues in 1895 at a meeting in Bern hosted by L'Institut International de Statistique. Most scholars rejected his arguments. In fact, Kiær's own Statistics Norway institute used probability sampling much less frequently after 1906 than in its initial phase from 1875. The representative method was controversial and subject to international and domestic criticisms. Obviously, it was against Kiær's wishes

that Statistics Norway turned away from his sampling methods and increasingly used full enumeration. A century later, Kiær was “credited with earning respectability for the practice of sampling among world statisticians” (Converse 1987, p. 41).

Opinion Polling Begins (1944–1946)

Opinion polling in Norway began at the end of World War II. In contrast to the United States, opinion polls related to elections played only a minor role at first. In the United States, the public breakthrough for George Gallup as a pollster occurred in relation to the 1936 presidential election, when he correctly predicted Franklin D. Roosevelt as the winner. George Gallup knew that every commercial institute was dependent upon the market and on demands from clients. An election campaign is an opportunity to interact with the public and hopefully prove competence. In Norway, strong media focus on party polling did not start until the 1973 parliamentary election.

The first opinion poll measuring party preference was published in the daily newspaper *Verdens Gang* just before the 1945 election. The survey had been conducted by a newly established institute, FAKTA. In spite of the fact that the prognosis was fairly accurate (an average of 1.4 percentage points’ deviance for six party alternatives, with the largest deviance at 3.8 percentage points), it would take nearly 30 years before this institute again measured voting intention for a newspaper. In the meantime, FAKTA was mostly engaged in market research.

FAKTA was established in 1944, during the German occupation of Norway. In its first year it was not only an opinion poll institute but also a cover for espionage

against the occupying power. The interviewers observed movements of ships along the coast and secretly coded their observations in the questionnaires. The founder of FAKTA was Leif Hobæk-Hansen, who later became professor at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen.

The Gallup Institute: De Facto Monopoly (1946–1970)

The Norwegian Gallup Institute was established in 1946 under the direction of Bjørn Balstad, who later became its owner as well. Gallup earned most of its income from market research but was less dependent on this source of income than was FAKTA. The Gallup Institute’s public exposure was through the widely published newspaper column “Gallup of the Week.” In fact, in the 1950s one-third of the income from the monthly survey was generated by “Gallup of the Week.” The articles dealt with most aspects of society. *Norwegian Opinion*, a three-volume work published in 1969, consisted of a compilation of tables from approximately 1,000 weekly “Gallup” articles from 1946 to 1966. The tables were thematically organized and commented on by social scientists.

From 1946 to the early 1970s the Gallup Institute had a monopoly on party polling. Early on, there was widespread reluctance to publish these polls. Gallup’s client *Aftenposten*, at that time the largest daily newspaper in Norway, did not want to print the institute’s first party barometer in August 1946. *Aftenposten* alleged that the issue—voting intention—was too complicated to be analyzed through polls. In 1948 the Norwegian Gallup Institute started to measure voting intention and voting behavior in the last election on a regular basis. From the

very beginning, Balstad used party polling to test the accuracy of the opinion polls.

Nineteen forty-eight was a significant year in the history of polling. In the 1948 U.S. presidential election, George Gallup wrongly predicted Thomas Edmund Dewey as the winner instead of Harry S Truman. The reputation of a "Gallup" was marred. In fact, as a result of this erroneous forecast the Norwegian institute lost clients among newspapers who subscribed to "Gallup of the Week." Another significant event was the visit of Professor Paul Lazarsfeld, who came to Norway just before the U.S. election. In an interview with the Norwegian daily newspaper *Dagbladet*, he argued that the social sciences had made remarkable progress. In fact, he said that the upcoming U.S. presidential election was really unnecessary, as the result was already known. Professor Lazarsfeld declared: "Curves and tables tell us that the Republicans will win." Some days later, the Democrat Truman was reelected.

In spite of problems with party polling in the United States, the Norwegian Gallup Institute continued to issue a party barometer. Prior to the 1949 election, the two largest political parties (Labour and the Conservatives) had become clients of Gallup and paid for a monthly party barometer. Past party preference was used in the weighting procedure; only those who shifted voting preference or who moved from the category "nonvoter" to "voter" or vice versa influenced the result. If every respondent said that she would vote as in the previous election, the result of the opinion poll would be identical to the election result. The clients—that is, Labour and the Conservatives—decided that the polls should *not* be published, fearing that there could be unfortunate consequences. For exam-

ple, parties experiencing an upswing could gain even more strength through a bandwagon effect. Consequently, the party barometer was allowed to circulate only among leading party politicians and editors of party newspapers. George Gallup, in his book *The Pulse of Democracy* (1940), had recognized this as a democratic problem. In his own words, the people were forbidden to listen to their own voice.

Among newspaper editors it was not easy to keep the oath of secrecy. Gradually it became evident that the oath was no longer respected by journalists. The 1969 general election was the first time since 1945 that party barometers could be published freely. However, in this election, party polling attracted little attention in the mass media.

From 1967, Gallup's party barometer had been published on a monthly basis with small variations from one month to another, partly due to the weighting procedure based on past votes. As there was no other party barometer, there was no choice but to trust the data. However, the election result was a test of quality, and there were usually only minor deviations between prognoses and election results.

The use of weighting procedures reduced random errors. And in addition to reliable fieldwork, one other factor influenced the accuracy of the party prognoses: the 1950s and 1960s were a period of political stability. Prior to the 1961 election, Israel's Golda Meir remarked, "Elections in Norway are reelections." However, this political stability would come to an end in the early 1970s, partly because of the dispute about Norwegian membership in the European Union (EU). The issue split many political parties and contributed to a weakening of party loy-

alties. Party shifts became more frequent. The floating voter made the election campaign more exciting and party polling more difficult.

The Issue of Membership in the EU: A Catalyst for Opinion Polling

The question of membership in the European Union has been the most debated and certainly the most important political issue in Norway after World War II. No other issue has been so thoroughly illuminated by opinion polls. The question of Norwegian membership in the EU has been addressed at unequal intervals. The year 1970 marked the third time the Norwegian government applied for membership. The first (1962) and second (1967) applications had been blocked by President Charles de Gaulle of France, who also vetoed UK membership. On this third attempt, the government decided to hold a referendum (as in 1962), which ended in 1972 with a majority of 53.5 percent against membership. A referendum campaign with two alternatives easily fits the demands of horserace journalism and represented a golden opportunity for the use of opinion polls in the mass media. In fact, this campaign was the breakthrough for opinion polling as a regular part of news coverage. Every month during the campaign, and right after the referendum, two EU polls were published in two different newspapers in Norway. At one point, two institutes—Gallup and FAKTA—presented their surveys on the same issue. This caused some confusion, but people slowly started to recognize the existence of random error.

Gradually the media established a demand for opinion polls. This demand was easy to meet. Several new opinion poll institutes were launched in the late 1960s. These institutes had public expo-

sure via the mass media's use of polling in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the new institutes were MMI and Scan-Fact, both of which became well-known as their polls were published in large newspapers and given television coverage.

The 1973 Election: The Breakthrough for Party Polling

The 1973 Norwegian parliamentary election campaign was the first to include extensive use of polling by the newspapers. Four opinion poll institutes (Gallup, FAKTA, Scan-Fact, and MMI) published their party barometers in various newspapers. This was, however, prior to the introduction of telephone interviews, and personal interviews were time-consuming. Three of the party polls (Gallup, FAKTA, and Scan-Fact) were based on fieldwork one month before election day. The fourth one (MMI) was carried out in the midst of the campaign one or two weeks before Election Day. In addition to registering party vote, the institutes asked questions about the popularity of the leaders, the second favorite party, and so on. These opinion polls resulted in articles that shed light on the various parties' possibilities for gaining or losing voters. Thus the 1973 election represented a watershed: from that election onward, opinion polls became a regular part of the news coverage of election campaigns. In every new election, a new record was broken. The number of polls seemed to increase continuously.

The 1973 election was also the first election during which Norway had complete national TV coverage. That gave additional weight to the polling results. This was a turbulent period in Norwegian politics, with frequent shifts in voter loyalties. A new party was launched (the forerunner of the Progress Party) under

the name Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties, and Public Intervention. According to Anders Lange himself, the idea of starting a new party came from Denmark. Mogens Glistrup's success with the Danish Progress Party inspired him. In fact, Glistrup and his companions were elected to parliament some months after Anders Lange. Consequently, Glistrup's success was rooted not in election results but in *opinion polls*. The strikingly good position in the party polls spread the news about Glistrup and injected courage in the founders of the Norwegian party. Here we touch upon the political role of opinion polls. The political effects are always difficult to document, as it is impossible to know what would have happened without opinion polls. However, some examples indicate that causal links do exist.

Political Effects of Polling:

The EU Issue as an Example

The question of EU membership can illustrate how opinion polls have been used politically in Norway. They have been tools in the hands of those opposing membership ever since the first application for membership in 1962, when opinion polls were in their infancy. Activists opposing membership realized that they could benefit from mapping public opinion. Hence, they collected money to conduct an opinion poll. The results were published in small advertisements in daily newspapers with the objective of illustrating the breadth and strength of opposition to membership. The Norwegian establishment has always overwhelmingly supported membership. Among the establishment, opponents had been seen as extremists or as alliances of various fringe groups. EU opponents used

opinion polls showing a majority against membership to counter this description.

The role of the opinion polls in 1962 was limited, as there were only two or three of them in existence at that time. The situation was quite different during the 1972 and 1994 referendum campaigns. The stream of opinion polls steadily showing a majority of "no" voters gave self-confidence to opponents of membership and boosted their morale.

The role of the EU issue in Norwegian politics from 1962 to 1994 can also illuminate various stages in the development of opinion polling. The first campaign (in 1962) took place in the infancy of opinion polling. In the 1972 campaign, two institutes reported the support for the "yes" and "no" positions monthly. In the 1994 campaign, six institutes regularly carried out polls. The polling became more frequent as the day of the 1994 referendum approached—first monthly, then weekly, and finally daily during the last two weeks of the campaign. The switch from personal to telephone interviews enabled continuous monitoring of opinion in the mass media. On Referendum Day in 1994, two exit polls (or rather two telepanels) made it possible to forecast the result and to analyze the sociodemographic profile of the "yes" and "no" voters.

The differences between the 1972 and the 1994 campaigns were partly based on two new inventions: telephone interviews in the 1980s and telepanels in the 1990s.

The 1980s: Telephone Interviews

By the 1980s, telephone coverage was so widespread that it became methodologically possible to use telephone interviews instead of personal interviews. Consequently, opinion poll institutes were no

longer dependent on a corps of interviewers spread throughout the country. Two new institutes were established (Opinion, 1985; Feedback, 1988), which relied solely on telephone interviews. The conditions for prompt reporting changed dramatically. For instance, the voters' judgment about the winner and the loser of a televised political debate could be reported in the next day's newspaper.

As the number of party barometers increased, so did the confusion about the correct level of support. In the second half of the 1980s, the discrepancies between the party barometers were particularly great regarding the Progress Party, the right-wing populist alternative. This party had a breakthrough in the 1987 local election, the first election with the immigration issue on the agenda. The Progress Party articulated opposition to immigration and attracted a lot of voters: 12.7 percent, compared to only 3.7 percent in the previous parliamentary election (1985).

The crucial variable in the weighting procedures is voting behavior in the previous election. Normally, parliamentary elections are used, but respondents can easily confuse local and parliamentary elections. Furthermore, a craving for consistency may result in an underestimation of party shifts. The question was raised among pollsters in Norway of whether to drop the weighting procedure or to use local elections as a weighting variable—or perhaps a combination of both. As a result of this discussion MMI developed a new weighting procedure seeking to correct for the respondents' erroneous recall regarding the previous election (Hellevik 1989). MMI has ever since used this weighting procedure in its regular service, even for the Election Day polls, which have consistently been very

accurate. As the election result gives us the correct figures, the Election Day poll is a rigorous test of the institute's quality.

The 1990s: Exit Polls

The first Norwegian exit poll was carried out by MMI in the 1993 election. Nearly 15,000 interviews were conducted at 116 selected polling stations around the country. This amounted to a lot of work, which paid off in a fairly accurate prognosis. In the same election, the Feedback opinion polling institute used a much simpler and significantly cheaper method than the traditional exit poll. Their prognosis was even better than MMI's. Feedback recruited a panel during its ordinary telephone interviews before the election. On Election Day the panel members were called again and asked if they had voted and, if so, for which party.

Both MMI and Feedback published their results on a TV channel and in a newspaper. Feedback revealed its result one hour before the polling stations closed. Some asked whether this could influence the party preference of those who had not yet voted. The authorities were concerned and changed the electoral law. They forbade publication of polls on Election Day before voting had officially ended and furthermore introduced a requirement that voters could not be interviewed within 200 meters of polling stations. In effect, this amounted to a ban on exit polls. This ban has not yet had any significant consequences, as telepanels (which rely solely on telephone interviews) proved to be more accurate and much cheaper than the traditional exit poll.

Conclusion

The opinion poll business has grown substantially in recent years. Economically

prosperous times combined with a stronger foothold for the market economy have provided favorable conditions. During the period that opinion polls have existed in Norway (from 1945 to the present), the country has developed from a society based on economic planning to one in which economic liberalism predominates. This change has favored the commercial aspects of opinion polling. Monopolies of different kinds have disappeared. Up to the 1980s, broadcasting in Norway was a state monopoly, without commercial advertising. That changed in the early 1990s with the introduction of commercial TV and radio. Market orientation has also gained a foothold in the public sector. Inhabitants are often regarded as clients or consumers of welfare services offered by the municipalities. Polls contribute in this respect by measuring consumer satisfaction. In addition, in political life voters are now often regarded as consumers and welfare-state clients. Political parties operate in a voters' market characterized by supply and demand. Party polling gives flesh and blood to market thinking. Party barometers indicate which parties are losers and winners of market shares, thus probably increasing the market orientation in political life.

We have seen the emergence of numerous new opinion poll institutes since the first one was established in 1944. However, there have also been mergers and acquisitions by large international companies. Paradoxically, the first two competing institutes—FAKTA and Gallup—merged in 1976 into Norges Markedsdata (NMD). Internal problems soon arose, and the former leader of the Gallup Institute split off and started a new institute, which after some years was renamed the Gallup Institute. In the 1990s, Taylor

Nelson Sofres bought Gallup together with Scan-Fact, and NMD became a part of A. C. Nielsen. Feedback was bought by British World Research International. MMI merged with FAKTA and kept its old name. It later bought the Swedish institute Temo and the Danish institute Vilstrup.

The future of polling in Norway is in jeopardy because of a methodological problem. The accuracy of results is impaired by an increasing share of respondent refusals. However, the mass media still trust opinion polls and use them on a regular basis.

In Norwegian public debate the use of opinion polls is more often criticized than defended. The following argument from George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae's book *The Pulse of Democracy* (1940) is not often heard: opinion polls are a democratic tool by serving as a channel for voters to express their views between elections (what Gallup called a *sampling referendum*). Usually opinion polls are criticized as a threat to democracy rather than extolled as a guarantee for democracy. Opinion polls get too much attention, some say. Election campaigns appear as a sporting event where the focus is on who will win rather than on political issues. The parties' success is measured by support percentages in the opinion polls just as sports results are measured by time, length, or weight. Issues as well as political visions may be lost in the shadow of all the numbers with their pluses and minuses.

Opinion polls have been published in Norwegian newspapers since 1946 and have been a part of election campaigns since 1973. If they suddenly disappeared, surely arguments defending opinion polls would emerge: they are a corrective to authorities who claim to have people's

support, are an instrument for a more realistic and more informed political debate, and contribute to enhancing interest in elections.

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Peru

Since the late 1970s, surveys of public opinion have played an important and sometimes even pivotal role in Peru's tumultuous politics. Although this trend is global, polls carry greater weight in Peru than in most other political systems, due to the weakness of the country's institutions and the volatility of its electorate. Ironically, surveys tend to be undertaken as a secondary activity and even serve as a form of advertising. Moreover, Peruvian pollsters have faced a number of unusual and daunting challenges. Thus, it is remarkable that the major polling organizations have pro-

vided a fairly consistent and reliable barometer of public opinion.

The Pollsters

The field of public opinion is dominated by market research companies engaged in various lines of work, rather than by specialized firms, academic institutions, or mass media organizations. Marketing companies typically conduct opinion surveys to gain public visibility and prestige, which in turn helps them to attract clients for other services. They usually are not paid for the ubiquitous polls that appear in the mass media (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, p. 120).

Five market research companies have conducted regular polls for more than a decade: Analistas y Consultores, Apoyo Opinión y Mercado, Compañía Peruana de Investigación de Mercados (CPI), Datum, and Imasen. Apoyo, the leading firm, is part of a business group that specializes in consulting and publishing, but the rest are small concerns led by a founding entrepreneur (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 83, 91). These five companies, along with other firms not engaged in political polling, are members of the Peruvian Association of Marketing Research Organizations, a trade group that upholds technical standards and defends the common interests of its members.

In addition, one of the pioneering polling firms, Peruana de Opinión (POP), still operates on a limited basis. Other companies have entered the saturated Peruvian market from time to time, particularly during electoral cycles, when some upstarts have been suspected of promoting particular candidates. However, it is difficult for newcomers to survive for very long. In recent years, the University of Lima and the National University of Engineering also have conducted regular

polls. Affiliates of foreign survey research companies have remained conspicuously absent, but immigrants to Peru head two of the top five polling firms: Manuel Torrado of Datum and Bernardo Verjovsky of Analistas y Consultores. Imasen is the only firm headed by a woman, Giovanna Peñaflor.

Surveys of public opinion in Peru are only marginally profitable, at best. To hold down costs, most polls are limited to Lima and the adjacent port of Callao, which account for about one-third of the electorate. Erroneous conclusions are sometimes drawn from these surveys when attitudes differ significantly between the capital and the rest of the country, as was the case in the referendum on the 1993 constitution. Nevertheless, in recent years the larger firms, particularly Apoyo, have done more national polls, especially in the latter months of electoral campaigns.

Origins and Early Development

During the 1960s Peru's first marketing firm, IMAT-Índices U, successfully conducted opinion surveys in several electoral cycles. Beginning in 1968, however, a military government suspended elections for a decade and further reduced the demand for polls by curtailing press freedom (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 70–71, 105–107). Peru's transition to democracy in the late 1970s created new opportunities for polling. Filling this void were firms founded by entrepreneurs who had expertise in marketing surveys and television ratings: Augusto Alegre's POP, Manuel Saavedra's CPI, and Manuel Torrado's Datum. Although their techniques were adapted from other specialties, the successes of these pioneers made polls a staple of news in the print and broadcast media. POP's success in predicting the

outcome of the 1980 presidential election on the basis of an exit poll was a particularly important breakthrough for the fledgling industry (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, p. 74). Polling firms also found consulting work with political parties, candidates, government agencies, and international organizations.

Peru's fragile democracy soon faced challenges that were daunting even by Latin American standards. During the 1980s two democratically elected presidents failed to reverse severe economic decline or to contain the ruthless Shining Path insurgency. Nevertheless, the polling industry made enormous strides as the decade progressed. Professionals trained in the social sciences, statistics, and related disciplines in Peru's best private universities greatly improved the technical standards of political surveys, especially in new companies such as Apoyo, Imasen, and A&C (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 71–72). Moreover, instead of just covering the horserace during electoral campaigns, several firms conducted extensive monthly polls that measured public attitudes toward leaders, institutions, and public policies. Polling companies also began to use focus groups to probe the undercurrents of public opinion and voting simulations to approximate the conditions under which balloting takes place (Conaghan 1995, p. 231).

The increasing frequency and sophistication of voter surveys and related techniques made the dismal performance of Peru's political system all the more obvious. The failures of Alan García, Peru's young and highly charismatic president (1985–1990), were especially poignant. As the economy collapsed, political violence escalated, and evidence of flagrant corruption mounted, García's monthly approval ratings in Lima plummeted from 96 per-

cent in August 1985 to only 6 percent in March 1990 (figures from Datum cited in Empujón 1990). A 1989 book by Apoyo's Alfredo Torres revealed an overwhelming lack of confidence in political parties, governmental institutions, the social security system, the police and armed forces, business organizations, and unions (Torres Guzmán 1989, p. 58).

This wholesale rejection of the establishment helped Mario Vargas Llosa, Peru's most famous novelist and a political novice, become the overwhelming favorite to win the 1990 presidential election. Yet doubts about Vargas Llosa multiplied as the campaign progressed. The novelist continued an alliance with the traditional conservative parties, stridently advocated market-oriented economic policies, and was widely perceived to be a member of Peru's mostly white elite. Nevertheless, his major opponents were even more unpopular, and he maintained a commanding and relatively stable lead until the final few weeks of the campaign.

Consulting secret surveys of voters conducted by the National Intelligence Service (SIN), President García—who abhorred Vargas Llosa—concluded that the personal characteristics of an obscure minor candidate, Alberto Fujimori, made him the ideal choice to appeal to disenchanted independent voters in the center of the political spectrum. García began to clandestinely provide polling data and material assistance to Fujimori, the son of Japanese immigrants. Several weeks before the election, IMASEN reported that 9.5 percent of voters in Lima supported Fujimori. This modest figure was sufficient to give him a credible chance of making a runoff in Peru's two-round system, and his support subsequently snowballed. Fujimori placed a close second in

the general election and then defeated Vargas Llosa by a landslide in the runoff (Schmidt 1996).

The Fujimori Factor

Surveys of public opinion continued to become more numerous, extensive, and refined during the 1990s. Moreover, Fujimori, a former mathematics professor, soon developed an addiction for polls. Enjoying exclusive access to the SIN's expensive and sophisticated surveys, the president and his advisers proved to be extremely adept at spinning polls and manipulating public opinion. Many of Fujimori's actions—such as his early attacks on the political establishment and periodic baiting of the Catholic Church—appear to have been calculated attempts to deflect public attention from other issues and to increase his personal popularity. A secretive team even used public opinion surveys to select candidates for Fujimori's handpicked congressional lists (Schmidt 2000, pp. 102, 110–111).

During much of his presidency Fujimori could use high approval ratings to justify controversial actions that were sometimes unconstitutional. Peruvians overwhelmingly backed his 1992 presidential coup, though public approval was contingent upon respect for civil liberties and an eventual return to democracy (Conaghan 1995, pp. 234–243; Schmidt 2000, p. 103). In the face of strong international pressure, Fujimori soon restored some semblance of constitutional rule, but the new charter approved in 1993 removed an important check against formidable powers of incumbency and potential electoral fraud by allowing a president to serve two consecutive terms. The defeat of the Shining Path, economic recovery, and sharp increases in social spending enabled Fujimori to defeat 13

rivals in the 1995 presidential election, with an astounding 64 percent of the valid vote (Schmidt 2000).

The high economic expectations generated by Fujimori's 1995 campaign were not fulfilled, and his approval ratings declined notably during a disappointing second term. At home and abroad, the president and his military allies came under increasing criticism for frustrating the development of democratic institutions, subverting the rule of law, violating civil liberties, and stifling the press. Fujimori's supporters nevertheless steamrolled opposition to an unconstitutional third term (Schmidt 2000, pp. 119–123). In May 2000 the president was reelected once again in a scandal-ridden process condemned by major international observers.

This new victory, however, proved to be Pyrrhic. After the release of a secretly recorded videotape that showed SIN boss Vladimiro Montesinos bribing an opposition congressman, the president was forced to call for new elections. More revelations, plummeting approval ratings, and defections by key supporters prompted Fujimori to flee Peru in November 2000. An interim government subsequently organized exemplary elections in 2001 that were won by Alejandro Toledo, who had been Fujimori's most dogged challenger.

Fujimori's controversial presidency prompted polling firms to ask citizens probing questions on such fundamental issues as the characteristics of democracy, the role of political parties, and the fairness of elections. Moreover, a careful reading of public opinion shows that Peruvians never gave the president a blank check. For example, citizens consistently opposed human rights violations by the government—despite their repudi-

ation of the Shining Path—and always had a very negative view of Montesinos, the president's shadowy adviser, whom many believed to be the real power in the country. Indeed, during Fujimori's second term most Peruvians classified his administration as authoritarian (Schmidt 2000, pp. 122–123). Thus, it is not at all surprising that the Peruvian people decisively rejected Fujimori after irrefutable evidence of political corruption came to light. However, public opinion data also suggest that Peruvians, especially those of modest means, are most concerned about employment and thus are prone to overlook or minimize transgressions of the constitution, human rights violations, and other abuses as long as the economic outlook appears to be improving (Schmidt 2000, pp. 104, 120).

Challenges and Limitations

Polling firms have had to contend with a number of unusual challenges in Peru. During the 1980s and early 1990s, many Peruvians were the victims of human rights abuses by the Shining Path and government security forces. The country no longer lives in a climate of fear, but nonresponse rates remain high, especially among more affluent Peruvians of predominantly European origin (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 98–99). Despite sometimes being identified as part of a mostly white establishment, the major pollsters have had greater success in reaching poorer Peruvians, who tend to be of indigenous or mixed ancestry. This success is due in large measure to the recruitment of mostly young, educated people from all backgrounds to conduct voter surveys.

Even when there are willing respondents, sampling is a challenge in a country where most people do not own a tele-

phone. The major Peruvian polling firms have developed innovative methods of sampling households and the residents within, as well as pedestrians in the streets and plazas of Lima. Nevertheless, factors beyond their control, such as obsolete census data or a curfew, can unexpectedly skew samples (Conaghan 1995, pp. 231–232).

Unusually high proportions of poll respondents do not answer certain questions, have no opinion, or are reluctant to reveal their true preferences, as discussed below. Even if a survey is accurate, the corresponding projections of electoral results can vary considerably, depending on the assumptions that one makes about the “don’t know/no opinion” category. Moreover, Peruvians cast unusually high numbers of null and blank ballots because voting is obligatory, many voters are poorly educated, and disillusionment with politics is high. Whereas support for various candidates in the polls is usually expressed in their shares of the potential total vote, electoral returns are reported as percentages of the valid vote (which excludes null and blank ballots). Discrepancies between these two sets of figures are frequently cited as “proof” of inaccurate polls or electoral fraud, even when there were plausible explanations for the differences.

From 1984 until 2001, polling results could not be made public during the 15 days preceding an election. Given Peru’s volatile politics, significant shifts in public opinion sometimes occur during this blackout period, most notably in the first round of the 1990 election. The last surveys reported by the media in that campaign gave Vargas Llosa a commanding lead and put Fujimori in fourth place. Thus, the polls appeared to be well off the mark in the eyes of the public, even

though surveys taken during the blackout period and distributed to the political cognoscenti proved to be remarkably prescient (Schmidt 1996, fig. 1, p. 340; Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 112–113). In 2001 new legislation reduced the blackout period to one week, thereby ameliorating but not eliminating this problem.

Two other general problems with polls have limited their utility in the Peruvian context. First, surveys of public opinion have been ill-equipped to measure strategic voting, which greatly facilitated Fujimori’s election in 1990 and Toledo’s surge in 2000. Although polls have occasionally included questions alluding to this topic, they were not well designed or effective. Second, as elsewhere, surveys do not measure the intensity of support in Peru. Thus, they tended to exaggerate Fujimori’s backing, which was disproportionately passive and based on clientelistic favors, and to underestimate the strength of an increasingly passionate opposition. Moreover, the media generally overlooked Fujimori’s high negatives at the end of his second term, when 40 percent of Peruvians reported that they would “definitely not” vote for the incumbent (Schmidt 2000, p. 126).

Indeed, pollsters have no control over how their results are presented in the mass media, which are more interested in electoral horseraces and catchy headlines than in analysis. Moreover, newspapers and TV stations frequently spin polls to support a particular editorial line, political perspective, or partisan preference. For example, during the four months that the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement held hostages in the Japanese ambassador’s residence in late 1996 and 1997, Lima’s major newspapers used survey data, sometimes selectively,

to support different positions (Tuesta Soldevilla 1997, pp. 119–122, 128–136).

Scholarship on Peruvian public opinion lags far behind polling technology. There is virtually no market for studies of public opinion, and the major polling firms generally lack the time, resources, and disposition for in-depth analysis. Apoyo and Imasen are partial exceptions. Linkages to academia remain weak, though some firms have been gracious to individual scholars. Peruvian and foreign academics have used aggregate data generated by pollsters in a number of important works, but they lack access to the underlying data sets and thus are unable to manipulate variables. Nevertheless, a few scholars have produced outstanding studies of political attitudes with other data sets, sometimes contracting the polling firms to do the surveys (e.g., Dietz 1998; Murakami 2000; Parodi 1993).

Disguised Preferences

Despite facing numerous challenges, the five major polling firms have compiled a remarkably good track record. Indeed, only once have most of their last preelection surveys been outside the margin of error. The sole exception occurred in the 1990 presidential runoff when the major polls showed a statistical dead heat between Vargas Llosa and Fujimori, but the latter won by a resounding margin of 62 percent to 38 percent. Subsequent analyses (e.g., Torres Guzmán 1990) have shown that many respondents, especially among the urban poor, masked their true preference in the face of constant attacks on Fujimori in the most prestigious media, the Catholic hierarchy's support of Vargas Llosa, and numerous endorsements of the novelist by entertainment and sports stars.

Disguised preferences had a major impact on the controversial 2000 election. Soon after balloting was completed, three of the major firms released exit polls that gave challenger Alejandro Toledo the lead over Fujimori. These projections turned out to be inaccurate because many Fujimori voters were too embarrassed to reveal their true preference. They were later rejected by the polling companies themselves after a more accurate quick count was released by Transparencia, an independent non-governmental organization. These results and the polling firms' own quick counts gave Fujimori a clear plurality that fell slightly short of a majority.

Toledo quickly concluded that the election was being stolen and spontaneously led his followers into the streets of Lima. The episode stiffened domestic and international demands for a second round, forcing Fujimori to abandon any plans to secure a majority through fraud. But it also hurt Toledo, who struck many Peruvians as impulsive. The challenger's negatives increased markedly, and he boycotted the runoff, ostensibly due to fears of fraud. Subsequent legislation banned the dissemination of exit polls until 10 P.M. on the night of the election or after the release of quick-count results.

Disguised preferences also played a major role in the 2001 presidential election. Although a series of miscues had increased Toledo's negatives even more, he won a first-round plurality by a comfortable margin. His runoff opponent was Alan García, the charismatic former president who had led Peru to ruin in the late 1980s. Noting widespread disillusionment with both candidates, two prominent journalists called on Peruvians to cast spoiled or blank ballots, an option that was embraced by almost a third of

poll respondents at one point. However, as Election Day drew near, the abstention option began to lose its appeal, and the race tightened. Nevertheless, standard voter surveys were prone to underestimate García's strength because some of his supporters were ashamed to admit their true preference. A week before the election, a more accurate voting simulation conducted by Apoyo gave Toledo an edge of only 4 percent.

During the last week of the campaign—when polling results could not be made public—rumors that García had pulled ahead were widespread. The prospect of another García presidency triggered a last-minute shift from the abstention option to Toledo, which may well have been decisive. Indeed, Apoyo (Torres Guzmán 2001) estimates that the shift could have been as great as 7 percent of the valid vote, in comparison to Toledo's 6.2 percent margin of victory.

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The Philippines

Opinion polling, which is essentially an American invention, developed early in the Philippines, a U.S.-occupied territory in 1898–1946 except for three years during World War II. Consistent success in predicting elections (Mangahas, Guerrero, and Sandoval 2001) is undoubtedly the main reason for the wide acceptance of opinion polling by Filipinos. Just like Americans, five out of six Filipinos aware of election predictions say that the opinion polls are right most of the time; four out of five say that the nation would be better off if the leaders followed public opinion surveys more closely; and most find it hard to believe that a sample of only 1,000 respondents accurately reflects the views of the entire population (Guerrero and Mangahas 1997).

The National Election System

The president and vice president are separately and directly elected by the nation at large. They frequently come from different parties, as voters tend to mix their choices. Since politicians change parties

easily, voters are much more loyal to personalities than to parties. There is only one round of voting, and so when there are more than two candidates, the winner's plurality is often less than 50 percent.

Philippine senatorial elections are unique, with no geographical allocation of seats. All 24 senators are elected at large and wage a national electoral campaign, making a high-scoring senatorial winner a strong contender for a future presidential or vice presidential nomination. Terms are staggered so that 12 Senate seats are vacated every three years, then filled by the top 12 in an election that is frequently contested by 30–40 serious candidates. Voters usually select a mix of senatorial candidates from different parties, just as when choosing a president and vice president. A party is said to win a senatorial election if most of the winners are affiliated with that party for that election.

Thus a scientific survey using a global-standard national sample of about 1,000 voters to predict winners of the top national positions can expect to be correct within the familiar error margin of plus or minus 3 percent. There is much more statistical confidence in predicting the winning president and vice president, however, than in predicting winning senators, since the difference between barely winning a Senate seat, in twelfth place, and barely losing, in thirteenth place, is often a fraction of a percent.

Opinion Polling in the Early Years

The scores of the first two elections for president (1946: Manuel Roxas, 54 percent, over Sergio Osmeña Sr., 46 percent; 1949: Elpidio Quirino, 51 percent, over Jose Laurel Sr., 37 percent) were far enough apart for the wins to have been

predicted by scientific polling, if any was done. The 1953 victory of the immensely popular Ramon Magsaysay, by 69 percent of the vote, was reportedly predicted by the pioneering opinion research firm Robot Statistics, on the basis of surveys in key cities (*Weekly Nation* 1965).

Robot Statistics, founded by George Cohen, a stateless person of Russian origin, conducted confidential election research over three administrations. Its 1961 prediction of a 54–46 percent win of Diosdado Macapagal over Carlos P. Garcia was so close to the official count of 55–45 percent that it led to journalistic alarm, present to this day, that polls could have too much influence for a nation's good (Locsin 1961). President Macapagal was reportedly attentive to his private polls but did not feel obliged to follow popularity in every respect. Robot did not make a public prediction of the 1965 election, most likely because it would be unfavorable to its client, Macapagal. Fearing the hostility of Ferdinand Marcos (the 1965 winner by a score of Marcos 52 percent, Macapagal 43 percent, and Raul Manglapus 5 percent), Cohen emigrated and Robot closed, without leaving its polling reports in any public library.

The Filipino pioneers in open or non-confidential polling are statistician Enrique T. Virata and political scientist Jose V. Abueva, both from the University of the Philippines. Virata did a Quezon City poll in 1957, from which he predicted the victory of Carlos P. Garcia (winner of the presidency by 42–28 percent over Jose Yulo). Abueva did a Manila poll in 1965, from which he predicted the victory of Marcos. Virata, who used mail surveys, continued to study elections up to 1965 and predicted the wins of both Macapagal and Marcos (Suyko 1965); but

his research materials are gone from the university library, except for two terse journal articles.

For the reelection of Marcos in 1969 (with 62 percent against Sergio Osmeña Jr.'s 38 percent), no scientific poll reports are available. Using a readers' poll, a precursor of the call-ins common on television today, the magazine *Weekly Graphic* (1969) saw Marcos ahead 56–44 percent in the week before the election.

The Authoritarian Period

On September 21, 1972, Marcos, who was ineligible for a third term in office, declared martial law and thereby seized authoritarian power indefinitely. Freedom of speech suffered as oppositionists were imprisoned and the independent media were forcibly shut down. A few critical scientific surveys were done but were unpublicized and known only to scholars. For instance, a 1974 national survey of 3,487 respondents found 38 percent saying that public contentment had improved in the past five years, compared to 49 percent saying that it had worsened (Porio and Fernandez 1975). A 1983 national sample of 4,100 respondents polled by the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) was asked if Filipinos could talk freely against the government and gave (unpublished) results of 47 percent yes, 36 percent no; 17 percent refused to answer. Although the freedom to disseminate research was restricted, there was a growing capacity to do surveys scientifically and rapidly, primarily among the leading market research practitioners, who had established the Marketing and Opinion Research Society of the Philippines in 1977.

After Marcos's archenemy Benigno Aquino was assassinated in September

1983, the great massing of people at his funeral and at the numerous demonstrations that followed in the next two years were clear signs of public disenchantment with Marcos. In 1984 and 1985, two national polls by the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference (BBC) for Human Development (BBC 1985), a civic group, found nearly two out of every three Filipinos opposed to Marcos's legislation by decree and also to his power to detain persons by fiat; these were announced in media conferences that included the foreign press. A 1985 Philippine Social Science Council survey had similar findings (PSSC 1985). In November 1985, when Marcos unexpectedly announced over U.S., not Philippine, television (on David Brinkley's show) that he would hold a snap presidential election, he cited a 1985 BBC poll item as the basis for expecting to win. This item was: "How many in this locality would vote for Ferdinand Marcos if he runs for President again?" In that poll, 52 percent answered "many/very many," while 37 percent said "few/very few." Despite the report's explicit warning that the 52–37 percent score was not a voting margin, Marcos, in his hubris, misread it in his favor.

Restoration of Democracy

Preceding the February 7, 1986, snap election, a poll done for the Marcos-controlled TV networks by the research firm Consumer Pulse scored the race, as of January 10–15, at 45 percent for Marcos, 26 percent for his opponent Corazon Aquino (the widow of Benigno), and 29 percent undecided/refusals, but the firm was noncommittal about the election outcome (Gochoco-Perez 1986). Five years after the fact, the firm Asia Research Organization disclosed that it did

a confidential poll on February 1–5, which found 42 percent for Aquino and 41 percent for Marcos, and that it had assigned the 17 percent undecideds to Aquino on account of the fear factor (Henares 1992). The quick count of the vote by the independent watchdog group National Movement for Free Elections gave a win to Aquino of 53–47 percent, but the slower official count by the National Legislature gave a win to Marcos of 54–46 percent. The crisis was settled by the world's first People Power Revolution; Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president on February 25. The following May, a joint survey by the Ateneo de Manila University and the new research institute Social Weather Stations (SWS) asked respondents for whom they had voted in the snap election: 64 percent Aquino, 27 percent Marcos, and 9 percent refusals. More significant, the Ateneo/SWS survey found that 66 percent identified People Power, whereas only 14 percent identified Aquino's election victory, as the most important basis for legitimacy of the Aquino government (Ateneo and SWS 1986).

SWS was established in 1985 by a group led by social indicators expert Mahar Mangahas, who had directed the survey research of DAP and BBC. It is a specialized, nonstock, nonprofit, nonpartisan, and tax-deductible scientific institute that conducts periodic surveys of public opinion, governance, and quality of life and maintains a library of survey reports and a public-use archive of all of its raw survey data (Mangahas 1994). SWS is enterprising yet basically academic since project confidentiality is subject to formal, temporary time limits. SWS and Ateneo did joint polls over 1986–1987; then the SWS and Ateneo surveys became

separate, with Ateneo public opinion polls lasting up to 1992.

The Social Weather surveys have been tracking Philippine economic, social, and political indicators, as well as national public opinion, quarterly since 1992 (Mangahas and Guerrero 1998). They provide general information to subscribers on advance basis and also serve as an omnibus for commissioned questionnaire items; owing to weakness of party affinity, subscribers and clients can come from different parts of the political spectrum. The SWS survey output has become part of recorded Philippine history, showing the honeymoon period of an administration, after which public satisfaction ratings tend to decline (Mangahas 2000); how the people rallied around President Aquino when rebel military groups staged coup attempts (SWS 1988, 1989); the public's consistently strong opposition to the lifting of term limits and other constitutional amendments likely to serve selfish interests only (Arroyo 1993; Belmonte 1998); how most Filipinos were initially amenable to an extension of the stay of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines (Guidote and Mangalindan 1990) but changed their minds a year after the Senate decided against it; and the differences between opinions of (minority) Muslim Filipinos and the majority of Filipinos (Langrio and Dayag-Laylo 1998).

However, since the underlying polls were not media-commissioned, such findings have received scant publicity and must compete with many other matters for newsworthiness. As yet there are no Philippine media companies that conduct their own polls. Their usage of the open opinion polls is almost entirely confined to the periodic ratings of public sat-

isfaction with the president and other government officials and to standings in electoral races.

Election Surveys

The newly restored democracy instituted a new election schedule of every six years for president (one term only) and every three years for Congress. Politicians and political backers began to rely heavily on opinion polling, especially items on name recognition, public satisfaction (a survey rating of public officials), and public trust (a survey rating of nonofficials) for decisions on candidacy for coming elections. Inasmuch as the presidency, the vice presidency, and the 24 Senate seats all have the same national constituency, one national survey can serve the data needs of a large number of political players at the same time and be affordable. Local politicians' use of polling is growing but comparatively small due to the comparative costliness of a constituency-tailored survey, whose sample size requirement tends to be not much less than that of a national survey. The market demand for survey data is seasonal, with politicians' interest being in the last 12 months before the candidacy filing deadline; media interest rises during the three-month campaign period up to Election Day.

Political transitions in the restored democracy went on schedule, despite periodic rumors of military coup-plotting, first to former general Fidel Ramos, winner of the 1992 election in a survey-predicted close contest, and then to former film star Joseph "Erap" Estrada, runaway winner in 1998. Political stability was enhanced by the ability of opinion polls to anticipate the changes, as seen in headlines of newspaper sponsors—*Manila*

Chronicle, May 9, 1992, "RAMOS, MIRIAM IN A CLOSE FIGHT"; *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 5, 1995, "SWS POLL SHOWS 7 SAFE WINNERS"; *Manila Standard*, May 7, 1998, "ERAP LEADS BY 18 AS JDV GETS SOLO 2ND; GLORIA'S LEAD OVER ANGARA NOW 24"; and *Manila Standard*, May 11, 2001, "SWS SURVEY: SCORE STILL 8-5; LOI NOW A CONTENDER"—which all proved accurate.

Starting in 1992, the ABS-CBN network commissioned SWS to conduct Election Day surveys—exit polls (actually done in a random sample of homes, interviewing people who have returned from voting, in private, rather than literally outside the voting centers in public view)—aimed at broadcasting and interpreting an election within 24 hours after the end of voting. These exit polls reliably anticipated, as much as two weeks in advance, the count of the official Commission on Elections (Comelec). The May 11, 1998, exit poll, aided by a Supreme Court restraint on a Comelec attempt to ban such polling (Mangahas 1998), proved its worth by estimating Estrada's winning presidential vote as 39.2 percent and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's winning vice presidential vote as 50 percent, versus the official counts of 39.9 percent and 49.6 percent, which were completed only on May 27, 1998. The archived exit-poll data provide a best-practice statistical database for analyzing vote-mixing and correlating the vote to sociodemographic variables.

Presidential Impeachment and People Power II

The next severe political crisis came in October 2000, when President Estrada was exposed by his confederate, a provincial governor, who personally paid him multimillion-peso bribes from illegal

gambling operations (numbers) in the province. A special SWS poll done on October 26–30 found 50 percent unsure about the truth of the charges, with 20 percent believing them and 14 percent not believing them. Thanks to the large bloc of unsure respondents, there were 44 percent opposed, and only 29 percent in favor, of the idea that Estrada should resign, hence the survey report's title, "Public Gives Erap Benefit of the Doubt." Feeling relieved by the poll, Estrada chose to harden his position rather than resign, on the mistaken impression that he could count on the people's continuing trust. He was impeached by the House on November 13, 2000, and his Senate trial, broadcast live on TV, went from December 8, 2000, to January 16, 2001, when the Senate decided, by an 11–10 vote, not to open a sealed envelope expected to reveal evidence of Estrada's holding bank deposits under an assumed name. From the evening of January 16 to January 20, masses of infuriated Filipinos went to the streets, in what is now known as People Power II, which culminated in military and police withdrawal of allegiance from Estrada, a Supreme Court declaration of a vacant presidency, the swearing-in of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and Estrada's voluntary departure from the palace. Shortly afterward Estrada was arrested on the capital charge of plunder, for which a mob of Estrada loyalists assaulted the palace in an unsuccessful, and unpopular, May Day attempt to depose the new president.

The misreadings of opinion polls by Marcos in 1986 and by Estrada in 2000 were due to hubris rather than to the way the polls were reported. In retrospect, they led to quicker progress across the country's bumpy road to better democracy and governance.

Maintenance of Survey Freedom

The freedom to conduct opinion research was beset by official attempts to ban exit polling and publication of surveys prior to elections but emerged unscathed thanks to timely actions by the Supreme Court (Mangahas 1999; Panganiban 2000, 2001).

Of seven senators who ran for either president or vice president in 1998, six had three years left of their six-year terms and could return to the Senate if they lost. Most resented the preelection polling reports, since only one was favored to win (Macapagal-Arroyo, who won as vice president, though not from the same party as Estrada). Of the five who failed to win higher office, and thus resumed their Senate seats, four joined the majority coalition of President Estrada, their adversary in the previous election. One filed an anti-survey publication bill in July 1998 as soon as the new Congress assembled, and a second chaired the committee handling the bill, which was cleverly joined with a more reasonable bill loosening restrictions on election advertising in mass media—thus effectively co-opting nearly all print and broadcast companies—to constitute the incongruously named Fair Election Practices Act. (The sponsors of the survey suppression bill had originally wanted to ban exit polling as well but desisted after the Supreme Court's January 2000 ruling that exit polling is protected by freedom of speech and of the press.)

As finally passed, the Fair Election Practices Act banned publication of election surveys for the last 15 days before a national election and the last seven days before a local election. It took effect on March 10, 2001, so as to be applicable to the election of May 14, 2001. On April

11, 2001, Social Weather Stations and the daily broadsheet *Manila Standard* petitioned the Supreme Court for a restraining order on the survey ban. The court's quick response, on May 5, 2001, was not merely a restraining order but a final ruling that a ban on publishing surveys violates constitutional freedoms of speech, expression, and press. On May 11, three days before the election, the SWS May 4–7 poll sponsored by ABS-CBN/*Manila Standard* updated the election race picture with the new finding that former First Lady Loi Estrada had gained in rank due to a late sympathy vote. On May 15, the ABS-CBN/SWS exit poll ($n = 5,238$ voters) made a call of all 13 winners, Loi Estrada included, on the basis of a statistically significant 2 percent difference between thirteenth place and fourteenth place, which was validated by the official count completed on June 4, 2001.

The Supreme Court's ruling of May 2001 rejected the contention that pre-election surveys "confuse the voters and debase the electoral process." The court was aware that election race polls of 1992, 1995, and 1998 had been reported as close as two days before elections, without controversy. The court's main decision said: "To sustain the ban on survey results would sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the campaign can confuse the voters and thus debase the electoral process."

A concurring opinion added: "In fact, the provision in dispute does not prohibit paid hacks from trumpeting the qualifications of their candidates. In fact, while survey organizations who employ scien-

tific methods and engage personnel trained in the social sciences to determine sociopolitical trends, are barred from publishing their results within the specified periods, any two-bit scribbler masquerading as a legitimate journalist can write about the purported strong showing of his candidate without any prohibition or restraint."

SWS surveys show that only a few Filipinos allow their voting choices to be affected by the published polls. In these few cases, the tendencies to go for the underdog are almost strong enough to offset the tendencies to go for the overdog, reducing further the slight bias for leading candidates. But since there are times when an election is decided by a close margin, the critical issue—which the Supreme Court settled with a loud "no!"—is whether a democratic state may justifiably hamper its citizens from choosing to be bandwagoners or underdoggers, as they prefer.

Conclusion

The public opinion research industry in the Philippines has grown considerably, with mostly commercial participants engaged in proprietary projects, but with enough academic and civic participants to ensure that information about Filipino opinions on prominent public issues, including global concerns like terrorism, is generally accessible within a reasonable time frame. The greater the competition to provide information, the better the public good is served. Close linkages that have been established with the world's leading opinion research networks, such as the World Association for Public Opinion Research, the International Social Survey Program, and the World Values Survey, are helping to

ensure that the quality of Philippine research meets global standards.

Yet many disputes continue, especially with politicians, journalists, and opinion-setters who do not understand how scientific surveys can consistently discern the opinions of the general public more accurately than they, or who do not accept that the average or ordinary person's opinion deserves at least as much attention as their own. The future expansion of opinion research will go some way toward resolving these disputes.

Linda Luz B. Guerrero and
Mahar Mangahas

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Poland

The history of Polish public opinion was heavily shaped by postwar history. The two largest and most influential public opinion research centers, OBOP and CBOS, were created prior to the political and economic transformation that began in 1989. Since the one-party government did not officially acknowledge popular discontent, there was little need for an institution that studied public opinion on political and social matters. The first Polish public opinion research center, OBOP, was created in 1958 to probe the preferences of Poles with regard to state-produced consumer goods in order to match outputs to consumer preferences. This situation changed with the rise of the Solidarity movement, which created a need for party leaders to better understand public opinion on political issues. CBOS was founded in 1982 to supplement OBOP. Both CBOS and OBOP underwent privatization in the 1990s.

After the Polish political reforms in 1989, OPOB began to conduct regular monthly studies of public opinion. Both OBOP and CBOS were privatized during the 1990s and remain the two firms specializing in public opinion research. They are joined by more than 20 new firms, many of which are outgrowths of academic institutes throughout the country. In addition to interview- or questionnaire-based survey research, these centers employ a wide variety of techniques,

including telephone polls, focus groups, and in-depth interviews. Major newspapers such as *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *Rzeczpospolita* also regularly conduct and publish polls.

Perhaps the largest and most regular research on public opinion was conducted by the European Union (EU) in the Central European EuroBarometer (CEEB). Conducted from 1990 to 1997, the CEEB investigated attitudes toward the European Community, as well as domestic issues like satisfaction with various aspects of economic reform and the development of democracy. The CEEB offers the possibility for cross-national comparison, as the first wave was conducted in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. By 1996, it had expanded to 19 countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a sample of 1,000 people in each country. The CEEB was resumed in 2001 as the Candidate Countries EuroBarometer (CCEB), with questions designed to probe the perceived benefits of joining the EU and attitudes toward EU accession if a referendum were held. The CCEB was first conducted in October 2001 in all 13 countries applying for EU membership and is almost methodologically identical to the standard EuroBarometer.

Use of Polls

The first large-scale poll conducted was an exit poll of the first democratic election for the Polish president in 1990. Exit polls were repeated for the parliamentary elections in 1993, 1997, and 2001 and the presidential elections in 1995 and 2000.

Currently, public opinion polling is heavily developed, polls are widely published in the press, and they have a strong influence on public discourse. The im-

pact of public opinion on actual policy decisions is less consistent. Polls cover a wide range of topics, from labor policy to trust in politicians and politician of the year. Political opinion surveys are conducted at the request of the press, political parties, and ministries. In particular, the ministries responsible for privatization and labor policy are among the public opinion research centers' largest clients.

Key Issues

According to the scholar Jerzy Wiatr, three debates dominated early Polish elections in the 1990s: support for monetarism and pro-market policies versus antimonetarist, prointerventionist policies; secularism versus religious conservatism; and support/nonsupport for lustration (screening former secret police collaborators) (Wiatr 1993). Over the 1990s, these debates broadened with the entrance of new but related issues. The major debates can be broken down into the following four categories.

Economic and Social/Labor Policy

The first category is economic and social/labor policy. Privatization, economic reform, and reductions in spending on education and social welfare programs have been at the top of the

political agenda. Not surprisingly, after a short honeymoon, labor and the elderly segments of the public began to express discontent over layoffs and the reduction or termination of social benefits that resulted from these policies. Those with more education and the new class of entrepreneurs generally supported reductions in the large state budget (and the reductions in taxes that were supposed to accompany them). That said, given the role of unions in Poland's transition, workers in Poland are surprisingly pro-market (Ost and Weinstein 1999).

Analysis of surveys reveals that Poles supported the government and its reforms despite rising inflation and falling wages during the Balcerowicz plan period (Stokes 1996; Przeworski 1996). However, Polish reaction to rising unemployment was markedly different, leading to a withdrawal of support for the program. Table 1 shows the support for the early 1990s market reforms among workers (Gardawski 1996, p. 81; Ost and Weinstein 1999).

To understand the extent of proreform sentiment, it is important to note that a majority of Solidarity and nearly 40 percent of OPZZ/Branch trade union activists, the two large unions in Poland, reported that they were involved in union activity to support market reform

Table 1 Workers on the Market Economy: Changing Support for Market Values (in %)

	1991	1992	1993
Full support for enterprise autonomy and tough competition between firms	83.6	75.4	72.4
Layoffs of unneeded employees	71.5	56.9	37.8
Bankruptcy of unprofitable firms	72.0	63.4	56.8

Source: Gardawski 1994 in Ost and Weinstein 1999.

Table 2 Reasons for Trade Union Activism (percentage of respondents responding "important" or "very important")

	<i>Solidarity</i>	<i>OPZZ/Branch Unions</i>
To support market reform	57.3	36.4
To speed privatization	53.1	42.0
To fight the Balcerowicz program	19.3	13.6

Source: Ost and Weinstein 1999, p. 12.

(see Table 2) (Ost and Weinstein 1999, p. 12). By contrast, relatively few opted for the opportunity to say that their activism stemmed from the desire to fight the shock therapy reforms of former finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz (Ost and Weinstein 1999). Nevertheless, union activists also estimated that only one-third to two-thirds of their members shared this position.

As can be seen in Table 3, an exception is the support for domestic agriculture protection. Despite slipping support for tariffs in general, 45 percent of the population still supports tariffs on the import of agricultural products.

Despite general support for market reforms, Poles feel a growing dissatisfaction with the direction in which Polish

capitalism is developing. The 1990s also saw a rise in the feeling that privatization was not in Poland's best interests (see Table 4). A poll in 2002 revealed that 74 percent of Poles associate privatization with selling out and theft. And 82 percent currently feel that Poland did not benefit from privatization as it was conducted (CBOS 2001b).

Widespread unemployment combined with the rise of a select group of entrepreneurs to great wealth, and frequent corruption scandals related to reform and insider privatization, have disillusioned much of the public about capitalism and democracy. As might be expected, the Polish public perceives politics as a self-interested power struggle where the strongest reap huge

Table 3 Perceptions of Agricultural Subsidies

	<i>July 1995</i>	<i>Aug. 1996</i>	<i>May 1997</i>	<i>May 1999</i>	<i>Sept. 2001</i>
	<i>Percent Agreed</i>				
Agriculture should be protected by duties, even if that means a rise in the price of foodstuffs.	53	61	63	66	45
Agriculture should not be protected by duties, because this causes a rise in the price of foodstuffs.	19	21	19	15	31

Source: CBOS 2001.

Table 4 Is Privatization Beneficial to Poland?

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	In Percent											
Beneficial	43	42	18	36	34	33	36	40	40	32	21	20
Equally	24	30	34	29	31	28	30	31	29	28	29	37
Beneficial and Detrimental												
Not	8	9	30	21	21	20	20	16	21	27	35	33
Beneficial												
Don't Know	25	19	18	14	14	19	14	13	10	13	15	10

Source: CBOS 2001.

rewards. The same belief is held about the market economy, which many view not as an institution with rules but rather as a system that benefits those who are strong enough to seize opportunities or gain access to political decisionmakers. Corruption is one of the critical issues in the public's attention to be addressed by politicians. Overall, in 2000, 41 percent believed that a market economy is the best system for Poland, but 38 percent stated that they were worse off than they expected after a decade of reform.

EU Membership

EU membership deserves special emphasis within debates about economics, as it has become a polarizing issue. Much of the public began to wonder if the benefits justified the costs. For the political right, membership in the EU symbolizes a permanent and irreversible break with Russia in favor of Poland's European identity. The importance of this move is attached to Polish fear of the eastern neighbor. This is clear given that four-fifths of respondents to a recent survey believe that Russia wants to recover its status as a superpower (*The Economist* 2001). In the words of Leszek Balcerowicz, EU

expansion would end the "unjust division" of Europe in 1945. This helps explain the wide gap between those for and against membership, especially given that two-thirds of Poles think they will be a second-class EU member "for the foreseeable future" (*The Economist* 2001).

Membership is also seen as a way of forcing the government to carry out reforms and industry to invest in the upgrades that are necessary to bring Poland to the level of its Western neighbors. Constituencies that stand to suffer from increased reform and competition harbor some reservations about Polish membership in the EU. The strongest opponents are supporters of the Self-Defense and Peasant Parties (CBOS 2002a).

A recent study finds that citizens' general attitudes toward democracy and a free-market economy are the strongest predictors of support for EU expansion (Cichowski 2000). "Political parties that represent a clear position on EU support are more likely to have supporters who favor EU membership" (Cichowski 2000, p. 1265). This and other studies do not show a strong link between economic variables, such as individual financial well-being and support for the




Figure 1 Support for EU Membership

Source: EuroBarometer, 1995–2001.

EU (Cichowski 2000; Duch and Taylor 1997).

Social and Moral Issues

The issue of abortion has been one of the most controversial and divides the public sharply (CBOS 1997b). From 1992 to 1998, support for abortion under any circumstances fell, as seen in Table 5 (CBOS 1998).

The church is another important issue in this context. Indeed, 95 percent of respondents to a CBOS survey in 1997 declared themselves as religious. Only one respondent in 20 was a declared atheist, whereas 14 percent characterized themselves as deeply religious. And 58 percent in March 2002 claimed to attend church once a week. The perception that the church has a large impact on Polish

Table 5 Support for Abortion under Certain Circumstances

	Yes	No	Yes	No
	<i>In Percent</i>			
	1992		1998	
Youth				
when the life of the mother is in danger?	82	11	80	12
when the pregnancy is the result of a rape?	74	16	65	24
when the woman just doesn't want a baby?	–	–	27	62
Adults				
when the life of the mother is in danger?	88	6	86	6
when the pregnancy is the result of a rape?	80	10	72	16
when the woman just doesn't want a baby?	–	–	27	58

Source: CBOS 1998.

politics declined since 1999, but 57 percent of respondents in 2002 still supported this view. Yet 42 percent believed that the church was still too strong, whereas 13 percent believed it should be stronger.

As for the role of women in society, in 1997, 44 percent of Poles felt that women held too few high-level positions in government and business, but only 21 percent favored legal remedies such as hiring quotas (CBOS 1997a).

History and the Past

Lustration and how to incorporate the past into Polish society continue to be areas of serious debate. This area can be divided into two broad thematic subsections: the problem of lustration and attitudes toward Jews and the Holocaust.

Understandings of the past have as much impact on attitudes toward reform as do personal economic assessments (Powers and Cox 1997). Within the general discourse of blame, they isolate two currents: one of "deep antipathy toward the communist past," and a second that

blames the Solidarity opposition leaders who became the early reformers and failed to realize the goals of the 1980s opposition movement (Powers and Cox 1997, p. 612).

Polish-Jewish relations and the debate over Polish anti-Semitism continues to be an issue despite an official Jewish population of less than 5,000. Polish-Jewish relations were again strained with the publication in 2000 of Jan Gross's *Neighbors* (Gross 2001), which identified the local population as the sole protagonists in the murder of Polish Jews in 1941 in the town of Jedwabne. The tension still present is apparent in the fact that 19 percent of Poles express "sympathy" toward Jews, whereas 26 percent profess indifference and 47 percent "dislike" in a survey of attitudes toward foreign nations conducted in 2001. Out of 27 nationalities listed in the survey, only Roma, Romanians, and Ukrainians were disliked by a higher percentage of respondents (CBOS 2001a; Ambrosewicz-Jacobs 2000).

*The Intensity and
Impact of Public Opinion*

Evidence of political mobilization in Polish society can be found in the fact that 55 percent of voters declared themselves "interested" and 13 percent "deeply interested" in the first local elections held in October 2002. The same survey revealed a growing frustration with politics and the current party conflicts. For example, 46 percent of respondents stated that in local elections they would prefer to vote for a mayoral candidate not affiliated with any party; 24 percent would vote for a candidate from the party with which they sympathize; and 30 percent declared themselves undecided (CBOS 2002b). The surprisingly low 35–40 percent turnout in the October elections led President Aleksander Kwasniewski to say that "it is still a long way to a civic society." Turnout at the 2001 parliamentary elections was also near 45 percent, with a rising percentage of voters saying, "I don't believe that elections will change anything" as a reason for not voting.

Indeed, when making policy decisions, public opinion often takes a secondary role to strategy or self-interest of parties and politicians. For example, international pressure to reduce the budget deficit has prevented any major concessions on social benefits in recent years. National strikes and demonstrations by

state employees, like those by teachers and health service employees in 2001, failed to extract raises in pay. Similarly, politicians frequently seem to judge the gain from insider dealings to be greater than the damage to public image that results from frequent scandals.

Therefore, the insecurity created by the economic transformations of the last decade has given rise to other expressions of public opinion, such as strikes and demonstrations, but the data in Table 5 show that their frequency and the level of participation in protest events have declined drastically since the mass unrest of the 1980s and early opposition to reform. Nevertheless, when economic conditions decline sufficiently, workers do resort to strikes (Ekiert and Kubik 1998; Przeworski 1996).

Despite the use of public opinion data in the press and the threat of protests and strikes, between elections public opinion continues to have less impact than might be expected. This can be explained by the fact that policymakers in Poland are caught between external pressure and their own vision about reform, and institutional flaws that continue to support a high level of political corruption and policymaking to suit particular interest groups. However, the public is becoming more vocal about the need to introduce anticorruption measures and create a more accountable political system. The

Table 6 Strikes and Lockouts in Poland

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Total	894	250	305	6,351	7,443	429	42	21	35	37	920	44
Workers involved in strikes												
Total	353,100	115,700	221,300	752,500	383,200	211,400	18,300	44,300	14,200	16,907	27,149	7,858

Source: Collected from the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS) by the International Labor Organization.

willingness of voters to punish politicians at the polls in the past suggests that the importance of public opinion will certainly increase in the future.

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Romania

Due to the long period of communism and the highly oppressive nature of the Romanian communist regime, public opinion and its study in Romania have a distinct dynamic even compared to other postcommunist countries. This entry will focus more on the postcommunist period.

Talking about public opinion under communism is hardly possible, of course, since few if any issues could be openly discussed and private opinions could not easily be made public. This is especially true in extreme cases like Romania, where the Nicolae Ceausescu regime tried to exert full control of the society, leading to an atomization of society and sizeable disjunction between public and private opinion. After World War II and until 1989, the most relevant attempts to measure public opinion were made by Pavel Câmpeanu and his team at the

communications department of the national television network in the short period of liberalization from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. This was the only period when some freedom of opinion was allowed on a restricted number of issues not touching upon the merits of the communist system as such or its proclaimed basic values. Câmpeanu's research unit was hidden in the complex structure of state television, and its scientific purposes were concealed as guidance for TV programming, although they were actually aiming to see the values and interests of the public (Câmpeanu 2002). Due to the eventual political swing toward the more oppressive Ceausescu dictatorship, this experimentation ceased before long. By 1989 even sociology departments were incorporated into the Communist Party's own school of party officials, where the teaching of Marxism-Leninism was the only goal, and there was no institution or person with a recent practice or up-to-date knowledge of opinion polling in the country.

With the demise of communism after the December 1989 revolution, the roles of public opinion and opinion polling changed radically. In the course of the 1990s, polls gradually became the central tool of assessing public opinion for both politicians and mass media, and at least lip service is paid to public opinion when controversial policy choices are made.

The Early 1990s: Exciting but Controversial Beginnings

The first postcommunist government acknowledged the need to study public opinion and tried to invite a Western European polling company to develop a state-of-the-art public opinion polling institute in Romania. Despite some initial interest from the French company

Sofres, the deal did not materialize, as the operation appeared to be prohibitively expensive (Datculescu 2002). Following bids from various groups of Romanian social scientists, the Romanian Institute for the Study of Public Opinion (IRSOP) was formed instead, under the directorship of Petre Datculescu, a psychologist aided by statistician Alexandru Bejan. IRSOP operated as a state-owned company on the basis of a one-year government grant until its privatization in 1991. IRSOP was the first institute to conduct opinion polls in the first months of 1990 and also carried out an exit poll in the May 1990 elections in collaboration with the German firm INFAS. At about the same time, Pavel Câmpeanu, the former pollster for Romanian television some twenty years earlier, and afterward a dissenter who authored a critical analysis of Stalinism published in the United States (Câmpeanu 1980), founded the Center for Public Polls of the Group for Social Dialogue, later renamed the Independent Center for Social Studies and Surveys (CIS). CIS was widely perceived as a proposition alternative to IRSOP, which, as a state-funded agency, was associated with the government, dominated up to late 1996 by former Communists who turned against Ceausescu's regime. Finally, the Institute for the Study of the Quality of Life (ICCV) also emerged in 1990 and has remained part of the Romanian Academy network ever since. The ICCV's surveys focused mostly on social issues related to the economic and political transition and produced a yearly diagnosis of quality of life in Romania.

A certain distrust of opinion polls prevailed in the mass public and among potential institutional users of polling data in the early 1990s. One reason was the lack of understanding of journalists

and politicians of the principles of opinion polling; another was the uncertainty over what the quality of polls in early 1990s Romania could be due to the apparent lack of trained social scientists and practical experience in the field. The high politicization of public life and polarization between former Communists and the anticommunist opposition in the early 1990s added a further element of mistrust; like everything in Romania at the time, public opinion polling agencies were considered partisan, and this bias was assumed to be reflected in the survey results. Large numbers of enthusiastic citizens participating at party-organized demonstrations and meeting with party leaders was considered stronger evidence of party popularity than poor poll ratings, which, in their turn, were considered biased and devoid of credibility.

High social desirability effects among the respondents were also assumed by commentators and pollsters. It was argued that after living for decades under a highly oppressive regime, the Romanian people were not yet ready to share their views with a stranger; therefore they were not sincere in their answers. Yet since most of the respondents were friendly with interviewers and apparently responsive, pollsters were reluctant to ask certain questions that might disturb them in any manner, that is, offend them or raise suspicion over the motives of the interviewer and the interview, or scare them off from answering. For instance, until 2002, in Romanian polls people were not asked about whether they were members of the Communist Party before 1990, although such a question was often asked after 1990 in several other postcommunist countries as it was deemed an important determinant of political attitudes. Instead, a strong but untested belief pre-

vailed among Romanian sociologists that Communist Party membership, since it was more widespread and even less voluntary in Romania than in other communist countries, was unlikely to be a predictor of attitudes or behavior, not even of conformism, after the fall of communism (Datculescu 2002; Kivu 2002; Sandu 2002).

In the incipient market of opinion polling, political connections were useful in obtaining contracts and visibility, but they turned out to be a double-edged sword since they damaged reputations. The association of IRSOP with the government and with state television, generally considered progovernment, rendered it untrustworthy for the anticommunist opposition and for a wider academic but nonspecialist circle, despite the relatively advanced knowledge of survey methodology and correct predictions. In 1990 the Institute for Marketing and Surveys (IMAS)-INFAS exit poll released two sets of predictions: one after the closing of the polls, and another (shown below in parentheses) a few hours later as the actual turnout figure became known. The figures gave 66 (65.5) percent of the vote to the National Salvation Front, 6 (7) percent to the Democratic Union of Hungarians, 10 (7.1) percent to the National Liberal Party, 5 (3) percent to the Environmental Movement, and 4 (3) percent to the National Christian Democratic Peasant Party. The actual election results of these parties were 66.3, 7.2, 6.4, 2.6, and 2.6 percent, respectively (see Datculescu and Liepelt 1991, pp. 39, 83). In 1992, the reputation of IRSOP was especially tarnished by the presentation of exit-poll results during Election Day on the news bulletins of national public television, which was criticized by the opposition parties and widely considered inappropriate. At

the same time, due to its sizeable errors in predicting the election outcome both in their preelection polls and in the exit polls in the 1992 elections, IMAS lost credibility on the political polling market for a long while, only to recapture it in the late 1990s.

*Professionalization and
Competition: Toward a Functioning
Public Opinion Polling Market*

A rather unsophisticated use of quota sampling and undertrained nonprofessional interviewers were major shortcomings of most polls in the early 1990s, a partial exception being IRSOP due to its collaboration with the German INFAS. In 1993–1994, probabilistic samples started to be used and became widespread by 1995–1996. In the absence of a reliable listing of the adult population of Romania, the sampling framework itself was at the center of methodological disputes, the electoral register being in the end generally accepted as the best available alternative. Capturing the significant differences between rural and urban populations in terms of both income and lifestyle has been important in designing questionnaires. Double-checking that the interviewers talked with the right person, as well as conscious efforts to minimize interviewer and question-order effects, is part of the remarkable progress in sampling, questionnaire design, and interviewing that all specialists acknowledge (Abraham and Lazaroiu 2001; Kivu 2002; Sandu 2002).

However, some residual wariness among Romanians to answer sensitive questions may survive; touchier questions still have lower response rates than other items. And income and property appear to be undervalued by the respondents compared to interviewers'

reports on the respondents' property and possessions. Unacceptably strong social desirability effects on responses cannot be completely ruled out, since 30 percent of interviews take place in the presence of a spouse or neighbors (see *Barometrul de Opinie Publica* 2002).

A decisive factor in the methodological improvements has been the Public Opinion Barometer (BOP), a regular public opinion survey initiated in 1994 by sociologist Alin Teodorescu, at the time president of the Romanian Soros Foundation. The BOP project provided public opinion researchers with the unique opportunity to discuss methodological matters with each other. In a bid to increase public confidence in surveys, opinion pollsters working for the Barometer surveys introduced very strict control mechanisms and made public both the methodological guidelines and the data files themselves. The board of the Barometer aimed to include the most reputable sociologists, and over time it co-opted representatives of a younger cohort of sociologists. Sociologist Dumitru Sandu was the first and the most significant influence on the methodological improvements introduced in the Barometer surveys, not only in terms of sampling and interviewing methodology but also regarding his interpretation of the range of relevant demographic distinctions (i.e., historic regions and rural/urban).

The growing demand for marketing research—accompanied by some increase in politicians' interest in surveys for electioneering purposes—was another critical factor that contributed to the professionalization of opinion polling and to a rise in the number of private polling companies. A competitive polling market emerged by the second half of the 1990s, and for the first time in the his-

tory of postcommunism, the 2000 elections' basically correct preelection and exit-poll predictions were available from all major polling companies.

To various degrees, all major polling companies conduct commercial marketing polls. Some, like IRSOP, attributed only 5 percent of their income to social and political surveys, whereas others, like the Center for Urban and Regional Sociology (CURS), attributed almost 100 percent. By 2002, the most important and reputable public opinion polling companies were CURS, Metromedia Transilvania, IMAS, and IRSOP, together with the Romanian branch of the Gallup organization and the Center for the Study of Opinion and Market. Since 1997, IMAS has undertaken a monthly public opinion barometer available by subscription that includes items on attitudes, current issues, retrospective and prospective evaluations, party preference, and so on. More recently, Metromedia Transilvania and CURS also started their own regular barometers of public opinion apart from their participation in the Soros Foundation-commissioned Barometer. All companies were commissioned polls by political parties and/or candidates, and some worked for the election campaign of a certain party or presidential candidate. Unlike in the early 1990s and in some other Eastern European countries, none of the polling companies are exclusively or generally associated with a political party.

Since public opinion in Romania could only be studied after 1989, the major topics in the polls were characteristic of the postcommunist period: economic and political transformation, the legacy of communism, and the form of state (republic or monarchy). Popular opinion on

these questions usually was polarized. Opinions were divided regarding the way in which economic reform should proceed. Across the 1995–1997 BOP surveys, fast privatization was the desire of 59 percent, whereas 41 percent on average preferred a slower, gradual process. Opinions were almost evenly split between supporters and opponents of closing down unprofitable (state-owned) companies (Public Opinion Barometer [POB], September 1997). Inflation has been the number-one fear for a plurality—on average, 40 percent—of Romanians, with personal health problems and a possible war in the region (Romania's southeastern neighbor is the war-ridden former Yugoslavia) finishing as distant runners-up on the list. The political elite—who they are and who they should be in terms of background and personal traits, how they behave and how they should behave, who they represent and their relationship with the people—has been constantly the focus of attention. Poor question wording and limited continuity over time only allow monitoring trends of opinion change on contentious issues over time on a few topics like self-reported poverty, life satisfaction, and a general evaluation of government performance.

Parties, Elections, and Opinion Polls

Opinion polls are frequently reported both in the press and on television, but journalists' and commentators' level of understanding remains problematic. The significance of changes in government performance evaluations or in politicians' ratings is often overinterpreted. The frequent fuss made about statistically insignificant changes, as well as inherent variations between poll results due to methodological differences between com-

panies, has helped entrench the belief that the results of opinion polls depend on who ordered the survey.

The main parties, although subject to splits and often appearing as parts of rapidly changing electoral alliances, went through a process of professionalization that strongly impacted electioneering strategies and increased their reliance on privately commissioned polls. The majority of the public (57 percent) followed the reports on opinion polls during the 2001 election year, and 65 percent of those exposed to polls trusted the results (POB May 2001). Election years bring a boom in opinion polling as well as in reporting of survey results, the 2000 election registering a record 27 polls published in the three preelection months. The issues covered by the media from the polls were almost exclusively the predicted vote shares of the parties and presidential candidates, with polls playing a major role in a horse-race-style coverage of the campaign. The differences between the various poll results became a popular subject of speculation, especially since there was an undifferentiated view on the reliability of the polls despite their considerable methodological diversity. Although the major polling companies gave basically correct predictions in their 19 polls, there were another eight polls reported in the press that were carried out by companies that never did surveys before or after the campaign. Since the media treated all surveys equally, the deviant forecasts of these ghost polling agencies created confusion that contributed to the eventual surprise caused by the election results (see also Aldea et al. 2001, p. 18). The activities of these agencies may thus have been successful in creating the impression of a much closer race and hence helped mobi-

lization and induced (or, in some other cases, prevented) tactical voting.

Conclusion

Since the fall of communism the role of polls has continued to grow due to the professionalization of electioneering and of party politics, as well as increased competition in the broadcasting sector. Yet the lack of tradition in measuring public opinion, in the analysis of such data, and in relying on public opinion requests in devising policies can still be noticed.

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Russia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent formation of the independent Russian Federation, public opinion research became a major focus of attention for academic researchers, public scholars, policy consultants, investors and business leaders, as well as political elites both within Russia and around the world. Since then, public opinion research has played a crucial role in providing answers to how Russian society is affected by the transition from communism. The ongoing processes of democratization and economic development in Russia have produced interesting questions and puzzles for public opinion research to unravel: public policy, voting behavior, party identification, approval of political elites, as well as support for democracy and democratic values in Russian society.

The Development of Public Opinion Research in Russia

Public opinion research was constrained under the regime of the Soviet Union. The study of public opinion, particularly public attitudes toward politics, was considered to be dangerous by the leadership of the Communist Party, as it threatened the ability to enforce the official interpretation of issues and events—the party line. Throughout much of Soviet history, the bulk of public opinion research was

confined to apolitical questions of labor/management relations and trade union participation and was collected by state ministries for internal use rather than public dissemination. Foreign agencies generally were not permitted to conduct public opinion research in the Soviet Union, and public opinion research of both foreign and domestic scholars was highly scrutinized and restricted. Although many foreign and domestic scholars learned to adapt to these realities to produce highly innovative and quality studies, public opinion research, particularly in the realm of politics, was a challenging undertaking.

The origins of contemporary Russian public opinion research began with the liberalization of state controls brought on by glasnost and perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s. In December of 1987, the Ministry of Labor and the All-Union Central Soviet of Trade Unions passed a resolution on the foundation of the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Research on Socio-Economic Issues (VCIOM). The creation of VCIOM marked a milestone for the expansion of public opinion research into the realm of politics. Although VCIOM operated under ideological dictates and constraints of party oversight until 1991, it did bring together a large group of scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds dedicated to the development of public opinion research and provided a facility for technical training and logistical networking for field research across Russia.

When Russia emerged as an independent state in 1992, an institutional basis for the expansion of public opinion research was already in place. Since 1992, a wide range of domestic and foreign-based research on public opinion in Rus-

sia has been developed and conducted. Scholars have used public opinion research to address a variety of issues in Russian politics and society, and both Russian and foreign political leaders now rely on public opinion research from a host of institutions and scholars in making assessments of Russian politics and public policy. The main institutions contributing to public opinion research in Russia are discussed below.

*The Russian Center for
Public Opinion Research*

VCIOM is the largest socioeconomic, sociopolitical, and marketing research organization in Russia. VCIOM is an independent nonprofit organization, with a network of 28 regional offices; it employs more than 3,000 trained interviewers across Russia and has partnership ties with research organizations around the world. VCIOM employs more than 100 specialists from sociology, political science, economics, and psychology. With financial assistance from the European Community in the early 1990s, VCIOM specialists obtained training in public opinion research methods from major European and U.S. research companies. Since 1991, VCIOM has conducted more than 1,000 mass surveys with more than 2 million people. It undertakes contracts from Russian state institutions, private enterprises, media agencies, and international research organizations. Its research has appeared in numerous journalistic and scientific publications and has contributed to many international comparative research programs. VCIOM is currently involved in a wide range of ongoing public opinion research programs. Major research programs are discussed below.

VCIOM conducts two standard omnibus surveys called Express and Monitor-

ing. Express is a nationally representative sample of 1,600 urban and rural respondents conducted on a monthly basis. Monitoring is a nationally representative sample of 2,100 urban and rural respondents conducted once every two months. Express is essentially a condensed version of the longer Monitoring survey and is useful for quick reference on major public opinion issues. Together, the Express and Monitoring surveys are representative of the collective activity of VCIOM research and have provided reliable long-term data on public opinion on social, political, and economic issues since 1993.

In addition to these surveys, VCIOM has been working since 1989 on a research program entitled *Homo Sovieticus*, which investigates the values and lifestyles of Russians after communism. Another research program, entitled *Institutions of Power*, investigates political preferences of Russian citizens. VCIOM also produces an annual survey of public opinion entitled *Results of the Year*, which chronicles the attitudes of Russians to major social, political, and economic events each year. In total, VCIOM has conducted more than 2,000 surveys since its founding in 1987 that can be obtained through the company's archive and publications.

VCIOM maintains an archive of all past research that can be accessed from the center's website (<http://www.vciom.ru>) or by written request. The latest analysis of public opinion from VCIOM can be accessed through the website and by subscription to VCIOM's bimonthly journal, *Russian Public Opinion Monitor: Economic and Social Changes*. The *Monitor* consists of more than 100 pages of analytical articles and data summaries. The *Monitor* has been published since 1993

and comprises more than 60 issues at present. Finally, VCIOM's monthly surveys of Russian public opinion (Express) can be accessed also from the Russia Votes website (www.russiavotes.org), which is maintained by the Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP) at the University of Strathclyde (www.cspp.strath.ac.uk). The CSPP has maintained a research partnership with VCIOM for years, conducting Barometer surveys in Russia.

The Center for the Study of Public Policy

CSPP, through its partnership with VCIOM, has become a leading figure in Russian public opinion research. CSPP receives funding from a host of governmental institutions for public opinion research in Russia (the European Commission, the World Bank, and the National Science Foundation). Since 1992, CSPP has contracted with VCIOM to produce the annual New Russia Barometer, a nationwide sample of 1,600–2,000 respondents on a wide range of social, economic, and political issues. There are currently 10 editions of the New Russia Barometer, including two special editions for the 2000 Russian presidential election.

CSPP provides access to data summaries, analysis, as well as raw data and questionnaires from the New Russia Barometer series on its website. CSPP also publishes a series of data analyses and research articles on Russian public opinion entitled *Studies in Public Policy*, which are available for order or subscription from the CSPP website. In addition, CSPP maintains on its website the useful Russian Regional Database, which consists of survey data and official statistics

on different regions and republics in Russia. Finally, data collected by CSPP and VCIOM have contributed to a multitude of scholarly publications in a range of books and journals. The CSPP website provides a bibliography of scholarly publications using the New Russia Barometer and other survey data. Many CSPP publications can be referenced through the principal investigator, Richard Rose, who serves as director of the CSPP.

The Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Group

The Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Group (ROMIR) is a smaller competitor to VCIOM; its research is on a par with VCIOM in terms of technical capabilities, scope, and analysis. ROMIR was founded in 1989–1990 as an independent research agency to conduct both social/political studies and market research. Like VCIOM, ROMIR is staffed by leading specialists in sociology, psychology, statistics, and so on who received training at Western European and U.S. universities. ROMIR currently has a staff of 50 specialists and employs 1,000 part-time interviewers in Russia and 500 in other CIS and Baltic states. ROMIR's clients include Russian government agencies, private enterprises, media companies, and international research organizations. ROMIR has been contracted to participate in a number of large-scale international projects, including the Central and East European Eurobarometer (CEEB) and the World Values Survey (WVS).

Recent research studies by ROMIR are published on its website (www.romir.ru). Access to raw data and questionnaires, however, is limited. The results of major international public opinion studies of

Russia that were conducted by ROMIR can be accessed through the websites of sponsoring agencies.

From 1990 to 1997, ROMIR collected data on Russian public opinion for the annual Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, sponsored by the European Commission. The CEEB consists of public opinion data on up to 20 former communist countries in Eastern Europe, including Russia. Each survey includes questions on social, economic, and political conditions for each survey country as well as questions regarding perceptions of European integration and the European Community/European Union. CEEB summary reports, data, and questionnaires can be obtained from a number of sources: the Central Archive for Empirical Social Research, University of Cologne (www.gesis.org/en/za/index.htm); the Council of European Social Science Data Archives (www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/index.html); the European Consortium for Political Research (www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR); and the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (www.icpsr.umich.edu/) all provide access to CEEB data. After 1997, the CEEB project was discontinued.

ROMIR has also conducted fieldwork in Russia for the third and fourth waves (1995–1996 and 1999–2001) of the World Values Survey. The WVS consists of public opinion data on social, cultural, political, and economic issues in more than 65 countries from around the world. ROMIR conducted interviews of more than 1,000 respondents across Russia for each of the two WVS surveys in which Russia has participated. WVS data on Russia and other countries can be obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, and details regarding the World Values Survey project, includ-

ing the contact information for principal investigators for each country, WVS survey methodology, and WVS publications, can be obtained from the WVS website (<http://wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.html>).

Finally, ROMIR is the Russian affiliate company of Gallup International and conducts all of Gallup's public opinion research in Russia for the annual Gallup International End of Year Survey and other Gallup projects. For information on Gallup-ROMIR research on Russian public opinion, consult the Gallup International website (www.gallup-international.com).

The Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences

The Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences has been one of the leading academic institutes for survey research both under the Soviet Union and since Russian independence. Unlike VCIOM and ROMIR, the Institute of Sociology focuses on completing a small number of large-scale academic projects each year. One of the largest independent survey research groups in the institute is Demoscope, led by Polina Kozyreva and Mikhail Kosolapov who, in collaboration with the late Michael Swafford of Paragon Research International, Inc., conducted research for international clients such as the BBC, the World Bank, USAID, the National Science Foundation, the Harvard University Russian Research Center, and the University of North Carolina (UNC). The affiliation with the UNC–Chapel Hill Carolina Population Center has been particularly important in providing funding for the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, which has been administered ten times nationwide across Russia since 1992 to assess the economic

and social impacts of the transition process on the Russian population.

Data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey can be accessed from the website www.coc.unc.edu/rlms. For more information regarding the activity and publications of Demoscope and the Institute of Sociology, contact the institute.

The Public Opinion Foundation

The Public Opinion Foundation (POF) is a highly valuable source of information for population and expert opinion polls. POF is an association of public opinion research institutions and provides a wealth of public opinion data from a single English-language-accessible website (www.fom.ru). POF online publications include a weekly series, info bulletin, and monthly digest and essay series. POF collects and publishes public opinion polling data and analysis in conjunction with a host of partner public opinion and market research organizations.

Other Sources for Public Opinion Research in Russia

The number of institutions and firms conducting public opinion and marketing research and providing analysis, publications, and consultancy grows each year, while established organizations constantly expand and improve on their research scope and capabilities. In order to keep abreast of the changes in Russian public opinion research, consult the World Association of Public Opinion and Marketing Research Professionals (ESOMAR) at www.esomar.com.

Established in 1948, ESOMAR currently includes more than 4,000 institutional members from more than 100 countries. In order to obtain ESOMAR membership, public opinion and market-

ing research institutions must agree to comply with the International Code of Marketing and Social Research Practice, which provides assurance that member institutions conduct research according to standard international procedures and ethical research practices. With respect to public opinion research in Russia, ESOMAR provides a standard for evaluating the standards and reliability of information provided by various research organizations. Although all of the key players in Russian public opinion research are ESOMAR-accredited, many of the newer research firms are not (consult the ESOMAR directory for Russia at www.esomar.nl/countries/directory_rus.html). The site provides a useful list of leading public opinion and marketing companies, a breakdown of their methodological areas of expertise, and local contact information.

Conclusion

The role of public opinion studies in Russia's first decade of democratic transition and consolidation has continued to expand. The development of sophisticated and competitive public opinion research institutes and the range of survey and polling research by these companies signify a strong demand for public opinion data in Russia. The demand is driven by domestic political elites, party organizations, government agencies, and local scholars, international intergovernmental organizations, foreign states, foreign scholars, and multinational corporations. The substantive interest is derived from a range of electoral, political, policy-making, socioeconomic, cultural, and broader theoretical interests. As such, the argument that public opinion research matters can be made definitively in the case of Russia. However, specific inter-

ests in public opinion data may vary considerably. Russia is not a country whose politics is driven extensively by public opinion polls and survey research. One can speculate as to the extent to which public opinion affects the decisionmaking of Russian political elites in terms of major policy issues such as East-West relations, ongoing civil war in Chechnya, and the effects of democratic and market transition.

What can be concluded is that public opinion research has become institutionalized through various research organizations and that a spectrum of interests has been generated and is being sustained. Given the current trajectory of the growth and development in public opinion research, if Russia continues along a path of democratic consolidation, then the impact of public opinion on politics and government should increase, as should the demands for public opinion research.

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Slovakia

The social legacy of communist rule, some scholars have argued, is the flatten-

ing of the social landscape, characterized by atomized social relationships, disaggregated social classes, the retreat of citizens from the public to the private domain, and distrust of all things political (Whitefield 2002; Evans and Whitefield 2000; Ost 1993; Elster, Offe, and Preusse 1998; White, Rose, and McAllister 1997; Wolchik 1997). At first glance, Slovakia's uneven democratic development appears to support the tabula rasa thesis. Authoritarian parties and politicians have been voted into power time and again since the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. However, a closer look at public attitudes indicates the public desires something altogether different: international democratic integration and the elimination of authoritarianism in government.

Brief Political History of Slovakia

Crucial to understanding public opinion in Slovakia is an understanding of Slovakia's recent political history. Slovakia's forty years under communism were strictly overseen by the Soviet Union, punctuated briefly in 1968 by the events following Alexander Dubcek's rise to party leadership. Dubcek's proposed democratic reforms—"socialism with a human face"—set the stage for the popular Prague Spring uprising, which was soon crushed by Warsaw Pact armed troops. Following Dubcek's replacement with a hard-line Communist, Gustav Husak, the period of normalization began. During the 1970s and 1980s, the regime attempted to repress any opposition, while the dissident movement strengthened, mainly in the Czech Republic. In 1977, more than 250 dissidents signed the Charter 77 manifesto, which publicly criticized the regime for violating human rights (Bugajski 2002).

On November 17, 1989, a series of popular political protests began, culminating in the capitulation of the communist regime—the Velvet Revolution. A transitional government was set up with former dissidents in leadership positions in December 1989, followed by free elections in June 1990, the first since 1948. Charter 77 and other groups united to become the umbrella political party Civic Forum, advocating administrative reform and civil liberties. Civic Forum's leader was the playwright, philosopher, and future president of Czechoslovakia (and later Czech Republic), Václav Havel. Civic Forum's Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence, was based on the same principles (Bugajski 2002).

The elections of 1990 brought massive victories for Public Against Violence in Slovakia's federal Chamber of the People and Chamber of Nations and its National Council (parliament) and for Civic Forum in the Czech federal Chambers and Council. However, the dissident groups who helped overthrow the communist regime were not as effective as governing political parties, and they soon began to splinter into smaller groups (Bugajski 2002). A discussion of milestones in Slovak elections since 1990 follows.

Milestones in Slovak Elections

The 1992 parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia fostered two pivotal events in the country. First, they set the stage for the Velvet Divorce, the official division of the country into two new states, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. An additional consequence for Slovakia was the consolidation of the authoritarian Vladimír Mečiar's political power, at least for the next six years.

The winners of the 1992 elections, Václav Klaus from the Civic Democratic

Party (ODS, once part of Civic Forum), and Vladimír Mečiar, founder of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), campaigned on the issues of economic reform and Slovak autonomy, respectively. However, it is likely that the citizens who elected Mečiar did not know that it was an effective mandate for the separation of Czechoslovakia. Slovak analysts argue that both Mečiar and Klaus knew that a popular referendum on the proposed division of the country would have resulted in deadlock, as repeated public opinion surveys conducted by several agencies showed that most citizens would have opposed the breakup, despite the inability of Czech and Slovak political leaders to agree on the particular form of coexistence (Bútorová and Bútor 1993, 1995, 1998a; Bútor, Bútorová, and Gyárfašová 1994; Musil 1997; Bugajski 2002).

The parliamentary elections of 1994 brought Mečiar's return to prime minister and, with it, continued disregard for the rule of law and civil liberties. Mečiar's political strategy was characterized by nationalism, populism, patronage, and political favoritism. He also deliberately polarized Slovak society to enhance his own image. Using a form of the classic divide and rule, Mečiar's rhetoric divided citizens and politicians into good and bad Slovaks, in order to undermine any domestic opposition. Not surprisingly, the fractured democratic political opposition to Mečiar was unable to mount a united alternative (or gain much electoral support) for much of the 1990s (Bútorová and Bútor 1998a; Kirschbaum 1995).

Mečiar's prominent position aggravated Slovakia's increasing isolation from the international community. After being considered a prime candidate for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European

Union (EU) in 1993, Slovakia was rejected for the first round of candidacy for NATO and EU membership in 1997, indicating, as scholars have argued, that the separation of Czechoslovakia was finally consolidated (Bútorová and Bútor 1998a; Bugajski 2002). In 1997, the Freedom House's evaluation of Slovakia was a transitional government, ranked behind the other consolidated democracies of the Visegrad three (Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary), and even behind the transitional government of Russia (Karatnycky, Motyl, and Shor 1997; Bútorová and Bútor 1998a).

The parliamentary elections of 1998 brought a welcome change to Slovak politics. A coalition of opposition parties led by Mikuláš Dzurinda of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) managed to unite against Meciar's HZDS. Even though HZDS won the majority of electoral votes, no party was willing to enter into a coalition agreement with it. Dzurinda's new coalition government included leftist, centrist, and rightist parties that agreed to bring Slovakia back onto the path of European integration (Bugajski 2002). In a direct election, pro-West Rudolf Schuster was elected president of Slovakia in March 1999 in a decisive win over Meciar. Under Dzurinda's government, Slovakia entered the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), closed almost all of the chapters for membership in the EU, and became a candidate for NATO membership.

Polls predicted a strong win by Meciar in the 2002 parliamentary elections. However, a surprise surge in votes for opposition parties enabled the formation of a center-right coalition against Meciar, with Dzurinda again at the helm. This current reformist government is focused

on NATO and EU membership, strengthening social and economic reforms, and further stabilizing the institutional system (Meseûnikov 2002).

Public Opinion Trends

The study of Slovak public opinion is still in its infancy. Data about Slovak public opinion are somewhat limited, as public opinion firms have had the freedom to conduct surveys for little more than ten years, and political pressure to limit political polling has been rampant. Moreover, the range of topics examined with surveys is small, and more sophisticated experimental work on latent attitudes has yet to begin. However, surveys do exist that measure basic political attitudes, such as those conducted by independent firms in Slovakia like FOCUS and the Institute for Public Affairs, the Applicant Countries Eurobarometer, and the New Democracies Barometer.

This section seeks to detail trends in Slovak public opinion with available data from 1991 to 1998. A number of political, economic, and social issues are salient to Slovak citizens. Membership in international organizations, such as the EU and NATO, and specific domestic policies, such as economic reform, continue to be prominent in the Slovak political agenda. Developing partisanship is one area that is closely watched by political scientists and sociologists, particularly after Slovakia's troubled early years of democracy. The social attitudes of Slovaks, such as racism, attitudes toward democracy and market reform, egalitarianism, and pro-Western/anti-Western attitudes, are also of particular interest to scholars, as such values often predict ideology.

Scholars have long argued that attitudes toward all sorts of political issues, as well as partisanship and ideology, are

structured by social values and, in the case of postcommunist Europe, responses to transition to democracy and a market economy (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Krause 2000; Tóka 1998). Given the authoritarian development of Slovakia under Mečiar, reactions to the old communist regime, the problematic democratic government, and the winners and losers from economic reform are likely to inform other political attitudes.

Reactions to the Triple Transition

Unique to postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe is the triple transition: the simultaneous transition from communism to democracy, socialist economy to free-market economy, and no civil society to civil society. Given the obvious difficulties of engineering such a monumental change, some citizens are bound to be left behind and, consequently, are disapproving of the regime that enacts such change. As the triple transition has continued in Slovakia, it is not surprising that a number of citizens express nostalgia for the communist past, when everyone was at least guaranteed some standard of living, albeit at the expense of civil rights and freedoms. Typically, pensioners and farmers express the most nostalgia for the past, as their economic existence is now in question (Haerpfer 2002).

However, it is not only pensioners and farmers who are not enthusiastic supporters of democracy. When asked to compare the pre-1989 communist regime with the current regime, the majority of Slovaks are pessimistic. As late as 1997, 42 percent believed the communist regime offered more advantages, 18 percent believed both regimes to be about the same, and only 36 percent believed the current regime had more advantages (Bútorová 1998). In general, life is rated as better

under the current regime by the younger generation; by people with the highest levels of education and foreign-language skills; by professionals, managers, students, and entrepreneurs; and by citizens who live in large cities (Bratislava and Košice). Citizens over 60 years of age, pensioners, unskilled workers, people with the lowest levels of education, and the unemployed are more likely to believe that there were better chances in life before 1989 (Bútorová 1998). Given the largely rural sociodemographic of Slovakia, this accounts for a great deal of the population.

Slovaks do not appear to overwhelmingly support a market economy, either. Citizens' evaluations of the economic system in five years have actually declined by 9 percent from 1991 to 1998 (Haerpfer 2002). Surveys show that since 1994, Slovak citizens have underestimated the depth of economic restructuring needed after the collapse of the socialist economy (Bútorová 1998). It is likely that many did not sufficiently understand the limits to a centrally planned socialist economy. Surprisingly, even given what we know about the stagnation of democracy and the economy under Mečiar's tenure, a majority of citizens (52 percent) were still doubtful about the necessity of fundamental economic reform (Bútorová 1998).

Even though Slovakia has been an independent state since 1993, attitudes against Czechoslovakia's separation have remained remarkably stable. In 1994, 27 percent of Slovak respondents stated that they would have voted in favor of separation in a referendum, whereas 67 percent would have voted against separation. Citizens had similar views in 1997; 67 percent were still critical of the separation (Bútorová 1998).

Value Orientations

Few would disagree with the statement that democracy requires democratic values (for an early proponent of this view, see Inglehart 1970, 1977). Yet the existence of democratic values in postcommunist societies cannot be taken for granted. Bratislava's Institute for Public Affairs measured Slovak citizens' value orientations in 1997, focusing on the 10 value orientations that it perceives as barriers to Slovakia's political and social transformation. These identified value orientations, constructed from indices (Kriř 1998), include measures of authoritarianism, ethnic intolerance, anti-Westernism, disrespect for the law, provincial isolationism, paternalism, egalitarianism, ruralism, helplessness, and clientelism. The institute found that 39.7 percent of Slovaks have an authoritarian value orientation; 53.8 percent are ethnically intolerant; 34.7 percent are anti-Western; 32.6 percent lack respect for the law; 49.7 percent have a provincial isolationism value orientation; 65.4 are paternalistic; 51.7 percent are egalitarian; 63.4 percent are ruralistic; 56.3 percent feel helpless (or, put another way, do not feel efficacious); and 68.3 percent have a clientelistic value orientation (Kriř 1998, p. 41). Clearly, these findings are pessimistic for the social bases of democracy. On the whole, Slovaks with the lowest levels of education are substantially stronger in all of these value orientations than those with the highest levels of education, with the exception of the clientelistic value dimension (Kriř 1998).

These findings indicate a clash of values between authoritarian and democratic tendencies in the public. Authoritarian tendencies are associated with anti-Westernism, ethnic intolerance, and disrespect for the law, and they are most

often found among the oldest, the poorly educated, and the unskilled in the population. Democratic tendencies are present mainly among the highly educated, younger generations, students, professionals, senior managers, and entrepreneurs (Kriř 1998).

*Attitudes toward the Most**Important Problems*

Several issues are salient to Slovak citizens. A clear majority of Slovak citizens believe that living standards and social security are the most pressing problems in Slovakia (Bútorová and Gyárfášová 1998). Other pressing problems are crime and personal safety, unemployment, politics and democracy, and economics and privatization (Bútorová and Gyárfášová 1998).

Partisanship

In terms of partisanship, supporters of HZDS are more likely to be among the least educated in society, and supporters of Dzurinda's broad coalition are more likely to be among those with the most education. Men are more likely to vote in general, while women account for as much as 65 percent of the undecided and 59 percent of the nonvoters (Bútorová, Gyárfášová, and Kriř 1998). Older citizens (more than 55 years old) and the unemployed are more likely to vote for HZDS; younger citizens and the employed are more likely to vote for parties from Dzurinda's coalition (Bútorová, Gyárfášová, and Kriř 1998).

Political scientists have theorized (after Lipset and Rokkan's seminal 1967 work) that enduring political cleavages are necessary for stable democracy and stable partisanship (Whitefield 2002; Krause 2000; Tóka 1998). Others (Evans and Whitefield 2000) have attempted to

identify developing social and ideological divisions to partisanship in Central and Eastern Europe. They found that Slovaks cleave *socially* along lines of ethnicity (mainly Hungarian, who represent 10 percent of the official population in Slovakia), religiosity (more than half of the Slovak population is Catholic), ethnicity (other ethnics, such as the Roma/gypsies, which are unofficially estimated to represent 10 percent of the population, and a much smaller Ruthenian minority in eastern Slovakia), and age and sector. These social divisions are thought to provide the sociostructural basis for political cleavages (i.e., in the tradition of Lipset and Rokkan 1967; see also Evans and Whitefield 2000). Ideologically, Slovaks split according to ethnic liberalism, economic liberalism, pro-West/anti-West, and social and political liberalism, manifested in attitudes toward the Roma. The endurance of these developing cleavages remains to be seen.

Attitudes toward the EU and NATO

The majority of Slovaks support their country's membership in the EU, and this has remained remarkably stable over time: 89 percent supported EU membership in 1994, and in 1998, 84 percent supported membership. A majority of Slovaks also support NATO membership, but their support is not as strong as for membership in the EU. In the period 1996–1998, Slovak support for NATO membership decreased slightly, from 62 percent to 60 percent (Haerpfer 2002). From 1999 to 2001, public support for NATO membership dropped even more, from 42 percent in early 1999 to 48 percent in mid-2001 (Gyárfašová and Križ 2001). Citizens who support EU and NATO membership are also more likely to support a market economy and a plu-

ralist democracy and are more tolerant of other ethnic groups (Bútorová and Bútorá 1998b; Haerpfer 2002).

Conclusion

What we know about Slovak public opinion is in its infancy. Likewise, public opinion polling in Slovakia is only just beginning. Public opinion polling existed under communism in the form of the Public Opinion Research Institute, but it was under strict control of the regime. Only topics considered safe by the regime were allowed to be examined, and not surprisingly, findings could not be trusted, as they were engineered and interpreted so that they would obey the ideology of building real socialism (Gyárfašová 2001). After 1989, the Public Opinion Research Institute in Bratislava and Prague (Czech Republic), along with other major institutions still in existence, such as GfK, led the revival of the political information market. However, after the split of Czechoslovakia, publicly accessible information from opinion polls was reduced, as many polling firms, based in Prague, limited or eliminated their polling in Slovakia (Gyárfašová 2001).

After the 1994 elections, public opinion polling in Slovakia underwent further turmoil: political parties, such as the HZDS, began accusing polling firms of deliberately misleading the public. As a result, survey results about the most sensitive topics practically disappeared from the public agenda, such as the monitoring of voting preferences of parties and the credibility of politicians (Gyárfašová 2001).

However, after the success of pro-democracy parties in the 1998 elections, the political pressures on public opinion polling eased considerably. Despite a growing campaign before the 1998 elec-

tions to discredit public opinion poll surveys, exit polls were carried out for the first time during these elections. This is noteworthy given that surveys of voting behavior (and predicting voting behavior) have typically been problematic in Slovakia. Pollsters and analysts do not have many years of experience, and consistent empirical findings do not exist that would enable them to forecast the voting behavior of sociodemographic groups. A compounding problem is an amendment to the election law that extends the moratorium on the public availability of voting preferences from public opinion polls from seven to 14 days (Gyárfašová 2001).

Methodological issues also exist with polling firms in Slovakia. Computer-assisted telephone interviewing is difficult to undertake in Slovakia, as few (if any) firms possess this technology. Moreover, most polls are conducted face-to-face, but this is expensive; however, the limits to representativeness in telephone interviewing are unknown. There also is an increasing unwillingness on the part of elites and the general population to respond to public opinion polls. A professional association, the Slovak Association of Research Agencies, was established in 1999 to set standard criteria for professional research (Gyárfašová 2001).

The nature of Slovak public opinion remains a study in progress. Given the problems of polling in Slovakia, coupled with little existing data on what Slovaks actually think about politics, this field begs for further examination.

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South Africa

A historical context of public opinion surveys in South Africa is essential, especially in a country that has experienced long periods of political upheaval. The methodologies that have been used in public opinion surveys in South Africa have been influenced by the political environment of the time. The political events include the mass mobilization against apartheid during the 1950s that was led mainly by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). The apartheid government banned the two organizations in 1961. Black mass politics resurfaced in the 1970s in the form of black-led trade unionism. Another political force was the black consciousness movement led by Steve Biko, who was later assassinated by operatives of the apartheid government. The black consciousness movement, among other factors, precipitated

the student revolt of 1976 (Kane-Berman 1978).

The democratic elections of 1994 and accompanying transformation process that touched every sector of South African society brought another dimension to public opinion surveys. Although some of the focus issues in public opinion surveys have transcended the historical political events, new ones have been added depending on the interest of the organization conducting the survey. Two major and related sets of social attitude surveys were conducted in South Africa in the decades before the democratic elections of 1994; one dealt with political options for conflict regulation, and the other dealt with black attitudes toward disinvestments and sanctions (Orkin 1998). The two furnish two case studies, the first starting just before the mid-1970s student revolt, the second just before the insurgency of the mid-1980s. They show how political considerations relate to practical decisions in the conduct of empirical surveys in an unevenly developed, ethnically diverse, and politically charged social context.

Political attitude studies during the transition to democracy in South Africa were an aspect of the ideological conflict. The apartheid government, organized business, the antiapartheid opposition, and foreign governments, in justifying their policies, often quoted social attitude survey findings. A pioneering sociopolitical attitudes survey by a political sociologist, Theo Hanf, and his colleagues was conducted at both the leadership and the grassroots levels among whites and some urban blacks. The study recommended some degree of institutional recognition, in an ethnically and racially plural society like South Africa, of the cultural and political autonomy of

various groups, sustained by elite negotiation (Hanf et al. 1981). The recommendations of the study are clear indications of the objectives of the survey, that is, to support the apartheid government policy of racial segregation.

Another social attitude survey conducted in the 1980s is one by Lawrence Schlemmer among selected samples for the Buthelezi Commission (1982). The Bureau for Information in 1987 and the Chamber of Mines in 1989 also conducted attitude surveys, but they avoided testing support for political movements that were fighting to end apartheid rule in South Africa. Foreign organizations such as the London *Sunday Times* (reported in the Johannesburg *Sunday Star* 1985) conducted opinion surveys regarding international sanctions on South Africa and found sanction supporters were in the majority. Public opinion surveys and outputs in South Africa have been supported by both local and foreign governments and nongovernmental organization (NGO) agencies.

Who Conducts Opinion Surveys in South Africa?

Prior to the democratic elections of 1994, public opinion surveys were conducted by governments and their bureaus, international agencies, and large corporations. These studies were expensive due to the required large-scale samples. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) is one of the major organizations that have been involved in public opinion surveys since the late 1980s. Although HSRC's research agenda was considered that of the apartheid government, this view has changed since the democratic elections of 1994. The aim of the HSRC's social opinion surveys in South Africa is to regularly provide reliable scientific data and

subsequent analysis on various national social priority issues. A national program committee of HSRC staff and stakeholders identifies key issues in South African society, then the survey is conducted, data are analyzed, and results are disseminated on a national basis. After democracy, a wide range of organizations, including government, NGOs, civil society organizations, and international agencies, have become involved in conducting social surveys. For example, the South African Broadcasting Corporation, in partnership with the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Markinor, conducted opinion polls in the run-up to elections since 1994. The year 1999 saw the launch of the first round of the Southern African Democracy Barometer (SADB), a regular multicountry, nationally representative survey currently conducted in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SADB measures public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic governance on people's everyday lives, survival strategies, and political participation. This initiative has generated a comparable, sustainable, and disseminable base of critical and largely untapped information about the prospects, challenges, and opportunities for democratization and consolidation in southern Africa. Although IDASA's Public Opinion Services coordinates this project from South Africa, the project is a collective effort involving the participation of national research partners from all relevant states, as well as the input of noted international experts of public opinion and democratization.

How Is Information on Public Opinion Collected?

The intersection of practical choices made by a researcher in the six critical phases of a project—sampling, questionnaire design, fieldwork, analysis, interpretation, and dissemination—constituted a serious problem in conducting social opinion surveys in South Africa during the apartheid era. Sampling design was largely purposive or quota-based and tended to be nonprobabilistic and excluded certain groups of people, for example black women and the rural population. Studies were more focused on interviewing whites and black men from urban areas. Instead of using nationwide probability samples, most of the studies conducted before 1994 were ethnically or geographically stipulated quotas that were aggregated in some impressionistic fashion. The studies also tended to select those people who were easiest to interview and with whom the researcher felt most comfortable (De Vaus 1990, p. 78). Results from such studies were wrongly generalized to the wider population despite the fact that the sampling designs used were nonprobabilistic.

Questions were intentionally structured to elicit certain responses, especially from the black population. The issue on the structure of questions touched on format, phrasing, and sequencing of questions. The interpretation of data was also meant to serve such forces. The democratic changes in South Africa have resulted in a shift to more scientifically sound research designs being adopted by most of the survey organizations. For example, the HSRC conducts a nationally representative sample covering a cross section of socioeconomic variables such as urban/rural. Census enumerator

areas are used as the clusters from which households are drawn, and respondents are drawn at random from the qualifying household members. The realized sample is weighted according to the most recent national census biographical features of the South African population of 18 years and older. The biographical features of the sample include socioeconomic classifications, race, gender, age group, marital status, educational qualification, language group, income, and occupation. The government and community-based organizations make use of public opinion research findings in addressing societal concerns and problems.

What Are the Key Issues That Occupy Public Thinking?

In order to assess progress toward democratic consolidation, regular public opinion surveys monitor public attitudes at different conceptual levels: commitment to democracy; government institutions; economy and development; diversity and nation-building; citizenship rights, duties, and obligations; voting and elections; crime and policing; and migration in South and southern Africa. Most public opinion surveys measure perceptions of the voting public of the governance and the sociopolitical and economic environment in which democracy must be consolidated. More specifically the surveys explore public views on perceptions of national, provincial, and local government performance; satisfaction concerning political and economic conditions; government control over and handling of crime; and the evaluation of government in terms of fairness, effectiveness, transparency, power, and honor. Indicators of the potential for violence have also been measured in public opinion surveys.

These include political and economic dissatisfaction, expectations and the nonrealization of expectations, the feeling of security/insecurity, the feeling of political power, the legitimacy of the government, and racial tolerance. Other issues are health care, provision of water and electricity, housing, corruption in government service, and control of immigrants to South Africa; these are of central concern to the South African public and are getting the attention of public opinion survey research houses.

Findings of the Public Opinion Surveys in South Africa

There is widespread popular support for democracy in South Africa. However, there has been a decrease in positive evaluation of the government since 1994 because of contrasting racial and political party affiliation differences. People understand the meaning of democracy as based on civil rights and personal freedoms, popular government, and elections and voting. State and government institutions receive mixed ratings when it comes to the key dimensions of trust, responsiveness, corruption in government, and overall job performance. In fact, a considerable proportion of South Africans feel that the performance of their current government is no better, or even worse, than their former government. South Africans do, however, tend to retain a sense of optimism about the positive potential of the vote, as well as the importance of winning political power through elections.

Economic growth, as indicated by the number of employment opportunities, is not keeping pace with the growth of the country's economically active population. Government is urged to speedily

implement its macroeconomic strategy for growth, employment creation, and redistribution. According to Statistics South Africa's October household survey of 1995, 29 percent of the economically active population was unemployed. Although this is in line with the International Labor Organization estimate (the world's unemployed workforce is 30 percent; *Quarterly Economic Review*, March 1997, p. 1), the government is still accused of an inability to create jobs. Corruption undermines economic recovery and has been seen to increase over the years, especially in public service. Since 1994, the feeling of security seems to have decreased. Government is perceived as not having adequate control over crime. Deterioration of racial intolerance, despite the fundamental transformation of South African society, has not given rise to racial tolerance. The clear message for democracy advocates, elected representatives, policymakers, and constitutional designers alike is that there is a dire need to build government institutions that are seen to be trustworthy, free of corruption, responsive, and effective.

What Role Do Public Opinion Surveys Play in the National Agenda?

Monitoring public opinion on democratic values, support for institutions, and perceptions of social justice allows for the assessment of the country's progress toward a consolidated democracy and the identification of key areas of concern and success. It also helps leaders and civil society understand public opinion as expressed through and between elections. Public opinion surveys provide crucial information about the current state and future state of democratic governance in South Africa to elected representatives, policymakers, democracy advocates, civil

society organizations, media, and scholars. They also provide ordinary people with a voice independent of politicians, traditional leaders, and journalists.

Public opinion surveys build government and civic society capacity for democracy by measuring attitudes on democracy, governance, and development, assessing needs and identifying solutions in consolidating democracy; by getting usable data into the hands of those in government and civil society who can act on the results; by using the findings to educate and train policymakers and civil society; and by building capacity in government, civil society, and academia to make greater use of surveys and attitude research—thereby making society more transparent. Results of the opinion surveys are disseminated in different ways; for example, they receive widespread coverage and comment on South African TV and radio networks and in national newspapers. The findings are also disseminated through research reports, press briefings, leadership briefings, publications, inserts and articles for newspapers and magazines, workshops and seminar presentations to civil society and government, conferences on important selected themes, submissions to parliamentary committees and government commissions, popular books, and research articles in scholarly journals.

The Conceptualization of Public Opinion in South Africa

The aim of public opinion surveys on national issues in South Africa is to regularly provide reliable scientific data and subsequent analysis on various national social priority issues. The majority of the organizations involved in public opinion surveys endeavor to pursue scientifically sound research methodologies. However,

the reality on the ground is that some fail to meet expectations. The public opinion surveys in South Africa are based on a belief that the capacity for a young democracy entails citizens who are knowledgeable about their government, who are ready to demand rights and meet responsibilities, who participate in politics, who tolerate opponents, and who would be willing to defend democracy if it came under threat. Another argument put forward is that democracy requires that elected government officials, political parties, and civil society organizations are able to represent citizens and meet their needs based on an understanding of what citizens want, what they are doing, and what they might do. The majority of the organizations involved in public opinion surveys therefore monitor, research, and disseminate information about popular opinion by conducting periodic opinion surveys. According to IDASA's Public Opinion Services (POS) of 1999, the overall aim of public opinion surveys is to promote sustainable democracy by educating citizens about democracy, by building strong institutions, and by advocating social justice. POS supports the overall mission by regularly monitoring the development of South Africans' democratic values, their assessments of democratic institutions, their perceptions of social justice in terms of how they are treated by those institutions, and quality of life. POS also monitors public opinion on selected issues of interest in order to provide a critical channel through which the opinions of ordinary South Africans may be heard.

Conclusion

Organizations involved in public opinion surveys are actively exploring ways to provide continuing support for future

research by identifying potential funders and preparing proposals for new projects. They are also achieving this by collaborating with other research institutions or universities and NGOs. Partnerships are built with interested government departments, media, and civil society organizations in discussing or further analyzing research information and results or to conduct new research on related topics. The South African Department of Government Communication Information Services is responsible for all forms of government communication; it also conducts research to assess people's perceptions, attitudes, and opinions on a wide range of issues related to the quality of government services. These surveys may be tailored to specific issues to enable the government to periodically gauge the mood of its citizenry. Although the public opinion surveys in South Africa are still dominated by research organizations, there is a growing interest by government in this area. It is expected that the list of issues for the public opinion surveys will get longer and that more empirically sophisticated research approaches will be employed. This will boost the confidence of stakeholders in the research findings, which will in turn find wider application in addressing societal concerns and problems.

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Spain

Public opinion polling in Spain began in October 1963, when the Instituto de la Opinión Pública (IOP, Public Opinion Institute) was created as a government organization within the Ministry of Information and Tourism by Minister Manuel Fraga-Iribarne, who joined Franco's cabinet in 1962. By comparison with previous cabinets of the 1940s and 1950s, this cabinet was labeled liberal because of its new economic, information, and foreign policies (though still authoritarian with respect to civic, labor, and political rights). Before 1963 there were a few unreliable social surveys, generally based on nonrepresentative samples and lacking the usual methodological requirements. A bulletin entitled *Opinión* had been published nonperiodically a few years before 1963 by an obscure section of the Ministry of Information and Tourism under the previous incumbent, but there is no evidence as to how the published data were collected, or

if they were collected at all. No academic publication or researcher has, at any time, made any reference to those data, and the bulletins are not accessible in university or specialized libraries.

The Instituto de la Opinión Pública was established in Madrid under the direction of Professor Luis González-Seara, as secretary general and acting director, and Juan Díez-Nicolás, a returnee from the University of Michigan where he had done graduate work as a Fulbright scholar for the two preceding years, as technical director. The two had the challenging task of establishing a true research institute for conducting social surveys following the model of the Institute for Social Research (ISR) in Ann Arbor (with much more limited resources, certainly), in a country with a dictatorial or authoritarian regime, in which there was no public or private institution at the time conducting social survey research in general or public opinion research in particular. In summary, they had to start from scratch with the goal of conducting scientifically based surveys in a hostile environment, because they were accused by the most conservative (and authoritarian) members of the government as constituting a danger to the political regime. They were also accused by the underground opposition of legitimizing the political regime.

All surveys conducted during this period but two (one on public opinion around the Gibraltar area regarding the closing of the Spanish-Gibraltar border, another on municipal elections in Madrid) were published in the *Revista Española de la Opinión Pública* (*Spanish Public Opinion Journal*), the professional quarterly journal of the IOP, which was widely distributed and used by both Spanish and foreign scholars and researchers

and which is accessible in most universities and public libraries.

Since 1965 all surveys were based on national representative samples of the population 21 years and over (18 years and over since 1978). Surveys were based on face-to-face interviews and used census sections as main territorial sampling units.

The IOP conducted more than 100 national surveys from 1963 to 1969, providing a great amount of data on the Spanish social structure, attitudes, and opinions about a great variety of topics, mainly on current world and national events, that were widely used and cited by social researchers regardless of their political or ideological preferences. Many assumptions about what Spaniards thought, aimed for, or wanted were thus rejected when confronted with empirical data obtained by the IOP. In 1966 the IOP participated in its first international comparative research project, on decisionmaking, coordinated by the University of Amsterdam and the Steinmetz Foundation. In 1967 it carried the Spanish survey for the Images of the World in the Year 2000, a research project coordinated by Johan Galtung in six countries under the sponsorship of the UNESCO European Center for the Coordination of Documentation and Research in the Social Sciences in Vienna.

The establishment of the IOP was in itself an element of social change, as its foundation was used by other interest groups to demand and obtain from the government permission to conduct commercial, marketing, and even public opinion research. Some private firms were therefore established during the late 1960s and early 1970s (ECO, DATA, ICSA-GALLUP, EMOPUBLICA, SOFEMASA, METRA-SEIS, and many

others), though they relied more on marketing than public opinion research until the death of Franco and the recovery of democracy in 1975. However, interviewers were frequently arrested for a few hours at police stations, including those of the governmental IOP, as security forces were not informed (or did not acknowledge) that these activities were legal. To give an example, when the technical director of the IOP went in person to supervise the fieldwork of the sensitive survey on the Gibraltar region after the closure of the border, he had to take a letter of presentation written by Minister Fraga to the general-governor of Gibraltar. The governor carefully read the letter and then concluded, "OK, you may proceed, but . . . if the government wanted to know the opinion of people in this area, instead of spending so much money, why didn't they ask me?"

The Growth of Public Opinion Research

After a political crisis in 1969, most of the founding team abandoned the IOP. During the following years, there was a great expansion of marketing and public opinion research. And though there were attempts to limit their activities and, especially, to censor the publication of results through some governmental agency, with the excuse of caring for the technical and professional quality of published data, it proved impossible to undo the way that had been opened by the IOP. A good example was the censorship enforced on the publication of the second report on the *Situación social de España* (*Social Situation of Spain*) published by FOESSA in 1970 (the first one was published in 1966). Chapter 5, devoted to political attitudes, had to be removed from the printed book such that reference

to it was in the book's table of contents, but pages 371–431 were missing. That chapter, photocopied, probably had a much larger circulation and diffusion than if it had been included in the book. Another example was that IOP director Ramón Cercós (1971–1972) was dismissed for having conducted a survey of public opinion on the wedding of one of Franco's granddaughters to Alfonso de Borbón, a cousin of the king-to-be, Juan Carlos I, who thought that his new relationship with Franco would help him to the crown.

In any case, the expansion of research kept growing, though much more in the private sector, whose clients were private firms and, in many cases, the public administration itself. Though the IOP satisfied demands from the public administration, especially on tourism, youth, sports, mass media, international affairs, and so on, it could not satisfy all of that demand, as it had its own research priorities on more academic topics and on public opinion about current events.

But the IOP was the mirror with which many of the private firms compared themselves, to the point that the IOP research design and methodology, themselves following the ISR model, were imitated by most private marketing and public opinion agencies, even with respect to the structure of reports and tables. But it remained a fact that, with a few exceptions like the FOESSA reports, the only published data were those of the IOP. Some other journals published articles based on survey data, IOP being the source for many of them.

Public Opinion Polls and the Political Transition to Democracy

Seven months after Franco died, King Juan Carlos appointed Adolfo Suárez-González president of the government,

with the task of leading the political transition from the former authoritarian regime to a true parliamentary democracy similar to those in the Western world. And four months later President Suárez appointed Díez-Nicolás as director-general of the IOP (from 1976 until the second general elections in 1979), with the responsibility of carrying out all the necessary polls and survey research to furnish reliable information that could be instrumental to achieving the goal of a true parliamentary democracy in Spain. Thus, in less than a year a few dozen polls were conducted to help decisionmaking during that challenging and interesting period. These ranged from polls to predict the result of the referendum on the Law of Political Reform (in 1976) to the massive surveys (three waves of about 30,000 interviews each prior to the first general parliamentary elections of 1977), in addition to polls about political amnesty, political rights, regional demands for decentralization, legalization of all political parties, political preferences, and a very long list of topics.

Some anecdotes may be representative of that period. The first one is related to the referendum on the Law of Political Reform in December of 1976. The director of the IOP had called a press conference three days before Referendum Day to present the forecast of those results based on several national surveys, which showed an affirmative vote of over 90 percent of voters, with only 2 percent negative votes, and a participation rate between 75 and 80 percent of the total electorate. At the very last minute the vice president for political affairs called off the press conference, under the conviction that the negative vote would be much higher than 2 percent, disregarding the IOP's claims about the reliability of its forecast. The official

count of results showed a participation rate of 77.4 percent of the total electorate. Taking into account only the voters, the result was 94 percent in favor and 2.6 percent against the proposed law, the rest being blank or invalid votes.

A second anecdote has to do with the legalization of all political parties for the first democratic elections in June 1977. President Suárez asked the IOP to take a poll on these issues, and results showed that more than 70 percent of the electorate would not consider the elections legitimate and democratic unless all political parties, including the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and other parties farther to the left, were legalized, so that they could participate in the election. But only around 10 percent of those who intended to vote said they planned to vote for the PCE. So President Suárez took these results to the Council of Ministers, where the four military ministers (army, navy, and air force, plus the vice president for defense) rejected the results on the basis that the sample was too small (a probability national sample of 1,200). Therefore, the IOP repeated the survey with a sample twice the size of the previous one, and the results were practically the same, with differences of 1 point up or down. The PCE and all parties, with no exception at all, were legalized and allowed to participate in the 1977 elections. The PCE obtained 7 percent of the votes over the total electorate (9 percent over the total number of voters).

All in all, the IOP's forecasts for the first democratic elections of 1977, the first ones since those held under the Republic (1931–1936) and before the Civil War (1936–1939), were quite accurate not only at the national level but also at the provincial level, the province being the electoral district. It must be taken into

account that the electoral law that was designed for the first elections, and which has not been modified since then, makes it very difficult to predict results at the provincial (district) level. There are 52 such districts, and the 350 seats in Congress are distributed so that each of the 50 provinces receives three seats, the remaining seats being distributed proportionally to the electoral population. In addition, district seats are distributed proportionally to the votes obtained by participating parties in that district (there were 82 parties competing in the first election of 1977, though not even half of them participated in all districts).

After the 1977 elections, the IOP changed its name to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS, Center for Sociological Research), and its journal also changed to *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (*REIS*, *Spanish Journal of Sociological Research*). The establishment of CIS meant more than a change in name. Its data archive, including all surveys conducted by the former IOP, was opened to the general public; all surveys had to be archived before six months after completion; its activities were widened to offer a greater cooperation with universities; and several book series were established in addition to the *REIS*. The good reputation of CIS has therefore remained after a change of regime in 1976, and after changes of the party in government, the Democratic Center Union (UCD, 1976–1982), the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE, 1982–1996), and the Popular Party (PP, 1996–), which usually implied changes in the director general.

The IOP and the CIS provided accurate information not only to politicians but also to mass media, scholars, and the public at large. Its most important contribu-

tion probably was to demonstrate that society had been changing consistently from 1939 to 1975. Spaniards wanted a democratic political regime, but to achieve it they wanted reform and change, not revolution or a return to the past. In fact, public opinion polls contributed to illuminate public opinion, a task defined many years before as the real "calling of sociology."

*The Role of Public Opinion
in a Consolidated Democracy*

The IOP's election forecasts have in general been more accurate than those from the private sector in most of the eight legislative elections. However, there has been a greater deviation from real results, both in public and in most of the private agencies, with respect to the last three elections (1993, 1996, and 2000), probably due to the fact that since 1993 the two main national parties, PP and PSOE, have received very similar support from the electorate. Participation rates among those who prefer one or the other party explain to a great extent why a party wins or loses.

The most important reason for the deviation seems to be that pollsters try to make predictions about the distribution of seats at the district level based on a sample that is absolutely insufficient (generally not larger than 12,000 for the country as a whole), when even with a sample of 1,000 interviews per district (a total of 52,000 interviews), predictions would continue to have a great degree of uncertainty.

Preelection polls in Spain have been generally more accurate than exit polls. The explanation seems to be that voters are tense after voting, and they dislike being interviewed in the street just at that moment, a reason that leads them to

hide their real vote. And finally, preelection forecasts also fail due to the fact that the electoral law forbids publication of results a week before Election Day, which means that interviews must be conducted almost two weeks before Election Day. These are not able to take into account the official period of campaigning, which is precisely two weeks preceding Election Day.

At present there are more than 100 private institutions doing marketing and public opinion research in Spain. Most of them are members of ESOMAR and WAPOR, many of them since the early 1970s. The larger firms are associated with ANEIMO. There is also a professional association with several hundred members (AEDEMO) that holds regular meetings on specialized topics of research. Two other associations, the more academic (Federación Española de Sociología) and the more professional (Colegio de Licenciados y Doctores en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología), also include public opinion researchers as members.

There are two data archives, one at the CIS (www.cis.es) and another one at a private firm, Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos (www.jdsurvey.com), and one national data archive, ARCES (<http://arces.cis.es/>), which is a member of CESDA and to which the two mentioned archives contribute their data. In fact, ASEP's data archive has been on the Internet for interactive use since January 2003 via subscription.

Public opinion is taught at Spanish universities as part of the offered courses in the schools of political science and sociology or in the school of information or communication sciences at Complutense University of Madrid, Autonomous University of Barcelona, University of the Basque Country in Bil-

bao, and University of Navarra in Pamplona, among others.

Juan Díez-Nicolás

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Sweden

Public opinion polls are a part of the daily news flow in Sweden today. It is hardly possible to listen to the news or open a newspaper without being exposed to a public opinion poll. In economic terms, the annual turnover for public opinion polls and marketing surveys is well over 1 billion Swedish kronor (U.S. \$100 million), with more than 8,000 people employed in this branch (ESOMAR 1997; Petterson and Holmberg 1998, pp. 37–38).

The opinion polls on political party support produced with regularity, not least of all during election campaigns, are accorded great attention. These polls may only comprise a small part of the work of public opinion institutes, but no other studies have such evident implications for democracy. They influence the political agenda and thus play an important, indirect role in the political decisionmaking process. They also affect opinions more directly in the form of bandwagon and underdog effects.

A lively debate on how opinion polls affected the outcome in the previous election (2002) developed toward the end of the campaign and continued unabated afterward. Critics argued that there were too many polls—at least two a day during the final weeks of campaigning, often showing different results. These polls affected the campaign agenda to a considerable extent and in the case of the Liberals clearly had a bandwagon effect. Also, the poor showing that the polls indicated for the Social Democrats may have contributed significantly to the party’s intensive efforts to mobilize its supporters in the final days of the campaign. In addition, the quality of the polls was called into question. The fact that there were substantial discrepancies both among the various polls published on the same day

and between the polls' forecasts and the actual election outcome caused people to look closely at the methods employed by the pollsters (Möller 2002).

According to Swedish researchers, the political culture in Sweden provides particularly good preconditions for opinion polls to have a major impact. In part, it is felt that an important component in Swedish politics is the unusually great demand for legitimacy based on popular support. When an opinion is found to have significant support within the population, this is an argument in itself for the legitimacy of the opinion. In part, the long tradition of social engineering has led to an unusually strong belief in statistical methods. There are few people who question whether it is reasonable to study and describe attitudes toward complex phenomena with the aid of techniques such as those used by public opinion institutes (Pettersson and Holmberg 1998, p. 13).

However, Sweden is naturally not unique in this respect. In most well-established democracies, opinion polls de facto assume a central role in politics. In a study of U.S. opinion polls, Susan Herbst (1993) claims that the central role that these polls play must be understood in light of democracy and rationality. Opinion polls possess an important symbolic power through the exactitude that quantification offers, and there is a feature of the same objectivity that characterizes studies in the natural sciences. For political journalism, the polls fulfill several of the criteria required for serving as good news items. First and foremost, they are news, and if the poll in addition offers the opportunity for longitudinal analysis, its news value is further increased. Furthermore, opinion polls offer many possibilities for illustrating

news reports: impressive diagrams, interviews, and so on.

For the campaign strategies of political parties, opinion polls are naturally indispensable, at least nowadays. But this has not always been the case.

The Breakthrough

The argument that democracy would be vitalized with the help of opinion polls was taken up in the Swedish public debate rather early on. In 1941 an influential article was written on the democratic potential of opinion polls in the journal *Tiden*. The author of the article, Alva Myrdal, a prominent Social Democrat, had been greatly impressed by George Gallup during a visit to the United States. The arguments that were found in the book *The Pulse of Democracy* from 1940, which Gallup wrote together with Saul Forbes Rae, greatly influenced the debate in Sweden due to Myrdal's interest.

According to Myrdal, opinion polls contributed to enriching representative democracy by giving the voters a voice even between elections. With this scientific method, more subtle shifts in popular opinion could be registered with greater nuance than was possible through general elections. The information that was gleaned could provide important guidance for those in power. Thus, the opportunity of achieving greater responsiveness drastically increased; democracy would become more sophisticated with these new techniques (Myrdal 1941, 1942).

A diametrically opposed view was presented by political science professor Herbert Tingsten. For the same reason that Tingsten was critical of popular referendums, he was critical of opinion polls. In his opinion, they undermined representative democracy. Tingsten reemphasized

the fundamental point of a representative form of government. The task of the voters was to choose leaders, and the task of these leaders was to govern. At election time they were to be held to account for their actions. If the voters were dissatisfied with their elected leaders, they could choose new ones. He was afraid that opinion polls would detract from the dialogue that would naturally arise through this process. However, preconditions did vary in different types of political systems. In a country like the United States—the promised land for opinion polls—there was, due to the majority election system, a greater need to monitor public opinion since the correspondence between the opinions of the voters and the opinions of the elected representatives was not as great as in countries with proportional electoral systems (Tingsten 1941).

The first opinion polls of political party support in Sweden were conducted in the run-up to the 1944 election by the Swedish Gallup Institute. Four days before the election, the institute published a prognosis based on a statistical sample of the population that, among other things, indicated that the Communists would receive 10 percent of the vote, which was well above the previous electoral results for the party. It was not unexpected that the Communists would have a good election, but many people nonetheless viewed the prognosis as improbable. The electoral results showed, though, that Gallup had been almost totally accurate in relation to all of the parties. The average deviation was only 0.2 percent per party. With this, opinion polls got off to a smashingly successful start. But even if measurement accuracy had been high, some criticism was raised against opinion polls as such. Social Democratic editorialists in particular

were bitter over the fact that Gallup had contributed to “pushing up the Communists” (Esaiasson 1990, p. 181).

Polls Increase in Importance

Interestingly enough, the first poll, conducted in the run-up to the 1944 election, is still the one that has come closest to predicting the actual election results. In an international comparison, the Swedish election prognoses maintain a high standard. Internationally, the average percentage deviation per party is seldom less than 1 percent in relation to the actual election results, but in Sweden this has been the norm. The record, though, is from the very year that public opinion was first measured. “The question is whether it is so remarkable to be world champion if we are no better than we were fifty years ago” (Pettersson and Holmberg 1998, p. 142).

In the 1948 election, the Gallup prognosis was considerably worse: the average percentage deviation was 1.1 percent. The results for the Social Democrats, in particular, deviated notably from the Gallup prognosis. The institute predicted a significant loss for the party—which was estimated to receive 42.5 percent—a result that would lead to a power shift. However, the Social Democrats received 45.1 percent, and since there was great faith in the prognosis after the successful premiere in 1944, this election result appeared to be a sensation. The enthusiasm for opinion polls was transformed into distrust after the 1948 election. An expression of this distrust was that the Social Democrats broke off their collaboration with Gallup. When Gallup offered to analyze the political attitudes of middle-class voters for the party the following year, the party declined. Similarly, the party refrained from commissioning

a special study from the institute on why younger voters abstained from voting to such a great extent, as the party leadership had originally intended to do.

During the 1950s the distrust of opinion polls disappeared, however. After the election loss in 1952, the Social Democrats reconsidered their attitude toward Gallup and turned to the institute in order to seek answers to a large number of questions. One concerned why younger people had a lower-than-average turnout in this election as well; another concerned how voters had judged the collaboration between the Social Democratic government and the Agrarian Party; a third concerned the effects that inflation had on the trust of the voters in the government; a fourth concerned which newspapers were read; a fifth concerned how the politics of overbidding within the field of social policy, which the Liberal Party, their main competitor, was felt to have engaged in during the election campaign, had influenced the election results.

The Social Democrats Break the Ice

It was first during the 1960s that opinion polls became a natural part of everyday political life. For the political parties, particularly Social Democrats, the polls seemed to be a natural instrument for making strategic decisions. The party ordered special studies from Sifo about the level of knowledge of citizens on political issues, about their ideas about the future, and about how they view politicians (Duit 1996). However, toward the end of the decade the Social Democrats ended their collaboration with Sifo, whose polls were not seen to be of sufficiently high quality. Instead, the party established its own department—the Group for Studies of Society (Gruppen för Samhällsstudier), with the job of analyz-

ing public opinion. The department was formally part of the Social Democratic organization, but operationally it came to enjoy a large degree of independence. Its primary task was to conduct a long-term and continuous analysis of public opinion. This was done through detailed studies of election results in different geographical areas, as well as through opinion polls under its own auspices. On the basis of this work, the party board was provided with regular and detailed analyses of the movement of voters between the parties and of how attitudes in relation to various political issues changed within different social categories. Great emphasis was placed on how the voters judged their economic situation.

In the 1950s the Gallup Institute stopped producing election prognoses. This task was instead taken over by Sifo, which had been established in the middle of that decade. Social Democrats collaborated with Sifo, but this collaboration ended toward the end of the 1960s. The party was critical of the special method of data collection used by Sifo—the institute conducted so-called weekly bus studies—which was considered to be of poor quality. However, the Social Democrats were also disappointed over Sifo having started to collaborate with the nonsocialist parties at that time. After the Social Democrats had ended their collaboration with Sifo, the party ordered some studies from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB). When it later became clear that the figures for the Social Democrats from SCB turned out to be systematically underestimated, the party published these polls, which had previously been kept secret.

The Nonsocialist Parties

Among the nonsocialist parties, it is primarily the Moderate Party (Moderata

Samlingspartiet) that has used opinion polls in its work. It is not clear how extensive this was during the early days of opinion polls, since the source material is incomplete, but it seems as if it was primarily the Social Democrats who used this new technique initially to sound out public opinion. During the 1960s the Moderates commissioned Sifo to conduct a number of confidential studies. There was intimate collaboration between the party and this public opinion institute. One of the leading analysts for Sifo, Karin Busch, was a member of the party's planning group for the 1968 election (Esaiasson 1990, p. 293). And when the institute published one of the studies commissioned by the Moderates concerning public opinion of the Social Democratic proposal to establish a public investment bank, Sifo was strongly criticized by the Social Democrats (Petterson and Holmberg 1998, p. 62).

At the beginning of the 1970s the Moderates intensified their use of opinion polls in their strategic planning. Since then, the party has commissioned Sifo to produce continuous *structural reports* that are based on six-month interview material and that allow for a deeper analysis of how different electoral groups view the parties and various issues. Furthermore, postelection studies are commissioned from the institute. Finally, the Moderates commission various special studies from the institute; these can involve the attitudes of voters on various issues that the party intends to pursue and the credibility of the party on those issues, but they can also involve how various campaign slogans are viewed. An interesting example of the value of conducting this kind of opinion poll is when the party commissioned a study as a part of the preparations for the 1976 election

campaign. Somewhat surprisingly, the slogan that was intended to be the main message in the upcoming campaign—"For freedom of choice—against socialism"—turned out to have the greatest appeal among voters supporting the Communists. They understood this slogan as a call to advance toward a socialist society (Petterson and Holmberg 1998, p. 65).

The Liberal Party (Folkpartiet Liberalerna) also devoted sizable resources to studying shifts in opinion early on. In the beginning of the 1960s the party commissioned special polls from Sifo, which it has continued to do since then. After the great electoral defeat for the Liberal Party in 1982, the party commissioned a comprehensive analysis of values in order to find out what is characteristic for different categories. For example, current, past, and potential voters supporting the party were the object of a special in-depth survey. This type of value map has comprised an important part of Liberal Party postelection analyses, after the most recent election as well.

Other parties have previously taken a more restrictive attitude toward opinion polls. The Center Party (Centerpartiet) made use of a less common method for sounding out public opinion during the 1970s, when the party mobilized about 25 percent of the voters and was the largest nonsocialist party. A hundred or so party activists throughout the country regularly answered mail questionnaires concerning their impressions about the general feelings of people. This involved first and foremost how the political message of the party was received but could also involve more general issues as to people's views of economic conditions and views of the future. This was a further development of the method that the legendary leader of the party, Gunnar Hedlund,

applied in order to keep abreast of opinion within the party. Hedlund, who headed the party from 1948 to 1971, was in continuous contact with a handful of loyal party members, particularly before important decisions, in order to obtain information about how party members and supporters felt about the actions of the party. These people were chosen because they were felt to have unusually sensitive feelers and could thus interpret the internal opinion. However, since 1985 the Center Party has also used the services of professional opinion institutes, even if to a more limited extent than the three parties previously discussed.

The fourth nonsocialist party, the Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*), entered the parliament in 1991 and was prior to that one of the parties that relied least on opinion polls. On one occasion in the mid-1970s the party did commission Sifo to find out how large the Christian Democrat voter potential was. The results were seen as hopeful: more than one-tenth of the voters could consider voting for the Christian Democrats. However, it was not until the 1988 election that the party received more than 2 percent of the vote (2.9 percent).

The Left Party (Communists) and the Environmental Party (Greens) were both strongly critical of opinion polls for a long time. These parties did not reconsider their position until the 1990s. Today both of these parties use opinion polls in their strategic planning to the same extent as the other parties.

Conclusion

The Social Democrats are still the party that uses opinion polls to the greatest extent. For the past decade the party has conducted two to four opinion polls per year on its own. The fieldwork is carried

out by an opinion institute, the name of which is kept confidential since it does not want the interviewees to know that the polls are being conducted under the auspices of the Social Democrats. This form of secrecy is not unique to the Social Democrats. In general, there is—for obvious reasons—a clear tendency on the part of all of the parties to de-emphasize the significance of their strategic analyses and consequently even to conceal or at least minimize the fact that opinion polls are used. The fact that there is great secrecy surrounding opinion polls means that there is only a limited group of people who are privy to the results. This gives the leadership an advantage in information within the parties as well as in relation to the electorate. Results that are seen as favorable to the party and the party leadership are generally leaked to the public, whereas other information that is less favorable from the point of view of public opinion is concealed.

It is clear, though, that several parties—primarily the Social Democrats and the Moderates, but even the Liberal Party—have been conducting daily polls in the final stages of election campaigns for a long time. Even the Environmental Party, which had previously been so skeptical about opinion polls, has been using them more recently. These tracking polls make it possible for party leadership to follow how voting propensity and the degree of mobilization change within various groups and how the share of uncertain voters decreases as Election Day moves closer. Such information is naturally of great significance for the final election spurt. If it is a matter of mobilizing the core voters of the party, it is important to speak about the traditional issues of the party. If it is a matter of making inroads

into new groups, it is necessary to revise the message and try to appropriate the domains of other parties. If the party feels that the party's traditional voters are decided and that voters who usually vote for other parties are more undecided, the latter strategy would seem to be more fruitful.

Most parties also began using focus groups during the 1990s in order to gain a deeper understanding of how voters think. The Moderates were the first to do this, and the party still attaches great importance to this type of qualitative data collection. In conjunction with telephone campaigns (telemarketing), which the party has conducted since the beginning of the 1990s, data are also collected on how the party is viewed. These calls are made by the party's own volunteers. Their job is not only to convince the voters who are called to vote for the party but also to document and compile the views that are revealed during the call.

It is difficult today to see any decisive difference between the attitudes of the parties in principle toward opinion polls. All of them make use of polls. Both of the largest parties—the Social Democrats and the Moderates—which have greater resources at their disposal, have naturally been at an advantage since the use of opinion polls is ultimately a matter of resources. For economic reasons, the other parties are not able to conduct their own opinion polls to the same extent as the two largest parties. Instead, these parties have devoted resources to interpreting and reanalyzing existing polls. The use of focus groups is not as costly, and these are used by all of the parties in the actual election planning, not least of all to test election posters and slogans.

Since March 1967, Sifo has been publishing polls of support for the political

parties every month, and for the past several years three other institutes have been publishing similar polls: Gallup, Temo, and Skop. These polls receive great attention from the mass media and mean that the public opinion plight of the political parties is regularly the object of commentaries of a more or less short-term nature. At least in the beginning, the polls contributed to increasing the interest of citizens in politics (Esaiaasson 1990, p. 245). However, it is doubtful whether this is still the case. Regardless, the focus of the mass media on these polls can be debated. According to more recent research, the actual manner in which politics is described in modern journalism—in which opinion polls assume a central place—tends to generate cynicism among voters (Cappella and Hall-Jamieson 1997).

The effect of opinion polls on public opinion displays a distinct pattern: while more mobile voters with a weaker party identification within the nonsocialist bloc often flock around the nonsocialist party that has the wind of public opinion at its back toward the end of the election campaign, Social Democratic voters are rarely as easy to mobilize as when their party is facing electoral defeat. The bandwagon effects are primarily a nonsocialist phenomenon, underdog effects a Social Democratic phenomenon. These effects are the result of rather subtle psychological mechanisms and are therefore difficult to verify scientifically but at the same time difficult to deny. However, they do greatly influence the behavior of the political parties. In recent years two party leaders have resigned with explicit reference to opinion polls indicating low figures for themselves and their parties. One case involved the leader of the Liberal Party, Maria Leissner, who resigned

for just that reason in 1997. What is particularly remarkable in this case was that Leissner, who was elected party leader in 1995, never confronted the voters in an election and thus was never subjected to the hard test that an election campaign constitutes for a party leader. It is also primarily in conjunction with election campaigns that a party leader receives the attention in the mass media that allows the person to become known to the electorate. Poor opinion figures in this case were, however, enough for a party leader to resign. In the other case, Lennart Daléus chose to resign as leader of the Center Party in 2001 for the same reason: he made reference to low opinion figures in relation to voter confidence in him and in his party. In contrast to Leissner, Daléus had headed his party during one election campaign, in 1998. The party suffered a decline in support, but since Daléus had assumed his position just three months prior to the election and was still seen as relatively unknown, his position was never questioned.

Public opinion polls have been a natural part of the political life of political parties for the past decades. This development is closely tied to general changes in the parties from being member-based popular movements to organizations more focused on election campaigns, or professional electoral parties (Panebianco 1988). The significance of this process of transformation is that internal party dialogue is replaced by externally oriented and more commercialized campaign activities in which policy is formulated with the help of public relations consultants and professionals instead of active party member volunteers. In this process, opinion polls play a central role.

This development can be illustrated by comparing the way in which the leader-

ship of the Center Party sounded out public opinion with the professionalized campaigns of the most recent election. The change can be described in terms of professionalization but also in terms of a shift in focus. Previously the focus was on internal party opinion; it was more important that proposals had the support of those active in the party. Today all of the attention is focused on the voters. The idea that the old mass parties have been replaced by catch-all parties is certainly not new. However, the notion of the transformation of parties is perhaps of greatest relevance precisely because it applies to the way in which political parties relate to public opinion polls.

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Taiwan

Survey and public opinion research is significant as a product of Taiwan's democratization and an important tool of reference for the governing capacity of the island's young democratic regime. Before Taiwan became democratized, public opinion survey was largely ignored, or else functioned as a monitoring device by the authoritarian regime. Therefore it is important to situate the development of public opinion research in the context of the island's regime transition. This entry reviews the development of Taiwan's public opinion survey in four periods following the Kuomintang regime's relocation to Taiwan and its installation of "the quasi-Leninist authoritarianism regime" (Chu and Lin 2001): authoritarian reconstruction and consolidation (1950–1976), authoritarian breakdown (1977–1990), democratic transition (1991–1999), and democratic consolidation (2000–).

Authoritarian Reconstruction and Consolidation (1950–1976)

Following the Kuomintang regime's retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist elite installed a series of institutional arrangements to establish its control over Taiwan's society. An array of emergency decrees and extraconstitutional rules were promulgated in the early 1950s as part of concerted efforts to suppress any potential resistance to rule. Under a

frozen political climate, public opinion research had a meager start, and its introduction to Taiwan was rather sporadic. Research methodology and the overall quality of the infrequent research conducted at this time were crude; moreover, the research topics were constrained by fear of touching issues of high political sensitivity (Cheng 1991).

According to a recent review, the earliest public opinion survey in Taiwan was 1953, in which the Provincial Meteorologist Bureau used a mail-in survey to look into public opinions solely on the issue of weather forecasting and its service (Mo 1996). One year later, the *United Daily News* surveyed its readers by mail to find out public opinions on the policy of simplified Chinese. Then in 1956, TSSD-NEWS established its Survey Research Center, making more than 30 public opinion surveys within ten years (Chen et al. 1993). In 1958, legislator Wu Wang-chi established the Chinese Association for Public Opinion Survey, the first professional organization for public opinion survey in Taiwan. This organization in 1972 founded the *Monthly of Public Opinion*, and in 1985 it established the *Journal of Survey and Public Opinion Research*, both of which still exist as academic journals focusing on public opinion survey. Meanwhile, academic institutes in Taiwan also commenced attempts to adopt the method of survey. For example, in 1964, Tsou Wen-hai measured the voting behavior of college students. In 1969, Tsai Chi-ching investigated voters' electoral behavior in Taipei. Also during this time, Hua Li-chin held the first public opinion survey covering the entire region of Taiwan. This survey contained 1,485 valid samples and focused on public political participation and voting behavior (Chen 1986). With respect to private institutes

for survey research, in 1976 the China Credit Information Service was established in response to the emergent needs for marketing research in Taiwan.

Authoritarian Breakdown (1977–1990)

Subsequent to the mid-1970s, Taiwan's authoritarian regime embarked on the path of its demise, resulting in an unprecedented openness in the structure of political contestation and popular participation and, accordingly, initiating a new stage in the development of public opinion survey within society. First, within the governmental sector, in 1978, Wei Yung, chairman of the Commission of the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of the Executive Yuan, established a regular survey encompassing the entire island and focusing on public opinion concerning election, political issues, and satisfaction with government performance. Unfortunately, the results of this survey were not open to the public; they were exclusively for the consumption of the governing elites, and so the survey had very little impact on public discourse.

Second, with regard to mass media, systematic public opinion surveys related to elections were undertaken by the *United Daily News* as early as 1983, with results publicized via news reported. This was followed after 1985 by the *China Times*. Around this time, with the diffusion of the telephone, adequate public opinion survey investigation via telephone became possible, and the *United Daily News* designed a computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) system in 1988 for the purpose of improving the quality and efficiency of surveys. Later on, when elections were held or disputes arose concerning issues, politics, economy, or society in Taiwan, newspapers would hold

surveys in reference to the topics at issue. This established the mass media as an important mechanism for public discourse.

Third, as regards civil institutes of survey research, there are companies and organizations that display regular activity, such as the Gallup Market Research Corporation, the Business Information Greater China, A. C. Nielsen, and so on. During this period of authoritarian breakdown, the most important civil institute was the Survey and Public Opinion Research Foundation, sponsored by the young turks of the Kuomintang. This institution undertook periodic surveys concerning satisfaction with government performance and questions and publicized the results through mass media. This practice instantly became a powerful instrument to challenge the legitimacy of the Kuomintang government and put its performance under scrutiny. Moreover, a younger generation of legislators within the Kuomintang began to incorporate the use of public opinion surveys within their practices of interpellation. Public opinion survey was even used as a potent weapon by factions within the Kuomintang. Yu Kuo-hua's deplorably low approval rate was cited by the political allies of Lee Huan as a justification for why Yu should be deposed and replaced by Lee as premier in 1990. It was at this time that the political elites began to notice the power of surveys.

Fourth, in regard to academic survey institutes, the process of development began establishing new milestones in processes of institutionalization, computerization, theoretical sophistication, and elaboration. In 1976, at National Taiwan University, Fu Hu, professor of political science, formally established the Workshop on Political Systems and Change and

began to assemble a respectable research team to conduct systematic research on democratization, electoral politics, and political culture. This workshop has conducted regular islandwide postelection surveys since 1983 and accumulated by far the most extensive and consistent longitudinal data series on Taiwan's electorate's political values, political participation, and voting behaviors, amounting to more than twenty-five data sets spanning over a quarter of a century. This workshop also initiated a trilateral comparative survey project covering two other culturally Chinese societies, Hong Kong and mainland China, in 1993. In collaboration with Andy Nathan of Columbia and Tianjian Shi of Duke, it completed a first nationwide political science survey in 1993 based on probability sampling covering all of mainland China except Tibet. Hu Fu and Yun-han Chu, who later became the codirectors of the workshop, were also the founding members of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, an international collaboration among more than 40 national electoral studies teams. Hu Fu, Yun-han Chu, and their colleagues also successfully launched a large-scale comparative survey project, known as East Asia Barometer, covering eight East Asian countries beginning in 1999, including Japan, Hong Kong, mainland China, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.

In 1989, National Cheng-Chi University (NCCU) established the Election Study Center. Besides undertaking regular face-to-face interviews, it introduced the CATI system. The Election Study Center of NCCU, under the leadership of Yi-yan Chen, Teh-fu Huang, Hung-yung Tai, and Yi-chou Liu, has quickly established itself as the leading institution for electoral studies. In 1994, the center launched a

new Chinese-language biannual, *Journal of Electoral Studies*, which is now ranked as one of six top Chinese-language journals in political science. The center also attracted a steady stream of contract research from the government sector, political parties, and campaign organizations. With the infusion of a generous research grant from the National Science Council, some leading social science scholars at Academia Sinica worked together in establishing two long-term projects in 1984: the Taiwan Social Change Survey and the Social Image Survey in Taiwan. The two projects conduct periodic face-to-face interviews at least once a year to investigate various political, economic, and societal issues that reflect the multifaceted changes of Taiwan's society (however, the latest project has also adopted new methods of telephone interview). The Taiwan Social Change Survey later became a member of the International Social Survey Program.

Democratic Transition (1991–1999)

Under the momentum of democratization in Taiwan, institutes of public opinion survey with CATI—both profit-oriented and nonprofit—emerged as a fresh stream. These institutes began to bring in new techniques and equipment and used focus groups as a regular procedure for pretesting questionnaires. In the academic circle, following the successful model of the Election Study Center of NCCU, many public and private university followed suit, such as National Taipei University, Shih Hsin University, Tunghai University, National Chung-cheng University, and National Sun Yat-sen University. Each established its own public opinion survey centers with the CATI system during the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, there were 13 univer-

sities or academic institutes with established survey organs (see Table 1), most notably Academia Sinica's Office of Survey Research, NCCU's Election Study Center, National Chung-cheng University's Survey and Opinion Research Center, and National Sun Yat-sen University's Survey and Opinion Research. These academic institutes are not only engaged in their own academic surveys; they receive and execute projects on behalf of other parties.

Within Taiwan's mass media, in addition to those established in the mid-1980s by the *United Daily News* and the *China Times*, three cable TV news services, TVBS, ETTV, and SETN, have also established their own centers of public opinion survey. Beyond this, other mass media firms such as the *Liberty Times* and FTV, although they have no internal survey offices of their own, will regularly retain civilian companies to undertake survey research on their behalf. As for the governmental sector, the CATI system, which was established by RDEC in 2000, has already undertaken more than 50 survey investigations. In the meantime, profit-oriented survey service companies flourish. In Table 1 are listed 15 profit-oriented, public opinion survey companies in Taiwan, almost all of which were established around 1997. The two most ambitious are Market Wise and Taiwan Marketing Research, both of which own 70 telephone lines. During this period, the activities of political parties featured quite prominently; for example, the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) each established its own independent survey institutes (in 1995 and 1996, respectively), while the People First Party is currently pondering the option.

The broad use of public opinion surveys has led to significant expansion of the functional aspects of survey research. For example, the Kuomintang and DPP first introduced the mechanism of survey as a reference tool, then later expanded it into a nomination function for elections. Beginning with the election of 1993, candidates increasingly integrated survey research into their election strategies. Especially after the gubernatorial and mayoral elections of 1994, public opinion surveys have constituted the core of election strategy. The DPP, for example, especially emphasized the importance of surveys in the subsequent elections. Moreover, the governmental sector has begun to catch up with public opinion by using surveys as a reference point for policymaking and implementation, and legislators have started to privilege poll figures as a central theme in interpellations. Some government agencies also employed the instrument of public opinion surveys gingerly to prop up the credibility of their own policy.

One of the most salient and divisive political issues that have received attention is national identity. Identity-related questions now become virtually standard political background variables in any public opinion research on political issues. This is also one of the few attitudinal variables that enjoy the longest shelf life. For instance, the Mainland Affairs Council has regularly commissioned public opinion institutions to trace the changes in the distribution of ethnic identity and issue positions on Taiwan independence versus reunification with mainland China. In regard to ethnic identity, some surveys showed that about 40 percent of the people in Taiwan identify themselves as Taiwanese,

Table 1 Institute of Public Opinion Research in Taiwan

<i>Category</i>	<i>Institute</i>	<i>Telephone Lines</i>	<i>Establishment Year</i>	<i>Website</i>
Government Institutes	Research, Development and Evaluation Commission	35	2000	www.rdec.gov.tw
Institutes of Political Party	DPP Survey Center	60	1996	www.dpp.org.tw
	KMT Survey Center	32	1995	none
Academic Institutes	Office of Survey Research, Academia Sinica	30	1993	www.sinica.edu.tw/as/survey
	Election Study Center, NCCU	45	1989	www2.nccu.edu.tw
	Market Survey Research Center, NCCU	30	1999	140.119.74.120
	Media Development and Research Center, NCCU	10	1997	none
	Graduate Institute of Mass Communication, NTNU	30	1997	none
	Research Center for Public Opinion and Election Studies, National Taipei University	20	1989	www.ntpu.edu.tw/rcpoes
	Survey and Opinion Research Center, National Sun Yat-sen University	24	1994	none
	Survey and Statistics Research Center, NCKU	36	1996	www.statncku.edu.tw
	Survey and Opinion Research Center, CCU	35	1996	www.ccunix.ccu.edu.tw/~deptsorc/
	Research Center for Public Opinion, Shih Hsin University, Tunghai University	50	1991	www.shu.edu.tw
	Center of Statistics and Information Science, Fu Jen Catholic University	20	1992	www.stat.fju.edu.tw
	Department of Political Science, Tunghai University	25	1996	www.thu.edu.tw
Mass Media	Survey and Opinion Research Center, Central Police University	10	1991	none
	<i>United News</i>	50	1988	www.udnnews.com/survey/
	<i>China Times</i>	20	1985	www.chinatimes.com.tw

continues

Table 1 continued

<i>Category</i>	<i>Institute</i>	<i>Telephone Lines</i>	<i>Establishment Year</i>	<i>Website</i>
	TVBS POLL CENTER	50	1996	www.tvbs.com.tw
	ET Survey and Research Center	60	1997	none
Profit-Oriented Organization	Focus Survey Research	50	1997	none
	A.C. Nielsen	35	1982	www.acnielsen.com
	Market Wise	79	1995	www.marketwise.com.tw
	E-Society Research Group (ESRG)	50	2000	www.e-society.com.tw
	Taiwan Marketing Research, Inc.	70	1994	www.twmr.com.tw
	China Credit Information Service	40	1967	www.credit.com.tw
	Business Information Greater China	70	1985	www.bigc.com.tw
	TrendGo	54	1997	www.trendgo.com.tw
	Trend Spotting	48	2001	under construction
	Chinese Association for Public Opinion Research	30	1958	under construction
	Gallup Market Research Corporation, Taiwan	57	1990	www.24hpoll.com
	Ching Shih Lin Chih Company	15	1988	www.ffms.com.tw
	Decision Making Research (DMR)	30	1999	www.dmr.com.tw
	Taiwan Real Survey (TRS)	50	2000	www.realsurvey.com.tw
Hui-Chieh Marketing Strategy Company	35	1994	www.mdr.com.tw	

Source: Data compiled by the authors.

about 40 percent of the population identify themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and less than 20 percent of the population identify themselves as exclusively Chinese (see Figure 1). In regard to national identity, more than 20 percent of the people in Taiwan favor independence, another 20 percent favor unification with mainland China, and about 40 percent are inclined to maintain the status quo.

These diversified opinions on ethnic and nation identity do affect the adoption of different political attitudes and are correlated with diverse views on certain political issues.

Democratic Consolidation (2000–)

Following a long period of expansion of public opinion research, certain negative phenomena began showing up in Taiwan




Figure 1 Ethnic Identity

Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20–69 accessible to telephone interviewers.
 Source: Mainland Affairs Council, R.O.C.

toward the end of the 1990s. The saturation of public opinion figures in mass media brought many unintended consequences. First, the proliferation of public opinion socialized a different breed of politicians. Increasingly, officeholders became preoccupied with public relations and media for the sole purpose of promoting their own approval rating and media exposure. Also, some popularly elected officials become overreliant on public opinion figures for making policy decisions without careful consideration of the ephemeral and fluid nature of public opinion at a given point in time. Traces of populism, myopia, and showmanship are now found in many politicians.

An even more worrisome development is the problem of the infestation of politics-driven survey research. Public opinion surveys are increasingly funded by clients with hidden political agendas or even unsavory partisan motivations. First, survey research has become a booming industry, yet there has been no concomitant development of professional ethics. Many for-profit institutes, under the intense market competition, simply degraded themselves as hired guns. They sacrificed professional ethics and produced dubious figures to meet their clients' demands. Second, even some academic institutes that are entrusted with investigations became involved as strate-




Figure 2 National Identity

Respondents: Taiwanese adults aged 20–69 accessible to telephone interviewers.
 Source: Mainland Affairs Council.

gic consultants during the elections. The credibility of their public opinion surveys thus became questionable under the shroud of conflict of interest.

Third, both the candidates and political parties have learned how to manipulate survey results during the nomination process or during electoral competition, even going so far as to plant false survey results in order to misinform the voters stuck in a mercurial situation with many possibilities of strategic voting. Fourth, some government agencies sometimes also went out of their way to engineer favorable public opinion figures through contracted surveys to advance their own agendas or to promote certain policies.

All these developments have eroded the public’s trust in public opinion professionals.

Conclusion

In its early stages, the development of survey and public opinion research in Taiwan was retarded under a tight grip of an authoritarian regime. Its time finally came during the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. Survey research swiftly transformed into a mechanism by which public sentiments could be measured and heard, and to some degree its rapid growth helped shape the course of regime transition. During democratization, both the incumbents and the opposition soon real-

ized the potency of public opinion survey and moved to fully exploit its utility. It rapidly became an indispensable element of Taiwan's new democracy.

Ironically, as Taiwan enters the stage of democratic consolidation, the public opinion profession has become the victim of its own success. Its credibility is under serious strain as politicians and political parties learned how to misuse this powerful tool. Therefore, for the long-term viability of this important barometer of social pulse, it is imperative that professionals in public opinion research find ways to revamp their tarnished public image. High on the agenda is the establishment of a set of enforceable codes of conduct, a system of financial disclosure, and mechanisms of peer review, in addition to constantly improving methodological sophistication. Without these much-needed reforms, public opinion will risk losing its calling in a young democracy where its values and utility could have been better actualized.

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Thailand

Survey research is not new in Thailand. The national census of 1950 was the first measurement of the population by survey method. It was conducted with the assistance of U.S. researchers who encouraged the adoption of contemporary survey methods. The result was a census that is comparable to the best efforts of European and American researchers. The decennial Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National Statistical Office and its frequent intradecennial updates are a highly professional and accurate measurement of the population. Ironically, research disciplines, especially those of the social sciences (with the exception of economics), have generally ignored the wealth of excellent data available for research purposes.

The uses of these data are principally for policy implementation, that is, allocation of resources based upon population distributions. As in other countries, notably the United States, challenges to the data on political grounds often cast doubt as to their reliability. Examination of survey strategies, however, indicates that the Thai census suffers only from problems similar to the national census of the United States. The lack of use by social researchers is largely a function of the state of social science in Thailand, which only now is moving toward empirical applications that make the census a treasure trove of data for scholarly study.

Development of Public Opinion Surveys in Thailand

Public opinion polling, by contrast, is quite new. Although scattered polling has been done in prior years, the use of polls by the media and by political interests came into focus in 1996, coincident with elections for governor of Bangkok

(equivalent of mayor, but with more powers than the governors in other provinces). Election polls taken during the 1992 election were highly flawed, but the 1996 polls received considerable acclaim from respected media outlets.

Most polls predicted that Bhichit Rattakul would win the election, and this was borne out by election results. Only the Shinawatra poll (Taksin Shinawatra is now prime minister, who at the time was supporting another candidate) suggested that another candidate (Chamlong Srimuang) would prevail. Polls conducted by Thammasat University, Ramkhamhaeng University, Rajabhat Institutes (Suan Dusit), and Assumption University (ABAC) produced impressive results.

Given the time lags until Election Day, these polls produced relatively accurate forecasts of election outcomes. Success in forecasting the election elicited praise from the media, the *Bangkok Post* (June 17, 1996) noting that such polls "already established themselves as a reliable source of opinion."

Polling in National Elections

National polls are a somewhat different story. The popularity of the polls for forecasting election outcomes during the 1996 Bangkok elections encouraged an explosion in political polling. Within days, the major polling organizations organized to conduct surveys anticipating parliamentary elections in November 1996. The ability to conduct the polls described above was largely due to the fact that they could be limited to Bangkok, but national election polls provided much more of a challenge. The Thai electoral system, under the old constitution, was based on multimember districts and at least eight effective parties contesting the election. The coalition

government that would be formed had little correspondence to the popular vote. Public opinion polls were limited to indicating preferences for parties and party leaders, and the result was that the party favored fifth (New Aspirations Party) won 125 seats, whereas the party favored by a large margin (Prajadhipat, or Democrat Party) won only 123 seats and ended up as the opposition party. The respected Rajabhat Institutes (Suan Dusit) poll conducted of 183,000 people predicted that Prajadhipat would win 148 seats to 114 for the New Aspirations Party (*Bangkok Post*, November 15, 1996).

The reason for this discrepancy was only partly a result of the complex election system. Most of the polls limited themselves to surveys of Bangkok and its environs. The Bangkok bias in public opinion surveys is consistent with the view of Bangkok elites and most of the media (almost entirely located in Bangkok) that the metropolis is always the key factor in political attitudes and electoral outcomes. This perspective ignores the fact that roughly 90 percent of the population is located outside Bangkok. A regional poll of the northeast region by the local Rajabhat Institute, for example, showed wide margins of victory for the New Aspirations Party, rather than the Prachadipat Party. But these more localized polls tend to be swallowed up by the attention to Bangkok in the mix of public opinion research. Polls within the city are comparatively easy to produce and are designed for local consumption, but they are hardly representative samples of Thai public opinion, as the 1996 elections demonstrated. Scholars citing Thai polls need to be cautious not only about the actual sampling but also about the universe from which the sample is drawn to guard against the Bangkok bias.

*Commercialization of
Public Opinion Polls*

Polling public opinion has developed into a lucrative business since 1996, with thousands of dollars being paid for polls by news media and government agencies. Respected polling organizations have established themselves within the last decade at several of the major universities. Demand for polls by the media and government has proven to be a significant source of income, especially at private universities, such as Assumption College and Bangkok University. Polling for profit has also emerged at some public institutions. The Rajabhat Institutes, with campuses covering every region of the country, house one of the most respected polls, the Rajabhat Suan Dusit Poll. The current move for universities to cut ties with the central government (and funding as well) has made public universities look to public opinion polling as a major source of income. The more established polls earn upward of 10 million baht (roughly U.S.\$250,000) a year, a substantial cash cow for universities attempting to generate new sources of revenue. To date, purchasers of polls appear content with these university-based organizations, and few private polls have entered the field in any significant way. This is partly due to the difficulty of creating national networks for sampling, plus the fact that private groups can contract with university-based polls. Networks of universities have natural bases throughout the country, as well as cheap labor in the form of students, who are often assigned polling duties as part of their coursework.

The ABAC Poll at Assumption College and the Suan Dusit Poll located at Rajabhat Institute–Bangkok are the most respected leaders among polling organizations. Polls located at Bangkok Univer-

sity and Thammasat University are respected polls, but their coverage is usually limited to the immediate Bangkok area. The ABAC Poll and the Suan Dusit Poll have emerged as highly professional organizations. Though they are associated with universities, they operate out of institutes affiliated with universities that have little to do with the instructional role of their hosts. They do, however, provide some experience in interviewing for students.

Probability Sampling in Thailand

The flourishing of public opinion polls has not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in scientific sampling practices. Published sampling errors in poll data are rare, and when they are included in reports, they are usually misleading. For example, many polls include reported sampling errors when the sample itself is not a true probability sample—the calculated error is based solely on the number of respondents. In general, the concept of probability sampling is difficult to communicate to elites, the news media, and the public. Poll directors appear unsure concerning the meaning of sampling error. Even senior academics at major universities often express the view that a 35,000-respondent convenience sample, for example, surely must be better than a 1,500 sample based on standard probability techniques. In response to a 1996 poll indicating that his opponent would win the Bangkok governor's election, one party leader suggested that a sample of 2,500 people was too small to reflect more than 3 million eligible voters in Bangkok (*Bangkok Post*, November 8, 1996). Even the director of the Suan Dusit Poll mentioned above (183,000 respondents) suggested that the polling error for such a sample would be about 4–5 percent.

(Obviously, this estimate had little reference to scientific probabilities.)

The lack of appreciation of the need for probability sampling is largely a result of Thai researchers following U.S. and European researchers primarily, who have been conducting surveys in Thailand for decades but who are not themselves trained in sampling design. Foreign scholars who are area studies specialists have long conducted survey research using convenience samples and snowball samples for research purposes. Well-funded dissertation researchers, with no survey research training, come to Thailand armed with adequate funds, a questionnaire, and a basic textbook on survey research. Because most Thai social researchers collaborated with these U.S. and European scholars, they came to assume that their practices were state-of-the-art. Without a community of scholars prepared to challenge these techniques, the results of the surveys are often adopted eagerly by consumers of survey data. The result is that, despite a plethora of polling data, examples of probability sampling are extremely rare. Furthermore, the lack of appropriate diagnostics or some description of the sampling design makes the nonprobability (or even haphazard) character of the sample difficult to detect. One should be careful in using Thai polls for generalizations without some effort to investigate the nature of the sample design. Such flaws, however, offer no deterrent to an almost insatiable consumption of polling data, especially by the news media.

Online Public Opinion Surveys

Along with the burgeoning interest in polls, there has been a growing use of computerized public opinion responses. These data are, of course, as fraught with

problems of representativeness as corresponding Internet survey data in other countries. Not unlike those in the United States, consumers of polls hardly discriminate between this method of polling and polls taken using highly sophisticated sampling designs. Issue polls conducted daily by the major newspapers over the Internet often become significant news items in support of or opposition to actions of political leaders or policies. It is important to note, however, that daily CNN polls are no more representative than Thai media polls, even if the anchors are careful to note that the polls are not scientific.

Uses of Public Opinion Polls

The major consumers of polls are the news media and the government. Both tend to view public opinion polls as a voice of the people. Given the substantial lack of confidence in representative government by Thai academics and social activists, polls are often taken to mean that the people have a very different view from that of the government. Such a view would be more tenable if the polls were truly representative. The indiscriminate, haphazard character of sampling by most venues makes most of the polls highly suspect and open to distortion for political purposes.

Polls obtained under the auspices of private organizations or political parties are often administered by one of the polling institutions mentioned above. Sponsored polls are often accused of question bias in favor of the candidate or cause of the sponsor. Although this bias is denied by the most respected polls, the finding of the Shinawatra-sponsored poll noted above from 1996 clearly produced results that were favorable to a candidate rather than accurately reflecting public opinion.

Attitudes toward polls have undergone considerable transformation since 1996. At the time, public officials were united in urging exit polls for the 1996 parliamentary elections. Exit polls are still conducted by polling organizations, with some success, but there has developed a growing suspicion that preelection polls have a significant influence on election outcomes.

Polls are taken so seriously that the institutes conducting them are subject to vitriolic attacks, alleging bribery or question-rigging. Other attacks suggest that most polls are unethical and mislead the public with opinions of middle- and upper-class Bangkokians while ignoring working-class or rural people. More recently, the ABAC Poll was subjected to intimidation by the military and police over a poll showing a drop in popularity of the prime minister. According to the *Bangkok Post* (March 2, 2002), 1,301 survey forms were seized, accompanied by a demand that the polls not affect key national leaders. The university affairs permanent secretary criticized the poll and issued "guidelines" to 70 state and private universities on how to conduct polls.

Despite these criticisms, public opinion polls are welcomed as giving voice to people who would not otherwise be heard in matters of government and public policy, a reliable guide to the views of people affected by government policies and decisions. There is even a bias in efforts to reflect the needs and feelings of ordinary people by stratifying sampling to include poverty areas in surveys of political, economic, social, and cultural issues. Still, consumers of polls often argue that polls (biased or not) are essential to the development of democracy in Thailand. One party leader noted that "opinion polls are

a form of public participation, reflecting the progress of a democratic society" (*Bangkok Post*, October 31, 2000).

There is a high commitment to stratified sampling over random or systematic sampling. As noted above, special care is taken to include poverty areas in some of the university polls by stratifying samples. The justification is that the opinions of people in these areas should be taken into account in public opinion about government and government policies. Unfortunately, data obtained through stratified sampling are rarely weighted, so that special groups constitute a disproportionate number of respondents. There is rarely, if ever, published information on weighting stratified samples. Without appropriate weights, these are highly skewed samples of the population and do not represent public opinion that would be obtained from random or systematic sampling. The most significant problem in this regard is the disproportionate sampling of Bangkok in national polls. This lack of weighting often constitutes another significant source of Bangkok bias.

Methods of Sampling Public Opinion

Development of public opinion polling in Thailand is largely a matter of attention to sampling methods. Because telephones are generally a luxury and the land-line system is woefully inadequate, telephone polls are not an option for opinion polling. This means that other strategies must be pursued for measurement of public opinion.

The most common method of sampling public opinion is to hire armies of workers, especially students, to fan out over selected areas and collect data on respondents by the thousands. Sometimes these polls include a criterion of stratification by gender and, often, by age. The workers

are paid by the interview, and questions are often raised about the reliability of the survey by workers who report knowledge of other workers filling out their questionnaires based upon imagined characteristics of phantom respondents. Such polls are seldom called into question except in passing, as they produce large numbers of respondents in quantities that persuade consumers that, no matter how the sample is conducted, such a number must be representative of enough public opinion to be credible.

At a more sophisticated level, survey organizers will engage in multistage cluster sampling by randomly selecting *amphur* (counties) from across the nation, then systematically sampling villages and, finally, households within the villages. This strategy provides some randomization. However, selection of households and household respondents generally breaks down into a haphazard affair. Because randomization appears at some levels of the survey, persons less sophisticated in survey methodology often take these samples to be randomized measures of public opinion. Survey directors themselves, who know better, confess that it is just too difficult to engage in randomized sampling at the respondent level.

Another common sampling method is to stratify by region and by *changwat* (province) as a way to guarantee that all areas of the country are included in the sample. If the stratification is sensitively constructed, this will often produce results that come close to the population of the nation as a whole. During the 2001 parliamentary elections, for example, a study that included 17 *changwat* from the five major regions of the country came within less than 2 percent of fore-

casting the vote for the Thai Rak Thai Party (Albritton and Bureekul 2001). Surveys of this type require weighting by population, and consumers should look for information on data weighting. In this design, the true population is the population of the *changwat* surveyed, not the Thai nation, even though the data may closely reflect national public opinion in its weighted form.

Opinion polls conducted by the King Prajadhipok's Institute, a parliament-funded but quasi-independent think tank to advise the government on democratization under the new constitution, use multistage cluster sampling of parliamentary constituencies, followed by systematic sampling of voting units (precincts), then systematic sampling of the voting lists. (Voting lists include all Thai citizens 18 years of age and older—the entire adult population.) This method comes closest to a true probability sample because it randomizes at the respondent level. Using this procedure, samples come very close to being representative by region. A substitution procedure for chosen respondents who have died, left the country, or will not be available ensures that substitutes represent the gender of the chosen respondent, guaranteeing a sample free of gender bias.

Unfortunately, the power of this design increases in proximity to national elections when voter lists are relatively up-to-date. The more reliable polls are beginning to use randomization by household as a reasonable and powerful substitute for individuals on voter lists. Household census data maintained by government agencies provide a basis for sampling that is as reliable as individual sampling, as long as some random selection process is applied within households.

Issues of Public Opinion

Three issues in public opinion that preoccupy public opinion polls, apart from approval of politicians and parties, are: support for democracy, levels of trust in government, and experiences of corruption in government. Scientific public opinion polls often diverge from elite discourse on these issues. Support for democracy is higher in the rural areas than in Bangkok, although this conclusion must be tempered by different understandings of what democracy means in the Thai context. For example, Bangkok elites tend to see democracy in terms of good governance; rural Thais tend to see it in terms of more populist forms of democratic control—especially diluting the influence of Bangkok.

Popular discourse among elites and in the news media tends to paint a cynical picture of the Thai government. Scientifically designed public opinion polls, however, indicate a very high level of trust in virtually all institutions of government (Albritton and Bureekul 2002). The natural hostility of academics and social activists toward the military and the police, for example, is not at all characteristic of the Thai population, which is highly trusting of national security forces. Contrary to a belief that corruption in Thailand is rife, only about 20 percent of the population has personal experience with corruption, however defined. Furthermore, such experiences are significantly higher in Bangkok than in the provinces, another factor counter to elite discourse.

Conclusion

Public opinion polling in Thailand has firmly established itself as a component of the democratic process. There is con-

siderable attention paid to responses to questions on surveys—whether or not they are based upon probability sampling. There is currently little ability or interest in critiquing polling methods, except by people who disagree with their result. The news media are simply uncritical in their acceptance of polling results. Not only do the media, especially the press, rely extensively on polls for news items; they are seen by politicians and interest groups as barometers of popular sentiment toward public affairs.

The development of influence and attention to opinion polls in the future bodes to be more, not less. Currently, polls are under way to gauge public attitudes toward constitutional changes allowed under the new constitution. Absent alternatives to the legislative branch, respected polls will be treated as the voice of the people in these and other matters.

Reforms in sampling techniques are under way. Development in this area is vital if public opinion polls are to continue their role in the discourse over democratic development. Thailand will continue to rely on opinion polls, scientific or not, as the voice of the people operating within a democracy, even if that voice is somewhat distorted by lack of attention to the discipline required in the public opinion polling craft.

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Uruguay

Uruguay's first public opinion studies were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. Initially they were the product of private research centers, then in the 1960s, the university arena, with the creation of the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) within the School of Law and Social Sciences. In the private sphere, the first organization to take up public opinion research was the Uruguayan Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP), founded in the 1950s, which began to publish the results of its surveys sporadically in the press and would later become Gallup-Uruguay. The first public opinion study focused on electoral behavior was the work of the ICS during the 1962 election campaigns. From the 1960s until the 1971 elections, some academic studies were conducted, oriented toward empirically proving the predominant sociological perspectives of electoral behavior, centered on class structure and ideological representations (Cárpena 1970; Filgueira 1972).

The first preelection polls were conducted by technicians sympathetic to the different parties in the city of Montevideo in 1971. The elections that year also marked the first estimation of vote results based on a quick count of a sample from the voting districts. The 1971 electoral process was also the scenario for the first conflict between a political party and a polling firm: the National (Blanco) Party accused Gallup of using the poll results to influence the decisions of the voters (Aguiar 2000).

Shortly after taking office, the president led a coup d'état with the support of the armed forces in June 1973, beginning an authoritarian period that lasted until 1984. National elections were held that year, and the new democratic government assumed power in March 1985. The ICS had closed its doors during the dictatorship, and public opinion polls were not conducted for a time. In the 1970s, other private research centers and some small enterprises were founded and conducted market research. But in the last stretch of the authoritarian period Equipos Consultores (Equipos/Mori) achieved a near monopoly on public opinion research in Uruguay. The firm has carried out numerous studies since 1981 and won notoriety in 1984 when the media reported on the correctly predicted election results for Montevideo.

The Equipos monopoly began to disintegrate in 1989 with the emergence of Factum, a company dedicated exclusively to public opinion polling. In the following years, new firms appeared, among which Cifra stands out. These three comprise the nucleus of a market that is still competitive and respected today. It is important to note that academic centers have conducted almost no public opinion polls in recent years, reinforcing the division of labor in this field, separating private companies from the academy (Cruz Fostik 2002). The communications media regularly report the results of polls, and Uruguay's political parties and various public entities contract the services of polling firms.

Preelectoral Polls: The Star of Public Opinion Studies

The mass media's publication of poll results takes on an important role when

they involve figures related to voting intention in the preelection context. The media, and the printed press in particular, seek to be the first to report on the latest polls conducted. In some cases, media outlets hold exclusive contracts with public opinion firms, and in other cases media groups have attempted to set up their own polling teams; there are others in which surveys conducted for private clients are leaked to the press. The interest in this type of information is strong among the elite and the politicized public, who consider leading polling firms' figures to be reliable.

Measurements of voting intention are published on an almost weekly basis in the final stretches of election campaigns but are also ongoing, and the leading polling firms tend to publish an electoral survey at least once a year. During election campaigns the data on voting intention dominate the publication of poll results. But between elections other variables take on greater importance. The public's support for the president is seen as one of the most relevant indicators for evaluating the state of public opinion in relation to the political system. Also, in the interim periods, public opinion on central issues and the policy agenda gains importance, particularly if there is a possibility that a matter will be subject to a plebiscite or referendum.

In parallel to public opinion polling, work began in 1989 on projecting election results based on exit polls and quick counts for local TV stations. The same firms that dominate the polling market perform this function for the broadcast media, such that they become a permanent presence during the campaign and play a key role on Election Day itself. In general terms, the figures disseminated

by the press, and the projection of Election Day results, have systematically been highly accurate, favoring the consolidation of the prestige and reliability of the leading polling firms.

Politicians have assumed the necessity of having public opinion research as a form of incorporating valuable inputs into the decisionmaking process. However, their attitudes toward the surveys are contradictory, a sort of love-hate relationship. Although politicians recognize the informative value of the polls and some have become highly dependent on them (polloholics), they also publicly foster distrust in their quality and precision to the extent that opinion fluctuations seem to benefit some and threaten others. Although nearly all political groups hire polling firms, they often say publicly that the resulting figures are not reliable or are biased. This led to the emergence of party-based institutes that disseminated poll results contradicting those offered by experienced and recognized firms. Nevertheless, the consolidation of prestige among the leading polling companies has prompted a political reaction that has sought—so far unsuccessfully—to regulate polling activities, especially to prohibit the dissemination of public opinion results in the final stages of election campaigns.

General Characteristics of Public Opinion in Uruguay

The polls conducted over the last 10–15 years provide a solid image of Uruguayan public opinion. The accuracy the polling firms have demonstrated in the electoral field is not fortuitous; nor is it the exclusive result of the technical abilities of their staffs. More than anything else, it is the consequence of a very stable public

opinion with a well-defined set of characteristics.

In the political realm the most noteworthy characteristic of Uruguayan public opinion is its high level of support for democracy as a government system. In recent years it has been admitted as an acceptable measurement for Latin America on this topic in the survey conducted by the Latinobarómetro firm. In the series available (see Table 1), levels of support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy are high and relatively stable. In comparative terms with Latin America, Uruguay is a leader, which can be associated with the country's early democratic political development, generating an institutional framework capable of providing the system with consistency and continuity. "Uruguay is a country characterized in the Latin American context by relatively strong and—all indications show—stable democratic values" (Canzani 2000a).

The democratic values of the Uruguayan people are associated with the centrality that politics has maintained in daily life. Various studies from a range of perspectives agree on the predominant role of politics in the lives of Uru-

Table 1 Support for and Satisfaction with Democracy in Uruguay

	<i>Support for Democracy</i>	<i>Satisfaction with Democracy</i>
1995	80	
1996	80	52
1997	86	64
1998	80	68
1999–2000	84	69
2001	79	55
2002	77	53

Source: www.latinobarometro.org.

guayans. For example, "politics as a priority was established as a defining element of Uruguayan political culture at the beginning of the 20th century" (Mora 1997, p. 115). However, a declining interest in politics has been observed in recent years, although it tends to peak during elections (see Table 2).

Table 2 Interest in Politics

	<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Nov. 89	44	54
Dec. 92	33	66
Dec. 93	30	66
Nov. 94	36	62
Nov. 95	26	74
Nov. 96	31	68
Nov. 97	28	69
Mar. 98	24	76
Sep. 98	24	75
Apr. 99	27	73

Source: Canzani 2000a.

Maintaining strong democratic support in the context of declining interest in politics can be explained by the presence of a growing group of "disenchanted democrats" (Rossel 2002). This group is characterized by its generally negative perception of the performance of the successive postdictatorship governments. Although Uruguayans overwhelmingly consider democracy the best form of government, they do not think they have had the best governments. This perception is reflected in one of the indicators most frequently measured and disseminated: the president's performance. In the series one can see that no president has garnered the support of the majority of the population, with the sole exception of Jorge Batlle during his first months in office (see Table 3).

Table 3 President's Performance

	<i>Approval</i>	<i>Disapproval</i>
1988	27	48
1989	22	51
1990	16	55
1991	16	56
1992	13	65
1993	16	60
1994	24	48
1995	25	42
1996	24	47
1997	25	44
1998	30	38
1999	28	43

Source: Canzani 2000b.

Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior

The characteristics above are articulated in the gradual change in Uruguayans' electoral preferences, beginning with the 1971 elections. From that moment on, a trend developed and then began to consolidate over the years. The changes have been manifest in the systematic loss of votes by the two traditional parties (Blancos and Colorados), which had dominated the political-electoral arena for more than a century, and the consequent electoral growth of the leftist opposition, Frente Amplio, to the point that this coalition was the most-voted-for party in the 1999 elections. This phenomenon—the electoral turnabout of the Uruguayan citizenry—is the most relevant long-term process of the past few decades in sociopolitical terms (see Table 4).

Ruling out the possibility of situation-specific changes, a theory has been developed based on Uruguayan political culture that attempts to explain this evolution. It proposes a demographic model emerging from the existence of a prominent age-based cleavage in elec-

toral behavior: "In an electorate divided by age group, even if no one changes his opinion, the mere passage of time implies growth for parties that have greater relative weight among the younger voters" (Aguiar 2000, p. 20). This model would in part explain the annual 1 percent growth of support for nontraditional parties. Public opinion surveys also show—complementing this explanation—the growing family vote retention capacity of the left (Moreira 2000). This phenomenon, which some call the *traditionalization* of the left, means the probability that children will follow the electoral behavior of their parents is much higher among leftist families than among those in which the parents support either of the two traditional parties (see Table 5).

However, it is important to note that this process also is rooted in the state of continued discontentment of Uruguay public opinion that could be traced to the mid-1950s, when the import substitution model of development entered into crisis. From that moment on, the notion of a country in crisis and in constant deterioration has become an idiosyncratic trait of Uruguayan culture, a "structural pessimism" (Luna 2002). That feature can be observed through opinions on the country's situation (see Table 6) and was manifest in the victory of different parties or factions election after election, practically without exception, from 1958 to 1999. It can be argued that the electoral growth of the left has been fed by the Uruguayan voters' political disenchantment that began long before the left's success in the electoral arena, and the impact of which does not consist exclusively of widening its electoral base but also is expressed in a process of electoral circulation between and within the traditional parties.

Table 4 Electoral Results

	<i>CAPITAL</i>		<i>INTERIOR</i>	
	<i>Traditionals</i>	<i>Challengers</i>	<i>Traditionals</i>	<i>Challengers</i>
1942	86%	14%	95%	5%
1946	78%	22%	93%	7%
1950	85%	15%	94%	6%
1954	81%	19%	95%	5%
1958	83%	17%	91%	9%
1962	85%	15%	95%	5%
1966	83%	17%	95%	5%
1971	69%	31%	90%	10%
1984	63%	37%	88%	12%
1989	52%	48%	84%	16%
1994	48%	52%	77%	23%
1999	42%	58%	65%	35%

	<i>MONTEVIDEO</i>		<i>INTERIOR</i>	
	<i>Traditionals</i>	<i>Challengers</i>	<i>Traditionals</i>	<i>Challengers</i>
1942	190,875	31,604	335,989	16,235
1946	202,103	58,508	379,322	30,128
1950	281,062	49,142	469,913	28,171
1954	284,227	65,221	502,361	27,433
1958	338,040	70,469	540,447	56,406
1962	412,869	71,176	653,389	33,584
1966	435,659	88,798	668,882	38,423
1971	488,043	216,800	862,403	96,873
1984	557,668	326,333	880,806	121,555
1989	467,594	439,208	895,360	168,424
1994	437,487	480,999	852,325	258,470
1999	397,253	538,608	785,642	425,646

Source: Database of the Instituto de Ciencia Política.

Conclusion

The systematic growth of the political left is related to the ability of the nontraditional parties, particularly Frente Amplio, to capitalize on the chronic discontent of the Uruguayan voters. However, this ability to attract votes is not sociopolitically neutral; rather it shows certain specific paths in relation to different variables. In addition to the mentioned age group differences, other social

cleavages are strongly associated with voter behavior.

Perhaps the most notable of the differentiating factors is whether a voter belongs to the urban or rural sphere and, more specifically, whether she lives in the capital or in the Uruguayan interior. The left is clearly an urban political construct with strong ties to trade unions and intellectual circles, which are almost exclusively concentrated in Montevideo.

Table 5 Family Vote Reproduction

<i>Parents' Party ID</i>	<i>Vote Intention</i>		
	<i>EPFA</i>	<i>Other Party</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
Both EPFA	85%	2%	13%
Both PN	46%	39%	15%
Both PC	53%	29%	18%
Both "traditional"	43%	27%	30%
Mixed EPFA "TRAD"	74%	17%	10%

Source: Moreira 2000.

As such, voter support for Frente Amplio was initially greatest in the capital, then grew gradually in the rest of the country, encountering fewer obstacles where the levels of urbanization and industrialization are higher (see Table 4).

Furthermore, level of education represents an important cleavage in regard to electoral behavior. The leftist political options receive greater support among the sectors with the most formal education and notably poorer support among the least educated sectors. The voter preferences for Batlle (Colorado Party) or Vázquez (Encuentro Progresista-Frente

Table 6 Country Situation

	<i>Good</i>	<i>Regular</i>	<i>Bad</i>
1990	2	30	66
1991	5	39	56
1992	5	32	64
1993	7	44	48
1994	8	51	40
1995	6	46	47
1996	6	41	52
1997	7	38	54
1998	7	44	47
1999	8	42	48

Source:

Amplio) in the second-round elections of 1999 clearly illustrate this differentiation (see Table 7).

Finally, the factor that proves to be determining for how one votes is ideological self-identification. One's positioning along the left-right spectrum is the leading cognitive reference of orientation in the electoral behavior of Uruguayans. As is shown in Table 7, the leftist positions on the spectrum are directly linked with votes for Vázquez, the rightist positions with votes for Batlle. It is clear that

Table 7 Vote in Second Round by Different Variables

	<i>Batlle (Right)</i>	<i>Vázquez (Left)</i>	<i>Other</i>
SEX			
Women	53	44	3
Men	51	48	1
AGE			
60 & over	64	32	4
50 to 59	56	41	3
40 to 49	52	47	1
30 to 39	44	56	0
18 to 29	41	57	2
EDUCATION LEVEL			
College	45	54	1
High School	49	50	1
Incomp. HS	53	46	1
Elem. School	72	26	2
SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL			
Low	55	43	2
Mid-low	54	43	3
Mid	47	53	0
High & mid-hi	54	45	1
IDEOLOGICAL ID			
Right	93	7	0
Center-right	89	8	3
Center	58	40	2
Center-left	5	93	2
Left	1	97	2

Source: Canzani 2000b.

Uruguayan electoral behavior is based on ideology.

The ideological factor permits a reconstruction in alternative terms of the evolution of Uruguayan voter behavior over the last few decades. The electoral success of the left in Uruguay may be characterized in the same way that Maurice Duverger assessed a similar phenomenon in France, saying that the French turned to the left, but even more, the left turned to the French. The ideological preferences of the Uruguayans have remained relatively stable since such data have been recorded; in any case, there has not been growth among the leftist positions (see Table 8). As such, the only plausible explanation of Frente Amplio's electoral expansion in ideological terms is that the political left has gradually shifted toward the center of the spectrum, a notion that is unanimously accepted by political experts.

The most relevant, long-term process of change in Uruguayan public opinion has led to a radical transformation of the country's party system and to placing a new leftist political actor at the gates of

the national government. This process is rooted in the electorate's ongoing democratic disenchantment, which is most evident among the youth, educated, and urbanized sectors and is manifest in the political support for a party that has been known to moderate its discourse and to gradually move toward the center of the left-right spectrum.

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Table 8 Ideological ID

	<i>Left</i>	<i>Center</i>	<i>Right</i>	<i>Other</i>
1988	25	38	25	12
1989	25	32	29	14
1990	23	34	29	14
1991	25	33	28	14
1992	22	35	29	14
1993	22	39	28	12
1994	20	33	34	14
1995	23	37	30	10
1996	23	37	31	8
1997	26	37	31	6
1998	25	37	32	7
1999	26	29	38	8

Source: Canzani 2000b.

Venezuela

The 1999 Venezuelan constitution made public opinion, more than at any previous time, a paramount institutional factor for political life. Referenda and midterm recalls for regional and national offices, including the presidency, have made courting and monitoring public opinion a matter of life and death for politicians and interest groups. The reversal in the support for president Hugo Chávez, detected by opinion polls by the end of 2001, was the departing signal for the opposition and triggered huge demonstrations and requests for early elections and a non-binding referendum on whether the president should resign. The attitude of the government was also heavily influenced by the opinion polls: from being wildly enthusiastic about calling for referenda when its popularity ran high, to becoming amazingly shy about consulting the people when the opinion polls began to indicate its support was fading. Thus opinion polls today are a common tool in the arsenal of politicians, newspapers, businesses, and interest groups. Several firms publish a monthly report on government popularity and political attitudes that is eagerly waited for and acted upon.

Opinion polls are without doubt the most important and widespread instrument to measure public opinion in the country. The market is dominated by four prestigious firms with nationwide coverage: Consultores 21, Datos, Dat-analysis, and Keller. However, there are several other minor businesses with mostly regional coverage. Polls are paid for by patrons of various kinds. Outstanding among them are national and regional governments, political parties, newspapers, television, and large national and international businesses. The most important national newspapers (*El*

Nacional and *El Universal*) give prime space to poll results, particularly in times of crisis.

Until the early 1970s public opinion polls were not a common event in Venezuelan politics. The first publication of a survey on political attitudes was for the 1958 elections (Alvarez 1994). This was a poll based on a local and nonrepresentative sample. At the academic level, a national survey jointly directed by the Center for Development Studies (CENDES, of the Universidad Central of Venezuela) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology was carried out during the 1960s, dealing with political attitudes and values (Bonilla 1972). However, the electoral campaign of 1973 marks the point from which surveys became widely used as instruments for political strategy and academic analysis (Koenke 2000). The two main parties, Acción Democrática and Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (COPEI), based their 1973 strategy for the first time on opinion polls commissioned to private firms and hired U.S. consultants with experience in campaigns. That election was also the first one studied through a national survey designed and administered under the direction of U.S. political scientists John Martz and Enrique Baloyra. That survey was a pioneer in analyzing Venezuelan elections, using state-of-the-art theories in electoral behavior (Baloyra and Martz 1979). This study was followed ten years later by a second study in collaboration with Arístides Torres of the University Simón Bolívar and has been the inspiration for the development of Venezuelan studies in electoral behavior. In 1997, researchers from several universities founded a research group: Red Universitaria de Estudios Políticos (REDPOL, University Network for Politi-

cal Studies), which has carried out national electoral surveys giving institutional continuity to Baloyra and Martz's seminal study and making available electoral attitude data on Venezuela to scholars at home and abroad.

Since 1973, public opinion monitored by national and regional surveys has progressively increased its weight not only in policymaking but also as an explanation of electoral behavior. This growth in importance reached a climax with the approval of the 1999 constitution, which allows referenda on government decisions and recalls for regional and national offices. This institutional factor has been compounded by the fact that the Chávez government, inaugurated in 1999, has made popular support the stated foundation of its legitimacy. The opposition obliged, also using public opinion as a tool to indicate that the government had lost legitimacy and strength—and to search for early elections or recalls.

Other Means of Assessing

Public Opinion

Today, polls are the most widely used and influential means of assessing public opinion in the country. However, they have never been the only mechanism for collecting information on public opinion or for ascertaining its direction on issues or personalities. Mass rallies, elections, focus groups, and referenda have also been used to assess public opinion in Venezuela.

Mass rallies convey the mood of the population or a sector of it; they are a way to show strength by political parties and organizations. They played an important role during the struggle for civil liberties after the death of Juan Vicente Gómez in December 1935, during the first period of political liberalization from 1936 to 1945.

They were also an important political tool during the electoral campaigns and political struggles that took place during the first span of representative democracy from 1945 to 1948. When democracy was restored in 1958, mass rallies were the main mechanism to ascertain the strength of the political organizations, an important tool of propaganda, and a mechanism to express public discontent or support. With the development of the mass media, opinion polls, and other means of political propaganda and assessing public opinion, the importance of mass rallies subsided. Nevertheless, they reappeared with great strength by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The government and opposition groups staged huge demonstrations during 2002 and 2003 as a way to show that they have public opinion behind them. Mass rallies have become daily events all over the country. They are staged to express support to the government or the opposition, or to convey approval and disapproval of specific policies and proposals.

From 1973 to 1988, when two strong parties prevailed, elections were contests in which the voting decision was made mainly on the basis of party identification (Molina and Pérez 1998) and were to a lesser extent influenced by candidates and government approval. As the two main parties were located close to the ideological center, the policy content of the election decision tended to be thin, beyond a general expression of discontent with the incumbent. The elections before 1973 can be regarded as having a message: support democracy in the face of threats from the right and the left to stability. In the 1963 elections the parties that had taken up arms against the government called for nonvoting. The high level of participation (91 percent of regis-

tered voters) was a clear sign of rejection of the Communist Party and its allies. When the two-party system started to crumble, elections acquired new meaning. In 1993, the four main candidates were divided between two traditional main parties, who expressly supported the neoliberal policies applied by the 1989–1993 government, and two other candidates, who were expressly committed against those policies and against the traditional parties. The victory of one of the alternative candidates made clear the rejection by most voters of the traditional parties. Elections in 1998 and 2000 can be read also as a message for radical change conveyed by public opinion. As the party system has become deinstitutionalized (Molina 2002; Mainwaring 1999, pp. 21–60), and politics is increasingly run on personalities and government approval, elections have become a means through which approval or disapproval of government performance is expressed.

Focus groups were introduced mostly as an exploration tool or as a complement to surveys by the opinion poll firms. Their use has tended to increase, as they have shown to be useful in getting a clearer idea of the meaning attributed by the public to general concepts used in surveys.

Referenda have been the latest mechanism to be used in Venezuela to assess public opinion. The first one in the democratic era occurred in April 1999. This was a referendum to decide whether to elect a constitutional assembly in order to write a new constitution. The second democratic referendum held in Venezuela was for deciding whether to approve the new constitution in December 1999. The new constitution allows several types of referenda, all of which can be requested by

the public or by the authorities. As of February 2003, only one other consultative referendum had been held: a referendum on whether to hold direct and fresh elections for the Venezuelan Labor Confederation (CTV, Confederación Venezolana de Trabajadores), which was held in December 2000 and declared binding by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. This finding on the binding character of consultative referenda was later reversed in January 2003 when a consultative referendum on whether to ask for the resignation of the president of the republic was requested. During 2003 the opposition collected signatures for several referenda geared to call for early elections on the presidential mandate that is due to end in January 2007 according to the constitution.

Public Opinion Issues

Support for democracy and ideology are two basic aspects of political culture that have been extensively studied and discussed by public opinion scholars in Venezuela and elsewhere. The data presented below show the attitudes of the Venezuelan public on democracy and the left-right ideological dimension. These data come from four academic nationwide surveys: 1973, conducted by Enrique Baloyra and John Martz with a sample of 1,521 (Baloyra and Martz 1979); Batoba 1983, a national survey conducted by Enrique Baloyra and Arístides Torres, with a sample of 1,789; World Values Survey Venezuela 1996, with a sample of 1,200; and World Values Survey Venezuela 2000, with a sample of 1,200.

Attitudes about Democracy

The extent to which people support democracy has been one of the issues that has deserved the most attention as far as nonindustrialized countries are

concerned. Public opinion support for democracy is regarded by the literature as an important element of a democratic political culture and for democratic consolidation and stability (Inglehart 2003; Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz 1999; Dahl 1998). The data from the surveys considered here show that there is a high level of public support for democracy in Venezuela, but at the same time support is not unequivocal.

The percentage of people who support democracy vis-à-vis dictatorship in Venezuela was 85 percent in 1973, 86 percent in 1996, and 93 percent in 2000. In 1973, people were asked whether they preferred a democracy like the one that existed in Venezuela since 1958 or a dictatorship. In 1996 and 2000, the World Values Survey asked whether the respondent agreed with the following statement: "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government." According to these data, there has been a stable and high level of support for democracy in Venezuela. This democratic culture has been one of the main reasons why democracy has survived in Venezuela despite a harsh economic and political crisis, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s. During the intractable political conflict of 2002 and 2003, all surveys showed that public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of democracy and against the resolution of the political crisis by a coup d'état. The survey results were a deterrent and made it clear to radicals on both sides, government and opposition, that any dictatorship would face strong public rejection. Nevertheless, support for democracy has not been completely unequivocal.

Despite the high level of support for democracy, there is a sizeable minority that in some circumstances would sup-

port a coup (Baloyra and Martz 1979; Myers and O'Connor 1998). Ronald Inglehart (2003) also points out the paradox that support for democracy, particularly in nonindustrialized countries, is often accompanied by significant support for a government with clear authoritarian traits. This is the case in Venezuela. Inglehart uses as an indicator of this situation the World Values Survey question that asks whether "having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections" would be a good type of government for the country. In Venezuela, the valid answers stating that such an authoritarian government would be good or very good were 30 percent in 1996 and 48 percent in 2000. The paradox posed by stable and enduring support for democracy versus simultaneous support for an authoritarian style of governing seems to mean that an elected government, as long as it does not suppress elections and does deliver the social and economic goods expected by its voters, has a large scope for authoritarian practices.

Attitudes about Ideology

The attitude toward political ideology as expressed in public opinion surveys is another element of political culture that has been the subject of analysis and debate in Venezuela. Here one finds another paradox: most people place themselves in the center or the right of the left-right ideology scale. This has been the case at least since 1973. Yet the population is evenly divided with regard to state versus individual responsibility for welfare, which means that there is sizeable support to increase rather than decrease state intervention.

Most people place themselves in the left-right continuum: 73 percent in 1973, 70 percent in 1983, 74 percent in 1996,

and 82 percent in 2000. Out of those who declared an ideological position, in 1973, 28 percent chose left, 30 percent chose center, and 42 percent chose right; in 1983, 24 percent chose left, 33 percent chose center, and 43 percent chose right; in 1996, 21 percent chose left, 27 percent chose center, and 52 percent chose right; in 2000, 17 percent chose left, 43 percent chose center, and 40 percent chose right. These percentages show there has been a steady decline of the left that did not stop with the victory of the leftist government in 1998. However, this last political change seems to have brought a decline of the right in favor of centrism. This composition of the ideological views of the population can help to explain why the 1998 leftist government carried a high level of support for change, but that support tended to evaporate when the path chosen was perceived as being too far to the left.

The predominance of center and right views is accompanied in Venezuela by sizeable support for state intervention as long as it is not seen as an encroachment on freedom and democracy. This viewpoint can be seen as a consequence of the long preeminence in Venezuelan politics of a social democratic party (Acción Democrática) that moved over time from socialism to a very mild version of social democracy. The World Values Survey asked the respondents to place themselves on a 10-point scale on which the first point was "the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for" and the tenth point was "people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves." The percentage of valid answers within the 1–5 range (more government intervention) was 55 percent in 1996 and 49 percent in 2000.

Venezuela has had a democratic system for more than forty years. It is by no means a flawless democracy, and the political and economic crises of the early 2000s have not helped to ease the burdens or the doubts about democratic quality and consolidation. Nevertheless, the increasing importance of public opinion in political life should be seen as one of the bright spots in the middle of a worrisome landscape, particularly because it seems to have come together with growth in awareness and interest in politics by the general public.

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APPENDIX: NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES 2002 POST-ELECTION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

A1.

Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you have been VERY MUCH INTERESTED, SOMEWHAT INTERESTED or NOT MUCH INTERESTED in the political campaigns so far this year?

1. Very much interested
3. Somewhat interested
5. Not much interested

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

A2.

Did you watch any programs about the campaign on television?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

A3.

Do you ever discuss politics with your family or friends?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

A3a.

How many days IN THE PAST WEEK did you talk about politics with family or friends?

0. None
1. One Day
2. Two Days
3. Three Days

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- 4. Four Days
- 5. Five Days
- 6. Six Days
- 7. Every Day

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B1.

As you know, the political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from one of the POLITICAL PARTIES call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B1a.

Which party was that?

- 1. Democrats
- 5. Republicans
- 6. Both
- 7. Other {SPECIFY}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B2.

We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a party or a candidate win an election. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B3.

Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B4.

Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B5.

Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B6.

During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution to support campaigns. Did you give money to AN INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE running for public office?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B7.

Did you give money to A POLITICAL PARTY during this election year?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B8.

Did you give any money to ANY OTHER GROUP that supported or opposed candidates?

1. Yes
5. No

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D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

B9.

During the campaign this year, did anyone talk to you about REGISTERING TO VOTE or GETTING OUT TO VOTE?

1. Yes, someone did
5. No, no one did

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

1/2 SAMPLE C1a AND 1/2 SAMPLE C1b

C1a.

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you—did you vote in the elections this November?

1. Yes, voted
5. No, didn't vote
6. R refused to say whether voted

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C1b.

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following statements best describes you:

- One, I did not vote (in the election this November);
- Two, I thought about voting this time - but didn't;
- Three, I usually vote, but didn't this time; or
- Four, I am sure I voted?

{INTERVIEWER: PLEASE READ ALL OPTIONS}

1. I did not vote (in the election this November)
2. I thought about voting this time but didn't
3. I usually vote but didn't this time
4. I am sure I voted

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C2.

Were you registered to vote in this election?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No
- 6. VOL: Not required to register in R's state

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

IF NO COUNTY PRELOAD, C2a1 (NOT C2a) IS ASKED

C2a.

{IF NOT WASHINGTON D.C AND NOT LOUISIANA:}

Your residence is located in county.

Are you registered to vote in county?

{IF LOUISIANA:}

Your residence is located in parish?

Are you registered to vote in parish?

{IF WASHINGTON D.C.:}

Your residence is located in Washington D.C.

Are you registered to vote in Washington D.C.?

- 1. Yes, registered in
- 5. No, registered elsewhere

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C2a1.

In what county and state are you registered?

OPENEND

VOTERS C4–C15a2a IN-COUNTY—C11a1 AND C15a1; OUTSIDE OR NO PRELOAD—C11a2 AND C15a2

C4.

Did you vote ON ELECTION DAY—that is, November 5, 2002, or did you vote at SOME TIME BEFORE this?

- 1. On election day
- 5. Some time before this

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C4a1.

How long before November 5th did you vote?

{PROBE: A FEW DAYS, A WEEK, LONGER THAN THAT?}

OPENEND

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C4a2.

Did you vote IN PERSON or by ABSENTEE BALLOT?

- 1. In person
- 5. Absentee ballot
- 7. R VOLUNTEERS: by mail {OREGON ONLY}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

C11a.

How about the election for the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in Washington. Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives?

- 1. Yes, voted for House of Representatives
- 5. No, didn't vote for House of Representatives

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> C11a1—R VOTED WITHIN COUNTY OF INTERVIEW: FOR DISTRICTS WITH 2 MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES: 1/2 SAMPLE DEM HOUSE CAND NAME READ 1ST- REP CAND NAME READ 2ND 1/2 SAMPLE REP HOUSE CAND NAME READ 1ST- DEM CAND NAME READ 2ND

C11a1.

Who did you vote for? Did you vote for (the [Democrat/Republican], [DEM CAND NAME/REP CAND NAME]) (or) (the [Republican/Democrat], [REP CAND NAME/DEM CAND NAME]) (or the candidate, OTHER CAND NAME) (or someone else)?

- 1. PRELOAD DEM CAND NAME
- 5. PRELOAD REP CAND NAME
- 3. PRELOAD IND/3RD PARTY CAND NAME
- 7. Other {SPECIFY}
- 0. R says these are not the candidates in R's district {SPECIFY}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> C11a2–C11a2a—R VOTED OUTSIDE COUNTY OF IW OR NO PRELOAD

C11a2.

Who did you vote for?

OPENEND

- D.
- R.
- N.

C11a2a.

Which party was that?

- 1. Democratic
- 5. Republican
- 7. Other {SPECIFY}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> C15a NOT ASKED IF R VOTED IN COUNTY OF INTERVIEW AND NO RACE IN STATE

C15a.

How about the election for the UNITED STATES SENATE? Did you vote for a candidate for the U.S. Senate?

- 1. Yes, voted for Senate
- 5. No, didn't vote for Senate
- 7. R VOLUNTEERS: no race in state of vote (R VOTED OUTSIDE COUNTY OF RESIDENCE)

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> C15a1—R VOTED IN DISTRICT OF INTERVIEW: FOR STATES WITH 2 MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES: 1/2 SAMPLE DEM SENATE CAND NAME READ 1ST- REP CAND NAME READ 2ND 1/2 SAMPLE REP SENATE CAND NAME READ 1ST- DEM CAND NAME READ 2ND NOTE: SAME PARTY FIRST AS IN C11a1

C15a1.

Who did you vote for? Did you vote for (the [Democrat/Republican], [DEM CAND NAME/REP CAND NAME]) (or) (the [Republican/Democrat], [REP CAND NAME/DEM CAND NAME]) (or the OTHER PARTY candidate, OTHER CAND NAME) (or someone else)?

- 1. PRELOAD DEM CAND NAME
- 5. PRELOAD REP CAND NAME
- 3. PRELOAD IND/3RD PARTY CAND NAME
- 7. Other {SPECIFY}
- 0. R says these are not the candidates in R's state {SPECIFY}

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D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

=====> C15a2-C15a2a—R VOTED OUTSIDE COUNTY OF IW OR NO PRELOAD

C15a2.

Who did you vote for?

OPENEND

D.
R.
N.

C15a2a.

Which party was that?

1. Democratic
5. Republican
7. Other {SPECIFY}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

*** NONVOTER CANDIDATE PREFERENCE C18-C19 CANDIDATES OF IW
LOCATION REGARDLESS OF REGISTRATION LOCATION ***

C18a.

How about the election for the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES in Washington? Did you PREFER one of the candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

=====> C18a1—DISTRICTS WITH 2 MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES: 1/2 SAMPLE
DEM HOUSE CAND NAME READ 1ST- REP CAND NAME READ 2ND 1/2 SAM-
PLE REP HOUSE CAND NAME READ 1ST- DEM CAND NAME READ 2ND

C18a1.

Who did you prefer? Did you prefer (the [Democrat/Republican], [DEM CAND NAME/
REP CAND NAME]) (or) (the [Republican/Democrat], [REP CAND NAME/DEM

CAND NAME]) (or the OTHER PARTY candidate, OTHER CAND NAME) (or someone else?)?

1. PRELOAD DEM CAND NAME
5. PRELOAD REP CAND NAME
3. PRELOAD IND/3RD PARTY CAND NAME
7. Other {SPECIFY}

0. R says these are not the candidates in R's district {SPECIFY}

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

=====> C18a2-C18a2a ONLY FOR CASES WITHOUT PRELOAD

C18a2.

Who did you prefer?

OPENEND

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

C18a2a.

Which party was that?

1. Democratic
5. Republican
7. Other {SPECIFY}

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

=====> C19a-C19a1 ASKED ONLY IF SENATE RACE IN STATE OF INTERVIEW

C19a.

How about the election for the UNITED STATES SENATE? Did you PREFER one of the candidates for the U.S. Senate?

1. Yes

5. No

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

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=====> C19a1—STATES WITH 2 MAJOR PARTY CANDIDATES: 1/2 SAMPLE DEM SENATE CAND NAME READ 1ST- REP CAND NAME READ 2ND 1/2 SAMPLE REP SENATE CAND NAME READ 1ST- DEM CAND NAME READ 2ND NOTE: SAME PARTY FIRST AS IN C18a1

C19a1.

Who did you prefer? Did you prefer (the [Democrat/Republican], [DEM CAND NAME/ REP CAND NAME]) (or) (the [Republican/Democrat], [REP CAND NAME/DEM CAND NAME]) (or the OTHER PARTY candidate, OTHER CAND NAME) (or someone else?)?

1. PRELOAD DEM CAND NAME
 5. PRELOAD REP CAND NAME
 3. PRELOAD IND/3RD PARTY CAND NAME
 7. Other {SPECIFY}
 0. R says these are not the candidates in R's state {SPECIFY}
- D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

=====> C19a2–C19a2a ONLY FOR CASES WITHOUT PRELOAD

C19a2.

Who did you prefer?

OPENEND

- D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C19a2a.

Which party was that?

1. Democratic
 5. Republican
 7. Other {SPECIFY}
- D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

C20.

In some countries, people believe their elections are conducted fairly. In other countries, people believe that their elections are conducted unfairly. Thinking of the Con-

gressional elections we've just had, do you believe they were VERY FAIR, SOMEWHAT FAIR, NEITHER FAIR NOT UNFAIR, SOMEWHAT UNFAIR, or VERY UNFAIR?

1. Very fair
2. Somewhat fair
3. Neither fair nor unfair
4. Somewhat unfair
5. Very unfair

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

D1.

I'd like to get your feelings toward some people in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'll ask you to rate that person on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person. Rating right at the 50 degree mark means you don't feel particularly warm or cold. You may use any number from 0 to 100 to tell me how favorable or unfavorable your feelings are. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.

=====> D1a-D1n Thermometers randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders

D1a.

The first person is: George W. Bush Where on that thermometer would you rate George W. Bush? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D1g.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]?) {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

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997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D1h.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]?) {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D1j.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]?) {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D1k.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]?) {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D1m.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]?) {PROBE

FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

=====> D1m1 is asked only when R's state of residence is Louisiana, which has 2 Republican Senate candidates.

D1m1.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

=====> FOR LOUISIANA, D1n CAPTURES THE 2ND REPUBLICAN HOUSE CANDIDATE

D1n.

(The next person is:) (Where on that thermometer would you rate [him/her]? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU DON'T KNOW WHO THE PERSON IS OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2.

Still using the thermometer, how would you rate:

=====> D2 Thermometers randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders

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D2a.

(How would you rate:) the Supreme Court? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2b.

(How would you rate:) Congress? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2c.

(How would you rate:) the Military? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2d.

(How would you rate:) the federal government in Washington? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2e.

(How would you rate:) blacks? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2f.

(How would you rate:) whites? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2g.

(How would you rate:) conservatives? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2h.

(How would you rate:) liberals? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

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997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2j.

(How would you rate:) labor unions? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2k.

(How would you rate:) big business? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2m.

(How would you rate:) poor people? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2n.

(How would you rate:) people on welfare? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize
998. Don't Know where to rate
R. Refused
N.

D2p.

(How would you rate:) Hispanics (Hispanic-Americans)? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize
998. Don't Know where to rate
R. Refused
N.

D2q.

(How would you rate:) Christian fundamentalists? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize
998. Don't Know where to rate
R. Refused
N.

D2r.

(How would you rate:) older people (the elderly)? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize
998. Don't Know where to rate
R. Refused
N.

D2s.

(How would you rate:) environmentalists? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE:

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WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2t.

(How would you rate:) gay men and lesbians, that is, homosexuals? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2u.

(How would you rate:) Catholics? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2v.

(How would you rate:) Jews? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2w.

(How would you rate:) Protestants? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2y.

(How would you rate:) feminists? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2z.

(How would you rate:) Asian-Americans? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

D2za.

(How would you rate:) the news media? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

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D2zb.

(How would you rate:) the Catholic Church? {PROBE FOR DON'T KNOW RESPONSE: WHEN YOU SAY "DON'T KNOW" DO YOU MEAN THAT YOU HAVE NEVER HEARD THE TERM BEFORE OR DO YOU HAVE SOMETHING ELSE IN MIND?}

0-100.

997. Don't Recognize

998. Don't Know where to rate

R. Refused

N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE ADMINISTERED D3 TRAITS; 1/2 SAMPLE ADMINISTERED D4 TRAITS

D3.

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe George W. Bush. For each, please tell me whether the word or phrase describes him.

=====> D3b-d Bush traits randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders (D3a always 1st)

D3a.

In your opinion, does the phrase 'he PROVIDES STRONG LEADERSHIP' describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

D3b.

What about 'he is MORAL'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

D3c.

What about 'he is OUT OF TOUCH WITH ORDINARY PEOPLE'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

D3d.

What about 'he is KNOWLEDGEABLE'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE ADMINISTERED D3 TRAITS; 1/2 SAMPLE ADMINISTERED D4 TRAITS

D4.

I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe George W. Bush. For each, please tell me whether the word or phrase describes him.

=====> D4b-d Bush traits randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders (D4a always 1st)

D4a.

In your opinion, does the phrase 'he PROVIDES STRONG LEADERSHIP' describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

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D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

D4b.

What about 'he REALLY CARES ABOUT PEOPLE LIKE YOU'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

D4c.

What about 'he is DISHONEST'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

D4d.

What about 'he is INTELLIGENT'? (Does this phrase describe George W. Bush EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?)

1. Extremely Well
2. Quite Well
3. Not Too Well
4. Not Well at All

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

E1.

Do you happen to know which party had the most members in the House of Repre-

sentatives in Washington BEFORE the election [this/last] month? {IF NECESSARY: WHICH ONE?} {DON'T PROBE DK}

1. The Democrats
5. The Republicans

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

F5.

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs MOST OF THE TIME, SOME OF THE TIME, ONLY NOW AND THEN, or HARDLY AT ALL?

1. Most of the time
2. Some of the time
3. Only now and then
4. Hardly at all

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

G1.

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE DEM HOUSE CAND NAME G1a AND REP HOUSE CAND NAME G1b 1/2 SAMPLE REP HOUSE CAND NAME G1a AND DEM HOUSE CAND NAME G1b

=====> SPECIAL NOTES: FOR VT01 (DISTRICT AT LARGE) ONLY—THE DEMOCRATIC QUESTION SHOULD BE ASKED ABOUT THE INDEPENDENT INCUMBENT (THERE IS NO DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE). FOR LOUISIANA 05 ONLY, G1c IS ASKED ABOUT THE 2ND LEADING REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE (REPRESENTED IN THE HOUSE INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE FIELDS OF THE PRELOAD)

G1a.

When it comes to politics, do you think of [DEM HOUSE CAND NAME/REP HOUSE CAND NAME] as a LIBERAL, a CONSERVATIVE, or a MODERATE?

1. Liberal
2. Conservative
3. Moderate

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- 8. Don't Know
- 9. Refused
- N. NA

G1a1.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG liberal or a NOT VERY STRONG liberal?

- 1. Strong liberal
- 5. Not very strong liberal

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1a2.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG conservative or a NOT VERY STRONG conservative?

- 1. Strong conservative
- 5. Not very strong conservative

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1a3.

Do you think [he/she] is more like a LIBERAL or more like a CONSERVATIVE?

- 1. Liberal
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Moderate {VOL}
- 7. Can't choose; neither {VOL}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1b.

What about [DEM HOUSE CAND NAME/REP HOUSE CAND NAME]? Do you think [he/she] is a LIBERAL, a CONSERVATIVE, or a MODERATE?

- 1. Liberal
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Moderate

- 8. Don't Know
- 9. Refused
- N. NA

G1b1.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG liberal or a NOT VERY STRONG liberal?

- 1. Strong liberal
- 5. Not very strong liberal
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1b2.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG conservative or a NOT VERY STRONG conservative?

- 1. Strong conservative
- 5. Not very strong conservative
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1b3.

Do you think [he/she] is more like a LIBERAL or more like a CONSERVATIVE?

- 1. Liberal
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Moderate {VOL}
- 7. Can't choose; neither {VOL}
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

=====> G1c is asked only when district is LA05, which has 2 leading Republican candidates

G1c.

What about [LA05 2ND HOUSE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATE]? Do you think [he/she] is a LIBERAL, a CONSERVATIVE, or a MODERATE?

- 1. Liberal
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Moderate

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- 8. Don't Know
- 9. Refused
- N. NA

G1c1.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG liberal or a NOT VERY STRONG liberal?

- 1. Strong liberal
- 5. Not very strong liberal

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1c2.

Would you call [him/her] a STRONG conservative or a NOT VERY STRONG conservative?

- 1. Strong conservative
- 5. Not very strong conservative

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

G1c3.

Do you think [he/she] is more like a LIBERAL or more like a CONSERVATIVE?

- 1. Liberal
- 2. Conservative
- 3. Moderate {VOL}
- 7. Can't choose; neither {VOL}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N. NA

K2.

Many people say they have less time these days to do volunteer work. What about you, were you able to devote any time to volunteer work IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS or did you not do so?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

K3.

Generally speaking, would you say that MOST PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED, or that you CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL in dealing with people?

- 1. Most people can be trusted
- 5. Can't be too careful

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE K4 AND 1/2 SAMPLE K5

K4.

Do you think most people would try to TAKE ADVANTAGE of you if they got the chance or would they TRY TO BE FAIR?

- 1. Take advantage
- 5. Try to be fair

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

K5.

Would you say that most of the time people TRY TO BE HELPFUL, or that they are JUST LOOKING OUT FOR THEMSELVES?

- 1. Try to be helpful
- 5. Just looking out for themselves

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE L1 SPENDING SERIES AND 1/2 SAMPLE L2 SPENDING SERIES
ALTERNATE SERIES WITH PRE K1 AND K2 SERIES

L1.

Next I am going to read you a list of federal programs. For each one, I would like you to tell me whether you would like to see spending INCREASED or DECREASED.

=====> L1c-L1h Federal spending items randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders (L1a and L1b always 1st and 2nd)

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L1a.

The first program is : building and repairing highways. If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, should federal spending on building and repairing highways be INCREASED, DECREASED or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1b.

(What about) defense? (Should federal spending on defense be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1c.

(What about) spending on AIDS research? (Should federal spending on AIDS research be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1d.

(What about) welfare programs? (Should federal spending on welfare programs be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased

3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1e.

(What about) [public schools/big-city schools]? (Should federal spending on [public schools/big-city schools] be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1f.

(What about) dealing with crime? (Should federal spending on dealing with crime be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L1g.

(What about) child care? (Should federal spending on child care be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

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L1h.

(What about) [homeland security/the war on terrorism]? (Should federal spending on homeland security be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refused

N.

L1j.

(What about) unemployment insurance? (Should federal spending on unemployment insurance be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refused

N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE L1 SPENDING ITEMS AND 1/2 SAMPLE L2 SPENDING ITEMS
ALTERNATE SERIES WITH PRE K1 AND K2

L2.

Next I am going to read you a list of federal programs. For each one, I would like you to tell me whether you would like to see spending INCREASED or DECREASED.

=====> L2c-L2j Federal spending items randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders (L2a and L2b always 1st and 2nd)

L2a.

The first program is : environmental protection If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, should federal spending on environmental protection be INCREASED, DECREASED or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

L2b.

(What about) defense? (Should federal spending on defense be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

- 1. Increased
- 2. Decreased
- 3. Kept about the same
- 4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

L2c.

(What about) [aid to poor people/aid to the working poor]? (Should federal spending on [aid to poor people /aid to the working poor] be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

- 1. Increased
- 2. Decreased
- 3. Kept about the same
- 4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

L2d.

(What about) foreign aid? (Should federal spending on foreign aid be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

- 1. Increased
- 2. Decreased
- 3. Kept about the same
- 4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

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L2e.

(What about) Social Security? (Should federal spending on Social Security be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refused

N.

L2f.

(What about) tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration? (Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refused

N.

L2g.

(What about) aid to blacks? (Should federal spending on aid to blacks be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refused

N.

L2h.

(What about) preventing infant mortality? (Should federal spending on preventing infant mortality be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased

3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

L2j.

(What about) [pre-school and early education for poor children/ pre-school and early education for black children]? (Should federal spending on [pre-school and early education for poor children/ pre-school and early education for black children] be INCREASED, DECREASED, or KEPT ABOUT THE SAME?)

1. Increased
2. Decreased
3. Kept about the same
4. Cut out entirely {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M4.

Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has A JOB AND A GOOD STANDARD OF LIVING. Others think the government should just LET EACH PERSON GET AHEAD ON THEIR OWN. Which is closer to the way you feel or haven't you thought much about this?

1. Government should see to jobs and standard of living
5. Government should let each person get ahead on own
0. Haven't thought much about this
7. Other, it depends, neither {SPECIFY} {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M4c.

How important is this issue to you personally - VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL?

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all

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D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M4d.

Has this issue ever made you angry?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M5.

Some people think that if a company has a history of discriminating against blacks when making hiring decisions, then they should be required to have an affirmative action program that gives blacks preference in hiring. What do you think? Should companies that have discriminated against blacks have to have an affirmative action program?

1. Yes, they should have to have affirmative action
5. No, they should not have to have affirmative action
7. Other (specify) {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

=====> M5a-M5d ASKED IF P1 IN PRE (RACE)

=====> 1/2 M5 Rs M5a 1st AND M5b 2nd; 1/2 M5 Rs M5b 1st AND M5a 2nd

M5a.

Which would you say is CLOSER to the Democratic Party's position — that companies that have discriminated against blacks should have an affirmative action program, or not? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

1. Yes, they should have to have affirmative action
5. No, they should not have to have affirmative action
7. Other (specify) {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M5b.

Which would you say is CLOSER to the Republican Party's position — that companies

that have discriminated against blacks should have an affirmative action program, or not? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

1. Yes, they should have to have affirmative action
5. No, they should not have to have affirmative action
7. Other (specify) {VOL}

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M5c.

How important is this issue to you personally—VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL?

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M5d.

Has this issue ever made you angry?

1. Yes
5. No

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M6.

How much do you think the federal government should be doing to make sure that women get equal pay for equal work—A LOT, SOME, or NOT MUCH AT ALL?

1. A lot
3. Some
5. Not much at all

D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

=====> M6a–M6d ASKED IF P2 IN PRE (GENDER)

=====> 1/2 M6 Rs M6a 1st AND M6b 2nd; 1/2 M6 Rs M6b 1st AND M6a 2nd

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M6a.

Which would you say is CLOSER to the Democratic Party's position—that the federal government should be doing—A LOT, SOME, or NOT MUCH AT ALL to make sure that women get equal pay for equal work? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

1. A lot
 3. Some
 5. Not much at all
- D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M6b.

Which would you say is CLOSER to the Republican Party's position—that the federal government should be doing—A LOT, SOME, or NOT MUCH AT ALL to make sure that women get equal pay for equal work? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

1. A lot
 3. Some
 5. Not much at all
- D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M6c.

How important is this issue to you personally—VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL?

1. Very important
 3. Somewhat important
 5. Not important at all
- D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M6d.

Has this issue ever made you angry?

1. Yes
 5. No
- D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE "estate tax"; 1/2 SAMPLE "death tax" SAME WORDING USED IN ALL M7 QUESTIONS HAVING THESE OPTIONS

M7b.

There has been a lot of talk recently about doing away with the tax on large inheritances, the so-called "[estate/death] tax". Do you FAVOR or OPPOSE doing away with the [estate/death tax]?

1. Favor
 5. Oppose
 7. Other; depends {VOL}
- D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M7b1.

Do you [favor/oppose] doing away with the [estate/death] tax STRONGLY or NOT STRONGLY?

1. Favor strongly
 2. Favor not strongly
 4. Oppose not strongly
 5. Oppose strongly
- D. Don't know
R. Refuse
N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLES WITH ORDER OF M7c AND M7e RANDOMIZED

M7c.

Which would you say is closer to the Democratic Party's position—that they FAVOR or OPPOSE doing away with the [estate/death] tax? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

1. Favor
 5. Oppose
 7. Other; depends {VOL}
- D. Don't know
R. Refused
N.

M7e.

Which would you say is closer to the Republican Party's position—that they FAVOR or OPPOSE doing away with of the [estate/death] tax? {DO NOT PROBE DON'T KNOW}

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- 1. Favor
- 5. Oppose
- 7. Other; depends {VOL}
- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

M7h.

How important is this issue to you personally—VERY important, SOMEWHAT important or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL?

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M7j.

Has this issue ever made you feel angry?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No
- D. Don't know
- R. Refused
- N.

M9.

Next are a few miscellaneous questions.

M9a.

Do you feel you are asked to pay MORE THAN YOU SHOULD in federal income taxes, about the RIGHT AMOUNT, or LESS THAN YOU SHOULD?

- 1. More than should pay
- 3. About right
- 5. Less than should pay
- 7. Don't pay at all {VOL}
- D. Don't know
- R. Refuse
- N.

=====> 1/2 SAMPLE M9b FIRST AND M9c SECOND; 1/2 SAMPLE M9c FIRST AND M9b SECOND

M9b.

What about rich people? Do you feel rich people are asked to pay MORE THAN THEY SHOULD in federal income taxes, about the RIGHT AMOUNT, or LESS THAN THEY SHOULD?

1. More than should pay
3. About right
5. Less than should pay
7. Don't pay at all {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refuse

N.

M9c.

What about poor people? Do you feel poor people are asked to pay MORE THAN THEY SHOULD in federal income taxes, about the RIGHT AMOUNT, or LESS THAN THEY SHOULD?

1. More than should pay
3. About right
5. Less than should pay
7. Don't pay at all {VOL}

D. Don't know

R. Refuse

N.

M10a.

How worried are you about our country getting into a nuclear war at this time? Are you VERY worried, SOMEWHAT worried, or NOT WORRIED AT ALL?

1. Very worried
3. Somewhat worried
5. Not worried at all

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

M10b.

How worried are you about our country getting into a conventional war at this time,

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one in which nuclear weapons are not used? Are you VERY WORRIED, SOMEWHAT worried, or NOT WORRIED AT ALL?

1. Very worried
3. Somewhat worried
5. Not worried at all

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M10d.

Recently, there has been a lot of talk about campaign finance reform. In general, which of the following statements best represents what you feel about the way political campaigns are financed in this country: it needs to be completely overhauled, it needs major changes, it needs minor changes, or it is basically fine the way it is?

1. Completely overhauled
3. Major changes
5. Minor changes
7. Fine the way it is

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11a.

In America today, some people have BETTER JOBS and HIGHER INCOMES than others do. WHY do you think that is—why do some Americans have better jobs and higher incomes than others do?

OPEN-END

PRE L2a - POST M11c PRE L2b - POST M11d PRE L2c - POST M11a PRE L2d - POST M11b

M11b.

In America today, some people have WORSE JOBS and LOWER INCOMES than others do. WHY do you think that is—why do some Americans have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do?

OPEN-END

M11c.

Next, we'd like to know WHY you think it is, that in America today, some people have BETTER JOBS and HIGHER INCOMES than others do. I'm going to read you some possible explanations, and I want you to tell me how IMPORTANT you think each is.

=====> M11c1–M11c7 reasons for economic inequality items randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders

M11c1.

[The first is:/(Next:)] ‘Because some people have more in-born ability to learn.’ (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn’t true {VOL}

D. Don’t Know
R. Refused
N.

M11c2.

[The first is:/(Next:)] ‘Because discrimination holds some people back.’ (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn’t true {VOL}

D. Don’t Know
R. Refused
N.

M11c3.

[The first is:/(Next:)] ‘Because some people just don’t work as hard.’ (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn’t true {VOL}

D. Don’t Know
R. Refused
N.

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M11c4.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people don't get a chance to get a good education.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11c5.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people just choose low-paying jobs.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11c6.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because government policies have helped high-income workers more.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11c7.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because God made people different from one another.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have better jobs and higher incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11d.

Next, we'd like to know WHY you think it is, that in America today, some people have WORSE JOBS and LOWER INCOMES than others do. I'm going to read you some possible explanations, and I want you to tell me how IMPORTANT you think each is.

=====> M11d1-M11d7 reasons for economic inequality items randomly assigned to 2 sequential orders

M11d1.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people have more in-born ability to learn.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important
5. Not important at all
7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11d2.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because discrimination holds some people back.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

1. Very important
3. Somewhat important

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- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11d3.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people just don't work as hard.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11d4.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people don't get a chance to get a good education.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

D. Don't Know
R. Refused
N.

M11d5.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because some people just choose low-paying jobs.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M11d6.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because government policies have helped high-income workers more.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M11d7.

[The first is:/(Next:)] 'Because God made people different from one another.' (Would you say that this is VERY important, SOMEWHAT important, or NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL as an explanation for why some people have worse jobs and lower incomes than others do ?)

- 1. Very important
- 3. Somewhat important
- 5. Not important at all
- 7. Statement isn't true {VOL}

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M12a.

DURING THE PAST 12 MONTHS, have you worked with other people to deal with some issue facing your community?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

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M12b.

DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, have you telephoned, written a letter to, or visited a government official to express your views on a public issue?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M12c.

DURING THE PAST TWELVE MONTHS, did you attend a meeting about an issue facing your community or schools?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M12d.

Here is a list of some organizations people can belong to. There are labor unions, associations of people who do the same kinds of work, fraternal groups such as Lions or Kiwanis, hobby clubs or sports teams, groups working on political issues, community groups, and school groups. Of course, there are lots of other types of organizations, too. Not counting membership in a local church or synagogue, are you a member of any of these kinds of organizations?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M12e.

Many people are finding it more difficult to make contributions to church or charity as much as they used to. How about you—were you able to contribute any money to church or charity in the LAST 12 MONTHS?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

M12f.

Aside from a strike against your employer, in the PAST TWELVE MONTHS, have you taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local issue?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

N2.

Now I'd like to read you a few statements about public life. I'll read them one at a time. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with each of them.

N2b.

'I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. 'Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?

- 1. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 5. Disagree

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

N2c.

'I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people. ' (Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement)?

- 1. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 5. Disagree

- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

N3.

'So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me

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whether I vote or not.' (Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DIS-AGREE with this statement)?

- 1. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 5. Disagree
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

Q1.

Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with these statements about the government. The first is:

Q1a.

'Public officials don't care much what people like me think. 'Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement?

- 1. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 5. Disagree
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

Q1b.

'People like me don't have any say about what the government does. '(Do you AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, or DISAGREE with this statement)?

- 1. Agree
- 3. Neither agree nor disagree
- 5. Disagree
- D. Don't Know
- R. Refused
- N.

Q2.

We're nearly at the end of the interview now, and have just a few more questions on a couple of topics.

Q3.

People have different ideas about the government in Washington. These ideas don't

refer to Democrats or Republicans in particular, but just to the government in general. We want to see how you feel about these ideas. For example:

Q3a.

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—JUST ABOUT ALWAYS, MOST OF THE TIME, or only SOME OF THE TIME?

1. Just about always
2. Most of the time
3. Only some of the time
4. Never {VOL}

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Q4.

Do you think that people in government waste A LOT of the money we pay in taxes, waste SOME of it, or DON'T WASTE VERY MUCH of it?

1. Waste a lot
3. Waste some
5. Don't waste very much

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Q5.

Would you say the government is pretty much run by A FEW BIG INTERESTS looking out for themselves or that it is run for THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE?

1. Government run by a few big interests
5. Government run for the benefit of all

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Q6.

Do you think that QUITE A FEW of the people running the government are crooked, NOT VERY MANY are, or do you think HARDLY ANY of them are crooked?

1. Quite a few are crooked
3. Not very many are crooked
5. Hardly any are crooked

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D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Q7.

How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what the people think—a GOOD DEAL, SOME, or NOT MUCH?

1. A good deal

3. Some

5. Not much

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

T6.

On the whole, are you SATISFIED, FAIRLY SATISFIED, NOT VERY SATISFIED, or NOT AT ALL SATISFIED with the way democracy works in the United States?

1. Satisfied

2. Fairly satisfied

3. Not very satisfied

4. Not at all satisfied

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

T7a.

When you see the American flag flying does it make you feel EXTREMELY GOOD, VERY GOOD, SOMEWHAT GOOD, or NOT VERY GOOD?

1. Extremely good

2. Very good

3. Somewhat good

4. Not very good

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

T7b.

How strong is your love for your country. . . EXTREMELY STRONG, VERY STRONG, SOMEWHAT STRONG, or NOT VERY STRONG?

1. Extremely Strong
2. Very Strong
4. Somewhat Strong
5. Not Very Strong

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

=====> Y4 ASKED ONLY IF PANEL

Y4.

We'd like to know if you are working now, or are you unemployed, retired, a homemaker, (a student), or what? {MULTIPLE RESPONSES}

1. working now
2. temporarily laid off
3. unemployed
4. retired
5. permanently disabled
6. homemaker
7. student

R. Refused

N.

=====> Y8 ASKED ONLY IF WORKING IN PRE (Y4 FRESH CROSS) OR POST (PANEL Y4)

Y8.

Here are a couple of things people sometimes do as part of their job. After I read each, please tell me whether or not you have done this, DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS, as part of your job.

Y8a.

Have you planned or chaired a meeting (in the last 6 months?)

1. Yes
5. No
7. Not currently employed {VOL}

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Y8b.

Have you given a presentation or speech (in the last 6 months?)

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1. Yes

5. No

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Z1.

Finally, I'd like to ask you a few questions about life in your neighborhood. During the PAST TWELVE MONTHS, have you worked with others from your neighborhood to deal with a common issue or problem?

1. Yes

5. No

D. Don't Know

R. Refused

N.

Z2.

Next some questions about the people you regularly see in your neighborhood. In general, with these people in mind, would you say that they are just looking out for themselves ALL OF THE TIME, MOST OF THE TIME, SOME OF THE TIME, HARDLY EVER, or NEVER?

1. All of the time

2. Most of the time

3. Some of the time

4. Hardly ever

5. Never

D. Don't Know {DO NOT PROBE}

R. Refused {DO NOT PROBE}

N.

Z3a.

Would you say those people you see regularly in your neighborhood try to take advantage of others ALL OF THE TIME, MOST OF THE TIME, SOME OF THE TIME, HARDLY EVER, or NEVER?

1. All of the time

2. Most of the time

3. Some of the time

4. Hardly ever

5. Never

D. Don't Know {DO NOT PROBE}

R. Refused {DO NOT PROBE}

N.

Z3b.

(Again, thinking about those people you see in your neighborhood,) Would you say they treat others with respect ALL OF THE TIME, MOST OF THE TIME, SOME OF THE TIME, HARDLY EVER, or NEVER?

1. All of the time

2. Most of the time

3. Some of the time

4. Hardly ever

5. Never

D. Don't Know {DO NOT PROBE}

R. Refused {DO NOT PROBE}

N.

Z3c.

Would you say that HONEST describes the people in your neighborhood EXTREMELY WELL, QUITE WELL, NOT TOO WELL, or NOT WELL AT ALL?

1. Extremely well

2. Quite well

3. Not too well

4. Not well at all

D. Don't Know {DO NOT PROBE}

R. Refused {DO NOT PROBE}

N.

ZZ4.

R's cooperation was:

1. Very good

2. Good

3. Fair

4. Poor

5. Very poor

N.

ZZ5.

R's general level of information about politics and public affairs seemed:

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1. Very high
2. Fairly high
3. Average
4. Fairly low
5. Very low

N.

ZZ6.

R's apparent intelligence:

1. Very high
2. Fairly high
3. Average
4. Fairly low
5. Very low

N.

ZZ7.

How suspicious did R seem to be about the study before the interview?:

1. Not at all suspicious
3. Somewhat suspicious
5. Very suspicious

N.

ZZ8.

Overall, how great was R's interest in the interview?

1. Very high
2. Fairly high
3. Average
4. Fairly low
5. Very low

N.

ZZ9.

How sincere did R seem to be in his/her answers?

1. Completely sincere
3. Usually sincere
5. Often seemed to be insincere

N.

ZZ9a.

Were there any particular parts of the interview for which you doubted R's sincerity?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No
- N.

ZZ9a1.

{IF SO, NAME THEM BY SECTION OR QUESTION NUMBER}

OPEN-END

ZZ12.

Rs reaction to interview {MULTIPLE MENTIONS}

- 10. Negative—general
- 11. Negative—too long
- 12. Negative—too complicated
- 13. Negative—boring/tedious/repetitious
- 15. R wanted to stop before interview completed. After starting the interview R made comments indicating he/she regretted having agreed to be interviewed
- 20. R complained and/or interviewer observed that R was ill/deaf/tired/had bad eye-sight etc.; interview was obviously hard for R
- 22. R complained and/or interviewer observed that R was confused by questions "couldn't understand the scales"; interview was obviously hard for R
- 30. R expressed (especially repeatedly) doubts/apologies/embarrassment over lack of knowledge or own suitability for interview
- 31. R expressed (especially repeatedly) doubts/apologies/embarrassment over lack of POLITICAL knowledge
- 40. R was agitated or stressed by interview PROCESS
- 41. R became angry at interview CONTENT
- 45. R became concerned about sampling purpose or bias: "why do you come to the old folks home?" "why THIS neighborhood?" "why/why not blacks/Hispanics?" "why me?" etc.
- 70. R appeared to enjoy the interview (R was "cooperative"/"interested"/"pleasant" etc.)
- 80. Neutral or no feedback (1st mention only)

N.

PROB1.

Is there any difficulty administering an interview by phone to this R? {EXAMPLES: hard of hearing, illness that makes it difficult for R to stay on the phone very long, etc.}

- 1 Yes {SPECIFY}
- 5 No

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R. Refused

N.

PROB2.

Is there any reason we should not contact this R again or is there any special care that should be taken when contacting R again? {EXAMPLES: R was threatening or otherwise indicated emphatically that we must never contact him again; R was hostile/drunk/ disoriented/dementia etc.}?

1 Yes {SPECIFY}

5 No

R. Refused

N.

TNAIL1.

PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY AMBIGUOUS OR CONFLICTING SITUATION THAT YOU WANT PROJECT STAFF TO KNOW ABOUT. DESCRIBE ANY PROBLEMS YOU ENCOUNTERED WHILE ADMINISTERING ANY QUESTION OR PORTION OF THE INTERVIEW, OR IN GENERAL

OPEN-END

TNAIL2.

PLEASE PROVIDE A FEW WORDS ABOUT THIS RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD HELP YOU REMEMBER THE INTERVIEW IF YOU HAD TO CALL BACK.

OPEN-END

Source:

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American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU): <http://www.aclu.org>

American Customer Satisfaction Index (University of Michigan Business School): <http://www.bus.umich.edu/research/nqrc/acsi.html>

Annenberg/Pew Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse: <http://www.sla.org/content/Events/conference/2000conf/Confslides/annenburgcd.cfm>

Belgian Federation of Market Research Institutes: <http://www.febelmar.be>

Brookings Institution: <http://www.brook.edu>

Campaign Finance Institute: <http://www.cfinst.org>

Canadian Election Study: <http://www.fas.umontreal.ca/pol/ces-eec/ces.html>

Canadian Opinion Research Archive (Queen's University): <http://www.queensu.ca/cora>

Canalipsos (in French): <http://www.canalipsos.com>

Carnegie Endowment polls: <http://www.ceip.org/files/news/library/poll.htm>

Cato Institute: <http://www.cato.org>

CBS News Polls: <http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/opinion/polls/main500160.shtml>

Center for American Women in Politics (Rutgers University): <http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu>

Center for Budget and Policy Priorities: <http://www.cbpp.org/pubs/socsec.htm>

Center on Hunger and Poverty (Brandeis University): <http://www.centeronhunger.org>

Center on Policy Attitudes: <http://www.policyattitudes.org>

Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP): <http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk>

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Centro de Estudos de Opinião Pública da Universidade de Campinas (Brazil): <http://www.unicamp.br/cesop>

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: <http://www.ccr.org/publications/opinion/opinion.html>

CJ Olson Market Research: <http://www.cjolson.com>

Committee for the Study of the American Electorate: <http://www.gspm.org/csae>

Council of American Survey Research Organizations: <http://www.casro.org>

China Leadership Monitor (Stanford University): <http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org>

The China Quarterly: <http://uk.cambridge.org/journals/cqy>

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences <http://www.cass.net.cn>

Computer-Assisted Survey (University of California–Berkeley): <http://csa.berkeley.edu>

Congressional Budget Office: www.cbo.gov

Council for Excellence in Government: <http://www.excelgov.org>

Data on the Net (University of California at San Diego): <http://odwin.ucsd.edu/idata>

DataFolha: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/datafolha>

Death Penalty Information Center: www.deathpenaltyinfo.org

Dillman's papers: <http://survey.sesrc.wsu.edu/dillman/papers.htm>

Epinet's *Pulse* magazine: <http://www.epinet.org/pulse/pulse.html>

Eurobarometer: http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion

European Consortium for Political Research: <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr>

Eurostat: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat>

FGV Opinião (Brazil): <http://www.cpdoc.fgv.br/fgvopiniaio>

Gallup Organization: <http://www.gallup.com>

General Social Survey: <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS>

Global Barometer: <http://www.globalbarometer.org>

Godbe Research and Analysis: <http://www.godbe.com>

Gonzales/Arcott Research: <http://www.garesearch.com/Poll-directory.htm>

Guia Electoral (Argentina): <http://www.guiaelectoral.com.ar>

Guttman Center, Israeli Democracy Institute: <http://www.idi.org.il>

Harris Associates: <http://www.harrispollonline.com>

Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (Chinese University of Hong Kong): <http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/hkiaps/tell.htm>

Institute for Research in Social Science (University of North Carolina): <http://www.irss.unc.edu>

- Institute for Social Research (University of Michigan): <http://www.isr.umich.edu>
- Institute of Public Policy and Social Research (Michigan State University): <http://www.ippsr.msu.edu>
- Institute of Social and Political Opinion Research: <http://www.kuleuven.ac.be/ispo>
- International Parliamentary Union: <http://www.ipu.org>
- Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (University of Michigan): <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu>
- Israeli Social Science Data Center (Hebrew University): <http://isdc.huji.ac.il>
- Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv University): <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/memoranda>
- Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies: <http://www.jointcenter.org>
- Joint Center for Poverty Research (Northwestern University/University of Chicago): <http://www.jcpr.org>
- Joint Program in Survey Methodology: <http://www.jpsm.umd.edu>
- KAET PBS Station Poll (Arizona State University): <http://www.kaet.asu.edu/horizon/poll>
- Kaiser Family Foundation Surveys: <http://www.kff.org/sections.cgi?section=opinion>
- Key's Personal Papers (John F. Kennedy Library, National Archives and Records Administration): http://www.jfklibrary.org/fa_key.html
- Keystone Poll (Millersville University): <http://www.millersv.edu/%7Eopinion>
- Krosnick's website: <http://www.psy.ohio-state.edu/social/krosnick.htm>
- Latinobarometer: <http://www.latinobarometro.org>
- League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC): <http://www.lulac.org>
- Lippman biographies: <http://www.americanwriters.org/writers/lippmann.asp>; <http://home.att.net/~quotesexchange/walterlippmann.html>
- Los Angeles Times* Polls: <http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/POLLS>
- Lucker's website: <http://junior.apk.net/~vokey/vok>
- Magellan Research: <http://www.magresearch.com>
- Marist Institute for Public Opinion (Marist College): <http://www.mipo.marist.edu>
- Mason-Dixon News Media Polls: <http://www.mason-dixon.com>
- La Nación* (Argentina): <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>
- National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials: <http://www.naleo.org>
- National Council on Public Polls: <http://www.ncpp.org>
- National Election Studies (University of Michigan): <http://www.umich.edu/~nes>
- National Network of State Polls (University of North Carolina): <http://www.unc.edu/depts/nnspp/nnspp.htm>

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- National Opinion Research Center (University of Chicago): <http://www.norc.uchicago.edu>
- New York Times*/CBS News Polls: <http://www.nytimes.com/library/politics/newspoll.html>
- Norwegian Social Science Data Service: <http://www.nsd.uib.no>
- Nueva Mayoría (South America): <http://www.nuevamayoria.com/ES>
- Office of Survey Research (University of Texas): <http://www.utexas.edu/coc/osr>
- Partnership for Trust in Government: <http://www.trustingov.org>
- Pew Research Center for the People and the Press: <http://people-press.org>
- Planned Parenthood Federation of America: <http://www.plannedparenthood.com>
- Point d'appui Interuniversitaire sur l'Opinion publique et la Politique (PIOP): <http://www.spri.ucl.ac.be/piop>
- The Polling Report: <http://www.pollingreport.com>
- Polling the Nations (University of Michigan): <http://poll.orpub.com>
- Presidential Job Performance Ratings (Roper Center): http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/roperweb/PresJobRatings40/PresJobRatings40.htm;start=HS_presapproval_home
- Princeton Survey Research Center: <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Epsrc>
- Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA): <http://www.pipa.org>
- Public Agenda: <http://www.publicagenda.org>
- Public Opinion and Survey Research (University of British Columbia): <http://www.library.ubc.ca/poli/cpwebop.html>
- Public Opinion Foundation (Russia): <http://www.fom.ru>
- Public Opinion on Federal Legislation (University of Michigan): <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/opinion.html>
- Public Opinion Poll Question Database (University of North Carolina): http://www.irss.unc.edu/data_archive/pollsearch.html
- Public Opinion Programme (University of Hong Kong): <http://hkupop.hku.hk>
- Public Opinion Quarterly* (University of Michigan): <http://www.jstor.org/journals/0033362X.html>
- Public Opinion Strategies: <http://www.pos.org>
- Public Policy Institute of California: <http://www.ppic.org/publications/calsurvey/balda.pref.html>
- Quinnipiac College Polling Institute (Connecticut): <http://www.quinnipiac.edu/polls>
- Research and Survey Programme (Lingnan University, Hong Kong): <http://www.ln.edu.hk/rsp>
- Rhode Island Public Opinion Report (Brown University): http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Taubman_Center/por/10_97/por1097.html
- Robert Wood Johnson Foundation: <http://www.rwjf.org/index.jsp>

Roper Center for Public Opinion Research (University of Connecticut): <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu>

Russia Votes: <http://www.russiamvotes.org>

Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (VCIOM): <http://www.vciom.ru>

Social Security Administration: <http://www.ssa.gov>

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Bureau of Justice Statistics): www.albany.edu/sourcebook

Southern Opinion Research (*Birmingham News/Huntsville Times/Mobile Register*): <http://www.southernopinion.com>

Southern Poverty Law Center: <http://www.splcenter.org>

Statistical Assessment Service: <http://www.stats.org/index.html>

Statistics Norway: <http://www.ssb.no>

Summer Institute in Survey Research Techniques: <http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/si>

Tomas Rivera Policy Institute: <http://www.trpi.org>

United Nations Association: <http://www.unausa.org>

Universidad Simón Bolívar (Caracas, Venezuela): <http://www.ce.usb.ve>

University of Michigan Documents Center: <http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/stats.html>

University of Oklahoma polling links: <http://www.ou.edu/cas/psc/linkspubopinion.htm>

U.S. Census Bureau (presidential election tables): <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/voting/vote-htabtcon.html>

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: <http://aspe.hhs.gov>

U.S. Department of State International Information Programs: <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/race/affirm>

U.S. Presidential Election Atlas: <http://www.uselectionatlas.org>

USA Today/CNN/Gallup Polls: <http://www.usatoday.com/news/polldex.htm>

Vanishing Voter (Harvard University): <http://www.vanishingvoter.org>

Wall Street Journal/NBC News Polls: <http://interactive.wsj.com/edition/resources/documents/pollhome.htm>

Washington Post polls: <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/vault.htm>

The White House Project: <http://thewhitehouseproject.org>

World Association for Public Opinion Research: <http://www.unl.edu/WAPOR>

Worldviews: <http://www.worldviews.org>

Yale University polling links: <http://www.library.yale.edu/socsci/opinion/polling-organizations.html>

Zogby International: <http://www.zogby.com/news/home.htm>

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